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Dataset card Data Studio Files
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$6$BqXRBsRiiIMI6WE$RT68NjgvLlxxxjgNJ80d1mLjm0NWuXXX6z35a4oKcu7.Sos
p.serial : PZB00XXX
< press down for more ... >
Additionally Infotool lets you modify as well:
Kapsch >> Info Tool
----------------------
[ Change Settings ]
< EEPROM Editor
< EEPROM Add Key
< EEPROM Delete Key
And second is eeprom_tool.
A bonus is the eeprom_write_enable.sh in case you accidentally disable write
or the unit you acquired had write disabled (the 6 I have do not)
--[ 5.3 - Lack of SPI Protected Ranges Enables Unauthorized Flash
Modification - CVE-2025-25735
This vulnerability affects both the 9160 and 9260 RSUs and is a result of
missing access controls. You can view this as the software/userspace side
of section 6.1. SPI Protected Range Registers (PRRs) are not set, meaning
there is no software-based restriction preventing unauthorized SPI flash
modifications. The system doesn't prevent runtime modifications to critical
firmware. Ultimately this allows firmware tampering at runtime for the
same regions as in 6.1. Additionally, it allows malware to disable security
features before reboot.
No need to rehash what I covered in 4.2 and 6.1, so here's the Chipsec
output confirming this vulnerability:
[*] FRAP = 0x0000FFFF << SPI Flash Regions Access Permissions Register
(SPIBAR + 0x50)
[00] BRRA = FF << BIOS Region Read Access
[08] BRWA = FF << BIOS Region Write Access
[*] Software access to SPI flash regions: read = 0xFF, write = 0xFF
--[ 5.4 - Improper Access Control in EFI Boot Environment Allows Persistent
Firmware Modification - CVE-2025-25734
This vulnerability affects both the 9160 and 9260 RSUs and is a result of
missing access controls. Specifically, Secure Boot UEFI variables are
protected BUT Secure Boot is disabled. So no problem if I can't modify them.
I think the attack path leveraging this is very obvious: Secure Boot is
disabled, so the BIOS allows execution of unsigned bootloaders and OS
kernels. This vulnerability is especially helpful, as it made getting access
to the EOS/Userspace trivial.
Relevant Chipsec output:
[*] Secure Boot appears to be disabled
[+] PASSED: All Secure Boot UEFI variables are protected
--[ 5.5 - Improper SMM Lock Configuration Enables Unauthorized System
Management Mode (SMM) Modification
- CVE-2025-25738
The UEFI menu shows SMM Lock = Disabled. This control locks SMRAM to
prevent non-SMM code from modifying SMM handlers. With it disabled,
a kernel privileged attacker can alter SMM handlers and gain SMM
code execution, which operates outside the OS and hypervisor.
This significantly raises the risk of stealthy compromise.
However, persistence across reboots requires separate weaknesses
or bypasses in firmware write-protection (BLE/BIOSWE, SMM_BWP).
SMM Lock alone does not ensure persistent firmware infection,
and OS based tools generally cannot inspect SMRAM.
Screenshot from UEFI menu Confirming SMM Lock is disabled linked below:
https://github.com/GainS…ock-Disabled.png
--[ 5.6 - Unauthorized ADB Root Shell Access to Cellular Modem
- CVE-2025-25736
Now we're into even more low hanging fruit territory. This vulnerability
only affects 9260 RSUs aka the CV2X units, as the 9160s do not have an
LTE modem.
From the local access approach, platform-tools including adb are installed
at /mnt/c3platpersistent/opt/platform-tools/. You can just start an adb
shell and you'll have root access to the modem. If the c3platpersistent
partition isn't automatically mounted (I ran into that on only one of the
units) you should first run lsblk, fdisk -l or whatever other way you want
to find the proper partition, then mount it. Now you should have access to
it. Alternatively, the RSUs all had debs on them which can be installed via
the kpdkg (kapsh dpkg) command. The .deb that includes platform-tools is
kapsch-persistence_1.1-beta-USDoT-QualcommCCA.deb.
Full command: kdpkg -i kapsch-persistence_1.1-beta-USDoT-QualcommCCA.deb
Now it's accessible.
Alternatively with physical access, you can just plug into the microUSB
port on the modem and adb shell.