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PS C:\Android\Sdk\platform-tools> .\adb.exe devices
* daemon not running; starting now at tcp:5037
* daemon started successfully
List of devices attached
91dc4XXX
device
PS C:\Android\Sdk\platform-tools> .\adb.exe shell
sh-3.2#
whoami
root
sh-3.2# ls -lha
total 8
drwxr-xr-x 23 root root 1.8K Aug 16 2018 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 224 Aug 16 2018 ..
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 1.8K Aug 16 2018 WEBSERVER
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 15.6K Aug 16 2018 bin
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 1.8K Aug 16 2018 boot
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 160 Aug 16 2018 build.prop
drwxr-xr-x 9 root root 3.9K Jun 19 07:43 cache
drwxrwxr-x 19 root root 7.0K Jun 19 07:43 data
drwxr-xr-x 5 root root 5.0K Aug 16 2018 dev
drwxrwxr-x 35 root root 7.0K Aug 16 2018 etc
drwxrwxr-x 5 43514 200 360 Jul 1 2018 firmware
--[ 5.7 - Weak or Unset Default BIOS Supervisor/User Passwords Allow
Unauthorized Firmware Access - CVE-2025-25737
Yeah... this one might just be petty? Idk, here you go. This vulnerability
affects both the 9160 and 9260 RSUs and is a result of misconfigurations.
I found it within both the new and used units. By default, the Phoenix
SecureCore BIOS has a password policy requiring just 1 character. More
importantly, the Phoenix SecureCore BIOS, by default, has both the User
& Supervisor passwords unset. Again, if either of these passwords were
set, it'd be a lot more annoying to get started poking at these units.
Another thing to note, TPM is supported but not detected.
Here's the relevant output:
Phoenix SecureCore Technology Setup
----------------------------------------------------
Main Advanced Security Boot Exit
----------------------------------------------------
Supervisor Password is: Cleared
User Password is: Cleared
Set Supervisor Password [Enter]
Supervisor Hint String [ ]
Set User Password [Enter]
User Hint String [ ]
Min. password length [ 1 ]
Authenticate User on Boot [Disabled]
HDD Security Status No HDD detected
Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
----------------------------------------------------
Item Specific Help
----------------------------------------------------
Set or clear the
Supervisor account's
password.
----------------------------------------------------
F1 Help ↑↓ Select Item +/- Change Values
Esc Exit
◇ Select Menu Enter Select > Sub-Menu
F9 Setup Defaults
F10 Save and Exit
----------------------------------------------------
--[ 6 - Phase 2: Onto the (C)V2X Client/Server Stack
--[ 6.1 - Can I have some more?
At this point it is easy to tell that there is still so much to this
embedded device to hack. I haven't even figured out what that second RJ45
port is for, I haven't determined what all the holes and pads are for.
I haven't soldered a second USB port to the proper pads. I haven't explored
custom bridge boards, or even delved very deep into the LTE modem (although
I have confirmed it has default passwords and web services set up). I
haven't messed with the boot over LAN or mSata port.
I think the point is clear, just at a high level there is so much more to
explore. And I definitely plan to but not within the next phase of my
reverse engineering. This is both a curse and a blessing. These devices
are fairly new and are such dark holes, that there is so much untapped
potential to hack 'em all.
--[ 6.2 Android/iOS Applications