id stringlengths 24 24 | question stringlengths 1 270 | answer stringlengths 1 239 | documents listlengths 1 1 |
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573337db4776f4190066079a | What percent of mortgages purchased by Citigroup in 2006 were defective? | 60% | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nTestimony given to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission by Richard M. Bowen III on events during his tenure as the Business Chief Underwriter for Correspondent Lending in the Consumer Lending Group for Citigroup (where he was responsible for over 220 professional underwrit... |
573337db4776f4190066079b | In 2006, how many mortgage companies were contractually responsible to meet Citi's standards? | 1,600 | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nTestimony given to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission by Richard M. Bowen III on events during his tenure as the Business Chief Underwriter for Correspondent Lending in the Consumer Lending Group for Citigroup (where he was responsible for over 220 professional underwrit... |
573337db4776f4190066079c | During 2007, what was the percent of defective mortgages not underwritten to Citi's standards? | over 80% | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nTestimony given to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission by Richard M. Bowen III on events during his tenure as the Business Chief Underwriter for Correspondent Lending in the Consumer Lending Group for Citigroup (where he was responsible for over 220 professional underwrit... |
5733399bd058e614000b5794 | Who was the largest residential loan due diligence and securitization surveillance company? | Clayton Holdings | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nIn separate testimony to Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, officers of Clayton Holdings—the largest residential loan due diligence and securitization surveillance company in the United States and Europe—testified that Clayton's review of over 900,000 mortgages issued from ... |
5733399bd058e614000b5795 | According to Clayton Holdings, how many mortgages issued from January 2006 to June 2007 met underwriting standards? | 54% | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nIn separate testimony to Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, officers of Clayton Holdings—the largest residential loan due diligence and securitization surveillance company in the United States and Europe—testified that Clayton's review of over 900,000 mortgages issued from ... |
5733399bd058e614000b5796 | How many investment and commercial banks were included in Clayton Holdings' analysis of January 2006 to June 2007 loans? | 23 | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nIn separate testimony to Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, officers of Clayton Holdings—the largest residential loan due diligence and securitization surveillance company in the United States and Europe—testified that Clayton's review of over 900,000 mortgages issued from ... |
5733399bd058e614000b5797 | Per Clayton's analysis of loans issued from January 2006 to June 2007, what percent of loans did not meet minimal standards of any issuer? | 28% | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nIn separate testimony to Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, officers of Clayton Holdings—the largest residential loan due diligence and securitization surveillance company in the United States and Europe—testified that Clayton's review of over 900,000 mortgages issued from ... |
5733399bd058e614000b5798 | How many mortgage loans did Clayton Holdings review in their analysis? | 900,000 | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nIn separate testimony to Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, officers of Clayton Holdings—the largest residential loan due diligence and securitization surveillance company in the United States and Europe—testified that Clayton's review of over 900,000 mortgages issued from ... |
57333ba64776f419006607ac | What is the name for lending that entices borrowers to enter into unsafe secured loans? | Predatory lending | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nPredatory lending refers to the practice of unscrupulous lenders, enticing borrowers to enter into \"unsafe\" or \"unsound\" secured loans for inappropriate purposes. A classic bait-and-switch method was used by Countrywide Financial, advertising low interest rates for home r... |
57333ba64776f419006607ad | What company used a classic bait-and-switch method by advertising low interest rates? | Countrywide Financial | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nPredatory lending refers to the practice of unscrupulous lenders, enticing borrowers to enter into \"unsafe\" or \"unsound\" secured loans for inappropriate purposes. A classic bait-and-switch method was used by Countrywide Financial, advertising low interest rates for home r... |
57333ba64776f419006607ae | Which type loan would the consumer be put into instead of the 1% or 1.5% interest rate loan as advertised? | adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nPredatory lending refers to the practice of unscrupulous lenders, enticing borrowers to enter into \"unsafe\" or \"unsound\" secured loans for inappropriate purposes. A classic bait-and-switch method was used by Countrywide Financial, advertising low interest rates for home r... |
57333ba64776f419006607af | What was created when the interest charged was greater than the amount of interest paid? | negative amortization | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nPredatory lending refers to the practice of unscrupulous lenders, enticing borrowers to enter into \"unsafe\" or \"unsound\" secured loans for inappropriate purposes. A classic bait-and-switch method was used by Countrywide Financial, advertising low interest rates for home r... |
57333ba64776f419006607b0 | What type predatory lending method did Countrywide Financial use? | classic bait-and-switch | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nPredatory lending refers to the practice of unscrupulous lenders, enticing borrowers to enter into \"unsafe\" or \"unsound\" secured loans for inappropriate purposes. A classic bait-and-switch method was used by Countrywide Financial, advertising low interest rates for home r... |
57333da94776f419006607be | Who sued Countrywide for unfair business practices and false advertising? | California Attorney General Jerry Brown | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nCountrywide, sued by California Attorney General Jerry Brown for \"unfair business practices\" and \"false advertising\" was making high cost mortgages \"to homeowners with weak credit, adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) that allowed homeowners to make interest-only payments\".... |
57333da94776f419006607bf | What type mortgages allowed homeowners to make interest-only payments? | adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nCountrywide, sued by California Attorney General Jerry Brown for \"unfair business practices\" and \"false advertising\" was making high cost mortgages \"to homeowners with weak credit, adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) that allowed homeowners to make interest-only payments\".... |
57333da94776f419006607c0 | What happened to home equity when housing prices decreased? | disappeared | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nCountrywide, sued by California Attorney General Jerry Brown for \"unfair business practices\" and \"false advertising\" was making high cost mortgages \"to homeowners with weak credit, adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) that allowed homeowners to make interest-only payments\".... |
57333da94776f419006607c1 | Who made the decision to seize Countrywide after their financial condition deteriorated? | Office of Thrift Supervision | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nCountrywide, sued by California Attorney General Jerry Brown for \"unfair business practices\" and \"false advertising\" was making high cost mortgages \"to homeowners with weak credit, adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) that allowed homeowners to make interest-only payments\".... |
57333da94776f419006607c2 | What type credit did borrowers obtaining mortgages from Countrywide have? | weak credit | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nCountrywide, sued by California Attorney General Jerry Brown for \"unfair business practices\" and \"false advertising\" was making high cost mortgages \"to homeowners with weak credit, adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) that allowed homeowners to make interest-only payments\".... |
57333f7dd058e614000b57c8 | What economist believed that regulations did not keep up with financial innovation? | Paul Krugman | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nCritics such as economist Paul Krugman and U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner have argued that the regulatory framework did not keep pace with financial innovation, such as the increasing importance of the shadow banking system, derivatives and off-balance sheet financi... |
57333f7dd058e614000b57c9 | Who was the U.S. Treasury Secretary dealing with the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007? | Timothy Geithner | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nCritics such as economist Paul Krugman and U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner have argued that the regulatory framework did not keep pace with financial innovation, such as the increasing importance of the shadow banking system, derivatives and off-balance sheet financi... |
57333f7dd058e614000b57ca | Which group's study suggested that Basel accords encourage unconventional business practices? | OECD | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nCritics such as economist Paul Krugman and U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner have argued that the regulatory framework did not keep pace with financial innovation, such as the increasing importance of the shadow banking system, derivatives and off-balance sheet financi... |
57333f7dd058e614000b57cb | It has been argued that what did not keep up with financial innovation? | regulatory framework | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nCritics such as economist Paul Krugman and U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner have argued that the regulatory framework did not keep pace with financial innovation, such as the increasing importance of the shadow banking system, derivatives and off-balance sheet financi... |
57333f7dd058e614000b57cc | What accords possibly contributed to or reinforced the financial crisis? | Basel | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nCritics such as economist Paul Krugman and U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner have argued that the regulatory framework did not keep pace with financial innovation, such as the increasing importance of the shadow banking system, derivatives and off-balance sheet financi... |
573342a9d058e614000b57f0 | What did financial institutions do prior to the crisis? | became highly leveraged | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nPrior to the crisis, financial institutions became highly leveraged, increasing their appetite for risky investments and reducing their resilience in case of losses. Much of this leverage was achieved using complex financial instruments such as off-balance sheet securitizatio... |
573342a9d058e614000b57f1 | What type financial instruments are off-balance sheet securitization and derivatives? | complex | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nPrior to the crisis, financial institutions became highly leveraged, increasing their appetite for risky investments and reducing their resilience in case of losses. Much of this leverage was achieved using complex financial instruments such as off-balance sheet securitizatio... |
573342a9d058e614000b57f2 | Who bailed out financial institutions? | government | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nPrior to the crisis, financial institutions became highly leveraged, increasing their appetite for risky investments and reducing their resilience in case of losses. Much of this leverage was achieved using complex financial instruments such as off-balance sheet securitizatio... |
573342a9d058e614000b57f3 | Which option was nearly impossible for financial institutions to reorganize under? | bankruptcy | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nPrior to the crisis, financial institutions became highly leveraged, increasing their appetite for risky investments and reducing their resilience in case of losses. Much of this leverage was achieved using complex financial instruments such as off-balance sheet securitizatio... |
573342a9d058e614000b57f4 | What are the type financial instruments that were difficult for creditors and regulators to monitor? | complex financial instruments | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nPrior to the crisis, financial institutions became highly leveraged, increasing their appetite for risky investments and reducing their resilience in case of losses. Much of this leverage was achieved using complex financial instruments such as off-balance sheet securitizatio... |
5733450ed058e614000b580e | How many U.S. investment banks significantly increased their financial leverage from 2004 to 2007? | five | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nFrom 2004 to 2007, the top five U.S. investment banks each significantly increased their financial leverage (see diagram), which increased their vulnerability to a financial shock. Changes in capital requirements, intended to keep U.S. banks competitive with their European co... |
5733450ed058e614000b580f | U.S. investment banks Increased their financial leverage and also increased their vulnerability to what? | financial shock | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nFrom 2004 to 2007, the top five U.S. investment banks each significantly increased their financial leverage (see diagram), which increased their vulnerability to a financial shock. Changes in capital requirements, intended to keep U.S. banks competitive with their European co... |
5733450ed058e614000b5810 | Changes in what intended to keep U.S. banks competitive with their European counterparts? | capital requirements | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nFrom 2004 to 2007, the top five U.S. investment banks each significantly increased their financial leverage (see diagram), which increased their vulnerability to a financial shock. Changes in capital requirements, intended to keep U.S. banks competitive with their European co... |
5733450ed058e614000b5811 | How much debt did the top five U.S. investment banks report in fiscal year 2007? | over $4.1 trillion | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nFrom 2004 to 2007, the top five U.S. investment banks each significantly increased their financial leverage (see diagram), which increased their vulnerability to a financial shock. Changes in capital requirements, intended to keep U.S. banks competitive with their European co... |
5733450ed058e614000b5812 | What financial institution went bankrupt and was liquidated in 2007? | Lehman Brothers | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nFrom 2004 to 2007, the top five U.S. investment banks each significantly increased their financial leverage (see diagram), which increased their vulnerability to a financial shock. Changes in capital requirements, intended to keep U.S. banks competitive with their European co... |
573346cc4776f419006607ec | What is an example of something that can be detrimental if too many individuals pursue the same behavior? | saving more during adverse economic conditions | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nBehavior that may be optimal for an individual (e.g., saving more during adverse economic conditions) can be detrimental if too many individuals pursue the same behavior, as ultimately one person's consumption is another person's income. Too many consumers attempting to save ... |
573346cc4776f419006607ed | What is it called when too many consumers attempt to save or pay down debt at the same time? | paradox of thrift | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nBehavior that may be optimal for an individual (e.g., saving more during adverse economic conditions) can be detrimental if too many individuals pursue the same behavior, as ultimately one person's consumption is another person's income. Too many consumers attempting to save ... |
573346cc4776f419006607ee | What will happen if too many consumers save or pay down debt simultaneously? | can cause or deepen a recession | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nBehavior that may be optimal for an individual (e.g., saving more during adverse economic conditions) can be detrimental if too many individuals pursue the same behavior, as ultimately one person's consumption is another person's income. Too many consumers attempting to save ... |
573346cc4776f419006607ef | Who is the economist who described a "paradox of deleveraging"? | Hyman Minsky | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nBehavior that may be optimal for an individual (e.g., saving more during adverse economic conditions) can be detrimental if too many individuals pursue the same behavior, as ultimately one person's consumption is another person's income. Too many consumers attempting to save ... |
573346cc4776f419006607f0 | Financial institutions cannot all de-leverage simultaneously without a decline in the value of this? | their assets | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nBehavior that may be optimal for an individual (e.g., saving more during adverse economic conditions) can be detrimental if too many individuals pursue the same behavior, as ultimately one person's consumption is another person's income. Too many consumers attempting to save ... |
57334868d058e614000b5822 | Who was the U.S. Federal Reserve vice-chair in April 2009? | Janet Yellen | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nDuring April 2009, U.S. Federal Reserve vice-chair Janet Yellen discussed these paradoxes: \"Once this massive credit crunch hit, it didn’t take long before we were in a recession. The recession, in turn, deepened the credit crunch as demand and employment fell, and credit lo... |
57334868d058e614000b5823 | What happened soon after the massive credit crunch hit? | we were in a recession | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nDuring April 2009, U.S. Federal Reserve vice-chair Janet Yellen discussed these paradoxes: \"Once this massive credit crunch hit, it didn’t take long before we were in a recession. The recession, in turn, deepened the credit crunch as demand and employment fell, and credit lo... |
57334868d058e614000b5824 | What deepened the credit crunch when demand and employment fell? | recession | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nDuring April 2009, U.S. Federal Reserve vice-chair Janet Yellen discussed these paradoxes: \"Once this massive credit crunch hit, it didn’t take long before we were in a recession. The recession, in turn, deepened the credit crunch as demand and employment fell, and credit lo... |
57334868d058e614000b5825 | What was one of the actions businesses took to preserve cash? | cancelling planned investments | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nDuring April 2009, U.S. Federal Reserve vice-chair Janet Yellen discussed these paradoxes: \"Once this massive credit crunch hit, it didn’t take long before we were in a recession. The recession, in turn, deepened the credit crunch as demand and employment fell, and credit lo... |
57334868d058e614000b5826 | What occurred in nearly every corner of the economy after the financial crisis of 2007? | balance sheet deleveraging | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nDuring April 2009, U.S. Federal Reserve vice-chair Janet Yellen discussed these paradoxes: \"Once this massive credit crunch hit, it didn’t take long before we were in a recession. The recession, in turn, deepened the credit crunch as demand and employment fell, and credit lo... |
573349f34776f41900660800 | What term refers to the ongoing development of financial products? | financial innovation | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nThe term financial innovation refers to the ongoing development of financial products designed to achieve particular client objectives, such as offsetting a particular risk exposure (such as the default of a borrower) or to assist with obtaining financing. Examples pertinent ... |
573349f34776f41900660801 | What is an example of financial innovation pertinent to the financial crisis? | adjustable-rate mortgage | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nThe term financial innovation refers to the ongoing development of financial products designed to achieve particular client objectives, such as offsetting a particular risk exposure (such as the default of a borrower) or to assist with obtaining financing. Examples pertinent ... |
573349f34776f41900660802 | What is the abbreviation for a form of credit insurance called credit default swaps? | CDS | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nThe term financial innovation refers to the ongoing development of financial products designed to achieve particular client objectives, such as offsetting a particular risk exposure (such as the default of a borrower) or to assist with obtaining financing. Examples pertinent ... |
573349f34776f41900660803 | What is the financial innovation that bundles subprime mortgages? | mortgage-backed securities (MBS) | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nThe term financial innovation refers to the ongoing development of financial products designed to achieve particular client objectives, such as offsetting a particular risk exposure (such as the default of a borrower) or to assist with obtaining financing. Examples pertinent ... |
573349f34776f41900660804 | What happened to the usage of financial innovation products in the years leading up the financial crisis? | expanded dramatically | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nThe term financial innovation refers to the ongoing development of financial products designed to achieve particular client objectives, such as offsetting a particular risk exposure (such as the default of a borrower) or to assist with obtaining financing. Examples pertinent ... |
57334b0b4776f4190066080a | When did the issuance of CDO peak? | Q1 2007 | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nCDO issuance grew from an estimated $20 billion in Q1 2004 to its peak of over $180 billion by Q1 2007, then declined back under $20 billion by Q1 2008. Further, the credit quality of CDO's declined from 2000 to 2007, as the level of subprime and other non-prime mortgage debt... |
57334b0b4776f4190066080b | What was the estimated value of CDO issuance in Q1 2004? | $20 billion | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nCDO issuance grew from an estimated $20 billion in Q1 2004 to its peak of over $180 billion by Q1 2007, then declined back under $20 billion by Q1 2008. Further, the credit quality of CDO's declined from 2000 to 2007, as the level of subprime and other non-prime mortgage debt... |
57334b0b4776f4190066080c | What was the estimated value of CDO issuance at it's peak in Q1 2007? | over $180 billion | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nCDO issuance grew from an estimated $20 billion in Q1 2004 to its peak of over $180 billion by Q1 2007, then declined back under $20 billion by Q1 2008. Further, the credit quality of CDO's declined from 2000 to 2007, as the level of subprime and other non-prime mortgage debt... |
57334b0b4776f4190066080d | What percent of CDO assets were subprime and other non-prime mortgage debt in 2007? | 36% | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nCDO issuance grew from an estimated $20 billion in Q1 2004 to its peak of over $180 billion by Q1 2007, then declined back under $20 billion by Q1 2008. Further, the credit quality of CDO's declined from 2000 to 2007, as the level of subprime and other non-prime mortgage debt... |
57334b0b4776f4190066080e | What was the estimated value of CDO issuance in Q1 2008? | under $20 billion | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nCDO issuance grew from an estimated $20 billion in Q1 2004 to its peak of over $180 billion by Q1 2007, then declined back under $20 billion by Q1 2008. Further, the credit quality of CDO's declined from 2000 to 2007, as the level of subprime and other non-prime mortgage debt... |
57334d024776f41900660814 | Which products created more complexity in the financial markets? | innovative financial products | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nThis boom in innovative financial products went hand in hand with more complexity. It multiplied the number of actors connected to a single mortgage (including mortgage brokers, specialized originators, the securitizers and their due diligence firms, managing agents and tradi... |
57334d024776f41900660815 | What effect did the introduction of innovative financial products have on a single mortgage? | multiplied the number of actors connected | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nThis boom in innovative financial products went hand in hand with more complexity. It multiplied the number of actors connected to a single mortgage (including mortgage brokers, specialized originators, the securitizers and their due diligence firms, managing agents and tradi... |
57334d024776f41900660816 | What did institutions rely more on as increasing distance from underlying assets occurred? | indirect information | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nThis boom in innovative financial products went hand in hand with more complexity. It multiplied the number of actors connected to a single mortgage (including mortgage brokers, specialized originators, the securitizers and their due diligence firms, managing agents and tradi... |
57334d024776f41900660817 | What is a type of indirect information that financial institutions and investors used to judge the risk? | computer models of rating agencies | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nThis boom in innovative financial products went hand in hand with more complexity. It multiplied the number of actors connected to a single mortgage (including mortgage brokers, specialized originators, the securitizers and their due diligence firms, managing agents and tradi... |
57334d024776f41900660818 | In what year did a group of computer scientists build a model for ratings produced by rating agencies that turned out to be accurate for what happened in 2006-2008? | 2005 | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nThis boom in innovative financial products went hand in hand with more complexity. It multiplied the number of actors connected to a single mortgage (including mortgage brokers, specialized originators, the securitizers and their due diligence firms, managing agents and tradi... |
57334ed54776f41900660828 | What is a measurement of pricing of risk? | interest rates or fees | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nThe pricing of risk refers to the incremental compensation required by investors for taking on additional risk, which may be measured by interest rates or fees. Several scholars have argued that a lack of transparency about banks' risk exposures prevented markets from correct... |
57334ed54776f41900660829 | What is the incremental compensation required by investors for taking on addition risk called? | pricing of risk | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nThe pricing of risk refers to the incremental compensation required by investors for taking on additional risk, which may be measured by interest rates or fees. Several scholars have argued that a lack of transparency about banks' risk exposures prevented markets from correct... |
57334ed54776f4190066082a | According to several scholars, what prevented markets from correctly pricing risk before the crisis? | lack of transparency about banks' risk exposures | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nThe pricing of risk refers to the incremental compensation required by investors for taking on additional risk, which may be measured by interest rates or fees. Several scholars have argued that a lack of transparency about banks' risk exposures prevented markets from correct... |
57334ed54776f4190066082b | How should risk levels have been disclosed according to several scholars? | straightforward, readily understandable format | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nThe pricing of risk refers to the incremental compensation required by investors for taking on additional risk, which may be measured by interest rates or fees. Several scholars have argued that a lack of transparency about banks' risk exposures prevented markets from correct... |
57334ed54776f4190066082c | What was the outcome of the financial crisis since risk levels were not adequately disclosed? | far more disruptive | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nThe pricing of risk refers to the incremental compensation required by investors for taking on additional risk, which may be measured by interest rates or fees. Several scholars have argued that a lack of transparency about banks' risk exposures prevented markets from correct... |
57335048d058e614000b5836 | What did market participants fail to measure accurately? | risk inherent with financial innovation | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nFor a variety of reasons, market participants did not accurately measure the risk inherent with financial innovation such as MBS and CDOs or understand its impact on the overall stability of the financial system. For example, the pricing model for CDOs clearly did not reflect... |
57335048d058e614000b5837 | What are the reasons market participants did not understand the impact financial innovation products would have? | a variety of reasons | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nFor a variety of reasons, market participants did not accurately measure the risk inherent with financial innovation such as MBS and CDOs or understand its impact on the overall stability of the financial system. For example, the pricing model for CDOs clearly did not reflect... |
57335048d058e614000b5838 | How much did JPMorgan estimate was the average recovery rate for high quality CDOs that had been liquidated? | approximately 32 cents on the dollar | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nFor a variety of reasons, market participants did not accurately measure the risk inherent with financial innovation such as MBS and CDOs or understand its impact on the overall stability of the financial system. For example, the pricing model for CDOs clearly did not reflect... |
57335048d058e614000b5839 | How much did JPMorgan estimate was the average recovery rate for mezzanine CDOs that had been liquidated? | approximately five cents for every dollar | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nFor a variety of reasons, market participants did not accurately measure the risk inherent with financial innovation such as MBS and CDOs or understand its impact on the overall stability of the financial system. For example, the pricing model for CDOs clearly did not reflect... |
57335048d058e614000b583a | How much did banks estimate was the value of CDOs sold between late 2005 to the middle of 2007? | $450bn | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nFor a variety of reasons, market participants did not accurately measure the risk inherent with financial innovation such as MBS and CDOs or understand its impact on the overall stability of the financial system. For example, the pricing model for CDOs clearly did not reflect... |
57335128d058e614000b584a | What firm insured obligations of various financial institutions using credit default swaps? | AIG | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nAnother example relates to AIG, which insured obligations of various financial institutions through the usage of credit default swaps. The basic CDS transaction involved AIG receiving a premium in exchange for a promise to pay money to party A in the event party B defaulted. ... |
57335128d058e614000b584b | What does the abbreviation CDS stand for? | credit default swaps | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nAnother example relates to AIG, which insured obligations of various financial institutions through the usage of credit default swaps. The basic CDS transaction involved AIG receiving a premium in exchange for a promise to pay money to party A in the event party B defaulted. ... |
57335128d058e614000b584c | When did the government take over AIG? | September 2008 | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nAnother example relates to AIG, which insured obligations of various financial institutions through the usage of credit default swaps. The basic CDS transaction involved AIG receiving a premium in exchange for a promise to pay money to party A in the event party B defaulted. ... |
57335128d058e614000b584d | How much money did taxpayers provide in government support to AIG during 2008 and early 2009? | over $180 billion | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nAnother example relates to AIG, which insured obligations of various financial institutions through the usage of credit default swaps. The basic CDS transaction involved AIG receiving a premium in exchange for a promise to pay money to party A in the event party B defaulted. ... |
57335128d058e614000b584e | What did AIG receive for promising to pay Party A in the event that Party B defaulted? | a premium | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nAnother example relates to AIG, which insured obligations of various financial institutions through the usage of credit default swaps. The basic CDS transaction involved AIG receiving a premium in exchange for a promise to pay money to party A in the event party B defaulted. ... |
573352f24776f41900660832 | Who commented that the super-boom got out of hand when products became so complicated that risk could not be accurately calculated? | George Soros | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nAs financial assets became more and more complex, and harder and harder to value, investors were reassured by the fact that both the international bond rating agencies and bank regulators, who came to rely on them, accepted as valid some complex mathematical models which theo... |
573352f24776f41900660833 | What happened to financial assets that made them harder to value? | more complex | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nAs financial assets became more and more complex, and harder and harder to value, investors were reassured by the fact that both the international bond rating agencies and bank regulators, who came to rely on them, accepted as valid some complex mathematical models which theo... |
573352f24776f41900660834 | Who did rating agencies rely on for information to rate financial innovation products? | the originators of synthetic products | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nAs financial assets became more and more complex, and harder and harder to value, investors were reassured by the fact that both the international bond rating agencies and bank regulators, who came to rely on them, accepted as valid some complex mathematical models which theo... |
573352f24776f41900660835 | When authorities could no longer calculate the risks of complex financial innovation products, who did they rely on for information? | the banks | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nAs financial assets became more and more complex, and harder and harder to value, investors were reassured by the fact that both the international bond rating agencies and bank regulators, who came to rely on them, accepted as valid some complex mathematical models which theo... |
573352f24776f41900660836 | Who reassured investors by showing the risk of complex financial innovation products was actually less than they proved to be? | international bond rating agencies | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nAs financial assets became more and more complex, and harder and harder to value, investors were reassured by the fact that both the international bond rating agencies and bank regulators, who came to rely on them, accepted as valid some complex mathematical models which theo... |
573354414776f41900660846 | What led to bad investments by asset managers in over-priced credit assets? | a conflict of interest | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nMoreover, a conflict of interest between professional investment managers and their institutional clients, combined with a global glut in investment capital, led to bad investments by asset managers in over-priced credit assets. Professional investment managers generally are ... |
573354414776f41900660847 | Who is compensated based on the volume of client assets they have under management? | Professional investment managers | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nMoreover, a conflict of interest between professional investment managers and their institutional clients, combined with a global glut in investment capital, led to bad investments by asset managers in over-priced credit assets. Professional investment managers generally are ... |
573354414776f41900660848 | What is the incentive for asset managers to expand their assets under management? | to maximize their compensation | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nMoreover, a conflict of interest between professional investment managers and their institutional clients, combined with a global glut in investment capital, led to bad investments by asset managers in over-priced credit assets. Professional investment managers generally are ... |
573354414776f41900660849 | What did many asset managers decide to do to the detriment of their clients? | continue to invest client funds in over-priced (under-yielding) investments | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nMoreover, a conflict of interest between professional investment managers and their institutional clients, combined with a global glut in investment capital, led to bad investments by asset managers in over-priced credit assets. Professional investment managers generally are ... |
573354414776f4190066084a | What rationale did asset managers who continued to invest in over-priced investments to the detriment of their clients use? | plausible deniability | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nMoreover, a conflict of interest between professional investment managers and their institutional clients, combined with a global glut in investment capital, led to bad investments by asset managers in over-priced credit assets. Professional investment managers generally are ... |
5733558fd058e614000b586e | Who published "Credit Correlation: Life After Copulas" in 2007? | World Scientific | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nDespite the dominance of the above formula, there are documented attempts of the financial industry, occurring before the crisis, to address the formula limitations, specifically the lack of dependence dynamics and the poor representation of extreme events. The volume \"Credi... |
5733558fd058e614000b586f | When did relevant warnings and research on CDOs appear in an article by Donnelly and Embrechts? | 2006 | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nDespite the dominance of the above formula, there are documented attempts of the financial industry, occurring before the crisis, to address the formula limitations, specifically the lack of dependence dynamics and the poor representation of extreme events. The volume \"Credi... |
5733558fd058e614000b5870 | The volume "Credit Correlation: Life After Copulas" summarizes a 2006 conference held by what firm in London? | Merrill Lynch | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nDespite the dominance of the above formula, there are documented attempts of the financial industry, occurring before the crisis, to address the formula limitations, specifically the lack of dependence dynamics and the poor representation of extreme events. The volume \"Credi... |
5733558fd058e614000b5871 | What did the volume "Credit Correlation: Life After Copulas" propose models to rectify? | some of the copula limitations | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nDespite the dominance of the above formula, there are documented attempts of the financial industry, occurring before the crisis, to address the formula limitations, specifically the lack of dependence dynamics and the poor representation of extreme events. The volume \"Credi... |
5733558fd058e614000b5872 | What year did the book by Brigo, Pallavicini and Torresetti report warnings and research on CDOs? | 2006 | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nDespite the dominance of the above formula, there are documented attempts of the financial industry, occurring before the crisis, to address the formula limitations, specifically the lack of dependence dynamics and the poor representation of extreme events. The volume \"Credi... |
573357204776f41900660850 | Who was President and CEO of the New York Federal Reserve Bank in June 2008? | Timothy Geithner | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nIn a June 2008 speech, President and CEO of the New York Federal Reserve Bank Timothy Geithner—who in 2009 became Secretary of the United States Treasury—placed significant blame for the freezing of credit markets on a \"run\" on the entities in the \"parallel\" banking syste... |
573357204776f41900660851 | What year did Timothy Geithner become U.S. Treasury Secretary? | 2009 | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nIn a June 2008 speech, President and CEO of the New York Federal Reserve Bank Timothy Geithner—who in 2009 became Secretary of the United States Treasury—placed significant blame for the freezing of credit markets on a \"run\" on the entities in the \"parallel\" banking syste... |
573357204776f41900660852 | In a June 2008 speech, Timoty Geithner placed blame for credit market freezing on which system? | "parallel" banking system | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nIn a June 2008 speech, President and CEO of the New York Federal Reserve Bank Timothy Geithner—who in 2009 became Secretary of the United States Treasury—placed significant blame for the freezing of credit markets on a \"run\" on the entities in the \"parallel\" banking syste... |
573357204776f41900660853 | What is the "parallel" banking system also called? | shadow banking system | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nIn a June 2008 speech, President and CEO of the New York Federal Reserve Bank Timothy Geithner—who in 2009 became Secretary of the United States Treasury—placed significant blame for the freezing of credit markets on a \"run\" on the entities in the \"parallel\" banking syste... |
573357204776f41900660854 | What is the term defined as being vulnerable by borrowing short-term in liquid markets to purchase long-term illiquid and risky assets? | maturity mismatch | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nIn a June 2008 speech, President and CEO of the New York Federal Reserve Bank Timothy Geithner—who in 2009 became Secretary of the United States Treasury—placed significant blame for the freezing of credit markets on a \"run\" on the entities in the \"parallel\" banking syste... |
5733582fd058e614000b5882 | When did the securitization markets supported by the shadow banking systems start to close down? | spring of 2007 | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nThe securitization markets supported by the shadow banking system started to close down in the spring of 2007 and nearly shut-down in the fall of 2008. More than a third of the private credit markets thus became unavailable as a source of funds. According to the Brookings Ins... |
5733582fd058e614000b5883 | When did the securitization markets supported by the shadow banking system nearly shut-down completely? | fall of 2008 | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nThe securitization markets supported by the shadow banking system started to close down in the spring of 2007 and nearly shut-down in the fall of 2008. More than a third of the private credit markets thus became unavailable as a source of funds. According to the Brookings Ins... |
5733582fd058e614000b5884 | How much of the private credit markets become unavailable as a source of funds? | More than a third | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nThe securitization markets supported by the shadow banking system started to close down in the spring of 2007 and nearly shut-down in the fall of 2008. More than a third of the private credit markets thus became unavailable as a source of funds. According to the Brookings Ins... |
5733582fd058e614000b5885 | What is the firm who reported that the traditional banking system does not have capital to close the gap as of June 2009? | Brookings Institution | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nThe securitization markets supported by the shadow banking system started to close down in the spring of 2007 and nearly shut-down in the fall of 2008. More than a third of the private credit markets thus became unavailable as a source of funds. According to the Brookings Ins... |
5733582fd058e614000b5886 | How many years would of strong profit would it take to generate enough capital to support additional lending? | a number of years | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nThe securitization markets supported by the shadow banking system started to close down in the spring of 2007 and nearly shut-down in the fall of 2008. More than a third of the private credit markets thus became unavailable as a source of funds. According to the Brookings Ins... |
573359544776f41900660870 | What economist testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in January 2010? | Mark Zandi | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nEconomist Mark Zandi testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in January 2010: \"The securitization markets also remain impaired, as investors anticipate more loan losses. Investors are also uncertain about coming legal and accounting rule changes and regulatory r... |
573359544776f41900660871 | In January 2010, what markets did Mark Zandi testify about that remain impaired and investors anticipate more loan losses? | securitization markets | [
"Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308\n\nEconomist Mark Zandi testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in January 2010: \"The securitization markets also remain impaired, as investors anticipate more loan losses. Investors are also uncertain about coming legal and accounting rule changes and regulatory r... |
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