hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 5 12 | section stringlengths 5 1.47k | content stringlengths 0 6.67M |
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75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 14b The WI is a Building Block: parent | Feature UID_390033 UTRA HNB (Acronym: HNB)
Annex A:
List of SA5 Release 8 specifications
Type
Number
Title
rapporteur
TR
30.818
Project scheduling and open issues for SA5, Release 8
ZOICAS, Adrian
TS
32.121
Advanced alarming on Itf-N Integration Reference Point (IRP); Requirements
SUERBAUM, Clemens
TS
32.122
Advanced ... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 1 Scope | This document studies the security architecture, i.e. the security features and the security mechanisms for inter-access mobility between 3GPP access system and non-3GPP access systems. For the general architecture for inter-access mobility cf. TR 23.882. This report is meant to provide more detail on the security aspe... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 2 References | The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
• References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
• For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
• Fo... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations | |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 3.1 Definitions | For the purposes of the present document, the following apply:
Access network: one of following access network: GPRS IP access, WLAN 3GPP IP access, WLAN Direct IP access LTE, WiMax, etc.
Data origin authentication: The corroboration that the source of data received is as claimed.
WLAN 3GPP IP Access: Access to an IP n... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 3.2 Symbols | For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
Gi Reference point between GPRS and an external packet data network
Wi Reference point is similar to the Gi reference point, applies to WLAN 3GPP IP Access
Wm Reference point is located between 3GPP AAA Server and Packet Data Gateway respectively b... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:
AAA Authentication Authorisation Accounting
AN Access network
APN Access Point Name
BSF Bootstrapping Function
DS-MIPv6 Dual stack MIP
FA Foreign Agent
GBA Generic Bootstrapping Architecture
GGSN Gateway GPRS Support Node
HA Home agency
HN Ho... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 4 Authentication protocols across access systems | Editor’s note: it will be decided later if this section is needed in the final report.
It is assumed that an SAE user has a USIM which is used as user credential in authentication.
Authentication protocols are assumed to be run between the UE and an authentication server in the home network. It is likely there will alw... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 4.1 UMTS AKA | UMTS AKA will be used across UTRAN. It is still to be decided by SA3 whether UMTS AKA or EAP-AKA will be used over LTE. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 4.2 EAP-AKA | EAP-AKA may be used across I-WLAN and for WiMAX. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 4.3 Others | |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 5 Establishment of security contexts in the target access system | Each type of access system may require there own security contexts, which may need to be available to protect the access network. An example is an MSK key in a WLAN access system using an EAP method for authentication and key agreement. The MSK is then used to derive further keys.
An example of an access system more co... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 5.1 Establishment of security contexts with the support of SAE | In this case, the credentials the UE shares with the 3G AAA server are used to establish security contexts in the access system. An example of this case is I-WLAN Direct IP access, where the SIM or USIM are used to establish MSK required to protect the WLAN link layer. Another example is likely WiMAX: the WiMAX Forum i... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 5.2 Establishment of security contexts without the support of SAE | In this case, credentials other than those available in 3G networks are used to establish security contexts in the non-3GPP access system. An example of this case is WiMAX when WiMAX-specific credentials are used to set up IP connectivity across WiMAX. SAE plays no role in this set up, so the establishment of these sec... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 6 Establishment of IPsec tunnel between UE and PDG across the target non-3GPP access system (if required) | One of the two variants of the S2 interface in the SAE architecture, cf. TR 23.882, allows to connect an access system to the evolved SAE packet core via an IPsec tunnel between the UE and a PDG. WLAN 3GPP IP access is an example of the use of such a tunnel, but WLAN is not the only access system which may be connected... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 6.1 The source access system has a UE-PDG tunnel | An example of this case is mobility between two I-WLAN 3GPP IP access systems. The problem to be solved is to retain the IPsec tunnel even when the IP address of the UE changes due to mobility.
There are two cases here: the PDG remains the same or the PDG changes.
If PDG remains the same, the existing IPsec tunnel coul... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 6.2 The source access system does not have a UE-PDG tunnel | An example of this case is mobility between a 3GPP access system, such as LTE or UTRAN, and an I-WLAN 3GPP IP access system. The problem to be solved is to set up the IPsec tunnel in the target system in an efficient way.
Neither MOBIKE nor an additional layer of Mobile IP will help here. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7 Security for IP based mobility | There may be several layers of Mobile IP being used in a complete SAE system, including access networks. E.g. there is a WiMAX-internal Mobile IP layer. The considerations in this section are concerned with the outermost such layer, where the related Home Agent 3GPP HA resides in the 3G network. It is still to be decid... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.1 General requirement | Major security threats related to IP mobility, when the procedures are not properly secured, are:
- IP address ownership needs to be verified else redirection attacks will happen
- Traffic sent to a target redirected elsewhere
- Attacker can blackhole traffic to a victim
- Attacker can insert itself on-path as a Man-in... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.2 Host based Mobility | |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.2.1 Security associations used with Mobile IP | Figure 1 gives an overview of the MIP security associations which need to be present irrespective of the version of Mobile IP used. More security associations may be required for certain versions of Mobile IP. E.g. for Mobile IP v4 with a Foreign Agent, security associations between MN and FA, and FA and HA are needed.... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.2.2 Security protocols used with Mobile IP | 1. The security association between the MN and 3GPP AAA is used for (mutual) authentication. In our context, the authentication protocol may be e.g. EAP-AKA. This protocol is independent of Mobile IP, but keys derived from a run of this protocol may be used for Mobile IP purposes.
2. The security association between th... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.3 Bootstrapping of Mobile IP parameters | |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.3.1 General | It would be undesirable for SAE if the UE had to obtain security credentials to be used specifically for Mobile IP signalling security. Rather, the security associations required for Mobile IP should be able to be derived from security credentials already available. In the case of SAE, this means that it should be poss... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.3.2 RFC3957 used in conjunction with GBA | NOTE: this subsection applies only to MIPv4.
MN-HA key generation & distribution based on RFC 3957. This method uses pre-shared secret between MS and AAA server to establish a shared secret between MS and HA and / or MS and FA.
Figure 2: MN-HA key generation & distribution
1. During initial MIPv4 registration, MS inclu... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.3.3 Use GBA to generate MN-HA key | NOTE: This subsection applies to MIPv4and MIPv6.
In this alternative authentication method, HA is associated with NAF.
Home Agent (HA) is associated with a NAF, and Ks_(ext/int)_NAF would be used as MN-HA key: the MN performs a bootstrapping procedure with the BSF and generates a (master) shared secret, Ks. After that,... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.3.4 Use partial GBA to derive MN-HA Keys | NOTE: This subsection applies to MIPv4 and MIPv6.
GBA was designed for a situation where a UE wants to securely access potentially many application servers (NAFs), while having to be authenticated to the home network (and consume authentication vectors) in the Ub protocol run only once. Furthermore, the NAFs the UE wan... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.3.5 Using IKEv2 | Authentication between the MN and the network and IPsec SA setup between the MN and the HA for MIPv6 shall be performed using IKEv2 as defined in the IETF draft [draft-ietf-mip6-bootstrapping-split-02.txt]. In SAE, the home agent communicates with the AAA server to perform mutual authentication. The IKEv2 authenticatio... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.3.6 Security bootstrapping for DS MIPv6 using MIP options | (From S3-070748)
This procedure uses the MIP authentication options defined in RFC4285 [8] to provide authentication of Binding Update and Binding Acknowledgement messages, namely the
• MN-HA Mobility Message Authentication Option and the
• MN-AAA Mobility Message Authentication Option.
The AAA Mobility Message Authent... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4 Network based Mobility | |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.1 PMIP | |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.1.1 Introduction | This section looks at how PMIP messages need to be protected within the Evolved Packet Core and how PMIP protection needs to be handled if the PMIP messages originate from a trusted non-3GPP network node.
This analysis is based on draft-ietf-netlmm-proxymip6-06.txt [11] from which in particular the sections 4 and 11 ha... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.1.2 Overview of PMIP usage in 3GPP | (From S3-070756)
PMIPv6 defines a MAG (Mobile Access Gateway) and an LMA (Local Mobility Anchor) from which the LMA will be integrated in the PDN Gateway or Serving Gateway (for the roaming case).
Figure 9: Protocols for MM control and user planes of S2a for the PMIPv6 option
TS 23.402v130 section 5 is relevant in this... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.1.3 PMIP trust model | PMIPv6 is an IETF based network-based mobility management mechanism, and has applied the same trust model properties as the use of GTP for mobility management in UMTS and the EPC (for the S5 and S2b reference points). This means the MAG i.e. the Serving Gateway (S5) or ePDG (S2b), is sufficiently trusted by the LMA to ... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.1.4 Security measures on the Reference points between the LMA and the MAG that have a trust relation | PMIPv6 draft [11] section 4 recommends the use of IPsec ESP in Transport Mode (RFC4303) as default security mechanism for integrity protection and data origin authentication for PMIP messages and IKEv2 end-to-end between the MAG and the LMA to establish IPsec security associations. Confidentiality protection of PMIP me... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.1.5 The need for using strong access authentication with Proxy Mobile IP | Clause 7.4.1.3 discusses the need for trust of the LMA in the correct operation of the MAG. Trust in the MAG means that the LMA can be ensured that the operation of MAG is not somehow influenced by an attacker. Clause 7.4.1.4 discusses the security on the reference point between the MAG and the LMA. Security on this re... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.1.6 No trust relation between LMA and MAG on S2a | NOTE：This section describes the case when there is no trust relation between the MAG and the LMA. However, what this section describes is not aligned with the assumption of TS33.402v100 section 9.3.1.2. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.1.6.1 Security risks | MAG lies in the trusted non-3gpp IP access system in S2a. There may be no trust relation between the MAG and the LMA since they may belong to different operators. In this case, a compromised MAG may make an attack to UE in other MAG’s domain. Also, a compromised MAG may send fake PBU message to update the binding of UE... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.1.6.2 Possible measures | One possible way is to have the mapping between the UE and the serving MAG in one of network servers. When a MAG sends a PBU to a LMA, the LMA can ask this server to check whether this MAG is currently serving the UE. In this way, it will be avoided that a compromised MAG represents UE served by other MAGs to send the ... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.2 NetLMM | In Network based Localized Mobility Management (NetLMM) the Localized Mobility Anchor (LMA) is configured with a globally routable network prefix which the IP address assigned to UE is composed of, and packets to/from the UE are tunnelled between LMA and Mobile Access Gateways (MAGs). MAG shares the same network prefix... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 8 Specific aspects of security for mobility between 3GPP access systems and non-3GPP access systems | |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 8.1 Security for mobility between pre-SAE 3GPP access systems and non-3GPP access systems | It needs to be clarified in the course of the work on SAE mobility to what extent mobility, and, in particular the related security aspects involving pre-SAE 3GPP access systems require a different handling. The goal is, of course, to minimise or completely avoid the differences, but it is currently not clear in how fa... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 8.2 Security context transfer between 3GPP and trusted non-3GPP access networks | Security context is the information on the current state of a UE in the serving system required to re-establish the security association in the target system. Security context includes
1. Agreed security algorithms between the UE and the serving network,
2. Agreed/derived encryption and/or integrity protection keys and... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 8.3 ANDSF Security | |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 8.3.1 General | ANDSF (Access Network Discovery and Selection Function) is a mechanism of access network discovery and selection. It is provided in order to control the UE's inter-system handover decisions and in order to reduce the battery consumption for inter-system mobility. See TS23.402 for more details. However, the privacy of ... |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 1 Scope | The purpose of this document is to contain the updated Work Item Descriptions (WIDs) and capture status of all TSG SA WG5 work items of the current 3GPP Release in order for the group to get an overview of current ongoing work.
This TR is used as a mean to provide input to the complete 3GPP work plan that is handled by... |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 2 References | The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
• References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
• For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
• Fo... |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 9 Impacts | Affects:
UICC apps
ME
AN
CN
Others
Yes
X
X
No
X
X
Don't know
X |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 10 Expected Output and Time scale (to be updated at each plenary) | New specifications
Spec No.
Title
Prime rsp. WG
2ndary rsp. WG(s)
Presented for information at plenary#
Approved at plenary#
Comments
32.4xy
Subscriber and equipment trace; Trace Management Integration Reference Point (IRP): Requirements
SA5
3GPPSA#31
13 - 15 Mar 200625 - 27 Sep 2006
3GPPSA#34
Dec 2006
32.4xy
Subscribe... |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 14c The WI is a Work Task: parent Building Block | Trace Management (BB: OAM7-Trace)
WI
Unique_ID
OAM7-Trace
35039 |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 32.307 Notification IRP SOAP SS | |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 32.317 Generic IRP Management SOAP SS | |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 32.607 Basic CM IRP SOAP SS | |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 32.617 Bulk CM IRP SOAP SS | |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 32.667 Kernel CM IRP SOAP SS | 5 Service Aspects
None
6 MMI-Aspects
None
7 Charging Aspects
None
8 Security Aspects
None |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 1 3GPP Work Area | Radio Access
X
Core Network
Services
2 Linked work items
OAM&P (Operations, Administration, Maintenance & Provisioning) (Feature: OAM7)
WI
Unique_ID
OAM7
35041
Network Infrastructure Management (BB: OAM7-NIM)
WI
Unique_ID
OAM7-NIM
35042
3 Justification
Circuit is a logic link between two exchange network nodes which ... |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 3.2 Principle of radio channel power monitoring | The transport channels and physical channels have mapping relations. The following is mapping of transport channels onto physical channels.
25.211
From the figure above, the mapping from transport channel to physical channel is mostly one to one. So, in most cases, we just need to monitor the physical channels.
It is p... |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 14b The WI is a Building Block: parent Feature | (one Work Item identified as a feature)
OAM&P (Operations, Administration, Maintenance & Provisioning) (Feature: OAM7)
Acronym
Unique_ID
OAM7
35041
Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects TSGS#29(05)0627
Meeting #29, Tallinn, ESTONIA, 26-28 September 2005
Source: SA5 (Telecom Management)
Title: WID W... |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 3 Open Work item status and approval time frame | This list reflects the open work items running under the responsibility of TSG SA WG5.
Work items in this colour are closed or building blocks. |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 4 Completed or Terminated Work items | This list reflects work items that have been completed or terminated.
Annex A:
Change history
Change history
Date
TSG #
TSG Doc.
CR
Rev
Subject/Comment
Old
New
Nov 2005
S5_44
S5-050529
--
--
Initial draft agreed by SA5#44
Dec 2005
SA_30
SP-050734
--
--
Submitted to SA#30 for Information
Mar 2006
SA_31
SP-060073
--
--
C... |
f4da59af4d170d3da6097a508a147acf | 50.099 | 45.005 New frequency ranges | |
f4da59af4d170d3da6097a508a147acf | 50.099 | 45.050 Scenarios for new frequencies | |
f4da59af4d170d3da6097a508a147acf | 50.099 | 24.008 Classmark information elements | |
f4da59af4d170d3da6097a508a147acf | 50.099 | 45.008 Add frequency ranges | |
f4da59af4d170d3da6097a508a147acf | 50.099 | 45.001 Add frequency and channels | |
f4da59af4d170d3da6097a508a147acf | 50.099 | 43.030 Add frequency ranges | |
f4da59af4d170d3da6097a508a147acf | 50.099 | 43.022 Add channels to be searched | 2080%
Dec 2002
StartedOngoing
Addition of frequency bands to GSM – Changes for conformance tests
GP-022074
51.010-1 Add testing
0%
Dec 2002
Started
Enhanced Power Control
GP-012748
Realization of Enhanced power control and signaling support
GP-012749
Concept
Changes to 43.051
Changes to 44.004
Changes to 44.018
Changes... |
e43c8396f49910c64271dab0534b85fe | 23.876 | 1 Scope | This technical report defines methods for supporting push services by 3GPP bearers. The mechanisms defined apply to existing bearers for the 3GPP Packet Switched Domain (PS domain), Circuit-Switched Domain (CS Domain), and the IP Multimedia Core Network Subsystem (IMS), Multimedia Broadcast Multicast Service, and Wirel... |
e43c8396f49910c64271dab0534b85fe | 23.876 | 2 References | The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
• References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
• For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
• Fo... |
e43c8396f49910c64271dab0534b85fe | 23.876 | 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations | |
e43c8396f49910c64271dab0534b85fe | 23.876 | 3.1 Definitions | For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in 3GPP TS 22.174 [3] and the following apply.
delivery network: a network that supports connectionless or connection oriented push services. A delivery network may simply be a GPRS network.
application server: a server that provides push service... |
e43c8396f49910c64271dab0534b85fe | 23.876 | 3.2 Symbols | For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply: |
e43c8396f49910c64271dab0534b85fe | 23.876 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:
NAT Network Address Translator
NRPCA Network Requested PDP Context Activation
OTA Over The Air delivery protocol
PP Push Proxy
PI Push Initiator |
e43c8396f49910c64271dab0534b85fe | 23.876 | 4 Architecture Requirements | |
e43c8396f49910c64271dab0534b85fe | 23.876 | 5 Push Architecture Overview | The Push Service Architecture overview is shown in figure 1. This includes the push application servers Push Function (or Push Proxy) and Push Initiator as well as the bearer services available as the delivery network and the Push Recipient or UE. The definition of functions in the Push Function (Push Proxy) and Push I... |
e43c8396f49910c64271dab0534b85fe | 23.876 | 5.1 Push Bearers in the PS Domain | This section describes the use of various mechanisms in the PS Domain to establish and/or maintain a bearer service connection to the UE over which Push services may be delivered.
Editors Note: the following bullets provide guidance for further work
• Push using Long Lived PDP Context
◦ This section describes the use o... |
e43c8396f49910c64271dab0534b85fe | 23.876 | 5.2 Push Bearers in the CS Domain | This section describes the use of various mechanisms in the CS Domain to establish and/or maintain a bearer service connection to the UE over which Push services may be delivered.
Editors Note: the following bullets provide guidance for further work
• Push over Circuit-Switched Data Bearer
◦ This section describes the ... |
e43c8396f49910c64271dab0534b85fe | 23.876 | 5.3 Push in the IP Multimedia Subsystem | Editors Note: the following bullets provide guidance for further work
• Push using SIP
◦ The solution described in this section defines a method using the SIP protocol in IMS to carry Push services to a UE. |
e43c8396f49910c64271dab0534b85fe | 23.876 | 5.4 Push using MBMS | |
e43c8396f49910c64271dab0534b85fe | 23.876 | 5.5 Push using WLAN | |
e43c8396f49910c64271dab0534b85fe | 23.876 | 6 Analysis and Conclusion | Annex <A> (normative):
<Normative annex title>
Annex <B> (informative):
<Informative annex title>
Annex <X> (informative):
Change history
Change history
Date
TSG #
TSG Doc.
CR
Rev
Subject/Comment
Old
New
200301
Created at SA2#29 San Francisco
0.0.0
2003-01
Revised at SA2#29 San Francisco
0.0.1 |
198feca7a70995985a5cc7f203dbedb2 | 25.867 | 1 Scope | The present document summarises the results of the feasibility study about inclusion of Wideband Distribution Systems, or WDS, as part of third generation networks in 3GPP standards.
It covers the history of the proposal, shows and discusses the results of relevant analysis and simulation activities, highlights the po... |
198feca7a70995985a5cc7f203dbedb2 | 25.867 | 2 References | The following documents contain provisions, which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
• References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
• For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
• F... |
198feca7a70995985a5cc7f203dbedb2 | 25.867 | 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations | |
198feca7a70995985a5cc7f203dbedb2 | 25.867 | 3.1 Definitions | |
198feca7a70995985a5cc7f203dbedb2 | 25.867 | 3.2 Symbols | |
198feca7a70995985a5cc7f203dbedb2 | 25.867 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:
3GPP Third Generation Partnership Project
ACLR Adjacent Channel Leakage Ratio
ACS Adjacent Channel Sensitivity
ALC Automatic Level Control
BS Base Stations
CPICH Common PIlot CHannel
DL Downlink
FDD Frequency Division Duplex... |
198feca7a70995985a5cc7f203dbedb2 | 25.867 | 4.2 WDS Architecture | The key attribute of WDS is its capability to enable the radio interface of a number of BS to be remote, and hence support a distributed multi-carrier and multi-operator network.
WDS is in general an active device and includes, but is not limited to, one or multiple RF front-end (LNA, MCPA) and RF transmission interfac... |
198feca7a70995985a5cc7f203dbedb2 | 25.867 | 4.3 Practical Deployment Examples of WDS | Two examples are given only for information and topology understanding purposes of practical deployment for WDS, with reference to previous functions listing in Table 1. Additional indications will require further study on a dedicated Technical Report on WDS Deployment Scenario.
4.3.1 In-building Deployment
A sta... |
198feca7a70995985a5cc7f203dbedb2 | 25.867 | 4.4 Benefits of WDS | |
198feca7a70995985a5cc7f203dbedb2 | 25.867 | 4.4.1 Technical and Deployment Aspects | Because of its very principle, WDS may bring technical and economical advantages as summarised here:
1. Possible BS and RNC co-location in centralised equipment locations allowing shared facilities, increased implementation flexibility and trunking efficiency.
2. Distributed RF wideband microcellular heads, with lower ... |
198feca7a70995985a5cc7f203dbedb2 | 25.867 | 4.4.2 Standardisation Aspects | A standardisation process of WDS in the UMTS UTRA scenario is envisaged for:
1. Removing technical uncertainty risks from Operators and prevent from integration surprises
2. Reducing the burden of additional responsibility for Operators in defining their own specifications for WDS
3. Enabling fulfilment of EU recommend... |
198feca7a70995985a5cc7f203dbedb2 | 25.867 | 5 RF Feasibility Study | 5.1 RF Performance Discussion
Starting from reference [5], the RF feasibility study addresses the technical analysis of WDS performance based on its non-linear characteristics that may affect RF transmission through it, and derived as a function of a set of RF parameters at its interface with BS.
The following t... |
198feca7a70995985a5cc7f203dbedb2 | 25.867 | 5.5 Simulation Results | |
198feca7a70995985a5cc7f203dbedb2 | 25.867 | 5.5.1 ACLR Testing | The simulations are carried out over a range of ACLR levels in order to assess the degradation attributable to the inclusion of a WDS and to attain the minimum ACLR input values to achieve the current specified output levels according to TS 25.104.
The performance of the BS was adjusted in order to achieve the range of... |
198feca7a70995985a5cc7f203dbedb2 | 25.867 | 5.5.2 Multicarrier ACLR | In order to assess the impact of a multi-operator environment where multiple BS’s were connected to WDS, a test simulation was carried out with two BS, transmitting on adjacent carrier frequencies, connected to WDS Test Model 2 and the ACLR was measured. The test setup is shown in Figure 16 below.
Figure 16 Test setup ... |
198feca7a70995985a5cc7f203dbedb2 | 25.867 | 5.5.3 Measurement of Occupied Bandwidth | WDS test model 2 was used to measure the occupied bandwidth resulting from the inclusion of the WDS. The occupied bandwidth containing 99.5% of the integrated transmitted power (43dBm) was measured at 3.855MHz (see figure 17).
Figure 17 Measurement of the occupied bandwidth.
Results from Figure 17.
Lower Side %
Upper S... |
198feca7a70995985a5cc7f203dbedb2 | 25.867 | 5.5.4 Spectrum Emission Mask ( Out of Band Emissions ) | The out of band emissions were measured as specified in TS25.141 for a single carrier scenario with output power of 43dBm using WDS model 2.
The result found is shown in the graph below (figure 18) along with the relevant mask for Power Out greater than or equal to 43dBm (reference TS25.141 6.2.5.1)
Figure 18 Measureme... |
198feca7a70995985a5cc7f203dbedb2 | 25.867 | 5.6 Simulation Summary | The simulation programme and hence the results set out to demonstrate two specific areas of interest.
1. The range of input levels available to a system which would feed a WDS system and its relationship to current specifications.
2. The margin required with the introduction of WDS over a number of output power classes... |
198feca7a70995985a5cc7f203dbedb2 | 25.867 | 5.6.1 ACLR | It was found that a 3dB margin is typically required to accommodate the effects of the inclusion of a WDS to an existing Base Station set-up.
There is a minor difference in performance which is dependent on WDS input signal level. With low input power signal levels, as demonstrated in the example with 20dBm output powe... |
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