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cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 1 Scope
| The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the Lawful Interception elements of a 3GPP network: Administration Function (ADMF), Point of Interception (POI), Triggering Function (TF), Location Acquisition Requesting Function (LARF), Mediation and Delivery Function (MDF).
I... |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 2 References
| Editor's Note: 1) English vs American spelling (e.g., "artefacts" vs "artifacts"), 2) full stops in lists.
The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition numbe... |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| This clause and its three (sub) clauses are mandatory. The contents shall be shown as "void" if the TS/TR does not define any terms, symbols, or abbreviations.
|
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
Definition format (Normal)
<defined term>: <definition>.
example: text used to clarify abstract r... |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
Symbol format (EW)
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
Abbreviation format (EW)
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 4 Overview
| 4.1 Approach
This TS was developed based on the guidance and methodology described in 3GPP TR 33.916 "Security Assurance Methodology (SECAM) for 3GPP network products" [3]. 3GPP has organized SCAS documents by publishing one TS per architectural network element. In contrast, we take a different approach in the LI spa... |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 4.2 Document Part Organization
| Editor's Note: The part structure of 33.129 should be re-visited when the maturity of the project warrants it, and likely not settle to its final form until the project is ~80%+ along.
• Part 1 - Common
Part 1 of TS 33.129 contains the general framework of LI SCAS. This part contains descriptions of threats and a... |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5 Security Elements
| |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.1 Assets
| 5.1.1 Assets Overview
Assets are categorized more granularly than functional blocks. These are the specific elements that, if exposed or influenced, could compromise LI.
Table 5.1.1-1: Asset definitions
Code
Name
Description
1
AS-TARGET-01
Target Identifier(s)
E.g., IMSI, MSISDN, IP address, used to define... |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.2 Attackers
| 5.2.1 Attackers Overview
Attackers can be human or automated. The following table lists the attackers considered in the present multi-part document.
Table 5.2-1: Attacker definitions
Code
Name
Description
1
AT-INTERNAL-01
Internal administrator
Has privileged access to network functions or management inter... |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.2.2 Detailed Attacker Descriptions
| 5.2.2.1 Internal Administrator
Attacker Code: AT-INTERNAL-01
Attacker Name: Internal Administrator
Attacker Description:
An internal administrator refers to a human actor with privileged access to core network systems, but without explicit authorization to access or manage Lawful Interception (LI) functions. This ... |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3 Threats
| |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.1 Threats Overview
| The following table contains named threat types. Each SCAS test can point to one or more.
Table 5.3.1-1: Threat definitions
Code
Name
Description
1
T-LOG-01
Log leak
LI activity generates logging artifacts observable by non-LI authorized parties.
2
T-CONFIG-02
Config leak
LI activity is inferred by analy... |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2 Detailed Threat Descriptions
| |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.1 Log Leak
| Threat Code: T-LOG-01
Threat Name: Log Leak
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: Certain system or network logs may unintentionally record details of Lawful Interception (LI) operations, such as interface initialization, provisioning events, or errors specific to LI services. If such logs are ... |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.2 Config Leak
| Threat Code: T-CONFIG-02
Threat Name: Config Leak
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: Configuration files or system state snapshots taken before and after LI provisioning may reveal changes indicative of interception functionality, such as new interfaces, active LI modules, or altered routing... |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.3 LI Leak via CPU Side Channel 1
| Threat Code: T-RES-CPU-03
Threat Name: LI Leak via CPU Side Channel (Pattern A)
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: LI operations may cause observable variations in CPU utilization due to additional processing, packet duplication, or encryption tasks. If an attacker monitors CPU resource usag... |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.4 LI Leak via CPU Side Channel 2
| Threat Code: T-RES-CPU-04
Threat Name: LI Leak via CPU Side Channel (Pattern B)
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: A refined side-channel analysis leveraging advanced statistical or machine learning methods may identify LI-related process signatures at a lower resolution or across virtualize... |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.5 LI Leak via Network Flow Side Channel
| Threat Code: T-RES-NET-05
Threat Name: LI Leak via Network Flow Side Channel
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: LI systems typically duplicate or redirect traffic to an MDF or mediation device. This may introduce subtle, but detectable changes in bandwidth utilization, jitter, or packet dupl... |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.6 LI Detection via Timing Anomalies
| Threat Code: T-TIMING-06
Threat Name: LI Detection via Timing Anomalies
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: The addition of LI processing steps (e.g., duplication, filtering, routing to MDF) can result in increased latency or jitter during communication sessions. An attacker may detect the pr... |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.7 MDF–LEMF LI Product Flow Detection
| Threat Code: T-TIMING-07
Threat Name: MDF–LEMF LI Product Flow Detection via Timing
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: The flow of intercepted traffic (IRI or CC) from the MDF to the LEMF may generate detectable timing patterns, especially if LI sessions are rare or traffic volume fluctuates... |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.8 POI–MDF Link Failure
| Threat Code: T-INTERRUPTION-08
Threat Name: POI–MDF Link Failure
Threat Category: Denial of Service
Threat Description: A network or logical interruption between the Point of Interception (POI) and the MDF may unintentionally reveal the existence of LI. If LI sessions degrade differently from normal user sessions un... |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.9 Session Count
| Threat Code: T-SESSION-COUNT-09
Threat Name: LI Detection via Session Count
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: Provisioning of LI may introduce additional sessions (e.g., replicated flows, internal signaling) that appear in session monitoring tools or access logs. If the session count increa... |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.10 Interface Security
| Threat Code: T-INTERFACE-SEC-10
Threat Name: Interface Security Misconfiguration
Threat Category: Tampering / Information Disclosure
Threat Description: If LI-related interfaces (e.g., between POI, MDF and LEMF) are not properly secured using cryptographic protocols such as TLS, an attacker may eavesdrop on or manip... |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.11 Unauthorized Use of Unnecessary Features
| Threat Code: T-FEATURE-11
Threat Name: Unauthorized Use of Unnecessary Features
Threat Category: Information Disclosure / Misuse of Resources
Threat Description: Default-enabled but unnecessary software or hardware features may remain active after installation or commissioning. Attackers may exploit these dormant fe... |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.11 Unauthorized Use of Unnecessary Services
| Threat Code: T-SERVICE-12
Threat Name: Unauthorized Use of Unnecessary Services
Threat Category: Information Disclosure / Misuse of Resources
Threat Description: After installation, supplier-preset, local, or network-accessible services may remain active that are not required for the LI system’s intended operation. ... |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 6.1.1.8 Use of Well-Established and Up-to-Date Crypto Libraries
| Requirement Name: Standard Crypto Libraries
Requirement Reference: TBD
Requirement Description: Well-established and up-to-date cryptographic libraries must be used to implement cryptographic algorithms. The use of self-implemented cryptographic methods is prohibited unless explicitly required, in which case such imp... |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 6.1.1.9 Replaceable Cryptographic Modules
| Requirement Name: Modular Cryptographic Implementations
Requirement Reference: TBD
Requirement Description: Cryptographic methods must be implemented in replaceable modules. Static implementations are prohibited, as they hinder corrections, replacements, and upgrades in the event of security incidents, evolving threa... |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 6.1.1.10 Configurable and Exchangeable Cryptographic Methods
| Requirement Name: Configurable Cryptographic Methods
Requirement Reference: TBD
Requirement Description: Applications must support configuration of cryptographic methods and provide functions to exchange encryption algorithms. Deactivation and modification capabilities (e.g., cipher suite adjustments) must be built d... |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 6.1.1.11 Continuous Integration/Continuous Delivery Separation
| Requirement Name: CI/CD Separation
Requirement Reference: TBD
Requirement Description: The CI/CD chain must be separate from systems that use it; there must exist no shared hosts/components/networks.
References:
Asset reference: AS-LI-FUNCTION-05
Attacker reference: TBD
Threat reference: TBD
Test Case... |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 6.1.1.12 Log Leak of LI Identifiers During LI Provisioning
| Requirement Name: Confidentiality of LI Identifiers
Requirement Reference: TS 33.126: R6.6 - 30 Undetectability by Non-Authorized Parties
Requirement Description: General-purpose logs must not contain Lawful Interception (LI) identifiers or other sensitive LI information. Only LI-protected audit logs, only accessible... |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 6.1.1.13 Log Leak of LI Identifiers During Communication Time
| Requirement Name: Confidentiality of LI Identifiers
Requirement Reference: TS 33.126: R6.6 - 30 Undetectability by Non-Authorized Parties
Requirement Description: General-purpose logs must not contain sensitive LI information. Only LI-protected audit logs, only accessible to LI-cleared personnel, may contain such det... |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 6.1.1.14 Log Segregation
| Requirement Name: Segregation of LI Logging
Requirement Reference: TS 33.126: R6.6 - 30 Undetectability by Non-Authorized Parties
Requirement Description: LI audit and operational logs must be segregated from all non-LI logging subsystems. Access to LI logs must be restricted to LI-cleared personnel only.
Referenc... |
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 1 Scope
| This permanent document describes the principle and the working method of the Inter Group Co-ordination ad-hocs (IGCs), the scope, reference and output of each individual IGC and the overall time plan.
|
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 2 Working method of the technical Inter-Group Co-ordination ad-hocs (IGCs)
| TSG-SA has a responsibility of technical co-ordination within 3GPP. TSG-S2 has been allocated a task to divide the feature descriptions defined by TSG-S1 to a Building blocks or Work packages based on System architecture and elaborate a project plan.
Therefore Inter Group Co-ordination ad-hocs (IGCs) are created. The ... |
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 3 List of IGCs
| 0 General
Coordinator: Alain Sultan, MCC (alain.sultan@etsi.fr)
Site: ftp://ftp.3gpp.org/TSG_SA/WG2_Arch/IGC
1 Bearer Services and QoS
Chair: Oscar Lopez-Torres, T-Mobil (Oscar.Lopez@t-mobil.de)
Site: ftp://ftp.3gpp.org/TSG_SA/WG2_Arch/IGC/Bearer&QoS
reflector address: 3GPP_TSG_SA_IGC_Bearer&QoS@list.etsi.fr
... |
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 4 Scope of the IGCs
| |
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 4.1 Bearer Services and QoS
| [editor's note: the scope has to be revised to reflect more clearly that the IGC is only supervising the groups and not providing the actual technical work]
The scope is to provide a consistent definition of the Services and Bearer Services mapping throughout the system: UMTS bearers, bearer management in the contro... |
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 4.2 GSM/UMTS Interoperation and Mobility Management
| [editor's note: to be further elaborated by the IGC chairman]
Consistent UMTS/GSM interoperation
Mobility handling within the system, RRC and MM interaction, MAP, consistent mobility management
|
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 4.3 Location based services (LCS) and Cell Broadcasting Services(CBS)
| The UMTS LCS and CBS inter group co-ordination ad hoc group shall co-ordinate the work on location services in UMTS and ensure that all 3GPP groups relevant for location services get involved in a timely manner. The ongoing work in T1P1.5 on GSM LCS Phase II shall be taken in account as well.
The UMTS LCS and CBS int... |
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 4.4 Packet Architecture and Circuit Architecture
| The technical scope of the “packet and circuit architecture IGC” is to work on the architecture of the packet and circuit domain and protocols.
It contains the following main areas:
1. The identification of new entities and interfaces of the overall system architecture
2. The determination of the principle p... |
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 4.5 Security
| This ad hoc group is intended to produce, maintain and monitor the work plan for the delivery of a consistent security specifications for release 99.
The work items being progressed in TSG-S3 are listed in the table below. Each work item addresses a particular security issue and is assigned a particular priority wh... |
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 4.6 Services and Service platforms
| The 3GPP Services and Service Platforms IGC is responsible for the following activities:
• establish a common understanding in 3GPP of the VHE and OSA work to be carried out for stage2 and 3 in 3GPP Release99;
• identify the appropriate working groups for carrying out the VHE and OSA work and ensure these gro... |
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 5 Overall time plan
| [Ed. note: scope to be provided by the rapporteur]
Meeting
Date
Activity
SA2#9
October 25-29, 1999
Define overall workplan. Start work on identifying requirements and issues related to architectural and functional aspects as compared to R99 (TR 23.ywz)
SA2#10
Nov 29 –Dec 3, 1999
Identify additional requiremen... |
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 6 Change history
|
Version
Date
Subject/Comments
0.0.0
July 1999
Creation of document
0.1.0
August 1999
Inclusion of comments from SA2#7
0.2.0
September, 4th 1999
Inclusion of results from SA2#8: addition of scope of IGC Security, Bearer and QoS, PS and CS architecture, Services and Service Platform, LCS.
0.3.0
September, ... |
c3e756be2cf10e873aefa14b6b740064 | 30.504 | 3 Indicates TSG approved document under change control.
| y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc.
z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the specification;
2 Introduction
The present document shall provide a work plan and study items as agreed... |
27beca56e63e2e84b7c4306bba73a041 | 25.831 | 3 Indicates TSG approved document under change control.
| y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc.
z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the specification.
1 Scope
The scope of this Technical Report is to list technical features and functions of... |
fd9931b60fc241f651706643f1ed6e48 | 33.900 | 3 Indicates TSG approved document under change control.
| y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc.
z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the specification;
2 Introduction
This document is intended to offer security guidance to those involved in 3G... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 1 Scope
| The present document studies additional architecture support of Ambient IoT for the support of Rel-19 AIoT Devices defined in TS 23.369 [3] in Topology 2 based on the RRC-based option as described in clause 8.1.3.3 of TR 23.700‑13 [7] and support for new AIoT Devices that will support the DO-A traffic type as described... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
Definition format (Normal)
<defined term>: <definition>.
example: text used to clarify abstract r... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 3.2 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
Abbreviation format (EW)
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 4 Architectural Assumptions and Requirements
| |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 4.1 Architectural Assumptions
| The following traffic types for AIoT Device are to be studied:
- DT: Device-terminated;
- DO-DTT: Device-originated - device-terminated triggered; and
- DO-A: Device-originated - autonomous.
Common architectural assumptions:
- Architecture reference models defined in TS 23.369 [3] are used as the baseline architec... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 4.2 Architectural Requirements
| The following architectural requirements are applicable to this study:
- Solutions shall build on the 5G System architectural principles as in TS 23.501 [4], including flexibility and modularity for newly introduced functionalities.
- The enhancements to support topology 2 shall not impact Rel-19 AIoT devices.
- Sol... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 5 Key Issues
| |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 5.1 Key Issue #1: support AIoT services under the RRC-based option for UE Reader connectivity
| NOTE 1: Only CM-CONNECTED with RRC_CONNECTED UE Reader is in the scope.
Only the following aspects will be included:
- How to perform and revoke authorization of UE Readers.
NOTE 2: Rel-19 interim conclusion in TR 23.700-13 [7] should be used as basis for UE Reader authorization.
- Potential impact from how the NG-... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 5.2 Key Issue #2: Support of DO-A Capable AIoT Devices
| This key issue will study the system architecture to support DO-A capable Ambient IoT Devices in Topology 1 and Topology 2.
The following aspects will be studied:
- How the AIoT Device informs the network of its presence autonomously (e.g. an AIoT Device initiated registration-like procedure) and what are the trigger... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6 Solutions
| |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.0 Mapping of Solutions to Key Issues
| Table 6.0-1: Mapping of Solutions to Key Issues
Key Issues
Solutions
Key Issue #1
Key Issue #2
#1
X
#2
X
#3
X
#4
X
#5
X
#6
X
#7
X
#8
X
#9
X
#10
X
#11
X
#12
X
#13
X
#14
X
#15
X
#16
X
#17
X
#18
X
#19
X
|
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.1 Solution #1: Enable 5G delivery AIoT device initiated traffic
| |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.1.0 High-level solution principles
| The key technical principles proposed in this solution are summarized below:
1. AIoT Device Profile Enhancement: The AIoT Device Profile is extended to include additional information, such as AF/NEF associations and the device's registration status.
2. Device Registration Requirement: Each AIoT Device must be registe... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.1.1 Description
| The introduction of Device Oriented-Autonomous (DO-A) traffic type addresses a significant gap in AIoT networks, where devices initiate communication autonomously based on available energy resources. This capability was not supported in previous releases and is now within the scope of this Release. The proposed solutio... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.1.2 Procedures
|
Figure 6.1.2-1: Procedure for Enable 5G delivery AIoT device initiated traffic
0. The AIoT device profile per an AIoT device is provisioned in the ADM (AIoT specific UDM). The AIoT device profile includes the following parameters:
- AIoT Device Permanent ID: Uniquely identifies the AIoT Device.
- Last known AIOTF ... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.1.3 Impacts on Services, Entities and Interfaces
| AIoT Device:
- Energy Management: The AIoT device autonomously initiates communication based on its energy harvesting capabilities.
- Timestamp support: The AIoT device provides time information indicating when the DO-A message was sent.
AIoT Reader:
- The AIoT reader forwards DO-A messages.
- It may provide energ... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.2 Solution #2: AIoT services support for DO-A capable AIoT Devices
| |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.2.0 High-level Solution Principles
| This solution addresses Key Issue #2 "Support of DO-A Capable AIoT Devices".
The solution combines registration-like procedure and data transfer procedure and is based on the following general principles to support AIoT services for DO-A capable AIoT Devices:
- The DO-A capable AIoT Device initiates registration-like... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.2.1 Description
| This solution is applicable to both the Direct Connectivity and the Indirect Connectivity architectures as defined in TS 23.369 [3].
For a DO-A (Device-originated - autonomous) capable AIoT Device, the device originated traffic is triggered by the AIoT Device itself for, e.g. sending data to the network.
The principl... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.2.2 Procedures
| Figure 6.2.2-1 describes the DO-A Procedure.
Figure 6.2.2-1: DO-A Procedure
0. AIoT Device obtains radio resource for D2R message.
Editor's note: How AIoT Device obtains radio resource for D2R message is FFS and is to be decided by RAN WGs.
1. The AIoT Device sends the AS D2R message (Registration Request) to the... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.2.3 Impacts on Services, Entities and Interfaces
| Editor's note: This clause captures impacts on existing services, entities and interfaces.
|
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.3 Solution #3: Support of Sensor Data Collection
| |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.3.0 High-level solution Principles
| This solution addresses KI #2. It includes a Service Request from AF to 5GS, Parameter Configuration for the service and Data Transfer for the service
|
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.3.1 Description
| The solution is based on the following assumptions:
- Sensor Data Collection Service utilizes Periodic DO-A Sensor Data Collection Service from Device including AF, AIOTF and AIoT Device. It uses Read/Write command type with the parameter Period or separate command types.
- Sensor Data Collection Service utilizes Per... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.3.2 Procedures
| The procedure is shown in Figure 6.3.2-1. It includes Service Request from AF to 5GS, Parameter Configuration for the Service and Data Transfer for the Service.
Figure 6.3.2-1: Sensor Data Collection Procedure
1. Step 1 to step 6 of Procedure for Command in clause 6.2.3 of TS 23.369 [3] with additional parameters.... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.3.3 Impacts on services, entities and interfaces
| Impacts on existing entities:
AIOTF:
- Receives AIoT Command Request for Sensor Data Collection Service from AF through NEF.
- Performs Inventory procedure and then sends Read Command Request with Period and Sensing Parameters.
- Performs Inventory procedure and then sends Write Command Request with Sensing Paramet... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.4 Solution #4: Architecture enhancements to support DO-A capable devices
| |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.4.0 High-level solution Principles
| This solution proposes call flows to support registration and handling of DO-A capable devices. The solution builds upon an AF request that is to be carried out more than once. The core network uses legacy inventory procedure to find Ambient IoT devices. The Ambient IoT devices indicates their support for registration ... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.4.1 Description
| The Ambient IoT devices of type 2b/c may be able to initiate communication independently with the help of DO-A traffic. This solution builds on the principle that the Ambient IoT device indicates support for registration in response to an AIoT paging message. The support for registration may also be seen as an indicati... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.4.2 Procedures
| |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.4.2.1 Ambient IoT device registration and DO-A execution
|
Figure 6.4.2.1-1: Ambient IoT device registration and DO-A execution
1. The AF sends Nnef_AIoT_Inventory/Command Request (DO-A dependent service request) to the NEF with a service request that is dependent on DO-A. For example, regular reporting of temperature, etc.
2. NEF selects AIOTF as specified in TS 23.369 [3... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.4.2.2 AIoT device capability syncronization
| Editor's note: It is FFS whether this procedure is needed.
Figure 6.4.2.2-1: AIoT device capability synchronization
1. The AIOTF sends NGAP Command Request message (Command request transfer (RAN A-IoT Device NGAP ID, first A-IoT NAS PDU (Command (AIoT device capability request indication)))) to the reader. The AIOT... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.4.3 Impacts on Services, Entities and Interfaces
| AIOTF:
- Support registration of AIoT devices.
- Support AIoT capabilities.
Reader:
- Context handling for DO-A devices.
ADM:
- Registration.
- AIOT device capabilities.
AIoT device:
- Registration.
- AIOT device capabilities.
- DO-A.
|
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.5 Solution #5: DO-A procedure with configured routing information
| |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.5.0 High-level solution Principles
| This solution aims to resolve KI#2 to support DO-A Capable AIoT Devices, the following principles are followed in this solution:
- This solution has reused the architecture defined in clause 4.2.2 of TS 23.369 [3]. This solution is applied to both direct connectivity and indirect connectivity for Topology 1.
- The AI... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.5.1 Description
| This solution resolves KI#2 for support of DO-A Capable AIoT Devices.
This solution has the following assumptions:
1) AIoT Device is pre-configured or configured by the network with DO-A routing information.
2) AIoT Device sends the DO-A routing information along with the DO-A message for AIOTF to find the proper AF... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.5.2 Procedures
| |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.5.2.1 DO-A data subscribe procedure
|
Figure 6.5.2-1: Figure for DO-A data subscribe procedure
1. The AF sends the DO-A data subscribe request to NEF with AF ID and target AIoT device information to subscribe for the notification of the DoA data.
2. NEF performs AIOTF selection based on the target AIoT device information.
3. The NEF sends the DO-A dat... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.5.2.2 DO-A data transfer procedure
|
Figure 6.5.2-2: Procedure for DO-A procedure with configured routing information
0. DoA routing information (e.g. AF ID or AIOTF allocated DO-A association ID) at the AIoT device side or configured by the network as defined in clause 6.5.2.1. Security information for DO-A traffic may also be pre-configured or config... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.5.3 Impacts on services, entities and interfaces
| The solution has impacts on the following entities:
AIoT Device:
- Support to initiate DO-A message transfer procedure and send routing information along with the DO-A data.
AIOTF:
- Support to route the DO-A message to proper NEF/AF according to the routing information.
NG-RAN:
- Support to select the AIOTF base... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.6 Solution #6: Support Reporting operator triggered by events without registration for DO-A capable AIoT Devices
| |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.6.0 High-level Solution Principles
| This solution addresses Key Issue #2 "Support of DO-A Capable AIoT Devices".
AIoT device sends report message when triggered by events, includes pending data, power on, device specific events (e.g. temperature higher than a threshold). The information for the device specific events can be provisioned by AF via Command... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.6.1 Description
| This solution is applicable to both the Direct Connectivity and the Indirect Connectivity architectures as defined of TS 23.369 [3].
For a DO-A capable AIoT Device, the device is triggered by events to report its presence and/or send data to the network.
The principles of this solution are as follows:
- No registrat... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.6.2 Procedures
| Figure 6.6.2-1 describes the Reporting procedure from DO-A capable AIoT Device.
Figure 6.6.2-1: DO-A device reporting procedure
0. The AIoT device is pre-configured with target AF information, e.g. FQDN, by the owner of the AIoT device for routing the information in the Report Request. Allowed AF(s) may be pre-conf... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.6.3 Impacts on Services, Entities and Interfaces
| Editor's note: This clause captures impacts on existing services, entities and interfaces.
AIoT Device:
- Support initiate Report Request procedure triggered by events.
NG-RAN:
- Support AIOTF selection.
AIOTF:
- Support Report Request authorization.
- Support sending Device ID, location information and optional... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.7 Solution #7: DO-A procedure for DO-A Capable AIoT Devices
| |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.7.0 High-level solution Principles
| This solution is for Key Issue #2, corresponding to bullet 3: How an AIoT Device sends data to the AIOTF autonomously. It includes DO-A procedure to send data to the AIOTF, get network resource/assistance information to initial DO-A procedure and DO-A policy information which describe when will perform the DO-A procedu... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.7.1 Description
| This solution is for Key Issue #2, corresponding to bullet 3: How an AIoT Device sends data to the AIOTF autonomously.
This solution is to support for an DO-A Capable AIoT Device autonomously originated DO-A procedure to send data to the AIOTF and support for routing the received data by AIOTF to AF.
The main points ... |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.7.2 Procedures
| The following figure presents a DO-A procedure for DO-A Capable AIoT Devices for Topology 1 and Topology 2.
Figure 6.7.2-1: DO-A procedure for DO-A Capable AIoT Devices
0-a. DO-A Capable AIoT Devices may be pre-configured with network resource/assistance information(e.g. frequency, QoS, Resource Expiration Date, et... |
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