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bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 8.2.3.1 Experimentation results | For the experiments, few traces were provided for the automotive case study. The output from the Bluetooth stack was provided as Bluetooth traces for the experiments. The Bluetooth traces show a pairing process of a car to the phone as shown in figure 33. Each of the Bluetooth traces obtained had a different device loc... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 8.2.3.2 Future works | Currently, the traces are obtained from the Host Controller Interface (HCI) layer, but the efficiency of the approach could be well appreciated if we could obtain traces from other layers (such as L2CAP layers) as there are more parameters than it was possible to monitor for performing security check. However, this ide... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 8.2.4 Security monitoring | Unlike the active fuzzing testing technique described in clause 8.2.2, passive monitoring does not inject any traffic in the network nor try to modify it. This is crucial because any injected message/packet during the system operation may modify the connectivity and communication module (SCM) environment, which is inco... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 8.2.5 Framework | The described fuzzing approach for this case study was integrated within the testing framework of the study's contractor. Following this approach the framework serves as a model based testing (MBT) environment for discreet interconnected embedded systems. Test cases are generated automatically out of a given system mod... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 8.3 Results | During the case study 1 836 test cases were generated based on functional test cases. The number of test cases is controlled by the number of variation, which can be produced with the fuzzing library. The generated test cases have a modification on the payload of the L2CAP messages. Instead of the original device name ... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 8.4 Summary and conclusion | The described combination of a security risk assessment, an effective test generation, and the fuzzing approach was new for the partners of the automotive case study. For upcoming projects Dornier Consulting will consider a feasible security risk assessment. This security risk assessment can be done independently from ... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9 eHealth case study results | |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.1 Case study characterization | Figure 41: The eHealth scenario In the eHealth scenario (see figure 41), ambulant patients are monitored using mobile devices worn by those patients. The mobile devices supply doctors with the vital data they recorded about their patients. The data are uploaded to a central server via wireless communication. From the c... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.1.1 Patient consent | How is the consent of a patient obtained? The consent workflow is newly introduced in this clause. It comprises a two- factor authorization both via the patient's account at the eHealth server and the patient's browser on the one hand and the patient's smart mobile on the other hand. First, the doctor applies for patie... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.1.2 Device pairing | What does the "pairing" workflow look like? In order to authorize the mobile monitoring device, the patient powers on the device (6). After turning it on, the device initiates the communication procedure defined by the device profile of OAuth 2.0, connecting to the pre-configured central eHealth server via wireless com... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.1.3 New application features | The eHealth application scenario described in [i.8] has been expanded to include a number of new features. As described, the eHealth system seen in figure 41 can be used to gather patient information which is recorded by patient monitoring devices. In addition, the eHealth system provides a dashboard, which the doctors... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.2 Security testing approaches | |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.2.1 Formalization | |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.2.1.1 Entity overview | The formal model of the eHealth system knows five types of agents (see Listing 1): a central server; doctors, patients, smart mobiles, and mobile monitoring devices recording patient data. types server < agent; % central server doctor < agent; % doctor patient < agent; % patient smart < agent; % smart mobile of patient... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.2.1.2 Environment and sessions | The session entity instantiates the party involved and informs them about their fellow actors (see Listing 7). It assigns a smart mobile S to patient P and pre-shares the necessary secret SK between S and the central eHealth server by declaring an appropriate fact. body { % of entity Session P->owns(S); SK := fresh(); ... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.2.1.3 Messages | The detailed message workflows for each of the two authorization workflows, consent and pairing, are given in the following. Consent. The consent requested by a doctor D from a patient P was modelled via a two-factor authentication of P using the eHealth server's web interface and her smart mobile S as follows. Figure ... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.2.1.4 Goals | Authenticity. The main goals of two-factor patient consent are that the consent responses by both the patient P herself (via EH's web interface) and by her smart mobile S are authentic and cannot be re-played (see P_consent and S_consent in Listing 16). In the pairing process, the eHealth server authenticates the patie... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.2.2 Analysis results using a model checker | Violations of the given goals were looked for using the model checker CL-AtSe. On the final version of the model, no attacks were found. There was a spurious attack on a previous version of the model, which was due to a mismatch in the assignment of pre- shared secrets SK and smart mobiles S that occurred when two sess... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.2.3 Technical details | The eHealth server consists of three different components which are able to interact with each other as well as with external providers: 1) eHealth Web Front-End 2) Device management platform 3) Two-Factor Authentication Service In the described eHealth scenario, the server side of all three components runs on top of a... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.2.3.1 eHealth web front-end | The eHealth Web Front-End provides a web interface for doctors and patients. It is able to use other components, such as the device management platform or the two-factor authentication service, in order to present both with a user-friendly dashboard with available information. After being authorized by the user using t... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.2.3.2 Device management platform | The device management platform is a central component of the eHealth system which can be used in order to manage medical devices for patient monitoring. Besides providing functionality for setting up new devices, a system is available for assigning them to users based on the OAuth 2.0 Device profile. Additionally, the ... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.2.3.3 Two-factor authentication service | The Two-Factor Authentication Service consists of two components, a RESTful web service running on Tomcat and an Android™ application, and can be called upon in order to request to perform an additional authentication through the use of mobile devices. By sending a request to the web service, the eHealth web front-end ... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.2.4 Improvements of the security model | The previous version eHealth security model comprised only the pairing workflow. The consent workflow is new to the eHealth model in this version. It was necessary to model the consent workflow to match the actual implementation of the eHealth system, as this process was included in the implementation of the eHealth se... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.2.5 Considered security properties and vulnerabilities | The following security properties and vulnerabilities are considered in the experiments discussed within the present document. ETSI ETSI TR 101 582 V1.1.1 (2014-06) 66 |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.2.5.1 Security properties | The focus is on verifying the security properties of: 1) Authenticity 2) Authorization 3) Integrity Privacy: The aim is not primarily to protect user privacy in this scenario. The objective is to explore the effectiveness of the security controls with respect to protecting the IT-Security properties of authenticity, au... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.2.5.2 Vulnerabilities | Similarly as for InfoBase, vulnerabilities were considered from a representative set of the most common low-level security vulnerabilities in web-applications (see for instance OWASP Top 10 https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category: OWASP_Top_Ten_Project) and corresponding to a refinement of the analysis performed in [i... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.3 Results by applying the VERA tool | In the following the experiments are described on applying Vera on the eHealth application. Due to the nature of the attacker models so far available for Vera, the efforts concentrated on testing the Web application that allows patients and doctors to interact with the system and not the protocols with the mobile devic... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.3.1 Password brute force | Brute-force attack uses a given login name and tries to login in with a commonly used password pool in the login interface of eHealth. The library of known user accounts is: • watson (doctor) • hyde (patient) With this information and other system details, the resulting configuration file in Vera is depicted in figure ... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.3.2 File enumeration | To be able to distinguish between different attack scenarios, the tests run for configuration files, backups, administrative interfaces and other hidden files and functionalities in the case of logged users (patients or doctors) and not authenticated users. To test for logged users, the session ID of a logged user shou... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.3.3 CSRF token checking | To check for the presence of CSRF tokens, Vera was applied on the following pages of the eHealth application: Instantiation library 1 IO=[ 2 "eHealthSec/pages/login", 3 "eHealthSec/pages/home", 4 "eHealthSec/pages/edit", 5 "eHealthSec/pages/consent" 6 ] In this case the session ID of logged users (doctors and patients)... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.3.4 SQL injection | To test for SQL injections, different user roles were also used, to maximize the attack surface. For instance the configuration file for a patient is reproduced in figure 52 and the obtained results in figure 53. It was not possible to find any SQL injection vulnerability in the eHealth application. Figure 52: Configur... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.3.5 XSS injection | The testing efforts were focused in the edit (to edit personal data) and consent (to issue new consent requests) sites of the eHealth application. It was possible to find two different kinds of reflected XSS injection in the edit site, as depicted in figure 54 with the configuration illustrated in figure 55. Figure 54:... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.3.6 Path traversal attack | The path traversal attack was applied to all available sites of the eHealth application, but it was not possible to detect any such vulnerability. ETSI ETSI TR 101 582 V1.1.1 (2014-06) 71 |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.3.7 Access control | To be able to test for access control violations a new attacker model was defined in Vera. This attacker tries to iterate the ID of a given parameter to exploit poorly implemented (or non-existent) access control mechanisms. Through the GUI of the eHealth webpage, the following access control should be existing: If a d... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 9.4 Summary and conclusion | In the third project year of SPaCIoS, the various approaches and technologies from the project were further improved and - most importantly - integrated into a common SPaCIoS Tool environment. Using this tool environment, a number of testing exercises were executed on the suggested application scenarios. Most tools and... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10 Document management system case study results | |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.1 Case study characterization | The Infobase Document Repository (IDR) is a document management system that allows for the secure management and sharing of any documents or data files using only a web browser. It is provided by Siemens to offer a collaboration platform for joint projects involving external partners. The repository mechanism supports ... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.2 Security testing approaches | |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.2.1 Security risk assessment of the Infobase application scenario | |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.2.1.1 Background | Today's security testing is often not systematic not enough standardized. In particular, there are no clearly defined criteria for selecting relevant tests. Thus different analysts come to different results and sound quality assurance is hardly possible. Literature suggests basing the choice and prioritization of tests ... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.2.1.2 Scope and goal of the case study | In this clause, it is outlined how the proposed procedure was applied to the Infobase application which was introduced in the SPaCIoS deliverables 5.1 [i.6] and 5.2 [i.7]. The goal of this effort was to apply the methodology to a real world example and in this way, first and foremost, to collect practical experiences an... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.2.1.3 Method walk-through | |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.2.1.3.1 Describe general usage scenarios | Briefly describing the main usage scenarios helps to get a basic understanding of the SUT's purpose and its external actors. Both are prerequisites for all subsequent steps. The following scenarios were noted: • The system allows to store, upload and download files (artefacts) • The possibly sensitive artefacts can be sh... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.2.1.3.2 List assets | In this step, the system owner lists the non-technical assets that the SUT comprises, uses, and protects. In case of the document management application, these were, among other things: • The sensitive repository content such as contract documents or price lists • The correct functioning of the repository 10.2.1.3.3 De... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.2.1.3.4 Identify relevant threats | After a discussion with the Infobase responsible and considering the usage scenarios, two main groups of possible attackers were identified: ETSI ETSI TR 101 582 V1.1.1 (2014-06) 76 Figure 60: Infobase security overview with two different user roles • Internal attackers, that is, legitimate users of the system such as e... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.2.1.3.6 Generate Security Overview | The security overview is the result of a technical system description which captures and structures the security relevant technical aspects of the SUT. Besides providing a better technical understanding of the SUT, the security overview is crucial for the transition from security risk assessment results to security tes... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.2.1.3.7 Map BWCS to Technical Threat Scenario (TTS) | There are two approaches to the mapping of BWCS to technical threat scenarios: (1) Top-down For every BWCS, examine which technical threats could lead to the BWCS. (2) Bottom-up For each DFD model element, brainstorm if any technical threat could pose a security problem which could lead to a, possibly not yet identified... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.2.1.3.8 Map TTSs to test types | The TTSs are still too abstract and need to be further concretized. For this purpose, the concept of test types was suggested. The rules that map TTSs to test types have the following structure: 1) A pattern in an annotated DFD. Besides a mandatory TTS which includes the security property violation, the pattern can inc... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.2.1.4 Lessons learned | The limited time frame of real world security assessments is the most significant obstacle for the industrial application of the proposed full risk-based test selection procedure. (This is also true for any other analysis method that requires additional time). Indeed, security risk assessment and system pre-analysis do ... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.2.2.1 Description of CSRF in Infobase | In this clause the aim is to validate the Infobase specification with respect to Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF). Considering that the objective is to search for CSRF at ASLan/ASLan++ level, it is first defined how to model a web application scenario for this purpose. In order to exploit a CSRF vulnerability, and attac... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.2.2.2 Modeling CSRF in ASLan++ | In this clause it is described how the Infobase ASLan++ specifications, to check for CSRF, are defined. In order to check for CSRF in the ASLan++ specifications two entities are considered: Client/Oracle entity and Server entity. ETSI ETSI TR 101 582 V1.1.1 (2014-06) 80 |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.2.2.2.1 Client | In the Client entity there is a first authentication phase to obtain the cookie and logging in to the web application. Figure 63: CSRF Oracle MSC-the image is from the intruder point of view and the grey part is not visible to the intruder % sends his/her name and password to the server’s login service Actor ->* Server:... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.2.2.2.2 Server | The server entity accepts three different kinds of requests: authentication, request for a web page and request that it has to commit to the web application. With authentication request a Client (not already authenticated) sends to the Server its username and password asking to log in. The Server will check the receive... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.2.2.2.3 Goal | The goal is to check if there is a way for the intruder to commit a request to the web application. csrf_goal: [](!commit(intruderRequest)); From the specification, the only way that the intruder has to commit a request is to bypass the CSRF protection (i.e. CSRF Token). 1 <acflaw> <authz>checkPermissions |contains</aut... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.2.2.3 Result of the analysis of the Infobase model | Both SATMC and CL-Atse concludes that the specification is safe with respect to the CSRF goal. This means that the CSRF protection (i.e. CSRF token) cannot be bypassed, in the modeled scenario, from the DY intruder. ETSI ETSI TR 101 582 V1.1.1 (2014-06) 83 |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.2.3 Mutation-based test generation | From the three semantic mutation operators presented in [i.10], one is applicable to the Infobase model, namely the Access Control Flaw (ACFlaw) operator. The purpose of the ACFlaw operator is to inject into the original model a "Missing Authorization" vulnerability. This task is carried out by removing a symbolic func... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.2.4 Test automation | Test automation in this context is concerned with deriving executable tests from the abstract attack traces generated using the mutation-based test generation technique introduced in clause 8.5. In the following clauses the test automation process and the test tool ScenTest which is used to generate executable test cod... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.2.4.1 The ScenTest tool for scenario-based testing | ScenTest is a tool that enables the description of test scenarios, i.e. test cases, as UML sequence diagrams and the generation of executable JUnit tests. It supports the black-box test of concurrent and distributed systems based on message-based communication. The tool builds on a software modeling tool for modeling t... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.2.4.2 General approach to test automation of AATs | Figure 64 depicts the complete test automation process followed for deriving executable tests from the abstract attack traces generated using the mutation-based test generation technique. The process can be summarized as follows: Manually concretize the attack traces by mapping them to a SUT specific test scenario. Repr... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.2.4.3 Derived test case, test execution and test results | In this clause a listing of attack traces and the test case derived from them are provided as well as the test execution results. |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.2.4.3.1 Test scenario 1: | Infobase_Scene1_contains_step008 Generated abstract attack trace. Follows a listing of the exchanged messages according the generated attack traces used to derive this test case. Figure 64: Test automation approach implemented in ScenTest 1 <?> ->* server : UserIP(123).UserName(123).Password (123) 2 server *->* <UserIP... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.2.4.3.2 Test scenario 2: | Infobase_Scene1_contains_step010 Generated abstract attack trace. Follows a listing of the exchanged messages according the generated attack traces used to derive this test case. 4 <i> *->* server : 5 cookie(usr1,Role(127),Nonce(127)).request1 server *->* <i> 6 : request1.answerOn(request1) Listing 24: AAT Infobase_Sce... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.2.4.3.3 Test Scenario 3: | Infobase_Scene1_checkPermissions_step010 Generated abstract attack trace. Follows a listing of the exchanged messages according the generated attack traces used to derive this test case. 7 UserIP(125) ->* <server > : UserIP(125).usr1.n113(Password) 8 <?> ->* server : i.usr2.n111(Password) server *->* <i>: 9 cookie(usr2... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.3 Results by applying the VERA Tool | |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.3.1 Considered vulnerabilities | In the following it is summarized the low-level vulnerabilities considered for this problem case. The considered vulnerabilities are a representative set of: Figure 67: Test automation for Infobase_Scene1_checkPermissions_step010 The most common low-level security vulnerabilities in web-applications and correspond to a... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.3.2 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) | It was applied the general injection model described in [i.5] with JavaScript payloads to InfoBase, but obtained no interesting results. However, during these tests it was noticed that some interesting tests cases were being neglected because the initial model did not take CSRF tokens present in InfoBase into account. ... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.3.3 SQL injection | To be able to test for SQL injection, the modified injection model was necessary as discussed in the previous clause. However, no SQL injection vulnerability was found in InfoBase. |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.3.4 Password brute-forcing | The goal of this experiment was to test the password brute force model as introduced in [i.5] to the InfoBase implementation, in particular to the log-in main interface (figure 70). For readability, this model is recalled in figure 69. Figure 69: Model "password_brute_force" ETSI ETSI TR 101 582 V1.1.1 (2014-06) 90 For... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.3.5 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) | Testing for Cross-site Request Forgery in an automated way is a challenging task, because the side-effects of a vulnerable action may vary widely from application to application. Therefore the focus was on a task that is more amenable to automatic testing: validating the strength of CSRF tokens. Infobase has CSRF token... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.3.6 File enumeration | The File Enumeration model of figure 71 was applied to InfoBase, with an instantiation library containing common directory and file names, in order to detect hidden interfaces to the system or forgotten backup files. Figure 71: File enumeration model The model checks if the tested file is found by looking at the response ... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 10.4 Summary and conclusions | In the third project year of SPaCIoS, the various approaches and technologies from the project were improved further and most importantly integrated into a common SPaCIoS Tool environment. Using this tool environment, a number of testing exercises were executed on the suggested application scenarios. Most tools and tec... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 11 Evaluation and assessment of case study results | To analyse the effectiveness of the model-based security testing techniques, tools and methods the DIAMONDS project has developed a profiling and assessment scheme called STIP (Security Testing Improvement Profile), which allows an objective, detailed analysis and evaluation of the case studies. The scheme allows an as... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 11.1 Approach: Security Testing Improvements Profiling (STIP) | The Security Testing Improvement Profiling Scheme (STIP Scheme) has been developed in the DIAMONDS project to assess the maturity and performance of the case studies and their model-based security testing processes. The approach was based on the general ideas of TMMi [i.12] and TPI™ [i.13], [i.14]. Thus, a selected set... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 11.1.1 Security risk assessment | Security risk assessment is a process for identifying security risks consisting of the following steps: establishing context, security risk identification, security risk estimation, security risk evaluation, and security risk treatment. Table 5: Progress level for security risk assessment # Name Description L1 Informal... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 11.1.2 Security test identification | Test identification is the process of identifying test purposes and appropriate security testing methods, techniques and tools. This can either be done by means of analysing the requirements of a system or by taking additional sources of information on the system, the relevance of its features and its environment (e.g.... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 11.1.3 Automated generation of test models | For model-based security testing (e.g. fuzzing, mutation based testing), a template or various levels of behavioural models are required. These templates or models can be either created manually or generated automatically from the system's input and output. Table 7: Progress level for automated generation of test model... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 11.1.4 Security test generation | Security test generation is about the automation of security test design. The initial level consists in a fully manual design of security tests, and the higher level consists in an optimized security test generation process, including a complete coverage of targeted security properties and/or vulnerabilities. ETSI ETSI... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 11.1.5 Fuzzing | Fuzzing is about injecting invalid or random inputs in order to reveal unexpected behaviour to identify errors and expose potential vulnerabilities. Ideally, fuzzers generate semi-valid input data, i.e. input data that is invalid only in small portions. Depending on fuzzer's knowledge about the protocol, fuzzers can ge... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 11.1.6 Security test execution automation | During active security testing, the test environment applies malicious input data based on attack scenarios in order to find existing security flaws. The automation of security test execution conducts the automatic application of malicious data to the SUT, the automatic assessment of the SUT's state and output to clear... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 11.1.7 Security passive testing/ security monitoring | Security monitoring based on passive testing consists of detecting errors, vulnerabilities and security flaws in a system under test (SUT) or in operation by observing its behaviour (input/output) without interfering with its normal operations (no external stimulations). Table 11: Progress level for security passive te... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 11.1.8 Static security testing | Static security testing involves analysing application without executing it. The main objective of static security testing is to find vulnerabilities in the applications that are caused by code level bugs, missing functionality, configuration error etc. One of the main components is code analysis. The code could be sou... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 11.1.9 Security test tool integration | Tool integration is the ability of tools to cooperate. Typically, tools work on their own data structures that are well suited to the task, which needs to be performed with or by the tool. So the tool can only process data that is relevant for the tool. Tools can save and load their internal data to a file which may ha... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 11.2 Evaluation results: STIP evaluation of the Case Studies | The DIAMONDS project has carried out eight case studies that show the applicability of the DIAMONDS innovations in relevant industrial domains like Banking, Smart Cards, Industrial Automation, Radio Protocols, Transport/Automotive, and Critical Infrastructures. The STIP approach has been used to evaluate all of the DIA... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 11.2.1 Evaluation of the banknote processing machine case study | Banknote processing machines are used in central, large and medium banks and also in CITs (cash in transport) and other organizations that handle large amounts of banknotes. These machines are usually configured to work in a network. During the DIAMONDS project the focus of security tests has been on two major subsyste... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 11.2.2 Evaluation of the banking case study | In order to assess the results of the DIAMONDS project on the case study one can look at the Security Test Improvement Profile (STIP) before the start of the project and now. Figure 75 shows the score before the project started in red and after the project in blue. ETSI ETSI TR 101 582 V1.1.1 (2014-06) 102 Figure 75: S... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 11.2.3 Evaluation of the radio protocol case study | In order to assess the results of the DIAMONDS project on the case study one can look at the Security Test Improvement Profile (STIP) before the start of the project and now. Figure 76 shows the score before the project started in red and after the project in blue. Figure 76: Security Test Improvement Profile Compariso... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 11.2.4 Evaluation of the automotive case study | In order to assess the results of the DIAMONDS project on the case study one can look at the Security Test Improvement Profile (STIP) before the start of the project and now. Figure 77 shows the score before the project started in red and after the project in blue. Figure 77: Security Test Improvement Profile Compariso... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 11.2.5 Evaluation of the eHealth case study | eHealth is an area of rapid innovation. Many different solutions are being discussed that intend to integrate mobile Patient Monitoring and centralized or distributed electronic Health Records Management systems. Siemens is developing, testing, and assessing the security of different variants to implement such a system... |
bd28b397d90ae09c9326d725e6e18150 | 101 582 | 11.2.6 Evaluation of the document management case study | The Infobase Document Repository (IDR) is a document management system that supports the collaboration of different users, with different security levels and from different administrative domains. The management and sharing of documents or other types of files is done via a web browser. It is provided to offer a platfo... |
d889670bb13fe140b45857bdfc45bcfd | 101 618 | 1 Scope | The present Working Package of the NPTF has the responsibility to study the issue of Location Portability utilizing to the greatest possible degree the work already done in the NPTF on Service Provider Portability. The different variants of Location Portability [1] should be investigated against a representative choice... |
d889670bb13fe140b45857bdfc45bcfd | 101 618 | 2 References | The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. • References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. • For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. • Fo... |
d889670bb13fe140b45857bdfc45bcfd | 101 618 | 3 Definitions and abbreviations | |
d889670bb13fe140b45857bdfc45bcfd | 101 618 | 3.1 Definitions | For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in Working Package 0 [1] and the following apply. exchange area: Area served by one specific exchange. The exchange area may be different for different operators. numbering area: Area where a specific part of a number, mostly called area code, is... |
d889670bb13fe140b45857bdfc45bcfd | 101 618 | 3.2 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: CLI Calling Line Identification GSM Global System for Mobile communications ISDN Integrated Services Digital Network |
d889670bb13fe140b45857bdfc45bcfd | 101 618 | 4 Aspects on location portability | |
d889670bb13fe140b45857bdfc45bcfd | 101 618 | 4.1 Number types | |
d889670bb13fe140b45857bdfc45bcfd | 101 618 | 4.1.1 Non-geographic numbers | The nature of non-geographic numbers is to have no geographic meaning. This can be service numbers, mobile numbers or other non-geographic numbers. Service numbers are, mostly in an IN-System, translated to a certain geographic number. This routing can be depending on the weekday and the time of day and also some other... |
d889670bb13fe140b45857bdfc45bcfd | 101 618 | 4.1.2 Geographic numbers | Geographic numbers consist of an area code and a following subscriber number. Beside the area code, the subscriber number can also consist of one part, the first few digits, standing for a geographic area, mostly the serving area of an exchange, and the other part, identifying a certain customer located in that area, o... |
d889670bb13fe140b45857bdfc45bcfd | 101 618 | 4.2 Areas of location portability | |
d889670bb13fe140b45857bdfc45bcfd | 101 618 | 4.2.1 Exchange area | Location portability within an area served by the same exchange has been provided by most of the network providers since the beginning. Exceptions may exist, where plans for division of the exchange area are prepared, or one of the following aspects apply. Modern network architecture may centralize control of several e... |
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