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3e324ca7bd9a22c18382e613feac7446 | 100 521 | 4.2.2 Signalling procedures | Signalling procedures supporting OACSU are specified in Technical Specification GSM 04.08. |
3e324ca7bd9a22c18382e613feac7446 | 100 521 | 4.3 Security related services | PLMNs will offer three security related services on the radio path: confidentiality of the user identity, confidentiality of user data and confidentiality of signalling information elements and connectionless user data. |
3e324ca7bd9a22c18382e613feac7446 | 100 521 | 4.3.1 Identity confidentiality | This service provides for the privacy of the identities of subscribers. An intruder cannot identify which subscriber is using a certain resource on the radio path. Instead of IMSI a temporary identity is used. |
3e324ca7bd9a22c18382e613feac7446 | 100 521 | 4.3.1.1 Circuit switched services | This identity (TMSI) is a local number only valid in a given location area. The TMSI is allocated by the VLR and is sent to the MS in a ciphered mode, when ciphering is available as a network option. The IMSI and IMEI should also be transmitted in ciphered mode, whenever the procedure allows this, and when ciphering is... |
3e324ca7bd9a22c18382e613feac7446 | 100 521 | 4.3.1.2 Packet switched services | The packet temporary mobile subscriber identity (P-TMSI) is a local number only valid in a given routing area. The P- TMSI is allocated by the SGSN and is sent to the MS in a ciphered mode, when ciphering is available as a network option. The structure of the TLLI is defined in Technical Specification GSM 03.03. |
3e324ca7bd9a22c18382e613feac7446 | 100 521 | 4.3.2 User data confidentiality | This service provides for the confidentiality of anything transmitted on a traffic channel. |
3e324ca7bd9a22c18382e613feac7446 | 100 521 | 4.3.2.1 Circuit switched services | Encryption/decryption is done in the MS and BSS with a key which is calculated in both the MS and network. Detailed information is given in Technical Specification GSM 03.20. |
3e324ca7bd9a22c18382e613feac7446 | 100 521 | 4.3.2.2 Packet switched services | Encryption/decryption is done in the MS and SGSN with a key which is calculated in both the MS and network. Detailed information is given in Technical Specification GSM 03.20. |
3e324ca7bd9a22c18382e613feac7446 | 100 521 | 4.3.3 Signalling Information Element Confidentiality | This service provides for the confidentiality of anything transmitted on a signalling channel |
3e324ca7bd9a22c18382e613feac7446 | 100 521 | 4.3.3.1 Circuit switched services | Signalling information to control the service offered to a subscriber or connectionless user data can be encrypted/decrypted. Encryption/decryption is done in the MS and BSS with a key which is calculated in both the MS and the network. Detailed information is given in Technical Specification GSM 03.20. |
3e324ca7bd9a22c18382e613feac7446 | 100 521 | 4.3.3.2 Packet switched services | Signalling information to control the service offered to a subscriber can be encrypted/decrypted. Encryption/decryption is done in the MS and SGSN with a key which is calculated in both the MS and the network. Detailed information is given in Technical Specification GSM 03.20. |
3e324ca7bd9a22c18382e613feac7446 | 100 521 | 4.4 Discontinuous Reception | Discontinuous reception is a technique used to reduce the battery consumption ofMSs. The operation of the technique is specified in Technical Specification GSM 03.13. This function must be supported by the network, but is optional forMSs. ETSI ETSI TS 100 521 V7.0.0 (1999-09) 16 (GSM 03.01 version 7.0.0 Release 1998) |
3e324ca7bd9a22c18382e613feac7446 | 100 521 | 4.5 Discontinuous Transmission | Discontinuous transmission is a technique used to reduce overall interference level on the radio interface, and to reduce the battery consumption in the MSs. The operation of the technique is specified in Technical Specification GSM 05.08. This function must be supported by the MSs, whereas only the receiver requiremen... |
3e324ca7bd9a22c18382e613feac7446 | 100 521 | 4.6 Support of DTMF | DTMF is supported as defined in Technical Specification GSM 03.14. |
3e324ca7bd9a22c18382e613feac7446 | 100 521 | 5 Network management oriented network functions | Network management functions are dealt with in the 12 series of GSM Technical Specifications. An overview is given in Technical Specification GSM 12.00. ETSI ETSI TS 100 521 V7.0.0 (1999-09) 17 (GSM 03.01 version 7.0.0 Release 1998) Annex A (informative): Change Request History Change history SMG No. TDoc. No. CR. No. ... |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 1 Scope | The present document supports the preparation of the answer to the EU standardisation request "Standardisation request to the European standardisation organisations as regards a European Trusted Data Framework in support of Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 of the European Parliament and of the Council" [i.3] further on called... |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 2 References | |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 2.1 Normative references | Normative references are not applicable in the present document. ETSI ETSI TR 104 409 V1.1.1 (2025-06) 7 |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: ACME CSE: open source CSE Middleware for Education connected product: item that obtains, generates or collects data concerning its use or environment and that is able to communicate product data via an electronic communications service, physical conne... |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: 3GPP 3rd Generation Partnership Project AE Application Entity API Application Programming Interface ARIB Association of Radio Industries and Business ATIS Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions BDVA Big Data Value Association CCSA ... |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 4 EU Data Act requirements analysis | |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 4.1 Introduction | On 22 December 2023 the EU Data Act [i.4] has been published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The Regulation has got into force on 11 January 2024 and, after a transition phase, will be European wide law after 12 September 2025. The EU Data Act [i.4] makes more data available for use, and sets up rules on... |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 4.2 EU Data Act Article 33 | Article 33 of the EU Data Act [i.4] is titled "Essential requirements regarding interoperability of data, of data sharing mechanisms and services, as well as of common European data spaces". This article addresses participants in Data Spaces that offer data or data services to other participants. It requests them to co... |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 4.3 EU Data Act Article 35 | The article 35 of the EU Data Act [i.4] is titled "Interoperability of data processing services". This article addresses open interoperability specifications and harmonised standards for the interoperability of data processing services. It requests them to comply with the essential requirements listed in article 35. Ar... |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 5.1 Introduction | The EU Data Act [i.4] article 33 (4) requires the European Commission to "request one or more European standardisation organisations to draft harmonised standards that satisfy the essential requirements laid down in paragraph 1 of article 33". Referring to this paragraph, the European Commission made available the draf... |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 5.3 DSSC Blueprint | |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 5.3.1 The DSSC | The Data Spaces Support Centre [i.24] is a European Project, fully funded under the Digital Europe Programme (DIGITAL) [i.25]. The project is coordinated by Fraunhofer Gesellschaft Zur Forderung Der Angewandten Forschung Ev (Germany). Other participants are: • Data Ai And Robotics Dairo (Belgium) • Capgemini Belgium (B... |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 5.3.2 The DSSC Blueprint | According to the provisions of the funding EU Project, the DSSC created an operational portal [i.26] from which the Blueprint [i.5] has been made available to the public. The DSSC Blueprint [i.5] is a foundational document that outlines the vision, structure, and operational framework for establishing and supporting Eu... |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 5.3.3 Data Spaces | The Blueprint [i.5] recalls that, seemingly, there currently is no formal/legal definition of a data space, so for the purpose of its scope uses a definition taken from [i.23]: "Interoperable framework, based on common governance principles, standards, practices and enabling services, that enables trusted data transact... |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 5.3.4 Building Blocks | The Blueprint [i.5] introduces the concept of "Building Blocks", i.e. a set of capabilities that are needed to successfully implement instances of Data Spaces, and classifies them into two categories, that are further articulated int subcategories: 1) Business and Organisational Building Blocks: a) Business: includes t... |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 5.3.5 Building Blocks: The Control Plane | The Control Plane is responsible for identifying users and determine how the Data Plane will manage the actual data exchange, thus enforcing access and usage policies. Typical interactions in the Control Plane are: • Identity and Attestations: for this purpose, the Blueprint suggests the use of the W3C Verifiable Crede... |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 5.3.6 Building Blocks: The Data Plane | While the Control Plane can be very similar between different Data Spaces, the Blueprint takes the position that, instead, the Data Plane can and will vary greatly. For each case, appropriate semantics and APIs are requested to be selected. The Blueprint cites some typical approaches that are adopted in some domains, e... |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 5.3.7 Reusability | The Blueprint stresses the importance of avoiding to "reinvent the wheel", by reusing existing specifications. This approach saves valuable man time, avoiding pitfalls and, in general build on the experience of others. For technical building blocks, it suggests to refer to specific open standards that are considered as... |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 5.3.8 Interoperability / Data Exchange | The Blueprint pays special attention to interoperability, making specific reference to article 33 of the EU Data Act [i.4]. It recalls the importance of interoperability, not only internally to a single data space instance but also to enable synergies with other Data Spaces (intra-data space versus cross-data space int... |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 5.3.9 DSSC ToolBox | As a help to choose software for the implementation of Services, the DSSC offers the ToolBox [i.37], defined as: • "DSSC Toolbox is a catalogue of data space solutions (tools) that are aligned with the DSSC Blueprint and have passed the Toolbox validation scheme". |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 5.3.10 Remarks | The Blueprint offers valuable propositions and insights. Among them, perhaps the most significant are: 1) The great care in which the non-technical part of creating and maintaining Data Spaces is described, recalling the need for governance, adherence to legislation, creation of trust (and keeping it over time), intero... |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 5.4 DCAT Vocabulary | DCAT is an RDF vocabulary designed to enhance interoperability among data catalogues published on the Web. This document outlines the schema and includes usage examples. By using a standardized model and vocabulary, DCAT allows publishers to describe datasets and data services within a catalogue, facilitating metadata ... |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 6 Existing applicable ETSI specifications | |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 6.1 oneM2M specifications | |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 6.1.1 What is oneM2M | Historically, oneM2M originates as a European standard in ETSI, which subsequently evolved into a global partnership project. Promoting its adoption helps strengthening European thought leadership. oneM2M is a global "de jure" standard, not controlled by any single private company. oneM2M was launched in 2012 as a glob... |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 6.1.2 oneM2M as an Interworking Platform for General Information | oneM2M offers several features that make it suitable as a technical building block in the context of Data Spaces. In fact, while it is common to think of oneM2M as a framework oriented to the handling of IoT data, its design allows exchanging information across different sources (platforms, Data Spaces, devices). The f... |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 6.1.3 Mapping of oneM2M versus EU Data Act Article 33 | The paragraphs below report how oneM2M features match the standardization requirements derived from the EU Data Act [i.4] article 33 as summarized in clause 4.2. The following requirements apply to participants in Data Spaces that offer data or data services to other participants. oneM2M is not a participant in a Data ... |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 6.1.5 Mapping of oneM2M versus the DSSC Blueprint | The paragraphs below report how oneM2M features match the requirements by the DSSC Blueprint as described in clause 5.3. Data Spaces The oneM2M specifications define an information management and interoperability framework that enables the creation of Data Spaces taking into account the concepts mentioned in clause 5.3... |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 6.2 ETSI SAREF specifications | The Smart Applications REFerence (SAREF) is a methodology supporting the creation of data repositories containing series of data produced through Internet of Things (IoT) devices. The SAREF methodology is instantiated by means of a suite of ontologies [i.1] forms a shared model of consensus intended to enable semantic ... |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 6.3 ETSI NGSI-LD specifications | NGSI-LD [i.39] is information model and API for publishing, querying and subscribing to context information. It enables structured information sharing across multiple domains like smart cities, smart industries, and digital twins. Standardized by ETSI through ISG CIM, it builds on decades of context management research... |
81658b232a32cde16e261a8aa7691011 | 104 409 | 7 Conclusions | The article 33 of the EU Data Act [i.4] addresses participants in Data Spaces that offer data or data services to other participants. It requests them to comply with the essential requirements listed in it. Following article 33 (4), which requires the European Commission to "request one or more European standardisation... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 1 Scope | The present document describes the O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment. It identifies assets to be protected, analyses the O-RAN components for vulnerabilities, examines potential threats associated with those vulnerabilities, provides security principles which stakeholders should address when building a... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 2 References | |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 2.1 Normative references | Normative references are not applicable in the present document. |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ETSI TR 121 905 [i.1], O-RAN [i.6], [i.9], [i.11] and the following apply: O-Cloud instance ID: unique identifier assigned to components within the O-Cloud platform, including VMs, pods, containers, nodes, and compute pools (i.e. a cluster in Kubernetes®) rad... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in ETSI TR 121 905 [i.1] and the following apply: AAL Acceleration Abstraction Layer AALI Acceleration Abstraction Layer Interface AALI-C Acceleration Abstraction Layer Interface-Common AALI-C-App Acceleration Abstraction Layer Interface-Common-Applicati... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 4 Overview | |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 4.1 Objective and structure | O-RAN architecture [i.6] differs significantly from the architecture of 3GPP RAN. It involves introducing new components, interfaces, and technologies, which give rise to new actors (stakeholders) and enable novel business models. Consequently, the attack surface expands considerably, and it is anticipated that O-RAN d... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 4.2 Methodology | The methodology adopted in the present document is based on the standard ISO 27005 [i.7] which provide a detailed and flexible structure to release a risk assessment. Refer to NIST SP 800-154 [i.13] for the definition of Attack, Attack Surface, Attack Vector, Controls, Risk, Risk Mitigation, Threat, and Vulnerability. ... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 4.3 Perimeter | |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 4.3.0 Introduction | This clause comprises the architecture in the scope of the security analysis. The architecture includes the list of O-RAN components, interfaces and protocols manipulating critical assets and implementing security functions. |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 4.3.1 Scope regarding architecture | As specified in [i.6], the logical architecture of O-RAN includes the following components, interfaces and protocols: O-RAN components: • Network functions and applications - Service Management and Orchestration (SMO) - Non-RT RIC and rApps - Near-RT RIC and xApps - O-CU-CP/UP ETSI ETSI TR 104 106 V3.0.0 (2025-06) 13 -... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 4.3.2 Out of scope components | The following components are not in the perimeter of the O-RAN system defined by the alliance; therefore, they are considered out of scope of this study: • 3GPP interfaces are already studied and maintained by 3GPP; • UE; • MEC; • Core; • Antennas. |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 5 Statement of compatibility with 3GPP | |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 5.0 Introduction | This clause gives the statement of compatibility with 3GPP/SCAS security Assets, Threats and Requirements. The statement of compatibility shows that 3GPP Assets/Threats/Requirements are applicable and that there is no conflict affecting the security of O-RAN components. ETSI ETSI TR 104 106 V3.0.0 (2025-06) 15 |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 5.1 Assets and Threats | Table 5-1: Statement of compatibility with 3GPP - Assets and Threats 3GPP/SCAS document reference/clause Description Applicable to O-RAN Rationale ETSI TR 133 926 [i.4], clauses 5 and 6 It describes the generic assets and threats of 3GPP network products. Yes Since these assets/threats are for generic 3GPP (virtualized... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 5.2 Security requirements | Table 5-2: Statement of compatibility with 3GPP - Security requirements 3GPP/SCAS document reference/clause Description Applicable to O-RAN Rationale ETSI TS 133 117 [i.5], clauses 4.3 and 4.42 It describes the general approach taken towards security functional requirements deriving from 3GPP specifications and the cor... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 6 Roles-Assumptions-Assets | |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 6.1 Stakeholders roles and responsibilities | The main stakeholders managing and using the O-RAN system are the following: Table 6-1: Roles and responsibilities Role Description Mobile Network Operator (MNO) Who offers network services and has a license to operate in allocated spectrum. Orchestrator Who is in charge of operating and orchestrating the O-RAN service... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 6.2 Void | |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 6.3 Critical assets | Table 6-2 gives the list of critical assets to be protected within the O-RAN system. An asset in this context may encompass data, interface or component deemed valuable for the O-RAN system. A component is defined as an O-RAN network function or architectural element. Here's an explanation of each column, along with gu... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7 Threat model | |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.1 Threat surface | The O-RAN architecture [i.6] introduces new functions and interfaces. The introduction of additional interfaces and nodes, and the decoupling of hardware and software, expands the threat and attack surface of the network. For the purposes of the present document, threat surfaces are divided into six (6) main groups: • ... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.2 Threat agent | For the purposes of the present document, threat agents are categorized as follows: • Cyber-criminals: Represents individuals who commits cybercrimes, where he/she makes use of the computer either as a tool or as a target or as both. • Insiders: Represents malicious attacks perpetrated on a network or computer system b... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.3 Potential vulnerabilities | The present document addresses the following potential security vulnerabilities that are exploitable through attacks against Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability: • O-RAN specific vulnerabilities - Unauthorized access to O-DU, O-CU-CP, O-CU-UP and RU to degrade RAN performance or execute broader network attack ... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4 Threats | |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.0 Introduction | For the purposes of the present document, threats are grouped in eight categories: • Threats against O-RAN system • Threats against O-CLOUD • Threats to open source code • Physical threats • Threats against 5G radio networks • Threats against ML system • Protocol stack threats • SMO threats The threat analysis is carri... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.1 Threats against O-RAN system | |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.1.1 Common among O-RAN components | The O-RAN system architecture introduces the following common threats among its components: Threat ID T-O-RAN-01 Threat title An attacker exploits insecure designs or lack of adoption in O-RAN components Threat description Unauthenticated/unauthorized access to O-RAN components could possibly be achieved via the differ... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.1.2 Threats against the fronthaul interface and M-S-C-U planes | The LLS architecture and the fronthaul interface introduce the following threats: Figure 7-1: Threats and Vulnerabilities for O-RAN LLS 7-2x Threat ID T-FRHAUL-01 Threat title An attacker penetrates O-DU and beyond through O-RU or the Fronthaul interface [i.12] Threat description When having two different vendors, the ... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.1.3 Threats against O-RU | The O-RU introduces the following threats: Threat ID T-ORU-01 Threat title An attacker stands up a false base station attack by attacking an O-RU Threat description A false base station attack occurs when an attacker masquerades as a legitimate mobile network to facilitate a Man-in-The-Middle (MiTM) attack between a su... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.1.4 Threats against Near-RT RIC | Near-Real-Time (RT) RIC introduces the following threats: Figure 7-2: UE Identification in Near-RT-RIC Threat ID T-NEAR-RT-01 Threat title Malicious xApps can exploit UE identification, track UE location and change UE priority [i.12] Threat description xApps in the Near-RT-RIC have the capability to manipulate behaviou... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.1.5 Threats against Non-RT RIC | Threats against Non-RT RIC include: Threat ID T-NONRTRIC-01 Threat title An attacker penetrates the Non-RT RIC to cause a denial of service or degrade the performance Threat description An attacker penetrates the Non-RT RIC through the SMO and attempts to trigger a Denial of Service or degrade the performance of non-RT... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.1.6 Threats against xApps | xApps introduce the following threats: Figure 7-3: Near-RT-RIC and xApps conflict with gNB Near-RT RIC Near-RT RIC O-gNB Normal service (dynamic) Denial-of-service / degraded service quality xApps xApps (especially 3PP xApps and those using FOSS) can attack availability ETSI ETSI TR 104 106 V3.0.0 (2025-06) 40 Threat I... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.1.7 Threats against rApps | Threats against rApps include: Threat ID T-rAPP-01 Threat title Conflicting rApps unintentionally or maliciously impact O-RAN system functions to degrade performance or trigger a DoS Threat description rApps in the Non-RT RIC can be provided by different vendors. For example, one vendor can provide the rApp for Carrier... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.1.8 Threats against PNF | NFs could be either VNF, CNF or PNF. Vulnerabilities of a PNF could be used as a starting point for an attack against VNFs/CNFs. Threat ID T-PNF-01 Threat title An attacker compromises a PNF to launch reverse attacks and other attacks against VNFs/CNFs Threat description A lack of security policies to protect mixed PNF... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.1.9 Threats against R1 interface | The R1 interface facilitates inter-connection between rApps and Non-RT RIC framework supplied by different vendors, and provides a level of abstraction between rApps and Non-RT RIC framework/SMO that can be the consumers and or producers of R1 services. Threat ID T-R1-01 Threat title An attacker gains unauthorized acce... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.1.10 Threats against A1 interface | A1 interface enables the Non-RT RIC function to provide policy-based guidance, ML model management and enrichment information to the Near-RT RIC function for RAN can optimization. The Non-RT RIC can provide enrichment information over the A1 interface to support the policy enforcement in the Near-RT RIC. The A1 interfa... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.1.11 Threats against application life cycle | Threat ID T-AppLCM-01 Threat title Compromise of App/VNF/CNF update package integrity prior to onboarding Threat description Attackers gains access to the SMO to modify the App/VNF/CNF update package to enable a malicious application. Threat type Tampering; Denial of Service Impact type Integrity; Availability Affected... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.1.12 Threats against E2 interface | E2 is a logical interface connecting the Near-RT RIC with an E2 Node as defined in [i.25]. The E2 functions are grouped into the following categories: • Near-RT RIC Services • Near-RT RIC support functions Threat ID T-E2-01 Threat title Untrusted Near-RT-RIC and/or E2 Nodes Threat description A malicious E2 Node commun... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.1.13 Threats against Y1 interface | The Near-RT RIC provides RAN Analytics Information (RAI) services via Y1 service interface. These services can be consumed by Y1 consumers by subscribing to or requesting the RAN analytics information via the Y1 service interface. Y1 consumers may be Application Functions (AFs) which are within an O-RAN trusted domain.... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.2 Threats against O-CLOUD | |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.2.0 Introduction | Virtualization and containerization technologies in O-RAN introduce the following relevant threats. |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.2.1 Generic Threats | Threat ID T-GEN-01 Threat title Software flaw attack Threat description Code of host OS, Hypervisor/Container Engine and VNF/CNF can include flaws that an attacker can exploit if they are present. As O-RAN software components relies on opensource software, opensource libraries, 3rd party components. Vulnerability in an... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.2.2 Threats concerning VMs/Containers | Threat ID T-VM-C-01 Threat title Abuse of a privileged VM/Container Threat description It is possible to run VMs/Containers with unintended configurations. Such misconfigurations can help the adversaries to compromise even strongest of VM/Container isolation measures. Such misconfigurations scenarios include: • A VMs/C... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.2.3 Threats concerning VM/Container images | Threat ID T-IMG-01 Threat title VM/Container images tampering Threat description An attacker can inject malicious code or tamper the information inside the unprotected image during on boarding. Then after the instantiation of the VNF/CNF, the tampered code can cause DoS, information stealing, frauds and so on. There ar... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.2.5 Threats concerning O-Cloud interfaces | |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.2.5.1 O2 interface | Two main interfaces are defined in O-RAN WG6 specification and identified as critical assets of O-Cloud, i.e. interfaces O2 between O-Cloud and SMO. The threats on these interfaces are as follows. Threat ID T-O2-01 Threat title MitM attacks on O2 interface between O-Cloud and SMO Threat description If the interface O2 ... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.2.5.2 O-Cloud API | Threat ID T-OCAPI-01 Threat title MitM attacks on O-Cloud interface between VNFs/CNFs and the virtualization layer Threat description An attacker can attack an instantiated VNF/CNF through a compromised virtualization layer. For example, cryptographic keys or other security critical data of an instantiated VNF/CNF coul... |
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