hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 7 13 | section stringlengths 3 121 | content stringlengths 0 2.2M |
|---|---|---|---|
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.2.6 Threats concerning hardware resources | Threat ID T-HW-01 Threat title Cross VM/Container side channel attacks Threat description In a typical cross-VM/Container side channel attack scenario, an adversary places a malicious VM/Container co-resident to the target VM/Container so that they share the same hardware resources. Then, the attacker extracts useful i... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.2.7 Threats concerning O-Cloud management (SMO, NFO, FOCOM) | Threat ID T-ADMIN-01 Threat title Denial of service against NFO/FOCOM Threat description A denial-of-service attack against the NFO/FOCOM can interfere with the ability of operators to control and maintain their deployments. This can lead to the inability to react to changing resource requirements. In addition, the NFO... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.2.8 Threats concerning Acceleration Abstraction Layer (AAL) | Threat ID T-AAL-01 Threat title Attacker exploits insecure API to gain access to hardware accelerator resources Threat description Insecure AAL API allows an attacker to tamper the requests/responses sent between the AAL components, the O-Cloud platform and O-RAN APPs/VNFs/CNFs. For example, the attacker can tamper req... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.2.9 Threats concerning O-Cloud instance ID | Threat ID T-O-CLOUD-ID-01 Threat title ID reuse in O-Cloud's object lifecycle Threat description In O-Cloud, objects such as Containers, Pods, Nodes, and Services are identified by their IDs within a given compute pool (e.g. cluster in Kubernetes®). When an object is deleted, its ID becomes available for reuse. This me... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.3 Threats to open source code | Open source introduces the following threats: Threat ID T-OPENSRC-01 Threat title Developers use SW components with known vulnerabilities and untrusted libraries that can be exploited by an attacker through a backdoor attack Threat description The O-RAN Software Community is a Linux Foundation project, supported and fu... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.4 Physical Threats | Threat ID T-PHYS-01 Threat title An intruder into a site gains physical access to O-RAN components to cause damage or access sensitive data Threat description Physical attacks on the O-RAN deployment that stores or processes keys, user plane data, control plane data and management data in cleartext. O-RAN physical comp... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.5 Threats against 5G radio networks | Threats against 5G radio networks include: Threat ID T-RADIO-01 Threat title Disruption through radio Jamming, Sniffing and Spoofing Threat description Like for any wireless technology, disruption through radio jamming is possible by analysing the physical downlink and uplink control channels and signals. 5G radio netw... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.6 Threats against ML system | This clause provides the relevant threats against the ML system implemented in O-RAN architecture. The threats listed here below are generic to cover the ML model and not refined at ML components (training and inference hosts) due to the various deployment scenarios that are considered for ML architecture/framework in ... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.7 Protocol Stack Threats | The A1 and R1 interfaces use the REST protocol stack shown in Figure 7-13. The transport network layer is built on IP transport. TCP provides the communication service at the transport layer. HTTP is the application-level protocol used providing reliable transport of messages. TLS provides secure HTTP connections for s... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.8 SMO Threats | |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.8.1 General SMO Threats | Threat ID T-SMO-01 Threat title External attacker exploits authentication weakness on SMO Threat description An external attacker can exploit the improper/missing authentication weakness on SMO functions. If the authentication of O-RAN subjects on A1, O1, O2, and External interfaces on SMO is not supported or not prope... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.8.2 SMO Threats at O2 interface | Threat ID T-SMO-19 Threat title Internal attacker exploits O2 interface to view data in transit between SMO and O-Cloud Threat description If the O2 interface is not properly confidentiality protected, an internal attacker can perform a man-in-the-middle attack to view data in transit. Threat type Information disclosur... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.8.3 SMO Threats at External interfaces | Threat ID T-SMO-26 Threat title External attacker exploits External interface to view data in transit between SMO and external service Threat description If an External interface is not properly confidentiality protected, an external attacker can perform a man-in-the-middle attack to view data in transit. Threat type I... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.9 Threats against Shared O-RU | |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.9.0 Introduction | 7.4. |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 9.0 Introduction | Threat Analysis tables are provided for each of the identified Shared O-RU threats in the clauses below. The Shared O-RU Threats are classified into 6 threat groups: • Lateral Movement Between Network Functions • Physical Port Access Threats ETSI ETSI TR 104 106 V3.0.0 (2025-06) 69 • Data Access Threats • Availability ... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.9.1 Lateral Movement Between Network Functions | This clause provides threat analysis tables for threats to access between Shared O-RU network functions. Threat ID T-SharedORU-01 Threat title O-DU Tenant accesses O-DU Host Threat description The O-DU Tenant accesses the O-DU Host through the Shared O-RU. Weak authentication can be exploited by a tenant to move latera... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.9.2 Physical Port Access Threats | This clause provides threat analysis tables for physical port access threats to Shared O-RU. Threat ID T-SharedORU-15 Threat title Physical port access to Shared O-RU Host/Tenant Threat description A host, tenant, or third-party gains physical port connectivity to the Shared O-RU. With this physical access the actor ex... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.9.3 Data Access Threats | This clause provides threat analysis tables for threats to Shared O-RU data access. Threat ID T-SharedORU-22 Threat title Unauthorized internal threat actor gains access to data in Shared O-RU Threat description Malicious internal threat actor exploits compromised credentials or weak or misconfigured authorization to g... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.9.4 Availability Threats | This clause provides threat analysis tables for availability threats to Shared O-RU. Threat ID T-SharedORU-29 Threat title Modify/Delete OFH C-Plane messages Threat description A Host MNO, Tenant MNO, or 3rd-party, modifies or deletes control plane messages on the OFH C-Plane between the Shared O-RU and Host O-DU or Te... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.9.5 Configuration Threats | This clause provides threat analysis tables for configuration threats to Shared O-RU. Threat ID T-SharedORU-37 Threat title Misconfiguration of MNO Host Role Threat description The SMO assigns the role of MNO Host and MNO SRO(s). The assignment of Host role to the wrong SRO can expose data. A threat actor could exploit... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.4.9.6 Resiliency Threats | This clause provides threat analysis tables for threats introduced by the O-DU Resiliency use case. Threat ID T-SharedORU-52 Threat title Thrashing O-DU Failovers Threat description Threat actor spoofs SMO to cause O-DU-1 and O-DU-2 to thrash between Active state and Standby state. Threat type Spoofing Impact type Auth... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 7.5 Coverage matrix of threats | From the above threats, a threat inventory is developed to provide a mapping between threats, vulnerabilities and assets. For the purposes of the present document, threats have been grouped into two categories: 1) 'O-RAN specific' comprises threats directly relating to O-RAN components and interfaces. 2) 'General' cove... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 8 Security principles | |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 8.0 Introduction | This clause elucidates security principles that an O-RAN system should achieve. They provide high level and abstract statement of the intended solution to countering potential Threats. Each security principle references applicable ZT tenets. |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 8.1 Principles (SP) | |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 8.1.1 SP-AUTH Mutual Authentication | • Mutual authentication should be established to allow the O-RAN system verifying who performs what, thus possible to detect fake base stations, unauthorized or malicious components, malicious applications and malicious users/administrators. • ZT Tenets: ZT-2, ZT-3, ZT-4, ZT-6. |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 8.1.2 SP-ACC Access Control | • The O-RAN system SHOULD forbid unauthorized administrators or components to access O-RAN resources or services anytime and anywhere. Access controls are required for: - Network Access Controls for filtering unauthorized/unexpected traffic in the O-RAN components over their interfaces. - Access controls to restrict ac... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 8.1.3 SP-CRYPTO Secure cryptographic, key management and PKI | • Well-known, standardized, secure and unbroken cryptographic schemes and protocols SHOULD be used. Proprietary schemes and protocols SHOULD be avoided. • A secure key management of O-RAN keys (KgNB, KRRC-enc, KRRC-int, KUP-int, and KUP-enc, ksn) SHOULD be implemented to manage all the steps of key lifecycle: key gener... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 8.1.4 SP-TCOMM Trusted Communication | • Integrity, confidentiality, availability, authenticity and replay protection of resources SHOULD be ensured in transit (see 'Critical Assets', clause 6.3) over O-RAN interfaces. • ZT Tenets: ZT-2. ETSI ETSI TR 104 106 V3.0.0 (2025-06) 98 |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 8.1.5 SP-SS Secure storage | • Integrity, confidentiality, availability protection of O-RAN resources SHOULD be ensured at rest (see 'Critical Assets', clause 6.3). |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 8.1.6 SP-SB Secure boot and self-configuration | • O-RAN components SHOULD secure their firmware and configuration to provide the opportunity for trust to be extended higher in the software stack. Verified platform firmware can, in turn, verify the Operating System (OS) boot loader, which can then verify other software components all the way up to the OS itself, the ... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 8.1.7 SP-UPDT Secure Update | • A secure update management process SHOULD be implemented for introducing a new component or software change into the O-RAN system. The process SHOULD consider the ability to update the cryptographic algorithms and to adapt to upcoming O-RAN security challenges. A timely update cycles if vulnerabilities are discovered... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 8.1.8 SP-RECO Recoverability & Backup | • A recoverability process to recovery in case of denial of service SHOULD be implemented. An approach for detecting and mitigating DoS attacks SHOULD be in place. • O-RAN vendors SHOULD define a recovery plan that resets the O-RAN components to a trustworthy state in case of a malfunction or an attack (e.g. DoS). • Ba... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 8.1.10 SP-ASSU Security Assurance | • Mobile networks are classified as critical infrastructure making security assurance especially more than relevant: - Vendors SHOULD ensure and prove that its software or hardware meets 3GPP Security Assurance Specifications (SCAS). - Vendors SHOULD ensure and prove that its software or hardware fulfils O-RAN security... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 8.1.11 SP-PRV Privacy | • In O-RAN, the privacy of end users SHOULD be protected. The privacy of end users can be divided into data privacy, identity privacy and personal information privacy. Most Communication services are to gather data and personal information around end users, which may reveal information sensitive to their privacy. Adver... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 8.1.13 SP-ISO Robust Isolation | • In a multi-vendor environment, intra-domain host isolation SHOULD be enforced. In the same host, VMs, CNs, virtualization/container layer, CPU, storage, and network security isolation of resources SHOULD be ensured by implementing system security orchestration, segmentation, lifecycle management, time scheduling, mon... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 8.1.14 SP-PHY Physical security | • The O-RAN system SHOULD be located at physically secure environment in a way that minimizes the risk of resource theft and destruction. It SHOULD support secure storage of sensitive data (cryptographic keys and configuration data), execution of sensitive functions (encryption/decryption, authentication), and executio... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 8.1.15 SP-CLD Secure cloud computing and virtualization | • Defense methods SHOULD be implemented: virtual machine-based intrusion detection, virtual machine-based isolation, virtual machine-based kernel protection, virtual machine-based access control, and virtual machine-based trusted computing. |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 8.1.16 SP-ROB Robustness | • The O-RAN system SHOULD not only ensure the robustness of software or hardware resources, but also guarantee the robustness of the cognitive radio channel for meeting the QoS of communication services required by users. In some scenarios, the robustness of spectrum sensing SHOULD be enhanced when some sensing nodes (... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 8.1.17 SP-IDM O-Cloud ID secure management | • To counter threats associated with ID reuse, mismanagement, and redundancy, the O-Cloud should employ robust strategies for ID generation, validation, and lifecycle management. Properly managed IDs reduce risks of data inconsistencies, unauthorized access, and operational inefficiencies. |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 8.2 Coverage Threats - Security principles | Table 8-1 illustrates how threats are covered by security principles. It outlines the list of security principles contributing to counter threats. ETSI ETSI TR 104 106 V3.0.0 (2025-06) 101 Table 8-1: Coverage Security principles-Threats (1/2) SP Threats T-O-RAN-01 T-O-RAN-02 T-O-RAN-03 T-O-RAN-04 T-O-RAN-05 T-O-RAN-06 ... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 9 Risk assessment | 9.0 Introduction After identifying the list of assets, threats and vulnerabilities, the next step is the risk assessment. The main concepts of risk assessment are illustrated in Figure 9-1. Figure 9-1: Main concepts of risk assessment The criticality of the identified threats in clause 7.4 were assessed based on the se... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 9.1 Determination of severity level process | The process followed to determine the severity level resulting from threats that successfully exploit vulnerabilities is based on Table 9-1 which includes the definition in terms of Privacy, Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability of the three severity levels 'Low', 'Medium' and 'High' shown here as green, yellow ... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 9.2 Determination of likelihood level process | The process followed to determine the likelihood level resulting from threats that successfully exploit vulnerabilities is based on Table 9-2 which includes the relevant factors that are considered. For each factor, three levels 'Low', 'Medium' and 'High' are shown in Table 9-2 as green, yellow and red. Table 9-2 defin... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 9.3 Evaluation of the risks process | The following risk assessment matrix is used to assess the risk score. The matrix takes as input two estimated qualitative inputs: (i) likelihood and (ii) the severity. One axis representing the probability of a risk scenario occurring and the other representing the damage it will cause (Severity). The scores in the mi... |
899b32132b2f5bc5361c182f777bca1f | 104 106 | 9.4 Risk assessment output | The following is the risk assessment output table which illustrates the different threats along with their impacts, the type of loss, the perceived severity/likelihood levels and the risk scoring. ETSI ETSI TR 104 106 V3.0.0 (2025-06) 110 Table 9-4: Risk Assessment Threat ID Risk Description Impact Description CIA Seve... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 1 Scope | The present document describes Terahertz Imaging for ground based vehicular RADARs, as defined in ECC Decision (04)03 [i.6], operating in the 300 - 400 GHz and 600 - 700 GHz bands. The present document provides information on the existing and intended applications, the technical parameters and the relation to the exist... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 2 References | |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 2.1 Normative references | Normative references are not applicable in the present document. |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 3.1 Terms | For the purpose of the present document, the following terms apply: Duty Cycle (DC): ratio, expressed as a percentage, of Σ(Ton)/(Trep) where Ton is the duration of the FMCW sweep and Trep is the signal repetition time ETSI ETSI TR 104 096 V1.1.1 (2025-06) 9 equivalent isotropically radiated power (e.i.r.p.): product o... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 3.2 Symbols | For the purpose of the present document, the following symbols apply: dB decibel dBm decibel milliwatt λ wavelength °C degree Celsius µm micrometer ms millimeter µs microsecond ms millisecond hPa hectopascal GHz gigahertz THz terahertz |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purpose of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: AD Autonomous Driving ADAS Advanced Driver Assistance Systems AEB Automatic Emergency Braking CEPT European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations DC Duty Cycle e.i.r.p. Equivalent isotropically radiated power EC European C... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 4 Comments on the System Reference Document | No ETSI member raised any comments. |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 5 Presentation of the system and technology | |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 5.1 Benefits of Terahertz Imaging Technology | According to a study by the Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) [i.18], today's ADAS systems have led to measurable improvements in road safety. Rear-end collisions have been reduced by 50 % for cars with modern ADAS systems and by 41 % for heavy trucks. The effect is even greater for accidents involving injuries. Neve... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 5.2 Overview of sensing technologies | Various vehicular perception sensors have been developed and deployed in the recent past to support driving and driver assistance functions. Each of these sensors has strengths and weaknesses, and it is common to deploy multiple different sensor modalities to achieve better perception of the environment under all condi... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 5.3 Current vehicular RADARs and associated frequency bands | Table 1 provides an overview of RADAR sensors with recent changes in the frequency usage. Table 1: Overview of RADAR sensors and use cases in current vehicles |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 6 Market information | The market for vehicular sensing technologies and vehicular RADAR has experienced rapid growth, driven by the increasing adoption of safety functions, Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) and the ongoing development of autonomous vehicles: • Safety and regulations The push for improved vehicle safety through regul... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 7 Technical information | |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 7.1 Detailed technical parameters | |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 7.1.1 Summary of technical parameters | Based on new technical developments, a next generation of chip technology is available which enables SRDs in frequency ranges 300 - 400 GHz and 600 - 700 GHz (e.g. Terahertz Imaging technologies). Table 2 summarizes the key technical parameters of the requested application. The following clauses characterize the underl... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 7.1.2 Transmit power and bandwidth | Automotive use cases for advanced safety (ADAS) and Autonomous Driving (AD) require sensing technologies that can provide high angular resolution at a distance of up to 300 m. In order to meet vehicular use case requirements for object detection at 300 m, Terahertz Imaging devices will transmit at the power levels give... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 7.1.3 Transmitter and receiver architecture | The architecture of Terahertz Imaging technology is rooted in the architecture of RADAR systems. Radio magnetic waves are generated in transmitter (Tx) chip elements. Radio waves propagate from the Terahertz Imaging device (Outgoing signal) and get reflected by objects. The reflected radio waves (returning signal) are ... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 7.1.4 High resolution 4D imaging | Above 300 GHz the wavelength of radio waves is smaller than 1 mm. Using such small wavelengths, Terahertz Imaging technologies achieve a high native angular resolution. Based on its native resolution and state of the art signal processing techniques, it is expected that operating at the frequency ranges of 300 - 400 GH... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 7.1.5 Antenna requirements | Above 300 GHz the wavelength of radio waves is shorter than 1 mm. As a result, antennas of Terahertz Imaging devices can be fully integrated on the Tx- and Rx-chip elements. A Terahertz Imaging receiver antenna array can contain up to several hundreds of antenna elements. The receiver array is configured as a digital p... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 7.1.6 Digital beamforming | The radiating elements in the Tx array are controlled by a microprocessor. For the outgoing transmit signal the following aspects are digitally configurable: • Duration of each beam from 1 s to several ms • Number of beams per duty cycle • Waveform One duty cycle of a Terahertz Imaging device consists of a freely defi... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 7.1.7 Atmospheric attenuation | Transmitting and receiving radio waves at higher frequency bands offer the opportunity of increasing the image resolution compared to current 79 GHz RADAR technology. However, radio waves at higher frequencies come along with smaller wavelengths and these wavelengths have to overcome the effects of increasing attenuati... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 7.2 Current ITU and European Common Allocations | There is no allocation in the Radio Regulations [i.2] to any service above 275 GHz. Some bands, in the 275 - 1 000 GHz range are identified for use by some radio services by means of following two footnotes: "5.564A For the operation of Fixed and Land Mobile service applications in frequency bands in the range 275-450 ... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 7.3 Sharing and compatibility studies already available | A limited number of sharing and compatibility studies are available above 275 GHz. These are mainly conducted by ITU-R. The following ITU-R Reports are already available: • Report ITU-R SM.2450-0 [i.18]: Sharing and compatibility studies between land-mobile, fixed and passive services in the frequency range 275 - 450 G... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 7.4 Sharing and compatibility issues still to be considered | |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 7.4.1 Overview | In accordance with the two footnotes given in clause 7.2, parts of the bands, under consideration for Terahertz Imaging systems in the present document (300 - 355 GHz and 650 - 700 GHz), are identified in Radio Regulations for use by administrations for Land Mobile and Fixed Service applications, Radio Astronomy servic... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 7.4.2 Mitigation factors | The design of Terahertz imaging technology provides a natural high level of protection for other co-existing applications in the same frequency band, mainly due to the short wavelength, among other protection mechanisms as explained in the following list: • High free space path loss Due to the small wavelength, the fie... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 7.4.3 Potential impact to radio users - overview | With the technical parameters and architecture defined in clause 7.1, the applications of Terahertz Imaging described in the present document should be allowed to make use of the frequency band 300 - 400 GHz and 600 - 700 GHz, provided that harmful interference to the victim receivers is safely avoided. Typical Teraher... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 7.4.4 Fixed and Land Mobile services | The findings and mitigation recommendations outlined in ECC Report 350 [i.22] with similar operating characteristics provide a sound basis for ensuring the compatibility of Terahertz Imaging systems operating at frequencies such as 300 - 355 GHz and 650 - 700 GHz with coexisting Fixed Services (FS). Ground based vehicu... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 7.4.5 Earth Exploration-Satellite service | ECC Report 351 [i.10] has analysed the impact of exterior vehicular RADARs between 122,5 and 148,5 GHz on EESS passive and concluded with ECC/DEC(22)03 [i.24] on limits for exterior vehicular RADARs of 32 dBm between 122,25 - 130 GHz and 134 - 141 GHz. Key technical differences with applications at 300 - 355 GHz and 65... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 7.4.6 Radio Astronomy Service (RAS) | The findings and recommendations in ECC Report 350 [i.22] and ECC Report 351 [i.10] provide a solid foundation for concluding that Terahertz Imaging systems operating in the 300 - 355 GHz and 650 - 700 GHz frequency bands are unlikely to interfere with Radio Astronomy Services (RAS). Key technical and environmental fac... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 7.5 Information on relevant standards | There is no ETSI standard for the use of the 300 - 400 GHz and 600 - 700 GHz bands for any system or application. The only standard for SRDs in the frequency range closer to the 300 GHz is ETSI EN 305 550-2 [i.20]. |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 8 Radio spectrum request and justification | |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 8.1 Radio spectrum request | Terahertz Imaging, as described in the present document, intends to use 300 - 355 GHz and 650 - 700 GHz bands. These bands can be used by SRDs on a non-interference - non-protection basis in accordance with Article 4.4 of the ITU Radio Regulations [i.2]. It is assumed that the proposed limits of 55 dBm peak e.i.r.p and... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 8.2 Radio spectrum justification | The target application is sensing, detection and ranging of objects and the environment in front of and around a vehicle during highway and urban driving scenarios. Based on the short wavelength of radio waves at such frequencies, it can be expected that Terahertz Imaging will provide significant sensing benefits such ... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 9 Regulations and standards | |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 9.1 Current regulations | 9.1.1 Current regulations in Europe Currently, there are no regulations for SRDs in the frequency ranges which are the subject of the present document. 9.1.2 ITU Region 1: Europe, Africa, the former Soviet Union, Mongolia, and some of the Middle East countries In these regions, besides Europe, the regulation of teraher... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 9.1.3.1 Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the USA | The FCC has opened up frequencies from 95 GHz to 3 THz for potential use in mobile communications and other applications. With this step the FCC is targeting to support innovation and further technical development in high-frequency technologies. The FCC has also made provisions for experimental spectrum licenses in thi... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 9.1.4 ITU Region 3: Most of Asia and Oceania | |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 9.1.4.1 Ministry of Industry and Information Technology in China | While no specific regulations for terahertz frequencies in vehicular applications exist, China has been focusing on the broader use of frequencies up to 300 GHz in various fields such as 6G communications, security and biomedical applications. The MIIT has issued guidelines and notices to ensure that the use of these f... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 9.1.4.2 Japan and Korea | National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT) in Japan and Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI) in South Korea are working on aligning its THz frequency regulations with international standards to facilitate global interoperability and support the development of next-gen... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 9.2 Proposed regulation | The 300 - 355 GHz and 650 - 700 GHz bands can be used by SRDs on a non-interference - non-protection basis in accordance with Article 4.4 of the ITU Radio Regulations [i.2]. An example regulation is given in Table 5. ETSI ETSI TR 104 096 V1.1.1 (2025-06) 25 Table 5: Proposed regulation for ground based vehicular Terahe... |
434af603c87796b4b286aa062f07354f | 104 096 | 9.3 Agenda Item 1.8 of WRC-27 Conference | The aim of Agenda item 1.8 of WRC-27 Conference is to consider possible additional spectrum allocations to the radiolocation service on a primary basis in the frequency range 231,5 - 275 GHz and possible new identifications for radiolocation service applications in frequency bands within the frequency range 275 - 700 G... |
a40bb51101196cec3be4d8fd3686e1c8 | 104 078 | 1 Scope | The present document describes SRD radar equipment operating in 57 - 64 GHz and 76 - 77 GHz for applications upon drones which may require a change in the present regulatory framework for the proposed band. It includes in particular: • Market information. • Technical information regarding equipment type and typical ins... |
a40bb51101196cec3be4d8fd3686e1c8 | 104 078 | 2 References | |
a40bb51101196cec3be4d8fd3686e1c8 | 104 078 | 2.1 Normative references | Normative references are not applicable in the present document. |
a40bb51101196cec3be4d8fd3686e1c8 | 104 078 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
a40bb51101196cec3be4d8fd3686e1c8 | 104 078 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
a40bb51101196cec3be4d8fd3686e1c8 | 104 078 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: governmental use: operations carried out by or on behalf of a public authority for the maintenance of law and order, protection of life and property, disaster relief and emergency response activities or services undertaken in the public interest exclu... |
a40bb51101196cec3be4d8fd3686e1c8 | 104 078 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. ETSI ETSI TR 104 078 V1.1.1 (2025-06) 9 |
a40bb51101196cec3be4d8fd3686e1c8 | 104 078 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast AGL (altitude) Above Ground Level ARC Air Risk Category ATAR Air To Air Radar BVLOS Beyond Visual Line Of Sight CAA Civil Aviation Authority dBsm decibels per square meter EASA European Union Av... |
a40bb51101196cec3be4d8fd3686e1c8 | 104 078 | 4 Comments on the System Reference Document | No ETSI member raised any comment. |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.