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c283b321481640a37e74db6d6840f337 | 119 411-8 | 6.7 Compliance Audit and Other Assessment | NOTE: See ETSI EN 319 411-1 [3], clause 6.7. |
c283b321481640a37e74db6d6840f337 | 119 411-8 | 6.8 Other Business and Legal Matters | |
c283b321481640a37e74db6d6840f337 | 119 411-8 | 6.8.1 Fees | These policy requirements are not meant to imply any restrictions on charging for TSP's services. |
c283b321481640a37e74db6d6840f337 | 119 411-8 | 6.8.2 Financial Responsibility | OVR-6.8.2-01: The requirements identified in ETSI EN 319 411-1 [3], clause 6.8.2 shall apply. |
c283b321481640a37e74db6d6840f337 | 119 411-8 | 6.8.3 Confidentiality of Business Information | No policy requirement. ETSI ETSI TS 119 411-8 V1.1.1 (2025-10) 18 |
c283b321481640a37e74db6d6840f337 | 119 411-8 | 6.8.4 Privacy of Personal Information | OVR-6.8.4-01: The requirements identified in ETSI EN 319 411-1 [3], clause 6.8.4 shall apply. |
c283b321481640a37e74db6d6840f337 | 119 411-8 | 6.8.5 Intellectual Property Rights | No policy requirement. |
c283b321481640a37e74db6d6840f337 | 119 411-8 | 6.8.6 Representations and Warranties | OVR-6.8.6-01: The requirements specified in ETSI EN 319 411-1 [3], clause 6.8.6 shall apply. |
c283b321481640a37e74db6d6840f337 | 119 411-8 | 6.8.7 Disclaimers of Warranties | See clause 6.8.6. |
c283b321481640a37e74db6d6840f337 | 119 411-8 | 6.8.8 Limitations of Liability | Limitations on liability are covered in the terms and conditions as per clause 6.9.4. |
c283b321481640a37e74db6d6840f337 | 119 411-8 | 6.8.9 Indemnities | No policy requirement. |
c283b321481640a37e74db6d6840f337 | 119 411-8 | 6.8.10 Term and Termination | No policy requirement. |
c283b321481640a37e74db6d6840f337 | 119 411-8 | 6.8.11 Individual notices and communications with participants | No policy requirement. |
c283b321481640a37e74db6d6840f337 | 119 411-8 | 6.8.12 Amendments | No policy requirement. |
c283b321481640a37e74db6d6840f337 | 119 411-8 | 6.8.13 Dispute Resolution Procedures | OVR-6.8.13-01: The requirements identified in ETSI EN 319 411-1 [3], clause 6.8.13 shall apply. |
c283b321481640a37e74db6d6840f337 | 119 411-8 | 6.8.14 Governing Law | Not in the scope of the present document. |
c283b321481640a37e74db6d6840f337 | 119 411-8 | 6.8.15 Compliance with Applicable Law | OVR-6.8.15-01: The requirements identified in ETSI EN 319 411-1 [3], clause 6.8.15 shall apply. |
c283b321481640a37e74db6d6840f337 | 119 411-8 | 6.8.16 Miscellaneous Provisions | No policy requirement. ETSI ETSI TS 119 411-8 V1.1.1 (2025-10) 19 |
c283b321481640a37e74db6d6840f337 | 119 411-8 | 6.9 Other Provisions | |
c283b321481640a37e74db6d6840f337 | 119 411-8 | 6.9.1 Organizational | OVR-6.9.1-01: The requirements identified in ETSI EN 319 411-1 [3], clause 6.9.1 shall apply. |
c283b321481640a37e74db6d6840f337 | 119 411-8 | 6.9.2 Additional testing | OVR-6.9.2-01: The requirements identified in ETSI EN 319 411-1 [3], clause 6.9.2 shall apply. |
c283b321481640a37e74db6d6840f337 | 119 411-8 | 6.9.3 Disabilities | OVR-6.9.3-01: The requirements identified in ETSI EN 319 411-1 [3], clause 6.9.3 shall apply. |
c283b321481640a37e74db6d6840f337 | 119 411-8 | 6.9.4 Terms and conditions | OVR-6.9.4-01: The requirements specified in ETSI EN 319 411-1 [3], clause 6.9.4 shall apply. In addition: OVR-6.9.4-02 [QCP-n-eudiwrp] [QCP-l-eudiwrp]: The requirements specified in ETSI EN 319 411-2 [4], clause 6.9.4 shall apply. ETSI ETSI TS 119 411-8 V1.1.1 (2025-10) 20 Annex A (informative): Bibliography • Regulati... |
d61f269b3bd6a8a4276ae1a17f53d29b | 104 134 | 1 Scope | The present document concerns a methodology for including uncertainty and sensitivity aspects for avoided environmental impact calculations. The objective of the present document is to provide a standardized method to assess in a simplified manner the uncertainty of calculations for avoided environmental impact resulti... |
d61f269b3bd6a8a4276ae1a17f53d29b | 104 134 | 2 References | |
d61f269b3bd6a8a4276ae1a17f53d29b | 104 134 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
d61f269b3bd6a8a4276ae1a17f53d29b | 104 134 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
d61f269b3bd6a8a4276ae1a17f53d29b | 104 134 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
d61f269b3bd6a8a4276ae1a17f53d29b | 104 134 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: accuracy: closeness to the value of the perfect reference system NOTE: If the perfect reference system would have a score of 100 EI units and the score of the calculated system at hand would be 90 EI units, the accuracy of the LCA would be 90 %. avoid... |
d61f269b3bd6a8a4276ae1a17f53d29b | 104 134 | 3.2 Symbols | For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply: Av Avoided environmental impacts SOE Second Order Effect FOE First Order Effect, ICT Scenario environmental impacts Rb Absolute environmental impacts for total rebound effect A Technology matrix p Process vector α Final demand vector β Final environ... |
d61f269b3bd6a8a4276ae1a17f53d29b | 104 134 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: 2D Two Dimensional 3D Three Dimensional 5G Fifth-generation for wireless technology 6G Sixth-generation for wireless technology AI Artificial Intelligence CO2e Carbon Dioxide equivalents CUVP Contribution of individual element to total uncerta... |
d61f269b3bd6a8a4276ae1a17f53d29b | 104 134 | 4 Methodology | |
d61f269b3bd6a8a4276ae1a17f53d29b | 104 134 | 4.1 Framework | Equation 1 based on Equation 1 in [i.6] shows the main factors for the proposed method which shall be applied to any ICT Solution. = − + (1) where: = All avoided Environmental Impacts (EI) or avoided emissions from the use of the ICT Solution at hand per functional unit. This is the net second order effec... |
d61f269b3bd6a8a4276ae1a17f53d29b | 104 134 | 4.2 Sensitivity of individual element | Equations 2 to 5 based on page 90 in [i.9], and Equation 6 based on pages 63 and 64 in [i.9], show how the rate sensitivity for activity and environmental load inventory flows shall be calculated. × = (2) = × (3) = × (4) = × × (5) = ∆ ∆ , ∆ ∆ (6) where... |
d61f269b3bd6a8a4276ae1a17f53d29b | 104 134 | 4.3 Estimation of contribution to total uncertainty | Equation 7 shows how the share of the total uncertainty shall be calculated. = × × (7) where: CUVPij = contribution of an individual element to total uncertainty. NOTE 1: As shown in Annex A (informative), the CUVP is valid both for uncertainty contributions from environmental flows and from... |
d61f269b3bd6a8a4276ae1a17f53d29b | 104 134 | 4.4 Estimation of relative rebound effect | Equation 8 shows how the relative total rebound effect shall be calculated. = ! (8) where: RRb = relative total rebound effect. Four examples are shown in Annex A (informative) on how the methodology in the present document can be applied. ETSI ETSI TS 104 134 V1.1.1 (2025-09) 14 Annex A (informative): Examples using... |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 1 Scope | The present document identifies and describes the problem arising from pervasive encrypted traffic in electronic/digital communications networks. In addition, the present document states the requirements for allowing Encrypted Traffic Integration (ETI) across an abstracted network architecture. The present document ide... |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 2 References | |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: compliance obligations: requirements imposed on parties to network communication arising from: governmental statutory or regulatory provisions or directives; judicial decisions, rules and orders; contractual obligations among providers or users; and f... |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: A2ApoA Application to Application point of Attachment A2SpoA Application to Service point of Attachment ACL Access Control List AI Artificial Intelligence ApoA Application point of Attachment CapEx Capital Expenditure CEP Communication End Poi... |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 4 Roles of encryption in networks | The role of encryption of information being transported between two end-points is perceived to have three widely recognized positive purposes depending on the context: • confidentiality protection of the transferred information or content; • enhanced trust in the identity of the parties associated with the information ... |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 5 Model of ETI problem | The Going Dark challenge in which an authorized user lacks the technical or practical ability to access data has been exaggerated through the increasing use of pervasive encryption of traffic and signalling across networks - usually on an end-to-end basis. The adverse effects on cyber defence as well as a broad array o... |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 6 Technical view of the problem of ETI | |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 6.1 Simplified network model | There are a very large number of ways of presenting a telecommunications network depending on the level of abstraction to be presented. The purpose of the network model in the present document is to identify the impact of encrypted traffic on network function. Assumption#1: The present document considers packet-based c... |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 6.2 Layer obfuscation | The term layer obfuscation is used in the ETI context to address one of the many problems wherein a packet is "re-networked" such as found in most tunnelling protocols. For the Internet Protocol (IP) stack this is a case of inserting one IP packet (the inner packet) into another IP packet (the outer packet), the outer ... |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 6.3 Stakeholder model | |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 6.3.0 General view | Stakeholders can be defined with respect to their relationship to the data, and to the nature of that relationship as one of owner, trusted party (each of these is considered as non-adversarial stakeholder), or adversary. |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 6.3.1 Adversarial stakeholders | The viewpoint of an adversarial stakeholder is to use pervasive encryption with an explicit intent to avoid any form of oversight (i.e. to explicitly act against the interests of parties in group A and C of the Venn diagram from Figure 2). |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 6.3.2 Non-adversarial stakeholders | A non-adversarial stakeholder uses encryption as offered by legitimate parties in order to ensure that privileged information is only made visible to authorized parties. |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 6.3.3 Network management stakeholders | Network managers are a special case of non-adversarial stakeholders that are network-resident and who aim to optimize availability of networks to serve the other non-adversarial stakeholders. In particular, one of the roles of network management stakeholders is to be able to inhibit the actions of adversarial stakehold... |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 7 Quantitative risk assessment | |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 7.1 Overview | The TVRA approach defined in ETSI TS 102 165-1 [7], and expanded on in ETSI TS 102 165-3 [i.35] for continuous vulnerability assessment in the context of the CSA [i.32], identifies risk as the product of the impact and likelihood of an attack. For assessment of likelihood a number of metrics are considered that determi... |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 7.2 Impact and likelihood assessment | The core concern of pervasive encryption has been outlined in clauses 4, 5 and 6 of the present document. In order to express the problem more quantitatively the risk calculation approach defined in ETSI TS 102 165-1 [7] is applied below. Risk is assessed as the weighted product of the likelihood of a threat, and the i... |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 7.3 Motivation assessment | It can be suggested that the application of encryption to user content is somewhat benign and is motivated by a reasonable desire on behalf of the user applying the encryption to satisfy the security tenet of least privilege. Thus it is reasonable to encrypt the details of a bank transaction as the network provider is ... |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 7.4 Countermeasure considerations | The guiding principle of countering ETI problems is visibility, transparency, and the provision of a trust architecture. The general model of countermeasure identified in ETSI TS 102 165-1 [7] is that they (the countermeasures) are assets that are added to the system to reduce the weighted risk to the system. The purpo... |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 8 Requirements to counter the ETI problem | |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 8.1 Introduction and overview of means to counter ETI | An ETI conformant network shall be able to demonstrate that for each connection there is an established trust contract, and an associated security contract. The present document identifies the role of Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) [1] and its close association to an active (rather than static) implementation of the sec... |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 8.2 Transparency | It shall be possible for an authorized entity to request the encryption state of any connection or data at any involved, identifiable, and addressable object (hereinafter referred to as an entity), in the ICT system by direct interrogation of the entities participating in the connection. The requesting entity should be... |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 8.3 Management of cryptographic keys | The trend in cryptographic protection is towards perfect forward secrecy in which session keys cannot be compromised even if the root key from which the session keys are derived is itself made known. Ephemeral keys are a consequence or attribute closely associated with trying to achieve forward secrecy. A key is descri... |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 8.4 Identification of authorized parties | The encryption state of any connection of an ETI conformant system shall only be disclosed to authorized parties. An authorized party shall be unambiguously identified and that identity shall be authenticated. The identity of the authorized party may take a number of forms including those defined in ETSI TS 103 486 [i.... |
dd3b0bf937cd109481cadaa34e26502f | 104 103 | 8.5 Trust architecture for ETI | A layered communications architecture, as defined for OSI in ISO/IEC 7498-1 [i.1], has implicit trust relationships at each layer determined by the functional model of each layer. The present document extends the OSI model to a wider concept of ZTA as in NIST SP 800-207 [1] beyond the enterprise network to a full publi... |
9510b0b4febcc39d76c2a20868042ba3 | 104 102 | 1 Scope | The present document defines a set of methods and the overall methodology for incorporating Zero Trust approaches as defined in NIST SP 800-207 [2] into an organization, product or service for the purpose of maximizing the transparency and explicability of the attack surface and to optimize the application of cybersecu... |
9510b0b4febcc39d76c2a20868042ba3 | 104 102 | 2 References | |
9510b0b4febcc39d76c2a20868042ba3 | 104 102 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
9510b0b4febcc39d76c2a20868042ba3 | 104 102 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
9510b0b4febcc39d76c2a20868042ba3 | 104 102 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
9510b0b4febcc39d76c2a20868042ba3 | 104 102 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: least persistence: means of granting access to an asset for only sufficient time to perform the requested action least privilege: means of granting access to a system asset only to those entities who have a legitimate purpose for access NOTE 1: Thus a... |
9510b0b4febcc39d76c2a20868042ba3 | 104 102 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
9510b0b4febcc39d76c2a20868042ba3 | 104 102 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: 5G NSA 5G Non-Stand Alone 5G SA 5G Stand Alone AV Attack Vector C&C Command and Control CI/CD Continuous Integration/Continuous Delivery CKC Cyber Kill Chain CSC Critical Security Control DoS Denial of Service ETI Encrypted Traffic Integration... |
9510b0b4febcc39d76c2a20868042ba3 | 104 102 | 4 Zero Trust security design principles | |
9510b0b4febcc39d76c2a20868042ba3 | 104 102 | 4.1 Introduction | Modern network design, supporting high speed, always-on connectivity with near 100 % availability, has led to a number of paradigms and initiatives that attempt to give assurance of security. These include "secure by design", "secure by default", and, as a stepping stone to Zero Trust (ZT), the principles of "least pri... |
9510b0b4febcc39d76c2a20868042ba3 | 104 102 | 4.2 Purpose of ZT in systems | As outlined in clause 4.1 above ZT is not a technology, rather it is an approach, formalized in the present document as the ZT-Kipling methodology and supporting methods, to look at systems in order to achieve transparency and explicability of the components or assets of a business system that when combined offer secur... |
9510b0b4febcc39d76c2a20868042ba3 | 104 102 | 4.3 ZT outline | All assets of the system are impacted by ZT-Kipling and are illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 1: Perspective of Zero Trust in Security ETSI ETSI TS 104 102 V1.1.1 (2025-09) 9 To quote from ETSI TS 104 103 [1] "Zero trust … provides a collection of concepts and ideas designed to minimize uncertainty in enforcing accurate,... |
9510b0b4febcc39d76c2a20868042ba3 | 104 102 | 4.4 ZT-Kipling application to achieve Least Privilege principle | In building an understanding of the application of ZT-Kipling to the least privilege paradigm the Kipling Criteria apply. In particular, when the use of an asset is determined by multiple criteria (e.g. attribute-based access control) the Kipling criteria provide deep knowledge of the role of an asset and its users, th... |
9510b0b4febcc39d76c2a20868042ba3 | 104 102 | 5 Applying ZT-Kipling using Critical Security Controls | |
9510b0b4febcc39d76c2a20868042ba3 | 104 102 | 5.1 Considering Cyber Attack Lifecycle - Cyber Kill Chain | The cyber attack lifecycle - also known and referred to in the present document as Cyber Kill Chain (CKC) - is a framework that outlines the stages that a cyber attack typically follows, from initial reconnaissance stage to the final data exfiltration stage (Actions on Objectives). CKC consists of 7 stages, as illustra... |
9510b0b4febcc39d76c2a20868042ba3 | 104 102 | 5.2 Step 1 - Define the Protected Surface | The present document identifies means to implement ZT-Kipling using specific Critical Security Controls (CSCs) from ETSI TR 103 305-1 [i.1]. In this case where specific CSCs are identified the present document identifies how they shall be applied in order to satisfy the ZT-Kipling methodology. Step 1 of ZT-Kipling seek... |
9510b0b4febcc39d76c2a20868042ba3 | 104 102 | 5.3 Step 2 - Map the Transaction Flows | Mapping the transaction flow step results in an intra-systems, inter-systems, or both flow, which could encompass any number of CSCs, ETSI TR 103 305-1 [i.1], depending on the type of transaction flow. The reflections of which CSCs matter for Step 2 are reflected in Step 1 (define the protected surface), Step 3 (build ... |
9510b0b4febcc39d76c2a20868042ba3 | 104 102 | 5.4 Step 3 - Build a Zero Trust Architecture | Once the protected surface is defined and transaction flows are mapped (Steps 1 and 2, as above) the architecture of the Zero-Trust implementation shall be developed. The CSCs [i.5], corresponding to the protected surface (Step 1) and, following the mapped transaction flows (Step 2), while applying ZT-Kipling questions... |
9510b0b4febcc39d76c2a20868042ba3 | 104 102 | 5.5 Step 4 - Create Zero Trust Security Policy (policies) | Once ZTA is built (Step 3), ZT security policies shall be created. The CSCs [i.5] corresponding to the protected surface (Step 1), following the mapped transaction flows (Step 2), and resulting ZTA (Step 4), shall be reflected in the security policies. ZT-Kipling questions (Figure 2) shall apply to creation of ZT secur... |
9510b0b4febcc39d76c2a20868042ba3 | 104 102 | 5.6 Step 5 - Monitor & Maintain | Step 5 of ZT-Kipling focuses on monitoring and maintenance of the designed and implemented ZTA and ZT security policies. While addressing the ZT-Kipling questions (Figure 2), the following controls from ETSI TR 103 305-1 [i.1] shall apply: • CSC-8 (Audit Log Management): "Collect, alert, review, and retain audit logs o... |
8e90692f70e1e9a0f58f164e7ad90f06 | 104 047-2 | 1 Scope | The present document is one of the parts of the radio conformance test specifications of the DECT-2020 New Radio (NR) radio device. The present document specifies radio device protocol conformance testing including Medium Access (MAC), Data Link Control (DLC) and Convergence Layer (CVG) protocol layers. Further the pre... |
8e90692f70e1e9a0f58f164e7ad90f06 | 104 047-2 | 2 References | |
8e90692f70e1e9a0f58f164e7ad90f06 | 104 047-2 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
8e90692f70e1e9a0f58f164e7ad90f06 | 104 047-2 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
8e90692f70e1e9a0f58f164e7ad90f06 | 104 047-2 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
8e90692f70e1e9a0f58f164e7ad90f06 | 104 047-2 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ETSI TS 103 636-4 [4], ETSI TS 103 636-5 [5] and the following apply: companion device: functionality of a lower tester implemented within a real test device FT-PT: RD operating in both FT and PT modes Lower Tester FT (LT_FT): tester entity operating strictly... |
8e90692f70e1e9a0f58f164e7ad90f06 | 104 047-2 | 3.2 Symbols | For the purposes of the present document, the symbols given in ETSI TS 103 636-4 [4] apply. |
8e90692f70e1e9a0f58f164e7ad90f06 | 104 047-2 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in ETSI TS 103 636-1 [1], ETSI TS103 636-4 [4], ETSI TS103 636-5 [5] and the following apply: NOTE: An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in ETSI TS 103 636-1 [1], ETSI TS 1... |
8e90692f70e1e9a0f58f164e7ad90f06 | 104 047-2 | 4 Overview | 4.1 Handling of conformance requirements in different releases of the core specification The core specifications, ETSI TS 103 636 series, and application specific profiles, ETSI TS 103 874 series, consist of multiple releases, where each release introduces new functionalities, procedures and configurations, that are th... |
8e90692f70e1e9a0f58f164e7ad90f06 | 104 047-2 | 4.2 Testing of optional functions and procedures | Any function or procedure which is optional, as indicated in the present document, may be subject to a conformance test if it is implemented in the RD. The implementation of the certain optional feature can be determined based on RD's support on given application profile specification as defined ETSI TS 103 874-1 [6], ... |
8e90692f70e1e9a0f58f164e7ad90f06 | 104 047-2 | 4.3 Implicit testing | For some DECT-2020 NR signalling and protocol features conformance is not verified explicitly in the present document. This does not imply that correct functioning of these features is not essential, but that these are implicitly tested to a sufficient degree in other tests. |
8e90692f70e1e9a0f58f164e7ad90f06 | 104 047-2 | 4.4 Repetition of testing | As a general rule, the test cases specified in the present document are highly reproducible and do not need to be repeated unless otherwise stated. However, the rate of correct RD behaviour can be specified statistically, e.g. "at least 90 %", which is defined separately in the specific test case. Additionally, in some... |
8e90692f70e1e9a0f58f164e7ad90f06 | 104 047-2 | 6 Test Suite Structure and Test Purposes | |
8e90692f70e1e9a0f58f164e7ad90f06 | 104 047-2 | 6.1 Structure for DECT-2020 NR tests | The test grouping is organized according to the structure of the protocols defined in the core specifications ETSI TS 103 636-4 [4] and ETSI TS 103 636-5 [5]. Moreover, test purposes are identified and categorized by a group, subgroup and sequential two-digits number (uniquely assigned upon definition of each test purp... |
8e90692f70e1e9a0f58f164e7ad90f06 | 104 047-2 | 6.2 Test Purpose definition conventions |
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