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678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.1 Overview of SFR hierarchy | NOTE 1: The SFRs in this clause are from CC-Part 2 [5] and, where appropriate, from extensions defined in specifically cited documents. All of the SFRs described are defined with respect to the core requirements from ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and the mapping is summarized in Annex B. NOTE 2: Where the... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.2 Security Audit class (FAU) | |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.2.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation | NOTE 1: In the context of ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] the term log or logging is used to refer to data gathered in the context of certain system actions for use in the conduct of further enquiry, including audits, whereas in CC-Part 2 [5] the term audit is used to include the gathering of data that is l... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.3 Cryptographic Support | |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.3.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation | NOTE 1: As the base requirements from ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] do not specify the cryptographic algorithms or key sizes specific wording of assignments in the SFRs from CC-Part 2 [5] are omitted in the present document but are expected to be provided in detail in any corresponding ST. NOTE 2: The spe... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.3.2 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution | The base documents ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] only specify key distribution in the context of exchange of public key material for signature verification (Requirement 52, see Annex B). In conventional practice a public key and its association to an attribute is distributed using a Public Key Certificate... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.3.3 FCS_CKM.3 Cryptographic key access | Whilst the base documents ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] do not specify the use of specific cryptographic material they do suggest from Annex A of ETSI TS 103 924 [12] that best practice is followed wherein keys are only made available to the function requiring them and are not available by any other mecha... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.3.4 FCS_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction | Whilst the base documents ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] do not specify the time at which cryptographic keys are destroyed, but cite both best practice (in ETSI TS 103 924 [12]) and least persistence as guiding principles, the primary requirement is Requirement 41 from ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 9... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.3.5 FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation | The base requirements from ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] identify a number of cryptographic operations in support of system and data integrity including the generation and verification of Integrity Check Values using hashing or Message Authentication Code algorithms, and digital signatures. In particular ... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.3.6 FCS_RNG.1 Random number generation | For the generation of random numbers as defined in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] the FCS class shall apply with the restrictions identified below consistent with requirements stated in [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2]. FCS_RNG.1.1: The TSF shall provide a physical or non-physical-true or deterministic random n... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.4 User data protection | |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.4.1 Summary of requirements for user data protection | The core requirements for accessing data of the TOE are rooted in the least-privilege and least-persistence paradigms that underpin most cybersecurity provisions. ETSI ETSI TS 103 996 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 38 Specific access control rules are specified in Requirement 82 of ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] Strict ... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.4.2 FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control | Requirements 71, 72, 73 and 74 from ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] apply and are met in part by FDP_ACC.1: • All data in OAN devices shall be made available to authorized entities using the principle of least privilege. • The access control mechanism shall follow the policy model outlined in ETSI TS 102 16... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.4.3 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control | As noted above the access control model defined in clause 7 of each of ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] is a Policy and Attribute Based Access Control model. Each of ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] identifies specific rules to be implemented by the access control mechanism. In addition, on the pr... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.4.4 FDP_SDC.1 Stored data confidentiality | FDP_SDC.1.1: The TSF shall ensure the confidentiality of all sensitive user data while it is stored in persistent memory. NOTE: Where user data includes a password that password should be stored in a manner that is consistent with clause 5.1.1 of NIST SP 800-63B [i.10] to provide resistance to offline attacks. EXAMPLE:... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.4.5 FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring | Clause 6.1 of ETSI TS 103 962 [1] identifies a number of requirements for establishing and verifying the integrity of data received by or transmitted from the TOE. The additional requirement here is consistent with the post reception (or pre-transmission) of data where that data comes from a data store on the TOE and i... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.5 Identity and authentication | |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.5.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling | With respect to the general principle of least privilege and to Requirement 78 of ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] the following SFRs from CC-Part 2 [5] apply. In particular, the error reporting threshold shall be defined by the ST and the evaluator shall ensure that a policy exists to address the functional... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.5.2 FIA_API.1 Authentication proof of identity | Proof of identity of any claimant shall be achieved by an appropriate authentication protocol (see also FIA_UAU.1 in clause 8.5.4 below). Each instance where an entity (as claimant) requires to be identified shall indicate the specific method of how authentication shall be achieved. FIA-API.1: The TSF shall provide an ... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.5.3 FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition | A number of requirements from ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] require the mapping of attributes to the device for the purpose of authentication, and for the assessment of access control privileges. Whilst not explicit in ETSI TS 103 962 ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] it is assumed that where at... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.5.4 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication | In support of the principle of least privilege, all entities seeking an action from another entity shall be identified and authenticated, and their right to the requested action shall be verified. This is stated in clause 5 of ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and captured in Requirements 3 and 30 from ETSI T... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.5.5 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification | In accordance with the least privilege principle, the TSF shall not allow any operational actions by unidentified entities. In addition, as the TSF is mostly deployed without a direct user (i.e. it operates autonomously) the mediated actions shall always be restricted. In this regard therefore the only actions enabled ... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.6 Security management class | |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.6.1 FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes | FMT_MSA.1.1: The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Policy to restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]], the security attributes [assignment: list of security attributes] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles]. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.6.2 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization | FMT_MSA.3.1: The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Policy to provide [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP. FMT_MSA.3.2: The TSF shall allow the [assignment: the authorized identified roles] to specify... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.6.3 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles | There is no user role as such in the TOE, rather the TOE operates autonomously as a low privilege device. The autonomous operation shall be defined with respect to a least privilege user. All restricted, non-operational actions, for example, modification of configuration data, are subject to the access control policy. ... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.6.4 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions | FMT_SMF.1.1: The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: a) Accounts, roles and rights management b) Audit c) TOE operation management d) Management of credentials and keys e) SW update functionality f) [Selection: none, or list of [further management functions]] NOTE: See also clause A.3... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.7 Protection of the TSF class | |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.7.1 FPT_INI.1 TSF initialization | Whilst not strictly addressed in the base specifications ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and [2] the following requirements extend from the assumption that the TSF/OND as a device has to be securely initialized. The further assumption is that the code and data required to start and initialize the device is verified before use. NOT... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.7.2 FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps | NOTE: Whilst the note at the beginning of this clause states the dependent SFRs are not cited as a distinct requirement an exception applies in this case as reliable time stamps are either explicit or implicit across logging and verification functions of the TOE. FPT_STM.1.1: The TSF shall be able to provide reliable t... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.7.3 FPT_HWROT.1 Root of Trust based on hardware | NOTE: The text in this clause is identical to that given in clause 7.1 (with the exception of referencing to table numbers) where it appears as the definition of the SFR family, and in the current clause it appears as the formal SFR instantiation FPT_HWROT.1.1: The TSF shall contain an immutable root of trust that cont... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.8 TOE access class | |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.8.1 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination | As a standalone autonomous device the TOE/OND is assumed to be available without interruption in its normal operational mode. Where an operation such as local or remote management invokes a dedicated interactive session that session shall terminate that session after a configurable time interval, where the timer is sta... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.9 Trusted Path class | |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.9.1 Overview of provisions | As declared in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] for each of Requirements 8, 28 and 66 it is required to establish a secured channel for communication of an external user to the TSF. The only external relationship envisaged is between the TSF and its remote management function. Requirement 8 states that all e... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8.9.2 FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel | FTP_ITC.1.1: The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure. FTP_ITC.1.2: The TSF shall permi... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 9 Security Functional Requirements Rationale | In addition to the rationale for the SFRs that are derived from requirements in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and mapped in Annex A the detail mapping is given in Table 11. ETSI ETSI TS 103 996 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 44 Table 11: Mapping from objectives to SFRs and the rationale to select each SFR Objective SFR... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 10 Security Assurance Requirements | |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 10.1 Rationale for the Security Assurance Requirements | The CC process, in very simple terms, asks an evaluator to verify the efficacy of the implementation of security requirements. The security requirements for the ONDS domain are specified in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] derived from the common catalogue in ETSI TS 103 924 [12] and have been identified as ... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 10.2 Dependencies of Assurance Components | The writer of any ST conforming to the present document shall consider the inter-dependencies of the SARs as defined in CC-Part 3 [6] and claimed in clause 4 with the targeted evaluation assurance level. Table 12 summarizes the dependencies of each of the identified SARs from the main body of the present document and t... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 1 Scope | The present document is a protection profile for ONDS management of devices as described in ETSI TS 103 961 [1] and supporting management of devices described in ETSI TS 103 962 [2], ETSI TS 103 963 [3]. The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are extended from the Common Criteria Part 2 [5] and defined in support ... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 2 References | |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ETSI TS 103 961 [1], ETSI TS 103 962 [2], ETSI TS 103 963 [3] and the following apply: substantial assurance level: assurance that the ICT products, ICT services and ICT processes where the corresponding security requirements, including security functionaliti... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: AAT Attribute Authority Tree AES Advanced Encryption System CC Common Criteria CRA Cyber Resilience Act CSA Cyber Security Act DoS Denial of Service ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 11 EAL Evaluation Assurance Level EUCC Common Criteria-b... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 3.4 Notations convention for SFRs and SARs | For the purposes of the present document, the following notations, symbols and structural conventions from [5] apply: • Strikethrough indicates text replaced with alternative text as a refinement. • [Underlined text in brackets] indicates additional text provided as a refinement. NOTE 1: It is recognized that the conve... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 4 Overview of protection profile and assurance | |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 4.1 General concepts | The present document defines an EUCC conformant Protection Profile (PP) for the purpose of evaluation of the security provisions given for the management of ONDS devices established in ETSI TS 103 961 [1]. The PP extension addresses test cases for each requirement with the purpose of advising the evaluator and develope... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 4.2 Alignment to expectation of APE class of CC-Part 3 | |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 4.2.1 Overview | The present document, including the referenced content of [1], is written to conform to the requirements that allow its evaluation as a Protection Profile as outlined in CC-Part 3 [6] for class APE as modified for EUCC [i.15]. cd General model «asset» DesignModule SystemDesign «Objective» SystemObjectives «Objective» S... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 4.2.2 Conformance Claim against APE_INT | The present document is made with respect to the provisions of [1]. The unique EUCC/PP reference is to the full title and version number of the present document: • ETSI TS 103 961 [1]. NOTE: The certified version of the present document is registered with ENISA under the EUCC scheme. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 4.2.3 Claim against APE_CCL | The present PP was built with, and claims conformance to, the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (in version 2022, in revision 1, as of November 2022, for all parts: [4], [5], [6], [7] and [8]). In addition, the present document claims conformance to the base requirements established in the ... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 4.2.4 Claim against APE_SPD | The security problem is defined in the reference documents ETSI TS 103 961 [1], and summarized in clause 6 of the present document. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 4.2.5 Claim against APE_OBJ | The security objectives are defined in the reference documents ETSI TS 103 961 [1], and summarized in clauses 6.5 and 6.6 of the present document. ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 16 |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 4.2.6 Claim against APE_ECD | The package claim, taken from ISO/IEC 15408-5 [8] of the present PP is: EAL3 augmented with ALC_FLR.2 AVA_VAN.2 [8], Vulnerability analysis methodically tested and checked, is included (see also clause 4.4 below). NOTE: The expectation of Substantial defined in Article 53 of [i.13] is that AVA_VAN.2 as a minimum is req... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 4.2.7 Claim against APE_REQ | The security requirements are defined in the reference documents [1], and stated in SFR format in clauses 8 and 9 of the present document (Annex A provides a mapping between the format used in the reference documents and that of PP-Part 2). Assurance claims are defined in clause 10 of the present document. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 4.3 PP Claim | The present PP requires strict conformance of the ST or PP claiming conformance to the present document. The present PP in all parts do not claim conformance to any other PP. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 4.4 Claim against the AVA_VAN class | The EUCC scheme adopts provisions of the AVA_VAN class from CC Part 3 [6] specifically mapped to the metrics defined in ETSI TS 102 165-1 [i.1] for attack potential as shown in Table 1 and these are mapped to the CSA expectation for each of Basic, Substantial and High. Table 1: Vulnerability rating Attack potential val... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 5 The ONDS management TOE | |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 5.1 Introduction | The TOE and the management interface security requirements are defined in ETSI TS 103 961 [1]. The description given in the present document is for information only. As described in ETSI TS 103 96 [1] the network management manager manages and controls devices on optical networks, supports unified management, and offer... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 5.2 The type of the TOE | The TOE is a software application located on the management and control layer of the cloud-based network. It can manage and control ubiquitous network devices, including transport, IP, and firewall devices. It provides open interfaces to quickly integrate with upper-layer application systems such as OSSs, service orche... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 5.3 TOE Description | The TOE is a single software system located in the management and control layer of the network protecting the assets defined in clause 6.2 against the threats identified in clause 6.4 of the present document. It is designed to manage and control optical network devices as defined in each of ETSI TS 103 962 [2] and ETSI... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 5.4 Main functions and security features of the TOE | The TOE shall support the functions identified in ETSI TS 103 963 [3] that have been identified in order to counter the security threats identified in ETSI TS 103 924 [12]. Thus as identified in ETSI TS 103 961 [1] the following security features are required and are expanded in the present document in the form and sty... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 5.5 Physical Scope | Out of scope of the present document. NOTE 1: The base specifications ETSI TS 103 963 [3] do not define the physical characteristics of the TOE. NOTE 2: The management functions are wholly software artefacts which rely on certain physical characteristics of the platform to run which are addressed in large part in claus... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 5.6 Logical Scope of the TOE | |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 5.6.1 User Management | As defined in ETSI TS 103 961 [1], clause 6, the TOE provides access control management to control permissions to users with different responsibilities, and adjusts the permissions based on service changes. NOTE: The present document extends the role of the manager object defined in ETSI TS 103 961 [1] to the object SM... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 5.6.2 Authentication and identification | As defined in clause 5 of ETSI TS 103 961 [1], the TOE shall authenticate all entities who access the TOE. The present document extends the definition given in ETSI TS 103 963 [3] to explicitly define, using SFRs in clause 9, the means by which an entity is identified and authenticated. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 5.6.3 Access Control | As defined in clause 7.2 of ETSI TS 103 961 [1], the TOE shall support policy based access control. The present document extends the definition given in ETSI TS 103 963 [3] to explicitly define, using SFRs in clause 9, the means of achieving access control. ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 19 |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 5.6.4 Communication security | As defined in clause 6 of ETSI TS 103 961 [1], the TOE shall provide integrity and confidentiality protection of any data in transmission. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 5.6.5 Audit | The TOE generates audit records for security-relevant management actions. NOTE: A Syslog™ as defined in IETF RFC 3164 [i.3], or in the updated IETF RFC 5434 [i.4], solution may be used to resolve the problem of limited storage space. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 5.6.6 Security Management | The TOE offers security management for configuration and topology management aspects of the Optical Network. Security management includes not only authentication and access control management, but also management of security-related data consisting of configuration profiles and runtime parameters. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 5.6.7 Cryptographic Services | Security functionalities rely and are dependent on the availability of cryptographic services. The TOE provides cryptographic algorithm and key management functions to support secure communication and software update, following endorsed standards, e.g. BSI TR-02102-1 [i.5]. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 5.7 The non-TOE Components | The following components are out of scope of the present document and not part of the TOE: • The components of the network device that hosts the TOE. EXAMPLE 1: The hardware components the TOE is installed on. • Local and remote management stations operated by the defined administrator user roles to connect to the TOE.... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 5.8 The TOE Lifecycle | Not applicable. NOTE: In order to be consistent with the aims of the Cyber Resilience Act [i.14] and the NIS2 Directive [i.9] provisions have to be made to ensure that the TOE (the OLT/OTN) has addressed lifecycle and supply chain issues and to be updateable over its lifetime. In this the provisions for vulnerability r... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 6 The Security Problem Definition | |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 6.1 Overview | The security problem which applies to the TOE is described in ETSI TS 103 963 [3] and in the common requirements ETSI TS 103 924 [12]. The text that follows in this clause summarizes the problem statement but the normative text remains in ETSI TS 103 963 [3]. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 6.2 Assets | The management entity allows managed access to the configuration data of the Optical Network Device (OND) and to the network topology as identified in ETSI TS 103 963 [3]. Each of these assets is identified as having high impact to the network availability if accessed or modified by an unauthorised entity and are thus ... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 6.3 Discussion of the Threats | |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 6.3.1 Overview | In Annex A of ETSI TS 103 961 [1] it is identified that the assets (see clause 6.2) are to be prevented from unauthorised access (see clause 7 of ETSI TS 103 963 [3]) with authorised entities identified and authenticated (see clause 5 of [3]) and data to be maintained as confidential and with integrity verifiable (see ... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 6.3.2 T.UnauthenticatedAccess | Unauthenticated entities could manage to bypass the identification, authentication and authorisation and get access to D.LOG and D.CONFIG, perform by that any malicious operation on D.CONFIG, enabling for abusing the TOE for a threat agent's purpose. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 6.3.3 T.UnauthorisedAccess | Logged in users with restricted authorisation could manage to escalate their restrictions and access thereby TOE functions that cause compromising of D.LOG and D.CONFIG which enables for any malicious operation and for abusing the TOE for a threat agent's purpose. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 6.3.4 T.Eavesdrop | An eavesdropper (remote attacker) in the management network served by the TOE, who is able to intercept, modify, or re-use information assets that are exchanged between the TOE and interconnection party. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 6.4 Assumptions | A.PhysicalProtection The operating environment of the cloud hosting the TOE is protected from unauthorised physical access. Only authorised users have the right to physically access the TOE and its operating environment. The underlying hardware and firmware that host the TOE is trusted and provide the capabilities the ... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 6.5 Security Objectives | O.Authorisation The TOE shall establish a role model for the authenticated entities where each role receives a set of functions assigned by the security management. O.Authentication The TOE identifies and authenticates entities before the authorisation to access TOE resources is granted. O.Audit The TOE generates, stor... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 6.6 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment | OE. PhysicalProtection The operating environment of the cloud hosting the TOE is protected from unauthorised physical access. Only authorised users have the right to physically access the TOE and its operating environment. The underlying hardware and firmware that host the TOE is trusted and provide the capabilities th... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 6.7 Security Objectives Rationale | Table 3 provides a mapping of TOE objectives to threats, showing that each objective is at least covered by one threat. Table 3: Mapping of security objectives to threats Security Objective for the TOE Threat O.Communication T.Eavesdrop O.Authentication T.UnauthenticatedAccess and T.UnauthorisedAccess O.Authorisation T... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 7 Extended Component definition | |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 7.1 SAR SW Update Management | |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 7.1.1 ALC_SWU.1 Software Update Management | The definition of SAR SW Update Management is given in clause 7.1.2. Recognizing that NMS software may contain vulnerabilities (an exploitable weakness as defined in ETSI TS 102 165-1 [i.1]) and that such vulnerabilities should be mitigated it is necessary to provide a mechanism for maintenance of the software of the d... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 7.1.2 ALC_SWU.1 Software Update Management | NOTE 1: If developers plan TOE upgrades that impact security functionality of TOE, and the upgraded product retains the same identification, the existing certificate may become invalid and in such cases the certificate should be updated and validation against the latest "good" certificate will apply. The SW update of t... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 7.1.3 ALC_SWU.1D Developer action elements | ALC_SWU.1.1D: The developer shall provide the description of the SW update management procedures. ALC_SWU.1.2D: The developer shall provide security updates based on the defined SW update management procedures at least until the end-of-support period of the TOE has been reached. Application Note: The ST writer is recom... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 7.1.4 ALC_SWU.1C Content and presentation elements | ALC_SWU.1.1C: The SW update procedure shall describe the process for the development and release of the patch for the TOE. ALC_SWU.1.2C: The SW update procedure shall describe the technical mechanism and functions for the adoption of the patch into the TOE. Application Note 1: That means the description of the TOE mech... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 7.1.5 ALC_SWU.1E Evaluation working units | ALC_SWU.1.1E: The evaluator shall verify that the provided information complies with all requirements regarding content and evidence presentation.ALC_SWU.1.2E: The SW update procedure shall describe a set of evaluation activities related to the effectiveness and performance of the technical mechanism. Application Note:... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 8 Additional SFR definitions | Void. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9 Security Functional Requirements | |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.1 Overview of SFR hierarchy | NOTE 1: The SFRs in this clause are from CC-Part 2 [5] and, where appropriate, from extensions defined in specifically cited documents. All of the SFRs described are defined with respect to the core requirements from ETSI TS 103 963 [3] and the mapping is summarized in Annex A. NOTE 2: Where an SFR from CC Part 2 [5] c... |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.2 Security Audit class (FAU) |
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