hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 7 13 | section stringlengths 3 121 | content stringlengths 0 2.2M |
|---|---|---|---|
c162d88c5a832e40110a86ba070ce0ef | 104 147-2 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in ETSI TR 121 905 [i.1] (3GPP TR 21.905) and the following apply: NOTE: An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in ETSI TR 121 905 [i.1] (3GPP TR 21.905). ICS Implementation ... |
c162d88c5a832e40110a86ba070ce0ef | 104 147-2 | 4 Recommended Test Case Applicability | The applicability of each individual test is identified in Table 4-1 (MCPTT Server). This is just a recommendation based on the purpose for which the test case was written. The applicability of every test is formally expressed by the use of Boolean expression that are based on parameters (ICS) included in annex A of th... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 1 Scope | The present document specifies the principles, objectives, and technical framework, which addresses the definition of standardized hardware inventory models for microwave wireless backhaul at the SDN Southbound Interface. It focuses on the modelling of hardware inventory information for microwave Network Elements as ex... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 2 References | |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: Band & Carrier Aggregation (BCA): typically referring to aggregating carriers in uniform or non-uniform bands NOTE: In the present document, it is referring to aggregating Eband with traditional MW band. Fixed (compact) IDU: IDU represented as a chass... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: AI Artificial Intelligence BCA Band and Carrier Aggregation ETH ETHernet FW FirmWare HW HardWare ID IDentity IDU Indoor Unit IEEE™ Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers IETF Internet Engineering Task Force IF Intermediate Frequency... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 4 Objectives | The objectives of this new Profile are as follows: • The new Profile shall define a standard, common, and interoperable YANG-based representation of microwave hardware inventory suitable for use in open SDN environments. • The new Profile shall specify a minimum and sufficient set of inventory parameters required for c... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 6 Technical Approach | The technical approach adopted in the present document follows the ETSI mWT SDN architectural framework and is based on the use of standard, YANG data model profiles derived from relevant IETF specifications, specified using YANG version 1.1 as defined in IETF RFC 7950 [4]. ETSI ETSI TS 104 143 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 10 The ... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 7 Plugtests Integration and Validation Status | The validation of the standard, YANG-based inventory model profiles derived from IETF specifications was carried out within the ETSI SDN Plugtests Programme. As part of the ETSI 5th mWT SDN Test Plan V1.0 [i.4], participating vendors implemented the YANG model profiles in their microwave Network Elements and exposed in... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 8 Industry Relevance and Impact | Industry relevance and impact are summarized in the following points: • Multi-Vendor Interoperability: The absence of common YANG-based inventory models has historically forced SDN Controllers to rely on vendor-specific adapters and proprietary data representations. By defining a standard, common set of YANG models bas... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 9 Description of MW Hardware Configurations | Figure 1 illustrates two fundamental microwave hardware deployment configurations that serve as baseline reference cases for the inventory profiling activity. Figure 1: Type 1 1+0 & Type 2 2+0/1+1 configuration The first configuration, referred to as Type 1: 1+0, represents the simplest microwave deployment scenario. I... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 10 Modelling Considerations and Clarifications | |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 10.0 Introduction | This clause documents the modelling considerations, interpretations, and agreements reached during the profiling activities of the present document. The objective of this clause is to ensure consistent understanding and application of the standardized YANG-based inventory model profiles across different microwave equip... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 10.1 Modular versus Fixed IDU Modelling | Microwave Indoor Units (IDUs) are implemented either as modular systems or as fixed (compact) systems. In the case of modular implementations, the IDU consists of a chassis hosting multiple containers, where each container may include one or more functional modules. These modules provide Ethernet interfaces, IF interfa... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 10.2 Dual RF ODU Identification | In the case of dual RF Outdoor Units (ODUs), the current understanding is that the dual RF ODU is identified and recognized by the SDN Controller upon the initial connection of the first carrier. No fundamental modelling differences have been identified between single RF and dual RF ODU configurations at the inventory ... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 10.3 Ethernet versus IF Connectivity Between IDU and ODU | Two distinct connectivity cases exist between the IDU and the ODU. In the case of Ethernet-based connectivity, the ODU, whether it operates in the traditional microwave or E-band frequency band, is treated as a separate chassis. In the case of IF-based connectivity, the ODU, typically used for traditional microwave RF,... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 10.4 Current Interpretation on Modelling Differences | For certain intermediate configurations currently under discussion (e.g. is Type 2 (2+0/1+1 config) different from Type 4 (2+0 XPIC config) from modelling point of view?), the present view is that no material modelling difference is observed at inventory level. This position is agreed for the time being and shall remai... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 10.5 Full-Outdoor Radio | A full outdoor radio is a single, outdoor unit in which the modem, network interfaces, and radio unit are integrated within the same physical hardware. The modelling approach is identical regardless of whether the radio operates in the Microwave (MW) or E-band frequency ranges. Compared to a split-type architecture, th... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 10.6 Treatment of BCA configurations | This topic is currently also addressed within IETF activities and remains a pending action item originating from the published ETSI GR mWT 025 [i.2], clause 5.1.4, related to gap analysis in standard models. Two alternative modelling interpretations are under consideration. In the first case, when all ODUs are connecte... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11 Hardware Inventory Modelling Profiles | |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.0 Introduction | The present document defines specific hardware profiles which follow the structure of IETF RFC 8348 [1]. The inventory modelling approach follows the hierarchical hardware classification defined in IETF specifications for network element representation. In this hierarchy, a chassis represents the primary physical enclo... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.1.0 Introduction | The below examples, illustrate two representative split-mount implementations of a 1+0 single-carrier microwave configuration in modular Indoor Unit (IDU) architectures. This configuration follows a split-type architecture, where the Outdoor Unit (MW ODU) is physically separated from the Indoor Unit (IDU). The IDU is o... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.1.1 ODU as a separate chassis | Figure 4: Split-mount (modular) IDU-ODU Connectivity ethernet - 1+0 Configuration Figure 4 illustrates a split-mount implementation of a 1+0 microwave configuration with modular Indoor Unit (IDU). In the considered configuration, the interconnection between the IDU and the ODU is provided via an Ethernet interface. For... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.1.2 ODU as a module and child component of the indoor | Figure 5: Split-mount (modular) IDU-ODU Connectivity IF - 1+0 Configuration This configuration follows a split-type architecture with IF cable connectivity between the Indoor Unit (IDU) and the Microwave Outdoor Unit (MW ODU). The IDU is again of modular design and may comprise one or more containers hosting pluggable ... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.2.0 Introduction | This architecture illustrates a split-mount microwave deployment implementing a 2+0 configuration, with a modular IDU which allows scalable deployment, where multiple pluggable boards can be hosted in the container slots. These examples, demonstrate how Ethernet-based or IF-based IDU-ODU connectivity can be used to mod... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.2.2 2+0 with single RF ODUs, single eth board, Ethernet connectivity | Figure 7: Split-mount 2+0 configuration using separate ODUs, Ethernet connectivity via single eth board Figure 7 illustrates a split-mount microwave deployment in which a single RF Outdoor Unit (ODU) is connected to an Indoor Unit (IDU) using Ethernet-based connectivity. The ODU integrates one radio frequency chain and... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.2.3 2+0 with dual RF ODUs, single eth board, Ethernet connectivity | Figure 8: Split-mount 2+0 configuration using dual RF ODUs with Ethernet connectivity via a single Ethernet board Figure 8 illustrates a split-mount microwave deployment in which a dual RF Outdoor Unit (ODU) is connected to an Indoor Unit (IDU) using Ethernet-based connectivity. The dual RF ODU supports two RF carriers... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.2.4 2+0 with single RF ODUs, separate modem boards, IF connectivity | Figure 9: Split-mount 2+0 configuration using single IF modems and single RF ODUs Figure 9 illustrates a split-mount microwave deployment in which the Indoor Unit (IDU) and Outdoor Units (ODUs) are interconnected using Intermediate Frequency (IF) cabling. The configuration supports a 2+0 microwave setup, where each RF ... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.2.5 2+0 with single RF ODUs, dual IF modem, IF connectivity | Figure 10: Split-mount 2+0 configuration using dual IF modem and single RF ODUs Figure 10 illustrates a split-mount microwave deployment in which a modular Indoor Unit (IDU) is connected to a single RF Outdoor Unit (ODU) using Intermediate Frequency (IF) cabling. The configuration supports a 2+0 microwave setup by mean... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.2.6 2+0 with dual RF ODUs, dual IF modem, IF connectivity | Figure 11: Split-mount 2+0 configuration using dual IF modem and dual RF ODU Figure 11 illustrates a split-mount microwave deployment that supports a 2+0 microwave setup by means of two IF modem instances housed on a single modem board within the IDU and a single ODU integrating two independent RF transmission paths. T... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.3.0 Introduction | The below examples, illustrate two representative split-mount implementations of a 1+0 single-carrier microwave configuration in non-modular, compact Indoor Unit (IDU) architectures, with a predefined and fixed set of physical ports without modular containerization. ETSI ETSI TS 104 143 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 24 |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.3.1 ODU as a separate chassis | Figure 12: Split-mount (fixed/compact indoor) IDU-ODU Ethernet Connectivity - 1+0 Configuration This configuration follows a split-type architecture but this time with a fixed (compact, non-modular) Indoor Unit (IDU), where the IDU is represented as a chassis with a fixed set of physical ports. The RJ45 Ethernet ports ... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.3.2 ODU as a module and child component of the indoor | Figure 13: Split-mount (fixed/compact indoor) IDU-ODU IF Connectivity - 1+0 Configuration This configuration follows a split-type architecture with a fixed (compact, non-modular) Indoor Unit (IDU), in which the interconnection between the IDU and the Microwave Outdoor Unit (MW ODU) is provided via an IF cable interface... |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.4 BCA configuration | 11.4.1 MW & Eband ODU as a separate chassis, Ethernet IDU ODU connectivity Figure 14: IDU-ODU Ethernet Connectivity, 2+0 BCA MW + Eband In this interpretation, all ODUs are connected to the IDU via Ethernet cabling. The example takes into account a single multiband antenna, a single MW ODU and single Eband ODU for simp... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 1 Scope | The present document defines the test cases in the form of evaluation criteria and PP/CC evaluation tests resulting from the Test Purposes identified for ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] in ETSI TS 103 993 [3]. In combination with the base standard (including its ICS statement), and the TSS&TP in ETSI TS 103... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 2 References | |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: Administration User (AU): external entity permitted to login to the TOE for the conduct of restricted administration tasks and functionality NOTE: In a Unix like operational environment this is equivalent to admin. ETSI ETSI TS 103 996 V1.1.1 (2026-01... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: APE Assurance class Protection Profile Evaluation AU Administration User CC Common Criteria CIA Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability CRA Cyber Resilience Act CSA Cyber Security Act DoS Denial of Service EAL Evaluation Assurance Level ENISA... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 3.4 Notation convention for SFRs and SARs | For the purposes of the present document, the notation and structural conventions given in CC-Part 2 [5] and the following apply: • Strikethrough indicates text replaced with alternative text as a refinement. • [Underlined text in brackets] indicates additional text provided as a refinement. NOTE 1: It is recognized th... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 4 Overview of protection profile and assurance | |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 4.1 General concepts | The present document defines an EUCC conformant Protection Profile (PP) for the purpose of evaluation of the security provisions given for ONDS devices established in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2]. The PP extension addresses test cases for each requirement with the purpose of advising the evaluator and de... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 4.1a Conformance claim | The Protection Profile (PP) defined in the present document claims to be conformant with the Common Criteria version 2022 Revision 1 as of November 2022 [5] and [6] as follows: • CC-Part 2 [5] extended, with FPT_HWROT.1 Root of trust based on HW (see clause 7.1). • CC-Part 3 [6] extended, ALC_SWU Software Update Manage... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 4.2 Alignment to expectation of APE class of CC-Part 3 | |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 4.2.1 Overview | The present document, including the referenced content of ETSI TS 103 962 [1], ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and ETSI TS 103 924 [12], is written to conform to the requirements that allow its evaluation as a Protection Profile as outlined in CC-Part 3 [6] for class APE as modified for EUCC [10]. Figure 4: Components of APE class... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 4.2.2 Claim against APE_INT | The present document is made with respect to the provisions of ETSI TS 103 962 [1], ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and ETSI TS 103 924 [12]. The unique PP reference (for EUCC [10]) is to the full title and version number of the present document. ETSI TS 103 996 (V1.1.1): "Cyber Security (CYBER); EUCC PP for Optical Network and De... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 4.2.3 Claim against APE_CCL | The present PP was built with, and claims conformance to, the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (in version 2022, in revision 1, as of November 2022, for all parts: [4], [5], [6], [7] and [8]). In addition, the present document claims conformance to the base requirements established in the ... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 4.2.4 Claim against APE_SPD | The security problem is defined in the reference documents ETSI TS 103 962 [1], ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and ETSI TS 103 924 [12], and summarized in clause 6 of the present document. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 4.2.5 Claim against APE_OBJ | The security objectives are defined in the reference documents ETSI TS 103 962 [1], ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and ETSI TS 103 924 [12], and summarized in clauses 6.6 and 6.7 of the present document. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 4.2.6 Claim against APE_ECD | The package claim, taken from CC-Part 3 [8] of the present PP is: EAL3 augmented with ALC_FLR.2 AVA_VAN.2 from CC-Part 3 [8], Vulnerability analysis methodically tested and checked, is included (see also clause 4.4 below). NOTE: The expectation of Substantial defined in Article 53 of [i.26] is that AVA_VAN.2 as a minim... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 4.2.7 Claim against APE_REQ | The security requirements are defined in the reference documents ETSI TS 103 962 [1], ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and ETSI TS 103 924 [12], and stated in SFR format in clauses 8 and 9 of the present document (Annex A provides a mapping between the format used in the reference documents and that of PP-Part 2 [5]). Assurance cla... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 4.3 PP Claim | The present PP requires strict conformance of the ST or PP claiming conformance to the present document. The present PP in all parts do not claim conformance to any other PP. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 4.4 Claim against the AVA_VAN class | The EUCC scheme adopts provisions of the AVA_VAN class from CC-Part 3 [6] specifically mapped to the metrics defined in ETSI TS 102 165-1 [i.1] for attack potential as shown in Table 1 and these are mapped to the CSA expectation for each of Basic, Substantial and High. Table 1: Vulnerability rating Attack potential val... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 5 The ONDS TOE | |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 5.1 Introduction | The TOE is defined in ETSI TS 103 962 [1], ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and by the common requirements in ETSI TS 103 924 [12]. In addition, the management interface security requirements are defined in clause 4 of [i.2] but are out of scope of the present document but are addressed in ETSI TS 104 013 [i.19]. NOTE: The descript... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 5.2 The type of the TOE | The TOE device provides transparent transmitting services. In this context, transparent means that the TOE does not have the ability to access the data stream contents. In the optical network scenario, as described in the common requirements catalogue ETSI TS 103 924 [12], and in the specializations of ETSI TS 103 962 ... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 5.3 TOE Description | The base requirements given in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and the common security catalogue in ETSI TS 103 924 [12] apply (see the summary of all requirements given in Annex B of the present document). |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 5.4 Main functions and security features of the TOE | The base requirements given in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] which come from the common security catalogue in ETSI TS 103 924 [12] apply. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 5.5 Physical Scope | Out of scope of the present document. ETSI ETSI TS 103 996 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 19 NOTE 1: The base specifications ETSI TS 103 962 [1], ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and the common catalogue ETSI TS 103 924 [12] do not define the physical characteristics of the TOE. NOTE 2: The developer of the ST is expected to give a full descript... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 5.6 Logical Scope of the TOE | The base requirements given in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] which come from the common security catalogue in ETSI TS 103 924 [12] apply and address the following characteristics of the TOE: • Security Management • Access Control configuration • Network Management Handling • TOE Flow Control • Communicati... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 5.7 The non-TOE Components | The following components are out of scope of the present TOE: • The ONDS management components for controlling and administering the TOE (see ETSI TS 103 961 [i.2]). • The ONDS management component mediating other services that the TOE uses (see ETSI TS 103 961 [i.2]). • All connecting fibres and wires. • All radio-equ... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 5.8 The TOE Lifecycle | Not applicable. NOTE: In order to be consistent with the aims of the Cyber Resilience Act [i.26] and the NIS2 Directive [i.17] provisions have to be made to ensure that the TOE (the OLT/OTN) has addressed lifecycle and supply chain issues and to be updateable over its lifetime. In this the provisions made in Annex A fo... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6 The Security Problem Definition | |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.1 Overview | The security problem which applies to the TOE is described in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and in the common requirements ETSI TS 103 924 [12]. The text that follows in this clause summarizes the problem statement but the normative text remains in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2]. ETSI ETSI TS... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.2 Assets | The assets considered in the TOE are described in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] as the configuration data of the device that allows it to perform the actions described above in clause 5.2. The text that follows restates the assets into a format commonly used in CC but the normative definition remains in E... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.3 Discussion of the Threats | |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.3.1 Overview of threat model | The threat and threat mitigation described in ETSI TS 103 924 [12] and expanded in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] derived the security requirements described in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2]. The model used in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] to identify threats is based on the app... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.3.2 Specific ONDS threats | |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.3.2.1 Disclosure of Internal data (T.DiscloseInternalData) | The internal data of the device (the TOE) is its operational software and its configuration data as outlined in clause 6.2 above and noted in the access control rules listed in clause 7.3 of each of ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2]. NOTE: As any instance of the TOE has a limited degree of personalization (e.... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.3.2.2 Misuse of TOE Functions (T.Misuse) | The TOE is intended as a single purpose device (see clauses 4.2 and 4.3 of ETSI TS 103 924 [12]) and is not intended to be used for any other purpose. However, in accepting that the hardware may consist of a computing architecture that is programmable there is a non-trivial risk of the device being misused by inappropr... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.3.2.3 Interception of communication (T.Intercept) | A number of provisions given in clause 6.1 of ETSI TS 103 924 [12] apply (see also Annex A of each of ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2]) to protect the content of consumer traffic that is managed by the TOE. As highlighted in clause A.5.1 of ETSI TS 103 924 [12] the application of passive and active measures ... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.3.2.4 Tampering with an asset (T.Manipulation) | As identified in the threat taxonomy in ETSI TS 102 165-1 [i.1] tampering is a form of manipulation threat against an asset. Clause 7.1 of ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] states that secure storage elements shall be tamper resistant, tamper evident and shall raise an alarm if tampering is identified. T.Mani... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.3.2.5 Malfunction of the TOE (T.Malfunction) | This threat applies to malicious forced malfunction of the TOE. ETSI ETSI TS 103 996 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 24 T.Malfunction: A threat agent tries to cause a malfunction of the TSF in order to deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE: NOTE: Malfunctions of the TOE arising from such things as physical fa... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.3.2.6 Unauthorized update (T.UNAUTH-UPD) | The TOE shall be updateable to counter threats. This is consistent with requirements identified in the CRA [i.25] and NIS2 [i.17] and is identified as a core requirement in ETSI TS 103 645 [i.15]. T.UNAUTH-UPD: During transmission of a SW patch to the TOE, a threat agent was able to replace or modify the original SW pa... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.3.2.7 Denial of service by manipulation of update process (T.DOS-UPD) | T.DOS-UPD: A DoS prevents the patch management from operation due to interruption or blocking of the update steps of SW patch loading and/or preventing the atomic conduct of the on-TOE patch mechanism: • Affected assets: D.SOFT, D.CONFIG |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.3.2.8 Unwanted management traffic (T.UnwantedManagementTraffic) | T.UnwantedManagementTraffic: The traffic here only refers to the traffic on management interfaces, that means, the Unwanted Network Traffic threat only exists on the management plane. The Unwanted network traffic may originate from an attacker and result in an overload of the management interfaces, which may cause a fa... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.4 Organizational Security Policies | The policy environment in which the TOE is deployed is independent of the device itself thus the examination and definition of organizational security policies is not addressed. Thus no Organization Security Policies (OSPs) are claimed. However, Annex C of ETSI TS 103 962 [1] identifies a number of environmental, deplo... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.5 Assumptions | Each of ETSI TS 103 962 [1], ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and the common catalogue ETSI TS 103 924 [12] state a number of assumptions for the use and deployment of the TOE that are re-drafted here into a CC format. The following specifies the assumptions on the TOE environment that are necessary for the TOE to meet its security... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.6 Security Objectives | The security objectives resulting in the mitigations given in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] are based on the common catalogue ETSI TS 103 924 [12]. The text that follows restates those objectives into a format commonly found in CC part 1 [4], chapter 10.6.2. O.CONF_01: The content of a transmission should... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.7 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment | Each of ETSI TS 103 962 [1], ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and the common catalogue ETSI TS 103 924 [12] define requirements for the operational environment and are redrafted here in a CC format. See in particular Annex B and Annex C of ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2]. OE.Certificates: Digital certificates that are g... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.8 Rationale for Security Objectives | Table 4 demonstrates that all threats are countered with the assigned objectives for the TOE and the Operational Environment (OE). ETSI ETSI TS 103 996 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 27 Table 4: Rationale for security objectives Threat / OSP Security Objectives Rationale for Security Objectives T.UnauthenticatedAccess O.Authenticati... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.9 Rationale for Objectives for the Environment | Table 5 provides a mapping of the objectives for the operational environment to assumptions, showing that each environmental objective is covered exactly by one assumption. The objectives for the environment are mirrored by the assumptions: • A.Certificates is upheld by OE.Certificates, which is a rephrasing of the ass... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 7 Extended Component definition | |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 7.1 FPT_HWROT.1 Root of Trust based on hardware | As identified in Table 6 a number of requirements from ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] explicitly call out for a hardware based root of trust within the computing platform of the TOE. There are multiple variants of the root of trust identified as below: • Root of Trust for Storage (RTS) - this shall provide... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 7.2 Extended SAR components | |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 7.2.1 SAR SW Update Management | |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 7.2.1.1 ALC_SWU.1 Software Update Management general principles | NOTE 1: See also Annex A. The definition of SAR SW Update Management is given below. Recognizing that software enabled devices may contain vulnerabilities (an exploitable weakness as defined in ETSI TS 102 165-1 [i.1]) and that such vulnerabilities should be mitigated it is necessary to provide a mechanism for maintena... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 7.2.1.2 ALC_SWU.1 Software Update Management functionality and behaviour | NOTE 1: If developers plan TOE upgrades that impact security functionality of TOE, and the upgraded product retains the same identification, the existing certificate may become invalid and in such cases the certificate should be updated and validation against the latest "good" certificate will apply. The SW update of t... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 7.2.1.3 ALC_SWU.1D Developer action elements | ALC_SWU.1.1D: The developer shall provide the description of the SW update management procedures. ALC_SWU.1.2D: The developer shall provide security updates based on the defined SW update management procedures at least until the end-of-support period of the TOE has been reached. Application note: The ST writer is recom... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 7.2.1.4 ALC_SWU.1C Content and presentation elements | ALC_SWU.1.1C: The SW update procedure shall describe the process for the development and release of the patch for the TOE. ALC_SWU.1 Software Update Management 1 ETSI ETSI TS 103 996 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 32 ALC_SWU.1.2C: The SW update procedure shall describe the technical mechanism and functions for the adoption of the pa... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 7.2.1.5 ALC_SWU.1E Evaluation working units | ALC_SWU.1.1E: The evaluator shall verify that the provided information complies with all requirements regarding content and evidence presentation. ALC_SWU.1.2E: The SW update procedure shall describe a set of evaluation activities related to the effectiveness and performance of the technical mechanism. Application note... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 7.2.2 Add-on for AGD_OPE.1.4C Operational User Guidance | Application note for AGD_OPE.1.4C. The SAR AGD_OPE.1.4C requires the operational user guidance to present each security-relevant event relative to the user role and function that need to be performed. It needs to be ensured that these user presentations comprise also the case of the TOE decommissioning. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 7.2.3 SAR augmentation: ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures | The augmentation with ALC_FLR.2 provides flaw-reporting procedures that require the developer to support the user with corrective actions, and guidance in order to ensure that the user is able to mitigate the discovered flaw. ETSI ETSI TS 103 996 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 33 Application note 1: The CC uses the term "security fl... |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 8 Security Functional Requirements |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.