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dba25161077ab25d04f1eb028c9d59ca | 104 126 | 4.1 Foundations | A takedown request is a technical request to take down an account, content or service. The present document does not make any statement about legislation. The request should contain supporting information which will allow the recipient to fully understand what is being asked for and why (e.g. can cite relevant legislation or can indicate that the request is made because the material in question does not meet a certain policy or practice). The basic definition of a takedown request does not involve requesting the disclosure, storage or delivery of data. ETSI TS 103 120 [i.1] already contains a range of provisions for disclosure and data preservation. It is for future study to look at whether there are situations in which there are requests for data to be both taken down and disclosed (or preserved). As part of this study, it is important to bear in mind the need to avoid confusion between takedowns and disclosure. |
dba25161077ab25d04f1eb028c9d59ca | 104 126 | 4.2 Benefits | The goal is to create a way of submitting requests that is clear, consistent, secure and efficient. This goal helps deliver the following benefits: • All parties can quickly have a common understanding of the action that is being requested and the justification for it. • Parties can have confidence that material is not being revealed to people who should not see it. Parties can have confidence that they are talking to the people they think they are talking to. • Parties do not have to build lots of different ways of working and do not have to try to understand which way of working is being used. • As much of the work as possible can be done automatically. There is always scope for humans to do tasks that need human judgement (interpretation of policies or legislation) but the goal is that automation is used to do the tasks that computers do best (moving data, following certain rules about data). In summary, the goal is to ensure requests can be made in a way which is low-risk and low-cost, giving everyone confidence to implement takedown requests in a way that meets the community's common goals (the takedown of material which everyone agrees should not be available or accessible). |
dba25161077ab25d04f1eb028c9d59ca | 104 126 | 4.3 Scenarios | The following scenarios are relevant: • Takedown of user-generated content. • Blocking of a service based on phone number, email address or (potentially) IP address (care needed about ephemeral identifiers). • Blocking material by a hosting organization or blocking a domain at a registrar level (for DNS Abuse, Fraud, hosting material that does not meet certain policies or legislation). It is important to handle situations where the takedown is temporary as well as those where it is permanent. It is important to bear in mind that (in some situations) decisions about takedowns may need to be changed later (e.g. an appeals process). The present document does not specify whether appeals are allowed or how appeals are decided; however, the present document aims to support situations where appeals take place. ETSI ETSI TR 104 126 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 7 |
dba25161077ab25d04f1eb028c9d59ca | 104 126 | 5 Approaches | |
dba25161077ab25d04f1eb028c9d59ca | 104 126 | 5.1 Two principles | The following two principles are recommended: 1) It is recommended to re-use existing TC LI standards where they are suitable i.e. re-use protocols and structures from existing TC LI specifications. Care has been taken to avoid confusion between takedowns and lawful disclosure requests: there are distinct standards and standard numbers; the messages will be incompatible at a coding level; care has been taken to keep terminology distinct. 2) There is a range of different scenarios and use cases (user-generated content, domain registration, IP address, email address, phone number). They are different in a range of ways. However, in terms of the structures/protocols for how to deliver requests (and reply to them), the different scenarios look very similar. Therefore, the recommended approach is to create one standard which covers all use cases, with space for defining the content (to be taken down) in a variety of ways. |
dba25161077ab25d04f1eb028c9d59ca | 104 126 | 5.2 Outline of the candidate solution | The recommended solution involves following these steps: • Establishing a secure link between the people making the request and the people receiving it. The goal is to use standard internet-based secure protocols which are easy to code. • Follow a certain message flow, which defines who starts the conversation and how people can respond (e.g. with acknowledgements or errors). • There is a clearly defined set of data in the messages. Some of it is basic information about times of messages and identifiers. Also, it includes a way to identify the material in question. • There is a clear, standard way of formatting messages. |
dba25161077ab25d04f1eb028c9d59ca | 104 126 | 5.3 Implementing this approach | The above approach is implemented by using the structure for takedown tasks (Called TDTask) as defined in ETSI TS 103 120 [i.1]. The TDTask is distinct from the existing tasks at a high level in the stack, so that software will be able to immediately see whether a request is a disclosure or takedown request. The TDTask reuses certain basic identifiers but care has been taken to ensure that concepts are not included where they are not relevant or appropriate to takedown requests. The main differences and similarities (for TDTask compared to the other types of tasks in ETSI TS 103 120 [i.1]) are explained in clause 5.4. The details of how to create and use the takedown task are given in ETSI TS 103 120 [i.1]. |
dba25161077ab25d04f1eb028c9d59ca | 104 126 | 5.4 Comparing TDTask to other request types | Clause 5.4 examines differences and similarities between the Takedown Task (TDTask) compared to the other types of tasks in ETSI TS 103 120 [i.1], such as the Lawful Disclosure Task LDTask. The purpose of clause 5.4 is to demonstrate that a balance has been struck: • Relevant material from other task types has been re-used i.e. not re-inventing the wheel. • Critical differences between takedowns and other task types have been acknowledged and properly accommodated. • There is a very clear distinction between takedown tasks (compared to other tasks) to keep the possibility of confusion as remote as possible. ETSI ETSI TR 104 126 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 8 The main similarity is that the goal is to create a secure, authenticated channel which can reliably and efficiently communicate requests from the organization making the request, to the organization receiving the request. All this infrastructure should be reused from ETSI TS 103 120 [i.1]. Some of the critical differences are as follows: • There will be different ways to identify the subject of the request. It is useful to re-use the techniques (such as dictionaries) in ETSI TS 103 120 [i.1] which give flexibility and strong typing at the same time. However, it should be noted that list of potential identifier types is often different for takedowns. • The process for authorizing takedown requests could be very different compared to requests for lawful disclosures. For example, some takedown requests might be based on the justification that "the material in question appears to contradict company policy". However, it is still essential to be able to have confidence in the identity of the organization making the request, i.e. the authentication provided by ETSI TS 103 120 [i.1] is still important. • No material (content) is supplied as part of a takedown request (unlike requests for disclosure or intercept). It is still important to have some information sent in return (such as feedback on the outcome of the request to perform a takedown, i.e. whether the takedown happened or not). • The process of appeals needs to be supported for takedown requests. It is important to support a process where either side can appeal a decision (the organization requesting the takedown, or the subject of the takedown request). • A similarity with other tasks in ETSI TS 103 120 [i.1] is that the request should support a flag indicating whether, or not, the subject of the request should be informed about the request. The present document does not describe the consequences of setting this flag (a policy or legal matter outside the scope of the present document). ETSI ETSI TR 104 126 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 9 Annex A: Change history Status of Technical Report ETSI TR 104 126 LEA support services; Takedown requests; Benefits, use cases and approach TC LI approval date Version Remarks January 2026 1.1.1 First publication of the TR after approval at ETSI TC LI#71 in Sophia Antipolis (France) ETSI ETSI TR 104 126 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 10 History Version Date Status V1.1.1 February 2026 Publication |
c162d88c5a832e40110a86ba070ce0ef | 104 147-2 | 1 Scope | The present document provides the Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) pro forma for testing Server implementations for compliance to the Mission Critical Services over LTE protocol requirements defined by 3GPP, and in accordance with the relevant guidance given in ISO/IEC 9646-1 [i.6] and ISO/IEC 9646-7 [2]. The present document specifies the recommended applicability statement for the test cases included in ETSI TS 104 147-1 [4]. These applicability statements are based on the features implemented in the Server respectively. The present document is valid for Mission Critical Push to Talk (MCPTT) Servers implemented according to 3GPP releases starting from Release 14 up to Release 15. The present document does not specify applicability or ICS for protocol conformance testing for the EPS (LTE) bearers which carry the Mission Critical Services data sent or received by the Client and/or the Server. These are defined in ETSI TS 136 523-2 [i.5] (3GPP TS 36.523-2). |
c162d88c5a832e40110a86ba070ce0ef | 104 147-2 | 2 References | |
c162d88c5a832e40110a86ba070ce0ef | 104 147-2 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found in the ETSI docbox. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI TS 136 579-5: "LTE; Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 5: Abstract test suite (ATS) (3GPP TS 36.579-5)". [2] ISO/IEC 9646-7: "Information technology — Open systems interconnection — Conformance testing methodology and framework — Part 7: Implementation Conformance Statements". [3] ETSI TS 123 379: "LTE; Functional architecture and information flows to support Mission Critical Push To Talk (MCPTT); Stage 2 (3GPP TS 23.379)". [4] ETSI TS 104 147-1: "Mission Critical (MC) services; Mission Critical Push To Talk (MCPTT) Application Server (AS) Protocol conformance specification for server-to-client interface; Part 1: Test structure, configurations, conformance requirement and test purposes". [5] ETSI TS 124 380: "LTE; Mission Critical Push To Talk (MCPTT) media plane control; Protocol specification (3GPP TS 24.380)". [6] ETSI TS 124 379: "LTE; Mission Critical Push To Talk (MCPTT) call control; Protocol specification (3GPP TS 24.379)". ETSI ETSI TS 104 147-2 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 7 |
c162d88c5a832e40110a86ba070ce0ef | 104 147-2 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents may be useful in implementing an ETSI deliverable or add to the reader's understanding, but are not required for conformance to the present document. [i.1] ETSI TR 121 905: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; 5G; Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications (3GPP TR 21.905)". [i.2] ETSI TS 136 579-1: "LTE; Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 1: Common test environment (3GPP TS 36.579-1)". [i.3] ETSI TS 136 579-2: "LTE; Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 2: Mission Critical Push To Talk (MCPTT) User Equipment (UE) Protocol conformance specification (3GPP TS 36.579-2)". [i.4] ETSI TS 136 579-3: "LTE; Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 3: Mission Critical Push To Talk (MCPTT) Server Application conformance specification (3GPP TS 36.579-3)". [i.5] ETSI TS 136 523-2: "LTE; Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA) and Evolved Packet Core (EPC); User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Part 2: Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) proforma specification (3GPP TS 36.523-2)". [i.6] ISO/IEC 9646-1: "Information technology — Open Systems Interconnection — Conformance testing methodology and framework — Part 1: General concepts". [i.7] ETSI TS 136 579-4: "LTE; Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 4: Test Applicability and Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) proforma specification (3GPP TS 36.579-4)". [i.8] ETSI TS 136 579-6: "LTE; Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 6: Mission Critical Video (MCVideo) User Equipment (UE) Protocol conformance specification (3GPP TS 36.579-6)". [i.9] ETSI TS 136 579-7: "LTE; Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 7: Mission Critical Data (MCData) User Equipment (UE) Protocol conformance specification (3GPP TS 36.579-7)". [i.10] 3GPP TS 36.579-8: "Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 8: Mission Critical Video (MCVideo) Server Application conformance specification". [i.11] 3GPP TS 36.579-9: "Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 9: Mission Critical Data (MCData) Server Application conformance specification". |
c162d88c5a832e40110a86ba070ce0ef | 104 147-2 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
c162d88c5a832e40110a86ba070ce0ef | 104 147-2 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ETSI TR 121 905 [i.1] (3GPP TR 21.905), ISO/IEC 9646-1 [i.6], ISO/IEC 9646-7 [2] and the following apply: NOTE: A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in ETSI TR 121 905 [i.1] (3GPP TR 21.905), ISO/IEC 9646-1 [i.6] or ISO/IEC 9646-7 [2]. ICS pro forma: document, in the form of a questionnaire, which when completed for an implementation or system becomes an ICS ETSI ETSI TS 104 147-2 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 8 Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS): statement made by the supplier of an implementation or system claimed to conform to a given specification, stating which capabilities have been implemented Implementation eXtra Information for Testing (IXIT): statement made by a supplier or implementer of an UEUT which contains or references all of the information (in addition to that given in the ICS) related to the UEUT and its testing environment, which will enable the test laboratory to run an appropriate test suite against the UEUT IUT containing MCX Client: statement identifying which entity, and associated requirements, from the MCX service architecture is subject of testing NOTE: Depending on the ETSI TS 136 579-5 [1] (3GPP TS 36.579-5) test model being used, the LTE UE (with the MCX Client installed) is considered as the IUT (MCX EUTRA test model), or, only the MCX Client is considered as the IUT (MCX IPCAN test model). In both cases the SUT is the UE, communicating with the SS over the Uu radio interface. IXIT pro forma: document, in the form of a questionnaire, which when completed for an UEUT becomes an IXIT Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS): ICS for an implementation or system claimed to conform to a given protocol specification Protocol Implementation eXtra Information for Testing (PIXIT): IXIT related to testing for conformance to a given protocol specification static conformance review: review of the extent to which the static conformance requirements are claimed to be supported by the UEUT, by comparing the answers in the ICS(s) with the static conformance requirements expressed in the relevant specification(s) |
c162d88c5a832e40110a86ba070ce0ef | 104 147-2 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
c162d88c5a832e40110a86ba070ce0ef | 104 147-2 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in ETSI TR 121 905 [i.1] (3GPP TR 21.905) and the following apply: NOTE: An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in ETSI TR 121 905 [i.1] (3GPP TR 21.905). ICS Implementation Conformance Statement IUT Implementation Under Test IXIT Implementation eXtra Information for Testing MC Mission Critical MCData Mission Critical Data MCPTT Mission Critical Push To Talk MCVideo Mission Critical Video MCX Mission Critical X NOTE: With X = PTT or X= Video or X= Data. SS System Simulator SUT System Under Test TC Test Case |
c162d88c5a832e40110a86ba070ce0ef | 104 147-2 | 4 Recommended Test Case Applicability | The applicability of each individual test is identified in Table 4-1 (MCPTT Server). This is just a recommendation based on the purpose for which the test case was written. The applicability of every test is formally expressed by the use of Boolean expression that are based on parameters (ICS) included in annex A of the present document. ETSI ETSI TS 104 147-2 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 9 Additional information related to the Test Case (TC), e.g. affecting its dynamic behaviour or its execution may be provided as well The columns in Table 4-1 have the following meaning: Clause The clause column indicates the clause number in ETSI TS 104 147-1 [4] respectively which contains the test body. Title The title column describes the name of the test and contains the clause title of the clause in ETSI TS 104 147-1 [4] respectively which contains the test body. Release The release column indicates the earliest release from which the test case is applicable. In some specific cases it may indicate the release(s) for which the TC is only applicable. NOTE 1: Some exceptions to this interpretation may be indicated in Notes in column 'Number of TC Executions'. Applicability - Condition The following notations are used for the applicability column: R recommended - the test case is recommended O optional - the test case is optional N/A not applicable - in the given context, the test case is not recommended. Ci conditional - the test is recommended ("R") or not ("N/A") depending on the support of other items. "i" is an integer identifying a unique conditional status expression which is defined immediately following the table. For nested conditional expressions, the syntax "IF ... THEN (IF ... THEN ... ELSE...) ELSE ..." is used to avoid ambiguities. NOTE 2: The conditions are defined in Table 4-1a (MCPTT Server). To avoid ambiguity for the MCPTT Server testing conditions the notation of CCi is used. Applicability - Comments This column contains a verbal description of the condition. Additional Information - Specific ICS This column contains the mnemonics of ICS(s) affecting the dynamic behaviour of the TC. NOTE 3: ICS items specified in other test specifications can be referred, to avoid redundant definitions. Additional Information - Specific IXIT This column contains the mnemonics of IXIT(s) affecting the dynamic behaviour of the TC. IXITs are defined in ETSI TS 136 579-5 [1] (3GPP TS 36.579-5). Additional Information - Number of TC Executions This column contains, wherever applicable, the recommended for certification purposes number of TC executions. It may contain also other information e.g. exceptions to the release applicable to the test. Clarifying notes when available are listed in dedicated tables with table numbers having the suffix "b". ETSI ETSI TS 104 147-2 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 10 Table 4-1: Applicability of MCPTT Server tests and additional information for testing Clause TC Title Release Applicability Additional Information Condition Comment Specific ICS Specific IXIT Number of TC Executions 5 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client Configuration 5.1 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / Configuration / Authentication / User Authorization / UE Configuration / User Profile / Key generation Rel-14 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 5.2 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / Configuration / Group Creation / Group Regroup Creation / Group Regroup Teardown Rel-14 CC02 IUT is MCPTT Server 5.3 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / Configuration / Group Affiliation / Implicit Affiliation / Remote change / De-affiliation / Home MCPTT system Rel-14 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 5.4 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / Configuration / Pre-established Session Establishment / Pre-established Session Modification / Pre-established Session Release Rel-14 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 5.5 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / Configuration / Determination of MCPTT Service Settings / Current Active MCPTT Settings / De-subscribe Rel-14 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 5.6 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / Configuration / Download CSK Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 5.7 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / Configuration / Subscription to group dynamic data / De-subscribe Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 5.8 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / Configuration / Functional Alias / Functional alias status determination / Activate functional alias / Deactivate functional alias Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client operation 6.1 Group Calls 6.1.1 Pre-arranged Group Call 6.1.1.1 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / Pre-arranged Group Call / On-demand / Automatic Commencement Mode / Floor Control / Upgrade to Emergency Group Call / Cancel Emergency State / Upgrade to Imminent Peril Group Call / Cancel Imminent Peril State Rel-14 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server ETSI ETSI TS 104 147-2 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 11 Clause TC Title Release Applicability Additional Information Condition Comment Specific ICS Specific IXIT Number of TC Executions 6.1.1.2 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / Pre-arranged Group Call / Pre-established Session / Automatic Commencement Mode Rel-14 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.1.1.3 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / Broadcast Group Call / On-demand / Manual Commencement Mode Rel-14 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.1.1.4 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / Emergency Alert / Cancel Emergency Alert Rel-14 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.1.2 Chat Group Calls 6.1.2.1 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / Chat Group Call / Pre-established Session Rel-14 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.1.2.2 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / Chat Group Call / On-demand / Join Chat Group Session / Upgrade to Emergency / Cancel Emergency / Upgrade to Imminent Peril / Cancel Imminent Peril Rel-14 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.1.3 Conference Event Package 6.1.3.1 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / Conference Event Package / Subscription to Conference Event Package / Termination of subscription Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.1.4 Remote Change of Selected Group 6.1.4.1 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / Remote Change of Selected Group / Selected Group Change of Targeted User Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.1.5 Remotely Initiated group call 6.1.5.1 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / Remotely initiated group call Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.2 Private Calls 6.2.1 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / Private Call / On-demand / Automatic Commencement Mode / With Floor Control / Upgrade to Emergency Call / Cancellation of Emergency on User request Rel-14 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.2.2 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / Private Call / On-demand / Automatic Commencement Mode / Without Floor Control Rel-14 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.2.3 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / Private Call / On-demand / Emergency Private Call / Automatic Commencement Mode / Force of automatic commencement mode / Without Floor Control Rel-14 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server ETSI ETSI TS 104 147-2 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 12 Clause TC Title Release Applicability Additional Information Condition Comment Specific ICS Specific IXIT Number of TC Executions 6.2.4 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / Private Call / Pre-established Session / Automatic Commencement Mode / Without Floor Control Rel-14 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.2.5 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / Private Call Call-Back Request / Private call call- back fulfilment / Private Call Call-Back Cancel Request Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.2.6 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / Ambient listening call / On-demand / Remotely initiated Ambient listening call / Remotely initiated ambient listening call release Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.2.7 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / First-to- answer call / On-demand / With Floor Control Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.2.8 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / Remotely initiated private call / On-demand Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.3 Location 6.3.1 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / Location / Event Triggered Location Information report Rel-14 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.3.2 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / Location / On-demand Location Information Request Rel-14 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.4 MBMS 6.4.1 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / MBMS / MBMS Bearer Announcement / MBMS Bearer Listening Status / Transition to MBMS from Unicast / MBMS Floor Control / Transition to Unicast from MBMS Rel-14 CC03 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.4.2 MCPTT Server - MCPTT Client / MBMS / Multi Talker Rel-14 CC03 IUT is MCPTT Server Table 4-1a: Applicability of tests Conditions MCPTT Server CC01 IF A.4.1-1/1 THEN R ELSE N/A CC02 IF A.4.1-1/2 THEN R ELSE N/A CC03 IF A.4.1-1/1 AND A.4.2-1/2 THEN R ELSE N/A ETSI ETSI TS 104 147-2 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 13 Annex A (normative): ICS pro forma for Mission Critical Services A.0 The right to copy Notwithstanding the provisions of the copyright clause related to the text of the present document, ETSI grants that users of the present document may freely reproduce the ICS pro forma for Mission Critical Services in this annex so that it can be used for its intended purposes and may further publish the completed ICS pro forma for Mission Critical Services. A.1 Guidance for completing the ICS pro forma A.1.1 Purposes and structure The purpose of this ICS pro forma is to provide a mechanism whereby a supplier of an implementation of the requirements defined in relevant specifications may provide information about the implementation in a standardized manner. The ICS pro forma is subdivided into clauses for the following categories of information: - guidance for completing the ICS pro forma; - identification of the implementation; - identification of the protocol; - global statement of conformance; - ICS pro forma tables (for example: Client implementation, Server implementation, etc.). A.1.2 Abbreviations and conventions The ICS pro forma contained in this annex is comprised of information in tabular form in accordance with the guidelines presented in ISO/IEC 9646-7. Item column The item column contains a number which identifies the item in the table. Item description column The item description column describes in free text each respective item (e.g. parameters, timers, etc.). It implicitly means "is <item description> supported by the implementation?". Reference column The reference column gives reference to the relevant ETSI core specifications. Release column The release column indicates the earliest release from which the capability or option is relevant. ETSI ETSI TS 104 147-2 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 14 Mnemonic column The Mnemonic column contains mnemonic identifiers for each item. Comments column This column is left blank for particular use by the reader of the present document. References to items For each possible item answer (answer in the support column) within the ICS pro forma there exists a unique reference, used, for example, in the conditional expressions. It is defined as the table identifier, followed by a solidus character "/", followed by the item number in the table. If there is more than one support column in a table, the columns shall be discriminated by letters (a, b, etc.), respectively. A.1.3 Instructions for completing the ICS pro forma The supplier of the implementation may complete the ICS pro forma in each of the spaces provided. More detailed instructions are given at the beginning of the different clauses of the ICS pro forma. A.2 Identification of the MCPTT Server Equipment A.2.0 Introduction Identification of the MCPTT Server should be filled in so as to provide as much detail as possible regarding version numbers and configuration options. The product supplier information and client information should both be filled in if they are different. A person who can answer queries regarding information supplied in the ICS should be named as the contact person. A.2.1 Date of the statement ......................................................................................................................................................................................... A.2.2 MCPTT Server under test identification MCPTT Server under test name: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Hardware configuration: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Software configuration: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ETSI ETSI TS 104 147-2 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 15 A.2.3 Product supplier Name: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Address: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Telephone number: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Facsimile number: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... E-mail address: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Additional information: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... A.2.4 The Organization responsible for the Product testing Name: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Address: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Telephone number: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Facsimile number: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... E-mail address: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ETSI ETSI TS 104 147-2 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 16 Additional information: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... A.2.5 ICS contact person Name: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Telephone number: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Facsimile number: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... E-mail address: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Additional information: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... A.3 Identification of the protocol This ICS pro forma applies to the ETSI standards listed in the normative references clause of the present document. A.4 ICS pro forma tables A.4.1 Implementation Types Table A.4.1-1: Mission Critical Services general functionality Item Functionality Reference Release Mnemonic Comments 1 MCPTT Server ETSI TS 123 379 (3GPP TS 23.379) Rel-15 pc_MCPTTServer 2 MCPTT Server performing GMS function ETSI TS 123 379 (3GPP TS 23.379) Rel-15 pc_MCPTTServer_GMS ETSI ETSI TS 104 147-2 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 17 A.4.2 Additional information Table A.4.2-1: Additional information Item Additional information Reference Release Mnemonic Comments 1 The MCPTT Server supports floor request queueing ETSI TS 124 380 (3GPP TS 24.380) Rel-14 pc_MCPTT_FloorR equestQueueing The MCPTT Server applies Floor Request Queueing 2 Support of MC service over MBMS ETSI TS 124 379 (3GPP TS 24.379) Rel-14 pc_MCX_MBMSSu pport ETSI ETSI TS 104 147-2 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 18 History Version Date Status V1.1.1 January 2026 Publication |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 1 Scope | The present document specifies the principles, objectives, and technical framework, which addresses the definition of standardized hardware inventory models for microwave wireless backhaul at the SDN Southbound Interface. It focuses on the modelling of hardware inventory information for microwave Network Elements as exchanged between a microwave SDN Controller and microwave Network Elements by means of standard, common YANG data model profiles exposed over NETCONF. Service-layer abstractions, performance management, and control-plane behaviour are present in the present document, when required to support accurate and interoperable hardware inventory representation. |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 2 References | |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found in the ETSI docbox. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] IETF RFC 8348 (March 2018): "A YANG Data Model for Hardware Management". [2] IETF RFC 8561 (June 2019): "A YANG Data Model for Microwave Radio Link" [3] IETF RFC 8343 (March 2018): "A YANG Data Model for Interface Management". [4] IETF RFC 7950 (August 2016): "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language". [5] IETF RFC 6241 (June 2011): "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)". |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents may be useful in implementing an ETSI deliverable or add to the reader's understanding, but are not required for conformance to the present document. [i.1] ETSI GR mWT 016 (V.1.1.1): "Applications and use cases of Software Defined Networking (SDN) as related to microwave and millimetre wave transmission". [i.2] ETSI GR mWT 025 (V1.1.1): "Wireless Backhaul Network and Services Automation: SDN SBI YANG models". [i.3] ETSI CTI 5th mWT SDN Plugtests Report V1.0 (2025-12). [i.4] ETSI 5th mWT SDN Test Plan V1.0 (2025-12). [i.5] ETSI GR mWT 025 (V1.1.1): "Wireless Backhaul Network and Services Automation: SDN SBI YANG models". ETSI ETSI TS 104 143 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 8 |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: Band & Carrier Aggregation (BCA): typically referring to aggregating carriers in uniform or non-uniform bands NOTE: In the present document, it is referring to aggregating Eband with traditional MW band. Fixed (compact) IDU: IDU represented as a chassis, but with a predefined and fixed set of physical ports without modular containerization full-outdoor: single, outdoor unit in which the modem, network interfaces, and radio unit are integrated within the same physical hardware Modular IDU: IDU of modular design and may include one or more containers hosting pluggable functional boards split-type (or split-mount) architecture: this configuration follows an architecture where the outdoor unit (MW ODU) is physically separated from the Indoor Unit (IDU) NOTE: There are two principal connectivity variants used in current microwave systems: Ethernet-based IDU-ODU connectivity and IF-based IDU-ODU connectivity. YANG model profile: standardized, vendor-neutral set of attributes, constraints and modelling guidelines applied to existing IETF YANG modules to ensure interoperable implementation across multiple vendors |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: AI Artificial Intelligence BCA Band and Carrier Aggregation ETH ETHernet FW FirmWare HW HardWare ID IDentity IDU Indoor Unit IEEE™ Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers IETF Internet Engineering Task Force IF Intermediate Frequency IP Internet Protocol LLDP Link Layer Discovery Protocol MODEM MOdulator/DEModulator MW MicroWave mWT millimetre-Wave Transmission NE Network Element NETCONF NETwork CONFiguration protocol NMS Network Management System ODU OutDoor Unit PTP Precision Time Protocol RF Radio Frequency RFC Request For Comment RO Read-Only RSL Received Signal Level RW Re-Write ETSI ETSI TS 104 143 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 9 SBI SouthBound Interface SDN Software Defined Networking SFP Small Form-factor Pluggable SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol SW SoftWare XPIC Cross-Polarization Interference Cancelling YANG Yet Another Next Generation |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 4 Objectives | The objectives of this new Profile are as follows: • The new Profile shall define a standard, common, and interoperable YANG-based representation of microwave hardware inventory suitable for use in open SDN environments. • The new Profile shall specify a minimum and sufficient set of inventory parameters required for consistent multi-vendor interpretation of microwave hardware. • The new Profile shall reuse and profile relevant IETF YANG models and shall extend them where necessary to accurately represent real microwave network configurations. • The new Profile should provide a controller-consumable representation that enables automated discovery, inventory synchronization, and lifecycle management of microwave Network Elements. • The new Profile should establish a stable inventory foundation that enables zero-touch provisioning, software- defined networking, and AI-assisted network operation. 5 Alignment with ETSI Standards, IETF Models, and Plugtests Activities The work specified in the present document is aligned with ETSI GR mWT 016 [i.1] as related to microwave and millimetre wave transmission" and ETSI GR mWT 025 [i.2], which define the SDN applicability framework for wireless transport networks. The present document extends this framework by introducing standard, common YANG- based inventory model profiles required to enable practical and scalable interoperability at the SDN Southbound Interface. At the data modelling level, the new Profile shall be based on the use of relevant IETF YANG data models, including the hardware, interface, and microwave radio link models defined in IETF RFC 8348 [1], IETF RFC 8561 [2], and IETF RFC 8343 [3]. This use shall ensure alignment with global YANG modelling practices, compatibility with existing SDN controller ecosystems, and long-term sustainability of the resulting models. The reused IETF models shall be adapted and refined through explicit microwave-specific profiling rules to reflect the characteristics of microwave transport hardware and real deployment scenarios. The activity shall be tightly coupled with the ETSI SDN Plugtests™ Programme. The architectural principles and multi-vendor environments validated across the ETSI mWT SDN Plugtests activities to date have been used as input to the development of the present document. In particular, the methodologies, test scenarios, and multi-vendor configurations documented in the 5th ETSI mWT SDN Plugtests report [i.3] have been used as a concrete validation reference. In addition, the ETSI SDN Plugtests environment shall continue to be used to validate the YANG model profiles defined in the present document in real multi-vendor SDN control scenarios and to refine the models based on implementation feedback. |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 6 Technical Approach | The technical approach adopted in the present document follows the ETSI mWT SDN architectural framework and is based on the use of standard, YANG data model profiles derived from relevant IETF specifications, specified using YANG version 1.1 as defined in IETF RFC 7950 [4]. ETSI ETSI TS 104 143 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 10 The IETF-originated YANG models have been refined and complemented, with microwave-specific usage profiles defined to represent real hardware configurations. The resulting models remain globally aligned with IETF modelling practices while providing operational accuracy for microwave transport equipment. The YANG model profiles provide a shared, machine-readable, and extensible abstraction of microwave Network Elements and are exposed via an open NETCONF interface between the microwave SDN Controller and the microwave Network Elements according to IETF RFC 6241 [5]. This ensures that inventory information is exchanged in a consistent, non-proprietary, and fully interoperable manner across vendors. The modelling approach follows a minimum-parameter philosophy. Only those attributes strictly required to achieve interoperability at the Southbound Interface are included, ensuring lightweight and practical implementations while providing a stable foundation for future automation, orchestration, and network intelligence functions. |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 7 Plugtests Integration and Validation Status | The validation of the standard, YANG-based inventory model profiles derived from IETF specifications was carried out within the ETSI SDN Plugtests Programme. As part of the ETSI 5th mWT SDN Test Plan V1.0 [i.4], participating vendors implemented the YANG model profiles in their microwave Network Elements and exposed inventory information via NETCONF toward a multi-vendor SDN Controller environment. The Plugtests campaign successfully demonstrated uniform hardware discovery based on common models, consistent inventory interpretation across different vendors, and interoperable SDN Controller behaviour using standardized inventory data. The Plugtests framework therefore served as a critical maturity accelerator for the YANG model profiles defined in the present document, providing practical implementation feedback and confirming their applicability in real multi-vendor SDN control scenarios. |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 8 Industry Relevance and Impact | Industry relevance and impact are summarized in the following points: • Multi-Vendor Interoperability: The absence of common YANG-based inventory models has historically forced SDN Controllers to rely on vendor-specific adapters and proprietary data representations. By defining a standard, common set of YANG models based on IETF specifications and specialized for microwave backhaul, the present document shall enable true multi-vendor interoperability at the Southbound Interface. Microwave Network Elements from different vendors shall be discoverable, identifiable, and manageable using the same data structures and semantic interpretation. • Open and Disaggregated Network Architectures: The introduction of common IETF-aligned YANG inventory models shall eliminate proprietary dependencies at the Southbound Interface and shall enable microwave backhaul to be integrated into open and disaggregated SDN transport architectures. This shall directly support the architectural framework defined in ETSI GR mWT 025 [i.2]. • Automation and Zero-Touch Operations: Automation, zero-touch provisioning, and closed-loop control depend on reliable, structured, and standardized inventory data. The common IETF-based YANG models defined under the present document shall provide this essential data layer and shall enable large-scale, AI-assisted network operations. • Real-World Applicability: The YANG model profiles shall be explicitly derived from real microwave configurations and deployment scenarios observed in operational networks. This shall ensure direct applicability to commercial products without excessive abstraction. • Validation Through Plugtests: Systematic multi-vendor validation within the ETSI SDN Plugtests Programme shall continuously verify the correctness, completeness, and interoperability of the YANG model profiles. This shall strengthen industry confidence and readiness for commercial deployment. • AI and Autonomous Networks: Common, standardized, IETF-aligned YANG-based inventory model profiles shall provide the trusted ground truth required for digital twins, predictive maintenance, AI-based fault correlation, and autonomous optimization of microwave networks. ETSI ETSI TS 104 143 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 11 • Industry Ecosystem Benefits: The introduction of standard, common YANG inventory model profiles based on IETF specifications and tailored for microwave backhaul shall deliver long-term benefits across the full ecosystem. Operators shall gain reduced integration complexity, faster SDN adoption, and increased vendor flexibility. Vendors shall benefit from a globally aligned implementation target and reduced proprietary interface burden. System integrators shall experience reduced customization effort and improved predictability. The research and standardization community shall benefit from a stable baseline for future automation and AI-driven innovation. • Strategic Importance: By establishing standard, common IETF-aligned YANG-based hardware inventory models at the SDN Southbound Interface, the present document shall create a foundational pillar for the long-term evolution of microwave wireless backhaul networks toward open, programmable, automated, and ultimately autonomous operation. It shall ensure that the microwave domain evolves in full alignment with cross-domain SDN control frameworks and global IETF data modelling practices, while preserving multi- vendor interoperability and long-term operational efficiency. |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 9 Description of MW Hardware Configurations | Figure 1 illustrates two fundamental microwave hardware deployment configurations that serve as baseline reference cases for the inventory profiling activity. Figure 1: Type 1 1+0 & Type 2 2+0/1+1 configuration The first configuration, referred to as Type 1: 1+0, represents the simplest microwave deployment scenario. In this configuration, a single Indoor Unit (IDU) is connected to one Outdoor Unit (ODU), which may operate either in the traditional microwave band or in the E-band. This topology supports a single radio carrier with no protection or redundancy. Due to its simplicity, this configuration is commonly used in straightforward point-to-point links where high availability through protection mechanisms is not a primary requirement. The second configuration is referred to as Type 2 and covers both 2+0 and 1+1 variants. In this case, a single IDU is connected to two ODUs, denoted as ODU A and ODU B. In the 2+0 variant, the two ODUs typically operate in parallel to provide increased capacity through carrier aggregation. In the 1+1 variant, the two ODUs provide protection redundancy, where one ODU acts as the active unit and the second as a standby unit to ensure high availability. This configuration reflects typical commercial deployments where either capacity scaling or link protection is required. Together, these two configuration types define the basic building blocks for the subsequent modelling and profiling of more complex microwave hardware topologies. ETSI ETSI TS 104 143 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 12 Figure 2: Type 3 2+0 non-uniform bands & Type 4 2+0 XPIC configuration Figure 2 extends the baseline microwave hardware configurations by introducing more advanced and specialized deployment scenarios that are relevant for modern high-capacity and heterogeneous-band microwave networks. The first configuration shown is referred to as Type 3: non-uniform bands 2+0. In this configuration, a single Indoor Unit (IDU) is connected to two Outdoor Units operating in different frequency bands. One ODU operates in the traditional microwave band, while the second ODU operates in the E-band. Both ODUs are used simultaneously to provide a combined 2+0 capacity configuration, where traffic is distributed across two carriers with dissimilar radio characteristics. This configuration is increasingly used in modern deployments to combine the high availability of traditional microwave with the very high capacity offered by E-band spectrum, resulting in a hybrid multi-band transport solution. The second configuration is referred to as Type 4: XPIC 2+0. In this case, a single IDU is connected to two ODUs that operate on the same frequency channel using dual polarization and Cross-Polarization Interference Cancellation (XPIC) technology. Both ODUs are active simultaneously and provide a doubled capacity while occupying the same channel bandwidth. This configuration is widely used in spectrum-constrained environments where maximizing spectral efficiency is critical, as it enables a true 2+0 capacity gain without requiring additional frequency resources. These two configuration types represent important modelling cases for the inventory profiles, as they introduce the need to capture heterogeneous band aggregation, dual-polarization operation, and advanced radio relationship attributes within the common YANG-based hardware inventory framework. Figure 3: Type 5 2+2 XPIC & Type 6 3+0 BCA (E-band + MW 2+0 XPIC) configuration Figure 3 presents the most advanced and complex microwave hardware deployment scenarios considered within the scope of the inventory profiling activity. These configurations combine multiple ODUs, advanced polarization techniques, and multi-band aggregation, and therefore represent the upper end of modelling complexity. ETSI ETSI TS 104 143 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 13 The first configuration shown is referred to as Type 5: XPIC 2+2. In this configuration, a single Indoor Unit (IDU) is connected to four Outdoor Units, organized as two XPIC pairs. The first pair consists of ODU A and ODU A', and the second pair consists of ODU B and ODU B′. Each pair operates on the same frequency channel using dual polarization with Cross-Polarization Interference Cancellation (XPIC), enabling a 2+0 capacity per pair. When combined, the overall system provides a 2+2 configuration, delivering very high aggregate capacity through the simultaneous operation of two XPIC links. This configuration is typically used in ultra-high-capacity backbone scenarios where both spectrum efficiency and throughput maximization are required. The second configuration is referred to as Type 6: non-uniform bands E-band plus microwave XPIC 2+0 evolving to 3+0 through Band and Carrier Aggregation (BCA). In this case, a single IDU is connected to three ODUs operating across heterogeneous frequency bands. One ODU operates in the E-band, while two additional ODUs operate in the traditional microwave band with XPIC. The microwave XPIC pair provides a 2+0 configuration, and when combined with the single E-band carrier, the overall system effectively delivers a 3+0 aggregated capacity. This configuration reflects modern hybrid transport deployments where E-band is used as a very high-capacity overlay on top of a protected and spectrally efficient traditional microwave link. These two configuration types represent the most demanding use cases for the inventory profiles, as they require the accurate modelling of multiple ODUs, XPIC relationships, heterogeneous frequency bands, and carrier aggregation mechanisms within a single, consistent, and vendor-neutral YANG-based inventory representation. |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 10 Modelling Considerations and Clarifications | |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 10.0 Introduction | This clause documents the modelling considerations, interpretations, and agreements reached during the profiling activities of the present document. The objective of this clause is to ensure consistent understanding and application of the standardized YANG-based inventory model profiles across different microwave equipment architectures and connectivity variants. |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 10.1 Modular versus Fixed IDU Modelling | Microwave Indoor Units (IDUs) are implemented either as modular systems or as fixed (compact) systems. In the case of modular implementations, the IDU consists of a chassis hosting multiple containers, where each container may include one or more functional modules. These modules provide Ethernet interfaces, IF interfaces, power distribution, or may host additional container structures. In the case of fixed/compact implementations, the IDU is also represented as a chassis, but with a predefined and fixed set of physical ports without modular containerization. It is agreed that the inventory profile shall support both modelling approaches. The profile shall therefore include one modelling variant for modular IDUs and one modelling variant for fixed IDUs, ensuring that both deployment types are represented consistently within the common YANG framework. |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 10.2 Dual RF ODU Identification | In the case of dual RF Outdoor Units (ODUs), the current understanding is that the dual RF ODU is identified and recognized by the SDN Controller upon the initial connection of the first carrier. No fundamental modelling differences have been identified between single RF and dual RF ODU configurations at the inventory level. This approach is agreed and shall be supported by the inventory profile without introducing additional structural differentiation. |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 10.3 Ethernet versus IF Connectivity Between IDU and ODU | Two distinct connectivity cases exist between the IDU and the ODU. In the case of Ethernet-based connectivity, the ODU, whether it operates in the traditional microwave or E-band frequency band, is treated as a separate chassis. In the case of IF-based connectivity, the ODU, typically used for traditional microwave RF, is treated as a child module of the IF modem, which itself is part of the IDU chassis. ETSI ETSI TS 104 143 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 14 It is agreed that the inventory profile shall support both connectivity cases. The profile shall therefore include one modelling variant for Ethernet-based IDU-ODU interconnection and a separate modelling variant for IF-based cabling between the IDU and the ODU. |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 10.4 Current Interpretation on Modelling Differences | For certain intermediate configurations currently under discussion (e.g. is Type 2 (2+0/1+1 config) different from Type 4 (2+0 XPIC config) from modelling point of view?), the present view is that no material modelling difference is observed at inventory level. This position is agreed for the time being and shall remain valid unless further differentiation becomes necessary through additional implementation feedback. |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 10.5 Full-Outdoor Radio | A full outdoor radio is a single, outdoor unit in which the modem, network interfaces, and radio unit are integrated within the same physical hardware. The modelling approach is identical regardless of whether the radio operates in the Microwave (MW) or E-band frequency ranges. Compared to a split-type architecture, the full outdoor radio is modelled as a single chassis, containing modem and ethernet interfaces. In most cases, full outdoor radios are non-modular, compact devices, with integrated and not field-replaceable modules. However, modular implementations may also exist. |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 10.6 Treatment of BCA configurations | This topic is currently also addressed within IETF activities and remains a pending action item originating from the published ETSI GR mWT 025 [i.2], clause 5.1.4, related to gap analysis in standard models. Two alternative modelling interpretations are under consideration. In the first case, when all ODUs are connected via Ethernet cabling, no functional difference is observed compared to millimetre-wave ODU connectivity, and the IDU together with all associated ODUs may be bundled and represented as a single network element in a single stack. In the second case, when traditional microwave ODUs are connected via IF cabling, the E-band ODU is treated as a separate chassis and network element. |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11 Hardware Inventory Modelling Profiles | |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.0 Introduction | The present document defines specific hardware profiles which follow the structure of IETF RFC 8348 [1]. The inventory modelling approach follows the hierarchical hardware classification defined in IETF specifications for network element representation. In this hierarchy, a chassis represents the primary physical enclosure of networking equipment and serves as the top-level container for most physical components. Within a chassis, containers are used to represent physical locations or slots capable of hosting removable components, while modules represent self-contained functional sub-systems that may be installed within such containers or, when non-removable, directly within another physical component. Ports represent the physical or logical interfaces used to transmit or receive network traffic. RJ45 Ethernet interfaces are modelled as ports of the module or chassis, as they are permanently integrated and not field replaceable. SFP cages are modelled as containers capable of hosting pluggable transceiver components (modules) with Ethernet ports. In IF-based connectivity systems, IF modem interfaces are modelled as containers representing pluggable/activatable functions within the modem modules of the IDU. In addition, a stack is used to represent a logical super-container that groups multiple chassis entities into a single aggregated structure. A stack represents a logical grouping of multiple chassis and is modelled at a level above individual chassis, rather than as a physical component contained within a chassis. The profile defines two alternative inventory modelling approaches for the MW RF ODU. In one approach, the MW RF ODU is modelled as a separate chassis, while in the other it is modelled as a child module of the modem, forming part of the IDU chassis inventory scope. ETSI ETSI TS 104 143 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 15 More specifically: 1) The MW RF ODU is modelled as a separate chassis, typically associated with deployments using Ethernet-based IDU-ODU connectivity. 2) The MW RF ODU is modelled within the IDU chassis inventory scope, typically associated with deployments using IF-based IDU-ODU connectivity. For inventory modelling purposes, the ODU is represented as a module and modelled as a child component of the IDU, more specifically as a child component of the IF container within the IDU. Furthermore, a distinction is made between modular and fixed (compact, non-modular) Indoor Unit (IDU) architectures, reflecting the different inventory modelling approaches required for each case: • In the case of a modular IDU, the IDU is modelled as a chassis comprising multiple containers, each of which may host one or more modules. Each module may expose Ethernet (electrical or optical) ports or may itself include additional containers, reflecting the modular and hierarchical nature of the hardware. • In the case of a fixed (compact, non-modular) IDU, the IDU is also modelled as a chassis, but with a fixed set of physical ports. The RJ45 Ethernet ports are modelled as fixed ports of the chassis, as they are permanently integrated and not field replaceable. SFP cages are modelled as containers capable of hosting pluggable transceiver components. IF modem ports are modelled as containers representing pluggable/activatable modem functions within the IDU. As a result, unlike the modular IDU mode, this representation does not include container slots since no removable board-level containers are present. 11.1 Split-mount IDU-ODU connectivity, modular IDU, 1+0 configuration |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.1.0 Introduction | The below examples, illustrate two representative split-mount implementations of a 1+0 single-carrier microwave configuration in modular Indoor Unit (IDU) architectures. This configuration follows a split-type architecture, where the Outdoor Unit (MW ODU) is physically separated from the Indoor Unit (IDU). The IDU is of modular design and may include one or more containers hosting pluggable functional boards. The examples highlight the two principal connectivity variants used in current microwave systems: Ethernet-based IDU-ODU connectivity and IF-based IDU-ODU connectivity. Together, the two examples illustrate how modular IDU architectures may support two different but widely deployed connectivity configurations, each requiring consistent representation in the common YANG-based inventory model profiles. The figures also highlight the underlying modelling abstractions used throughout the present document (stack, chassis, container, module, and port), which ensure a uniform and extensible description of microwave hardware across vendors and implementations according to IETF recommendations. ETSI ETSI TS 104 143 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 16 |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.1.1 ODU as a separate chassis | Figure 4: Split-mount (modular) IDU-ODU Connectivity ethernet - 1+0 Configuration Figure 4 illustrates a split-mount implementation of a 1+0 microwave configuration with modular Indoor Unit (IDU). In the considered configuration, the interconnection between the IDU and the ODU is provided via an Ethernet interface. For inventory modelling purposes, the MW ODU is represented as a separate chassis with its own inventory scope. The ODU is connected to the IDU through an optical or electrical Ethernet cable. The ODU is treated as an independent chassis with its own class identity and is modelled as a separate network component in the inventory. The IDU contains multiple containers and modules, such as SFP cages, modem boards, and Ethernet boards, which expose their ports directly to the SDN Controller. The ODU is represented as a peer chassis, connected via the Ethernet interface. In this configuration, the ODU and IDU chassis are logically grouped using a stack, acting as a super-container that aggregates multiple chassis entities into a single logical inventory grouping, while each physical unit remains a distinct chassis component within the stack. ETSI ETSI TS 104 143 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 17 |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.1.2 ODU as a module and child component of the indoor | Figure 5: Split-mount (modular) IDU-ODU Connectivity IF - 1+0 Configuration This configuration follows a split-type architecture with IF cable connectivity between the Indoor Unit (IDU) and the Microwave Outdoor Unit (MW ODU). The IDU is again of modular design and may comprise one or more containers hosting pluggable functional boards. In the considered configuration, the interconnection between the IDU and the MW ODU is provided via an IF cable interface. For inventory modelling purposes, the MW ODU is represented as a module and modelled as a child component of the IDU, more specifically as a child component of the IF board container within the modem board, and therefore within the same chassis and inventory scope. 11.2 Split-mount IDU-ODU connectivity, modular IDU, 2+0 configurations |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.2.0 Introduction | This architecture illustrates a split-mount microwave deployment implementing a 2+0 configuration, with a modular IDU which allows scalable deployment, where multiple pluggable boards can be hosted in the container slots. These examples, demonstrate how Ethernet-based or IF-based IDU-ODU connectivity can be used to model and manage 2+0 split-mount systems in a consistent and interoperable manner. ETSI ETSI TS 104 143 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 18 11.2.1 2+0 with single RF ODUs, separate eth boards, Ethernet connectivity Figure 6: Split-mount 2+0 configuration using separate ODUs, Ethernet connectivity via different eth boards Figure 6 illustrates a split-mount microwave deployment implementing a 2+0 configuration, where two independent radio paths are realized using two separate Outdoor Units (ODUs). The overall link capacity is increased through carrier aggregation mechanisms. The IDU–ODU connections are realized using electrical Ethernet cabling or optical Ethernet cabling with pluggable units, depending on deployment requirements. Within the IDU, multiple Ethernet boards installed in separate slots provide the connectivity to support the two parallel ODUs. This modular arrangement allows flexible scaling and clear separation of the two radio channels while maintaining a single indoor aggregation point. The extra MW RF ODU is modelled as a separate chassis. All chassis are again bundled together via a stack. ETSI ETSI TS 104 143 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 19 |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.2.2 2+0 with single RF ODUs, single eth board, Ethernet connectivity | Figure 7: Split-mount 2+0 configuration using separate ODUs, Ethernet connectivity via single eth board Figure 7 illustrates a split-mount microwave deployment in which a single RF Outdoor Unit (ODU) is connected to an Indoor Unit (IDU) using Ethernet-based connectivity. The ODU integrates one radio frequency chain and is responsible for the RF transmission towards the remote end of the microwave link. Service traffic from the Ethernet network is aggregated on the IDU and forwarded through the same Ethernet board to the ODU. The ODU processes the Ethernet traffic and maps it onto the RF carriers for transmission. This configuration represents a compact and cost-efficient split-mount deployment. This example highlights a split-mount topology where both RF ODUs Ethernet connectivity is centralized on a single Ethernet board, simplifying hardware layout while maintaining clear separation between indoor aggregation and outdoor radio functions. The IDU hosts a single Ethernet board that terminates both of the outdoor physical chassis. This Ethernet board may support electrical Ethernet ports as well as optical Ethernet interfaces via pluggable transceivers, enabling flexible choice of cabling between the IDU and the ODU. ETSI ETSI TS 104 143 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 20 |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.2.3 2+0 with dual RF ODUs, single eth board, Ethernet connectivity | Figure 8: Split-mount 2+0 configuration using dual RF ODUs with Ethernet connectivity via a single Ethernet board Figure 8 illustrates a split-mount microwave deployment in which a dual RF Outdoor Unit (ODU) is connected to an Indoor Unit (IDU) using Ethernet-based connectivity. The dual RF ODU supports two RF carriers, forming a 2+0 microwave configuration in a single outdoor box. The IDU hosts a single Ethernet board that terminates both Ethernet interfaces towards the ODUs. This Ethernet board may support electrical Ethernet ports as well as optical Ethernet interfaces via pluggable transceivers, enabling flexible cabling options between the IDU and the ODU. Service traffic from the Ethernet network is aggregated on the single Ethernet board within the IDU and forwarded over Ethernet towards the ODU. Within the ODU, the Ethernet traffic is mapped onto the corresponding RF carriers for transmission over the microwave link. This configuration represents a compact and cost-efficient split-mount 2+0 deployment, where a single indoor Ethernet board and a dual-RF outdoor unit are used, simplifying the overall system hardware architecture. Compared to the previous example, the overall number of chassis are reduced to two, again modelled as a common stack. ETSI ETSI TS 104 143 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 21 |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.2.4 2+0 with single RF ODUs, separate modem boards, IF connectivity | Figure 9: Split-mount 2+0 configuration using single IF modems and single RF ODUs Figure 9 illustrates a split-mount microwave deployment in which the Indoor Unit (IDU) and Outdoor Units (ODUs) are interconnected using Intermediate Frequency (IF) cabling. The configuration supports a 2+0 microwave setup, where each RF carrier is served by a dedicated IF modem and a corresponding RF ODU. The IDU is modular and hosts two separate modem boards, each occupying an individual slot. Each modem board provides an IF interface that is connected via an IF cable to a corresponding RF ODU. Each ODU integrates a single RF transmission path supporting one RF carrier. Ethernet service traffic is terminated on a single Ethernet board within the IDU. The Ethernet board aggregates service-facing Ethernet traffic and forwards internally to the modem boards. Each modem processes the Ethernet traffic, performs modulation and framing functions, and outputs the corresponding IF signal towards its associated ODU. ETSI ETSI TS 104 143 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 22 |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.2.5 2+0 with single RF ODUs, dual IF modem, IF connectivity | Figure 10: Split-mount 2+0 configuration using dual IF modem and single RF ODUs Figure 10 illustrates a split-mount microwave deployment in which a modular Indoor Unit (IDU) is connected to a single RF Outdoor Unit (ODU) using Intermediate Frequency (IF) cabling. The configuration supports a 2+0 microwave setup by means of two IF modem instances housed on a single modem board within the IDU and two single RF outdoor units integrating two independent RF transmission paths. The IDU hosts a modem board that provides two IF interfaces, each corresponding to a separate RF carrier. These IF interfaces are connected via IF cables to the single ODU. Ethernet service traffic is terminated on a single Ethernet board within the IDU. The Ethernet board aggregates service-facing Ethernet interfaces and forwards traffic internally to the modem boards. The modem board processes the Ethernet traffic, performs modulation and framing functions independently for each carrier, and outputs two distinct IF signals towards the ODU. ETSI ETSI TS 104 143 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 23 |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.2.6 2+0 with dual RF ODUs, dual IF modem, IF connectivity | Figure 11: Split-mount 2+0 configuration using dual IF modem and dual RF ODU Figure 11 illustrates a split-mount microwave deployment that supports a 2+0 microwave setup by means of two IF modem instances housed on a single modem board within the IDU and a single ODU integrating two independent RF transmission paths. The IDU hosts a modem board that provides two independent IF interfaces, each corresponding to a separate IF modem instance. These IF interfaces are connected via IF cables to the dual RF ODU. The ODU integrates two RF transmission paths, each supporting one RF carrier, and performs RF up-conversion and transmission towards the remote end of the microwave link. This architecture reduces outdoor hardware footprint. In this case, the ODU is a child of both IF containers but for modelling purposes, the parent of the ODU is only the first IF container. 11.3 Split-mount IDU-ODU connectivity, fixed (compact) IDU, 1+0 configuration |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.3.0 Introduction | The below examples, illustrate two representative split-mount implementations of a 1+0 single-carrier microwave configuration in non-modular, compact Indoor Unit (IDU) architectures, with a predefined and fixed set of physical ports without modular containerization. ETSI ETSI TS 104 143 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 24 |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.3.1 ODU as a separate chassis | Figure 12: Split-mount (fixed/compact indoor) IDU-ODU Ethernet Connectivity - 1+0 Configuration This configuration follows a split-type architecture but this time with a fixed (compact, non-modular) Indoor Unit (IDU), where the IDU is represented as a chassis with a fixed set of physical ports. The RJ45 Ethernet ports are modelled as fixed ports of the chassis, as they are permanently integrated and not field replaceable. SFP cages are modelled as containers capable of hosting pluggable transceiver components. IF/modem interfaces are modelled as containers representing pluggable/activatable modem functions within the IDU. Unlike the modular IDU representation, this configuration does not include container slots, as direct child components of the chassis, since no removable board-level containers are present. In this case, the interconnection between the IDU and the MW ODU is provided via an Ethernet interface. For inventory modelling purposes, the MW ODU is represented as a separate chassis with its own inventory scope. ETSI ETSI TS 104 143 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 25 |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.3.2 ODU as a module and child component of the indoor | Figure 13: Split-mount (fixed/compact indoor) IDU-ODU IF Connectivity - 1+0 Configuration This configuration follows a split-type architecture with a fixed (compact, non-modular) Indoor Unit (IDU), in which the interconnection between the IDU and the Microwave Outdoor Unit (MW ODU) is provided via an IF cable interface. For inventory modelling purposes, the MW ODU is represented as a module and modelled as a child component of the IDU, within the same chassis and inventory scope. ETSI ETSI TS 104 143 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 26 |
1584b7fdf3f44bb6efc1b17a14e5aa7b | 104 143 | 11.4 BCA configuration | 11.4.1 MW & Eband ODU as a separate chassis, Ethernet IDU ODU connectivity Figure 14: IDU-ODU Ethernet Connectivity, 2+0 BCA MW + Eband In this interpretation, all ODUs are connected to the IDU via Ethernet cabling. The example takes into account a single multiband antenna, a single MW ODU and single Eband ODU for simplicity. From a functional and operational perspective, this configuration is similar to the one depicted in clause 11.2.1, since there is no distinction if the added ODU is in MW frequency band or Eband. As a result, the IDU together with all associated ODUs are bundled and represented as a single network element, modelled using a single stack that groups the involved chassis under a common logical entity. More carriers can be added via additional ethernet cable connectivity to MW or Eband ODUs. ETSI ETSI TS 104 143 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 27 11.4.2 MW ODU as a module & child component of the indoor, IF-based IDU-ODU connectivity Figure 15: IDU-ODU IF Connectivity, 2+0 BCA MW + Eband In this interpretation, the traditional microwave ODU is connected to the IDU via IF cabling and is treated again as a module of the indoor. The E-band ODU is connected to the IDU via ethernet cabling and is treated as a separate chassis and network element, with its own inventory scope, reflecting the different architectural and modelling characteristics associated with IF-based connectivity. The example takes into account a single multiband antenna, a single MW ODU and single Eband ODU for simplicity. More carriers can be added via additional IF cable connectivity to MW ODUs and ethernet cable connectivity to Eband ODUs. ETSI ETSI TS 104 143 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 28 Annex A (informative): Parameters used in the "5th mWT SDN Plugtests" The list of parameters used from IETF RFC 8348 [1] during the 5th mWT SDN Plugtests for Hardware Management. Parameter Description Required for test Comment +--rw name NE name (component) Yes +--rw class Yes +--ro physical-index? Model number, Chassis id (to correlate SNMP with NETCONF) Out of scope +--ro description? NE description (component) Optional +--rw parent? Yes +--rw parent-rel-pos? Yes +--ro contains-child* Yes +--ro hardware-rev? HW version At least one occurrence not used for Container and port +--ro firmware-rev? FW version Optional Software on a specific chip +--ro software-rev? SW version At least one occurrence not used for Container and port +--ro serial-num? Serial number Yes not used for Container and port +--ro mfg-name? Manufacturer name Optional not used for Container and port +--ro model-name? Model version Optional not used for Container and port +--rw alias? Out of scope +--rw asset-id? Out of scope +--ro is-fru? Field replacable unit Optional not used for Container +--ro mfg-date? Optional not used for Container +--rw uri* Out of scope +--ro uuid? Hardware id Out of scope +--rw state {hardware- state}? Out of scope +--ro sensor-data {hardware-sensor}? Out of scope ETSI ETSI TS 104 143 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 29 Annex B (informative): Bibliography • IEEE™ 802.3.2-2025: "IEEE Standard for Ethernet YANG Data Model Definitions". NOTE: Additional resources: YANG Catalog. • IEEE™ 802.1Qcp-2018: "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks -- Bridges and Bridged Networks -- Amendment 30: YANG Data Model". NOTE: Additional resources: https://ieee802.org/1/files/public/YANGs/ieee802-dot1q-bridge.yang ieee802.org/1/files/public/YANGs/ieee802-dot1q-pb.yang • IEEE™ 802.1AB-2016: "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks - Station and Media Access Control Connectivity Discovery". NOTE: Additional resources: https://www.yangcatalog.org/api/services/tree/ieee802-dot1ab-lldp@2022-03-15.yang. ieee802.org/1/files/public/YANGs/ieee802-dot1ab-lldp.yang • IETF RFC 8632 (September 2019): "A YANG Data Model for Alarm Management". • IETF RFC 6020 (October 2010): "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)". • IETF RFC 8575 (May 2019): "YANG Data Model for the Precision Time Protocol (PTP)". • draft-ietf-netmod-intf-ext-yang: "Common Interface Extension YANG Data Models". • IETF RFC 5277 (July 2008): "NETCONF Event Notifications". • IETF RFC 7317 (March 2004): "A YANG Data Model for System Management". ETSI ETSI TS 104 143 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 30 History Version Date Status V1.1.1 February 2026 Publication |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 1 Scope | The present document defines the test cases in the form of evaluation criteria and PP/CC evaluation tests resulting from the Test Purposes identified for ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] in ETSI TS 103 993 [3]. In combination with the base standard (including its ICS statement), and the TSS&TP in ETSI TS 103 993 [3] this serves as a complete ONDS specification to allow use in the EUCC regime [10] or equivalent under Common Criteria (CC) as a Protection Profile (PP) [4]. NOTE 1: The present document adopts the style and much of the structure of a PP adapted to conform to the ETSI Stylesheet. NOTE 2: The present document is structured in such a way to form part of the EUCC [10] submission. NOTE 3: The present document addresses the assurance levels identified in CSA [i.26] for EUCC [10] as Substantial (Article 52.6 of [i.26]). NOTE 4: In the present document the requirements from ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] in the conventional ETSI format are highlighted against the most relevant SFRs from CC-Part 2 [5] in clauses 8 and 9 and in Annex B. NOTE 5: The present document uses both ETSI style NOTEs that give additional information but are not mandatory, and CC style Application notes that also give additional information but in a more formal way than the ETSI NOTE as an evaluation body is expected to address the content of the application note and to give a justification if the content is ignored. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 2 References | |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found in the ETSI docbox. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI TS 103 962: "CYBER; Optical Network and Device Security; Security provisions in Optical Access Network Devices". [2] ETSI TS 103 963: "CYBER; Optical Network and Device Security; Security provisions in transport network devices". [3] ETSI TS 103 993: "Cyber Security (CYBER); ONDS Test Suite Structure and Test Purposes". [4] Common Criteria CCMB-2022-11-001: "Common Criteria for Information Technology, Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and general model", November 2022, Revision 1. [5] Common Criteria CCMB-2022-11-002: "Common Criteria for Information Technology, Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security functional components", November 2022, Revision 1. [6] Common Criteria CCMB-2022-11-003: "Common Criteria for Information Technology, Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security assurance components", November 2022, Revision 1. [7] Common Criteria CCMB-2022-11-004: "Common Criteria for Information Technology, Security Evaluation, Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and activities", November 2022, Revision 1. ETSI ETSI TS 103 996 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 9 [8] Common Criteria CCMB-2022-11-005: "Common Criteria for Information Technology, Security Evaluation, Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements", November 2022, Revision 1. [9] Common Criteria CCMB-2022-11-006: "Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology", November 2022, Revision 1. NOTE: The above listed references ([4] through [9]) are also published by ISO as ISO/IEC 15408 (for [4] through [9]) and as ISO/IEC 18045 (for [8]). [10] Cybersecurity Certification: Candidate EUCC Scheme V1.1.1. NOTE: The EUCC scheme is a Common Criteria based European candidate cybersecurity certification scheme and issued by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA). [12] ETSI TS 103 924: "Optical Network and Device Security Catalogue of requirements". [14] ETSI TS 102 165-2: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Methods and protocols; Part 2: Protocol Framework Definition; Security Counter Measures". |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. The following referenced documents may be useful in implementing an ETSI deliverable or add to the reader's understanding, but are not required for conformance to the present document. [i.1] ETSI TS 102 165-1: "Cyber Security (CYBER); Methods and protocols; Part 1: Method and pro forma for Threat, Vulnerability, Risk Analysis (TVRA)". [i.2] ETSI TS 103 961: "CYBER; Optical Network and Device Security; Security provisions for the management of Optical Network devices and services". [i.3] Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Specification Release 2.10. [i.4] Trusted® Computing Group: "Trusted Platform Module Specification". NOTE: Available from trusted platform group or as ISO/IEC 11889. [i.5] ETSI TS 102 165-3: "Cyber Security (CYBER); Methods and Protocols for Security; Part 3: Vulnerability Assessment extension for TVRA". [i.6] NIST SP 800-133rev2: "Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation", June 2020. [i.7] Recommendation ITU-T X.509: " Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks". [i.8] NIST FIPS 140-2: "Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules". [i.9] NIST SP 800-90B: "Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation", 2018-01. [i.10] NIST SP 800-63B: "Digital Identity Guidelines Authentication and Lifecycle Management", 2017-06. [i.11] ETSI TS 103 994 (V1.1.1): "Cyber Security (CYBER); Privileged Access Workstations; Part 1: Physical Device". [i.12] ETSI GR NFV-SEC 007: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Trust; Report on Attestation Technologies and Practices for Secure Deployments". ETSI ETSI TS 103 996 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 10 [i.13] ETSI TR 103 838: "Cyber Security; Guide to Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure". [i.14] ETSI TS 103 305-1: "Cyber Security (CYBER); Critical Security Controls for Effective Cyber Defence; Part 1: The Critical Security Controls". [i.15] ETSI TS 103 645: "CYBER; Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things: Baseline Requirements". NOTE: The above TS is periodically published as ETSI EN 303 645. [i.16] ETSI TS 103 701: "Cyber Security (CYBER); Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things: Conformance Assessment of Baseline Requirements". [i.17] Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS2 Directive). [i.18] ISO/IEC 29147:2018: "Information technology — Security techniques — Vulnerability disclosure". [i.19] ETSI TS 104 013: "Cyber Security (CYBER); EUCC PP for ONDS management protocols and services". [i.20] NIST SP 800-164: "Guidelines on Hardware-Rooted Security in Mobile Devices". [i.21] NIST SP 800-132: "Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation Part 1: Storage Applications". [i.22] Alex Biryukov, Daniel Dinu and Dmitry Khovratovich: "Argon2: the memory-hard function for password hashing and other applications". [i.23] Tarsnap: "scrypt". [i.24] ETSI TS 103 486: "CYBER; Identity Management and Discovery for IoT". [i.25] Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013 and (EU) No 2019/1020 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 (Cyber Resilience Act). [i.26] Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communication technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity Act). [i.27] Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 of 31 January 2024 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the adoption of the European Common Criteria-based cybersecurity certification scheme (EUCC). 3 Definition of terms, symbols, abbreviations and notation convention |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: Administration User (AU): external entity permitted to login to the TOE for the conduct of restricted administration tasks and functionality NOTE: In a Unix like operational environment this is equivalent to admin. ETSI ETSI TS 103 996 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 11 operational user: autonomous entity that operates the OND NOTE: In a Unix like operational environment this is equivalent to user. rogue ONT: ONT that transmits optical signals as upstream at unsynchronized times or time slots that are not assigned to this ONT sensitive data: data, that if compromised, directly harms the protection and security of the TOE and data operated and resting on the TOE substantial assurance level: assurance that the ICT products, ICT services and ICT processes where the corresponding security requirements, including security functionalities, are provided at a level intended to minimize the known cybersecurity risks, and the risk of incidents and cyberattacks carried out by actors with limited skills and resources. NOTE 1: A contextual definition is given in CSA Article 52.6 [i.26]. NOTE 2: A mapping from the CSA [i.26] definition to the metrics for risk analysis is given in ETSI TS 102 165-3 [i.5] and in ETSI TS 102 165-1 [i.1]. trusted channel: means by which a Target Of Evaluation (TOE) Security Functionality (TSF) and another trusted IT product can communicate with the necessary confidence |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: APE Assurance class Protection Profile Evaluation AU Administration User CC Common Criteria CIA Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability CRA Cyber Resilience Act CSA Cyber Security Act DoS Denial of Service EAL Evaluation Assurance Level ENISA European Union Agency for Cybersecurity EOL End Of Life EUCC Common Criteria-based European cybersecurity certification scheme FW Firmware HW Hardware HWROT Hardware Root of Trust ICS Implementation Conformance Statement ICT Information and Communications Technology ICV Integrity Check Value IoT Internet of Things IT Information Technology IXIT Implementation eXtra Information for Testing MAC Message Authentication Code NA Not Applicable NMS Network Management System NTP Network Time Protocol OAN Optical Access Network OE Operational Environment OLT Optical Line Termination ON Optical Network OND Optical Network Device ONDS Optical Network and Device Security ONT Optical Network Termination ETSI ETSI TS 103 996 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 12 OS Operating System OTN Optical Transportation Network OTP One Time Programmable PON Passive Optical Network PP Protection Profile RTS Root of Trust for Storage RTV Root of Trust for Verification SAR Security Assurance Requirement SBOM Software Bill Of Materials SFP Security Function Policy SFR Security Functional Requirement SFTP Secure File Tranfer Protocol SPD Security Problem Definition SRU Service Requesting User ST Security Target SUT System Under Test SW Software TOE Target Of Evaluation TPM Trusted Platform Module TSF TOE Security Functionality TSS&TP Test Suite Structure and Test Purposes TVP Time Variant Parameter TVRA Threat Vulnerability Risk Analysis VIAR Vulnerability Impact Analysis Report |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 3.4 Notation convention for SFRs and SARs | For the purposes of the present document, the notation and structural conventions given in CC-Part 2 [5] and the following apply: • Strikethrough indicates text replaced with alternative text as a refinement. • [Underlined text in brackets] indicates additional text provided as a refinement. NOTE 1: It is recognized that the convention above from CC-Part 2 [5] clashes with the ETSI convention for references. • If not being the headline of the SFR itself, bold text indicates the completion of an assignment. • Italicized and bold text indicates the completion of a selection. • Iteration/Identifier indicates an element of the iteration, whereas the identifier distinguishes the different iterations. • Normal text applies unchanged from the SFR definition in CC-Part 2 [5]. • Begin and end of application- and general notes are marked in italic letters and are given below the according SFR or SAR definition. General notes are informative only. NOTE 2: It is recognized that this is inconsistent with the use of notes in ETSI's stylesheet. Begin and end of evaluator action elements are marked in italic and underlined letters and are given below the SFR definition. An evaluator action element should be understood as guidance for the evaluation action of a certain requirement detail. ETSI ETSI TS 103 996 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 13 |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 4 Overview of protection profile and assurance | |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 4.1 General concepts | The present document defines an EUCC conformant Protection Profile (PP) for the purpose of evaluation of the security provisions given for ONDS devices established in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2]. The PP extension addresses test cases for each requirement with the purpose of advising the evaluator and developer of how a pass verdict for conformance is to be achieved. The PP described in the present document (and its normative references, in particular [1], ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and ETSI TS 103 924 [12]) is documented to be consistent with at least Substantial level as defined in the EU Cyber Security Act (CSA) [i.26] and has been designed to be consistent with the requirements of the Common Criteria-based European cybersecurity certification scheme (EUCC) [10]. A PP is defined as an implementation-independent statement of security requirements for a Target Of Evaluation (TOE) addressing a particular type of device (see Common Criteria [4], [5], [6], [7] and [8] (and the corresponding text from ISO/IEC 15408). A PP may inherit requirements from one or more other PPs. NOTE 1: In like manner to a PP an ETSI Technical Specification defines an implementation-independent statement of requirements, where these requirements are stated for the present document in each of ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2], and in ETSI TS 103 924 [12]. NOTE 2: The term TOE has a similar meaning to System Under Test (SUT) that is conventionally used in ETSI test documents. NOTE 3: In ETSI TS 102 165-1 [i.1] the use of TOE is being deprecated in favour of a more general and wider system role of identification of the attack surface of a system or component although there remains a close mapping to the TOE in use in [4]. In the convention of PP it is necessary to identify Security Functional Requirements (SFRs), which contribute to fulfil the security requirements for protection of the TOE identified in either the Security Problem Definition (SPD) in clause 6, or in the Protection Profile (PP) in clauses 7 through 10 of the present document. In each case the base requirements for ONDS devices established in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] apply, and are mapped to the relevant SFRs in Annex A and to the Test Purposes defined in ETSI TS 103 993 [3] in Annex C. The structure of a PP is defined in Annex B of [4] and shall normally contain the elements outlined in Figure 2. NOTE 4: In ETSI's convention it is normal that the security objectives and security requirements are made by reference to other documents, e.g. ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and ETSI TS 103 993 [3] which is not recommended in CC, although for the present document the ETSI convention is maintained. ETSI ETSI TS 103 996 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 14 NOTE: The figure references ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045 which are given as alternative sources to those given in clause 2.1 coming from the Common Criteria group [4] to [9]. Figure 2: Contents of a Protection Profile (Source: CC-Part 1 [4], Annex B) The structure of the PP shown in Figure 1 places the security problem above the security objectives. An alternative convention is often followed in the ETSI standards process wherein the system objective is met by the system design. The threats are against the system objectives (see ETSI TS 102 165-1 [i.1] and Figure 3 below) and those threats, and their mitigation, is the security problem to be solved by the identification and implementation of mechanisms in support of the security requirements. The present document follows the broad model of ETSI TS 102 165-1 [i.1] mapped to the PP content structure of Figure 1. ETSI ETSI TS 103 996 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 15 Figure 3: Relationship between system design, objectives and requirements (Source: ETSI TS 102 165-1 [i.1]) For the purposes of the present document, and from the expectations of the market position in core networks that may be classified as critical infrastructure, the assurance level identified in CSA [i.26] for EUCC [10] as Substantial (Article 52.6 of [i.26]) apply: Quote: "A European cybersecurity certificate that refers to assurance level 'substantial' shall provide assurance that the ICT products, ICT services and ICT processes for which that certificate is issued meet the corresponding security requirements, including security functionalities, and that they have been evaluated at a level intended to minimise the known cybersecurity risks, and the risk of incidents and cyberattacks carried out by actors with limited skills and resources. The evaluation activities to be undertaken shall include at least the following: a review to demonstrate the absence of publicly known vulnerabilities and testing to demonstrate that the ICT products, ICT services or ICT processes correctly implement the necessary security functionalities. Where any such evaluation activities are not appropriate, substitute evaluation activities with equivalent effect shall be undertaken." |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 4.1a Conformance claim | The Protection Profile (PP) defined in the present document claims to be conformant with the Common Criteria version 2022 Revision 1 as of November 2022 [5] and [6] as follows: • CC-Part 2 [5] extended, with FPT_HWROT.1 Root of trust based on HW (see clause 7.1). • CC-Part 3 [6] extended, ALC_SWU Software Update Management (see clause 7.2). cd General model «asset» DesignModule SystemDesign «Objective» SystemObjectives «Objective» SecurityObjectives «Objective» AssuranceObjectives «Requirement» SystemRequirements «Requirement» SecurityRequirements «Requirement» AssuranceRequirements «realize» +Is an aggregation of ETSI ETSI TS 103 996 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 16 |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 4.2 Alignment to expectation of APE class of CC-Part 3 | |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 4.2.1 Overview | The present document, including the referenced content of ETSI TS 103 962 [1], ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and ETSI TS 103 924 [12], is written to conform to the requirements that allow its evaluation as a Protection Profile as outlined in CC-Part 3 [6] for class APE as modified for EUCC [10]. Figure 4: Components of APE class (Source: CC-Part-3 [6]) |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 4.2.2 Claim against APE_INT | The present document is made with respect to the provisions of ETSI TS 103 962 [1], ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and ETSI TS 103 924 [12]. The unique PP reference (for EUCC [10]) is to the full title and version number of the present document. ETSI TS 103 996 (V1.1.1): "Cyber Security (CYBER); EUCC PP for Optical Network and Device Security (ONDS)". NOTE: The certified version of the present document is registered with ENISA under the EUCC scheme. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 4.2.3 Claim against APE_CCL | The present PP was built with, and claims conformance to, the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (in version 2022, in revision 1, as of November 2022, for all parts: [4], [5], [6], [7] and [8]). In addition, the present document claims conformance to the base requirements established in the ONDS requirements catalogue in ETSI TS 103 924 [12] and their specialization in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2]. Furthermore, the present PP extends CC-Part 2 [5] with the following SFR extension: • FPT_HWROT.1 Root of trust based on HW (see clause 7.1) The chosen Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) is augmented with ALC_FLR.2, which is defined in CC-Part 3 [6]. The underlying methodology to be considered for the present PP is the CC-Part 3 [6], as applicable to the EUCC programme [10]. NOTE: As stated above (scope statement (clause 1) and in clause 4.1) the specific assurance level claim of the present document is to level substantial as defined in Article 52 of [i.26]. ETSI ETSI TS 103 996 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 17 |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 4.2.4 Claim against APE_SPD | The security problem is defined in the reference documents ETSI TS 103 962 [1], ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and ETSI TS 103 924 [12], and summarized in clause 6 of the present document. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 4.2.5 Claim against APE_OBJ | The security objectives are defined in the reference documents ETSI TS 103 962 [1], ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and ETSI TS 103 924 [12], and summarized in clauses 6.6 and 6.7 of the present document. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 4.2.6 Claim against APE_ECD | The package claim, taken from CC-Part 3 [8] of the present PP is: EAL3 augmented with ALC_FLR.2 AVA_VAN.2 from CC-Part 3 [8], Vulnerability analysis methodically tested and checked, is included (see also clause 4.4 below). NOTE: The expectation of Substantial defined in Article 53 of [i.26] is that AVA_VAN.2 as a minimum is required. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 4.2.7 Claim against APE_REQ | The security requirements are defined in the reference documents ETSI TS 103 962 [1], ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and ETSI TS 103 924 [12], and stated in SFR format in clauses 8 and 9 of the present document (Annex A provides a mapping between the format used in the reference documents and that of PP-Part 2 [5]). Assurance claims are defined in clause 10 of the present document. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 4.3 PP Claim | The present PP requires strict conformance of the ST or PP claiming conformance to the present document. The present PP in all parts do not claim conformance to any other PP. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 4.4 Claim against the AVA_VAN class | The EUCC scheme adopts provisions of the AVA_VAN class from CC-Part 3 [6] specifically mapped to the metrics defined in ETSI TS 102 165-1 [i.1] for attack potential as shown in Table 1 and these are mapped to the CSA expectation for each of Basic, Substantial and High. Table 1: Vulnerability rating Attack potential values Attack potential required to exploit attack Resistant to attacker with attack potential of AVA_VAN CSA [i.26] rating 0 to 9 Basic No rating CSA-Basic 10 to 13 Enhanced-basic Basic AVA_VAN.1 and AVA_VAN.2 CSA-Substantial 14 to 19 Moderate Enhanced basic AVA_VAN.3 CSA-High 20 to 24 High Moderate AVA_VAN.4 CSA-High > 24 Beyond High High AVA_VAN.5 CSA-High As the present document only considers the TOE against the Substantial a rating of the CSA the following notes with regards to the role of the evaluator is copied from ETSI TS 102 165-3 [i.5] and presented in Table 2. ETSI ETSI TS 103 996 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 18 Table 2: Evaluator actions for CSA and attack potential rating AVA_VAN class Attack potential CSA [i.26] rating Notes AVA_VAN.1.3E Basic Substantial The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack potential. AVA_VAN.2.4E The mapping to the EAL levels historically used in CC can be found in CC-Part 5 [8]. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 5 The ONDS TOE | |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 5.1 Introduction | The TOE is defined in ETSI TS 103 962 [1], ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and by the common requirements in ETSI TS 103 924 [12]. In addition, the management interface security requirements are defined in clause 4 of [i.2] but are out of scope of the present document but are addressed in ETSI TS 104 013 [i.19]. NOTE: The description given in the present document is for information only as the normative definitions are given ETSI TS 103 962 [1], ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and ETSI TS 103 924 [12]. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 5.2 The type of the TOE | The TOE device provides transparent transmitting services. In this context, transparent means that the TOE does not have the ability to access the data stream contents. In the optical network scenario, as described in the common requirements catalogue ETSI TS 103 924 [12], and in the specializations of ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2], there are two types of devices: • OLT devices connect single Service Requesting Users (SRUs) or user groups that communicate across optical fibre: - Multiple SRUs can be grouped and shared on one physical fibre (the security requirements for OLTs are defined in ETSI TS 103 962 [1]). • OTN devices providing point-to-point transmitting services with the aggregation network and that can manage the OLT traffic (the security requirements for OTNs are defined in clauses 5, 6 and 7 of ETSI TS 103 963 [2]). Although there are differences between OLT and OTN in network function, both devices can be treated as one TOE type which is covered with the present PP. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 5.3 TOE Description | The base requirements given in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and the common security catalogue in ETSI TS 103 924 [12] apply (see the summary of all requirements given in Annex B of the present document). |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 5.4 Main functions and security features of the TOE | The base requirements given in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] which come from the common security catalogue in ETSI TS 103 924 [12] apply. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 5.5 Physical Scope | Out of scope of the present document. ETSI ETSI TS 103 996 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 19 NOTE 1: The base specifications ETSI TS 103 962 [1], ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and the common catalogue ETSI TS 103 924 [12] do not define the physical characteristics of the TOE. NOTE 2: The developer of the ST is expected to give a full description of the physical scope of the TOE. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 5.6 Logical Scope of the TOE | The base requirements given in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] which come from the common security catalogue in ETSI TS 103 924 [12] apply and address the following characteristics of the TOE: • Security Management • Access Control configuration • Network Management Handling • TOE Flow Control • Communication and Cryptographic Services • Audit & Recovery |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 5.7 The non-TOE Components | The following components are out of scope of the present TOE: • The ONDS management components for controlling and administering the TOE (see ETSI TS 103 961 [i.2]). • The ONDS management component mediating other services that the TOE uses (see ETSI TS 103 961 [i.2]). • All connecting fibres and wires. • All radio-equipment, for example Wi-Fi™ and Bluetooth® devices, operated in the TOE environment which interface with the TOE. • The environment in which TOE is deployed (a guide to environmental provisions is given in ETSI TS 103 924 [12]). |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 5.8 The TOE Lifecycle | Not applicable. NOTE: In order to be consistent with the aims of the Cyber Resilience Act [i.26] and the NIS2 Directive [i.17] provisions have to be made to ensure that the TOE (the OLT/OTN) has addressed lifecycle and supply chain issues and to be updateable over its lifetime. In this the provisions made in Annex A for software update apply, as do the provisions for vulnerability reporting given in ETSI TS 103 645 [i.15]. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6 The Security Problem Definition | |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.1 Overview | The security problem which applies to the TOE is described in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and in the common requirements ETSI TS 103 924 [12]. The text that follows in this clause summarizes the problem statement but the normative text remains in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2]. ETSI ETSI TS 103 996 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 20 The TOE is a managed object where it is configured by the management component [i.2] on behalf of a customer to deliver data to a customer at an agreed grade and quality of service. The TOE has to be able to identify itself to the management component and give assurance to the management component that is has not been compromised. In addition, the management component has to be able to protect itself against malicious attempts to access and modify any configuration data or to its operational software. As the operational software of the TOE is updateable the TOE has to be able to protect itself against any attempt to make unauthorized changes to its software. NOTE: The nature of the device is that it does not actively interact with the optical data (e.g. explicitly in a Passive Optical Network (PON) and by configuration in any other mode where the device may interact with the signal (e.g. by amplification) but not with the content of the communication). |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.2 Assets | The assets considered in the TOE are described in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] as the configuration data of the device that allows it to perform the actions described above in clause 5.2. The text that follows restates the assets into a format commonly used in CC but the normative definition remains in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2]. The security problem identified in ETSI TS 103 924 [12] and formalized as requirements in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] enforce some forms of cryptographic protection of the primary assets of the system. Those primary assets are the configuration data required to make the device operational, and the identifying data required to uniquely identify and connect to the device. The cryptographic protections introduce further assets to the system in the form of keys, algorithms and policies. In addition, in recognition that the device is software enabled, and that that software is updateable, the software of the device is identified as an asset, protected by access control for both basic operation (i.e. to use the software operationally), and for maintenance (i.e. to allow for the software to be updated). NOTE 1: In addition to software update the TOE is expected to ensure that the configuration of the software is a protected asset. The TOE holds and operates assets that require protection against manipulation, disclosure and termination that would endanger the fulfilment of the services the TOE is expected to provide. The following assets are identified (dependent assets are indicated by formatting as sub-bullets): • D.ID_CAN: The canonical identifier of the device (see ETSI TS 103 962 [1], ETSI TS 103 963 [2], ETSI TS 103 924 [12]): - D.ID_AUTH_CRED: The authentication data (credentials) used to authenticate the identifier. - D.ID_AUTH_PROT: The data and protocol used to provide the authentication service. • D.ID_SEM: The semantic identifier of the device (see ETSI TS 103 962 [1], ETSI TS 103 963 [2], ETSI TS 103 924 [12]). • D.CONFIG: The configuration data of the device. NOTE 2: The configuration data is treated as a single asset even if it can be decomposed into discrete configuration data elements. • D.SOFT: Executable software of the TOE: - D.SOFT_UPDATE: The update received by the on-TOE-patch-mechanism, and temporarily stored on the TOE before being installed and activated. It includes executable code, identification (e.g. version and name), and configuration data associated with the patch. NOTE 3: The D.SOFT_UPDATE asset is dependent on the core asset D.SOFT and is only relevant during an update process (i.e. it is ephemeral and does not exist outside of the update process). - D.PUBKEY: Public keys and/or certificates on the TOE or retrieved from the HW host to verify the digital signatures of the any received asset, or to decrypt data encrypted with the associated private key. ETSI ETSI TS 103 996 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 21 NOTE 4: The existence of the D.PUBKEY is only required where data verification is required and may be ephemeral or persistent depending on the performance requirement or preference of the device. • D.AUD_LOG: Audit and log records retained at the device. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.3 Discussion of the Threats | |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.3.1 Overview of threat model | The threat and threat mitigation described in ETSI TS 103 924 [12] and expanded in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] derived the security requirements described in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2]. The model used in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] to identify threats is based on the approach given in [i.1] where the textual statement derived from ETSI TS 102 165-1 [i.1] applies: "A system consists as an aggregation of assets. An asset may be physical, human or logical. Assets in the model may have Weaknesses that may be attacked by Threats. A Threat is enacted by a Threat Agent, and may lead to an Unwanted Incident breaking certain pre-defined security objectives. A Vulnerability is modelled as the combination of a Weakness that can be exploited by one or more Threats. When applied, Countermeasures protect against Threats to Vulnerabilities and reduce the Risk." For the purposes of the present document the TOE is the system. A visual representation of the model is given in Figure 5. Figure 5: Generic security TVRA model (Source: ETSI TS 102 165-1 [i.1]) A simplified risk analysis is given in Annex A of the common security requirements in ETSI TS 103 924 [12]. The following text restates the threats in a format commonly used in CC. Threats are identified against the primary CIA attributes as also identified in the threat tree given in ETSI TS 102 165-1 [i.1] as: • Interception. • Manipulation. • Denial of service. • Repudiation of an action: - E.g. Repudiation of change configuration. For the present document the primary CIA threats identified in ETSI TS 102 165-1 [i.1] as above are restated in CC format below. T. Repudiation: A threat agent is able to repudiate an action, such as repudiation of modification of configuration of TOE. • Affected assets: D.AUD_LOG cd SecurityRelationships «asset» DesignModule «Vulnerability» AssetVulnerability «Threat» AttackingThreat «Weakness» AssetWeakness SystemDesign «Countermeasure» SecCountermeasure «UnwantedIncident» Incident ThreatAgent +Enacts specific threat +Exploit may lead to +Protects +Is an aggregation of +May have ETSI ETSI TS 103 996 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 22 T.UnauthenticatedAccess: An unauthenticated person may attempt to bypass the security access controls of the TOE to access the TOE as legitimate user. • Affected assets: D.ID_CAN, D.ID_SEM, D.ID_AUTH_CRED, D.SOFT T.UnauthorizedAccess: A user with restricted action and information access authorization gains access to unauthorized commands or information. This threat also includes data leakage to non-intended person or device. Discovering unauthorized access in a system with strict access control implies that there has been manipulation of the access control rules, or manipulation of the parameters used to gain access. This threat is the worst scenario, because as an authorized user the threat agent has access and can execute anything. All assets are in danger. • Affected assets: D.ID_CAN, D.ID_SEM, D.ID_AUTH_CRED, D.CONFIG, D.SOFT, D.SOFT_UPDATE, D.PUBKEY, D.AUD_LOG The general mapping of threats to system objectives (the CIA triad) are outlined in Table 3. Table 3: Threats to security objective types (Source: ETSI TS 102 165-1 [i.1]) Threat Objective type Confidentiality Integrity Availability Authenticity Accountability Interception (eavesdropping) X Manipulation - Unauthorized access (note 1) X X X X Manipulation - Masquerade (note 2) X X X X Manipulation - Forgery (note 3) X X X X Manipulation - Loss or corruption of information (note 4) X X Repudiation X X X Denial of service X NOTE 1: Unauthorized access in a system with strict access control is taken to imply that there has been manipulation of the access control rules, or manipulation of the parameters used to gain access. NOTE 2: Masquerade of an entity as another can be achieved in a number of ways that may include manipulation of data to present an alternative identity. NOTE 3: Forgery is a form of manipulation of data to present a false representation (forgery is assumed to be distinct from duplication). NOTE 4: Manipulation in its most basic form corrupts data. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.3.2 Specific ONDS threats | |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.3.2.1 Disclosure of Internal data (T.DiscloseInternalData) | The internal data of the device (the TOE) is its operational software and its configuration data as outlined in clause 6.2 above and noted in the access control rules listed in clause 7.3 of each of ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2]. NOTE: As any instance of the TOE has a limited degree of personalization (e.g. implementation specific configuration data such as the asset location (virtual or geographical) if present) any compromised device may reveal information that may be used to exploit devices of the same type. The design objectives and development requirements of the device, outlined in ETSI TS 103 924 [12] and captured in part in Annex C, Table C.2 of ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2], apply. T.DiscloseInternalData: A threat agent tries to disclose information stored in the TOE and if the TOE has reached its End Of Life (EOL): • Assumption: Only trained and authorized users can operate the device. ETSI ETSI TS 103 996 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 23 • Objective for the environment: The patch provision system enables the TOE for the verification of the authenticity and integrity of a made available SW patch: - Affected assets: D.CONFIG, D.SOFT |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.3.2.2 Misuse of TOE Functions (T.Misuse) | The TOE is intended as a single purpose device (see clauses 4.2 and 4.3 of ETSI TS 103 924 [12]) and is not intended to be used for any other purpose. However, in accepting that the hardware may consist of a computing architecture that is programmable there is a non-trivial risk of the device being misused by inappropriate programming of the TOE functions. T.Misuse: A threat agent tries to use or abuse the TSF without authorization: • Affected assets: D. SOFT, D.CONFIG NOTE: This is normally mitigated by provision of an Access Control mechanism. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.3.2.3 Interception of communication (T.Intercept) | A number of provisions given in clause 6.1 of ETSI TS 103 924 [12] apply (see also Annex A of each of ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2]) to protect the content of consumer traffic that is managed by the TOE. As highlighted in clause A.5.1 of ETSI TS 103 924 [12] the application of passive and active measures to detect interference with the physical cable and devices on the cable limit the likelihood of a successful attack, which when combined with the application of encryption to the content (see also the mandates given in clause 6.1 of ETSI TS 103 924 [12]) reduces the risk to a minimum. T.Intercept: A threat agent tries to intercept the communication between the TOE and external entities to disclose, forge and delete data packets of the communication. A threat agent records, modifies and replays identification data for reuse at other attack steps: • Affected assets: D.ID_CAN, D.ID_SEM, D.CONFIG, D.SOFT_UPDATE NOTE: The conventional mitigation of this threat is by encryption of the communication from the TOE (mitigation against unwanted disclosure) and to give assurance of chronological sequencing of such communication in order to detect deletion, and to give assurance of the integrity of the content of such communication by provision of an integrity verification measure. EXAMPLE: This threat could arise as a consequence of an inappropriate protocol selection, faulty implementation, or operation with insecure parameters. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.3.2.4 Tampering with an asset (T.Manipulation) | As identified in the threat taxonomy in ETSI TS 102 165-1 [i.1] tampering is a form of manipulation threat against an asset. Clause 7.1 of ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] states that secure storage elements shall be tamper resistant, tamper evident and shall raise an alarm if tampering is identified. T.Manipulation: A threat agent modifies the configuration data to achieve packet redirections or other perturbations on the traffic A threat agent replays recorded and modified identification data to achieve malfunction or wrong commands of the managing device: • Affected assets: D.ID_CAN, D.ID_SEM, D.CONFIG NOTE 1: The conventional mitigation of this form of threat is to provide an integrity verification scheme, such as enabled by cryptographically hashing the data and verification of the hash prior to use where the attacker is unable to generate a valid hash after manipulating the data. NOTE 2: The mechanism for generating the hash should include a variable parameter (a salt). |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.3.2.5 Malfunction of the TOE (T.Malfunction) | This threat applies to malicious forced malfunction of the TOE. ETSI ETSI TS 103 996 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 24 T.Malfunction: A threat agent tries to cause a malfunction of the TSF in order to deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE: NOTE: Malfunctions of the TOE arising from such things as physical failure of a component are not considered in this PP. • Affected assets: D.SOFT and D. SOFT_UPDATE and D.CONFIG EXAMPLE: This could be by sending maliciously crafted data packets, flooding with data packets, or by applying rogue communication. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.3.2.6 Unauthorized update (T.UNAUTH-UPD) | The TOE shall be updateable to counter threats. This is consistent with requirements identified in the CRA [i.25] and NIS2 [i.17] and is identified as a core requirement in ETSI TS 103 645 [i.15]. T.UNAUTH-UPD: During transmission of a SW patch to the TOE, a threat agent was able to replace or modify the original SW patch with a maliciously crafted SW patch: • Affected assets: D. SOFT |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.3.2.7 Denial of service by manipulation of update process (T.DOS-UPD) | T.DOS-UPD: A DoS prevents the patch management from operation due to interruption or blocking of the update steps of SW patch loading and/or preventing the atomic conduct of the on-TOE patch mechanism: • Affected assets: D.SOFT, D.CONFIG |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.3.2.8 Unwanted management traffic (T.UnwantedManagementTraffic) | T.UnwantedManagementTraffic: The traffic here only refers to the traffic on management interfaces, that means, the Unwanted Network Traffic threat only exists on the management plane. The Unwanted network traffic may originate from an attacker and result in an overload of the management interfaces, which may cause a failure of the TOE to respond to system control and normal management operations. As a consequence, the TOE might be unable to provide some of the TSF while under attack and in particular security management functionality to update configuration data for the TOE: • Affected assets: D.ID_CAN, D.ID_SEM, D.CONFIG, D.SOFT_UPDATE |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.4 Organizational Security Policies | The policy environment in which the TOE is deployed is independent of the device itself thus the examination and definition of organizational security policies is not addressed. Thus no Organization Security Policies (OSPs) are claimed. However, Annex C of ETSI TS 103 962 [1] identifies a number of environmental, deployment, and development constraints to be considered. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.5 Assumptions | Each of ETSI TS 103 962 [1], ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and the common catalogue ETSI TS 103 924 [12] state a number of assumptions for the use and deployment of the TOE that are re-drafted here into a CC format. The following specifies the assumptions on the TOE environment that are necessary for the TOE to meet its security objectives. A.Certificates: It is assumed that digital certificates that are generated externally by trusted certification authorities are of good quality i.e. meeting corresponding standards and providing sufficient security strength through the use of appropriate cryptographic mechanisms and cryptographic parameters. This applies for the cryptographic mechanisms and parameters contained in the certificate and as well for the mechanisms and parameters used to sign the certificate. It is assumed that administrators examine the quality of the certificates besides verifying the integrity and authenticity before importing them. Especially certificates signed with weak hashing algorithms are assumed to be not imported into the TOE. ETSI ETSI TS 103 996 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 25 A.PhysicalProtection: It is assumed that the TOE and its operational environment (i.e. the complete system including attached peripherals) are protected against unauthorized physical access. It is assumed that only administrators (i.e. all users who could successfully authenticate to the TOE) are authorized to physically access the TOE and its operational environment. This assumption includes that the management network, including IT trusted products, NMS together with all related communication lines are operated in the same physically secured environment as the TOE. A.NetworkElements: It is assumed that the operational environment provides securely and correctly working network devices as resources that the TOE needs to cooperate with. Behaviours of such network devices provided by operational environment shall be also secure and correct. These network devices are deployed in an independent network which is segregated from another network. A.NetworkSegregation: It is assumed that the operational environment provides segregation of networks by deploying the management interface in TOE into an independent local network. A.NoEvil: It is assumed that personnel working as authorized administrators (i.e. all users that can successfully authenticate to the TOE) shall be carefully selected for trustworthiness and trained for proper operation of the TOE. These administrative users will be competent, and not careless or willfully negligent or hostile, and will follow and abide by the instructions provided by the TOE documentation. A.Monitoring: It is assumed that the network management systems or administrators continuously monitor the TOE operation for occurring failures and misbehaviours, and, if so, appropriate resolution and mitigation means are executed to restore the normal functioning of the TOE. A.Device: It is assumed that the underlying hardware of the optical network device, which is outside the scope of the TOE, as well as the firmware and the underlying OS and non-TOE software, are trusted and work correctly. |
678492cef4dd29f7256aac1452da5850 | 103 996 | 6.6 Security Objectives | The security objectives resulting in the mitigations given in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] are based on the common catalogue ETSI TS 103 924 [12]. The text that follows restates those objectives into a format commonly found in CC part 1 [4], chapter 10.6.2. O.CONF_01: The content of a transmission should not be available to an attacker even if the raw data is intercepted. NOTE 1: This objective is met by the mandates given in clause 6.1 of ETSI TS 103 924 [12]. NOTE 2: The matching objective of not making management and control data available to an attacker is addressed in [i.19] and by O.AVAIL_02. O.AVAIL_01: Endpoints of each link should be uniquely identifiable, and should be able to verify their identity. NOTE 3: This objective is met by the mandates given in clause 5.1 (for canonical identifiers) and in clause 5.2 (for semantic or functional identifiers) of ETSI TS 103 924 [12]. O.AVAIL_02: Data (content, control, signalling) that is essential to the management of the network should only be visible to authorized entities in the network. NOTE 4: This objective is met by the mandates given in each of clauses 7.3 and 7.4 of ETSI TS 103 924 [12]. O.DataFilter: The TOE shall ensure that only allowed management traffic goes through the TOE. O.Authentication: The TOE shall authenticate users before access to data and security functions is granted. NOTE 5: This objective is stated in clause 5.2 of ETSI TS 103 924 [12]. O.Authorization: The TOE shall implement different authorization roles that can be assigned to users in order to restrict the functionality that is available to them. O.Audit: The TOE shall provide functionality generate audit records for security-relevant administrator actions. O.Communication: The TOE shall implement logical protection means to ensure integrity and confidentiality for network communication between the TOE and Network Management System (NMS) as well as the TOE and trusted IT products from the operational environment. NOTE 6: This objective includes the requirements identified in clauses 6.1 and 7.2 of ETSI TS 103 924 [12]. ETSI ETSI TS 103 996 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 26 O.SecurityManagement: The TOE shall provide functionality to manage security functions provided by the TOE. NOTE 7: This objective is stated in clause 4.4 of ETSI TS 103 924 [12]. O.SWVerification: The TOE shall provide functionality to allow code loading only when it was prior successfully verified in terms of authenticity and integrity. NOTE 8: This objective includes updates and patches from external entities. NOTE 9: The extended assurance requirement for Software Update described and defined in Annex A of the present document applies to this objective. |
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