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a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 6.4 Assumptions | A.PhysicalProtection The operating environment of the cloud hosting the TOE is protected from unauthorised physical access. Only authorised users have the right to physically access the TOE and its operating environment. The underlying hardware and firmware that host the TOE is trusted and provide the capabilities the TOE requires for correct operation. Host-external network services the TOE operation requires are always available. The TOE is deployed within a cloud network that is protected from the outer world by the operational environment of the cloud operator. EXAMPLE: Host-external services the TOE requires for operation can be timestamp-, backup-, or audit servers. A.NetworkSegregation Assume that the network interfaces of the server and TOE client are accessible only through the subnet where the TOE host is installed. The subnet is separated from the public network. Communicates with the TOE server through the firewall. A.AdministratorBehaviour Any authorised user role is trustworthy, is trained and qualified to operate the assigned functions on the TOE, follows the TOE user guidance, and attempts no adverse or malicious operations on the TOE. A.Services The operational environment provides the required services for TOE operations including a reliable time or timestamp source. A.NetworkElements The connected NEs and ONDs that are managed by the TOE always use protected communication channels with publicly endorsed standard communication protocols. The channel protection comprises endpoint identification, authentication, integrity and confidentiality protection. A.Components Connected TOE-host external NEs, specifically those providing services to the TOE, are effectively protected from being abused and do not adversely or maliciously interact with the TOE. A.TrustedPlatform The TOE-host, comprising its HW and its operational SW, is protected against threats that endanger its correct operation. And, this protection is maintained by the cloud operator using state-of-the-art means. ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 22 A.RNG The TOE-host provides a random number service conformant to NIST SP 800-90A [13] with the appropriate entropy quality whenever the TOE requires a random number. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 6.5 Security Objectives | O.Authorisation The TOE shall establish a role model for the authenticated entities where each role receives a set of functions assigned by the security management. O.Authentication The TOE identifies and authenticates entities before the authorisation to access TOE resources is granted. O.Audit The TOE generates, stores and reviews audit records for security-relevant administrator actions. The audit logs shall be accessible for authorised entities only. O.Communication The TOE shall provide protected communication channels, based on publicly endorsed standard protocols, between itself and the connected managed objects. The protection is required to comprise endpoint identification, authentication as well as integrity and confidentiality protection of the transmitted data (that may be used in the policy-based access control defined in ETSI TS 103 963 [3]). O.SecurityManagement The TOE shall support the management of its security functions, including as a minimum: access control (as defined in ETSI TS 103 963 [3] but extended to the internal operation of the TOE). O.Cryptography The TOE shall operate cryptographic operations as described in Annex A of ETSI TS 103 961 [1] and shall provide mechanisms supporting crypto-agility. NOTE: The specific algorithms to be maintained are not defined but should follow best practice (e.g. on the basis of publicly endorsed algorithms). |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 6.6 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment | OE. PhysicalProtection The operating environment of the cloud hosting the TOE is protected from unauthorised physical access. Only authorised users have the right to physically access the TOE and its operating environment. The underlying hardware and firmware that host the TOE is trusted and provide the capabilities the TOE requires for correct operation. Host-external network services the TOE operation requires are always available. The TOE is deployed within a cloud network that is protected from the outer world by the operational environment of the cloud operator. EXAMPLE: Host-external services the TOE requires for operation can be timestamp-, backup-, or audit servers. OE.NetworkSegregation The operational environment protects the cloud hosting the TOE by separation from other networks. At least a firewall is operated between the TOE-host filter unused communication ports. The firewall shall be trusted not attack the TOE. ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 23 OE.AdministratorBehaviour Any authorised user role is trustworthy, is trained and qualified to operate the assigned functions on the TOE, follows the TOE user guidance, and attempts no adverse or malicious operations on the TOE. OE.Services The operational environment provides the required services for TOE operations including a reliable time or timestamp source. OE.NetworkElements The connected NEs and ONDs that are managed by the TOE always use protected communication channels with publicly endorsed standard communication protocols. The channel protection comprises endpoint identification, authentication, integrity and confidentiality protection. OE.Components Connected TOE-host external NEs, specifically those providing services to the TOE, are effectively protected from being abused and do not adversely or maliciously interact with the TOE. OE.TrustedPlatform The TOE-host, comprising its HW and its operational SW, is protected against threats that endanger its correct operation. And, this protection is maintained by the cloud operator using state-of-the-art means. OE.RNG The TOE-host provides a random number service conformant to NIST SP 800-90A [13] with the appropriate entropy quality whenever the TOE requires a random number. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 6.7 Security Objectives Rationale | Table 3 provides a mapping of TOE objectives to threats, showing that each objective is at least covered by one threat. Table 3: Mapping of security objectives to threats Security Objective for the TOE Threat O.Communication T.Eavesdrop O.Authentication T.UnauthenticatedAccess and T.UnauthorisedAccess O.Authorisation T.UnauthorisedAccess O.Audit T.UnauthorisedAccess and T.UnauthenticatedAccess O.SecurityManagement T.UnauthenticatedAccess, T.UnauthorisedAccess and T.Eavesdrop O.Cryptography T.Eavesdrop Table 4 provides a mapping of security objectives for the operational environment to assumptions and threats, showing that each security objective for the operational environment is at least covered by one assumption or threat. ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 24 Table 4: Mapping of security objectives for the environment to assumptions and threats Security Objective for the Operational Environment Threat / Assumption OE.PhysicalProtection A.PhysicalProtection T.UnauthenticatedAccess OE.NetworkSegregation A.NetworkSegregation OE.AdministratorBehaviour A.AdministratorBehaviour OE.Services A.Services OE.NetworkElements T.Eavesdrop A.NetworkElements OE.Components A.Components OE.TrustedPlatform A.TrustedPlatform OE.RNG A.RNG |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 7 Extended Component definition | |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 7.1 SAR SW Update Management | |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 7.1.1 ALC_SWU.1 Software Update Management | The definition of SAR SW Update Management is given in clause 7.1.2. Recognizing that NMS software may contain vulnerabilities (an exploitable weakness as defined in ETSI TS 102 165-1 [i.1]) and that such vulnerabilities should be mitigated it is necessary to provide a mechanism for maintenance of the software of the device. NOTE 1: The term patch management is equivalent to other terms including those addressing software update and software maintenance and that give assurance that the software on a device is up to date. NOTE 2: Software update provisions for devices is addressed in clause 5.3 of ETSI TS 103 645 [i.8] and the present document conforms to the provisions of [i.8] and of the testing of those provisions given in clause 5.3 of ETSI TS 103 701 [i.12] (noting that whilst the scope of the reference documents addresses IoT the functional requirements in the reference documents are universal). In conformance to the provisions of ETSI TS 103 645 [i.8] and of ETSI TS 103 701 [i.12], the developer shall be able to clearly indicate if software is updateable and the mechanism applied shall pass the tests defined in clause 5.3 of ETSI TS 103 701 [i.12]. This may be assisted by the use of Software Bills of Material (SBOMs), and a clear IXIT (Implementation extra Information for Testing) as defined in ETSI TS 103 701 [i.12]. If an update fails it should be possible for the system to be reverted to a previously known state (noting however that the previous state may contain a known vulnerability). |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 7.1.2 ALC_SWU.1 Software Update Management | NOTE 1: If developers plan TOE upgrades that impact security functionality of TOE, and the upgraded product retains the same identification, the existing certificate may become invalid and in such cases the certificate should be updated and validation against the latest "good" certificate will apply. The SW update of the TOE for its security maintenance, in the sense of flaw remediation, corrections in user guidance, and most important for the remediation or mitigation of vulnerabilities. If the TOE update follows the certified update procedures, the TOE update can be done as soon the remediation or mitigation code is available. The SW update procedures contain instructions for secure signing, distributing, and applying of software updates. NOTE 2: None of the information the ST writer may collect to achieve the fulfilment of the SAR ALC_SWU.1 is deemed for the user or the public. This information is to be made available to the evaluator and certification bodies, but to no other party. ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 25 Table 5: ALC_SWU.1 Software Update Management Family name ALC_SWU.1 Software Update Management Behaviour This component implements regulation related aspects of the SW patch management. Levelling ALC_SWU.1 Software Update Management - 1 Hierarchical to To no other components. Management There are no management activities foreseen. Dependencies ALC_FLR.2 Audit There are no actions defined to be auditable. Dependency The dependency to ALC_FLR.2 is as a result of the software update management is used as the enabling mechanism for the vulnerability mitigation or remediation. Code that is delivered by the software update management process can serve for mitigation of a vulnerability. In addition, the dependency builds assurance for the flaw remediations, as flaws can also be security flaws inducing vulnerabilities and are resolved using the equal correction procedures. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 7.1.3 ALC_SWU.1D Developer action elements | ALC_SWU.1.1D: The developer shall provide the description of the SW update management procedures. ALC_SWU.1.2D: The developer shall provide security updates based on the defined SW update management procedures at least until the end-of-support period of the TOE has been reached. Application Note: The ST writer is recommended to define the end of support according to the manufacturer's definition, as that definition may be subject of a regulation affecting the TOE. ALC_SWU.1.3D: The developer shall provide a protected channel for the download of each update software following the TOE's communication protection capabilities, or, alternatively, provide the patch in secure off-TOE-ways to the user for managing the update. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 7.1.4 ALC_SWU.1C Content and presentation elements | ALC_SWU.1.1C: The SW update procedure shall describe the process for the development and release of the patch for the TOE. ALC_SWU.1.2C: The SW update procedure shall describe the technical mechanism and functions for the adoption of the patch into the TOE. Application Note 1: That means the description of the TOE mechanism that validates the SW update before it is adopted which means installed. ALC_SWU.1.3C: The SW update procedure shall describe the mandatory structure and content of the VIAR (Vulnerability Impact Analysis Report). Application Note 2: The ST writer should consider the requirements of Article 35 of the Implementing Act [12] and the content of Annex IV.3 Changes to a certified product. The VIAR informs the certification body to determine whether a change in view of the developer has a major or minor security impact. The certification body decides then about the certificate maintenance procedures. ALC_SWU.1.4C: The SW update procedures shall include rules and work items that have to be followed, documented and checked before an update is released. Application Note 3: The conduct of the SW update procedures shall generate evidence for the evaluation. ALC_SWU.1.5C: The SW update procedure shall describe the mandatory structure and content of patch release notes. Application Note 4: A patch release note is user guidance on how to securely operate a specific SW update. ALC_SWU.1.6C: The SW update procedure shall describe how unfixed flaws are documented. ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 26 Application Note 5: Unfixed flaws mean that the developer's risk assessment has decided to accept the risk induced by an identified flaw. The rationale for that decision shall be documented and prove that the evaluation assurance level is not affected. ALC_SWU.1.7C: The TOE user guidance shall contain a description how the SW update procedure is securely operated. ALC_SWU.1.8C: The TOE user guidance and the SW update procedure shall enable the user to verify the integrity and authenticity of a SW update. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 7.1.5 ALC_SWU.1E Evaluation working units | ALC_SWU.1.1E: The evaluator shall verify that the provided information complies with all requirements regarding content and evidence presentation.ALC_SWU.1.2E: The SW update procedure shall describe a set of evaluation activities related to the effectiveness and performance of the technical mechanism. Application Note: The ST writer should ensure that the evaluation tests are able to demonstrate the effectiveness of security update functionality of TOE. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 8 Additional SFR definitions | Void. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9 Security Functional Requirements | |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.1 Overview of SFR hierarchy | NOTE 1: The SFRs in this clause are from CC-Part 2 [5] and, where appropriate, from extensions defined in specifically cited documents. All of the SFRs described are defined with respect to the core requirements from ETSI TS 103 963 [3] and the mapping is summarized in Annex A. NOTE 2: Where an SFR from CC Part 2 [5] contains the term user, then this is interpreted in a wider sense as any functional entity using another functional entity. The hierarchy, or dependency tree, for each SFR defined in [5] is explicitly stated in [5] and unless extended or modified by their application in the present document those dependencies shall be followed even if not cited. EXAMPLE: FAU_GEN.1.2 in [5] is dependent on FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps. The present document does not cite the dependent SFR as a distinct requirement. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.2 Security Audit class (FAU) | |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.2.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation | NOTE 1: The audit class of CC Part 2 [5] supports the requirements of Article 51 c/e/f from the CSA [i.13]. In ETSI TS 103 961 [1] requirements for audit in the event of errors are identified in clause 5, and the detail content of the records is defined in clause 7.3 of [1]. FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate audit data of the following auditable events: a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; b) All auditable events for the [selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified] level of audit; c) [assignment: other specifically defined auditable events]. ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 27 FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within the audit data at least the following information: a) Date and time of the auditable event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; b) For each auditable event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP, PP-Module, functional package or ST, [assignment: other audit relevant information]. NOTE 2: The specific data identified by "other audit relevant information", if used and present in the implementation for which an ST is defined, have to be explicitly identified by the ST author. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.2.2 FAU_GEN.2 User identity association | NOTE: The audit class of CC Part 2 [5] supports the requirements of Article 51 c/e/f from the CSA [i.13]. FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.2.3 FAU_SAR.1 Audit review | NOTE: The audit class of CC Part 2 [5] supports the requirements of Article 51 c/e/f from the CSA [i.13]. FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorised users] with the capability to read [assignment: list of audit information] from the audit records. FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.2.4 FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review | NOTE: The audit class of CC Part 2 [5] supports the requirements of Article 51 c/e/f from the CSA [i.13]. FAU_SAR.2.1 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that have been granted explicit read-access. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.2.5 FAU_SAR.3 Selectable Audit Review | NOTE: The audit class of CC Part 2 [5] supports the requirements of Article 51 c/e/f from the CSA [i.13]. FAU_SAR.3.1 The TSF shall provide the ability to apply [assignment: methods of selection and/or ordering] of audit data based on [assignment: criteria with logical relations]. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.2.6 FAU_STG.2 Protected audit data storage | NOTE: The audit class of CC Part 2 [5] supports the requirements of Article 51 c/e/f from the CSA [i.13]. ETSI TS 103 961 [1] requires, in clause 7.3, that both configuration data and the audit trail of changes shall be maintained in a secure store. FAU_STG.2.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit data in the audit trail from unauthorised deletion. FAU_STG.2.2 The TSF shall be able to [selection, choose one of: prevent, detect] unauthorised modifications to the stored audit data in the audit trail. ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 28 |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.2.7 FAU_STG.4 Action in case of possible audit data loss | NOTE: The audit class of CC Part 2 [5] supports the requirements of Article 51 c/e/f from the CSA [i.13]. FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall [store audit records in the database and export them into files] if the audit data storage exceeds [occupies over the default value of 80 % of the database capacity and lasts for over the default duration of 45 days]. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.3 User data protection | |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.3.1 FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control | Clause 7.2 of ETSI TS 103 961 [1] defines a number of requirements for access control which are met in part by FDP_ACC.1. • All data the NMS shall be made available to authorised entities using the principle of least privilege. • The access control mechanism shall follow the policy model outlined in ETSI TS 102 165-2 [i.5]. • Each protected Object in the OAN device shall be protected by an access control policy • The access control policy shall be evaluated on each access attempt. The TSF shall enforce the access control policy on critical subjects and objects and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP. NOTE: The critical subjects and objects are those identified in clause 6.2 as configuration data and identities and their associated credentials. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.3.2 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute-based access control | NOTE 1: The use of FDP_ACF.1 given below formalizes the access control rules defined in [1] with modifications as required to meet the formatting and wording of the CC SFRs. FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the access control SFP to objects based on the following: • Subject: "User authentication status" with security attribute "Status": "authenticated" or "rejected" • Subject: "User role assigned" with security attribute "Role": "Administration user (AU)" or "fail" • Object: "TOE resources" with security attributes: "authenticated", "AU" FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects Access is permitted to subjects that are "authenticated" and where the role is AU and the assigned privileges match with the object. FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: Access and execution to "TOE resources and executable commands" shall only be granted if the "Role" is set to "AU" and the assigned privileges match with the object. FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: Access and execution to the object shall not be granted if its execution requires "Role" being "AU" while the set value is any other value. NOTE 2: The assignment of privileges or execution rights to user roles can be subject of the security management FMT_SMF.1 if not defined otherwise. ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 29 |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.4 Identity and authentication | |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.4.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling | FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: list of authentication events]. FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions]. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.4.2 FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition | A number of requirements from ETSI TS 103 963 [3] require the mapping of attributes to the NMS for the purpose of authentication, and for the assessment of access control privileges. FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: [assignment: list of security attributes]. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.4.3 FIA_UAU. 1 Timing of authentication | FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF mediated actions] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. NOTE: In the context of the present document user refers only to an NMS administrator user, i.e. the user managing the protected assets (e.g. configuration data). FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each management user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.4.4 FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating | FIA_UAU.6.1 The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the condition [assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required]. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.4.5 FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback | FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only [assignment: list of feedback] to the user while the authentication is in progress. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.4.6 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification | In accordance with the least privilege principle, the TSF shall not allow any operational actions by unidentified entities. In addition, as the TSF is mostly deployed without a direct user (i.e. it operates autonomously) the mediated actions shall always be restricted. In this regard therefore, the only actions enabled on the TSF prior to identification and authentication are those required to complete the authentication and authorisation process. FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 30 |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.5 Cryptographic Support | |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.5.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation | NOTE 1: As the base requirements from ETSI TS 103 963 [3] do not specify cryptography, the specific wording of assignments in the SFRs from [5] are omitted in the present document, but are expected to be provided in detail in any corresponding ST. The relevant parts are highlighted in clauses 9.5.2 through 9.5.5. NOTE 2: The specific provision of cryptographic primitives is expected to be paired between participating entities to ensure interoperability. FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards]. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.5.2 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution | FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key distribution method [assignment: cryptographic key distribution method] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards]. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.5.3 FCS_CKM.3 Cryptographic key access | FCS_CKM.3.1 The TSF shall perform [assignment: type of cryptographic key access] in accordance with a specified cryptographic key access method [assignment: cryptographic key access method] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards]. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.5.4 FCS_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction | FCS_CKM.6.1 The TSF shall destroy [assignment: list of cryptographic keys (including keying material)] when [selection: no longer needed, [assignment: other circumstances for key or keying material destruction]]. FCS_CKM.6.2 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys and keying material specified by FCS_CKM.6.1 in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [assignment: cryptographic key destruction method] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards]. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.5.5 FCS_COP.1.1 Cryptographic operation | FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards]. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.6 Security management class | |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.6.1 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions | FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [assignment: • Assignment of privileges and rights to user roles • Management of user accounts • list of management functions to be provided by the TSF ]. ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 31 |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.6.2 FMT_MOF.1 Management of Security Functions Behaviour | FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: determine the behaviour of, disable, enable, modify the behaviour of] the functions [assignment: list of functions] to [assignment: the authorised identified roles]. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.6.3 FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes | The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)] to restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]] the security attributes [assignment: list of security attributes] to [assignment: the authorised identified roles]. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.6.4 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles | FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment: the authorised identified roles]. FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.6.5 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization | FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] to provide [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP. FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [assignment: the authorised identified roles] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.6.6 FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data | FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorised identified roles]. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.7 TOE Access | |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.7.1 FTA_TSE.1 TOE Session Establishment | FTA_TSE.1.1 The TSF shall be able to deny session establishment based on [assignment: attributes]. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.7.2 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination | FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [assignment: time interval of user inactivity]. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.7.3 FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination | FTA_SSL.4.1 The TSF shall allow user-initiated termination of the user's own interactive session. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.7.4 FTA_TAH.1 TOE Access History | FTA_TAH.1.1 Upon successful session establishment, the TSF shall display the [selection: date, time, method, location] of the last successful session establishment to the user. FTA_TAH.1.2 Upon successful session establishment, the TSF shall display the [selection: date, time, method, location] of the last unsuccessful attempt to session establishment and the number of unsuccessful attempts since the last successful session establishment. FTA_TAH.1.3 The TSF shall not erase the access history information from the user interface without giving the user an opportunity to review the information. ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 32 |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.8 Trusted Path class | |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.8.1 FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path | FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and [selection: remote, local] users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from [selection: modification, disclosure, [assignment: other types of integrity or confidentiality violation]]. FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, local users, remote users] to initiate communication via the trusted path. FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [selection: initial user authentication, [assignment: other services for which trusted path is required]]. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 9.8.2 FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel | FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure. FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product] to initiate communication via the trusted channel. FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required]. ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 33 9.9 Summary of security requirements dependency and rationale Table 6: Security Requirements Dependency Rationale Security Functional Requirement Dependencies Resolution FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 Resolved by external time source. The audit time depends on the reliable time stamp. Reliable time stamp depends on external time sources FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1 FIA_UID.1 FAU_GEN.1 FIA_UID.2 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_SAR.2 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.3 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_STG.2 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.2 FAU_STG.2 FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1 FMT_MSA.3 FDP_ACC.2 FMT_MSA.3 FIA_UID.1 None None FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UAU.6 None None FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.2 FIA_ATD.1 None None FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.2 FMT_SMF.1 None None FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.2 FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_MTD.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_MSA.1 [FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1] FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FDP_ACC.2 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_MSA.1 FMT_SMR.1 FTA_TSE.1 None None FTA_SSL.3 None None FTA_SSL.4 None None FTA_TAH.1 None None FTP_TRP.1 None None FTP_ITC.1 None None FCS_CKM.1 [FCS_CKM.2, or FCS_CKM.5, or FCS_COP.1] [FCS_RBG.1, or FCS_RNG.1] FCS_CKM.6 FCS_COP.1 FCS_RBG.1 FCS_CKM.6 FCS_CKM.2 [FDP_ITC.1, or FDP_ITC.2, or FCS_CKM.1 or FCS_CKM.5] FCS_CKM.3 FDP_ITC.1 FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.3 FCS_CKM.3 [FDP_ITC.1, or FDP_ITC.2, or FCS_CKM.1, or FCS_CKM.5] FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.6 [FDP_ITC.1, or FDP_ITC.2, or FCS_CKM.1] FCS_CKM.1 FCS_COP.1 [FDP_ITC.1, or FDP_ITC.2, or FCS_CKM.1, or FCS_CKM.5] FCS_CKM.6 FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.6 ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 34 Table 7: Mapping from objectives to SFRs and the rationale to select each SFR Security objectives SFR Rationale O.Communication FTP_ITC.1 This SFR ensures the presence of a protected channel that includes identification of the end points as well as confidentiality and integrity protection of the data transmitted. FTP_TRP.1 The SFR provides a secure communication channel with external entities through a trusted path, ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of communication data. FMT_SMF.1 The SFR finally assigns the attributes to the user role and authorises thereby the user in its roles and manages the rights. FCS_CKM.6 Stored and no more used key material could be abused to decrypt previously recorded data at a later point in time. This SFR ensures that those keys are no more present. The objective is covered. O.Authorisation FDP_ACC.1 Access to management data requires passing the authentication policy this SFR provides. Only successfully authenticated users can access the data. FDP_ACF.1 Access to the TOE is only granted when the access control policy was passed which requires the presence of the security attributes meeting the policy rules. FIA_UAU.1 This SFR ensures that communication can be initiated from external but else no other action can occur until the user has been authenticated. That ensures that unallowed access to data and resources is not practical. FIA_UID.1 This SFR ensures that the TOE first executes on user initiation only actions that serve for authorisation of the user before identification. That ensures that unallowed access to data and resources is not practical. FIA_UAU.6 The SFR defines the attributes that are essential for passing the access controls. FIA_ATD.1 The SFR defines the attributes that are essential for passing the access controls. FMT_SMR.1 This SFR ensures the presence of different user roles that receive in a second step their different access rights respectively privileges. It is a perquisite for the access control policy. FMT_MSA.1 Security attributes are critical parameters that should only be set by a specified user role having the privileges to do so. That SFR ensures that only authorised modifications of security parameters are operated. FMT_MSA.3 This SFR ensures that right from power on all security attributes come with the correct and secure default values, which can only be set by specified user role have the privileges to do so. Only authorised users can access these data. FMT_SMF.1 The SFR finally assigns the attributes to the user role and authorises thereby the user in its roles and manages the rights. FIA_AFL.1 This SFR ensures that failed authentications are treated properly and protect from bypassing authentication controls. The objective is covered. O.Authentication FIA_UID.1 This SFR ensures that the TOE first executes on user initiation only actions that serve for authorisation of the user before identification. That ensures that unallowed access to data and resources is not practical. FIA_UAU.1 This SFR ensures that communication can be initiated from external but else no other action can occur until the user has been authenticated. That ensures that unallowed access to data and resources is not practical. FIA_UAU.6 This SFR ensures that users need to be re-authenticated at specific time intervals or when a security incident occurs. FIA_UAU.7 This SFR ensures that the information fed back to the user during the authentication process does not lead to the leakage of security information. FIA_ATD.1 This SFR ensures that failed authentications are treated properly and protect from bypassing authentication controls. FIA_AFL.1 This SFR ensures that failed authentications are treated properly and protect from bypassing authentication controls. FTA_TSE.1 This SFR ensures that session establishment can be denied based on specific attributes. FMT_SMF.1 The SFR finally assigns the attributes to the user role and authorises thereby the user in its roles and manages the rights. ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 35 Security objectives SFR Rationale FTA_SSL.3 A distant entity is out of TOE controls, and an existing but no more used communication channel could be captured. The TOE terminates such connections and protects therewith from abuse of previously authenticated channels. FTA_TAH.1 This SFR ensures that a history of successful or failed access attempts to the TOE is provided, enabling authorised users to determine whether there is a risk of their account being misused based on this record. FTP_ITC.1 Authentication of users is security critical and related credentials are exchanged. That exchange requires a protected channel between the TOE and the remote entity the user operates. FTP_TRP.1 The SFR provides a secure communication channel with external entities through a trusted path, ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of communication data. The objective is covered. O.Audit FAU_GEN.1 This SFR ensures the logging of security relevant events including defined user (administrator) activities. FAU_GEN.2 Ensure that complete audit records are generated, including key information such as event time, subject identity, and event outcome, to provide foundational data for log analysis. FIA_UID.1 This SFR ensures that users complete identity verification before performing any operations. FAU_SAR.1 This SFR provides the function of accessing security audit records. FAU_SAR.2 This SFR restricts unauthorised users from accessing audit information. FAU_SAR.3 This SFR provides capability support for authorised users to access the required security audit functions under specified conditions. FMT_SMF.1 Control the management and configuration permissions for audit functions to ensure that only authorised personnel can modify log management policies and parameters. FAU_STG.2 This SFR prevents audit data from being illegally deleted or modified. FAU_STG.4 This SFR defines the measures to be taken when audit record storage exceeds the threshold to prevent loss of audit data. The objective is covered. O.SecurityManageme nt FMT_SMF.1 The SFR finally assigns the attributes to the user role and authorises thereby the user in its roles and manages the rights including those for the security functions. FIA_ATD.1 The SFR defines the attributes that are essential for passing the access controls and that can be linked with the user role to achieve the correct authorisation. FMT_MOF.1 Ensure that only authorised administrators can perform security-related operations and protect administrative data. FMT_MTD.1 Ensure that only authorised administrators can perform security-related operations and protect administrative data. FMT_MSA.1 Security attributes are critical parameters that should only be set by a specified user role having the privileges to do so. That SFR ensures that only authorised modifications of security parameters are operated. FMT_MSA.3 This SFR ensures that right from power on all security attributes come with the correct and secure default values, which can only be set by specified user role have the privileges to do so. Only authorised users can access these data. FTA_SSL.4 The TOE provides a mechanism for users to securely terminate their sessions, ensuring that previously authenticated session channels are properly closed and protected from potential abuse. FCS_CKM.1 Disclosure protection of intercepted data is achieved with encryption, requiring quality key material of which this SFR ensures the generation. FCS_CKM.2 Generated key material has to reach communication entities in secure ways which this SFR ensures. FCS_CKM.3 Generated key material has to reach external servers for communication and reception of logging files in secure ways. This SFR ensures that intercepted data remain protected from disclosure. FCS_CKM.6 Stored and no more used key material could be abused to decrypt previously recorded data at a later point in time. This SFR ensures that those keys are no more present. FCS_COP.1 Provides cryptographic protection mechanisms for secure system operations. The objective is covered. ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 36 |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 10 SAR Components | |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 10.1 Additional SAR components | |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 10.1.1 SAR SW Patch Management | SAR SW Patch Management is formed to include these aspects into the TOE evaluation in order to verify the correctness of the assigned SFRs and SARs. SAR Vulnerability processing has been added to the TOE. Passing the evaluation provides the basis for the conformance statement for the assigned SFRs and SARs. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 10.1.2 SAR augmentation: ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures | NOTE: The CC uses the term "security flaw" where other documentation (e.g. from ETSI) and EU regulation uses the term "security vulnerability". The terms appear to be identical in intent and the broad recommendation in [1] and [2] to adopt the guidance of ETSI TR 103 838 [i.2] and to implement the security controls of ETSI TS 103 305-1 [i.7] apply. The augmentation with ALC_FLR.2 provides flaw-reporting procedures that require the developer to support the user with corrective actions, and guidance in order to ensure that the user is able to mitigate the discovered flaw. Table 8: ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures ALC_FLR.2 Flaw Reporting Procedures Dependencies: No dependencies Developer action elements ALC_FLR.2.1D The developer shall document and provide flaw remediation procedures addressed to TOE developers. ALC_FLR.2.2D The developer shall establish a procedure for accepting and acting upon all reports of security flaws and requests for corrections to those flaws. ALC_FLR.2.3D The developer shall provide flaw remediation guidance addressed to TOE users. Content and presentation elements ALC_FLR.2.1C The flaw remediation procedures documentation shall describe the procedures used to track all reported security flaws in each release of the TOE. ALC_FLR.2.2C The flaw remediation procedures shall require that a description of the nature and effect of each security flaw be provided, as well as the status of finding a correction to that flaw. ALC_FLR.2.3C The flaw remediation procedures shall require that corrective actions be identified for each of the security flaws. ALC_FLR.2.4C The flaw remediation procedures documentation shall describe the methods used to provide flaw information, corrections and guidance on corrective actions to TOE users. ALC_FLR.2.5C The flaw remediation procedures shall describe a means by which the developer receives from TOE users reports and enquiries of suspected security flaws in the TOE. ALC_FLR.2.6C The procedures for processing reported security flaws shall ensure that any reported flaws are remediated and the remediation procedures issued to TOE users. ALC_FLR.2.7C The procedures for processing reported security flaws shall provide safeguards that any corrections to these security flaws do not introduce any new flaws. ALC_FLR.2.8C The flaw remediation guidance shall describe a means by which TOE users report to the developer any suspected security flaws in the TOE. |
a6e30bb789283d6250af7e65d14a1c87 | 104 013 | 10.2 Dependencies of Assurance Components | The writer of any ST conforming to the present document shall consider the inter-dependencies of the SARs as defined in [6] and claimed in clause 4 of the present document with the targeted evaluation assurance level. ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 37 Annex A (informative): Mapping between base requirements and SFRs Table A.1: Mapping between base requirements and SFRs Item Requirement text from [3] Status Requirement analysis for test and evaluation Applicable PP SFR (from CC part 2 [5]) Req-1 The provisions for securing the management of the optical network should follow existing best practice for securing management data and protocols R NA Req-2 The overall approach for the security of managed objects of the ON is that the models of least persistence and least privilege shall apply (see NIST SP 800-171) M Detail privilege of each role is defined. FMT_MOF.1 Management of Security Functions Behaviour FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data Req-3 Each managed object shall create an explicit security association with its managing entity The security association between a managed object and its manager shall give assurance of the following: The identity of participants in the security association, The integrity of data exchanged in the course of the security association, and, The confidentiality of data. M FDP_ACC.2 Complete Access Control FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization FTP_ITC.1 inter-TSF trusted channel FTP_TRP.1 trusted path Req-4 Within the overall structure the management functions shall be within the management plane, the management plane shall establish the primary trust domain for the entire network. The management plane shall act as the overall root of trust for the relevant operator. The management plane shall establish the trust domain of the operator. M Same as Req-3. Define security capability sets for different roles on different planes. FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions FDP_ACC.2 Complete Access Control FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization FTP_ITC.1 inter-TSF trusted channel FTP_TRP.1 trusted path Req-5 Managed entities shall be entered into the trust domain by successfully proving their identity and by validation of the proof of attestation of function to the management plane M FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification FDP_ACC.2 Complete Access Control FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 38 Item Requirement text from [3] Status Requirement analysis for test and evaluation Applicable PP SFR (from CC part 2 [5]) Req-6 Where an entity/device supports multiple independent functions, it shall establish a security and trust association to the primary trust domain for each function M FDP_ACC.2 Complete Access Control FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization FTP_TRP.1 trusted path Req-7 The management plane shall maintain the security policy for the primary trust domain. The security policy shall be driven from the management plane down to the Optical Network Devices. The managed object should be initialized by the manager object M FDP_ACC.2 Complete Access Control FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions Req-8 If the managed object detects either loss or corruption of the local configuration file or data it shall request a new set of configuration data from the associated manager. The manager shall ensure that all device configuration data for each managed object is always available. M These operations are NE service operations. NA Req-9 The optical network manager shall support the following functions: • Discovery and update of the network topology in real time; • Configuration of devices and services; • FCAPS management (Fault Configuration Accounting Performance Security or Fault management, Configuration management, Accounting management, Performance management, Security management); and, • Assurance of network resilience. M These operations are NE service operations. NA Req- 10 The specificities of managing network configuration and performance (e.g. Grade of Service, routing information to indicate where to address/send data, allocation of bandwidth to individual end-points), shall be managed through the configuration data elements M These operations are NE service operations. NA Req- 11 An ON may support multiple services (see Annex D of ETSI TS 103 962 [2]). Each service shall be managed as a discrete managed object (i.e. the service is the managed object). M These operations are NE service operations. NA Req- 12 For the purposes of allowing the manager to make decisions the managed entity shall gather relevant metrics for each of fault management, security breach management, and performance management M These operations are NE service operations. NA Req- 13 ON managers and managed entities shall be identified with both a canonical identity and a semantic identifier. The semantic identifier shall be used to indicate the functional nature of the entity and the attestation of function shall be verifiable by a third party. the attestation of function should be consistent with the Attribute Authority Tree (AAT) model described in ETSI TS 103 486 [i.11] M FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute-Based Access Control ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 39 Item Requirement text from [3] Status Requirement analysis for test and evaluation Applicable PP SFR (from CC part 2 [5]) Req- 14 All identities shall be cryptographically authenticated M FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication Req- 15 Where asymmetric encryption is used the canonical identifier shall be asserted using an identity form of public-private key binding (e.g. X.509 identity certificate [i.10]) M FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution FCS_CKM.3 Cryptographic key access FCS_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation Req- 16 Any attribute shall be asserted using an attribute form of public-private key binding (e.g. X.509 attribute certificate [i.10]). M No SFR about certificate. NA Req- 17 Any public key carried in a PKC shall be checked to ensure that it is still valid M No SFR about certificate. NA Req- 18 if the certificate has expired, or if the certificate and its key have been revoked, the verifier shall indicate a certificate verification error M No SFR about certificate. NA Req- 19 if the certificate has expired, or if the certificate and its key have been revoked, the verifier shall not process any data associated to the key M No SFR about certificate. NA Req- 20 In case of failure of the authentication or identification, the time, location and reason for the failure shall be recorded in a log file M FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Handling Req- 21 The log file shall only be accessible by the manager object M FAU_SAR.1 Audit review Req- 22 Managed objects may be identified using Object Identifiers (OIDs) as attributes of a device. The identity and any associated attributes shall be identified and authenticated within a PKI structure using attribute or identity certificates as appropriate M Which managed object？ NA Req- 23 Management functions enabled by a connection between the manager and the managed object should not have persistent security associations between the manager and the managed object R Prohibited persistent connection? Only security protocols are displayed. NA Req- 24 The security association created during the identification and authentication phase should derive a session key used to protect the confidentiality of all data transferred between the manager and the managed object R FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution FCS_CKM.3 Cryptographic key access FCS_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction Req- 25 The session key shall be used to encrypt the data using an algorithm agreed in the session establishment M (Condi tional) FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution FCS_CKM.3 Cryptographic key access FCS_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction Req- 26 To prevent replay the network management system shall support means to protect against replay attacks M Using TLS. FTP_ITC.1 inter-TSF trusted channel ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 40 Item Requirement text from [3] Status Requirement analysis for test and evaluation Applicable PP SFR (from CC part 2 [5]) Req- 27 If a persistent shared secret is used as the basis of the session key it shall be randomized using a session-specific variable (e.g. nonce, counter, timestamp) in order to derive the session key M (C) No match SFR. A.RNG Req- 28 It shall not be feasible to determine the value of any shared secret by capture of the session- specific variable or the en-clair (plain text) content of the management message M No match SFR. FTP_ITC.1 inter-TSF trusted channel Req- 29 The managed object shall have means to ensure that data in the secure storage area is stored in a form that maintains confidentiality M Sensitive information is encrypted and stored using AES. FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation Req- 30 The managed object shall have means to ensure that any data manipulation that leads to loss of data integrity is prevented M Use security protocols to ensure integrity. FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path Req- 31 The following characteristics shall be met by the secure storage element: Tamper resistant Tamper evident Persistent M Use the database to store data and use the database's own capabilities, which is outside the scope of the TOE. NA Req- 32 If the management system detects any loss of data integrity a security alarm should be raised from the managed object to the associated manager R NA Req- 33 The management system shall implement an access control policy in which the right to access any protected element (referred to as objects) shall be made by evaluation of the rules contained in the policy M FIA_UAU.6 Re- authenticating Req- 34 The principles of least privilege and least persistence shall apply at all times M NA Req- 35 If the manager entity for any managed object changes over time this shall be captured as a policy rule (see ETSI TS 102 165-2 [i.5]) and should be applied with contextual constraints M FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication Req- 36 If more than one subject (e.g. employee and their manager) is required to authorise a change to a managed object, this shall be addressed in the policy by enforcing at least 2 rules (employee and manager), one for each role, both of which have to pass M FIA_UAU.6 Re- authenticating Req- 37 Any change in configuration shall be recorded M FAU_GEN.1: Audit data generation FAU_GEN.2 User identity association Req- 38 the record of changes in configuration shall be maintained and stored in a secure storage area (where the key for the secure storage area is managed by an RtS) M FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage Req- 39 Read access to log files related to a specific managed object shall be restricted to the related manager and its hierarchy and access control shall be granted as per the roles in the access control policy (additional contextual, identity or role attributes may be added as rules to the policy for evaluation) M FAU_SAR.1 Audit review FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review Req- 40 Irrespectively of where log files are stored the storage shall provide the following security services, where enabled by the manager: proof of integrity of the contents. confidentiality protection of all or part of the content (e.g. in encrypted form) M FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 41 Item Requirement text from [3] Status Requirement analysis for test and evaluation Applicable PP SFR (from CC part 2 [5]) Req- 41 If log files are stored remotely, they shall be transferred in a channel that shall provide the following security services, where enabled by the manager: proof of integrity of the contents; confidentiality protection of the content; and, mutual authentication of the end-points prior to establishment of the transfer channel M FTP_ITC.1 inter-TSF trusted channel Req- 42 The period for which log records are to be retained shall be configurable by the manager M FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss Req- 43 Any cryptographic provision for ONs shall be crypto-agile M Principle. This can be achieved through upgrades, updating. NA Req- 44 Cryptographic provisions should be designed in such a manner that they are able to support a Quantum Safe approach to both asymmetric and symmetric security R Principle. This can be achieved through upgrades, updating. NA Req- 45 All devices in the ON with a cryptographic function shall ensure that the cryptographic facility is "crypto agile" both within the same class of algorithms, and to allow for migration to an alternative class of algorithm M Principle. This can be achieved through upgrades, updating. NA Req- 46 All algorithms used in ONs should be provisioned as quantum safe, or the underlying mechanisms should be designed as crypto- agile to support a quantum safe algorithm during the life of the equipment and its services R NA Req- 47 If passwords are used for authentication the password shall not be stored on the system M FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback Req- 48 If passwords are used the system shall store a cryptographic hash of the password only M FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation Req- 49 In order to give assurance of a secure connection between 2 entities the entities shall negotiate to support a shared set of algorithms M FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path Req- 50 If an algorithm proposed by the manager is not supported by the managed object, the manager object should raise an exception report indicating the algorithms are unmatched R Configuration of trusted channels for connecting to the external entities FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions Req- 51 If a decision is made to change the algorithm to one of lower perceived cryptographic strength this should be logged as a potential bid-down attack by the managed object R No match SFR. But has the capability to eliminate the prompt when users select weak algorithms. NA Req- 52 Bid-down attacks should be avoided and if the managed object is not able to support the preferred algorithms of the manager object steps should be taken to update the managed object to support the stronger set of algorithms R Belongs to the management action. NA ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 42 Annex B (informative): Mapping to CRA considerations Table B.1: Mapping for essential requirements of CRA Part 1 Essential Requirements CC SFR(Substantial）/ OE CC SAR (Substantial） Rationale Cybersecurity requirements relating to the properties of products with digital elements principle, no mapping is required principle, no explicit mapping is required although the following SARs are identified: ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements The definition of the security problem, the security objectives and threats are included in the assurance families ASE_SPD (Security problem definition), ASE_OBJ (Security objectives) and ASE_REQ (Security requirements) (in [CC2022P3]), which define content requirements for the Security Target and their related assessment activities. (1) Products with digital elements shall be designed, developed and produced in such a way that they ensure an appropriate level of cybersecurity based on the risks; ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design ALC_CMC.3 Configuration management capabilities – authorised controls ALC_CMS.3 Configuration management scope – Implementation representation CM coverage ADV_TDS.1 or ADV_TDS.2 TDS design ADV_ARC.1: This SAR provides that the TOE design is based on a clear security architecture ensuring that the security functions meet the desired properties of self- protection, domain separation, and non-bypass ability. The architecture description justifies why the TOE security functionality is complete and all SFRs are enforced. It covers the requirements of the design principles. ALC_CMC.[1/2/3]: This SAR provides a number of requirements ensuring that only authorised, reviewed, managed, controlled, tested and formally accepted components can be made an implemented part of the TOE. ALC_CMS.[1/2/3]: Provides the system that holds and controls the original sources of any piece of code, its identification and also the evidences that led to acceptance. It provides authorised access controls to the configuration list, parts, and implementation representation. Thereby, it assures that modifications were done in "controlled manner with proper authorisations" only. ADV_TDS.1 or ADV_TDS.2: The TOE design description provides information on how the TSF were implemented, the design principles, subsystem behaviour and more, which provides relevant information on the attack surface and therewith risk assessment. ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 43 Essential Requirements CC SFR(Substantial）/ OE CC SAR (Substantial） Rationale (2) On the basis of the cybersecurity risk assessment referred to in Article 13(2) and where applicable, products with digital elements shall: APE_REQ Security requirements APE_OBJ Security objectives APE_SPD Security problem description APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims APE_SPD is the first point in the list as it identifies the risks within the identified operational environment. That provides the basis for the derivation of the objectives which are then fulfilled by the requirements the TOE type has to fulfil. Out of that the CC claim may specify the EAL. (a) be made available on the market without known exploitable vulnerabilities; AVA_VAN.2 AVA_VAN.[1/2]: The EUCC "substantial" with AVA_VAN.1 or AVA_VAN.2 ensure the appropriate assurance level for the design, development, production, delivery and maintenance of the TOE. The SAR thereby ensures that the PP consistently meets the security problem definition. (b) be made available on the market with a secure by default configuration, unless otherwise agreed between manufacturer and business user in relation to a tailor-made product with digital elements, including the possibility to reset the product to its original state; FMT_SMF.1 Management of security functions FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description ADV_ARC.1 contains a description how the TSF are securely initialized and protected against tampering FMT_SMF.1 specifies the management functions doing a reset to the defaults. FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization ensures that the default values of security attributes are appropriately either permissive or restrictive in nature. (c) ensure that vulnerabilities can be addressed through security updates, including, where applicable, through automatic security updates that are installed within an appropriate timeframe enabled as a default setting, with a clear and easy-to-use opt-out mechanism, through the notification of available updates to users, and the option to temporarily postpone them; FMT_SMF.1 Management of security functions ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures FMT_SMF.1: Vulnerabilities that occur when the product is in market need to be addressed, among other means, most importantly by security updates. This SFR can and should be used to specifies the management functions or mechanisms for the conduct of the TOE security update. ALC_FLR.[1/2/3]: Flaws and vulnerabilities are handled in equal ways, as flaws in the TOE could be exploited and lead in consequence to vulnerabilities. See also chapter 5.3.3 of ISO/IEC 15408-3 [6]. Both are closely related. The required activities on an incoming or recognized flaw and vulnerability can/are defined by the definition of appropriate procedures implementing the timelines and detailed requirements for tracking and reporting of the applicable regulation, including CRA. ALC_FLR.[1/2/3] ensures that appropriate procedures are in place that meet all the CRA requirements. ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 44 Essential Requirements CC SFR(Substantial）/ OE CC SAR (Substantial） Rationale (d) ensure protection from unauthorised access by appropriate control mechanisms, including but not limited to authentication, identity or access management systems, and report on possible unauthorised access; FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute-based access control FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1: to ensure the correct identification and authentication forming the access control. FIA_AFL.1: Access control comprises also the limitation of access attempts that yield no success, in order to avoid brute force or denial of service approaches. The SFR ensures the limitation of attempts and contributes therewith to the access control. FIA_ATD.1: After login, the TOE assigns security attributes to the authenticated entity to further enforce the access control. FDP_ACC.1: This SFR provides the access control policy to control the access to TOE resources. FDP_ACF.1: This SFR implements the access control functions assigned by the security attributes and is linked with FDP_ACC.1. FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation: the logging enables the administrator to react on failed access attempts in timely manner. (e) protect the confidentiality of stored, transmitted or otherwise processed data, personal or other, such as by encrypting relevant data at rest or in transit by state of the art mechanisms, and by using other technical means; FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path FDP_ACC.1: This SFR provides the access control policy to control the access to TOE resources. FTP_ITC.1: This SFR provides the confidentiality protection of transmitted data within a machine-to- machine communication due to a distinct communication channel with confidentiality and integrity protection. The assured identification of the endpoints provides some additional confidentiality protection, as it prevents an unidentified entity accessing the communication. (f) protect the integrity of stored, transmitted or otherwise processed data, personal or other, commands, programs and configuration against any manipulation or modification not authorised by the user, and report on corruptions; FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path FDP_ACC.1: This SFR provides the access control policy to control the access to TOE resources. FTP_ITC.1: This SFR provides the integrity protection of transmitted data within a machine-to-machine communication due to a distinct communication channel with integrity protection. (g) process only data, personal or other, that are adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the intended purpose of the product with digital elements (minimization of data); ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description NA (Interpretation by EC JRC and ENISA says it is about GPDR, device does not have any personal data). ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 45 Essential Requirements CC SFR(Substantial）/ OE CC SAR (Substantial） Rationale (h) protect the availability of essential and basic functions, also after an incident, including through resilience and mitigation measures against denial-of- service attacks; FTA_SSL.3 Session termination ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description FTA_SSL.3: This SFR contributes to the resilience of the TOE as it prevents from abusing an authenticated but passive session after a time. It could also be linked with FTA_MCS.1. ADV_ARC.1: The architecture description can be used to describe how the TSF protect itself against DoS attacks. (i) minimize the negative impact by the products themselves or connected devices on the availability of services provided by other devices or networks; FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description FAU_GEN.1: This SFR provides the definition of events for reporting which can include the absence of external services that are used for the correct operation of the TSF. The event logging enables the administrator to react and re-establish the missing external service. Thus, this SFR contributes to the fulfilment of the CRA requirement. AGD_OPE.1: The user guidance can provide procedures and advice to preserve reliable external services in order that the TOE does not get restrictions in operation. Also, in dependency when there are no claims for failure handling the user guidance should cover the related aspects. Else, there is a gap, the "negative impact" is not minimized. (j) be designed, developed and produced to limit attack surfaces, including external interfaces; ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability survey ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design ADV_FSP.[1/2/3]: The functional specification provides a description of the TOE's security functional interfaces which provides relevant information on the attack surface and therewith risk assessment. ADV_TDS.[1/2]: The TOE design description provides information on how the TSF were implemented, the design principles, subsystem behaviour and more, which provides relevant information on the attack surface and therewith risk assessment. ADV_ARC.1: Can demonstrate the consistency of the TOE design with the interface descriptions of the FSP and that there are only interfaces that are essential for TOE operation. ADV_AVA.2: The vulnerability assessment includes penetration testing during which unprotected external interfaces and other vulnerabilities should be discovered. ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 46 Essential Requirements CC SFR(Substantial）/ OE CC SAR (Substantial） Rationale (k) be designed, developed and produced to reduce the impact of an incident using appropriate exploitation mitigation mechanisms and techniques; FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FMT_SMR .1 Security roles ADV_ARC Security architecture description ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification FAU_GEN.1: This SFR provides the definition of events for reporting which can include occurrence of incidents. The event logging enables the administrator to react and resolve the incident Thus, this SFR contributes to the fulfilment of the CRA requirement. FMT_SMR.1: The threat agent circumventing access controls for identification, still needs to achieve a user role and the assignment of security attributes to be authorised for accessing the corresponding TOE resources. That means that even if he could bypass the identification and authentication controls he still needs to have authorisation to access TOE resources. ADV_ARC.1: The architecture description can be used to describe how the TSF protect itself against tampering and bypassing after an incident occurred. Maintaining the TSF contributes to minimization of the incident's impact. ADV_TDS.2: Describes the design of the TSFI and can describe the mechanisms of how an incident is restricted and limited in its impact. ADV_FSP.1: Describes the link between the access control related SFRs and the TSFIs, so that it can be shown how the SFR prevent in incident to increase in terms of authorization to access TOE resources. (l) provide security related information by recording and monitoring relevant internal activity, including the access to or modification of data, services or functions, with an opt-out mechanism for the user; FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FAU_GEN.1: This SFR provides the definition of events for reporting which can include occurrence of incidents. The event logging enables the administrator to react and resolve the incident Thus, this SFR contributes to the fulfilment of the CRA requirement. FMT_SMF.1 can specify the management functions doing a reset to the defaults, i.e. "factory Reset", which is understood as "opt out" from normal operation with user configuration. FMT_SMR.1 Only certain roles should have the right to opt-out from recording and monitoring. (m) provide the possibility for users to securely and easily remove on a permanent basis all data and settings and, where such data can be transferred to other products or systems, ensure that this is done in a secure manner FCS_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance ADV_ARC Security architecture description FCS_CKM.6: This SFR ensures that user generated, or user imported keys are wiped securely when those are no more needed which protects from key disclosure and abuse. AGD_OPE.1: For the case there is no dedicated user accessible secure wiping functions, or a given function of the TOE requires a guidance, the user guidance provides advice and/or procedures to securely wipe the data related to the individual user. ADV_ARC.1: The architecture description can demonstrate that user data and related keys can be securely removed in the context to the "factory reset". ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 47 Table B.2: Mapping for essential requirements of CRA Part 2 Essential Requirements CC SAR(Substanital-EAL3） Rationale Manufacturers of products with digital elements shall: NA (1) identify and document vulnerabilities and components contained in products with digital elements, including by drawing up a software bill of materials in a commonly used and machine- readable format covering at the very least the top-level dependencies of the products; "ALC_FLR.2.1D The developer shall document and provide flaw remediation procedures addressed to TOE developers". ALC_FLR.2.2D The developer shall establish a procedure for accepting and acting upon all reports of security flaws and requests for corrections to those flaws. ALC_FLR.2.3C The flaw remediation procedures shall require that corrective actions be identified for each of the security flaws. ALC_FLR.2.5C The flaw remediation procedures shall describe a means by which the developer receives from TOE users reports and enquiries of suspected security flaws in the TOE. (1) is covered with ALC_FLR.2.1D documenting how identified vulnerabilities reach the developer ALC_FLR.2.2D documenting that each flaw is received and handled, ALC_FLR.2.5C shows that user have simple ways to report vulnerabilities to the developer. (2) in relation to the risks posed to products with digital elements, address and remediate vulnerabilities without delay, including by providing security updates; where technically feasible, new security updates shall be provided separately from functionality updates; ALC_FLR.2.4C The flaw remediation procedures documentation shall describe the methods used to provide flaw information, corrections and guidance on corrective actions to TOE users. ALC_FLR.2.6C The procedures for processing reported security flaws shall ensure that any reported flaws are remediated and the remediation procedures issued to TOE users. (2) is covered when: ALC_FRL.2.4C includes demonstration that there is no undue delay in the conduct ALC_FLR.2.6C when the correction procedures keep security updates separate from functional updates." (3) apply effective and regular tests and reviews of the security of the product with digital elements; AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis covers the required testing. And, regular testing is implicit by the EUCC [i.15] scheme rules. The EUCC maintenance mechanism implicitly fulfils the requirement, as the EUCC scheme limits a certificate's lifetime, requires reassessment and handles also changes to the TOE. ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 48 Essential Requirements CC SAR(Substanital-EAL3） Rationale (4) once a security update has been made available, share and publicly disclose information about fixed vulnerabilities, including a description of the vulnerabilities, information allowing users to identify the product with digital elements affected, the impacts of the vulnerabilities, their severity and clear and accessible information helping users to remediate the vulnerabilities; in duly justified cases, where manufacturers consider the security risks of publication to outweigh the security benefits, they may delay making public information regarding a fixed vulnerability until after users have been given the possibility to apply the relevant patch; ALC_FLR.2.3D The developer shall provide flaw remediation guidance addressed to TOE users. ALC_FLR.2.6C The procedures for processing reported security flaws shall ensure that any reported flaws are remediated and the remediation procedures issued to TOE users." ALC_FLR.2.8C The flaw remediation guidance shall describe a means by which TOE users report to the developer any suspected security flaws in the TOE. (4) is covered as all essential information is disclosed to the users. (5) put in place and enforce a policy on coordinated vulnerability disclosure; ALC_FLR.2.3D The developer shall provide flaw remediation guidance addressed to TOE users. ALC_FLR.2.6C The procedures for processing reported security flaws shall ensure that any reported flaws are remediated and the remediation procedures issued to TOE users (5) is covered when the procedure description contains a policy for information disclosure. (6) take measures to facilitate the sharing of information about potential vulnerabilities in their product with digital elements as well as in third party components contained in that product, including by providing a contact address for the reporting of the vulnerabilities discovered in the product with digital elements; ALC_FLR.2: The flaw reporting procedures documentation should comprise the methods to provide flaw information, corrections and guidance on corrective actions (6) is covered when the procedure documentation of ALC_FLR.2 includes also the information to third parties that provided dependencies to the TOE. ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 49 Essential Requirements CC SAR(Substanital-EAL3） Rationale (7) provide for mechanisms to securely distribute updates for products with digital elements to ensure that vulnerabilities are fixed or mitigated in a timely manner and, where applicable for security updates, in an automatic manner; ALC_FLR.2.1D The developer shall document and provide flaw remediation procedures addressed to TOE developers. ALC_FLR.2.2D The developer shall establish a procedure for accepting and acting upon all reports of security flaws and requests for corrections to those flaws. ALC_FLR.2.2C The flaw remediation procedures shall require that a description of the nature and effect of each security flaw be provided, as well as the status of finding a correction to that flaw. ALC_FLR.2.4C The flaw remediation procedures documentation shall describe the methods used to provide flaw information, corrections and guidance on corrective actions to TOE users." (7) is covered when ALC_FLR.2.1D demonstrates secure mechanisms for providing updates, ALC_FLR.2.2D ensures that activities are launched for each vulnerability, ALC_FLR.2.2C shows that the status for corrections is tracked which address to achieve the resolution status in a timely manner, ALC_FLR.2.4C details the security means deployed for the methods of provision. (8) ensure that, where security updates are available to address identified security issues, they are disseminated without delay and, unless otherwise agreed between a manufacturer and a business user in relation to a tailor-made product with digital elements, free of charge, accompanied by advisory messages providing users with the relevant information, including on potential action to be taken. ALC_FLR.2.3D The developer shall provide flaw remediation guidance addressed to TOE users. ALC_FLR.2.2C The flaw remediation procedures shall require that a description of the nature and effect of each security flaw be provided, as well as the status of finding a correction to that flaw. ALC_FLR.2.6C The procedures for processing reported security flaws shall ensure that any reported flaws are remediated and the remediation procedures issued to TOE users". (8) is covered when: ALC_FLR.2.3D demonstrates that each update comes with guidance, ALC_FLR.2.2C keeps track of the status including its disclosure to the user ALC_FLR.2.6C shows that users receive the remediation procedures for each update. ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 50 Annex C (informative): Bibliography • ISO/IEC 27001:2022: "Information technology — Security techniques — Information security management systems — Requirements". ETSI ETSI TS 104 013 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 51 History Version Date Status V1.1.1 January 2026 Publication |
c94756e4aa7c166fd2e3d23d16d8bedc | 104 151-2 | 1 Scope | The present document provides the Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) pro forma for testing Server implementations for compliance to the Mission Critical Services over LTE protocol requirements defined by 3GPP, and in accordance with the relevant guidance given in ISO/IEC 9646-1 [i.6] and ISO/IEC 9646-7 [2]. The present document specifies the recommended applicability statement for the test cases included in ETSI TS 104 151-1 [4]. These applicability statements are based on the features implemented in the Server respectively. The present document is valid for Mission Critical Video (MCVideo) Servers implemented according to 3GPP releases starting from Release 14 up to the Release indicated on the cover page of the present document. The present document does not specify applicability or ICS for protocol conformance testing for the EPS (LTE) bearers which carry the Mission Critical Services data sent or received by the Client and/or the Server. These are defined in ETSI TS 136 523-2 [i.5] (3GPP TS 36.523-2). |
c94756e4aa7c166fd2e3d23d16d8bedc | 104 151-2 | 2 References | |
c94756e4aa7c166fd2e3d23d16d8bedc | 104 151-2 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found in the ETSI docbox. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI TS 136 579-5: "LTE; Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 5: Abstract test suite (ATS) (3GPP TS 36.579-5)". [2] ISO/IEC 9646-7: "Information technology - Open systems interconnection - Conformance testing methodology and framework - Part 7: Implementation Conformance Statements". [3] ETSI TS 123 281: "LTE; Functional architecture and information flows to support Mission Critical Video (MCVideo); Stage 2 (3GPP TS 23.281)". [4] ETSI TS 104 151-1: "Mission Critical (MC) services; Mission Critical Video (MCVideo) Application Server (AS) Protocol conformance specification for server-to-client interface; Part 1: Test structure, configurations, conformance requirement and test purposes". [5] ETSI TS 124 581: "LTE; Mission Critical Video (MCVideo) media plane control; Protocol specification (3GPP TS 24.581)". ETSI ETSI TS 104 151-2 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 7 |
c94756e4aa7c166fd2e3d23d16d8bedc | 104 151-2 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents may be useful in implementing an ETSI deliverable or add to the reader's understanding, but are not required for conformance to the present document. [i.1] ETSI TR 121 905: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; 5G; Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications (3GPP TR 21.905)". [i.2] ETSI TS 136 579-1: "LTE; Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 1: Common test environment (3GPP TS 36.579-1)". [i.3] ETSI TS 136 579-2: "LTE; Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 2: Mission Critical Push To Talk (MCPTT) User Equipment (UE) Protocol conformance specification (3GPP TS 36.579-2)". [i.4] ETSI TS 136 579-3: "LTE; Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 3: Mission Critical Push To Talk (MCPTT) Server Application conformance specification (3GPP TS 36.579-3)". [i.5] ETSI TS 136 523-2: "LTE; Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA) and Evolved Packet Core (EPC); User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Part 2: Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) proforma specification (3GPP TS 36.523-2)". [i.6] ISO/IEC 9646-1: "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Conformance testing methodology and framework - Part 1: General concepts". [i.7] ETSI TS 136 579-4: "LTE; Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 4: Test Applicability and Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) proforma specification (3GPP TS 36.579-4)'. [i.8] ETSI TS 136 579-6: "LTE; Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 6: Mission Critical Video (MCVideo) User Equipment (UE) Protocol conformance specification (3GPP TS 36.579-6)". [i.9] ETSI TS 136 579-7: "LTE; Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 7: Mission Critical Data (MCData) User Equipment (UE) Protocol conformance specification (3GPP TS 36.579-7)". [i.10] 3GPP TS 36.579-8: "Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 8: Mission Critical Video (MCVideo) Server Application conformance specification". [i.11] 3GPP TS 36.579-9: "Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 9: Mission Critical Data (MCData) Server Application conformance specification". |
c94756e4aa7c166fd2e3d23d16d8bedc | 104 151-2 | 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations | |
c94756e4aa7c166fd2e3d23d16d8bedc | 104 151-2 | 3.1 Definitions | For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in ETSI TR 121 905 [i.1] (3GPP TR 21.905) and the following apply: NOTE 1: A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in ETSI TR 121 905 [i.1] (3GPP TR 21.905). In addition for the purposes of the present document, the following terms, definitions, symbols and abbreviations apply: - such given in ISO/IEC 9646-1 [i.6] and ISO/IEC 9646-7 [2]. ETSI ETSI TS 104 151-2 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 8 NOTE 2: Some terms and abbreviations defined in ISO/IEC 9646-1 [i.6] and ISO/IEC 9646-7 [2] are explicitly included below with small modification to reflect the terminology used in 3GPP. ICS pro forma: form of a questionnaire, which when completed for an implementation or system becomes an ICS Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS): statement made by the supplier of an implementation or system claimed to conform to a given specification, stating which capabilities have been implemented Implementation eXtra Information for Testing (IXIT): statement made by a supplier or implementer of an UEUT which contains or references all of the information (in addition to that given in the ICS) related to the UEUT and its testing environment, which will enable the test laboratory to run an appropriate test suite against the UEUT IUT containing MCX Client: statement identifying which entity, and associated requirements, from the MCX service architecture is subject of testing NOTE: Depending on the ETSI TS 136 579-5 [1] (3GPP TS 36.579-5) test model being used, the LTE UE (with the MCX Client installed) is considered as the IUT (MCX EUTRA test model), or, only the MCX Client is considered as the IUT (MCX IPCAN test model). In both cases the SUT is the UE, communicating with the SS over the Uu radio interface. IXIT pro forma: form of a questionnaire, which when completed for an UEUT becomes an IXIT Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS): ICS for an implementation or system claimed to conform to a given protocol specification Protocol Implementation eXtra Information for Testing (PIXIT): IXIT related to testing for conformance to a given protocol specification static conformance review: review of the extent to which the static conformance requirements are claimed to be supported by the UEUT, by comparing the answers in the ICS(s) with the static conformance requirements expressed in the relevant specification(s) |
c94756e4aa7c166fd2e3d23d16d8bedc | 104 151-2 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
c94756e4aa7c166fd2e3d23d16d8bedc | 104 151-2 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in ETSI TR 121 905 [i.1] (3GPP TR 21.905) and the following apply: NOTE: An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in ETSI TR 121 905 [i.1] (3GPP TR 21.905). ICS Implementation Conformance Statement IPCAN IP Connectivity Access Network IUT Implementation Under Test IXIT Implementation eXtra Information for Testing MC Mission Critical MCData Mission Critical Data MCPTT Mission Critical Push To Talk MCVideo Mission Critical Video TC Test Case ETSI ETSI TS 104 151-2 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 9 |
c94756e4aa7c166fd2e3d23d16d8bedc | 104 151-2 | 4 Recommended Test Case Applicability | The applicability of each individual test is identified in Table 4-1 (MCVideo Server). This is just a recommendation based on the purpose for which the test case was written. The applicability of every test is formally expressed by the use of Boolean expression that are based on parameters (ICS) included in annex A of the present document. Additional information related to the Test Case (TC), e.g. affecting its dynamic behaviour or its execution may be provided as well The columns in Table 4-1 have the following meaning: Clause The clause column indicates the clause number in ETSI TS 104 151-1 [4] respectively which contains the test body. Title The title column describes the name of the test and contains the clause title of the clause in ETSI TS 104 151-1 [4] respectively which contains the test body. Release The release column indicates the earliest release from which the test case is applicable. In some specific cases it may indicate the release(s) for which the TC is only applicable. Note: Some exceptions to this interpretation may be indicated in Notes in column 'Number of TC Executions'. Applicability - Condition The following notations are used for the applicability column: R recommended - the test case is recommended O optional – the test case is optional N/A not applicable - in the given context, the test case is not recommended. Ci conditional - the test is recommended ("R") or not ("N/A") depending on the support of other items. "i" is an integer identifying a unique conditional status expression which is defined immediately following the table. For nested conditional expressions, the syntax "IF ... THEN (IF ... THEN ... ELSE...) ELSE ..." is used to avoid ambiguities. NOTE: The conditions are defined in Table 4-1a (MCVideo Server). To avoid ambiguity for the MCVideo Server testing conditions the notation of CCi is used. Applicability - Comments This column contains a verbal description of the condition. Additional Information - Specific ICS This column contains the mnemonics of ICS(s) affecting the dynamic behaviour of the TC. NOTE: ICS items specified in other test specifications can be referred, to avoid redundant definitions. Additional Information - Specific IXIT This column contains the mnemonics of IXIT(s) affecting the dynamic behaviour of the TC. IXITs are defined in ETSI TS 136 579-5 [1] (3GPP TS 36.579-5). ETSI ETSI TS 104 151-2 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 10 Additional Information - Number of TC Executions This column contains, wherever applicable, the recommended for certification purposes number of TC executions. It may contain also other information e.g. exceptions to the release applicable to the test. Clarifying notes when available are listed in dedicated tables with table numbers having the suffix "b". ETSI ETSI TS 104 151-2 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 11 Table 4-1: Applicability of MCVideo Server tests and additional information for testing Clause TC Title Release Applicability Additional Information Condition Comment Specific ICS Specific IXIT Number of TC Executions 5 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Client Configuration 5.1 MCVIDEO Server - MCVIDEO Client / Configuration / Authentication / User Authorisation / UE Configuration / User Profile / Key generation Rel-14 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 5.2 MCVIDEO Server - MCVIDEO Client / Configuration / Group Creation / Group Regroup Creation / Group Regroup Teardown Rel-14 CC02 IUT is MCPTT Server 5.3 MCVIDEO Server - MCVIDEO Client / Configuration / Group Affiliation / Implicit Affiliation / Remote change / De-affiliation / Home MCVIDEO system Rel-14 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 5.4 MCVIDEO Server - MCVIDEO Client / Configuration / Determination of MCVIDEO Service Settings / Current Active MCVIDEO Settings / De-subscribe Rel-14 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 5.5 MCVIDEO Server - MCVIDEO Client / Configuration / Download CSK Rel-14 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 5.6 MCVIDEO Server - MCVIDEO Client / Configuration / Subscription to group dynamic data / De-subscribe Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Client operation 6.1 Group call 6.1.1 Pre-arranged Group Calls 6.1.1.1 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Client / Pre- arranged Group Call / On-demand / Automatic Commencement Mode / Transmission Control / Upgrade to Emergency Group Call / Cancel Emergency State / Upgrade to Imminent Peril Group Call / Cancel Imminent Peril State Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.1.1.2 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Client / Pre- arranged Group Call / On-demand / Emergency Group Call Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.1.1.3 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Client / Pre- arranged Group Call / On-demand / Transmission Control State Transitions Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server ETSI ETSI TS 104 151-2 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 12 Clause TC Title Release Applicability Additional Information Condition Comment Specific ICS Specific IXIT Number of TC Executions 6.1.1.4 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Client / Pre- arranged Group Call / On-demand / Reception Control State Transitions Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.1.2 Chat Group Calls 6.1.2.1 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Client / Chat Group Call / On-demand / Join Chat Group Session / Upgrade to Emergency / Cancel Emergency / Upgrade to Imminent Peril / Cancel Imminent Peril Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.1.3 Subscription to Conference Event Package 6.1.3.1 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Client / Conference Event Package / Subscription to Conference Event Package / Termination of subscription Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.1.4 Remote Change of Selected Group 6.1.4.1 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Client / Remote Change of Selected Group / Selected Group Change of Targeted User Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.2 Private Calls 6.2.1 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Client / Private Call / On-demand / Automatic Commencement Mode / With Transmission Control / Upgrade to Emergency Call / Cancellation of Emergency on User request Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.3 Emergency Alert 6.3.1 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Client / Emergency Alert / Cancel Emergency Alert Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.4 Video Push 6.4.1 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Client / Video push call / One-to-one video push call Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.4.2 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Client / Video push call / One-to-server video push call Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.5 Video Pull 6.5.1 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Client / Video pull call / One-to-one video pull call Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.5.2 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Client / Video pull call / One-from-server video pull call Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.6 Ambient Viewing Calls 6.6.1 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Client / Ambient Viewing Call / On-demand / Remotely initiated ambient viewing call / Remotely initiated ambient viewing call release Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server ETSI ETSI TS 104 151-2 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 13 Clause TC Title Release Applicability Additional Information Condition Comment Specific ICS Specific IXIT Number of TC Executions 6.7 Use of MBMS transmission 6.7.1 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Client / MBMS / MBMS Bearer Announcement / MBMS Bearer Viewing Status / Transition to MBMS from Unicast / MBMS Transmission Control / Transition to Unicast from MBMS Rel-15 CC03 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.8 Location 6.8.1 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Client / Location / Event Triggered Location Information report Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server 6.8.2 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Client / Location / On-demand Location Information Request Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCPTT Server Table 4-1a: Applicability of tests Conditions MCVideo Server CC01 IF A.4.1-1/1 THEN R ELSE N/A CC02 IF A.4.1-1/2 THEN R ELSE N/A CC03 IF A.4.1-1/1 AND A.4.2-1/2 THEN R ELSE N/A ETSI ETSI TS 104 151-2 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 14 Annex A (normative): ICS pro forma for Mission Critical Services A.0 The right to copy Notwithstanding the provisions of the copyright clause related to the text of the present document, ETSI grants that users of the present document may freely reproduce the ICS pro forma for Mission Critical Services pro forma in this Annex so that it can be used for its intended purposes and may further publish the completed ICS pro forma for Mission Critical Services. A.1 Guidance for completing the ICS pro forma A.1.1 Purposes and structure The purpose of this ICS pro forma is to provide a mechanism whereby a supplier of an implementation of the requirements defined in relevant specifications may provide information about the implementation in a standardised manner. The ICS pro forma is subdivided into clauses for the following categories of information: • instructions for completing the ICS pro forma; • identification of the implementation; • identification of the protocol; • ICS pro forma tables (for example: Client implementation, Server implementation, etc). A.1.2 Abbreviations and conventions The ICS pro forma contained in this annex is comprised of information in tabular form in accordance with the guidelines presented in ISO/IEC 9646-7 [2]. Item column The item column contains a number which identifies the item in the table. Item description column The item description column describes in free text each respective item (e.g. parameters, timers, etc.). It implicitly means "is <item description> supported by the implementation?". Reference column The reference column gives reference to the relevant ETSI core specifications. Release column The release column indicates the earliest release from which the capability or option is relevant. Mnemonic column The Mnemonic column contains mnemonic identifiers for each item. ETSI ETSI TS 104 151-2 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 15 Comments column This column is left blank for particular use by the reader of the present document. References to items For each possible item answer (answer in the support column) within the ICS pro forma there exists a unique reference, used, for example, in the conditional expressions. It is defined as the table identifier, followed by a solidus character "/", followed by the item number in the table. If there is more than one support column in a table, the columns shall be discriminated by letters (a, b, etc.), respectively. A.1.3 Instructions for completing the ICS pro forma The supplier of the implementation may complete the ICS pro forma in each of the spaces provided. More detailed instructions are given at the beginning of the different clauses of the ICS pro forma. A.2 Identification of the MCVideo Server Equipment A.2.0 Introduction Identification of the MCVideo Server should be filled in so as to provide as much detail as possible regarding version numbers and configuration options. The product supplier information and client information should both be filled in if they are different. A person who can answer queries regarding information supplied in the ICS should be named as the contact person. A.2.1 Date of the statement ......................................................................................................................................................................................... A.2.2 MCVideo Server under test identification MCVideo Server under test name: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Hardware configuration: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Software configuration: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ETSI ETSI TS 104 151-2 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 16 A.2.3 Product supplier Name: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Address: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Telephone number: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Facsimile number: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... E-mail address: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Additional information: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... A.2.4 The Organisation responsible for the Product testing Name: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Address: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Telephone number: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Facsimile number: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... E-mail address: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ETSI ETSI TS 104 151-2 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 17 Additional information: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... A.2.5 ICS contact person Name: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Telephone number: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Facsimile number: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... E-mail address: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Additional information: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... A.3 Identification of the protocol This ICS pro forma applies to the ETSI standards listed in the normative references clause of the present document. A.4 ICS pro forma tables A.4.1 Implementation Types Table A.4.1-1: Mission Critical Services general functionality Item Functionality Ref. Release Mnemonic Comments 1 MCVideo Server ETSI TS 123 281 (3GPP TS 23.281) Rel-14 pc_MCVideoServer 2 MCVideo Server performing GMS function ETSI TS 123 281 (3GPP TS 23.281) Rel-14 pc_MCVideoServer_GMS ETSI ETSI TS 104 151-2 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 18 A.4.2 Additional information Table A.4.2-1: Additional information Item Additional information Ref. Release Mnemonic Comments 1 The MCVideo Server supports transmission request queueing ETSI TS 124 581 (3GPP TS 24.581) Rel-14 pc_MCVideo_Transmission RequestQueueing The MCVideo server applies Transmission Request Queueing 2 Support of MC service over MBMS ETSI TS 124 581 (3GPP TS 24.581) Rel-14 pc_MCX_MBMSSupport ETSI ETSI TS 104 151-2 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 19 History Version Date Status V1.1.1 February 2026 Publication |
18c8d791e85b7f57392db2bcf1248e26 | 104 153-1 | 1 Scope | The present document provides the Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS) pro forma for the test specification for the IP/ICMP Translation Algorithm as specified in IETF RFC 7915 [1] in compliance with the relevant requirements and in accordance with the relevant guidance given in ISO/IEC 9646-7 [2] and ETSI ETS 300 406 [i.2]. The supplier of a protocol implementation which is claimed to conform to IETF RFC 7915 [1] is required to complete a copy of the PICS pro forma provided in annex A of the present document and is required to provide the information necessary to identify both the supplier and the implementation. |
18c8d791e85b7f57392db2bcf1248e26 | 104 153-1 | 2 References | |
18c8d791e85b7f57392db2bcf1248e26 | 104 153-1 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found in the ETSI docbox. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] IETF RFC 7915: "IP/ICMP Translation Algorithm". [2] ISO/IEC 9646-7: "Information technology — Open Systems Interconnection — Conformance testing methodology and framework — Part 7: Implementation Conformance Statements". [3] IETF RFC 6052: "IPv6 Addressing of IPv4/IPv6 Translators". [4] IETF RFC 1191: "Path MTU Discovery". [5] IETF RFC 4884: "Extended ICMP to Support Multi-Part Messages". |
18c8d791e85b7f57392db2bcf1248e26 | 104 153-1 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents may be useful in implementing an ETSI deliverable or add to the reader's understanding, but are not required for conformance to the present document. [i.1] ISO/IEC 9646-1: "Information technology — Open Systems Interconnection — Conformance testing methodology and framework — Part 1: General concepts". [i.2] ETSI ETS 300 406: "Methods for testing and Specification (MTS); Protocol and profile conformance testing specifications; Standardization methodology". ETSI ETSI TS 104 153-1 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 6 |
18c8d791e85b7f57392db2bcf1248e26 | 104 153-1 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
18c8d791e85b7f57392db2bcf1248e26 | 104 153-1 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in IETF RFC 7915 [1] and the following apply: PICS pro forma: document, in the form of a questionnaire, designed by the protocol specifier or conformance test suite specifier, which, when completed for an OSI implementation or system, becomes the PICS NOTE: See ISO/IEC 9646-1 [i.1]. Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS): statement made by the supplier of an Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) implementation or system, stating which capabilities have been implemented for a given OSI protocol NOTE: See ISO/IEC 9646-1[i.1]. static conformance review: review of the extent to which the static conformance requirements are met by the IUT, accomplished by comparing the PICS with the static conformance requirements expressed in the relevant standard(s) NOTE: See ISO/IEC 9646-1[i.1]. |
18c8d791e85b7f57392db2bcf1248e26 | 104 153-1 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
18c8d791e85b7f57392db2bcf1248e26 | 104 153-1 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in IETF RFC 7915 [1] and the following apply: 3GPP 3rd Generation Partnership Project AH Authentication Header ATS Abstract Test Suite DCCP Datagram Congestion Control Protocol DF Don't Fragment ESP Encapsulating Security Payload ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol ICMPv4 Internet Control Message Protocol version 4 ICMPv6 Internet Control Message Protocol version 6 IP Internet Protocol IPv4 Internet Protocol version 4 IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6 IUT Implement Under Test MF More Fragment MLD Multicast Listener Discovery MTU Maximum Transport Unit OSI Open Systems Interconnection PDU Protocol Data Unit PICS Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement PIXIT Protocol Implementation eXtra Information for Testing TC Traffic Class TCP Transmission Control Protocol TOS Type Of Service TP Test Purpose TSS Test Suite Structure TTL Time To Live UDP User Datagram Protocol ETSI ETSI TS 104 153-1 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 7 |
18c8d791e85b7f57392db2bcf1248e26 | 104 153-1 | 4 Conformance | A PICS pro forma which conforms to this PICS pro forma specification shall be technically equivalent to annex A, and shall preserve the numbering and ordering of the items in annex A. A PICS which conforms to this PICS pro forma specification shall: a) describe an implementation which claims to conform to IETF RFC 7915 [1]; b) be a conforming ICS pro forma which has been completed in accordance with the instructions for completion given in clause A.1; c) include the information necessary to uniquely identify both the supplier and the implementation. ETSI ETSI TS 104 153-1 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 8 Annex A (normative): PICS pro forma A.1 The right to copy Notwithstanding the provisions of the copyright clause related to the text of the present document, ETSI grants that users of the present document may freely reproduce the PICS pro forma in this annex so that it can be used for its intended purposes and may further publish the completed PICS pro forma. A.2 Guidance for completing the PICS pro forma A.2.1 Purposes and structure The purpose of this PICS pro forma is to provide a mechanism whereby a supplier of an implementation of the requirements defined in relevant specifications may provide information about the implementation in a standardized manner. The PICS pro forma is subdivided into clauses for the following categories of information: • instructions for completing the PICS pro forma; • identification of the implementation; • identification of the protocol; • PICS pro forma tables (for example: Major capabilities, etc.). A.2.2 Abbreviations and conventions This annex does not reflect dynamic conformance requirements but static ones. In particular, a condition for support of a PDU parameter does not reflect requirements about the syntax of the PDU (i.e. the presence of a parameter) but the capability of the implementation to support the parameter. In the sending direction, the support of a parameter means that the implementation is able to send this parameter (but it does not mean that the implementation always sends it). In the receiving direction, it means that the implementation supports the whole semantic of the parameter that is described in the related protocol specification. As a consequence, PDU parameter tables in this annex are not the same as the tables describing the syntax of a PDU in the reference specification. The PICS pro forma contained in this annex is comprised of information in tabular form in accordance with the guidelines presented in ISO/IEC 9646-7. Item column The item column contains a number which identifies the item in the table. Item description column The item description column describes in free text each respective item (e.g. parameters, timers, etc.). It implicitly means "is <item description> supported by the implementation?". ETSI ETSI TS 104 153-1 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 9 Reference column The reference column gives reference to the relevant sections in core specifications. Status column The various status used in this annex are in accordance with the rules in table A.1. Table A.1: Key to status codes Status code Status name Meaning m mandatory The capability shall be supported. It is a static view of the fact that the conformance requirements related to the capability in the reference specification are mandatory requirements. This does not mean that a given behaviour shall always be observed (this would be a dynamic view), but that it shall be observed when the implementation is placed in conditions where the conformance requirements from the reference specification compel it to do so. For instance, if the support for a parameter in a sent PDU is mandatory, it does not mean that it shall always be present, but that it shall be present according to the description of the behaviour in the reference specification (dynamic conformance requirement). o optional The capability may or may not be supported. It is an implementation choice. n/a not applicable It is impossible to use the capability. No answer in the support column is required. c.<integer> conditional The requirement on the capability ("m", "o", "n/a") depends on the support of other optional or conditional items. <integer> is the identifier of the conditional expression. o.<integer> qualified optional For mutually exclusive or selectable options from a set. <integer> is the identifier of the group of options, and the logic of selection of the options. Mnemonic column The Mnemonic column contains mnemonic identifiers for each item. Support column The support column shall be filled in by the supplier of the implementation. The following common notations, defined in ISO/IEC 9646-7, are used for the support column: Y or y supported by the implementation. N or n not supported by the implementation. N/A, n/a or - no answer required (allowed only if the status is N/A, directly or after evaluation of a conditional status). References to items For each possible item answer (answer in the support column) within the PICS pro forma there exists a unique reference, used, for example, in the conditional expressions. It is defined as the table identifier, followed by a solidus character "/", followed by the item number in the table. EXAMPLE: A.5/4 is the reference to the answer of item 4 in table A.5. A.2.3 Instructions for completing the PICS pro forma The supplier of the implementation may complete the PICS pro forma in each of the spaces provided. More detailed instructions are given at the beginning of the different clauses of the PICS pro forma. ETSI ETSI TS 104 153-1 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 10 A.3 Identification of the Network Equipment A.3.1 Introduction Identification of the Network Equipment should be filled in so as to provide as much detail as possible regarding version numbers and configuration options. The product supplier information and client information should both be filled in if they are different. A person who can answer queries regarding information supplied in the PICS should be named as the contact person. A.3.2 Date of the statement ............................................................................................................................................................................................... A.3.3 Network Equipment Under Test identification Name: ............................................................................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................................................................... Hardware configuration: ............................................................................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................................................................... Software configuration: ............................................................................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................................................................... A.3.4 Product supplier Name: ............................................................................................................................................................................................... Address: ............................................................................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................................................................... Telephone number: ............................................................................................................................................................................................... Facsimile number: ............................................................................................................................................................................................... ETSI ETSI TS 104 153-1 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 11 E-mail address: ............................................................................................................................................................................................... Additional information: ............................................................................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................................................................... A.3.5 Client Name: ............................................................................................................................................................................................... Address: ............................................................................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................................................................... Telephone number: ............................................................................................................................................................................................... Facsimile number: ............................................................................................................................................................................................... E-mail address: ............................................................................................................................................................................................... Additional information: ............................................................................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................................................................... A.3.6 PICS contact person Name: ............................................................................................................................................................................................... Telephone number: ............................................................................................................................................................................................... Facsimile number: ............................................................................................................................................................................................... E-mail address: ............................................................................................................................................................................................... ETSI ETSI TS 104 153-1 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 12 Additional information: ............................................................................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................................................................... A.4 Identification of the protocol This PICS pro forma applies to the following specification: • IETF RFC 7915. A.5 Global statement of conformance The implementation described in this PICS meets all the mandatory requirements of the referenced standard? [ ] Yes [ ] No NOTE: Answering "No" to this question indicates non-conformance to the protocol specification. Non-supported mandatory capabilities are to be identified in the PICS, with an explanation of why the implementation is non-conforming. Explanations may be entered in the comments field at the bottom of each table or on attached pages. In the tabulations which follow, all references are to IETF RFC 7915 unless another numbered reference is explicitly indicated. A.6 PICS pro forma tables for the IP/ICMP translation algorithm A.6.1 PICS Items Table A.2 need only to be completed for implementations. Table A.2: System Capabilities Item Does the IUT support... Reference Status Support 1 Procedures for translating from IPv4 to IPv6? 4 m 1.1 Procedures for translating IPv4 Headers into IPv6 Headers? 4.1 m 1.1.1 Configuration function for the network administrator to adjust the threshold of the minimum IPv6 MTU to a value greater than 1 280 bytes if the real value of the minimum IPv6 MTU in the network is known to the administrator? 4.1 m 1.1.2 Procedures for sending ICMPv4 "Fragmentation Needed" error message to the IPv4 source address If the DF bit is set and the MTU of the next-hop interface is less than the total length value of the IPv4 packet plus 20? 4.1 m 1.1.3 The IPv6 header contains fields including: Version, Traffic Class, Flow Label, Payload Length, Next Header, Hop Limit, Source Address, Destination Address? 4.1 m 1.1.3.1 Procedures for setting Version field to 6? 4.1 m 1.1.3.2 Configurable option to ignore the IPv4 TOS and always set the IPv6 Traffic Class (TC) to zero? 4.1 m 1.1.3.3 Procedures for setting Flow Label field to all 0? 4.1 m ETSI ETSI TS 104 153-1 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 13 Item Does the IUT support... Reference Status Support 1.1.3.4 Procedures for setting Payload Length field to the value which is total length value from IPv4 header minus the size of the IPv4 header and IPv4 options? 4.1 m 1.1.3.5 Procedures for copying the protocol field from IPv4 header to Next Header field except that ICMPv4(1) is changed to ICMPv6(58). 4.1 m 1.1.3.6 Procedures for checking for zero and sending the ICMPv4 "TTL Exceeded" or ICMPv6 "Hop Limit Exceeded" error after decrementing the TTL or Hop Limit. 4.1 m 1.1.3.7 Procedures for Source Address mapping to an IPv6 address based on the algorithms. 4.1 IETF RFC 6052 m 1.1.3.7.1 Procedures for silently discarding the packet with an illegal source address (e.g. 0.0.0.0, 127.0.0.1, etc.) except translating ICMPv4 Error Messages into ICMPv6. 4.1 m 1.1.3.8 Procedures for Destination Address mapping to an IPv6 address based on the algorithms? 4.1 IETF RFC 6052 m 1.1.4 Procedures for ignoring any options presented in the IPv4 packet? 4.1 m 1.1.4.1 Procedures for sending an ICMPv4 "Destination Unreachable, Source Route Failed" (Type 3, Code 5) error message when receiving unexpired source route option. 4.1 m 1.1.5 Procedures for fragmenting when the packet is a fragment or the DF bit is not set and the packet size is greater than the minimum IPv6 MTU in the network set by the translator configuration function. 4.1 m 1.1.5.1 Procedures for setting Payload Length to the value which is Total length value from the IPv4 header, plus 8 for the Fragment Header, minus the size of the IPv4 header and IPv4 options, if present? 4.1 m 1.1.5.2 Procedures for setting Next Header field to 44 (Fragment Header)? 4.1 m 1.1.5.3 Procedures for copying the Next Header field of Fragment Header from IPv4 header to Next Header field except that ICMPv4(1) is changed to ICMPv6(58)? 4.1 m 1.1.5.4 Procedures for copying Fragment Offset of IPv4 header to Fragment Offset of Fragment Header? 4.1 m 1.1.5.5 Procedures for copying More Fragment bit of IPv4 header to Fragment Offset of Fragment Header? 4.1 m 1.1.5.6 Procedures for copying the low-order 16 bits of Identification field of IPv4 header to Identification of Fragment Header and setting high- order 16 bits to zero? 4.1 m 1.2 Procedures for translating ICMPv4 Headers into ICMPv6 Headers 4.2 m 1.2.1 Procedures for translating the included IP header in the ICMPv4 error messages? 4.2 m 1.2.2 Procedures for translating ICMPv4 query messages? 4.2 m 1.2.2.1 Procedures for adjusting Echo and Echo Reply messages (type 8 and type 0) to the type values to 128 and 129 respectively, and adjusting the ICMP checksum both to take the type change into account and to include the ICMPv6 pseudo-header? 4.2 m 1.2.2.2 For information Request/Reply messages (Type 15 and Type 16), procedures for silently dropping? 4.2 m 1.2.2.3 For Timestamp and Timestamp Reply messages (Type 13 and Type 14), procedures for silently dropping? 4.2 m 1.2.2.4 For Address Mask Request/Reply messages (Type 17 and Type 18), procedures for silently dropping? 4.2 m 1.2.2.5 For ICMP Router Advertisement messages (Type 9), procedures for silently dropping? 4.2 m 1.2.2.6 For ICMP Router Solicitation messages (Type 10), procedures for silently dropping? 4.2 m 1.2.2.7 For Unknown ICMPv4 types messages, procedures for silently dropping? 4.2 m 1.2.3 Procedures for translating ICMPv4 error messages? 4.2 m 1.2.3.1 For Destination Unreachable messages (Type 3), procedures for setting the Type to 1 and adjust the ICMP checksum both to take the type/code change into account and to include the ICMPv6 pseudo- header? 4.2 m 1.2.3.1.1 For code 0 and 1 (Net Unreachable, Host Unreachable), procedures for setting the code to 0 (No route to destination)? 4.2 m ETSI ETSI TS 104 153-1 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 14 Item Does the IUT support... Reference Status Support 1.2.3.1.2 For code 2 (Protocol Unreachable), procedures for translating to an ICMPv6 Parameter Problem (Type 4, Code 1) and making the pointer point to the IPv6 Next Header field? 4.2 m 1.2.3.1.3 For code 3 (Port Unreachable), procedures for setting the code to 4 (Port unreachable)? 4.2 m 1.2.3.1.4 For code 4 (Fragmentation Needed and DF was Set), procedures for translating it to an ICMPv6 Packet Too Big message (Type 2) with code set to 0? 4.2 m 1.2.3.1.4.1 Procedures for adjusting MTU field for the difference between the IPv4 and IPv6 header sizes, and not setting a value smaller than the minimum IPv6 MTU? 4.2 m 1.2.3.1.4.2 For MTU field being zero, procedures for using the plateau values specified in IETF RFC 1191? 4.2 IETF RFC 1191 m 1.2.3.1.5 For code 5 (Source Route Failed), procedures for setting the code to 0 (No route to destination)? 4.2 m 1.2.3.1.6 For code 6, 7, 8, procedures for setting the code to 0 (no route to destination)? 4.2 m 1.2.3.1.7 For code 9, 10 (Communication with Destination Host Administratively Prohibited), procedures for setting the code to 1 (Communication with destination administratively prohibited)? 4.2 m 1.2.3.1.8 For code 11, 12, procedures for setting the code to 0 (no route to destination)? 4.2 m 1.2.3.1.9 For code 13 (Communication Administratively Prohibited), procedures for setting the code to 1 (Communication with destination administratively prohibited)? 4.2 m 1.2.3.1.10 For code 14 (Host Precedence Violation), procedures for silently dropping? 4.2 m 1.2.3.1.11 For code 15 (Precedence cutoff in effect), procedures for setting the code to 1 (Communication with destination administratively prohibited)? 4.2 m 1.2.3.1.12 For other code values, procedures for silently dropping? 4.2 m 1.2.3.2 For Redirect (Type 5) messages, procedures for silently dropping? 4.2 m 1.2.3.3 For Alternative Host Address (Type 6) messages, procedures for silently dropping? 4.2 m 1.2.3.4 For Source Quench (Type 4) messages, procedures for silently dropping? 4.2 m 1.2.3.5 For Time Exceeded (Type 11) messages, procedures for setting the Type to 3, and adjusting the ICMP checksum both to take the type/code change into account and include the ICMPv6 pseudo- header? 4.2 m 1.2.3.6 For Parameter Problem (Type 12) messages, procedures for setting the Type to 4, and adjusting the ICMP checksum both to take the type/code change into account and to include the ICMPv6 pseudo- header? 4.2 m 1.2.3.6.1 For code 0 (Pointer indicates the error), procedures for setting the code to 0(Erroneous header field encountered) and update the pointer as defined in Figure 3 (If the Original IPv4 Pointer Value is not listed or the Translated IPv6 Pointer Value is listed as "n/a", silently drop the packet.)? 4.2 IETF RFC 7915, Figure 3 m 1.2.3.6.2 For code 1 (Missing a required option), procedures for silently dropping? 4.2 m 1.2.3.6.3 For code 2 (Bad length), procedures for setting the code to 0 (Erroneous header field encountered) and update the pointer as defined in Figure 3. (If the Original IPv4 Pointer Value is not listed or the Translated IPv6 Pointer Value is listed as "n/a", silently drop the packet.)? 4.2 IETF RFC 7915, Figure 3 m 1.2.3.6.4 For other code values, procedures for silently dropping? 4.2 m 1.2.3.7 Procedures for truncating the extension If the ICMPv4 Extension exceeds the maximum size of an ICMPv6 message on the outgoing interface? 4.2 m 1.3 Procedures for translating ICMPv4 Error Messages into ICMPv6 4.3 m 1.3.1 Procedures for translating the ICMP error messages containing the packet in error just like a normal IP packet (except the TTL value of the inner IPv4/IPv6 packet)? 4.3 m ETSI ETSI TS 104 153-1 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 15 Item Does the IUT support... Reference Status Support 1.3.2 Procedures for updating the Total Length field in the outer IPv6 header, If the translation of this "packet in error" changes the length of the datagram? 4.3 m 1.3.3 Procedures for stopping the process of translating the outer IP headers at the first embedded header and dropping the packet if it contains more embedded headers? 4.3 m 1.4 Generation of ICMPv4 Error Message 4.4 m 1.4.1 Procedures for sending back an ICMPv4 error message to the original sender of the packet, If the IPv4 packet is discarded, unless the discarded packet is itself an ICMPv4 error message. The ICMPv4 message, if sent, has a Type of 3 (Destination Unreachable) and a Code of 13 (Communication Administratively Prohibited)? 4.4 m 1.4.2 Function for allowing an administrator to configure whether the ICMPv4 error messages are sent, rate-limited, or not sent. 4.4 m 1.5 Transport-Layer Header Translation 4.5 m 1.5.1 Procedures for the recalculation and updating of the transport-layer headers that contain pseudo-headers, If the address translation algorithm is not checksum neutral? 4.5, Section 4.1 of IETF RFC 6052 m 1.5.2 For UDP packets that do not contain a UDP checksum (i.e. the UDP checksum field is zero), configuration function to allow:1. dropping the packet and generating a system management event that specifies at least the IP addresses and port numbers of the packet. 2. Calculating an IPv6 checksum and forwarding the packet? 4.5 m 1.5.3 Other transport protocols (e.g. the Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)) are OPTIONAL to support. 4.5 o 1.6 Knowing When to Translate 4.6 m 1.6.1 If the IP/ICMP translator also provides a normal forwarding function, and the destination IPv4 address is reachable by a more specific route without translation, the procedures for forwarding it without translating it. 4.6 m 1.6.2 When an IP/ICMP translator receives an IPv4 datagram addressed to an IPv4 destination representing a host in the IPv6 domain, the procedures for translating the packet to IPv6. 4.6 m 2 Procedures for translating from IPv6 to IPv4? 5 m 2.1 Procedures for translating IPv6 headers into IPv4 headers? 5.1 m 2.1.1 If there is no IPv6 Fragment Header, the IPv4 header fields contains Version, Internet Header Length, Type of Service (TOS) Octet, Total Length, Identification, Flags, Fragment Offset, Time to Live, Protocol, Header Checksum, Source Address, Destination address? 5.1 m 2.1.1.1 Procedures for setting Version field to 4? 5.1 m 2.1.1.2 Procedures for copying the IPv6 Traffic to the Type of Service (TOS) Octet and providing the ability to ignore the IPv6 traffic class and always set the IPv4 TOS Octet to a specified value? 5.1 m 2.1.1.3 Procedures for setting the value which is payload length value from the IPv6 header, plus the size of the IPv4 header. 5.1 m 2.1.1.4 Setting Identification field according to a Fragment Identification generator? 5.1 o 2.1.1.5 Procedures for setting the More Fragments flag to 0 and the Don't Fragment (DF) flag is set to 0 if the size of the translated IPv4 packet is less than or equal to 1260 bytes; otherwise, it is set to 1? 5.1 m 2.1.1.6 Procedures for setting Fragment Offset to all zeros? 5.1 m 2.1.1.7 Procedures for decrementing the Hop Limit value, and checking for 0 and sending the ICMPv4 "TTL Exceeded" or ICMPv6 "Hop Limit Exceeded" error? 5.1 m 2.1.1.8 Procedures for ignoring IPv6 headers HOPOPT (0), IPv6-Route (43), and IPv6-Opts (60)? 5.1 m 2.1.1.9 Procedures for computing the header checksum once the IPv4 header has been created? 5.1 m 2.1.1.10 Procedures for mapping Source address to an IPv4 address based on the algorithms and silently dropping illegal addresses? 5.1 m 2.1.1.11 Procedures for mapping Destination address to an IPv4 address based on the algorithms? 5.1 m 2.1.2 Procedures for ignoring any of an IPv6 Hop-by-Hop Options header, Destination Options header, or Routing header with the Segments Left field equal to zero are present in the IPv6 packet? 5.1 m ETSI ETSI TS 104 153-1 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 16 Item Does the IUT support... Reference Status Support 2.1.3 Procedures for returning an ICMPv6 "parameter problem/erroneous header field encountered" (Type 4, Code 0) error message, with the Pointer field indicating the first byte of the Segments Left field", if a Routing header with a non-zero Segments Left field is present? 5.1 m 2.1.4 Procedures for processing IPv6 fragment? 5.1.1 m 2.1.4.1 If the Next Header field of the Fragment Header is an extension header (except ESP, but including the Authentication Header (AH)), dropping the packet and log? 5.1.1 m 2.1.4.2 For other cases, set the Total Length to Payload Length value from IPv6 header, minus the length of the extension headers up to the Fragmentation Header, minus 8 for the Fragment Header, plus the size of the IPv4 header.? 5.1.1 m 2.1.4.3 Procedures for copying the low-order 16 bits in the Identification field in the Fragment Header to Identification? 5.1.1 m 2.1.4.4 The IPv4 More Fragments (MF) flag is copied from the M flag in the IPv6 Fragment Header. The IPv4 Don't Fragment (DF) flag is cleared (set to zero), allowing this packet to be further fragmented by IPv4 routers? 5.1.1 m 2.1.4.5 If the Next Header field of the Fragment Header is not an extension header (except ESP), then Fragment Offset have to be copied from the Fragment Offset field of the IPv6 Fragment Header. If the Next Header field of the Fragment Header is an extension header (except ESP), then the packet should be dropped and logged? 5.1.1 m 2.1.4.6 For ICMPv6 (58), it is changed to ICMPv4 (1); otherwise, extension headers are skipped, and the Next Header field is copied from the last IPv6 header? 5.1.1 m 2.1.4.7 If an IPv6 packet that is smaller than or equal to 1280 bytes results (after translation) in an IPv4 packet that is larger than the MTU of the next-hop interface, then the translator has to perform IPv4 fragmentation on that packet. 5.1.1 m 2.2 Procedures for translating ICMPv6 Headers into ICMPv4 Headers? 5.2 m 2.2.1 Procedures for translating ICMPv6 informational messages? 5.2 m 2.2.1.1 For Echo Request and Echo Reply (Type 128 and 129), Adjust the Type values to 8 and 0, respectively, and adjust the ICMP checksum both to take the type change into account and to exclude the ICMPv6 pseudo-header? 5.2 m 2.2.1.2 For MLD Multicast Listener Query/Report/Done (Type 130, 131, 132), silently drop? 5.2 m 2.2.1.3 For neighbour Discover messages (Type 133 through 137), silently drop? 5.2 m 2.2.1.4 For unknown informational messages, silently drop? 5.2 m 2.2.2 Procedures for ICMPv6 error messages? 5.2 m 2.2.2.1 For Destination Unreachable (Type 1), set the Type to 3, and adjust the ICMP checksum both to take the type/code change into account and to exclude the ICMPv6 pseudo-header? 5.2 m 2.2.2.1.1 For Code 0 (No route to destination), set the Code to 1 (Host unreachable)? 5.2 m 2.2.2.1.2 For Code 1 (Communication with destination administratively prohibited), set the Code to 10 (Communication with destination host administratively prohibited)? 5.2 m 2.2.2.1.3 For Code 2 (Beyond scope of source address), set the Code to 1 (Host unreachable)? 5.2 m 2.2.2.1.4 For Code 3 (Address unreachable), set the Code to 1 (Host unreachable)? 5.2 m 2.2.2.1.5 For Code 4 (Port unreachable), set the Code to 3 (Port unreachable)? 5.2 m 2.2.2.1.6 For other Code values, silently drop? 5.2 m 2.2.2.2 For Packet Too Big (Type 2) messages, translate to an ICMPv4 Destination Unreachable (Type 3) with Code 4, and adjust the ICMPv4 checksum both to take the type change into account and to exclude the ICMPv6 pseudo-header? 5.2 m 2.2.2.2.1 Adjust the MTU field for the difference between the IPv4 and IPv6 header sizes, taking into account whether or not the packet in error includes a Fragment Header, i.e. minimum ((MTU value in the Packet Too Big Message)-20, MTU_of_IPv4_nexthop, (MTU_of_IPv6_nexthop)-20)? 5.2 m ETSI ETSI TS 104 153-1 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 17 Item Does the IUT support... Reference Status Support 2.2.2.3 For Time Exceeded (Type 3) messages, set the Type to 11, and adjust the ICMPv4 checksum both to take the type change into account and to exclude the ICMPv6 pseudo-header? 5.2 m 2.2.2.4 For Parameter Problem (Type 4) messages, translate the Type and Code and adjust the ICMPv4 checksum both to take the type/code change into account and to exclude the ICMPv6 pseudo-header? 5.2 m 2.2.2.4.1 For Code 0 (Erroneous header field encountered), set to Type 12, Code 0, and update the pointer as defined in Figure 6. (If the Original IPv6 Pointer Value is not listed or the translated IPv4 Pointer Value is listed as "n/a", silently drop the packet.)? 5.2 m 2.2.2.4.2 For Code 1 (Unrecognized Next Header type encountered), translate this to an ICMPv4 protocol unreachable (Type 3, Code 2). 5.2 m 2.2.2.5 For Unknown error messages, silently drop? 5.2 m 2.2.2.6 If the received ICMPv6 packet contains an ICMPv6 Extension, adjust the ICMPv4 Extension length attribute accordingly? 5.2 m 2.2.2.7 For extensions not defined in IETF RFC 4884, pass the extensions as opaque bit strings and any IPv6 address literals contained? 5.2 IETF RFC 4884 m 2.3 Translate ICMPv6 Error Messages into ICMPv4? 5.3 m 2.3.1 Translate the ICMP error messages containing the packet in error just like a normal IP packet (except that the TTL/Hop Limit value of the inner IPv4/IPv6 packet are not decremented), and update the Total Length field in the outer IPv4 header? 5.3 m 2.3.2 Translate the inner IP header and stop at the first embedded header and drop the packet if it contains more embedded headers? 5.3 m 2.4 Generation of ICMPv6 Error Messages? 5.4 m 2.4.1 If the IPv6 packet is discarded, send back an ICMPv6 error message with Type 1 (Destination Unreachable) and Code 1 (Communication with destination administratively prohibited) to the original sender of the packet, unless the discarded packet is itself an ICMPv6 message? 5.4 m 2.4.2 Function for allowing an administrator to configure whether the ICMPv6 error messages are sent, rate-limited, or not sent? 5.4 m 2.5 Transport-Layer Header Translation? 5.5 m 2.5.1 If the address translation algorithm is not checksum neutral (see Section 4.1 of IETF RFC 6052), perform the recalculation and updating of the transport-layer headers that contain pseudo-headers, and do this for TCP, UDP, and ICMP? 5.5 m 2.5.2 Support other transport protocols (e.g. DCCP) in order to ease debugging and troubleshooting, and forward all transport protocols as described in the "Protocol" step of Section 5.1. 5 o 2.6 Knowing when to translate? 5.6 m 2.6.1 When an IP/ICMP translator receives an IPv6 datagram addressed to an IPv6 address representing a host in the IPv4 domain, translate the IPv6 packet to IPv4? 5.6 m ETSI ETSI TS 104 153-1 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 18 History Version Date Status V1.1.1 February 2026 Publication |
cc9787fab9d1cbf1a057f655ddd1d77a | 104 152-2 | 1 Scope | The present document provides the Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) pro forma for testing Server implementations for compliance to the Mission Critical Services over LTE protocol requirements defined by 3GPP, and in accordance with the relevant guidance given in ISO/IEC 9646-1 [i.6] and ISO/IEC 9646-7 [2]. The present document specifies the recommended applicability statement for the test cases included in ETSI TS 104 152-1 [4]. These applicability statements are based on the features implemented in the Server respectively. The present document is valid for Mission Critical Video (MCVideo) Servers implemented according to 3GPP releases starting from Release 14 up to the Release indicated on the cover page of the present document. The present document does not specify applicability or ICS for protocol conformance testing for the EPS (LTE) bearers which carry the Mission Critical Services data sent or received by the Client and/or the Server. These are defined in ETSI TS 136 523-2 [i.5] (3GPP TS 36.523-2). |
cc9787fab9d1cbf1a057f655ddd1d77a | 104 152-2 | 2 References | |
cc9787fab9d1cbf1a057f655ddd1d77a | 104 152-2 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found in the ETSI docbox. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI TS 136 579-5: "LTE; Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 5: Abstract test suite (ATS) (3GPP TS 36.579-5)". [2] ISO/IEC 9646-7: "Information technology - Open systems interconnection - Conformance testing methodology and framework - Part 7: Implementation Conformance Statements". [3] ETSI TS 124 581: "LTE; Mission Critical Video (MCVideo) media plane control; Protocol specification (3GPP TS 24.581)". [4] ETSI TS 104 152-1: "Mission Critical (MC) services; Mission Critical Video (MCVideo) Application Server (AS) Protocol conformance specification for server-to-server interface; Part 1: Test structure, configurations, conformance requirement and test purposes". [5] ETSI TS 123 281: "LTE; Functional architecture and information flows to support Mission Critical Video (MCVideo); Stage 2 (3GPP TS 23.281)". ETSI ETSI TS 104 152-2 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 7 |
cc9787fab9d1cbf1a057f655ddd1d77a | 104 152-2 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents may be useful in implementing an ETSI deliverable or add to the reader's understanding, but are not required for conformance to the present document. [i.1] ETSI TR 121 905: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; 5G; Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications (3GPP TR 21.905)". [i.2] ETSI TS 136 579-1: "LTE; Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 1: Common test environment (3GPP TS 36.579-1)". [i.3] ETSI TS 136 579-2: "LTE; Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 2: Mission Critical Push To Talk (MCPTT) User Equipment (UE) Protocol conformance specification (3GPP TS 36.579-2)". [i.4] ETSI TS 136 579-3: "LTE; Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 3: Mission Critical Push To Talk (MCPTT) Server Application conformance specification (3GPP TS 36.579-3)". [i.5] ETSI TS 136 523-2: "LTE; Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA) and Evolved Packet Core (EPC); User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Part 2: Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) proforma specification (3GPP TS 36.523-2)". [i.6] ISO/IEC 9646-1: "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Conformance testing methodology and framework - Part 1: General concepts". [i.7] ETSI TS 136 579-4: "LTE; Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 4: Test Applicability and Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) pro forma specification (3GPP TS 36.579-4)". [i.8] ETSI TS 136 579-6: "LTE; Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 6: Mission Critical Video (MCVideo) User Equipment (UE) Protocol conformance specification (3GPP TS 36.579-6)". [i.9] ETSI TS 136 579-7: "LTE; Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 7: Mission Critical Data (MCData) User Equipment (UE) Protocol conformance specification (3GPP TS 36.579-7)". [i.10] 3GPP TS 36.579-8: "Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 8: Mission Critical Video (MCVideo) Server Application conformance specification". [i.11] 3GPP TS 36.579-9: "Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 9: Mission Critical Data (MCData) Server Application conformance specification". |
cc9787fab9d1cbf1a057f655ddd1d77a | 104 152-2 | 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations | |
cc9787fab9d1cbf1a057f655ddd1d77a | 104 152-2 | 3.1 Definitions | For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ETSI TR 121 905 [i.1] (3GPP TR 21.905) and the following apply: NOTE 1: A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in ETSI TR 121 905 [i.1] (3GPP TR 21.905). In addition for the purposes of the present document, the following terms, definitions, symbols and abbreviations apply: • such given in ISO/IEC 9646-1 [i.6] and ISO/IEC 9646-7 [2]. ETSI ETSI TS 104 152-2 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 8 NOTE 2: Some terms and abbreviations defined in ISO/IEC 9646-1 [i.6] and ISO/IEC 9646-7 [2] are explicitly included below with small modification to reflect the terminology used in 3GPP. ICS pro forma: form of a questionnaire, which when completed for an implementation or system becomes an ICS Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS): statement made by the supplier of an implementation or system claimed to conform to a given specification, stating which capabilities have been implemented Implementation eXtra Information for Testing (IXIT): statement made by a supplier or implementer of an UEUT which contains or references all of the information (in addition to that given in the ICS) related to the UEUT and its testing environment, which will enable the test laboratory to run an appropriate test suite against the UEUT. IUT containing MCX Client: statement identifying which entity, and associated requirements, from the MCX service architecture is subject of testing NOTE: Depending on the ETSI TS 136 579-5 [1] (3GPP TS 36.579-5) test model being used, the LTE UE (with the MCX Client installed) is considered as the IUT (MCX EUTRA test model), or, only the MCX Client is considered as the IUT (MCX IPCAN test model). In both cases the SUT is the UE, communicating with the SS over the Uu radio interface. IXIT pro forma: form of a questionnaire, which when completed for an UEUT becomes an IXIT Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS): ICS for an implementation or system claimed to conform to a given protocol specification Protocol Implementation eXtra Information for Testing (PIXIT): IXIT related to testing for conformance to a given protocol specification static conformance review: review of the extent to which the static conformance requirements are claimed to be supported by the UEUT, by comparing the answers in the ICS(s) with the static conformance requirements expressed in the relevant specification(s) |
cc9787fab9d1cbf1a057f655ddd1d77a | 104 152-2 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
cc9787fab9d1cbf1a057f655ddd1d77a | 104 152-2 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in ETSI TR 121 905 [i.1] (3GPP TR 21.905) and the following apply: NOTE: An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in ETSI TR 121 905 [i.1] (3GPP TR 21.905). ICS Implementation Conformance Statement IPCAN IP Connectivity Access Network IUT Implementation Under Test IXIT Implementation eXtra Information for Testing MC Mission Critical MCData Mission Critical Data MCPTT Mission Critical Push To Talk MCVideo Mission Critical Video TC Test Case ETSI ETSI TS 104 152-2 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 9 |
cc9787fab9d1cbf1a057f655ddd1d77a | 104 152-2 | 4 Recommended Test Case Applicability | The applicability of each individual test is identified in Table 4-1 (MCVideo Server). This is just a recommendation based on the purpose for which the test case was written. The applicability of every test is formally expressed by the use of Boolean expression that are based on parameters (ICS) included in annex A of the present document. Additional information related to the Test Case (TC), e.g. affecting its dynamic behaviour or its execution may be provided as well The columns in Table 4-1 have the following meaning: Clause The clause column indicates the clause number in ETSI TS 104 152-1 [4] respectively which contains the test body. Title The title column describes the name of the test and contains the clause title of the clause in ETSI TS 104 152-1 [4] respectively which contains the test body. Release The release column indicates the earliest release from which the test case is applicable. In some specific cases it may indicate the release(s) for which the TC is only applicable. NOTE 1: Some exceptions to this interpretation may be indicated in Notes in column 'Number of TC Executions'. Applicability - Condition The following notations are used for the applicability column: R recommended - the test case is recommended O optional - the test case is optional N/A not applicable - in the given context, the test case is not recommended. Ci conditional - the test is recommended ("R") or not ("N/A") depending on the support of other items. "i" is an integer identifying a unique conditional status expression which is defined immediately following the table. For nested conditional expressions, the syntax "IF ... THEN (IF ... THEN ... ELSE...) ELSE ..." is used to avoid ambiguities. NOTE 2: The conditions are defined in Table 4-1a (MCVideo Server). To avoid ambiguity for the MCVideo Server testing conditions the notation of CCi is used. Applicability - Comments This column contains a verbal description of the condition. Additional Information - Specific ICS This column contains the mnemonics of ICS(s) affecting the dynamic behaviour of the TC. NOTE 3: ICS items specified in other test specifications can be referred, to avoid redundant definitions. Additional Information - Specific IXIT This column contains the mnemonics of IXIT(s) affecting the dynamic behaviour of the TC. IXITs are defined in ETSI TS 136 579-5 [1] (3GPP TS 36.579-5). ETSI ETSI TS 104 152-2 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 10 Additional Information - Number of TC Executions This column contains, wherever applicable, the recommended for certification purposes number of TC executions. It may contain also other information e.g. exceptions to the release applicable to the test. Clarifying notes when available are listed in dedicated tables with table numbers having the suffix "b". ETSI ETSI TS 104 152-2 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 11 Table 4-1: Applicability of MCVideo Server tests and additional information for testing Clause TC Title Release Applicability Additional Information Condition Comment Specific ICS Specific IXIT Number of TC Executions 5 MCVideo Server – MCVideo Server operation 5.1 Group Calls 5.1.1 Pre-arranged Group Call 5.1.1.1 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Server / Pre- arranged Group Call / Upgrade to Emergency Group Call / Cancel Emergency State / Upgrade to Imminent Peril Group call / Cancel Imminent Peril State / Controlling server Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCVideo Server 5.1.1.2 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Server / Pre- arranged Group Call / Automatic Commencement / Upgrade to Emergency Group Call / Cancel Emergency State / Upgrade to Imminent Peril Group call / Cancel Imminent Peril State / Terminating Participating server Rel-15 CC02 IUT is MCVideo Server 5.1.1.3 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Server / Pre- arranged Group Call / Upgrade to Emergency Group Call / Cancel Emergency State / Upgrade to Imminent Peril Group call / Cancel Imminent Peril State / Originating Participating server Rel-15 CC03 IUT is MCVideo Server 5.1.1.4 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Server / Pre- arranged Group Call / Manual Commencement / Terminating Participating server Rel-15 CC02 IUT is MCVideo Server 5.1.1.5 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Server / Pre- arranged Group Call / Emergency Group Call / Controlling server Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCVideo Server 5.1.1.6 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Server / Pre- arranged Group Call / Emergency Group Call / Terminating Participating server Rel-15 CC02 IUT is MCVideo Server 5.1.1.7 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Server / Pre- arranged Group Call / Emergency Group Call / Originating Participating server Rel-15 CC03 IUT is MCVideo Server 5.1.1.8 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Server / Pre- arranged Group Call / Imminent Peril Group Call / Controlling server Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCVideo Server 5.1.1.9 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Server / Pre- arranged Group Call / Imminent Peril Group Call / Terminating Participating server Rel-15 CC02 IUT is MCVideo Server 5.1.1.10 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Server / Pre- arranged Group Call / Imminent Peril Group Call / Originating Participating server Rel-15 CC03 IUT is MCVideo Server 5.1.1.11 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Server / Broadcast Group Call / Controlling server Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCVideo Server 5.1.1.12 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Server / Broadcast Group Call / Terminating Participating server Rel-15 CC02 IUT is MCVideo Server 5.1.1.13 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Server / Broadcast Group Call / Originating Participating server Rel-15 CC03 IUT is MCVideo Server ETSI ETSI TS 104 152-2 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 12 Clause TC Title Release Applicability Additional Information Condition Comment Specific ICS Specific IXIT Number of TC Executions 5.1.1.14 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Server / Pre- arranged Group Call / Transmission Control State Transitions / Controlling server Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCVideo Server 5.1.1.15 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Server / Pre- arranged Group Call / Reception Control State Transitions / Controlling server Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCVideo Server 5.1.2 Chat Group Call 5.1.2.1 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Server / Chat Group Call / Upgrade to Emergency Group Call / Cancel Emergency State / Upgrade to Imminent Peril Group call / Cancel Imminent Peril State / Controlling server Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCVideo Server 5.1.2.2 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Server / Chat Group Call / Originating Participating server Rel-15 CC03 IUT is MCVideo Server 5.1.2.3 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Server / Chat Group Call / Emergency Group Call / Controlling server Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCVideo Server 5.1.2.4 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Server / Chat Group Call / Emergency Group Call / Terminating Participating server Rel-15 CC02 IUT is MCVideo Server 5.1.2.5 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Server / Chat Group Call / Emergency Group Call / Originating Participating server Rel-15 CC03 IUT is MCVideo Server 5.1.2.6 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Server / Chat Group Call / Imminent Peril Group Call / Controlling server Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCVideo Server 5.1.2.7 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Server / Chat Group Call / Imminent Peril Group Call / Terminating Participating server Rel-15 CC02 IUT is MCVideo Server 5.1.2.8 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Server / Chat Group Call / Imminent Peril Group Call / Originating Participating server Rel-15 CC03 IUT is MCVideo Server 5.2 Private Calls 5.2.1 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Server / Private Call / Automatic Commencement Mode / With Transmission Control / Upgrade to Emergency Call / Cancellation of Emergency on User Request / Controlling server Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCVideo Server 5.2.2 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Server / Private Call / Manual Commencement Mode / Without Transmission Control / Controlling server Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCVideo Server 5.3 Video Push 5.3.1 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Server / Video push Call / One-to-one video push call / Controlling server Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCVideo Server 5.4 Video Pull 5.4.1 MCVideo Server - MCVideo Server / Video pull Call / One-to-one video pull call / Controlling server Rel-15 CC01 IUT is MCVideo Server ETSI ETSI TS 104 152-2 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 13 Table 4-1a: Applicability of tests Conditions MCVideo Server CC01 IF A.4.1-1/1 THEN R ELSE N/A CC02 IF A.4.1-1/2 THEN R ELSE N/A CC03 IF A.4.1-1/3 THEN R ELSE N/A ETSI ETSI TS 104 152-2 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 14 Annex A (normative): ICS pro forma for Mission Critical Services A.0 The right to copy Notwithstanding the provisions of the copyright clause related to the text of the present document, ETSI grants that users of the present document may freely reproduce the ICS pro forma for Mission Critical Services pro forma in this Annex so that it can be used for its intended purposes and may further publish the completed ICS pro forma for Mission Critical Services. A.1 Guidance for completing the ICS pro forma A.1.1 Purposes and structure The purpose of this ICS pro forma is to provide a mechanism whereby a supplier of an implementation of the requirements defined in relevant specifications may provide information about the implementation in a standardised manner. The ICS pro forma is subdivided into clauses for the following categories of information: - instructions for completing the ICS pro forma; - identification of the implementation; - identification of the protocol; - ICS pro forma tables (for example: Client implementation, Server implementation, etc.). A.1.2 Abbreviations and conventions The ICS pro forma contained in this annex is comprised of information in tabular form in accordance with the guidelines presented in ISO/IEC 9646-7. Item column The item column contains a number which identifies the item in the table. Item description column The item description column describes in free text each respective item (e.g. parameters, timers, etc.). It implicitly means "is <item description> supported by the implementation?". Reference column The reference column gives reference to the relevant ETSI core specifications. Release column The release column indicates the earliest release from which the capability or option is relevant. Mnemonic column The Mnemonic column contains mnemonic identifiers for each item. ETSI ETSI TS 104 152-2 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 15 Comments column This column is left blank for particular use by the reader of the present document. References to items For each possible item answer (answer in the support column) within the ICS pro forma there exists a unique reference, used, for example, in the conditional expressions. It is defined as the table identifier, followed by a solidus character "/", followed by the item number in the table. If there is more than one support column in a table, the columns shall be discriminated by letters (a, b, etc.), respectively. A.1.3 Instructions for completing the ICS pro forma The supplier of the implementation may complete the ICS pro forma in each of the spaces provided. More detailed instructions are given at the beginning of the different clauses of the ICS pro forma. A.2 Identification of the MCVideo Server Equipment A.2.0 Introduction Identification of the MCVideo Server should be filled in so as to provide as much detail as possible regarding version numbers and configuration options. The product supplier information and client information should both be filled in if they are different. A person who can answer queries regarding information supplied in the ICS should be named as the contact person. A.2.1 Date of the statement ......................................................................................................................................................................................... A.2.2 MCVideo Server under test identification MCVideo Server under test name: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Hardware configuration: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Software configuration: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ETSI ETSI TS 104 152-2 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 16 A.2.3 Product supplier Name: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Address: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Telephone number: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Facsimile number: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... E-mail address: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Additional information: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... A.2.4 The Organisation responsible for the Product testing Name: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Address: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Telephone number: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Facsimile number: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... E-mail address: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ETSI ETSI TS 104 152-2 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 17 Additional information: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... A.2.5 ICS contact person Name: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Telephone number: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Facsimile number: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... E-mail address: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Additional information: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... A.3 Identification of the protocol This ICS pro forma applies to the ETSI standards listed in the normative references clause of the present document. A.4 ICS pro forma tables A.4.1 Implementation Types Table A.4.1-1: Mission Critical Services general functionality Item Functionality Ref. Release Mnemonic Comments 1 MCVideo Server performing Controlling role ETSI TS 123.281 (3GPP TS 23.281) Rel-14 pc_MCVideoServer_Contr olling 2 MCVideo Server performing Terminating Participating role ETSI TS 123.281 (3GPP TS 23.281) Rel-14 pc_MCVideoServer_Term Part 3 MCVideo Server performing Originating Participating role ETSI TS 123.281 (3GPP TS 23.281) Rel-14 pc_MCVideoServer_OrigP art ETSI ETSI TS 104 152-2 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 18 A.4.2 Additional information Table A.4.2-1: Additional information Item Additional information Ref. Release Mnemonic Comments 1 The MCVideo Server supports transmission request queueing ETSI TS 124.581 (3GPP TS 24.581) Rel-14 pc_MCVideo_Tran smissionRequestQ ueueing The MCVideo server applies Transmission Request Queueing ETSI ETSI TS 104 152-2 V1.1.1 (2026-02) 19 History Version Date Status V1.1.1 February 2026 Publication |
700e2f9cc025d565da15725694fe1bf2 | 104 008 | 1 Scope | The present document specifies the key aspects of Continuous Auditing-Based Conformity Assessment (CABCA) as an audit methodology to evaluate and assess an AI system's conformity to relevant standards and regulations in a continuous manner. The present document applies to all types of organizations involved in the quality management of any of the lifecycle stages of AI systems as well as to any AI stakeholder roles. The present document specifies: • Principles underlying CABCA, including independence, reliability, stakeholder trust and transparency. • CABCA assessment process, covering architecture, roles and procedures. • Outcome of the assessments, including the issuance or revocation of conformity status. |
700e2f9cc025d565da15725694fe1bf2 | 104 008 | 2 References | |
700e2f9cc025d565da15725694fe1bf2 | 104 008 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found in the ETSI docbox. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ISO/IEC 42001:2023: "Information technology — Artificial intelligence — Management system". [2] ISO 19011:2018: "Guidelines for auditing management systems" (Edition 3, 2018). [3] ISO 9001:2015: "Quality management systems — Requirements" (Edition 5, 2015). |
700e2f9cc025d565da15725694fe1bf2 | 104 008 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents may be useful in implementing an ETSI deliverable or add to the reader's understanding, but are not required for conformance to the present document. [i.1] P. Pfeiffer et al.: "Towards a Standard Process enabling AI-support for Safety and Conformity of Medical Devices", 2022. [i.2] J. Mökander et al.: "Conformity Assessments and Post-market Monitoring: A Guide to the Role of Auditing in the Proposed European AI Regulation", Minds and Machines, vol. 32, pp. 241-268, 2022. [i.3] L. Floridi et al.: "capAI - A Procedure for Conducting Conformity Assessment of AI Systems in Line with the EU Artificial Intelligence Act", SSRN Electronic Journal, 2022. ETSI ETSI TS 104 008 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 8 [i.4] C. A. Sánchez: "Role of Measurement in Conformity Assessment", in Handbook of Quality System, Accreditation and Conformity Assessment, Springer, 2024. [i.5] T. Granlund et al.: "On Medical Device Software CE Compliance and Conformity Assessment", arXiv preprint arXiv:2103.06815, 2021. [i.6] ETSI TR 103 910: "Methods for Testing and Specification (MTS); AI Testing; Test Methodology and Test Specification for ML-based Systems". [i.7] K. Lam et al.: "A Framework for Assurance Audits of Algorithmic Systems", in Proc. ACM FAccT '24, 2024. [i.8] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST): "Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0)", NIST AI 100-1, 2023. [i.9] Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act). [i.10] High-Level Expert Group on AI: "Ethics guidelines for trustworthy AI", European Commission, Apr. 8, 2019. [i.11] ETSI TR 104 119: "Methods for Testing & Specification (MTS); AI Testing; Guidelines for Documentation of AI-enabled Systems". |
700e2f9cc025d565da15725694fe1bf2 | 104 008 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
700e2f9cc025d565da15725694fe1bf2 | 104 008 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: AI - risk management frameworks: guidelines and best practices for identifying, assessing, and mitigating risks associated with Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems, such as machine learning models, to ensure their safe and responsible use AI system: machine-based system that is designed to operate with varying levels of autonomy and that may exhibit adaptiveness after deployment, and that, for explicit or implicit objectives, infers, from the input it receives, how to generate outputs such as predictions, content, recommendations or decisions AI system lifecycle: entire sequence of activities relating to an AI system, from its initial ideation, requirements gathering, and design, through its development, deployment, operation, monitoring and eventual decommissioning assessment engine: software component that automates the evaluation of collected artifacts against predefined quality criteria to generate quality assessment outcomes assessment report: document providing detailed information on the AI System's compliance status NOTE: The assessment report involves regularly updating stakeholders by mapping measurement results to specific requirements categorized under relevant quality dimensions, ensuring transparency and building trust in the adherence to relevant standards and regulations. conformity assessment: process of evaluating and determining whether a product, service, or system complies with specified requirements, such as standards or regulations conformity specification: foundational document outlining the required standards and guidelines, originating from sources like international bodies, national standards, industry guidelines, internal policies, and legislative requirements, to ensure systems meet the necessary compliance criteria continuous assessment: automated collection and evaluation of measurement results against predefined metric thresholds operating in a continuous manner ETSI ETSI TS 104 008 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 9 continuous auditing: ongoing process of collecting, analysing, and reporting audit-related information, typically conducted in real-time or near-real-time, to provide stakeholders with timely insights into an organization's operations and compliance status metrics and measurements: set of defined parameters and established quantification methods assigned to requirements in CABCA NOTE: These are crucial for the auditable and applicable framework provided by CABCA for continuous assessment. ML life cycle: technical process that is a subset of the broader AI System Lifecycle, comprising the stages of data preparation, model engineering, evaluation, and deployment, which culminate in the creation and operationalization of a model MLOps: set of practices and methodologies for managing the lifecycle of Machine Learning (ML) models, including development, deployment and maintenance model: technical component or representation of learned knowledge within an AI system, such as a neural network or a foundation model, derived from a machine learning process operationalization: process in CABCA of translating high-level Conformity Specifications into actionable steps and machine-readable metrics NOTE: This process includes the documentation of operational decisions and the setup of automated assessments. operationalization specification: specification that ensures the proper instantiation of the CABCA measurement and evidence collection system quality dimensions: fundamental aspects in CABCA used to assess AI compliance, including accuracy, robustness, avoidance of unwanted bias, accountability, privacy and security NOTE: Each dimension is broken down into specific, manageable components for precise auditing. risk traceability: capability in CABCA ensuring that each risk mitigation action is linked back to its original risk and source specification, maintaining clarity and accountability stakeholder: individual, group, or organization that has an interest or concern in an AI system NOTE: Stakeholders can affect or be affected by the AI system's actions, objectives, and policies. |
700e2f9cc025d565da15725694fe1bf2 | 104 008 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
700e2f9cc025d565da15725694fe1bf2 | 104 008 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: AI Artificial Intelligence API Application Programming Interface CABCA Continuous Auditing-Based Conformity Assessment CE Conformité Européenne ER Entity-Relationship ESO European Standardization Organization GDPR General Data Protection Regulation HEN Harmonised European Standard HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act IEC International Electrotechnical Commission ISO International Organization for Standardization MIL Military ML Machine Learning MLOp Machine Learning Operations NER Named Entity Recognition ETSI ETSI TS 104 008 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 10 NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology QMS Quality Management System STD Standard TD Technical Documentation UL Underwriters Laboratories |
700e2f9cc025d565da15725694fe1bf2 | 104 008 | 4 CABCA Motivation and Overview | |
700e2f9cc025d565da15725694fe1bf2 | 104 008 | 4.1 Imperative of CABCA in AI System Assurance | The European Union's Artificial Intelligence Act (EU AI Act) [i.9] establishes comprehensive obligations for providers of high-risk AI systems, encompassing critical areas such as risk management (Art. 9), technical documentation (Art. 11), quality management (Art. 17), conformity assessment (Art. 43), the EU Declaration of Conformity (Art. 47), and post-market monitoring (Art. 72) [1], [i.2], [i.3]. These requirements form a tightly interlinked compliance framework demanding sustained conformity throughout the AI system's lifecycle. Satisfying these legal obligations effectively, especially at scale and given the dynamic nature of AI, necessitates an operational framework capable of translating legal specifications into verifiable, continuously monitored processes. This regulatory imperative creates a distinct demand for methodologies that can manage this complexity and ensure ongoing compliance, moving beyond traditional static assessments. This need is driven significantly by regulations like the EU AI Act, which places organizations, including stakeholders like manufacturers, vendors, and providers, under increasing pressure to ensure their AI systems meet stringent quality and compliance standards. This necessity stems from a broad spectrum of stakeholders, including regulators, customers, and society at large, who demand assurance that AI systems are accurate, robust, fair, secure, and respect privacy [i.2], [i.3]. The challenge, however, lies in translating these high-level, often abstract, requirements into tangible and measurable attributes that can be assessed continuously throughout the AI system's lifecycle [i.1], [i.4]. Such assessment criteria are required by the European Standardisation Request on AI to underpin the European legislation on AI. This is where CABCA emerges as a methodology, directly addressing the unique needs required by regulations like the EU AI Act and the inherent challenges of AI system assurance. CABCA addresses the specific needs of AI system operators in terms of quality management by operationalizing conformity in a manner distinct from traditional process-oriented management systems while also providing assurance for regulators, customers, and society. Whereas quality management systems that ensure compliance of AI systems address the broad processes of AI development, deployment, upkeep, and governance, CABCA targets the specificities of AI systems themselves. For this, CABCA defines how to translate high-level requirements (like those in the AI Act and related standards) into actionable metrics, ensuring that abstract standards become tangible and assessable [i.1], [i.5]. Moreover, the inherent dynamic nature of AI systems, characterized by frequent updates to models and changes in data sources - aspects directly relevant to the Act's post-market monitoring requirements (Art. 72) - demands a continuous conformity assessment methodology [i.3], [i.4]. CABCA rises to this challenge by supporting ongoing reassessment, thus ensuring that AI systems consistently align with evolving standards and regulations like the EU AI Act, enhancing their compliance and reliability over time for the benefit of all stakeholders. It is important to state that CABCA's specific continuous assessment approach is proposed as a method to effectively meet the Act's intent, particularly given the dynamic nature of AI, rather than being an explicitly mandated mechanism itself. However, this approach is forward-looking, anticipating that future harmonised standards will likely require continuous assessment to ensure ongoing compliance. ETSI ETSI TS 104 008 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 11 Figure 4.1‑1: EU-AI Acts mapping to CABCA The interrelationship between these key articles and CABCA's supporting role is illustrated in Figure 4.1-1, which details the interconnected compliance workflow for high-risk AI systems under the EU AI Act. The figure explains how foundational obligations are translated into operational evidence for formal assessment and declaration. The process begins with the core provider obligations of establishing a Risk Management (Art. 9) system and a Post-Market Monitoring (Art. 72) plan. These are not standalone activities; they should be integrated into the provider's operational framework. The arrows show this operationalization: • The procedures, plans and results of these activities should be formally 'Documented in TD (Annex IV.5/IV.9)'. The Technical Documentation (TD) serves as the central repository of evidence about the AI system itself, detailing its design, capabilities, and the specific risk and monitoring measures applied to it. • Simultaneously, the processes for conducting risk management and post-market monitoring should be 'Included in QMS (Art. 17(1)(g/h))'. This ensures these activities are embedded within the provider's organizational Quality Management System (QMS), demonstrating a systematic, repeatable and managed approach to compliance. Together, the Technical Documentation (Art. 11, Annex IV) and the Quality Management System (Art. 17) form the comprehensive body of proof that serves as 'Evidence For' the Conformity Assessment (Art. 43 / Annex VII). During this assessment, an auditor evaluates this evidence to verify that the provider's claims of compliance are substantiated. Following a successful assessment, the provider 'Generates (47.1)' the formal EU Declaration of Conformity (Art 47). To close the evidence loop, a 'Copy kept in TD (Annex IV.8)' ensures this final declaration is included in the system's official documentation. CABCA is designed to directly support the 'Operationalization' (blue) and 'Assessment & Declaration' (green) phases. It provides the structured methodology to translate abstract legal requirements into measurable controls and to continuously generate the verifiable, up-to-date evidence that populates the TD and QMS, thereby enabling a robust and manageable compliance lifecycle. ETSI ETSI TS 104 008 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 12 |
700e2f9cc025d565da15725694fe1bf2 | 104 008 | 4.2 Comparison of CABCA with Traditional Audit Processes | Figure 4.2‑1: CABCA comparison to a traditional audit While CABCA serves the fundamental audit objective of evaluating conformity against requirements, its operational structure differs significantly from a traditional generic audit process, such as one guided by ISO 19011:2018 [2]. The simplified process flows illustrated in Figure 4.2‑1 highlights these key distinctions. In the CABCA framework, A0 Scoping is a standing organizational activity that produces a formal Conformity Specification prior to any CABCA run, whereas B0 Identification of Requirements belongs to a single traditional audit engagement and is performed once per audit as part of audit planning. The CABCA process is color-coded: the 'Scoping' phase (A0) is highlighted in yellow, the 'Operationalization' phase (A1) is highlighted in blue, while the continuous 'Assessment' cycle (A2-A5) is highlighted in green. The differences between the classic process and CABCA are described below, based on the structure of the classic process: 1) Identifications of Requirements: Both processes begin with determining the applicable requirements. In a traditional audit, this is the 'Identification of Requirements' (B0), a foundational activity performed as part of the initial audit planning to establish the audit criteria. In contrast, 'Scoping' (A0) is treated as a prerequisite governance activity that occurs within an organization before the CABCA methodology is implemented. The explicit output of this scoping phase - a formal Conformity Specification - is then used as the mandatory input for the first active CABCA phase, Operationalization (A1), thereby establishing a clear and traceable foundation for automation. ETSI ETSI TS 104 008 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 13 2) Planning & Risk Assessment: In a traditional audit, this is typically a distinct upfront phase (B1), involving defining objectives, scope, criteria, and applying a risk-based approach to determine the audit strategy and plan (ISO 19011:2018 [2], clause 6.3 Preparing audit activities, clause 6.3.2 Audit planning, clause 6.3.3 Assigning work to audit team, clause 6.3.4 Preparing documented information for audit)). For CABCA, "Operationalization" (A1) incorporates this phase. It includes the essential Planning & Risk Assessment steps but extends them to translate requirements into detailed, machine-readable metrics and set up the automation framework (clause 5). This phase effectively configures the continuous assessment engine, integrating planning directly into the mechanism for execution. 3) Fieldwork / Evidence Gathering: The traditional audit involves "Fieldwork / Evidence Gathering" (B2), where auditors manually collect and verify information through interviews, observations, and document review during a specific period (ISO 19011:2018 [2], clause 6.4 Conducting audit activities, clause 6.4.2 Collecting and verifying information). CABCA's "Continuous Evidence Gathering & Measurement" (A2) is fundamentally different. It is an automated, ongoing process that collects data from system artifacts (clause 6.2) using programmed measurements, replacing periodic manual collection with continuous monitoring. Both approaches adhere to the principle of obtaining sufficient, appropriate audit evidence (ISO 19011:2018 [2], clause 4 Principles of auditing - Evidence-based approach). 4) Analysis & Findings: Traditional audits involve analysing collected evidence against audit criteria to generate Analysis & Findings (B3), often requiring auditor judgment (ISO 19011:2018 [2], clause 6.5 Generating audit findings, clause 6.5.1 Evaluating audit evidence, clause 6.5.2 Identifying and recording audit findings). In CABCA, the "Automated Analysis & Findings Mapping" (A3) performs this step programmatically. Measurement results are automatically compared against predefined thresholds from the operationalization phase (clause 6.1), and deviations are identified as findings, enabling rapid identification of nonconformity. 5) Reporting: Reporting (B4) in a traditional audit typically involves issuing a formal Assessment Report upon completion of the engagement (ISO 19011:2018 [2], clause 6.6 Completing audit, clause 6.6.1 Assessment Report). CABCA's "Continuous Reporting & Status Updates" (A4) provides more frequent communication. It focuses on providing dynamic conformity status updates and reports based on the continuous analysis (clause 6.1 and 6.4), reflecting the real-time nature of the assessment. 6) Follow-up & Monitoring: The traditional audit process includes a distinct " Follow-up & Monitoring" phase (B5) where actions taken to address findings are verified (ISO 19011:2018 [2], clause 6.7 Completing audit, implicitly part of programme management to verify action effectiveness). In CABCA, "Iterative Follow-up & Monitoring" (A5) is integrated into the continuous loop (A5 --> A2). A change in conformity status triggers the need for corrective action, and the effectiveness of these actions is verified through the next cycle of continuous measurement and analysis, rather than a separate follow-up activity. In essence, CABCA adapts the core principles and phases outlined in standards like ISO 19011:2018 [2], but re-engineers them for a continuous, automated application specifically suited for the dynamic evaluation of AI systems and similar technologies. |
700e2f9cc025d565da15725694fe1bf2 | 104 008 | 5 Fundamentals of CABCA | |
700e2f9cc025d565da15725694fe1bf2 | 104 008 | 5.1 General | CABCA is a dynamic methodology designed for the continuous assessment of an AI system's adherence to relevant requirements. CABCA implementation is established on a per-system basis, as this allows for the necessary specificity in auditing. However, the framework and the operationalization logic developed for one system can often be adapted and reused for other, similar AI systems within an organization, promoting efficiency and consistency. The requirements that CABCA assesses can originate from various sources, including: a) requirements in regulations like the AI Act as well as sector-specific legislation; b) requirements set by bodies from standardization worldwide like ISO, ETSI and CEN; c) additional market rules or internal company policies; and d) customer demands. ETSI ETSI TS 104 008 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 14 Figure 5.1-1: CABCA Process flow, for building Stakeholder Trust, showing initial setup (solid arrows) and frequent assessment (dashed arrows) As illustrated in Figure 5.1-1, CABCA is structured to systematically generate and maintain stakeholder trust through transparent processes and verifiable artifacts. Distinct phases and actions of CABCA are visually differentiated by colors and arrow types. Inputs explicitly include prior assessment results (including corrective actions), data used by or produced from the AI system, and the measurement tools/methods configured for assessments (see clauses 7.2.1 and 8.1.5). Foundational trust in the audit method is established through an initial setup process, indicated by solid arrows. This begins with the Inputs being fed into the "A1: Operationalization phase" (blue box). The key output of this foundational phase is the Operationalization Specification artifact. The present document, which details how conformity will be measured, is provided to Stakeholders for a formal Initial Review and Approvement, an action indicated by the double- lined arrow. This foundational approval process is conducted once at the start and is repeated only when significant changes are made to the AI-System, including its Data, or its Conformity Specifications. Prior assessment results also serve as an input to inform adaptations, ensuring that the audit method remains aligned and trusted. ETSI ETSI TS 104 008 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 15 Ongoing trust in the audit results is maintained through a frequent assessment cycle, indicated by dashed arrows. The approved A1 phase configures the "A2-A5: Continuous Assessment phases" (green box), which consists of Continuous Evidence Gathering & Measurement (A2), Automated Analysis & Findings Mapping (A3), Continuous Reporting & Status Updates (A4), and Iterative Follow-up & Monitoring (A5). These phases are triggered frequently. This phase generates a recurring "Assessment Report" that is provided for "Frequent Review and Approvement". To build trust, this report includes a clear conformity status, detailed findings mapped to specific requirements, and links to the underlying verifiable evidence, providing a transparent basis for the review process. The feedback from this recurring review informs the ongoing assessment cycle. By separating the foundational approval of the method from the frequent approval of the results, CABCA creates a robust and transparent framework for building and sustaining stakeholder confidence. |
700e2f9cc025d565da15725694fe1bf2 | 104 008 | 5.2 Mandatory Prerequisites for Implementing CABCA | |
700e2f9cc025d565da15725694fe1bf2 | 104 008 | 5.2.1 General | Successful implementation and operation of the CABCA methodology shall be contingent upon the organization meeting specific mandatory prerequisites. These prerequisites represent the necessary input conditions and foundational capabilities required before CABCA can be effectively applied. They are distinct from the capabilities or outcomes facilitated by the CABCA process itself. Organizations intending to implement CABCA shall ensure the following requirements are met: i) comprehensive knowledge base; ii) technical and operational expertise; iii) infrastructure and methodological framework; and iv) risk management and stakeholder engagement. These requirements are further explained in the following clauses. |
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