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6189a1f76fc571fd85565ed4db067de7 | 104 233 | 5 REST based protocol stack | |
6189a1f76fc571fd85565ed4db067de7 | 104 233 | 5.1 General | The layers of the protocol stack for the R1 interface are described in the following chapters: • TCP [2] provides the communication service at the transport layer, • TLS [10] is used as specified in SPS [13], clause 4.2 to provide secure HTTP [17] [18] connections, • HTTP [16] [17] [18] is used as application-level protocol, ETSI ETSI TS 104 233 V4.3.0 (2026-02) 7 • the data interchange layer constitutes the transport of documents in the JSON format [8]. Figure 5.1-1 illustrates the REST based protocol stack for the R1 interface. Physical layer Data link layer IP TCP TLS HTTP JSON Physical Data Link Network Transport Security Application Data Interchange Figure 5.1-1: REST Based Protocol Stack for the R1 Interface |
6189a1f76fc571fd85565ed4db067de7 | 104 233 | 5.2 Network layer | As network layer at least one of IPv6 [9] or IPv4 [1] shall be supported. |
6189a1f76fc571fd85565ed4db067de7 | 104 233 | 5.3 Transport layer | TCP [2] shall be supported as transport protocol. NOTE: When using TCP as the transport protocol, an HTTP connection is mapped to a TCP connection. |
6189a1f76fc571fd85565ed4db067de7 | 104 233 | 5.4 Security | The specification of security controls on the R1 interface in SRS [12], clause 5.2.6.2 shall be followed. These security controls refer to the detailed specification of the support and use of TLS v1.2 and TLS v1.3 (IETF RFC 8446 [10]), and OAuth2.0 [14] with JSON Web Tokens (JWT) (IETF RFC 7519 [15]) in the O-RAN TS SPS [13]. |
6189a1f76fc571fd85565ed4db067de7 | 104 233 | 5.5 Application | As application layer, HTTP/1.1 [17] shall be supported, and HTTP/2 [18] should be supported. The HTTP semantics as defined in IETF RFC 9110 [16] shall be supported. HTTP over TLS (as defined in IETF RFC 9112 for HTTP/1.1 [17] and in IETF RFC 9113 [18] for HTTP/2) shall be supported. HTTP details such as use of standard headers, custom headers, error codes, methods, URIs, etc. will be specified in Application Protocols for R1 Services. The default TCP port numbers should be used for HTTP operation. |
6189a1f76fc571fd85565ed4db067de7 | 104 233 | 5.6 Data interchange | As a data interchange format, JSON [8] shall be supported. ETSI ETSI TS 104 233 V4.3.0 (2026-02) 8 |
6189a1f76fc571fd85565ed4db067de7 | 104 233 | 6 Kafka based protocol stack | |
6189a1f76fc571fd85565ed4db067de7 | 104 233 | 6.1 General | The Kafka based protocol stack for the R1 interface includes the following layers: • TCP [2] provides the communication service at the transport layer; • TLS [10] is used to provide secure connections at the security layer; • the Kafka Protocol Guide [20] is used at the application layer; • the data interchange layer constitutes the serialization format in which data are represented. Figure 6.1-1 illustrates the Kafka based protocol stack for the R1 interface. Physical layer Data link layer IP TCP TLS Kafka Serialization format Physical Data Link Network Transport Security Application Data Interchange Figure 6.1-1: Kafka Based Protocol Stack for the R1 interface |
6189a1f76fc571fd85565ed4db067de7 | 104 233 | 6.2 Network layer | As network layer at least one of IPv6 [9] or Ipv4 [1] shall be supported. |
6189a1f76fc571fd85565ed4db067de7 | 104 233 | 6.3 Transport layer | TCP [2] shall be supported as defined in Kafka Protocol Guide [20]. |
6189a1f76fc571fd85565ed4db067de7 | 104 233 | 6.4 Security | The specification of security controls on the R1 interface in SRS [12], clause 5.1.2.1 shall be followed. |
6189a1f76fc571fd85565ed4db067de7 | 104 233 | 6.5 Application | As application layer, Kafka Protocol Guide [20] version 3.0 or higher shall be supported. The Kafka semantics are defined in the Kafka Documentation [i.1]. R1 service procedures as defined in R1GAP [11] are mapped to the Kafka protocol in R1AP [19]. ETSI ETSI TS 104 233 V4.3.0 (2026-02) 9 |
6189a1f76fc571fd85565ed4db067de7 | 104 233 | 6.6 Data interchange | The Kafka based protocol stack for the R1 interface is agnostic to the data serialization format. ETSI ETSI TS 104 233 V4.3.0 (2026-02) 10 History Version Date Status V4.3.0 February 2026 Publication |
5321880801ac34d054cb1c648f063969 | 104 246 | 1 Scope | The present document defines the policy of the Technical Committee (TC) Terrestrial Trunked Radio and Critical Communications Evolution (TCCE) in the ETSI Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) [i.1]. This policy is based on the ETSI CVD and applies to ETSI deliverables of the TCCE [i.2] only. The present document is intended for all roles in the ETSI CVD process and provides guidance to: Finder, ETSI CVD Steering Committee, TC TCCE and the rapporteur(s) of the impacted standard(s). It details the process for Finders of potential vulnerabilities, explains the actions of the TC TCCE and may be used as guidance for all roles. For Finders not acquainted with Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) the present document outlines typical TETRA network environments and explains typical constraints and complexities in vulnerability mitigations. |
5321880801ac34d054cb1c648f063969 | 104 246 | 2 References | |
5321880801ac34d054cb1c648f063969 | 104 246 | 2.1 Normative references | Normative references are not applicable in the present document. |
5321880801ac34d054cb1c648f063969 | 104 246 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents may be useful in implementing an ETSI deliverable or add to the reader's understanding, but are not required for conformance to the present document. [i.1] ETSI Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD). [i.2] ETSI Technical Committee (TC) Terrestrial Trunked Radio and Critical Communications Evolution (TCCE). [i.3] ETSI TR 103 838 (V1.1.1): "Cyber Security; Guide to Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure". [i.4] ETSI EN/TS 3/100 392-2: "Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA); Voice plus Data (V+D); Part 2: Air Interface (AI)". [i.5] Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013 and (EU) 2019/1020 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 (Cyber Resilience Act) (Text with EEA relevance). [i.6] ETSI EN/TS 3/100 392-3 series: "Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA); Voice plus Data (V+D); Part 3: Interworking at the Inter-System Interface (ISI)". ETSI ETSI TR 104 246 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 6 |
5321880801ac34d054cb1c648f063969 | 104 246 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
5321880801ac34d054cb1c648f063969 | 104 246 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: ETSI CVD Steering Committee: committee which, for each vulnerability report, triages the vulnerability, interacts with the Chair and the ETSI Technical Officer of the TC TCCE and the rapporteur(s) of the impacted standard(s) to resolve the vulnerability, and communicates on the progress of the handling of the vulnerability report with the Finder NOTE: As defined in [i.1]. finder: individual or organization who has found a potential vulnerability NOTE: As defined in [i.1]. manufacturer: designer or manufacturer of TETRA equipment or components of TETRA networks Mobile Station (MS): physical grouping that contains all of the mobile equipment that is used to obtain TETRA services network operator: organization that operates a TETRA network subscription: permit for a Mobile Station to use a TETRA network, characterized by a subscriber identity and, optionally, an authentication key provided by the TETRA network TCCE Technical Experts Group (TCCE TEG): expert group consisting of delegates of manufacturers and operators, which looks for a solution to reported vulnerabilities. TETRA network: SwMI with one or more Base Station(s) broadcasting the same Mobile Network Identity user organization: organization that holds subscriptions of a TETRA network vulnerability: security weakness that can be abused to cause unintended behaviour NOTE: As defined in [i.1]. |
5321880801ac34d054cb1c648f063969 | 104 246 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
5321880801ac34d054cb1c648f063969 | 104 246 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: BS Base Station CRA Cyber Resilience Act CVD Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure DMO Direct Mode Operation EU European Union IOP InterOPerability ISG Industry Specification Group ISI Inter-System Interfaces ITSI Individual TETRA Subscriber Identity K, K2 authentication Key MS Mobile Station NCSC National Cyber Security Centre PAMR Public Access Mobile Radio PMR Private Mobile Radio SDS Short Data Service SIM Subscriber Identity Module ETSI ETSI TR 104 246 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 7 SwMI Switching and Management Infrastructure TB Technical Body TC Technical Committee TCCA The Critical Communications Association TCCE Terrestrial Trunked Radio and Critical Communications Evolution TEDS TETRA Enhanced Data Service TEG Technical Experts Group TETRA TErrestrial Trunked RAdio TF Technical Forum TMO Trunked Mode Operation |
5321880801ac34d054cb1c648f063969 | 104 246 | 4 Overview of TETRA networks | |
5321880801ac34d054cb1c648f063969 | 104 246 | 4.1 Standardization of TETRA networks | ETSI's Technical Committee (TC) Terrestrial Trunked Radio and Critical Communications Evolution (TCCE) is responsible for the design and standardization of Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) and its evolution to critical communications mobile broadband solutions. TETRA standards define the TETRA air interface, TETRA algorithms of the air interface, the TETRA speech codec and external interfaces of TETRA networks. This enables the development and deployment of interoperable solutions. To ensure interoperability, The Critical Communications Association (TCCA) has established an Interoperability (IOP) certification process managed by TCCA's Technical Forum (TF). This allows for an open multi-vendor market for TETRA infrastructure and mobile equipment. The standardized frequency bands range from 100 to 900 MHz. TETRA networks are narrowband systems optimized for voice services and Short Data Services (SDSs). The use of TETRA Enhanced Data Service (TEDS) allows for higher packet data rates depending on bandwidth, modulation and coding rate. However, as these narrowband systems provide moderate data rates, TETRA data services are usually not used to deploy firmware updates to Mobile Stations (MSs). |
5321880801ac34d054cb1c648f063969 | 104 246 | 4.2 Typical TETRA network environments | TETRA is used in Private and Public Access Mobile Radio (PMR and PAMR) networks. Major markets include: • Public Safety • Transportation • Utilities • Government • Military • Commercial and Industry • Oil and Gas |
5321880801ac34d054cb1c648f063969 | 104 246 | 4.3 TETRA network architectures | In TETRA standards TETRA networks comprise Mobile Stations (MSs) and components of the Switching and Management Infrastructure (SwMI). A MS comprises all of the mobile equipment that is used to obtain TETRA services. In TETRA networks a MS may be directly provisioned with the Individual TETRA Subscriber Identity (ITSI) and authentication Keys (K or K2 or both) or instead make use of a removable Subscriber Identity Module (SIM). MSs are available in different device types, e.g. handheld devices, mobile devices installed in vehicles or aircraft or fixed stations with wireless access to the network. ETSI ETSI TR 104 246 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 8 The SwMI comprises the network equipment, e.g. Base Stations (BSs), switching centres and additional system components. Only the relevant SwMI interfaces are standardized by ETSI, the SwMI itself is not standardized. Typically a TETRA network is supplied by one vendor of the SwMI components and one or multiple vendors of MSs. As TETRA is a cellular network technology it is based on a single or multiple Base Stations (BSs) that cover the service area. Typically BSs are connected by wire or microwave links to switching centres, while for high availability requirements redundant connections are preferred. The terrestrial cell size may be limited by different factors. For instance the path delay may allow terrestrial cell sizes up to 58 km radius when using phase modulation. The use of Air- Ground-Air service may further extend cells radius [i.4]. Anyway, the typical design range of cell sizes primarily depends on capacity requirements as well as terrain in rural areas or building density in urban areas. The deployment sizes of TETRA networks can vary in the following range: • a single or a few Base Stations (BSs) covering a local site, e.g. an industrial plant; • tens of BSs covering urban areas, e.g. a public transportation network; or • hundreds to thousands of BSs covering an entire country, e.g. a national public safety network. The number of subscriptions can vary according to the user organizations. Industrial plants may use tens to hundreds of subscriptions, public transportation networks up to over a thousand subscriptions. In national public safety networks the number of subscriptions can exceed one million. Such national networks typically serve multiple independent user organizations, e.g. police, fire brigades and emergency medical services in regional organizations. Typically these user organizations provide and maintain their own MSs. TETRA can be used in Trunked Mode Operation (TMO) and Direct Mode Operation (DMO). TMO is the primary mode of operation used by TETRA networks. Each MS connects to a BS in the respective service area. Control and user data are transferred through the network between the MSs, e.g. from the calling MS to multiple called MSs in a group call. DMO is independent of cellular infrastructure services and relies on direct communication between MSs. DMO is primarily used for local short range communications or where TMO is not reliably available. DMO can be combined with repeaters to extend the range as well as with gateways that connect DMO and TMO. TETRA networks can also be connected to other TETRA networks to allow the migration of MSs from home into visiting networks. This feature is standardized using Inter-System Interfaces (ISI) covered by ETSI EN/TS 3/100 392-3 series [i.6]. |
5321880801ac34d054cb1c648f063969 | 104 246 | 4.4 TETRA network operations | Most user organizations in TETRA networks require high availability. For example police, fire brigades, emergency medical services or critical operations personnel in industrial plants form typical user organizations. Due to their mission critical duties these users demand high availability and fast remediation of communication service degradations. For many user organizations the availability of the communication services can be seen as the most important security objective. Almost all TETRA networks operate continuously 24 hours a day. Various technologies are applied to support high availability and fast disaster recovery of the SwMI, e.g. redundant backhaul network design, redundant active or standby components, uninterruptable power supplies and backup solutions. |
5321880801ac34d054cb1c648f063969 | 104 246 | 5 Mitigation of vulnerabilities in TETRA networks | |
5321880801ac34d054cb1c648f063969 | 104 246 | 5.1 Options to mitigate vulnerabilities in TETRA networks | As outlined in clause 4.1 implementations of the TETRA air interface, TETRA algorithms, the TETRA speech codec and external interfaces of TETRA networks follow ETSI standards. Therefore vulnerabilities in those standards may have direct impact on a high number of components in TETRA networks worldwide. Usually these vulnerabilities impact MSs and/or components of the SwMI, e.g. BSs, switching centres or additional system components. Options to provide mitigations in any of these components are: • changes in configuration; ETSI ETSI TR 104 246 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 9 • updates of embedded firmware; • updates of software; and • updates, extensions or replacements of hardware. Compared to mobile broadband networks the data bandwidth of TETRA is very limited. This generally prevents firmware updates of MSs over the TETRA air interface. The following clauses explain the complexities of the update process and the vulnerability mitigation at MSs and in SwMI. |
5321880801ac34d054cb1c648f063969 | 104 246 | 5.2 Update processes in TETRA networks | Update processes in TETRA networks typically contain multiple steps of different stakeholders. To update components all stakeholders have to work together. To illustrate this complexity the following list shows an example of the necessary steps in the mitigation of a vulnerability found in TETRA standards. In this example all of the following steps need to be performed by the respective roles: • vulnerability assessment and definition of mitigations by ETSI TCCE as defined in clause 6.4; • adaption and approval of the revised specification by ETSI TCCE as defined in clause 6.4; • adaptation and approval of revised TETRA interoperability specification by TCCA TF; • development of updates and quality assurance tests by manufacturers; • cross-manufacturer TETRA interoperability tests and certification of MS and SwMI and/or of MS and MS or of SwMI and SwMI in test centre by certification body; • in some networks additionally: certification/re-certification of MS and/or approval tests of SwMI components in tests centres by network operator; • release of updates by manufacturers; and • roll-out of updates to TETRA network components (MSs and/or SwMI) by network operator and/or user organizations. Some of these steps may overlap and are not necessary consecutive. After the last step is completed and updates are installed on all affected components, the vulnerability in an affected TETRA network has been mitigated. The following clauses explain the options for mitigations at MSs and in SwMI in more detail. |
5321880801ac34d054cb1c648f063969 | 104 246 | 5.3 Vulnerability mitigation at Mobile Station | Vulnerability mitigations at the MS may comprise configuration changes and/or updates of firmware or the exchange of MS hardware. Due to bandwidth constraints MS firmware updates are not provided over the TETRA air interface. For configuration or firmware updates the MS has to be brought to a particular location where updates are applied via wired connection or secure local wireless networks. Further methods may be provided by MSs that include additional mobile broadband network access. In large TETRA networks typically every user organization maintains and manages their own MSs. This results in different update processes of varying efficiency. Based on MS quantities, organizational structures and available funding the required time for updating an organization's fleet can last from weeks to years. For a typical MS configuration or firmware update all MSs of an organization have to be present at a particular location. In order not to massively hinder day-to-day operations this is done in batches. Whenever a subset of MSs can be present at a suitable location the MSs are temporarily taken out of service for the duration of the process. ETSI ETSI TR 104 246 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 10 Only user organizations can deploy MS configuration and firmware updates on their own MSs. TETRA network operators typically cannot enforce updates of MSs affected by vulnerabilities. The disabling of a single MS by the network operator might be acceptable for some user organizations, but the uncoordinated disabling of fleets of MSs by the network operator would usually not be compatible with the high availability requirements of most user organizations. |
5321880801ac34d054cb1c648f063969 | 104 246 | 5.4 Vulnerability mitigation in SwMI | Vulnerability mitigations in SwMI may comprise configurations changes and/or updates of software or hardware of SwMI components. Updates of SwMI components usually temporarily decrease network availability down to service outages. Therefore updates may be scheduled to low traffic periods in order to reduce downtime or rolled-out in service windows that have been agreed before with the user organizations. Updates may be installed remotely or on-site. Especially on-site installations at multiple locations (e.g. all BSs of a large network or all geo-redundant components) can cause high expenses and long delays in the roll-out process. |
5321880801ac34d054cb1c648f063969 | 104 246 | 6 ETSI CVD in TCCE TETRA context | |
5321880801ac34d054cb1c648f063969 | 104 246 | 6.1 Roles and responsibilities | ETSI CVD contains a definition of roles and responsibilities [i.1]. The following list specifies this definition further for the context of TC TCCE in the TETRA environment: • Finder: individual or organization who has found a potential vulnerability in the TETRA standards. • ETSI CVD Steering Committee: committee which, for each vulnerability report, triages the vulnerability, interacts with the Chair and the ETSI Technical Officer of the TCCE and the rapporteur(s) of the impacted standard(s) to resolve the vulnerability, and communicates on the progress of the handling of the vulnerability report with the Finder. • TCCE Chair: chair of the ETSI Technical Committee Terrestrial Trunked Radio and Critical Communications Evolution. • TCCE Technical Officer: technical officer of the TCCE. • Rapporteur(s) of the impacted standard(s): rapporteur(s) of the impacted TCCE standard(s). • TCCE: delegates of Technical Committee Terrestrial Trunked Radio and Critical Communications Evolution. • TCCE TEG: TCCE Technical Expert Group consisting of delegates of manufacturers and operators, which looks for a solution to reported vulnerabilities. |
5321880801ac34d054cb1c648f063969 | 104 246 | 6.2 Reporting obligations of network operators | As outlined in clause 4, TETRA networks are in operation in critical infrastructures or public safety. Network operators in these markets have to follow particular national regulations and laws in cybersecurity. The details are subject to national legislation, but typically network operators in critical infrastructure or public safety are obligated to share information on vulnerabilities with the respective National Cyber Security Centres (NCSCs). By this confidential information exchange vulnerability reports are not disclosed to the public. |
5321880801ac34d054cb1c648f063969 | 104 246 | 6.3 Reporting obligations of manufacturers | Cybersecurity regulations may require manufacturers to report vulnerabilities in their products. These reporting obligations are independent from ETSI CVD and may require the manufacturer to follow additional processes outside the scope of the present document. ETSI ETSI TR 104 246 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 11 For example, in the European Union (EU) the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) may require manufacturers of connected devices to immediately report any actively exploited vulnerabilities in their products [i.5]. As this does not apply to products for national security or defence purposes or to products that process classified information, it may be required for TETRA products used in all other markets in the EU. |
5321880801ac34d054cb1c648f063969 | 104 246 | 6.4 ETSI CVD process in the TCCE environment | Table 1 shows the ETSI CVD process in the TCCE environment. To illustrate the process in more detail the four steps of the ETSI CVD [i.1] have been divided into sub-steps. Table 1: ETSI CVD process in TCCE environment Step No Leading role Involved role(s) Action listed to ETSI CVD [i.1] Follow-up step(s) 0 Finder ETSI CVD Steering Committee Submit vulnerability report to ETSI 1.1 1.1 ETSI CVD Steering Committee TCCE Chair, TCCE Technical Officer, Rapporteur(s) Once a vulnerability report is submitted by a Finder, it is shared with the ETSI CVD Steering Committee. They triage the vulnerability and share the report with the Chair and the ETSI Technical Officer for the relevant TB/ISG and the rapporteur(s) of the impacted standard(s). 1.2 and 2.1 1.2 ETSI CVD Steering Committee Finder The Finder will receive an email from the ETSI CVD Steering Committee that the report has progressed to the impacted TB/ISG. none 2.1 TCCE Chair TCCE, TCCE Technical Officer, Rapporteur(s) Next, the impacted TB/ISG assesses the vulnerability report at a committee-wide meeting. The vulnerability is assessed, and either accepted or rejected as to its validity. 2.2 and (3.1 or 5) 2.2 TCCE Chair Finder In either case, the Finder is notified. none 3.1 TCCE Chair TCCE TEG If the vulnerability report is assessed as valid, the impacted TB/ISG works to create a resolution. The resolution is prepared and adopted using the ETSI decision-making procedures by the impacted TB/ISG, 3.2 and 4 3.2 TCCE Chair Finder And the Finder is informed by email of what the resolution is and that it has been made. none 4 TCCE Chair TCCE ETSI aims to resolve all valid vulnerabilities within 90 days of reporting though it may take longer for complicated fixes. 5 5 none End none 6.5 Example time frames for resolving vulnerabilities in the TETRA standards Time frames for resolving vulnerabilities in TETRA standards are mainly influenced by the following factors: • the complexity of the resolution; and • the severity of the vulnerability assessed by TCCE TEG. The complexity of the resolution in TETRA standards is determined by the appropriate technical solution and the number of impacted ETSI deliverables. The severity rating provides an assessment of the impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability. It also takes into account how easily the vulnerability could be exploited by an attacker in TETRA networks [i.3]. Table 2 shows three example time frames for the resolving of vulnerabilities in TETRA standards that are explained below. ETSI ETSI TR 104 246 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 12 Table 2: Example time frames for resolving vulnerabilities in TETRA standards Example Complexity of the resolution Severity rating of the vulnerability by TCCE TEG Example time frame for resolving vulnerability in TETRA standards 1 low critical impact up to three months 2 medium medium impact three to six months 3 high low impact more than six months Example 1 represents a vulnerability that has a low complexity in the resolution and has been assessed by TCCE TEG to a critical impact. An example is a vulnerability in one ETSI deliverable that allows to exploit it in TETRA networks, but that can be easily resolved e.g. by a change in configuration that can be applied remotely and has been tested before. Example 2 represents a vulnerability that has a medium complexity in the resolution and has been assessed by TCCE TEG to a medium impact. An example is a vulnerability in one ETSI deliverable that needs some adjustments. Example 3 represents a vulnerability that needs a complex mitigation and has been assessed by TCCE TEG to a low impact. An example is a vulnerability that affects multiple ETSI deliverables and IOP specifications that need to be updated. 6.6 Example time frames for resolving vulnerabilities in TETRA networks As explained in clause 5.1 vulnerabilities in TETRA standards may have direct impact on a high number of components in TETRA networks worldwide. Time frames for resolving vulnerabilities in TETRA networks depend on multiple parties, have a wide variance and are therefore difficult to estimate. To mitigate a vulnerability in components of a TETRA network typically one or more options outlined in clause 5.1 have to be chosen. These update processes may require very different time frames. As outlined in clause 5.2 also the number of parties involved can be seen as an important influence. Time frames for resolving vulnerabilities in TETRA networks are substantially influenced by: • the complexity of the mitigation as outlined in clause 5.2; • the number of parties involved in the mitigation as outlined in clause 5.2; and • the severity rating of the vulnerability assessed by TCCE TEG. Table 3 shows three example time frames for resolving vulnerabilities in TETRA networks that are explained in the following. Table 3: Example time frames for resolving vulnerabilities in TETRA networks Example Complexity of the mitigation Number of parties involved Severity rating of the vulnerability by TCCE TEG Example time frame for resolving vulnerability in a TETRA network 1 low low to medium critical impact three to six months 2 medium low to medium medium impact six to 12 months 3 high high low impact more than 12 months Example 1 represents a vulnerability that has low complexity in the mitigation and involves an easily manageable low to medium number of parties. An example may be a mitigation that involves the change of a SwMI parameter that is defined in the TETRA standards, has been tested before in IOP tests with all relevant components and can be applied remotely on all affected SwMI components. Such a change may be evaluated by the SwMI manufacturers and applied by the network operators in a priority process for critical vulnerabilities within three to six months. Example 2 represents a vulnerability that has medium complexity in the mitigation and involves an easily manageable low to medium number of parties. An example may be a mitigation that involves software updates of SwMI components that need to be tested by the manufacturers but does not need new IOP tests of the affected components. Example 3 represents a vulnerability that has high complexity in the mitigation and involves a high number of parties. An example may be a mitigation that demands firmware updates of MSs as outlined in clause 5.3. ETSI ETSI TR 104 246 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 13 History Version Date Status V1.1.1 January 2026 Publication |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 1 Scope | The present document specifies test cases for conformance testing and interoperability testing of the rApps and R1 services over R1 interface. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 2 References | |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found in the ETSI docbox. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI TS 104 228: "Publicly Available Specification (PAS); O-RAN R1 interface General Aspects and Principles (O-RAN.WG2.TS.R1GAP-R004-v11.00)". [2] O-RAN.WG2.TS.R1UCR-R004: "R1 Use Cases and Requirements" ("R1UCR"). [3] O-RAN.WG2.TS.R1TP-R004: "Transport Protocols for R1 services" ("R1TP"). [4] O-RAN.WG2.TS.R1AP-R004: "Application Protocols for R1 services" ("R1AP"). [5] O-RAN.WG2.TS.Non-RT-RIC-ARCH-R004: "Non-RT RIC: Architecture" ("Non-RT RIC ARCH"). |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents may be useful in implementing an ETSI deliverable or add to the reader's understanding, but are not required for conformance to the present document. Not applicable. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in R1GAP [1], R1UCR [2] and R1TP [3] apply. ETSI ETSI TS 104 229 V3.0.0 (2026-02) 13 |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in R1GAP [1], R1UCR [2] and R1TP [3] apply. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 4 Test methodology | |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 4.1 General | This clause describes the methodology for conformance and interoperability testing of rApps and SMO/Non-Real Time RIC framework over R1 interface. For conformance tests, simulators are used for testing R1 procedures. These simulators will have capability of generating HTTP requests and responses. There will be flexibility in configuring URI, headers and body for these HTTP requests and responses to enable creation of various test cases. For interoperability tests, devices under tests are rApps and SMO/Non-RT RIC framework that are defined in the Non-RT RIC architecture specification [5], these devices are brought to operation by connecting to appropriate real or simulated devices. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 4.2 Conformance testing of rApps | |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 4.2.1 General | For conformance testing of rApps, rApp is the device under test and SMO/Non-RT RIC framework is the test simulator. The present document specifies conformance tests for API Consumer and API Producer functionality as specified in R1AP [4]. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 4.2.2 Test configuration | |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 4.2.2.1 Overview | The test configuration for R1 conformance testing of rApp is illustrated in figure 4.2.2.1-1. For testing of rApp over R1 interface, the rApp is onboarded and instantiated in the cloud environment of the test simulator. ETSI ETSI TS 104 229 V3.0.0 (2026-02) 14 rApp E2 node functionality 4G/5G Core functionality UEs SMO/Non-RT RIC framework functionality R1 E2 Test simulator DUT O1 O-cloud functionality O2 Near-RT RIC functionality A1 O1 Figure 4.2.2.1-1: Illustration of R1 conformance testing of rApps |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 4.2.2.2 Device under test rApps | For enabling conformance testing, rApp has implemented API Consumer and/or API Producer functionality and the procedures as specified in R1AP [4] that are required to perform testing of the applicable R1 service test cases. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 4.2.2.3 Test simulator | For enabling conformance testing, the test simulator has implemented API Producer and/or API Consumer functionality, have HTTP Client and HTTP Server capabilities, and have flexibility to generate, receive, and validate HTTP messages for all the R1 procedures. The test simulator logs all message content during the testing. As illustrated in figure 4.2.2.1-1, test simulator has all the capabilities required to execute the conformance testing of an rApp. For example, the test simulator has the capabilities to simulate the functionality of A1, O1, and O2 in a cloud environment. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 4.3 Conformance testing of SMO/Non-RT RIC framework | |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 4.3.1 General | For conformance testing of SMO/Non-RT RIC framework, SMO/Non-RT RIC framework is the device under test and rApp is the test simulator. The present document specifies conformance tests for API Consumer and API Producer functionality as specified in R1AP [4]. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 4.3.2 Test configuration | |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 4.3.2.1 Overview | The test configuration for R1 conformance testing of SMO/Non-RT RIC framework is illustrated in figure 4.3.2.1-1. ETSI ETSI TS 104 229 V3.0.0 (2026-02) 15 rApp(s) E2 node functionality 4G/5G Core functionality UEs Near-RT RIC functionality R1 Test simulator DUT O1 O-cloud functionality O2 A1 SMO/Non-RT RIC framework E2 O1 Figure 4.3.2.1-1: Illustration of R1 conformance testing of Non-RT RIC framework |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 4.3.2.2 Device under test (SMO/Non-RT RIC Framework) | For enabling conformance testing, the SMO/Non-RT RIC framework has implemented API Producer and/or API Consumer functionality, and the procedures specified in R1AP [4] that are required to perform testing of the applicable test cases. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 4.3.2.3 Test simulator | For enabling conformance testing, the test simulator rApp(s) has both API Producer and/or API Consumer and HTTP Server capabilities and have flexibility to generate, receive and validate HTTP messages for all the R1 procedures. As illustrated in figure 4.3.2.1-1, test simulator has all the capabilities required to execute the conformance testing of an SMO/Non-RT RIC framework. For example, the test simulator has the capabilities to simulate the functionality of A1, O1, and O2. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5 SME Service Registration service test cases | |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1 Conformance test cases for rApp | |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.1 General | |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.1.1 Device under test requirements | The rApp that acts as Device Under Test (DUT) in the test scenarios of this clause can be a function that is under development, or it can be a finalized commercial product. The requirements on the DUT for these tests are that it can handle the SME service registration service, and the purpose of the test scenarios is to validate that it confirms API Consumer functionality as specified in R1AP [4]. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.1.2 Test simulator capabilities | The test simulator has the capabilities as required for a SMO/Non-RT RIC framework. In addition, it has the following capabilities: • Recording of received HTTP requests and responses and analysing them regarding conformance to the R1 service definitions. • Controlled initiation of procedures with configurable URIs and payload formulated and modified. ETSI ETSI TS 104 229 V3.0.0 (2026-02) 16 Validating messages and issuing of verdicts related to the procedures in the test cases and thereby enabling determination of the DUT's conformance API Producer functionality as specified in R1AP [4]. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.2 Register service API as API Consumer test scenario | |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.2.1 Register service (positive case) | |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.2.1.1 Test description and applicability | The purpose of this test case is to test the Register service API as specified in R1AP [4], clause 6.1.4.1. The expected outcome is successful validation of the request from the DUT. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.2.1.2 Test entrance criteria | The DUT has functionality to initiate the Register service procedure as defined in R1GAP [1]. NOTE: The DUT provides the service API description as defined in R1AP [4]. The service being registered can be a standard or non-standard R1 service. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.2.1.3 Test methodology | 5.1.2.1.3.1 Initial conditions The test simulator as API Producer is ready and available to receive HTTP requests from the DUT. 5.1.2.1.3.2 Procedure Step 1 The DUT as an API Consumer initiates a HTTP request to register a service that it produces. Step 2 At the test simulator the contents of the received HTTP request are recorded. Step 3 The test simulator does the following validation: a) The URI confirms to the format specified in R1AP [4], clause 6.1.5.2. b) The HTTP request is a POST operation. c) The HTTP request message content includes rApp identifier and the service API description conforms to the schema as specified in R1AP [4]. Step 4 The test simulator generates the service API identifier and constructs the URI for the created resource and sends the appropriate HTTP response as specified in R1AP [4], clause 6.1.4.1.1. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.2.1.4 Expected result | The test is considered passed if Step 3 validation has passed. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.2.2 Update registered service (positive case) | |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.2.2.1 Test description and applicability | The purpose of this test case is to test the Update registered service API as specified in R1AP [4], clause 6.1.4.2. The expected outcome is successful validation of the request from the DUT. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.2.2.2 Test entrance criteria | a) The DUT has functionality to initiate the Update registered service procedure as defined in R1GAP [1]. b) A service API registration exists in test simulator and the serviceApiId and the apfId are known to DUT. ETSI ETSI TS 104 229 V3.0.0 (2026-02) 17 c) The schema of the ServiceAPIDescription used for this test are available and used in DUT to formulate the Update registered service request, and in test simulator to validate the request. NOTE: The DUT provides the ServiceApiDescription as defined in R1AP [4]. The service being updated can be a standard or non-standard R1 service. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.2.2.3 Test methodology | 5.1.2.2.3.1 Initial conditions The test simulator as API Producer is ready and available to receive HTTP requests from the DUT. 5.1.2.2.3.2 Procedure Step 1 The DUT as an API Consumer initiates a HTTP request to update a registered service API identified by the apfId and the serviceApiId. Step 2 At the test simulator the contents of the received HTTP request are recorded. Step 3 The test simulator does the following validation: a) The URI confirms to the format specified in R1AP [4], clause 6.1.5.3. b) The HTTP request is a PUT operation. c) The apfId and the serviceApiId in the URI match the service API being updated. d) The HTTP request message body contains the ServiceAPIDescription of the service API to be updated and conforms to the schema as specified in R1AP [4]. Step 4 The test simulator updates the resource, and a representation of the updated resource shall be returned in the response body the appropriate HTTP response as specified in R1AP [4], clause 6.1.5.3.1.1. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.2.2.4 Expected result | The test is considered passed if Step 3 validation has passed. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.2.3 Deregister service (positive case) | |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.2.3.1 Test description and applicability | The purpose of this test case is to test the Deregister service API as specified in R1AP [4], clause 6.1.4.3. The expected outcome is successful validation of the request from the DUT. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.2.3.2 Test entrance criteria | 1) The DUT has functionality to initiate the Deregister service procedure as defined in R1GAP [1]. 2) A service API registration exists in test simulator and the serviceApiId and the apfId are known to DUT. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.2.3.3 Test methodology | 5.1.2.3.3.1 Initial conditions The test simulator as API Producer is ready and available to receive HTTP requests from the DUT. 5.1.2.3.3.2 Procedure Step 1 The DUT as an API Consumer initiates a HTTP request to deregister a service API identified by the apfID and the serviceApiId. ETSI ETSI TS 104 229 V3.0.0 (2026-02) 18 Step 2 At the test simulator the contents of the received HTTP request are recorded. Step 3 The test simulator does the following validation: a) The URI confirms to the format specified in R1AP [4], clause 6.1.5.3. b) The HTTP request is a DELETE operation. c) The serviceApiId and apfId in the URI match the service being deleted. d) The message body is empty. Step 4 The test simulator generated the appropriate HTTP response as specified in R1AP [4], clause 6.1.5.3.1.2. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.2.3.4 Expected result | The test is considered passed if Step 3 validation has passed. 5.1.2.4 Query registered service (positive case) |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.2.4.1 Test description and applicability | The purpose of this test case is to test the Query service APIs as specified in R1AP [4], clause 6.1.4.5. The expected outcome is successful validation of the request from the DUT. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.2.4.2 Test entrance criteria | 1) The DUT has functionality to initiate Query registered service procedure. 2) A set of service API registrations exist in the test simulator and the apfId is known to DUT. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.2.4.3 Test methodology | 5.1.2.4.3.1 Initial conditions The test simulator as API Producer is ready and available to receive HTTP requests from the DUT. 5.1.2.4.3.2 Procedure Step 1 The DUT as an API Consumer initiates a HTTP request to query service APIs that are registered by the apfId. Step 2 At the test simulator the contents of the received HTTP request are recorded. Step 3 The test simulator does the following validation: a) The URI confirms to the format specified in R1AP [4], clause 6.1.5.3. b) The HTTP request is a GET operation. c) The apfId in the URI match the service APIs being queried. d) The message body is empty. Step 4 The test simulator generated the appropriate HTTP response as specified in R1AP [4], clause 6.1.5.2.1.2. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.2.4.4 Expected result | The test is considered passed if Step 3 validation has passed. ETSI ETSI TS 104 229 V3.0.0 (2026-02) 19 |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.5.5 Partially updated registered service (positive case) | |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.5.5.1 Test description and applicability | The purpose of this test case is to test the partially update registered service API as specified in R1AP [4], clause 6.1.4.4. The expected outcome is successful validation of the request from the DUT. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.5.5.2 Test entrance criteria | 1) The DUT has functionality to initiate the Partially update registered service procedure as defined in R1GAP [1]. 2) A service API registration exists in test simulator and the serviceApiId and the apfId are known to DUT. 3) The schema of the ServiceAPIDescriptionPatch used for this test are available and used in DUT to formulate the Partially update registered service request, and in test simulator to validate the request. NOTE: The DUT provides the ServiceApiDescriptionPatch as defined in R1AP [4]. The service being updated can be a standard or non-standard R1 service. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.5.5.3 Test methodology | 5.1.5.5.3.1 Initial conditions The test simulator as API Producer is ready and available to receive HTTP requests from the DUT. 5.1.5.5.3.2 Procedure Step 1 The DUT as an API Consumer initiates a HTTP request to partially update a registered service API identified by the apfId and the serviceApiId. Step 2 At the test simulator the contents of the received HTTP request are recorded. Step 3 The test simulator does the following validation: a) The URI confirms to the format specified in R1AP [4], clause 6.1.5.3. b) The HTTP request is a PATCH operation. c) The apfId and the serviceApiId in the URI match the service API being updated. d) The HTTP request message body contains the ServiceAPIDescriptionPatch of the service API to be updated and conforms to the schema as specified in R1AP [4]. Step 4 The test simulator updates the resource, and a representation of the partially updated resource shall be returned in the response body the appropriate HTTP response as specified in R1AP [4], clause 6.1.5.3.1.3. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.1.5.5.4 Expected result | The test is considered passed if Step 3 validation has passed. ETSI ETSI TS 104 229 V3.0.0 (2026-02) 20 |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.2 Conformance test cases for SMO/Non-RT RIC framework | |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.2.1 General | |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.2.1.1 Device under test requirements | The SMO/Non-RT RIC framework that acts as Device Under Test (DUT) in the test scenarios of this clause can be a product that is under development, or it can be a finalized commercial product. The requirements on the DUT for these tests are that it can handle the SME service registration service, and the purpose of the test scenarios is to validate that it confirms API Producer functionality as specified in R1AP [4]. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.2.1.2 Test simulator capabilities | The test simulator has the capabilities as specified in clause 4.3.2. In addition, it has the following capabilities: 1) Recording of received HTTP requests and responses and analysing them regarding conformance to the R1 service definitions. 2) Controlled initiation of procedures with configurable URIs and payload formulated and modified. Validating messages and issuing of verdicts related to the procedures in the test cases and thereby enabling determination of the DUT's conformance to API Producer functionality as specified in R1AP [4]. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.2.2 Register service API as API Producer test scenario | |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.2.2.1 Register service (positive case) | |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.2.2.1.1 Test description and applicability | The purpose of this test case is to test the Register service API as specified in R1AP [4], clause 6.1.4.1. The expected outcome is successful validation of the response from the DUT. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.2.2.1.2 Test entrance criteria | The test simulator has functionality to initiate the Register service procedure as defined in R1GAP [1]. NOTE: The test simulator provides the service API description as defined in R1AP [4]. The service being registered can be a standard or non-standard R1 service. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.2.2.1.3 Test methodology | 5.2.2.1.3.1 Initial conditions The test simulator as API Consumer is ready and available to receive HTTP responses from the DUT. 5.2.2.1.3.2 Procedure Step 1 The test simulator as an API Consumer initiates a HTTP request to register a service that it produces. Step 2 The DUT receives the HTTP request. Step 3 The DUT does the following validation: a) The HTTP request is a POST request. b) The URI conforms to the format specified in R1AP [4], clause 6.1.5.2.1.1. c) The HTTP request message content includes the information as specified in R1AP [4]. ETSI ETSI TS 104 229 V3.0.0 (2026-02) 21 Step 4 The DUT generates the service API identifier and constructs the URI for the created resource. Step 5 The DUT sends the appropriate HTTP response as specified in R1AP [4], clause 6.1.4.1.1. Step 6 At the test simulator the contents of the received HTTP response are recorded. Step 7 The test simulator does the following validation: a) The HTTP response message content includes the information as specified in R1AP [4], and the Location header will be present. b) The URI confirms to the format specified in R1AP [4], clause 6.1.5.2. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.2.2.1.4 Expected result | The test is considered passed if Step 7 validation has passed. |
2e6894662525cba6f1eb97c4ec9e419d | 104 229 | 5.2.2.2 Update registered service (positive case) |
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