hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 7 13 | section stringlengths 3 121 | content stringlengths 0 2.2M |
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702f3180cf38120ac6ffce92a3b68174 | 104 291 | 4.4 TDMA frame number validation - downlink | |
702f3180cf38120ac6ffce92a3b68174 | 104 291 | 4.4.1 Threat | This threat applies to TMO only. The attacker sets a fake base station, manipulates the RF environment and captures the MS, and adjusts the values of the frame numbering system as described in clause 4.3.1 above. The attacker then generates the shortest possible downlink message that will provoke a Basic Link Acknowled... |
702f3180cf38120ac6ffce92a3b68174 | 104 291 | 4.4.2 Countermeasure | ETSI EN 300 392-7 or ETSI TS 100 392-7 [i.1], clause 6.3.2.0a specifies that the MS should only treat the frame numbering received from the BS as valid following an authentication of the SwMI or following a mutual authentication. |
702f3180cf38120ac6ffce92a3b68174 | 104 291 | 4.5 Entropy of TEA1 | |
702f3180cf38120ac6ffce92a3b68174 | 104 291 | 4.5.1 Threat | This threat applies to TMO and DMO. The TEA1 algorithm has a key reduction step which reduces the effective keylength of the key to 32 bits. An overview is provided in ETSI TS 101 053-1 [i.6], clause 8. This was done to allow export of equipment containing TEA1 in some situations. This means that an attacker can mount ... |
702f3180cf38120ac6ffce92a3b68174 | 104 291 | 4.5.2 Countermeasure | An alternative air interface encryption algorithm can be deployed instead of TEA1. TEA2, TEA3 or TEA4 from TEA set A may be deployed with either the TAA1 or TAA2 authentication and key management algorithm set, or TEA5, TEA6 or TEA7 from TEA set B may be deployed with the TAA2 authentication and key management algorith... |
702f3180cf38120ac6ffce92a3b68174 | 104 291 | 4.6 Identity Encryption | |
702f3180cf38120ac6ffce92a3b68174 | 104 291 | 4.6.1 Threat | This threat applies to TMO only, and where an algorithm from TEA set A is in use. ETSI ETSI TR 104 291 V1.1.1 (2026-04) 10 If an attacker can capture several clear identities and the equivalent encrypted identities, it is possible to compute an intermediate encryption key that is used in the identity encryption process... |
702f3180cf38120ac6ffce92a3b68174 | 104 291 | 4.6.2 Countermeasure | The attacker needs to capture a number of authentication transactions that take place in clear (without encryption) to determine a clear and encrypted identity pair for the MS. Encrypted registrations and encrypted authentication transactions (using the previous Derived Cipher Key that was established for the MS) can m... |
702f3180cf38120ac6ffce92a3b68174 | 104 291 | 4.7 Message injection | |
702f3180cf38120ac6ffce92a3b68174 | 104 291 | 4.7.1 Threat | This threat applies to TMO only. If a key or a keystream can be recovered using the threat mechanisms outlined in clauses 4.3 and 4.4, or if the recipient accepts clear (encryption Class 1) messages as well as encrypted messages, a fake message can be composed and sent on the uplink to the real SwMI, or on the downlink... |
702f3180cf38120ac6ffce92a3b68174 | 104 291 | 4.7.2 Countermeasure | An MS and SwMI can be configured to only accept encrypted messages sent outside a registration and authentication procedure. An MS with the behaviour described in clause 4.3.2 (explicit IV validation, as specified in ETSI EN 300 392-7 or ETSI TS 100 392-7 [i.1], clause 6.3.2.0a) above will not be susceptible to the key... |
702f3180cf38120ac6ffce92a3b68174 | 104 291 | 4.8 Reuse of CCK between algorithms | |
702f3180cf38120ac6ffce92a3b68174 | 104 291 | 4.8.1 Threat | This threat applies to TMO only where more than one encryption algorithm from TEA set A is in use on a SwMI, for example during transition from the use of one algorithm to use of another and where service is provided to all users of both algorithms on the same base stations. If a SwMI supports multiple air interface en... |
702f3180cf38120ac6ffce92a3b68174 | 104 291 | 4.8.2 Countermeasure | Multiple air interface encryption algorithms should only be present for as short a time as possible on a SwMI, for example during transition from one algorithm to another. Users should be aware of the issue and manage the risks. ETSI ETSI TR 104 291 V1.1.1 (2026-04) 11 Individually addressed transmissions are encrypted... |
702f3180cf38120ac6ffce92a3b68174 | 104 291 | 4.9 End-to-end encryption | The details of end-to-end encryption mechanisms are outside the scope of the TETRA security standards, which make provision for end-to-end encryption, but do not specify the mechanisms that can be employed. ETSI ETSI TR 104 291 V1.1.1 (2026-04) 12 History Version Date Status V1.1.1 April 2026 Publication |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 1 Scope | ........................................................................................................................................................7 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 2 References | ................................................................................................................................................7 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 2.1 Normative references | ......................................................................................................................................... 7 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 2.2 Informative references | ....................................................................................................................................... 8 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations | ...................................................................................................8 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 3.1 Definitions | ......................................................................................................................................................... 8 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 3.2 Symbols | ............................................................................................................................................................. 9 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 3.3 Abbreviations | ................................................................................................................................................... 10 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 4 Overview of the security architecture | ....................................................................................................11 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 5 Security features | ....................................................................................................................................12 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 5.1 Network access security | ................................................................................................................................... 12 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 5.1.1 User identity confidentiality | ....................................................................................................................... 12 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 5.1.2 Entity authentication | .................................................................................................................................. 13 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 5.1.3 Confidentiality | ............................................................................................................................................ 13 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 5.1.4 Data integrity | .............................................................................................................................................. 14 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 5.1.5 Mobile equipment identification | ................................................................................................................ 14 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 5.2 Network domain security | ................................................................................................................................. 14 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 5.2.1 Entity authentication | .................................................................................................................................. 14 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 5.2.2 Data confidentiality | .................................................................................................................................... 15 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 5.2.3 Data integrity | .............................................................................................................................................. 15 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 5.2.4 Fraud information gathering system | ........................................................................................................... 15 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 5.3 User domain security | ....................................................................................................................................... 15 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 5.3.1 User-to-USIM authentication | ..................................................................................................................... 15 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 5.3.2 USIM-Terminal Link | ................................................................................................................................. 16 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 5.4 Application security | ......................................................................................................................................... 16 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 5.4.1 Secure messaging between the USIM and the network | ............................................................................. 16 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 5.4.2 Network-wide user traffic confidentiality | .................................................................................................. 16 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 5.4.3 Access to user profile data | ......................................................................................................................... 16 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 5.4.4 IP security | .................................................................................................................................................. 16 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 5.5 Security visibility and configurability | .............................................................................................................. 17 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 5.5.1 Visibility | ..................................................................................................................................................... 17 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 5.5.2 Configurability | ........................................................................................................................................... 17 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6 Network access security mechanisms | ....................................................................................................17 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.1 Identification by temporary identities | .............................................................................................................. 17 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.1.1 General | ....................................................................................................................................................... 17 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.1.2 TMUI reallocation procedure | ..................................................................................................................... 18 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.1.3 Unacknowledged allocation of a temporary identity | .................................................................................. 18 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.1.4 Location update | .......................................................................................................................................... 18 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.2 Identification by a permanent identity | ............................................................................................................. 19 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.3 Authentication and key agreement | ................................................................................................................... 20 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.3.1 General | ....................................................................................................................................................... 20 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.3.2 Distribution of authentication data from HE to SN | .................................................................................... 22 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.3.3 Authentication and key agreement | ............................................................................................................. 24 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.3.4 Distribution of IMSI and temporary authentication data within one serving network domain | .................. 26 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.3.5 Re-synchronisation procedure | .................................................................................................................... 27 6.3.6 Reporting authentication failures from the SGSN/VLR to the HLR.......................................................... 27 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.3.7 Length of sequence numbers | ...................................................................................................................... 28 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.4 Local authentication and connection establishment | ......................................................................................... 28 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.4.1 Cipher key and integrity key setting | ........................................................................................................... 28 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.4.2 Ciphering and integrity mode negotiation | .................................................................................................. 28 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.4.3 Cipher key and integrity key lifetime | ......................................................................................................... 29 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.4.4 Cipher key and integrity key identification | ................................................................................................ 29 ETSI ETSI TS 133 102 V3.4.0 (2000-03) 4 3G TS 33.102 version 3.4.0 Release 1999 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.4.5 Security mode set-up procedure | ................................................................................................................. 30 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.4.6 Signalling procedures in the case of an unsuccessful integrity check | ........................................................ 32 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.4.7 Signalling procedure for periodic local authentication | ............................................................................... 32 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.5 Access link data integrity | ................................................................................................................................. 33 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.5.1 General | ....................................................................................................................................................... 33 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.5.2 Layer of integrity protection | ...................................................................................................................... 33 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.5.3 Data integrity protection method | ................................................................................................................ 33 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.5.4 Input parameters to the integrity algorithm | ................................................................................................ 34 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.5.4.1 COUNT-I | .............................................................................................................................................. 34 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.5.4.2 IK | .......................................................................................................................................................... 34 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.5.4.3 FRESH | .................................................................................................................................................. 35 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.5.4.4 DIRECTION | ........................................................................................................................................ 35 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.5.4.5 MESSAGE | ........................................................................................................................................... 35 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.5.5 Integrity key selection | ................................................................................................................................ 35 6.5.6 UIA identification ..................................................................................................................................... 35 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.6 Access link data confidentiality | ....................................................................................................................... 36 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.6.1 General | ....................................................................................................................................................... 36 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.6.2 Layer of ciphering | ...................................................................................................................................... 36 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.6.3 Ciphering method | ....................................................................................................................................... 36 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.6.4 Input parameters to the cipher algorithm | .................................................................................................... 37 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.6.4.1 COUNT-C | ............................................................................................................................................ 37 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.6.4.2 CK | ........................................................................................................................................................ 37 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.6.4.3 BEARER | .............................................................................................................................................. 38 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.6.4.4 DIRECTION | ........................................................................................................................................ 38 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.6.4.5 LENGTH | .............................................................................................................................................. 38 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.6.5 Cipher key selection | ................................................................................................................................... 38 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.6.6 UEA identification | ..................................................................................................................................... 39 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.7 Network-wide encryption | ................................................................................................................................ 39 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.7.1 Introduction | ................................................................................................................................................ 39 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.7.2 Ciphering method | ....................................................................................................................................... 39 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.7.3 Key management | ........................................................................................................................................ 40 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.7.3.1 General case | .......................................................................................................................................... 40 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.7.3.2 Outline scheme for intra-serving network case | .................................................................................... 40 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.7.3.3 Variant on the outline scheme | .............................................................................................................. 41 |
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