hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 7 13 | section stringlengths 3 121 | content stringlengths 0 2.2M |
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9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.8 Interoperation and handover between UMTS and GSM | .................................................................................. 42 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.8.1 Authentication and key agreement of UMTS subscribers | .......................................................................... 42 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.8.1.1 General | ................................................................................................................................................. 42 6.8.1.2 R99+ HLR/AuC.................................................................................................................................... 43 6.8.1.3 R99+ VL... |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.8.1.4 R99+ UE | ............................................................................................................................................... 44 6.8.1.5 UICC (USIM/SIM)............................................................................................................................... 45 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.8.2 Authentication and key agreement for GSM subscribers | ........................................................................... 45 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.8.2.1 General | ................................................................................................................................................. 45 6.8.2.2 R99+ HLR/AuC.................................................................................................................................... 46 6.8.2.3 VLR/SGS... |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.8.2.4 R99+ UE | ............................................................................................................................................... 47 6.8.3 Distribution and use of authentication data between VLRs/SGSNs........................................................... 47 6.8.4 Intersystem handover for CS Services... |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.8.4.1 UMTS security context | ......................................................................................................................... 48 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.8.4.2 GSM security context | ........................................................................................................................... 48 6.8.5 Intersystem handover for CS Services – from GSM BSS to UTRAN ....................................................... 49 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.8.5.1 UMTS security context | ......................................................................................................................... 49 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.8.5.2 GSM security context | ........................................................................................................................... 49 6.8.6 Intersystem change for PS Services – from UTRAN to GSM BSS ........................................................... 49 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.8.6.1 UMTS security context | ......................................................................................................................... 49 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.8.6.2 GSM security context | ........................................................................................................................... 50 6.8.7 Intersystem change for PS services – from GSM BSS to UTRAN............................................................ 50 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.8.7.1 UMTS security context | ......................................................................................................................... 50 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 6.8.7.2 GSM security context | ........................................................................................................................... 50 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 7 Network domain security mechanisms | ..................................................................................................51 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 7.1 Overview of Mechanism | .................................................................................................................................. 51 ETSI ETSI TS 133 102 V3.4.0 (2000-03) 5 3G TS 33.102 version 3.4.0 Release 1999 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 7.1.1 Layer I | ........................................................................................................................................................ 51 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 7.1.2 Layer II | ....................................................................................................................................................... 52 7.1.3 Layer III ........................................................................................................................................................ |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 7.1.4 General Overview | ...................................................................................................................................... 52 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 7.2 Layer I Message Format | .................................................................................................................................. 52 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 7.2.1 Properties and Tasks of Key Administration Centres | ................................................................................ 53 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 7.2.2 Transport of Session Keys | .......................................................................................................................... 53 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 7.3 Layer II Message Format | ................................................................................................................................. 54 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 7.4 Layer III Message Format | ................................................................................................................................ 54 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 7.4.1 General Structure of Layer III Messages | .................................................................................................... 54 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 7.4.2 Format of Layer III Message Body | ............................................................................................................ 55 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 7.4.2.1 Protection Mode 0 | ................................................................................................................................ 55 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 7.4.2.2 Protection Mode 1 | ................................................................................................................................ 55 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 7.4.2.3 Protection Mode 2 | ................................................................................................................................ 56 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 7.4.3 Structure of Security Header | ...................................................................................................................... 56 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 7.5 Mapping of MAP Messages and Modes of Protection | .................................................................................... 56 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 7.6 Distribution of security parameters to UTRAN | ............................................................................................... 56 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 8 Application security mechanisms | ..........................................................................................................57 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 8.1 Secure messaging between the USIM and the network | ................................................................................... 57 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 8.2 Void | ................................................................................................................................................................. 57 |
9e6375fdafd921aa046ba06e2cd36484 | 133 102 | 8.3 Mobile IP security | ............................................................................................................................................ 57 Annex A (informative): Requirements analysis ..................................................................................58 Annex B (informative): Enhanced user identity ... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 1 Scope | The present document provides developers with general guidance to aid the secure implementation of quantum-safe algorithms. This includes an overview of the interfaces and expected security properties of quantum-safe algorithms; some general good practice guidance for cryptographic implementations; some background on s... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 2 References | |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 2.1 Normative references | Normative references are not applicable in the present document. |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 3.1 Terms | Void. |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 3.2 Symbols | For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply: ct Ciphertext ETSI ETSI TR 104 239-1 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 9 m Message par Parameter set pk Public key sk Private key ss Shared secret σ Signature |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: DHKEM Diffie-Hellman Key Encapsulation Mechanism DSS Digital Signature Scheme ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm EdDSA Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm KAS Key Agreement Scheme KEM Key ... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 4 Introduction | Traditional public-key algorithms such as RSA, Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) are known to be vulnerable to quantum attacks using Shor's algorithm [i.53]. In response to this, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) are currently stan... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 5 Interfaces | |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 5.1 Key encapsulation mechanisms | |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 5.1.1 Key encapsulation interface | A Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) consists of a collection of parameter sets and three algorithms: • KEM.KeyGen Input: Parameter set par. Output: Public encapsulation key pk and private decapsulation key sk, or an error. • KEM.Encaps Input: Parameter set par and public encapsulation key pk. Output: Shared secret ss a... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 5.1.2 Errors | Each of the key generation, encapsulation and decapsulation algorithms can return an error. These errors can be caused by a malformed input, including invalid parameters; the failure of an internal algorithm check, potentially due to an implementation mistake elsewhere; or an error in a component relied on by the algor... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 5.1.3 Decapsulation failures | The shared secret output by encapsulation might not always match the shared secret output by decapsulation; that is, for a key pair (sk, pk) it is possible to have (ss, ct) = KEM.Encaps(par, pk) and ss' = KEM.Decaps(par, sk, ct) with ss ≠ ss'. NOTE 1: This is not the same as a decapsulation error where decapsulation do... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 5.2 Digital signature schemes | |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 5.2.1 Digital signature interface | A Digital Signature Scheme (DSS) consists of a collection of parameter sets and three algorithms: • DSS.KeyGen Input: Parameter set par. Output: Public verification key pk and private signing key sk, or an error. • DSS.Sign Input: Parameter set par, private signing key sk and message m. Output: Signature σ, or an error... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 5.2.2 Errors | The key generation and signature generation algorithms can return an error. These errors can be caused by a malformed input, including invalid parameters; the failure of an internal algorithm check, potentially due to an implementation mistake elsewhere; or an error in a component relied on by the algorithm such as ran... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 5.2.3 Pre-hashing | In general purpose digital signature schemes, the signature generation algorithm takes a variable length message as input. If a hardware device is being used to securely store the private signing key and perform signature generation, it might not be feasible to transfer long messages to the device for signing; for exam... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 5.2.4 Context strings | If a protocol reuses the same private signing key to sign messages across different sessions of the protocol or for different purposes within the protocol, this can lead to replay or cross-protocol attacks. One mitigation technique is to include a context string which is specific to a given session or use case when sig... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 6 Best practice guidance | |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 6.1 Reuse existing implementations | If an existing cryptographic implementation has been independently reviewed and rigorously tested, then it is generally better to reuse that implementation than to develop a new implementation. Open-source projects that are well-organised and well-supported will benefit from greater community scrutiny and are more like... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 6.2 Perform input validation | |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 6.2.1 Check input formats | It is good practice for any implementation to validate input data so that unexpected data does not cause unpredictable behaviour [i.1]. At best, unexpected data can lead to the implementation returning inconsistent outputs. At worst, it can be an exploitable security vulnerability. The simplest form of input validation... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 6.2.2 Check cryptographic inputs | A more sophisticated form of input validation checks that cryptographic inputs such as private keys, public keys and ciphertexts have the expected properties. Cryptographic validation is generally not part of the algorithm specification, but it can often be recommended or required before passing the cryptographic input... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 6.3 Perform output validation | |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 6.3.1 Include consistency checks | Some cryptographic algorithms include consistency checks on the output as part of the specification. These are often intended to detect and prevent issues caused by mistakes elsewhere in the implementation. They can also include intermediate cryptographic checks that cannot be applied directly on the cryptographic inpu... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 6.3.2 Use expected output formats | Cryptographic algorithms can often have multiple representations or formats for keys, ciphertexts and signatures. Supporting different formats increases the complexity of an implementation. Some formats can be more vulnerable to side-channel or fault attacks than others. An implementation that returns the output in a f... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 6.4 Prevent leakage of intermediate values | |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 6.4.1 Zeroise intermediate values after use | Intermediate values from key generation, encryption, decryption or signature generation algorithms can potentially reveal sensitive information about private keys or plaintexts. If these values remain in memory after the cryptographic calculation, they might be recoverable by attackers with the right access. This inclu... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 6.4.2 Limit access to intermediate functions | Cryptographic algorithms are often built from lower-level primitives. If an implementation allows direct access to the lower-level primitives, or other intermediate functions, with the same inputs then this will reveal the intermediate values output by those primitives or functions. In particular, accessing lower-level... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 6.5 Handle errors gracefully | |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 6.5.1 Include specified error handling | As discussed in clauses 5.1.2 and 5.2.2, cryptographic algorithms can return errors due to malformed inputs, mistakes in the implementation, or other failures. Errors that are not handled carefully can lead to unexpected behaviour or leak sensitive information. Algorithm specifications often include requirements on how... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 6.5.2 Avoid leaking information through errors | If an error is caused by a check or other failure that depends on intermediate values derived from the private key or plaintext, then the error itself can reveal sensitive information. It is important to avoid leaking this information via error messages or timing data. EXAMPLE: The RSA-OAEP decryption algorithm [i.6] c... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 6.5.3 Indicate the severity of errors | For failures that are expected to occur with reasonable probability through normal use, it is usually safe to retry the computation with different random values where this is possible. On the other hand, failures that would never be expected to occur through normal use are likely to be caused by critical implementation... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 6.6 Use good randomness | |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 6.6.1 Use a secure random bit generator | Cryptographic algorithms require a good source of randomness. Randomness that is predictable or biased can critically undermine the security of the algorithm. Recommendations for generating and testing the quality of randomness can be found in [i.20] for example. Algorithm specifications often include requirements on t... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 6.6.2 Use good entropy | Even when an implementation uses a cryptographically secure random bit generator, the output can still be predictable if it is not instantiated and reseeded with good entropy. EXAMPLE 1: A change in the entropy collection for the random number generator in Debian led to predictable output (CVE-2008-0166). EXAMPLE 2: Re... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 6.6.3 Perform de-randomisation correctly | A technique that is commonly used to defend against entropy failures is de-randomization: the random bits needed by the algorithm are generated deterministically from the algorithm input. De-randomisation can be part of the algorithm specification (see, for example, [i.7]). If it is being used to replace a call to a ra... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 7 Side-Channels and Fault Attacks | |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 7.1 Introduction | |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 7.1.1 Concept | It is possible to closely observe devices performing cryptographic calculations and deduce secret information by analysing the measurements taken. The existence of such an extraction route for secrets is called a "side-channel", and the information is said to be "leaking" from the device. Examples of potential side-cha... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 7.1.2 Physical Access | An adversary's physical access to a device may range from remote observation through to full lab instrumentation. A further consideration is whether the adversary can make permanent modifications to the device, such as removing or introducing circuit board components. In general, the more permissive the physical access... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 7.1.3 Duration | The length of time an adversary can monitor a device for directly informs the number of calculations that can be observed. In the worst case, measurements made during a single iteration of a cryptographic algorithm can reveal the full secret key (a "single trace attack"). More typically, multiple iterations will be req... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 7.1.4 Control | An adversary's ability to trigger calculations, and to observe and control inputs, outputs and cryptographic secrets will impact the potential effectiveness of the attacks they are able to carry out. If an adversary can only passively observe calculations, this may increase the length of time taken to collect the requi... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 7.2 Timing Analysis | |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 7.2.1 Concept | Timing attacks use variations in the execution time of a cryptographic routine or subroutine to recover information about secret values. EXAMPLE: A password checking subroutine could perform a string comparison between the stored password and an input and terminate as soon as a mismatch is found. An adversary able to r... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 7.2.2 Secret-Dependent Branching | In cryptographic algorithm specifications, there are often branching paths where the control flow is dependent on the secret value. If the branches take differing lengths of time to execute, then an adversary able to observe the duration of calculation may be able to infer information about the secret value. EXAMPLE 1:... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 7.2.3 Variable Time Operations | Timing variations can also arise from applying variable time operations to secret data, such as a modular reduction or a division operation where the length of time taken is correlated with the secret value being processed. EXAMPLE: A secret-dependent timing variation introduced by the division operator occurred in man... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 7.2.4 Secret-Dependent Memory Addressing | If the adversary is able to monitor and influence the cache usage of a device, then secret-dependent memory addressing can also lead to timing vulnerabilities. EXAMPLE: AES implementations are often optimised by the introduction of lookup tables to speed up the final two rounds. Purging part of a lookup table from shar... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 7.2.5 Mitigations | Cryptographic code should be isochronous, which means it avoids secret-dependent branching or addressing and the application of variable time instructions to secret-dependent data. ETSI ETSI TR 104 239-1 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 21 NOTE: The property of being isochronous does not mean that the entire calculation is required to... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 7.3 Power and EM Analysis | |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 7.3.1 Concept | The amount of power drawn by a device is correlated with the operations it is performing, including the data being processed in registers. For data, this correlation is usually with the value's Hamming weight or its Hamming distance to the previous value in the register. If an adversary can gain sufficiently close acce... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 7.3.2 Mitigations | As mentioned in clause 7.1.1, the present document will focus on protocol and algorithmic level mitigations. Protocol level mitigations can reduce the number of traces an adversary can collect for a particular secret by enforcing regular key rotation after a certain period of time or number of algorithm iterations usin... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 7.3.3 Randomisation | Altering the order of operations can be an effective way to mitigate some Simple Power Analysis attacks by removing the adversary's ability to identify which value is being operated on at a particular time. This can be done by randomly permuting a loop or array, where the algorithm functionally permits this. EXAMPLE: A... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 7.3.4 Masking | The dependence of a device's power consumption on sensitive intermediate values can be mitigated algorithmically by rewriting the algorithm to operate on shares of these values, or equivalently "masking" the values. Masking introduces significant overheads to the complexity of implementing and testing an algorithm and ... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 7.4 Fault Attacks | |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 7.4.1 Concept | Inducing a fault in a cryptographic calculation can reveal information about the secret key. This is typically most useful if the output of several faulted calculations on the same input can be collected and compared, which is called Differential Fault Analysis [i.29]. An adversary can induce faults in a variety of way... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 7.4.2 Mitigations | Tools exist to analyse implementations and identify where carefully targeted faults could reveal cryptographic secrets [i.37]. In practice, this sort of precision is hard for an adversary to achieve. Where fault attacks are considered part of a threat model, a simple mitigation is to iterate the vulnerable calculations... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 8 Testing and Formal Verification | |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 8.1 Introduction | Typically, implementations of cryptographic algorithms are deemed functionally correct by checking they conform to a series of known-answer tests. This testing occurs on a very limited subset of all possible input-output pairs and provides no guarantee that other inputs do not map to an incorrect output according to th... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 8.2 Testing | |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 8.2.1 Concept | Known-answer tests are used to gain confidence in algorithm implementations. Validation tests are typically provided as a small number of known input-output pairs for an algorithm. These will include pairs sampled uniformly at random from the input space and ideally pairs that cover corner cases such as testing the err... |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 8.3.1 Concept | Cryptographic algorithms are based on years of analysis, including writing precise specifications, accompanying mathematical security proofs which are in some cases complemented by computer-aided security proofs, to ensure the security of their algorithms. To achieve high levels of assurance that an implementation conf... |
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