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422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 4.2 Usage and Major Security Features | This is a Protection Profile Module (PP-Module) used to extend a Base-PP for a consumer mobile device to provide additional security requirements on the bootloader. The major security features are: • Root of Trust: an intrinsically trusted component that is generated very early in the device start-up process (before th... |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 4.3 PP-Module Identification | PP-Module Title ETSI TS 103 732-5 (the present document) "Consumer Mobile Device; Part 5: Bootloader Protection Profile Module". PP-Module Version 1.1.1 PP-Module Date July 24, 2024 ETSI ETSI TS 103 732-5 V1.1.1 (2024-07) 9 |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 4.4 Base-PP Identification | • This PP-Module relies on the following Base-PP: Base-PP Short Name [CMD PP] Base-PP Title ETSI TS 103 732-1 [6]: "Consumer Mobile Device; Part 1: Base Protection Profile". Base-PP Version 2.1.2 Base-PP Date November 16, 2023 |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 4.5 Conformance Claim | The present document: • claims conformance to CC V3.1 Release 5 [1], [2], [3], [4] and the CC and CEM addenda [5]; • is CC Part 2 [2] extended; • assurance requirements are inherited from the Base-PP; • does not claim conformance to any other PP. |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 5 Security Problem Definition | |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 5.1 Assets and interfaces of the TOE | The TOE of this PP-Module is the bootloader and storage configuration on the CMD. The assets and interfaces of the TOE are defined in the Base-PP for the CMD, the TOE here is a deeper focus on the best security practices for the bootloader on the CMD to ensure those assets and interfaces are protected. |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 5.2 Threat agents and threats | The following threat agents from the Base-PP are identified as below: • TA.PHYSICAL: a threat agent who has physical access to the TOE, and therefore to both the user interface and the physical interface. • TA.FLAWAPP: a malicious or poorly programmed app that the user has installed on the TOE and that therefore has ac... |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 5.3 Organizational Security Policies | There are no organizational security policies defined for the TOE. |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 5.4 Assumptions | There are no assumptions defined for the TOE. |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 6 Security Objectives | |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 6.1 Security Objectives for the TOE | The following security objectives from the Base-PP are identified as below as satisfied by the requirements in the PP-Module: O.SECURE_BOOT - The TOE, at the start of its boot process, checks the TSF to ensure it has not been tampered with. O.SECURE_WIPE - The TOE is able to make user data assets permanently unreadable... |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 6.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment | There are no security objectives for the operational environment. |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 6.3 Security Objectives Rationale | The security objectives rationales for threats that come from the Base-PP are in addition to the rationale in the Base-PP. ETSI ETSI TS 103 732-5 V1.1.1 (2024-07) 11 Threat Rationale T.FLAWAPP_HACKS_TOE (from the Base-PP) This threat is countered by: • O.SELF_PROTECTION (from the Base-PP) by ensuring that the TSF secur... |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 7 Extended Components Definition | |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 7.1 Definition of the family Bootloader Unlock (FDP_ULK) | Family Behaviour This family describes the functional requirements for how the user's data is protected when the bootloader is changed from a locked (when only developer-approved system images can be installed) to unlocked (when a non-developer- approved system image may be installed). The security functional component... |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 7.2 Definition of the family Boot Bypass (FPT_BBY) | Family Behaviour This family describes the functional requirements for how the bootloader shall not enable modes of operation which bypass the TSF. The security functional components are defined in an additional family (FPT_BBY) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF). Component Levelling FPT_BBY: Boot Bypass 1 FPT_ B... |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 7.3 Definition of the family Bootloader Privilege (FPT_BLP) | Family Behaviour This family describes the functional requirements for how the bootloader is run within the CPU privilege levels. The security functional components are defined in an additional family (FPT_BLP) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF). Component Levelling FPT_BLP: Bootloader Privilege 1 FPT_BLP.1 The b... |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 7.4 Definition of the family TSF initialization (FPT_INI) | Family Behaviour This family describes the functional requirements for the initialization of the TSF by a dedicated function of the TOE that ensures the initialization in a correct and secure operational state. Component Levelling FPT_INI: TSF initialization 1 This family consists of only one component, Component FPT_I... |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 7.5 Definition of the family Partition Safety (FPT_PRT) | Family Behaviour This family describes the functional requirements on the storage structure through the protection of and enforcement of the partition configuration of the TOE. The security functional components are defined in an additional family (FPT_PRT) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF). ETSI ETSI TS 103 732... |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 7.6 Definition of the family Rollback Protection (FPT_ROL) | Family Behaviour This family describes the functional requirements for when and how the software/firmware on the device may allowed to have an older version of the software/firmware installed over a newer version (rollback). The security functional components are defined in an additional family (FPT_ROL) of the Class F... |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 8 Security requirements | |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 8.1 Conventions | The following conventions are used for the completion of operations defined in the SFRs: • Unaltered SFRs are stated in the form used in Part 2 [2] or their Extended Component Definition (ECD). • Refinement made in the PP: the refinement text is indicated with bold text and strikethroughs. • Selection wholly or partial... |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 8.2 ETSI TS 103 732-1 Security functional requirements | There are no modifications to the SFRs from the Base-PP. |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 8.3 TOE Security functional requirements | |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 8.3.1 User data protection (FDP) | As the CMD is not a managed device in the enterprise sense, all management is handled locally by the user as opposed to a specific management service as would be the case for an enterprise device. FDP_ULK.1 Bootloader Unlock FDP_ULK.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that [selection: the bootloader cannot be unlocked, changing t... |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 8.3.2 Protection of the TSF (FPT) | FPT_ BBY.1 Boot Bypass FPT_ BBY.1.1 The TSF shall be enforced in any alternative boot modes. Application Note 2: Alternate boot modes are modes which do not boot to the main OS for normal functioning of the CMD. A common example of an alternate boot mode is a recovery mode which may provide a method for re-installing t... |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 8.4 Security assurance requirements | There are no additional security assurance requirement beyond those defined in the Base-PP, though the following content expectations are clarified for ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification. ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification clarification As part of the functional specification, the ... |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 8.5 Security requirements rationale | |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 8.5.1 Rationale for choosing the SARs | This PP-Module does not define any additional assurance requirements above and beyond what is defined in the Base-PP that it extends. Application of the SARs to the TOE boundary described by both the claimed base and this PP-Module is sufficient to demonstrate that the claimed SFRs have been implemented correctly by th... |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 8.5.2 The SFRs meet all the security objectives for the TOE | Security Objective Rationale O.SECURE_BOOT (from the Base-PP) This objective is achieved by: • FPT_INI.1 and FPT_RDI.1, providing a Root of Trust to be used to verify the bootloader. • FPT_PRT.1 and FPT_PRT.2, protecting the integrity of the storage configuration. O.SECURE_WIPE (from the Base-PP) This objective is achi... |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 8.5.3 Dependency analysis | SFR Dependency Rationale FDP_ULK.1 - FPT_BBY.1 - FPT_BLP.1 - FPT_INI.1 - FPT_PRT.1 - FPT_PRT.2 FPT_PRT.1 Included in the PP-Module FPT_RDI.1 - FPT_ROL.1 - ETSI ETSI TS 103 732-5 V1.1.1 (2024-07) 19 |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 8.6 Consistency rationale | |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 8.6.1 TOE type consistency | When this PP-Module is used to extend the ETSI TS 103 732-1 [6] Base-PP, the TOE type for the overall TOE is still a consumer mobile device. This PP-Module adds requirements on bootloader and storage configuration included in the consumer mobile device. The TSF boundary is not extended, but provides more detailed requi... |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 8.6.2 Consistency of Security Problem Definition | The threats, OSPs and assumptions defined by the PP-Module are consistent with those defined in the ETSI TS 103 732-1 [6] Base-PP as follows. PP-Module Threats/OSPs Consistency Rationale T.FLAWAPP_HACKS_TOE These threats are taken from the Base-PP. T.PHYSICAL T.RECOVER_DATA_ROLLBACK The threat of data access based on d... |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 8.6.3 Consistency of Objectives | The objectives for the preloaded applications are consistent with the ETSI TS 103 732-1 [6] Base-PP based on the following rationale. PP-Module TOE Objectives Consistency Rationale O.SECURE_BOOT These TOE Objectives are taken from the Base-PP. O.SECURE_WIPE O.SELF_PROTECTION O.INITIALIZATION This objective is a detaile... |
422ac8948550190292e4df89f508aa1f | 103 732-5 | 8.6.4 Consistency of Requirements | The TOE of this PP-Module is comprised of the bootloader, storage configuration and Root of Trust elements described in clause 4.1. These comprise core functionality of the CMD. This PP-Module assumes that the CMD satisfies SFRs defined in the ETSI TS 103 732-1 [6], and there are no specific SFR selections from ETSI TS... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 1 Scope | The present document defines communication requirements and profiles to support communications from/to ITS-S stations (e.g. fixed road side ITS-S, mobile ITS-S) for the support of security management services specified in ETSI TS 102 941 [2] (i.e. certificate management, trust and revocation lists distribution). The pr... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 2 References | |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ETSI TS 102 940 [1], ETSI TS 102 941 [2] and the following apply: CTL/CRL Distribution Application: software application supported by an ITS-S that enables a relay service for storing and distribution of CTL/CRL to other ITS-S Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU):... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 3.2 Symbols | For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply: N1 number of attempts that an ITS-S is authorized to do after the sending of the EC request. Note that N1 is a non-negative integer (N1 ≥ 0) N1 = 0 means that no EC retry is possible N1 = 1 means that after sending the EC request and not having rece... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: 5G-NR 5G New Radio AA Authorization Authority AES Advanced Encryption Standard AID Application Identifier ALC Asynchronous layered coding ASN Abstract Syntax Notation AT Authorization Ticket B2B Business to Business ETSI ETSI TS 103 601 V2.1.1... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 3.4 Notations | For the purposes of the present document, the notations given in ETSI TS 102 940 [1] apply. |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4 Services description: use cases and requirements | |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.1 Certificate provisioning service | |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.1.1 Service description | |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.1.1.1 Overview | The certificates reloading service consists for an ITS-S to request EC/AT to the PKI in an online and automatic manner. EC requests are not frequent as an ITS-S usually requests one EC at the beginning of its lifecycle and then renews its EC in advance before the end of its key validity period [2]. However, AT are requ... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.1.1.2 UC-SEC-01: EC initial request or re-keying | Use Case ID: UC-SEC-01 Use Case Name: Enrolment credential initial request or re-keying. Priority: Mandatory. Related Requirement: ITS-S is registered in the PKI. ITS-S has Ipv6 connectivity. Primary Actor ITS-S. Description ITS-S requests an EC to the EA. After verification, the EA replies positively by sending back t... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.1.1.3 UC-SEC-02: AT reloading | Use Case ID: UC-SEC-02 Use Case Name: Authorization ticket reloading. Priority: Mandatory. Related Requirement: ITS-S is registered in the PKI. ITS-S has a valid EC. ITS-S has Ipv6 connectivity. Primary Actor ITS-S. Description ITS-S requests an AT to the AA. After verifications, the AA replies positively by sending ba... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.1.1.4 Use cases and communication profiles mapping | Table 1 summarizes the communication profiles that can be used for each use case. Details of the communication profiles are provided in clause 6 of the present document. Table 1: Mapping between use cases and communication profiles CPS_001 CPS_002 CPS_003 CPS_004 UC-SEC-01 R-ITS-S X V-ITS-S X (see note) X UC-SEC-02 R-I... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.1.2 Requirements | |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.1.2.1 Security requirements | The PKI management protocols shall satisfy the following basic set of security objectives: • Authentication/authorization control: authentication consists to be sure of the identity which sends data. Authorization control is the verification of an access policy, based on a trusted authentication. Authenticate all entit... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.2 CTL distribution service | |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.2.1 Service description | |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.2.1.1 Overview | Within the CCMS framework, the CTL or ECTL is generated and issued by the Root CA or the TLM and published by a DC or CPOC to be made available to all the participants of the trusted C-ITS system, as specified in ETSI TS 102 940 [1]. The issuance of a new CTL (or ECTL) should be done periodically as well as on specific... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.2.1.2 UC-SEC-03: On demand request of a FullCTL | This use case allows an ITS-S to update its certificate trust list information by requesting the Full CTL to the corresponding CPOC (which distributes the ECTL published by a TLM) or DC (which distributes the CTL published by a RCA). In this use case, the ITS-S shall use the communication profile as specified in ETSI T... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.2.1.3 UC-SEC-04: On demand request of a DeltaCTL | Use Case ID: UC-SEC-04 Use Case Name: On demand request of a DeltaCTL. Priority: Mandatory for R-ITS-S as the R-ITS-S shall be used as a relay for distribution of Delta CTLs (see UC-SEC-07). Optional for V-ITS-S: it is not necessary that all V-ITS-Ss provide the DeltaCTL to other ITS-Ss. Only some public safety or spec... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.2.1.4 UC-SEC-05: ITS-S based DeltaCTL distribution | This use case focuses on end-entities such as R-ITS-S or V-ITS-S that have the capabilities of distributing Delta ECTL or Delta CTL using their short-range wireless communication interface. The receiving ITS-S is a mobile ITS station, as the fixed ITS Station shall use other Use cases for requesting the updated ECTL or... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.2.1.5 UC-SEC-06: Delay-tolerant peer-2-peer DeltaCTL distribution | Use Case ID: UC-SEC-06 Use Case Name: Delay-tolerant peer-2-peer DeltaCTL distribution. Priority: Mandatory. Related Requirement: ITS-S (neighbour) has received from the CPOC the current DeltaCTL corresponding to the base ECTL and has checked its validity. ITS-S is providing a memory storage to store DeltaCTL messages ... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.2.1.6 UC-SEC-10: ITS-S based FullCTL distribution | This use case focuses on end-entities such as R-ITS-S or V-ITS-S that have the capabilities of distributing ECTL or CTL using their short-range wireless communication interface. The receiving ITS-S is a mobile ITS station, as the fixed ITS Station shall use other Use cases for requesting the updated ECTL or CTL using w... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.2.1.7 UC-SEC-11: Delay-tolerant peer-2-peer FullCTL distribution | Use Case ID: UC-SEC-11 Use Case Name: Delay-tolerant peer-2-peer DeltaCTL distribution. Priority: Mandatory. Related Requirement: ITS-S (neighbour) has received from the CPOC or from the DC the latest updated (E)CTL and has checked its validity. ITS-S is providing a memory storage to store FullCtl messages issued by a ... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.2.1.8 Use cases and communication profiles mapping | Table 2 summarizes the communication profiles that can be used for each use case. Details of the communication profiles are provided in clause 6. ETSI ETSI TS 103 601 V2.1.1 (2024-03) 20 Table 2: Mapping between use cases and communication profiles CPS_001 CPS_002 CPS_003 CPS_004 UC-SEC-03 X X UC-SEC-04 X X UC-SEC-05 X... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.2.2 Requirements | |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.2.2.1 System requirements | The system requirements for this service are as follows: • Notification of trust list information: the system shall notify explicitly or implicitly to every entities of the C-ITS trust domain all updated trust list information (CTL, CRL) which are necessary for their correct operation (e.g. in their operation context s... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.2.2.2 Security requirements | The PKI management protocols shall satisfy the following basic set of security objectives: • Authentication/authorization control: authentication consists to be sure of the identity which sends data. Authorization control is the verification of an access policy, based on a trusted authentication. Authenticate all entit... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.3 CRL distribution service | |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.3.1 Service description | |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.3.1.1 Overview | Within the CCMS framework, the CRL is generated and issued by the Root CA and published by a DC to be made available to all the participants of the trusted C-ITS system, as specified in ETSI TS 102 940 [1]. The issuance of a new CRL should be done periodically as well as on specific conditions triggered by a security m... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.3.1.2 UC-SEC-07: On demand request of a CRL | This use case allows an ITS-S to update a certificate revocation list information by requesting the CRL to the DC (which distributes the CRL published by a RCA). In this use case, the ITS-S shall use the communication profile as specified in ETSI TS 102 941 [2], clause D.2. It is agnostic from the underlying communicat... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.3.1.3 UC-SEC-08: ITS-S based CRL distribution | This use case allows end-entities such as R-ITS-S or V-ITS-S to broadcast the certificate revocation list information (signed by the RCA) to all the participants of the trusted C-ITS system using their short-range wireless communication interface. Use Case ID: UC-SEC-08 Use Case Name: ITS-S based Certificate Revocation... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.3.1.4 UC-SEC-09: Delay-tolerant peer-2-peer CRL distribution | Use Case ID: UC-SEC-09 Use Case Name: Delay-tolerant peer-2-peer CRL distribution. Priority: Mandatory. Related Requirement: ITS-S (neighbour) has received from the DC an updated CRL and has checked its validity. ITS-S is providing a memory storage to store CRL messages issued by a DC. ITS-S has an available ITS-S pres... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.3.1.5 Use cases and communication profiles mapping | Table 3 summarizes the communication profiles that can be used for each use case. Details of the communication profiles are provided in clause 6. Table 3: Mapping between use cases and communication profiles CPS_001 CPS_002 CPS_003 CPS_004 UC-SEC-07 X X UC-SEC-08 X UC-SEC-09 X NOTE: The communication profiles defined f... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.3.2 Requirements | |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.3.2.1 System requirements | The system requirements for this service are as follows: • Notification of trust list information: the system shall notify explicitly or implicitly to every entities of the C-ITS trust domain all updated trust list information (CTL, CRL) which are necessary for their correct operation (e.g. in their operation context s... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 4.3.2.2 Security requirements | The following list gives the basic set of security objectives which should be satisfied by the PKI management protocols: • Authentication/authorization control: authentication consists to be sure of the identity which sends data. Authorization control is the verification of an access policy, based on a trusted authenti... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 5 Use cases specific protocols description | |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 5.1 Enrolment Management with repetition mechanism | |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 5.1.1 EC retry overview | The EC retry aims at managing the failure of EC request or EC response service. The ITS-S shall be able to re-send an EC request following the EC request/response service specified in ETSI TS 102 941 [2], clause 6.2.3.2 and by using the same cryptographic key (session encryption key) used for the first transmission of ... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 5.1.2 EC retry protocol | The EC retry service shall provide repetition mechanism in case of a loss of the EC request or the EC response and shall include the following functionalities: • When the requesting ITS-S initiates an EC request, it creates and stores the EnrolmentRequest message as specified in ETSI TS 102 941 [2], clause 6.2.3.2.1. E... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 5.1.3 Message and version | The message used in EC request/response retry service are the same messages as specified in ETSI TS 102 941 [2], clause 6.2.3.2. The version is unchanged. |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 5.1.4 EC retry requirements | The EC retry service shall comply to the "Enrolment/Authorization assumption and requirements" defined in ETSI TS 102 941 [2], clause 6.2.2 and support additionally the following requirements: • The ITS-S shall set a timer T1 (interval between two successive EC requests) to the value TH1. I.e. the end of timer T1 occur... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 5.1.5 Service communication parameter | Service communication parameters are specified in clause 6.1 (CPS_001) and clause 6.2 (CPS_002). |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 5.2 Authorization Management with repetition mechanism | |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 5.2.1 AT retry overview | The AT retry aims at managing the failure of AT request or AT response service. The ITS-S should be able to re-send an AT request following the AT request/response service specified in ETSI TS 102 941 [2], clause 6.2.3.3 and by using the same cryptographic key (session encryption key) used for the first failed AT reque... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 5.2.2 AT retry protocol | The AT Retry service specified in this clause is related to use case UC-SEC-02 and provides the AT retry mechanism in case of a failed end condition. The AT retry service shall provide repetition mechanism in case of a loss of the AT request or the AT response and shall include the following functionalities: • When the... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 5.2.3 Message and version | The message used in AT request/response retry service are the same messages as specified in ETSI TS 102 941 [2], clause 6.2.3.3. The version is unchanged. |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 5.2.4 AT retry requirements | The AT retry service shall comply to the "Enrolment/Authorization assumption and requirements" defined in ETSI TS 102 941 [2], clause 6.2.2 and support additionally the following requirements: • The ITS-S shall set a timer T4_requestID (time interval before repeating an AT request) to the value TH4. I.e. the end of tim... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 5.3 Peer-to-peer CRL/CTL distribution protocol | |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 5.3.1 Overview | The present document specifies the Peer-to-Peer CRL/CTL Distribution (P2PCXLD) service. This service refers to Security Management or Facilities Layer entities that provide the CRL, DeltaCTL and FullCTL distribution service as defined in Use Cases UC-SEC-O5, UC-SEC-O6 and UC-SEC-O8 to UC-SEC-11. It allows to manage the... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 5.3.2 Peer-to-peer CRL/CTL request/response protocol | The Peer-to-peer CRL/CTL distribution (P2PCXLD) service shall provide the communication service for the support of transmission of requests/reception of responses using the in-band message communication and provide the following functionalities: • Generation of a secured F-PDU (e.g. CAM) inserting a single request to g... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 5.3.3 Message and version | The ITS-S Responder which initiates the Broadcast service shall use the response message format corresponding to the request (see clause 5.4.3). |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 5.3.4 Peer-to-peer CRL/CTL request message | |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 5.3.4.1 General | This clause specifies the ITS-S requester functionalities to support the Peer-to-Peer CRL/CTL Request service using the Short-Range communication profile over a ITS safety or non-safety channel (CPS_003). The ITS-S requesting a new updated CRL DeltaCTL, or FullCTL shall use the corresponding ContributedExtensions field... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 5.3.4.2 Generation of a Peer-to-peer CRL request | To create a Peer-to-peer CRL request, the ITS-S shall follow this process: • The ITS-S shall select, from its local list of Trust Anchors (TA), the current valid certificate of the RCA which is issuing the requested CRL and shall compute the issuerId value as the HashedID8 of this RCA certificate (as specified in ETSI ... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 5.3.4.3 Generation of a Peer-to-peer Delta CTL request | To create a Peer-to-peer Delta CTL request, the ITS-S shall follow this process: • The ITS-S shall select, from its local list of Trust Anchors (TA), the current valid certificate of the RCA which is issuing the requested DeltaCTL and shall compute the issuerId value as the HashedID8 of this RCA certificate (as specifi... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 5.3.4.4 Generation of a Peer-to-peer Full CTL request | To create a Peer-to-peer Full CTL request, the ITS-S shall follow this process: • The ITS-S shall select, from its local list of Trust Anchors (TA), the current valid certificate of the RCA which is issuing the requested FullCTL and shall compute the issuerId value as the HashedID8 of this RCA certificate (as specified... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 5.3.5 Peer-to-peer CRL/CTL response message | Requirements for the ITS-S responder are specified in clause 5.4. |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 5.3.6 P2P CRL/CTL request message trigger, repetition and termination | The requesting ITS-S shall initiate a P2PCXLD request to get the next updated version of the DeltaCTL issued by the TLM or by its own RCA: • on a periodic basis depending on rules set by the CP; • when the ITS-S receives a signed PDU which contains an ETSI originating extension block in the HeaderInfo structure (compon... |
db5c2a2c623de7817060981e27f80453 | 103 601 | 5.3.7 Protocol communication parameter | The service communication parameters for the ITS-S requester are depending of the Facilities message (F-PDU) which carries the Peer-to-Peer CTL/CRL request and the service communication parameters for the ITS-S distributor are specified in clause 5.4.4 or 5.5.4. |
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