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8.5 Form factor
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8.5.1 Form factor - mandatory requirements
Identifier Requirement REQ-15-SSP-8.5.1-01 The SSP definition shall be independent of the form factor (see note). NOTE: The form factors used for SSP may include the form factors defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [2] and ETSI TS 102 671 [3].
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8.6 Security
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8.6.1 Security - mandatory requirements
Identifier Requirement REQ-15-SSP-8.6.1-01 It shall be possible for the SSP to go through a high level of certification and advanced attacks testing with high level qualified labs. REQ-15-SSP-8.6.1-02 Such certification process shall include the SOG-IS protection profiles [5]. REQ-15-SSP-8.6.1-03 The SSP shall be tampe...
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8.6.2 Security - optional requirements
Identifier Requirement REQ-15-SSP-8.6.2-01 The SSP shall include an optional mechanism in order to allow remote auditing of its security state. REQ-15-SSP-8.6.2-02 The SSP shall include an optional secure mechanism in order to allow remote provisioning of its software components, including applications, part of or all ...
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8.7 SSP management
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8.7.1 SSP management - mandatory requirements
Identifier Requirement REQ-15-SSP-8.7.1-01 There shall be a mechanism to discover the services available in the SSP by the terminal (see note). NOTE: Examples of services are: Card Application Toolkit, support for suspension mechanism, ability to exchange IP data.
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8.7.2 SSP management - optional requirements
Identifier Requirement REQ-15-SSP-8.7.2-01 There shall be an optional mechanism for the SSP to discover the services available for its use in the terminal.
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8.8 Backwards compatibility
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8.8.1 Backwards compatibility - mandatory requirements
None.
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8.8.2 Backwards compatibility - optional requirements
Identifier Requirement REQ-15-SSP-8.8.2-01 There shall be an option for the SSP to support the transport of APDU. REQ-15-SSP-8.8.2-02 There shall be an option for the SSP to support the ISO/IEC 7816-3 [7] interface. REQ-15-SSP-8.8.2-03 An SSP implemented according to one of the existing form factors in ETSI TS 102 221 ...
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8.9 Primary/secondary platform architecture
8.9.1 Primary/secondary platform architecture - class dependent requirements
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8.9.1.1 General
The primary/secondary platform architecture shall be comprised of 4 parts: • Primary Platform: The hardware platform, a low-level operating system managing the exceptions, the hardware platform resources and their accesses. The primary platform should provide forward compliance, subject to limitations of resources. The...
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8.9.1.2.1 General description
This clause specifies the roles, interfaces and requirements associated with the SSP for the provisioning of a secondary platform bundle. iSSP Terminal SPB Manager CI Service Provider LBA SPBL SSP Maker End User SSPDS Si6 Si6 Si6 Si1 Si5 Primary Platform Si2 Si4 Si3 Si8 Si7 SPBL Agent Si9 Si10 Figure 4: SSP external in...
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8.9.1.2.2 Primary/secondary platform external interfaces requirements
Identifier Requirement REQ-15-SSP-8.9.1.2.2-01 The SPB manager shall securely bind an SPB to a specific SSP instance. REQ-15-SSP-8.9.1.2.2-02 The service provider shall have a means to control the SPB binding via Si1 interface. REQ-15-SSP-8.9.1.2.2-03 The SPBL shall use a secure mechanism ensuring that, each time an SP...
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8.9.1.2.3 SPB metadata requirements
Identifier Requirement REQ-15-SSP-8.9.1.2.3-01 The SPB shall have associated SPB metadata. REQ-15-SSP-8.9.1.2.3-02 The SPB metadata for an installed SPB shall be stored in the SSP. REQ-15-SSP-8.9.1.2.3-03 The SPB metadata shall be readable by the LBA via Si2 interface during loading process of the SPB before the instal...
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8.9.1.2.4 SPB provisioning information requirements
Identifier Requirement REQ-15-SSP-8.9.1.2.4-01 The SPB manager shall have means to securely determine the manufacturer and the model (hardware and software version) of the primary platform instance. REQ-16-SSP-8.9.1.2.4-02 There shall be a means to set a default SPB manager address in the SSP by an authorized entity (s...
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8.9.1.2.5 Primary/secondary platform PKI requirements
Identifier Requirement REQ-15-SSP-8.9.1.2.5-01 The SPBL end entity certificate(s) shall end a certification path originating from a CI trusted by the SPBM (see note 1). REQ-15-SSP-8.9.1.2.5-02 The SPBM end entity certificate(s) shall end a certification path originating from a CI trusted by the SPBL (see note 2). REQ-1...
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8.9.1.2.6 SSP discovery service requirements
Identifier Requirement REQ-16-SSP-8.9.1.2.6-01 If the LBA supports SSPDS the LBA shall be compliant with the following requirements. REQ-16-SSP-8.9.1.2.6-02 The LBA may be configured with zero, one, or more than one SSPDS address (see notes 1 and 4). REQ-16-SSP-8.9.1.2.6-03 The LBA should be able to display, in a stand...
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8.9.1.2.7 SSP device change requirements
8.9.1.2.7.1 General requirements Identifier Requirement REQ-16-SSP-8.9.1.2.7.1-01 There shall be a means for the SPB owner to configure within its SPB whether the device change is allowed by using an SPB generated by the SPBM. REQ-16-SSP-8.9.1.2.7.1-02 With regard to REQ-16-SSP-8.9.1.2.7.1-01, the configuration may inc...
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8.9.1.3 APIs
Identifier Requirement REQ-15-SSP-8.9.1.3-01 SSPs shall provide an abstraction layer on top of the hardware platform, the low-level operating system managing the exceptions, the hardware platform resources and their accesses, providing a standardized interface that enables development of high level OS solely based on t...
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8.9.1.4 Platform applications
Identifier Requirement REQ-15-SSP-8.9.1.4-01 SSPs shall contain a secondary platform bundle loader compliant with GlobalPlatform Open Firmware Loader for Tamper Resistant Element [13].
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8.9.1.5 Primary/secondary platform security requirements
Identifier Requirement REQ-15-SSP-8.9.1.5-01 The primary platform shall provide a means to be securely and uniquely identified. REQ-15-SSP-8.9.1.5-02 The SSP shall be able to support a certification by composition of a secondary platform bundle on top of the primary platform certification. REQ-15-SSP-8.9.1.5-03 There s...
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8.9.1.6 Primary/secondary platform core security requirements
Identifier Requirement REQ-15-SSP-8.9.1.6-01 Privacy by design shall be enforced by the primary platform specification. REQ-15-SSP-8.9.1.6-02 It shall be possible for the primary platform to support multiple secondary platform bundles provided by different issuers. REQ-15-SSP-8.9.1.6-03 The primary platform shall provi...
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8.9.1.7 Access rights requirements
Identifier Requirement REQ-15-SSP-8.9.1.7-01 The primary platform shall provide a mechanism to securely destroy the contents of the private working set of the secondary platform bundle before the memory is reallocated. REQ-15-SSP-8.9.1.7-02 The API defined in REQ-15-SSP-8.9.1.3-04 shall be accessible only to the second...
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8.9.1.8 Certification requirements
Identifier Requirement REQ-15-SSP-8.9.1.8-01 The certification of the primary platform shall claim in its security target the conformance with protection profile BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [11] including loader package 2. REQ-15-SSP-8.9.1.8-02 The security target of a primary platform shall support all the security requiremen...
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8.9.1.9 SSP remote management requirements
Identifier Requirement REQ-16-SSP-8.9.1.9-01 There shall be a means for an SPBM to remotely install, enable, disable and delete an SPB via Si4 interface. REQ-16-SSP-8.9.1.9-02 The SPBL shall only accept remote management commands from authenticated and authorized SPBMs. REQ-16-SSP-8.9.1.9-03 There shall be a means to s...
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9 Requirements for iSSP class
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9.1 Introduction
This clause specifies the requirements for the iSSP class. Some use cases for an integrated secure element are described in clause 6. There should be common principles of operation for the management framework across all industry sectors.
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9.2 Additional requirements for iSSP
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9.2.0 General Requirements
Identifier Requirement REQ-15-SSP-9.2-01 The iSSP shall support the requirements defined in clause 8.9. ETSI ETSI TS 103 465 V16.6.0 (2022-01) 48 Release 16
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9.2.1 Void (clause is now clause 8.9.1.3)
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9.2.2 Filesystem
No additional requirement.
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9.2.3 Void (clause is now clause 8.9.1.4)
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9.2.4 Transport protocol
Identifier Requirement REQ-15-SSP-9.2.4-01 A transport protocol may be defined to allow testing and debugging of the SSP functionality (see note 2). REQ-15-SSP-9.2.4-02 The iSSP shall support the SCL network layer as defined in clause 8.3.1 (see note 1). NOTE 1: This requirement does not mandate the usage of the SCL ne...
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9.2.5 Link layer protocol
None.
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9.2.6 Physical and electrical interface
Any electrical and physical interfaces of an iSSP are out of scope of the present document.
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9.2.7 Form factor
None.
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9.2.8 Power modes and related timings
None.
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9.2.9 Security
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9.2.9.1 Generic security requirements
Identifier Requirement REQ-15-SSP-9.2.9.1-01 The iSSP shall be isolated from all other SoC components such that no other SoC components can have access to the iSSP owned assets. REQ-15-SSP-9.2.9.1-02 iSSP software and data shall never be exposed outside the iSSP in clear text (see note 2). REQ-15-SSP-9.2.9.1-03 All iSS...
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9.2.9.2 Core platform security requirements
Identifier Requirement REQ-15-SSP-9.2.9.2-01 Void. See requirement REQ-15-SSP-8.9.1.6-01. REQ-15-SSP-9.2.9.2-02 Void. See requirement REQ-15-SSP-8.9.1.6-02. REQ-15-SSP-9.2.9.2-03 Void. See requirement REQ-15-SSP-8.9.1.6-03. REQ-15-SSP-9.2.9.2-04 The primary platform shall provide a means to preserve the integrity of th...
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9.2.9.3 Void
This clause is now clause 8.9.1.7.
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9.2.9.4 Void
This clause is now clause 8.9.1.8. ETSI ETSI TS 103 465 V16.6.0 (2022-01) 50 Release 16
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9.2.9.5 System on chip security requirements
Identifier Requirement REQ-15-SSP-9.2.9.5-01 It should be possible for the iSSP to allocate a private logical partition of the rNVM. REQ-15-SSP-9.2.9.5-02 It may be possible for the rNVM controller to dynamically manage the size of the private logical partition as define in REQ-15-SSP-9.2.9.5-01. REQ-15-SSP-9.2.9.5-03 ...
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9.2.10 Void (clause is now clause 8.9.1.1)
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9.2.11 Void (clause is now clause 8.9.1.2)
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9.2.11.1 Void (clause is now clause 8.9.1.2.1)
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9.2.11.2 Void (clause is now clause 8.9.1.2.2)
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9.2.11.3 Void (clause is now clause 8.9.1.2.3)
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9.2.11.4 Void (clause is now clause 8.9.1.2.4)
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9.2.11.5 Void (clause is now clause 8.9.1.2.5)
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10 Requirements for eSSP class
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10.1 Introduction
This clause specifies the requirements for the eSSP class. Some use cases for an embedded secure element are described in clause 6. There are two types of the eSSP class using different architectures: eSSP Type 1 and eSSP Type 2.
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10.2 Additional requirements for the eSSP Type 1 class
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10.2.1 Application and file structure
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10.2.1.1 SSP application requirements
Identifier Requirement REQ-15-SSP-10.2.1.1-01 There shall be an option for the eSSP Type 1 to support SSP applications using the APDU as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4 [8] and ETSI TS 102 221 [2]. REQ-15-SSP-10.2.1.1-02 There shall be an option for the eSSP Type 1 to support SSP applications using HTTP(S).
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10.2.1.2 File system
No additional requirement.
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10.2.1.3 SSP application and file system access conditions
No additional requirement. ETSI ETSI TS 103 465 V16.6.0 (2022-01) 51 Release 16
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10.2.2 Protocols
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10.2.2.1 Required protocol support
Identifier Requirement REQ-15-SSP-10.2.2.1-01 The eSSP Type 1 shall support SCL network layer, as described in clause 8.3.2.1. REQ-15-SSP-10.2.2.1-02 If the eSSP Type 1 supports the ISO/IEC 7816-3 [7] interface as per REQ-15-SSP-8.4.2.1-01, it shall support the APDU protocol according to ISO/IEC 7816-4 [8] over the ISO...
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10.2.3 Electrical and physical Interface
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10.2.3.1 General electrical and physical interface requirements
Identifier Requirement REQ-15-SSP-10.2.3.1-01 The eSSP Type 1 shall support at least one of the electrical and physical interfaces described in the requirements REQ-15-SSP-8.4.2.1-02, REQ-15-SSP-8.4.2.1-04 and REQ-15-SSP-8.4.2.1-05. REQ-15-SSP-10.2.3.1-02 In addition to REQ-15-SSP-10.2.3.1-01, the eSSP Type 1 may also ...
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10.2.4 Form factor
No additional requirement.
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10.2.5 Security
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10.2.5.1 Generic security requirements
No additional requirement.
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10.2.5.2 Certification requirements
Identifier Requirement REQ-15-SSP-10.2.5.2-01 The certification of the eSSP Type 1 integrated chip shall claim in its security target the conformance with protection profile BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [11] (see note). REQ-15-SSP-10.2.5.2-02 If the eSSP Type 1 integrated chip includes a loader then it shall claim in its securi...
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10.2.6 SSP management
No additional requirement. ETSI ETSI TS 103 465 V16.6.0 (2022-01) 52 Release 16
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10.2.7 Backwards compatibility
Identifier Requirement REQ-15-SSP-10.2.7-01 The eSSP Type 1 may support legacy logical architecture as defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [2] and ETSI TS 102 671 [3]. REQ-15-SSP-10.2.7-02 The eSSP Type 1 should support the contactless interface as defined in ETSI TS 102 613 [4] and ETSI TS 102 622 [6]. REQ-15-SSP-10.2.7-03 The...
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10.3 Additional requirements for the eSSP Type 2 class
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10.3.1 General requirements
Identifier Requirement REQ-15-SSP-10.3.1-01 The eSSP Type 2 shall support the requirements defined in clause 10.2 (see note). REQ-15-SSP-10.3.1-02 The eSSP Type 2 shall support the requirements defined in clause 8.9. NOTE: ISO/IEC 7816-3 [7] physical interface is not applicable. ETSI ETSI TS 103 465 V16.6.0 (2022-01) 5...
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1 Scope
The present document specifies trust models, functions and protocols using attribute based encryption as a foundation of an attribute based access control scheme. It covers both the Ciphertext-Policy (CP-ABE) and Key-Policy (KP-ABE) variants of Attribute-Based Encryption. The specifications address the following aspect...
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2 References
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2.1 Normative references
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a...
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2.2 Informative references
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i...
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3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations
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3.1 Terms
For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: ABE authority: ABE entity that stores the master secret key and gives out secret keys ABKEM universe: set of attributes in which the number of attributes can be a linear (small-universe) or exponential (large-universe) function of the system's securit...
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3.2 Symbols
Void.
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3.3 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: 3SP Third Party Service Provider AAD Additional Authentic Data ABAC Attribute-Based Access Control ABE Attribute-Based Encryption ABEA Attribute-Based Encryption Authority ABFN Augmented Backus-Naur Form ABKEM Attribute-Based Key-Encapsulation...
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4 Attribute-Based Encryption Toolkit
4.1 CPA-secure ciphertext-policy and key-policy attribute-based key-encapsulation mechanisms
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4.1.1 Overview
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Key-Encapsulation and Key-Policy Attribute-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanisms (CP-ABKEM and KP-ABKEM) are specified in clauses 4.1.2 and 4.1.3.
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4.1.2 Ciphertext-policy ABKEM
A Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (CP-ABKEM) shall associate secret keys with attributes from an attribute universe and ciphertexts with access policies. The following flow is specified: • System setup: - The setup party shall specify a security parameter k and shall output system paramete...
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4.1.3 Key-policy ABKEM
The Key-Policy Attribute-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (KP-ABKEM) shall associate secret keys with access policies and ciphertexts with attributes from an attribute universe. The following flow is specified: • System setup: - The setup party shall specify a security parameter k and shall output system parameters PA...
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4.2.1 General
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4.2.1.1 Introduction
The ABKEM security notion of indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA) is the most basic security notion for ABKEMs. It captures that no efficient adversary can distinguish symmetric keys even in case that the encapsulating ciphertext is present. This also holds when the adversary has access to secret k...
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4.2.1.2 Random bit generation
The mechanisms specified hereafter require a random bit generation algorithm. Random bits should be generated as recommended in ISO/IEC 18031:2011 [i.4], including pseudo-random generation. Given a parameter , random integers in  are generated by invoking a source of random values in the space {0,1}, by interpretin...
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4.2.1.3 Formats for attributes and policies
Attributes are encoded as strings in a way that non-ambiguously expresses their nature or refers to a determined referential for interpreting the name, type and value of attributes from their string expression. Self-explanatory examples of such strings can be "City:Berlin", "GenderFemale" or "Access.Level3.True". A mon...
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4.2.1.4 The map2point mapping
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4.2.1.4.1 General
This clause describes several possible procedures for mapping an integer to a point on an elliptic curve. The 2  primitive shall be used in combination with a regular hash function to provide a hash function ℋ that maps arbitrary strings to elliptic curve points: ℋ = 2  mod  Given an integer  in , ...
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4.2.1.4.2 map2point_34
Input: • The prime numbers , and the coefficients ,  ∈ of the curve. The prime  shall be such that  = 3 mod 4. • An integer  in . ETSI ETSI TS 103 532 V1.2.1 (2021-05) 19 Output: • A point  in  = (())[]. Algorithm: 1) Compute  =  +  +  mod . 2) If  is not a quadratic residue modulo  then se...
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4.2.1.4.3 map2point_ssing23
Input: • The prime numbers , where  = 2 mod 3 and the coefficient  ∈ of the curve. Output: • A point  in  = (())[]. Algorithm: 1) Compute  = ( −)( )/ mod . 2) Return  = [](, ) where  is the number of points in (()).
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4.2.1.4.4 map2point_23
Input: • The curve parameters , , ,  where  = 2 mod 3. • An integer  in . Output: • A point  in  = (())[]. Algorithm: 1) Compute:  =  mod  , =   +  −2 −     mod  ,  =  +  mod  . 2) Return  = []( , ) where  is the number of points in (()). ETSI ETSI TS 103 532 V1.2.1 (2021-...
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4.2.1.5 Monotone span programs
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4.2.1.5.1 General
Monotone Span Programs (MSP) are integer-valued matrices that allow one to encode monotone attribute policies algebraically. This clause specifies two algorithms: • An algorithm _ !"#$% that takes as input a monotone attribute policy  and returns a pair (&, '(') where & is an integer-valued matrix and '(' is a map...
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4.2.1.5.2 MSP_Encode
Input: • A monotone attribute policy . • An optional argument (./ which is a list of integers with default value (1). Output: • A pair (&, '(') where & is an integer-valued matrix and '(' is a list of attributes. Algorithm: 1) If  is of the form OR(, … , ) for some  ≥2 then: 1.1) For = 1 to , compute (&...
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4.2.1.5.3 MSP_Decode
Input: • An integer-valued matrix &, • A list '(' of attributes, • A set of attributes *. Output: • An invalidity flag, or a pair of sets of integers (+, ,). Algorithm: 1) Set  to the number of lines of &. 2) If the length of '(' is not equal to , return an error. 3) Set 0 to the set of all indices 1 ≤1 ≤ such ...
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4.2.2 Specification of CP-WATERS-KEM
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4.2.2.1 General
This mechanism realizes a ciphertext-policy attribute-based key encapsulation mechanism (CP-ABKEM) as defined in clause 4.1.2.
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4.2.2.2 Setup
The setup operation creates public system parameters, a master public key and a master secret key. Input: • The security parameter 2. Output: • The system parameters /, • The master public key 3, • The master secret key 3. Algorithm: The steps to setup the master public and secret keys and system parameters sh...
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4.2.2.3 Secret-key generation
The secret-key generation operation takes an arbitrary set of attributes * and generates a corresponding secret decryption key 3. The algorithm shall be as follows: Input: • The system parameters /; • The master public key 3; • The master secret key 3; • A set of attributes * = (, , … , ). ETSI ETSI TS...