hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 7 13 | section stringlengths 3 121 | content stringlengths 0 2.2M |
|---|---|---|---|
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.2.2.4 Symmetric-key encapsulation | The key encapsulation operation takes the MSP encoding (&, '(') of a monotone attribute policy and generates a random symmetric key 4 as well as its encapsulation 5. The algorithm shall be as follows. Input: β’ The system parameters /. β’ The master public key 3. β’ An MSP encoding (&, '('). β’ A random i... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.2.2.5 Symmetric-key decapsulation | The key decapsulation operation takes an encapsulation 5 and a secret decryption key 3 and returns either the symmetric key 4 if * satisfies or an invalidity flag. The algorithm shall be as follows: Input: β’ The system parameters /; β’ An MSP encoding (&, '('); β’ An encapsulation 5 produced for (&, '('... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.2.3 Specification of CP-FAME-KEM and KP-FAME-KEM | |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.2.3.1 Hash functions | The hash functions ββ, and =β, for β= {1,2,3} and 3 = {1,2} are used for hashing arbitrary bit-strings to a point on the elliptic curve group . They are based on a generic hash function and on a subroutine 2 described in the clause 4.2.1.4. The description of includes a prime and shall be chosen such tha... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.2.3.2 Setup for CP-FAME-KEM and KP-FAME-KEM | The setup operation creates public system parameters, a master public key and a master secret key. The master secret key shall be secured by the secret key issuer, as all secret decryption keys calculated within the system depend on it. Applications should establish a methodology for renewing the master secret key, the... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.2.3.3 CP-FAME-KEM | |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.2.3.3.1 General | This mechanism realizes a ciphertext-policy attribute-based key encapsulation mechanism as defined in clause 4.1. Contrarily to CP-WATERS-KEM, this mechanism requires only 6 evaluations of a bilinear map during key decapsulation, which makes it particularly attractive when decapsulation is time-critical. |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.2.3.3.2 Secret-key generation | The secret-key extraction operation takes an arbitrary set of attributes * and generates a corresponding secret decryption key 3. The algorithm shall be as follows: Input: β’ The system parameters /. β’ The master public key 3. β’ The master secret key 3. β’ A set of attributes * = (, , β¦ , ). Output: β’ A ... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.2.3.3.3 Symmetric-key encapsulation | The symmetric-key encapsulation operation takes as input an MSP encoding (&, '(') and generates a random symmetric key 4 as well as its encapsulation 5. The algorithm shall be as follows. Input: β’ The system parameters /. β’ The master public key 3. β’ An MSP encoding (&, '('). β’ A random integer 6 servin... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.2.3.3.4 Symmetric-key decapsulation | The symmetric-key decapsulation operation takes an encapsulation 5 and a secret key 3 and returns either the symmetric key 4 if * satisfies or an invalidity flag. The algorithm shall be as follows: Input: β’ The system parameters /. β’ An MSP encoding (&, '('). β’ An encapsulation 5 produced for (&, '('... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.2.3.4 KP-FAME-KEM | |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.2.3.4.1 General | This mechanism realizes a key-policy attribute-based key encapsulation mechanism as defined in clause 4.1. |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.2.3.4.2 Secret-key generation | The secret-key generation operation takes as input an MSP encoding (&, '(') and generates a corresponding secret key 3. The algorithm shall be as follows. Input: β’ The system parameters /. β’ The master public key 3. β’ The master secret key 3. β’ An MSP encoding (&, '('). Output: β’ A secret decryption ... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.2.3.4.3 Symmetric-key encapsulation | The symmetric-key encapsulation operation takes set of attributes * and generates a random symmetric key 4 as well as its encapsulation 5. The algorithm shall be as follows: Input: β’ The system parameters /. β’ The master public key 3. β’ A set of attributes * = (, , β¦ , ). β’ A random integer 6 serving as a... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.2.3.4.4 Symmetric-key decapsulation | The symmetric-key decapsulation operation takes an encapsulation 5 and a secret key 3 and returns either the symmetric key 4 if * satisfies or an invalidity flag. The algorithm shall be as follows. Input: β’ The system parameters /. β’ A set of attributes *. β’ An encapsulation 5 produced for *. β’ An MSP encodi... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.2.4 Specification of KP-GSPW-KEM | |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.2.4.1 General | This mechanism realizes a key-policy attribute-based encapsulation mechanism as defined in clause 4.1.3. A specific property of this mechanism is that all the possible attributes under which encapsulations may be produced shall be known at setup time. ETSI ETSI TS 103 532 V1.2.1 (2021-05) 31 |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.2.4.2 Setup | The setup operation creates public system parameters, a master public key and a master secret key. Input: β’ The security parameter 2. Output: β’ The system parameters /. β’ The master public key 3. β’ The master secret key 3. Algorithm: The steps to setup the master public and secret keys and system parameters sh... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.2.4.3 Secret-key generation | The generation of a secret decrytion key takes as input an MSP encoding (&, '(') and generates a corresponding secret key 3. The algorithm shall be as follows. Input: β’ The system parameters /. β’ The master public key 3. β’ The master secret key 3. β’ An MSP encoding (&, '('). Output: β’ A secret decryp... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.2.4.4 Symmetric-key encapsulation | The key encapsulation operation takes set of attributes * and generates a random symmetric key 4 as well as its encapsulation 5. The algorithm shall be as follows: Input: β’ The system parameters /. β’ The master public key 3. β’ A set of attributes * = (, , β¦ , ). β’ A random integer 6 serving as a seed for ... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.2.4.5 Symmetric-key decapsulation | The key decapsulation operation takes an encapsulation 5 and a secret key 3 and returns either the symmetric key 4 if * satisfies or an invalidity flag. The algorithm shall be as follows. Input: β’ The system parameters /. β’ A set of attributes *. β’ An encapsulation 5 produced for *. β’ An MSP encoding (&, '... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.3.1 Overview | Ciphertext-Policy and Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE and KP-ABE) schemes for messages of arbitrary length achieving CPA-security are specified in clauses 4.3.2 and 4.3.3. |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.3.2 Ciphertext-policy ABE | The Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) scheme shall associate secret keys with attributes from an attribute universe and ciphertexts with access policies. The messages to be encrypted can be of arbitrary integer length. The following flow is specified: β’ System setup: - The setup party shall specify ... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.3.3 Key-Policy ABE | The Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) scheme shall associate ciphertexts with attributes from an attribute universe and secret keys with access policies. The messages to be encrypted can be of arbitrary integer length. ETSI ETSI TS 103 532 V1.2.1 (2021-05) 34 The following flow is specified: β’ Setup proced... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.4.1 General | |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.4.1.1 Introduction | The ABE security notion of indistinguishability under Chosen-Plaintext Attacks (CPA) is the most basic security notion for ABE schemes. It captures that no efficient adversary can distinguish challenge ciphertexts under self-chosen messages. This even holds when the adversary has access to secret keys of its choice tha... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.4.1.2 Pseudorandom generator | Let k be an integer. The Pseudorandom-Generator (PRG) operation P shall take as input a seed bitstring s in {0,1}m and the length integer parameter l>m, and shall return a pseudorandom bitstring r in {0,1}l or an invalidity flag otherwise. |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.4.2 CPA-secure CP-ABE | A CPA-secure CP-ABE scheme may be built from any CPA-secure CP-ABKEM and a pseudorandom generator. The attribute universe of the CP-ABE scheme shall be the attribute universe of the CP-ABKEM. The symmetric-keys shall be bitstrings of integer length m from {0,1}m. The messages shall be bitstrings of integer length l fro... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.4.3 CPA-secure KP-ABE scheme | A CPA-secure KP-ABE scheme may be built from any CPA-secure KP-ABKEM and a pseudorandom generator. The attribute universe of the KP-ABE scheme shall be the attribute universe of the KP-ABKEM. The symmetric-keys shall be bitstrings of integer length m from {0,1}m. The messages shall be bitstrings of integer length l fro... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.5.1 General | |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.5.1.1 Introduction | The ABKEM and ABE security notions of indistinguishability under Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks (CCA) are the standard security notions for ABKEMs and ABE schemes. It captures that no efficient adversary can distinguish symmetric keys even in case that the encapsulating ciphertext is present (ABKEM) or no efficient adversar... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.5.1.2 Collusion-resistant hash function | A collusion-resistant hash function H shall take as input a bitstring of arbitrary integer length from {0,1}* and shall output a uniformly random bitstring of size 2k from {0,1}2k for security parameter k. |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.5.1.3 Authenticated encryption | Authenticated Encryption (AE) is a symmetric-key encryption mechanism. The following flow is specified: β’ System setup: - The setup party shall specify a security parameter k and output a symmetric key KAE. β’ Message encryption: - The encryptor shall take as input a message M of arbitrarily length, a symmetric key KAE,... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.5.2 CCA-secure CP-ABKEM | A CCA-secure CP-ABKEM may be built from any CPA-secure CP-ABE scheme. The attribute universe of the CP- ABKEM shall be the attribute universe of the CP-ABE scheme. The messages size of the underlying CP-ABE scheme is set to 2k where k is the security parameter. The symmetric-key size shall be k. ETSI ETSI TS 103 532 V1... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.5.3 CCA-secure KP-ABKEM | A CCA-secure KP-ABKEM may be built from any CPA-secure KP-ABE scheme. The attribute universe of the KP- ABKEM shall be the attribute universe of the KP-ABE scheme. The messages size of the underlying KP-ABE scheme is set to 2k where k is the security parameter. The symmetric-key size shall be k. The following flow is s... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.5.4 CCA-secure CP-ABE | A CCA-secure CP-ABE scheme with arbitrary message size may be built from any CCA-secure CP-ABKEM scheme and an AE scheme. The attribute universe of the CP-ABE scheme shall be the attribute universe of the CP-ABKEM. Let R be a uniformly random bitstring of from {0,1}k. The following flow is specified: β’ System setup: - ... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.5.5 CCA-secure KP-ABE | A CCA-secure KP-ABE scheme with arbitrary message size may be built from any CCA-secure KP-ABKEM scheme and an AE scheme. The attribute universe of the KP-ABE scheme shall be the attribute universe of the KP-ABKEM. Let R be a uniformly random bitstring from {0,1}k. ETSI ETSI TS 103 532 V1.2.1 (2021-05) 39 The following... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.6 Requirements for compliant ABKEMs | |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.6.1 General | The clause 4.2 specifies: β’ CP-WATERS-KEM as a CP-ABKEM. β’ CP-FAME-KEM as a CP-ABKEM. β’ KP-FAME-KEM as a KP-ABKEM. β’ KP-GPSW-KEM as a KP-ABKEM. However, other CP-ABKEMs and KP-ABKEMs may be used if they comply with the following requirements. 4.6.2 Requirement 1: correctness and indistinguishability under chosen-plaint... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.6.2.1 Correctness | The considered CP-ABKEM mechanism shall be correct in the sense that for any security parameter, any system parameters, any master secret and public keys output by the system setup, any secret keys output by the secret-key generation for any attributes from the attribute universe, any access policy, any symmetric key K... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.6.2.2 Indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attacks | The considered ABKEM mechanism shall admit a reductionist security proof of its indistinguishability under Chosen-Plaintext Attacks (CPA) as formulated below. The CPA security shall be proven under a complexity assumption that is known to provide 128, 192, 256, 384 and 512-bit security (see Requirement 2 below). Securi... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.6.3 Requirement 2: Sufficient security levels | The considered mechanism shall admit values of the security parameter 2 that provide 128, 192, 256, 384 and 512-bit security. |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.7 Revocation | |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.7.1 Attribute revocation | Attribute may be revoked: β’ by providing an attribute-revocation list: - Once attributes are revoked, the corresponding attributes shall be included in the latest version of the attribute-revocation list. - The encapsulating party shall use the latest available version of the attribute-revocation list and shall not con... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.7.2 Secret-key revocation | Secret keys may be revoked: β’ by introducing time intervals: - The encryptor shall: ο§ Define an expiration timestamp as a constant (EXP_TIME). ο§ Include a condition on EXP_TIME in any access policy and attribute used to encapsulate a symmetric key. - The decryptor shall: ο§ Receive attributes and access policy asserting... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.8 Recommendations | |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.8.1 Overview | In clause 4.8.2, recommendations are given concerning the efficiency of the CP-ABE and KP-ABE schemes. In clause 4.8.3, recommendations are given concerning the security of CP-ABE and KP-ABE schemes. ETSI ETSI TS 103 532 V1.2.1 (2021-05) 42 |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.8.2 Efficiency considerations | If repeating attributes per policy are required and fast ciphertext decryption is not required, the CP-ABE scheme with CP-WATERS-KEM (clauses 4.5.4 and 4.2.2) and the KP-ABE scheme with KP-GPSW-KEM (clauses 4.5.5 and 4.2.4) should be used. If fast ciphertext decryption is required and repeating attributes per policy is... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 4.8.3 Security considerations | CCA-secure CP-ABE and KP-ABE (clauses 4.5.4 and 4.5.5) schemes should be used. In scenarios where the CPA-security notion is sufficient, CPA-secure CP-ABE and KP-ABE schemes (clauses 4.4.2 and 4.4.3) may be chosen. |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 5 Trust models | |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 5.1 Overview | Notwithstanding the possibility of applying the specifications provided by the present document to different use cases, this clause specifies three general trust models under which several use cases may be framed. These trust models differ for the involved actors, their roles and the specification of functions they sha... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 5.2 Roles | |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 5.2.1 Data Consumer | A Data Consumer is a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body accessing data for a given purpose. |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 5.2.2 Data Controller | A Data Controller is a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly with other data controllers determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data. ETSI ETSI TS 103 532 V1.2.1 (2021-05) 43 |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 5.2.3 Data Processor | A Data Processor is a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which processes personal data on behalf of the Data Controller. |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 5.2.4 Data Subject | A Data Subject is an identifiable person, i.e. a person who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity. |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 5.2.5 Device manager | A device manager is a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which manages and configures a device. |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 5.2.6 Platform Provider (PP) | A Platform Provider (PP) is a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which provides services necessary to run and support a platform. These services shall include identity management for the Platform users (Pu) and any interfaces (e.g. API, components, etc.) allowing third parties to use an... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 5.2.7 Third Party Service Provider (3SP) | A Third Party Service Provider (3SP) is a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which provides support to the provisioning of services by Platform Provider, or to the consumption of service by a Platform User. The 3SP may be a specialization of Data Processor and of Data Controller. The 3S... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 5.2.8 Platform User (Pu) | A Platform user (Pu) is a Data Subject in business relation with a Platform Provider consuming one or more services of the Platform. The Platform User is typically assigned an identifier (PuID) by the Platform Provider. See clause 6.1 for more details. |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 5.3 Models | |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 5.3.1 Long term storage | The aim of this model is to preserve the confidentiality of (static) data, when data is located in an untrusted storage. A user can process confidential data inside a secure environment of a device. Afterwards, the user may need to move the data to an untrusted storage, either physically owned (i.e. a local storage) or... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 5.3.2 Offline access control | The aim of the present model is to protect the confidentiality of data on a device which has no connectivity with other devices. Due to the specific capabilities of some devices (e.g. industrial devices), operational constraints or costs of the communication links, the unavailability of a central authority supporting a... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 5.3.3 Platform Provider | The "Platform Provider" model specified in this clause considers three roles: β’ The Platform user (Pu) is a data subject and shall subscribe to services offered by the Platform Provider. The Platform user trusts the Platform Provider, who typically manages and has full access to her data (including identifiers, PII, pe... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 5.4 Functions | |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 5.4.1 Authority function | Each trust model shall implement the set up and maintenance of the ABKEM universe, including the maintenance of an attribute revocation list. The execution of these functions shall happen on a trusted execution environment. In the Platform Provider trust model, the trusted execution environment may be part of a Platfor... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 5.4.2 Assertion function | |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 5.4.2.1 General | For the purpose of the present document, assertions are statements being made by an authority about a property of a target (a subject or an object) for access control decisions. Two different types of assertions are specified: assertions relevant for data access (data access assertions), and assertions relevant to data... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 5.4.2.2 Data access assertion | Data access assertions may be used in the evaluation of access control policies when the policy relies on properties of the subject. Data access assertions are assertions concerned with properties (attributes) of the subject as well as the environment. Data access assertions shall be produced when a subject attempts to... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 5.4.2.3 Data capture assertion | Data capture assertions may be used during the evaluation of an access control policy when the policy relies on properties of the data. Data capture assertions are assertions concerned with the trustworthiness of properties of the captured data. Data capture assertions shall be produced at the time the data is captured... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 5.4.3 Encryption function | Each trust model shall implement the encryption function. The source of data may coincide with the encryptor. However, the source of data may delegate encryption to a trusted entity. Static data is assumed not to vary for a relatively long period, therefore the ciphertext shall be considered outdated only in case of at... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 5.4.4 Policy Management function | Each trust model shall implement the policy management function. For each trust model, the actor responsible for generating and maintaining the set of policies shall be identified as specified in table 5.1. |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 5.4.5 Key distribution function | Each trust model shall implement the key distribution function. The role responsible for key material distribution shall be identified as specified in table 5.1. For the Platform Provide trust model, the Platform Provider may use a PKIX infrastructure as specified in clause 6.2. The infrastructure shall take care of is... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 5.4.6 Decryption function | Each trust model shall implement the decryption function. For each trust model, the ciphertext transmission flow shall happen as specified in table 5.1. The decryptor shall take the role specified in table 5.1. Table 5.1: Summary of trust models Function Long Term Storage Offline Access Control Platform Provider Data s... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 6 Procedures for distributing attributes and keys | |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 6.1 Introduction | The present clause specifies procedures for securely distributing attributes and secret keys when the Platform Provider trust model is adopted. ETSI ETSI TS 103 532 V1.2.1 (2021-05) 48 6.2 Platform Provider extended with Public Key Infrastructure X.509 |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 6.2.1 Overview | This clause specifies the use of RSA cryptography along with ABE cryptography to increase protection against some attacks that may threat the Platform Provider trust model. In a first attack scenario, a malicious user which has received the master public key is enabled to perform encryption operations. Thus, a maliciou... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 6.2.2 Entities | |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 6.2.2.1 Introduction | IETF RFC 5280 [i.5] describes a traditional PKI infrastructure. The present document introduces three additional architectural elements that shall be present in the system: β’ the ABE Authority (ABEA); β’ the Third Party Service Provider (3SP); β’ the Platform Provider (PP). Figure 6.1 summarizes the ABE-extended PKI arch... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 6.2.2.2 ABE Authority (ABEA) | In PKI X.509, Certification Authorities (CAs) are in charge of the following tasks: β’ issuing X.509 certificates to users (EE); ETSI ETSI TS 103 532 V1.2.1 (2021-05) 49 β’ maintaining Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). In the present document, an ABE Authority (ABEA) is in charge of the following tasks: β’ setting up t... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 6.2.2.3 Keys associated to the Third Party Service Provider (3SP) | The 3SP shall be associated to the following keys/parameters: β’ PK3SPRSA, SK3SPRSA: the RSA public and secret key pair of the 3SP; β’ SK3SPABE: the ABE secret key of the 3SP. 3SP uses these key for decapsulation. The 3SP shall never disclose at any time the secret keys (SK3SPRSA and SK3SPABE ). |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 6.2.2.4 Keys associated to the Platform Provider (PP) | The PP is associated to the following keys/parameters: β’ PKPPRSA, SKPPRSA: the RSA public and secret key pair of the PP. The PP shall keep secret the secret key (SKPPRSA). |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 6.2.3 ABE Key Distribution | |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 6.2.3.1 General | The distribution of the ABE keys and policies shall be performed as described in the following clauses. |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 6.2.3.2 Setup | The ABEA shall generate the following keys: β’ PKABEARSA, SKABEARSA: RSA public and secret key pair of the ABEA; β’ PKABEAABE, SKABEAABE: ABE master public key and master secret key of the ABEA. The PP shall generate the following keys: β’ PKPPRSA, SKPPRSA: the RSA public and secret key pair of the PP. The 3SP shall gener... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 6.2.3.3 ABE Public Key distribution | The CA shall issue a CA-signed (extended) X.509 certificate that shall contain the ABEA public keys PKABEARSA and PKABEAABE. The certificate shall contain also information on supported attributes along with global cryptographic parameters, as described in clause 6.2.3.5. The ABEA shall publish this certificate. The PP ... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 6.2.3.4 ABE secret key material distribution | Both the PP and the 3SP shall submit a certificate signing request to the CA using X.509 standard protocols and shall obtain corresponding certificates containing PKPPRSA and PK3SPRSA respectively. The PP and the 3SP shall obtain offline the root certificate of the CA beforehand. The PP and the 3SP shall publish the af... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 6.2.3.5 Attributes distribution | The ABE authority may be willing to limit the use of attributes for encapsulation, by limiting the issuing of secret keys to only those related to valid attributes. In this case, the 3SP shall discard secret keys related to not valid attributes. The 3SP may receive a list of valid attributes embedded in a certificate. ... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 6.2.4 ABE Public Key revocation | To revoke an ABEA PKABEAABE key the ABEA shall instruct the CA to revoke the corresponding X.509 certificate by adding this certificate to its CRL. The ABEA shall regenerate the ABE universe issuing a new master public key and a new master secret key (PKABEAABE, SKABEAABE) and repeat the distribution procedures describ... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 6.3 Assertions | |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 6.3.1 Introduction | Assertions may be widely used to convey semantics between parties involved in an ABE system. The present clause specifies several types of assertions and their binding. |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 6.3.2 Types of assertions | The present document defines the following types of assertions: A (data access assertions) - In large universe CP-ABEKEM, the key generation party may use data access assertions to check attribute values of the decapsulating party before generating a related secret key and delivering it to the decapsulating party. ETSI... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 6.3.3 Mapping to SAML | |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 6.3.3.1 SAML Attributes | SAML attributes shall be described by a local "name" and a "nameformat" as specified in SAML specifications [5]. The "nameformat" shall contain an URI reference that shall be used to interpret the local "name". To identify ABE attributes (assertion types A, B, C and D) the following rules shall apply: β’ Different ABE u... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 6.3.3.2 SAML Attribute Statements | |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 6.3.3.2.1 Unencrypted format | Attribute statements shall be transported in SAML <AttributeStatement> element. Inside the <AttributeStatement> element: β’ The <Subject> element shall indicate the subject to which the attributes refer to. β’ The <Attribute> element shall contain the "name" and the "nameformat" XML attributes. In case the attribute stat... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 6.3.3.2.2 Encrypted format | <AttributeStatement> may contain attributes in an encrypted form. In this case, the <EncryptedAttribute> element shall appear on behalf of the <Attribute> element specified in clause 6.3.3.2.1. In particular, the content of the whole <Attribute> element shall be encrypted according to Syntax and Processing specificatio... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 6.3.3.3 SAML Attribute Queries | To carry out a query about one or more attributes, SAML <AttributeQuery> element shall be used. Inside the <AttributeQuery> element: The <Subject> subelement shall indicate the subject to which the statement refers to. The <Attribute> subelement shall indicate the attribute(s) to be returned. If omitted, it indicates a... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 6.3.3.4 Key assertions | For type E (public key) assertions, the setup party (or any other entitled system entity) shall transmit the Master Public Key to the encapsulating party inside an <AttributeStatement> element, whose <Subject> subelement shall refer to the setup party and whose <Attribute> subelement shall refer to the Master Public Ke... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 6.3.3.5 Security considerations | Depending on the particular use case, the assertion party may need to be authenticated, and integrity protection may be required. Mechanisms for authentication and message integrity defined for SAML [6] may apply. Assertion may be signed according to SAML specification [5]. SAML confidentiality protection mechanism (th... |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.