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ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 7.5.5 Combining algorithms and functions | The policy-combining algorithms given in table 7.15 shall be supported, and for step 4 of clauses 7.5.3.3 and 7.5.4.3 the logical operator to be used between logical statements resulting from each <Policy> element shall be as indicated by the last column. Other policy-combining algorithms shall not be used. Table 7.15:... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 7.6 Authentication using ABKEM | |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 7.6.1 Introduction | A simple challenge-response authentication mechanism based on ABE is hereby defined, where a claimant can prove their identity to a verifier. In order do so, the claimant possesses an ABE secret key such that the claimant can resolve the challenge encrypted using ABKEM to the criteria of the verifier. The present claus... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 7.6.2 Principles | The device may require authentication using ABKEM of the access control subject, in case of direct access. Figure 7.1 describes the overall resource request and challenge-response mechanisms. ETSI ETSI TS 103 532 V1.2.1 (2021-05) 85 Figure 7.1: Overall principle of the challenge-response mechanism for authentication us... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 7.6.3 Common messages | |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 7.6.3.1 Resource identification | The resource request shall identify the resource by its attribute-name element. The request shall include the universe identifier uni-id element. The request shall not include any attribute (identified by the attribute-name element) that has not been declared within the ABKEM universe identified by uni-id. |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 7.6.3.2 Claimant identification | When the claimant identifies itself as a user, the user attribute type as defined in clause 7.3.2.4.4 shall be used. When the claimant identifies itself as a device, the device attribute type as defined in clause 7.3.2.4.5 shall be used. When the claimant identifies itself as a function, the function attributes type as... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 7.6.4 Implementation in KP-ABKEM | Using the identity of the claimant and the resource identifier, the verifier shall select an applicable access control policy and derive a set of attributes. The verifier shall generate a challenge token. It shall execute a new key encapsulation algorithm using the derived set of attributes, produce a new symmetric key... |
ba35a078486de8cdd1a51b965fdc9f0e | 103 532 | 7.6.5 Implementation in CP-ABKEM | Using the identity of the claimant and the resource identifier, the verifier shall select an applicable access control policy. The verifier shall generate a challenge token. It shall execute a new key encapsulation algorithm using the selected access control policy, produce a new symmetric key with its encapsulation, a... |
9a9c1abb9f75287bb49625f1bfee469a | 103 486 | 1 Scope | The present document describes a model of secure and attestable identity management applicable to IoT devices. The present document defines a data structure, described as Authority-Attribute Trees, for managing identifiers and properties of a device (as attributes), where identifiers and properties are exposed in a num... |
9a9c1abb9f75287bb49625f1bfee469a | 103 486 | 2 References | |
9a9c1abb9f75287bb49625f1bfee469a | 103 486 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
9a9c1abb9f75287bb49625f1bfee469a | 103 486 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
9a9c1abb9f75287bb49625f1bfee469a | 103 486 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
9a9c1abb9f75287bb49625f1bfee469a | 103 486 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: attribute provider: 3rd party that attests to the ownership of any attribute of the principal (see attribute authority as defined in requirement 4) Authority-Attribute Tree (AAT): tree like data structure that encodes identity information AAT provider... |
9a9c1abb9f75287bb49625f1bfee469a | 103 486 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
9a9c1abb9f75287bb49625f1bfee469a | 103 486 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: AAT Authority-Attribute Tree DNS Domain Name System EEC European Economic Community EU European Union GDPR General Data Protection Regulation ICT Information and Communications Technology IdM Identity Management IMEI International Mobile Equip... |
9a9c1abb9f75287bb49625f1bfee469a | 103 486 | 4 Identity Management problem | The requirements outlined in Table 1 apply for the purposes of the present document as core requirements for identity management. Table 1: Core identity management requirements Requirement id Text 1 A <<device>> shall be distinguished by an <<identifier>> 2 A <<device>> shall be discoverable using a <<discovery mechani... |
9a9c1abb9f75287bb49625f1bfee469a | 103 486 | 5.1 General overview | The present document defines Authority-Attribute Trees as data structures that encode identity information. The structure is "tree like" containing a persistent root node and an arbitrary number of attribute leaf nodes. The root node of the tree shall contain a canonical identity of the entity attested to by a recogniz... |
9a9c1abb9f75287bb49625f1bfee469a | 103 486 | 5.2 Contextual and persistent attributes | It is recognized that many attributes of an instance of an object are ephemeral, temporary, and contextual. In addition the value assigned to an attribute may be referential (i.e. depends on the value of another attribute). Such non-persistent attribute values do not have persistent attestation but shall be included in... |
9a9c1abb9f75287bb49625f1bfee469a | 103 486 | 6 Discovery protocols and Identity Management | |
9a9c1abb9f75287bb49625f1bfee469a | 103 486 | 6.1 Terminology | The terminology of conventional identify management applies with the additional scope for having multiple authorities for attribute assertion: • Principal, or AAT provider - owner of the AAT • Identity Provider - a 3rd party that attests to the root/canonical identifier of the principal (see the Identity authority defi... |
9a9c1abb9f75287bb49625f1bfee469a | 103 486 | 6.2 Discovery use cases | |
9a9c1abb9f75287bb49625f1bfee469a | 103 486 | 6.2.1 Remote file discovery and access under single authority | In this use case the requestor is unsure of exactly where a particular file is stored on a private cloud, but all assets on the cloud are access restricted, thus the requestor sends a discovery poll request with the triplet to be matched (where the triplet indicates the type of asset the requestor is searching for and ... |
9a9c1abb9f75287bb49625f1bfee469a | 103 486 | 6.2.2 Home discovery | Home discovery is a refinement of the consumer IoT use-case: discovery and trust establishment between devices from different manufacturers. Current solutions to this use access to a secure home access point as a proxy to anchor trust in the home authority. Alternatives rely on the manufacturer authority to allow trust... |
9a9c1abb9f75287bb49625f1bfee469a | 103 486 | 6.3 Discovery and information hiding | The present document describes protocols for nuanced and flexible private discovery of controlled portions of identity information codified in Authority-Attribute trees, as defined in clause 5; in addition, the present document describes protocols for private service advertisement, offer and acceptance. Before they can... |
9a9c1abb9f75287bb49625f1bfee469a | 103 486 | 6.4 Discovery models | |
9a9c1abb9f75287bb49625f1bfee469a | 103 486 | 6.4.1 Discovery by polling (pull model) | In this case a device or service (the AAT requestor) wants to connect to another device or service (the AAT provider). The AAT requestor polls all devices to determine if they are of the right type, i.e. that attributes of match those required. The AAT requestor shall include the public key and request all responders t... |
9a9c1abb9f75287bb49625f1bfee469a | 103 486 | 6.4.2 Discovery by advertisement (push model) | In this case an AAT provider periodically publishes its capability for any AAT requestor to find. For restricted channel advertisement the AAT requestor shall subscribe to the AAT provider's subscription channel. For unrestricted channel advertisement the AAT provider is not able to restrict visibility to named entitie... |
9a9c1abb9f75287bb49625f1bfee469a | 103 486 | 6.4.3 Restriction of scope of discovery | The nature of the network that underpins the IoT assumes global connectivity. In theory this would suggest that an advertisement, or polling request, can propagate to every node of the connected world. All signalling of capability, either by advertisement or by polling, should restrict the scope of responses. Forms of ... |
9a9c1abb9f75287bb49625f1bfee469a | 103 486 | 6.5 Discovery protocol initialization | For further study. |
9a9c1abb9f75287bb49625f1bfee469a | 103 486 | 6.6 Discovery protocol messages | With respect to the AAT structure the following message types are defined for attribute discovery in an AAT environment. Table 2: AAT message types in discovery scenario Message Topology Acknowledged Content AAT_ServiceAdvertisement Broadcast, Multicast No AAT_ServiceAdvertisement _Bid Unicast Yes AAT_ServiceAdvertisem... |
9a9c1abb9f75287bb49625f1bfee469a | 103 486 | 6.7 Application to SAREF | A suitable ontology for IoT/M2M can be found in the Smart Appliances REFerence (SAREF) Ontology in ETSI TS 103 264 [i.3]. SAREF defines a device as "a tangible object designed to accomplish a particular task in households, common public buildings or offices" although SAREF is extensible and each extension may simplify ... |
9a9c1abb9f75287bb49625f1bfee469a | 103 486 | 6.8 Role of Object Identifiers | Object Identifiers (OIDs) may be used to identify attributes of an entity. In such cases, and where the entity is defined in an ETSI standard, the OID should be assigned using the deliverable form as follows: • itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) document-id (dddd) object (nn) - in the example above "dddd" refe... |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 1 Scope | The present document defines the means to enable assurance of privacy, using the conventional CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) paradigm and with reference to the functional capabilities for privacy protection described in Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation [1]. The present docu... |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 2 References | |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: personal data: data relating to the natural person as per the GDPR ETSI ETSI TS 103 485 V1.1.1 (2020-08) 8 private data: data that an entity wants to restrict distribution of |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: ABAC Attribute Based Access Control ABE Attribute Based Encryption CBC Cipher Block Chaining CIA Confidentiality Integrity Availability CP-ABE Ciphertext Policy - Attribute Based Encryption CTR Counter DAC Discretionary Access Control DLT Dist... |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 4 Core concepts of privacy and privacy protection | |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 4.1 Introduction | The guidance given in ETSI TR 103 370 [i.18] is formalized in the present document for application in ICT systems. This aims to address the requirement from GDPR to protect those aspects of a natural person's rights and freedoms which encompass privacy and Personally Identifying Information (PII). The General Data Prot... |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 4.2 Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) | Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs) help to evaluate, the origin, nature, particularity and severity of risk presented to the rights and freedoms of natural persons when processing operations are implemented. The outcome of the assessment should be used to determine the appropriate measures to be implemented. Th... |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 4.3 Core data protection principles | The core protection principles for use of private data are already extant in the OECD Guidelines [i.7] and are formalized in each of ETSI TR 187 010 [i.19] and ETSI TR 103 370 [i.18]: • Collection limitation principle (see also GDPR [i.6], Articles 6, 5.1.a) • Data quality principle (see also GDPR [i.6], Articles 5.1.d... |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 4.4 Conventional CIA protections | The Confidentiality Integrity Availability (CIA) paradigm provides for mechanisms to assure each of the CIA attributes. Frameworks and patterns for techniques that apply the CIA approach can be found in ETSI TS 102 165-2 [i.8] and are adopted in the remainder of the present document. |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 5 Privacy protection measures from Common Criteria | |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 5.1 Introduction and summary of measures in Common Criteria | NOTE: This clause contains text from Common Criteria Part 2 [1] to give clarity in the processing of data to provide privacy protection. The texts from these referenced documents are intended for re-use and thus have been treated as templates and modified from the source for the application to the present document. The... |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 5.2 Interaction with core data protection principles | The data collection, use and deletion policies shall be declared as shown in Figure 2 before applying any specific privacy protection mechanisms. NOTE: Assured protection cannot be afforded if there is no bounded policy in which data is processed. |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 5.3 Anonymity | NOTE 1: This clause contains text from Common Criteria Part 2 [1] to give clarity in the processing of data to provide privacy protection. The texts from these referenced documents are intended for re-use and thus have been treated as templates and modified from the source for the application to the present document. A... |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 5.4 Pseudonymity | NOTE: This clause contains text from Common Criteria Part 2 [11] to give clarity in the processing of data to provide privacy protection. The texts from these referenced documents are intended for re-use and thus have been treated as templates and modified from the source for the application to the present document. An... |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 5.5 Unlinkability | NOTE: This clause contains text from Common Criteria Part 2 [1] to give clarity in the processing of data to provide privacy protection. The texts from these referenced documents are intended for re-use and thus have been treated as templates and modified from the source for the application to the present document. Any... |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 5.6 Unobservability | NOTE: This clause contains text from Common Criteria Part 2 [1] to give clarity in the processing of data to provide privacy protection. The texts from these referenced documents are intended for re-use and thus have been treated as templates and modified from the source for the application to the present document. Any... |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 6 Relationship cardinality for privacy assurance | |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 6.1 Overview | The number of entities in a relationship determines to some extent the difficulty of managing (private) data within that relationship. The cardinality of the relationship between Alice and Bob shall be determined in advance of any data exchange. As the number of entities in a relationship grows the risk of exposure of ... |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 6.2 One to one | Here, there is only one instance of each of Alice and Bob and they can exchange a secret in advance, perhaps out-of- band pre-shared keys or through public-key authentication; the present document does not consider how this shared key has been distributed ahead of time. If a shared key has been previously distributed, ... |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 6.3 One to many, many to one | In a one-to-many or many-to-one data sharing relationship, Alice shares data with multiple other parties, but these other parties do not communicate with each other directly. This is similar to the one-to-one case, but with multiple instances of Bob referring to one Alice. In larger systems an infrastructure may be use... |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 6.4 Many to many | In this case, a user community can be large, but for some certain class of data, there is a subgroup of the community that needs to be able to share that data securely without others accessing it. EXAMPLE: Database access or group communications are often sub-divided according to role or privilege level. Other privileg... |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 7 Access control mechanisms in protecting private data | |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 7.1 General provisions | The use of access control shall be used to counter threats and their associated threat agents that lead to attacks of unauthorized use, disclosure, modification, destruction and denial of service. NOTE: Access control counter-measures act independently of authentication and confidentiality countermeasures but are used ... |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 7.2 Discretionary Access Control (DAC) | In the Discretionary Access Control (DAC) model the entity responsible for the asset (e.g. the private data) determines who has access to it. However once Alice has retrieved the data, Alice can use that data at her discretion, in other words if Bob is the owner of the data and grants Alice access then Bob has no role ... |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 7.3 Mandatory Access Control (MAC) | Mandatory Access Control (MAC) extends the DAC model by enforcing restrictions on actions Alice can take on data she has been granted access to. Technical enforcement of MAC is more difficult than for DAC and can require that Alice and Bob share mutually compatible data access and usage policies. Details of how to achi... |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 7.4 Role Based Access Control (RBAC) | NOTE: The models of DAC and MAC apply to RBAC, where RBAC only determines the means by which Alice is offered access. In RBAC access to the asset is granted only to entities holding a particular role. EXAMPLE 1: Finance records can be restricted to someone with the role "finance officer" such that an access rule can be... |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 7.5 Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) | NOTE 1: The models of DAC and MAC apply to ABAC, where ABAC only determines the means by which Alice is offered access. ABAC is the generalization of RBAC where rather than just using the attribute of role any (arbitrary) set of attributes are used to control access. The greater the set of attributes used in ABAC then ... |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 8 Integrity control mechanisms | |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 8.1 Overview | Integrity control mechanisms primarily enable the accountability principle and data quality principle as outlined in clause 4.3 and in each of ETSI TR 187 010 [i.19] and ETSI TR 103 370 [i.18]. The purpose of integrity control is to verify that a document, audit trail or system cannot be modified without such changes b... |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 8.2 Cryptographic hashes | Any modern cryptographic hash algorithm produces a fingerprint of a file with the core property that it is infeasible, given only the hash, to retrieve the file that the hash is a fingerprint of, or to create a file that produces the same hash. Similarly it is infeasible to modify the original file in such a way that t... |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 8.3 Distributed ledgers | Distributed ledger technology, of which blockchain is one example, provides an accurate audit trail of what data has been accessed and when. There is no central administrator, and a peer-to-peer network is required; for this and other reasons with respect to the privacy protection principles outlined in clause 4, and t... |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 8.4 Signatures | Cryptographic signatures can contribute to the assurance of integrity protection mechanisms where, for example, two or more parties have communicated before trust establishment is complete, and need assurance that all parties have received the same data. EXAMPLE: At the end of a key exchange or other trust establishmen... |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 8.5 Privacy and integrity controls | Cryptographic hashing mechanisms are not identity revealing of themselves, however where a hash is exchanged to mask other data (say user name and password) it can be uniquely associated to an individual even if no explicit personal data is visible. EXAMPLE: If a user-name and password are input to a hash function the ... |
564dc93fc316a1a6501e320bcf2d233d | 103 485 | 9 Confidentiality mechanisms | In a simplified view of confidentiality Alice and Bob share data in such a way that any adversary, Eve, cannot access the meaning of the content. The most common approach to achieve confidentiality is keyed encryption; see also Annex A. Niche techniques, such as steganography, seek to conceal the existence of the conte... |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 1 Scope | The present document covers the minimum characteristics which are considered necessary for the UICC or UICC and UICC application in order to provide compliance to TS 102 484 [1]. The present document specifies the test cases for the Secured APDU - Application to Application type of secure channel and includes tests for... |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 2 References | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the reference document (including any amendments) applies. • In the case of a reference ... |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 2.1 Normative references | The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI TS 102 484: "Smart Cards; Secure channel between a UICC and an end-point terminal". [2] ETSI TS 102 221: "Smart Cards; UICC-Terminal interface; Physical and logical characteristics". [3] ETSI TS 102 223: "Smart Cards;... |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 2.2 Informative references | The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area. Not applicable. |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations | |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 3.1 Definitions | For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TS 102 484 [1] and the following apply: Modified Value: modified value is the original value increased by one: • Value* = Value + 1; If the resulting value requires more bytes than allowed, the original value is reduced by one: • Value* = Valu... |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 3.2 Symbols | For the purposes of the present document, the symbols given in TS 102 484 [1] and the following apply: || Concatenation 'XX' Unknown byte value ETSI ETSI TS 103 484-2 V9.0.0 (2013-05) 12 Release 9 |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TS 102 484 [1], TS 102 221 [2] and the following apply: DUT Device Under Test MSC Manage Secure Channel RQ Conformance requirement SC Secure Channel T Terminal, i.e. the terminal simulator (shortcut used only in test procedure tables) TE Test Equipmen... |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 3.4 Formats | |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 3.4.1 Format of the table of optional features | The columns in table 4.1 have the following meaning: Column Meaning Option: The optional feature supported or not by the implementation. Status: See chapter 3.4.3 'Status and Notations'. Support: The support columns are to be filled in by the supplier of the implementation. The following common notations, defined in IS... |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 3.4.2 Format of the applicability table | The applicability of every test in table 4.2 a) is formally expressed by the use of Boolean expression defined in the following clause. The columns in table 4.2 have the following meaning: Column Meaning Test case: The "Test case" column gives a reference to the test case number(s) detailed in the present document and ... |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 3.4.3 Status and Notations | The "Rel-x Terminal" columns show the status of the entries as follows: The following notations, defined in ISO/IEC 9646-7 [12], are used for the status column: M mandatory - the capability is required to be supported. O optional - the capability may be supported or not. N/A not applicable - in the given context, it is... |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 4 Test environment | |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 4.1 Table of optional features | The supplier of the implementation shall state the support of possible options in table 4.1. See clause 3A for the format of table 4.1. Table 4.1: Options Item Option Status Support Mnemonic 1 UICC Capability - the UICC support for an application that implements the TS 102 484 [1] secure channel specification C1/1 C_UI... |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 4.2 Applicability table | Table 4.2.1 specifies the applicability of each test case to the device under test. See clause 3A for the format of table 4.2.1. Table 4.2.1: Applicability of tests Test case Description Release Rel-7 UICC capability Rel-8 UICC capability Rel-9 UICC capability Support |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 6.1 Test group 1: Discovery | 6.1.1.1 Discovery of secure channel support - ATR Rel-7 M M M |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 6.2 Test group 2: Channel Administration | 6.2.1.1 Manage Secure Channel - Retrieve UICC Endpoints - Positive Case with No Endpoints Rel-7 C001 C001 C001 6.2.1.2 Manage Secure Channel - Retrieve UICC Endpoints - Positive Case with One Endpoints Rel-7 M M M 6.2.1.3 Manage Secure Channel - Retrieve UICC Endpoints - Positive Case with Multiple Endpoints Rel-7 C001... |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 6.4 Test group 4: Channel Operation | 6.4.1.1 Channel Operation - Securing Case 3 commands - Case 3 command secured in 1 secure channel TLV Rel-7 C002 C002 C002 6.4.1.2 Channel Operation - Securing Case 3 commands - Case 3 command secured in 2 secure channel TLVs Rel-7 C002 C002 C002 6.4.1.3 Channel Operation - Securing Case 3 commands - Case 3 command sec... |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 4.3 Information provided by the device supplier | Void. |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 4.4 Test equipment | The test equipment shall provide a Terminal simulator which is connected to the DUT during test procedure execution, unless otherwise specified. With respect to the UICC, the Terminal simulator shall act as a valid Terminal according to TS 102 484 [1] and TS 102 221 [2], unless otherwise specified. In particular, durin... |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 4.4.1 Measurement / setting uncertainties | None. |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 4.4.2 Default conditions for DUT operation | Pre-hared key is known to the Terminal simulator or the mechanism to produce it is known. It is assumed that the test application is loaded on the UICC for the test cases identified in the applicability table in clause 4.2. The UICC application is selected before the start of the Secure Channel testing procedures. |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 4.4.3 Terminal Simulator Requirements | The following requirements are for a Terminal Test application intended for use when the Test is UICC Capability. |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 4.4.3.1 General Requirements | REQ_TERM_TEST_GEN_01 The terminal simulator shall be designed to TS 102 484 [1] Release 9 and TS 102 221 [2] Release 9. REQ_TERM_TEST_GEN_02 The terminal simulator shall be capable of communicating with a UICC. REQ_TERM_TEST_GEN_03 The terminal simulator shall be capable of performing all of the terminal operations for... |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 4.4.3.2 MANAGE SECURE CHANNEL - ATR Requirements | REQ_TERM_TEST_ATR_01 The terminal simulator shall be able to retrieve the contents of the ATR from the UICC and display it to the tester unmodified. REQ_TERM_TEST_ATR_02 The terminal simulator may interpret the ATR and highlight to the tester the following secure channel detail: • The presence of the Global interfaces ... |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 4.3.3.3 MANAGE SECURE CHANNEL - Retrieve UICC Endpoints Requirements | REQ_TERM_TEST_RUE_01 At the request of the tester, the terminal simulator shall be able to send the "First block of command data" as defined in clause 4.4.4.1. The CLA byte shall be set to the logical channel chosen by the tester for this test. REQ_TERM_TEST_RUE_02 If the Send SW1 SW2 response to this command from the ... |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 4.4.3.4 MANAGE SECURE CHANNEL - Key Agreement Requirements | REQ_TERM_TEST_KEY_01 The terminal simulator shall support the entry of a strong proprietary key to be used in the Secure channel setup and operation. REQ_TERM_TEST_KEY_02 The terminal simulator shall support the entry of a weak proprietary key to be used in the Secure channel setup and operation. REQ_TERM_TEST_KEY_03 T... |
9b83d46ddaed52db6d247ce75934180e | 103 484-2 | 4.4.3.5 MANAGE SECURE CHANNEL - Establish SA - Master SA Requirements | REQ_TERM_TEST_MSA_01 The terminal simulator shall support the issuing of the MANAGE SECURE CHANNEL - Establish SA - Master SA without requiring a MANAGE SECURE CHANNEL - Retrieve UICC Endpoints to be issued. REQ_TERM_TEST_MSA_02 At the request of the tester, the terminal simulator shall be able to send the "First block... |
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