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56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 1 Scope | The present document: 1) Specifies a JSON [1] format for AdES signatures (JAdES signatures hereinafter) built on JSON Web Signatures (JWS hereinafter) as specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2]. For this, the present document: - Extends the JSON Web Signatures specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2] by defining an additional set of JSON header parameters that can be incorporated in the JOSE Header (either in its JWS Protected Header or its JWS Unprotected Header parts). Many of these new header parameters have the same semantics as the attributes/properties defined in CAdES [i.2] and XAdES [4] digital signatures. Other header parameters are defined to meet specific requirements that current JSON Web Signatures cannot meet (e.g. for explicitly referencing detached JWS Payload). These new header parameters and their corresponding types are defined in a JSON schema. - Specifies the mechanisms for incorporating the aforementioned JSON components in JSON Web Signatures [2] to build JAdES signatures, offering the same features as CAdES and XAdES in JSON syntax, and therefore fulfilling the same requirements (such as the long-term validity of digital signatures). 2) Defines four levels of JAdES baseline signatures addressing incremental requirements to maintain the validity of the signatures over the long term. Each level requires the presence of certain JAdES header parameters, suitably profiled for reducing the optionality as much as possible. The aforementioned levels provide the basic features necessary for a wide range of business and governmental use cases for electronic procedures and communications to be applicable to a wide range of communities when there is a clear need for interoperability of digital signatures used in electronic documents. EXAMPLE: An example of requirements raised in specific domains is signing HTTP messages exchanged by parties in certain environments, which require signing both the HTTP body and some specific http headers. The format specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2] does not provide any native mechanism for individually identifying a detached JWS Payload. Clause 5.2.8 of the present document defines sigD, a new JSON header parameter that allows to identify one or more detached data objects which, suitably processed and concatenated, form the detached JWS Payload. Procedures for creation, augmentation, and validation of JAdES digital signatures are out of scope. NOTE 1: ETSI EN 319 102-1 [i.3] specifies procedures for creation, augmentation and validation of other types of AdES digital signatures. The present multi-part deliverable aims at supporting electronic signatures independent of any specific regulatory framework. NOTE 2: Specifically, but not exclusively, it is the aim that JAdES digital signatures specified in the present multi-part deliverable can be used to meet the requirements of electronic signatures, advanced electronic signatures, qualified electronic signatures, electronic seals, advanced electronic seals, and qualified electronic seals as defined in Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 [i.1]. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 2 References | |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at https://docbox.etsi.org/Reference/. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 8 The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] IETF RFC 8259 (December 2017): "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format". [2] IETF RFC 7515 (May 2015): "JSON Web Signature (JWS)". [3] IETF RFC 3061 (February 2001): "A URN Namespace of Object Identifiers". [4] ETSI EN 319 132-1: "Electronic Signatures and Trust Infrastructures (ESI); XAdES digital signatures; Part 1: Building blocks and XAdES baseline signatures". [5] IETF RFC 5035 (August 2007): "Enhanced Security Services (ESS) Update: Adding CertID Algorithm Agility". [6] Recommendation ITU-T X.509: "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks". [7] IETF RFC 3161 (August 2001): "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP)". [8] IETF RFC 5280 (May 2008): "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile". [9] IETF RFC 6960 (June 2013): "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP". [10] IETF RFC 5816 (April 2010): "ESSCertIDv2 Update for RFC 3161". [11] IETF RFC 3494 (March 2003): "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol version 2 (LDAPv2) to Historic Status". [12] IETF RFC 4648 (October 2006): "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings". [13] IETF RFC 3230 (January 2002): "Instance Digests in HTTP". [14] IETF RFC 7797 (February 2016): "JSON Web Signature (JWS) Unencoded Payload Option". [15] IETF RFC 3339 (July 2002): "Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps". [16] IETF RFC 7518 (May 2015): "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)". [17] IETF RFC 3986 (January 2005): "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax". [18] IETF RFC 2616 (June 1999): "Hypertext Transfer Protocol - HTTP/1.1". [19] draft-handrews-json-schema-01 (March 2018): "JSON Schema: A Media Type for Describing JSON Documents". [20] draft-handrews-json-schema-validation-01 (March 2018): "JSON Schema Validation: A Vocabulary for Structural Validation of JSON". [21] ETSI TS 119 312 (V1.3.1): "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Cryptographic Suites". [22] IETF RFC 7519 (May 2015): "JSON Web Token (JWT)". [23] ISO 8601-1:2019: "Date and time - Representations for information interchange - Part 1: Basic rules". [24] IETF RFC 7540 (May 2015): "Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)". ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 9 |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area. [i.1] Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC. OJ L 257, 28.08.2014, p. 73-114. [i.2] ETSI EN 319 122-1: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); CAdES digital signatures; Part 1: Building blocks and CAdES baseline signatures". [i.3] ETSI EN 319 102-1: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Procedures for Creation and Validation of AdES Digital Signatures; Part 1: Creation and Validation". [i.4] ETSI TR 119 000: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); The framework for standardization of digital signatures and trust services; Overview". [i.5] ETSI TR 119 001: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); The framework for standardization of signatures; Definitions and abbreviations". [i.6] ETSI TR 119 100: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Guidance on the use of standards for signature creation and validation". [i.7] ETSI TS 119 172-1: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Signature Policies; Part 1: Building blocks and table of contents for human readable signature policy documents". [i.8] OASIS Standard: "Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0". [i.9] ETSI TS 101 533-1: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Data Preservation Systems Security; Part 1: Requirements for Implementation and Management". [i.10] IETF RFC 4998: "Evidence Record Syntax (ERS)". [i.11] W3C Recommendation (19 November 2019): "Verifiable Credentials Data Model 1.0". [i.12] draft-cavage-http-signatures-10 (May 2018): "Signing HTTP Messages". [i.13] JSON Schema Specification in json-schema.org website. [i.14] draft-handrews-json-schema-02 (September 2019): "JSON Schema: A Media Type for Describing JSON Documents". [i.15] draft-handrews-json-schema-validation-02 (September 2019): "JSON Schema Validation: A Vocabulary for Structural Validation of JSON". [i.16] IETF RFC 7517 (May 2015): "JSON Web Key (JWK)". [i.17] ISO 3166-1: "Codes for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions -- Part 1: Country code". [i.18] Juan Carlos Cruellas: "Bringing JSON signatures to ETSI AdES framework: meet JAdES signatures". Computer Standards and Interfaces, Volume 71, August 2020. [i.19] ETSI TS 119 182-1 (V1.1.1): "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); JAdES digital signatures; Part 1: Building blocks and JAdES baseline signatures", March 2021. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 10 3 Definition of terms, symbols, abbreviations and terminology |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ETSI TR 119 001 [i.5], IETF RFC 7515 [2] and the following apply: electronic time-stamp: data in electronic form which binds other electronic data to a particular time establishing evidence that these data existed at that time NOTE 1: In the case of IETF RFC 3161 [7] protocol, updated by IETF RFC 5816 [10], the electronic time-stamp is referring to the timeStampToken field within the TimeStampResp element (the TSA's response returned to the requesting client). NOTE 2: This definition makes JAdES signatures not to be bound to a particular format of electronic time-stamp, because header parameters adoTst, sigTst, arcTst, rfsTst, and sigRTst can contain electronic time-stamps of any format. JAdES signature: JSON Web Signature meeting the requirements specified in this or other parts of the present multi- part document NOTE: As specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2], or other parts of this multi-part deliverable. JWS Signature Value: digital signature cryptographic value calculated over a sequence of octets derived from the JWS Protected Header and data to be signed NOTE 1: IETF RFC 7515 [2] uses the term JWS Signature for this concept. The present document does not use this term, but the JWS Signature Value, for the sake of terminological coherence of other AdES specifications. NOTE 2: The present document uses the term JSON Web Signature (or its abbreviation, JWS), as defined by IETF RFC 7515 [2], i.e. for denoting the JSON data structure for representing a digitally signed message. NOTE 3: Note that a JAdES signature is a special type of JSON Web Signature (or JWS). Therefore these terms are not directly interchangeable as, indeed a JAdES signature IS ALSO A JSON Web Signature, but NOT ALL the JSON Web Signatures are JAdES signatures. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange ASN.1 Abstract Syntax Notation 1 CA Certification Authority CRL Certificate Revocation List FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol IETF Internet Engineering Task Force ISO International Organization for Standardization ITU-T International Telecommunication Union Telecommunication Standardization Sector JOSE JSON Object Signing and Encryption JSON JavaScript Object Notation JWS JSON Web Signature OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 11 OID Object IDentifier PKI Public Key Infrastructure RFC Request For Comments SAML Security Assertion Markup Language SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SIM Subscriber Identification Module SPO Service Provision Option URI Uniform Resource Identifier URL Uniform Resource Locator URN Uniform Resource Name UTC Coordinated Universal Time |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 3.4 Terminology | The present document adopts, wherever it is possible the same terminology as the terminology used in IETF RFC 7515 [2] and in IETF RFC 8259 [1]. Therefore, within the present document, the term "JSON Web Signature" shall denote the JSON structure specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2]. The present document uses the term "JSON value" for denoting JSON objects, or JSON arrays, or JSON numbers, or JSON strings, i.e. a subset of the potential meanings of "JSON value" listed in clause 3 of IETF RFC 8259 [1]. The present document uses the term "header parameter" for denoting a JSON object, JSON array, JSON number, or JSON string, which is member either of the JWS Protected Header or the JWS Unprotected Header specified in IETF RFC 8259 [1]. The present document uses the term "member" for denoting a JSON object's member, as specified in clause 4 of IETF RFC 8259 [1]. The present document uses the term "element" or "element of the array" for denoting the contents of a position within a JSON array (specified in clause 5 of IETF RFC 8259 [1]). NOTE: These last terms will be used for denoting each of the JSON values that will be added to the etsiU JSON array (specified in clause 5.3.1 of the present document), which will be incorporated in the JWS Unprotected header as a header parameter. Therefore, these JSON values will play, within the present document, an equivalent role to the role played by the unsigned attributes in CAdES and the unsigned qualifying properties in XAdES. The present document uses the term "JAdES component" or "component" for denoting any JAdES signature constituent, regardless it is a header parameter, a member of a JSON Object, an element of a JSON array, or any other JSON Value. The present document uses this special font for denoting tags of JAdES components. As for the names of the header parameters and elements of the etsiU JSON array, the following criteria and conventions have been used: 1) The names have been selected to have a maxim length of 8 characters; most of the names are shorter. 2) The names of header parameters qualifying the signature itself use to start with "sig". 3) The names of header parameters qualifying the signer use to start with "sr". 4) The names of header parameters qualifying the data to be signed use to start with "sd". 5) The names of header parameters dealing with electronic time-stamps use to finalize with "tst". 6) The names of header parameters dealing with certificates use to start or contain "x" (following the convention of IETF RFC 7515 [2], which defines the header parameters x5u, x5c, x5t, and x5t#S256). 7) The names of header parameters dealing with revocation values (CRLs or OCSP responses) use to start or contain "r". ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 12 8) The names of header parameters dealing with attribute certificates or the corresponding revocation values use to start "a". 9) The names of header parameters dealing with values (of certificates or revocation values) use to contain "Vals". 10) The names of header parameters dealing with references (to certificates or revocation values) use to contain "Refs" (except x5t, and x5t#S256, which have been defined in IETF RFC 7515 [2], contain references to certificates, and do not include it). |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 4 General Requirements | The JAdES components defined in the present document shall be carried within the JOSE header as specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2]. All the JAdES signed header parameters specified in clause 5.2 of the present document, as well as the header parameters specified elsewhere and further profiled in clause 5.1 of the present document, if required to be present, shall be incorporated as header parameters of the JWS Protected Header of the JSON Web Signature, specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2]. JAdES signatures may be serialized using either JWS Compact Serialization or JWS JSON Serialization as specified in clause 3 of IETF RFC 7515 [2]. JWS Unprotected Header in JAdES signatures shall contain only one header parameter, namely the etsiU header parameter (specified in clause 5.3 of the present document), which is defined as a JSON array. As in JWS, if a JAdES signature contains the JWS Unprotected Header, then the JAdES signature can only be serialized using JWS JSON Serialization. NOTE 1: The rationale for this is that the JWS Unprotected Header is a JSON object, and no order may be inferred in its different members. This is the reason why the present document defines etsiU header parameter as a JSON array. NOTE 2: The elements of this JSON array will contain JSON values that play for JAdES signatures the same role as the role played by the unsigned attributes for CAdES signatures, and the role played by the unsigned qualifying properties for XAdES signatures. NOTE 3: An immediate consequence is that an electronic time-stamp present within the arcTst object specified in clause 5.3.6.2 of the present document, protects the JWS Payload, the JWS Protected Header, the JAdES Signature Value, and the etsiU header parameter within the JWS Unprotected Header. Header parameters defined by IETF RFC 7515 [2] and IETF RFC 7797 [14] not further profiled within the present document may be added as header parameters within the JAdES signature, following the requirements specified in the present document. In JAdES signatures, the JWS Payload may be attached or detached. Detached JWS Payload may either be one detached object, or result from the concatenation of more than one detached data objects. See the specification of sigD signed header parameter in clause 5.2.8 of the present document. NOTE 4: At the moment of producing the present document, JSON Schema was under development. The working draft being used at the present document was the one specified by draft-handrews-json-schema-01 [19], and draft-handrews-json-schema-validation-01 [i.15]. These documents, though, do not correspond to the latest version (draft-handrews-json-schema-02 [i.14], and draft-handrews-json-schema-validation-02 [i.15]) due to the fact that tools checking correctness of JSON schema files have not been yet completed. The drafts of JSON schema specifications may be accessed at JSON Schema Specification in json-schema.org website [i.13]. NOTE 5: Although at the moment of producing the present document there exist several proposals for JSON canonicalization algorithms, none have been formally adopted by any standardization organization. Nevertheless, the present document uses placeholders for identifiers of canonicalization algorithms in a number of components that could use them if such algorithms are standardized in the future. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 13 |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5 Header parameters semantics and syntax | 5.1 Use of header parameters defined in IETF RFC 7515, IETF RFC 7797, and IETF RFC 7519 |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.1.1 Introduction | This clause defines additional requirements for the use of some of header parameters specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2]. JAdES signatures may incorporate any of the header parameters specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2] and IETF RFC 7797 [14]. NOTE: Clause 6.3 also specifies requirements (mainly of presence and cardinality), for the use of some of the header parameters specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2] for JAdES baseline signatures. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.1.2 The alg (X.509 URL) header parameter | Semantics The alg header parameter shall be a signed header parameter that qualifies the signature. The alg header parameter shall have the semantics specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2], clause 4.1.1. Syntax The alg header parameter shall have the syntax specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2], clause 4.1.1. The algorithm should be one of the algorithms for digital signatures recommended by in ETSI TS 119 312 [21]. The identifier of the algorithm shall be one of the identifiers registered at the IANA "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms" (https://www.iana.org/assignments/jose/jose.xhtml#web-signature-encryption-algorithms). |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.1.3 The cty (content type) header parameter | Semantics The cty header parameter shall be a signed header parameter that qualifies the JWS Payload. The cty header parameter shall have the semantics specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2], clause 4.1.10. The cty header parameter should not be present if the sigD header parameter, specified in clause 5.2.8 of the present document, is present within the JAdES signature. The cty header parameter should not be present if the content type is implied by the JWS Payload. The cty header parameter shall not be present if the JWS Payload is a (counter-signed) signature. NOTE: The sigD header parameter has one member that contains information of the format and type of the constituents of the JWS Payload. Syntax The cty header parameter shall have the syntax specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2], clause 4.1.10. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.1.4 The kid (key identifier) header parameter | Semantics The kid header parameter shall be a signed header parameter that qualifies the signature. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 14 The kid header parameter shall have the semantics specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2], clause 4.1.4. The content of kid header parameter should be the base64 (IETF RFC 4648 [12]) encoding of one DER-encoded instance of type IssuerSerial type defined in IETF RFC 5035 [5]. The header parameter kid shall be used as a hint that can help to identify the signing certificate if other header parameters referencing or containing the signing certificate are present in the JAdES signature. Syntax The kid header parameter shall have the syntax specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2], clause 4.1.4. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.1.5 The x5u (X.509 URL) header parameter | Semantics The x5u header parameter shall be a signed header parameter that qualifies the signature. The x5u header parameter shall have the semantics specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2], clause 4.1.5. The x5u member shall be used as a hint, as implementations can have alternative ways for retrieving the referenced certificate if it is not found at the referenced place. Syntax The x5u header parameter shall have the syntax specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2], clause 4.1.5. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.1.6 The x5t (X.509 Certificate SHA-1 Thumbprint) header parameter | JAdES signatures shall not contain the x5t header parameter specified in clause 4.1.7 of IETF RFC 7515 [2]. 5.1.7 The x5t#S256 (X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint) header parameter Semantics The x5t#S256 shall be a signed header parameter that qualifies the signature. The x5t#S256 header parameter shall have the semantics specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2], clause 4.1.8. Syntax The x5t#S256 header parameter shall have the syntax specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2], clause 4.1.8. A JAdES signature shall have at least one of the following header parameters in its JWS Protected Header: x5t#S256 (specified in clause 4.1.8 of IETF RFC 7515 [2]), x5c (specified in clause 4.1.6 of IETF RFC 7515 [2]), sigX5ts (specified in clause 5.2.2.3 of the present document), or x5t#o (specified in clause 5.2.2.2 of the present document). NOTE 1: The simultaneous presence of x5t#S256 and x5t#o header parameters is allowed for facilitating interoperability whilst implementations migrate from x5t#S256 to x5t#o. NOTE 2: Profiles of JAdES can allow some of the combinations of the aforementioned header parameters. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.1.8 The x5c (X.509 Certificate Chain) header parameter | Semantics The x5c header parameter shall be a signed header parameter. The x5c header parameter shall have the semantics specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2], clause 4.1.6. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 15 Syntax The x5c header parameter shall have the syntax specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2], clause 4.1.6. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.1.9 The crit (critical) header parameter | Semantics The crit header parameter shall be a signed header parameter that qualifies the signature. The crit header parameter shall have the semantics specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2], clause 4.1.11. Syntax The crit header parameter shall have the syntax specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2], clause 4.1.11. If the JAdES signature includes the sigD header parameter, the crit header parameter shall also be present and "sigD" shall be one of its JSON array elements. NOTE 1: The requirement of mandating that all the names of the signed header parameters are elements of the crit JSON array, present in version 1.1.1 of the present document, has been suppressed after receiving comments qualifying it as problematic because it could not be properly managed by plane JWS processing applications. With this reformulation any JAdES signature that does not incorporate the sigD header parameter can be (partly) processed by a plane JWS processing application (it will not process the JAdES signed parameters, which is OK if the signature policy allows it). NOTE 2: This change requires JAdES v1.1.1 processing applications to be modified to consider conformant JAdES signatures that do not contain names of the signed header parameters defined by the present document within the crit JSON array when the JAdES signature does not incorporate the sigD header parameter. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.1.10 The b64 header parameter | Semantics The b64 header parameter shall be a signed header parameter. The b64 header parameter shall have the semantics specified in IETF RFC 7797 [14], clause 3. Syntax The b64 header parameter shall have the syntax specified in IETF RFC 7797 [14], clause 3. If the sigD header parameter is present with its member set to "http://uri.etsi.org/19182/HttpHeaders" then the b64 header parameter shall be present and set to "false". |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.1.11 The iat (claimed signing time) header parameter | Semantics In JAdES signatures, the iat header parameter shall be a signed header parameter. In JAdES signatures, the iat header parameter's value shall specify the time at which the signer claims to have performed the signing process. Syntax The syntax of the iat header parameter shall be as specified in IETF RFC 7519 [22], clause 4.1.6. Its value shall be an integer number, instance of the NumericDateValue type, which is defined in IETF RFC 7519 [22], clause 2. The value of the iat header parameter shall not contain fractions of seconds. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 16 The iat header parameter shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and is copied below for information: "iat": {"type": "integer"}, Before 2025-07-15T00:00:00Z, this header parameter should be incorporated in new JAdES signatures instead of the sigT header parameter specified in clause 5.2.1 of the present document. Starting at 2025-07-15T00:00:00Z, this header parameter shall be incorporated in new JAdES signatures. NOTE 1: The iat header parameter has been incorporated with this semantics following the recommendation by Designated Experts that assessed the ETSI TC ESI's request of registering within the IANA the header parameters defined by JAdES in the JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters Registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/jose/jose.xhtml#web-signature-encryption-header-parameters). NOTE 2: The date and time value indicated by 2025-07-15T00:00:00Z follows the format specified in ISO 8601-1 [23]. NOTE 3: This period of roughly one year from the publication of the present document until the date and time 2025-07-15T00:00:00Z, is for giving time to applications that generate JAdES signatures to generate them incorporating iat header parameter instead of sigT. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.2 New signed header parameters | |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.2.1 The sigT (claimed signing time) header parameter | Semantics The sigT header parameter shall be a signed header parameter that qualifies the signature. The sigT header parameter's value shall specify the time at which the signer claims to have performed the signing process. Syntax The sigT header parameter shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and is copied below for information: "sigT": {"type": "string", "format": "date-time"}, The contents of the string: 1) Shall be formatted as specified in IETF RFC 3339 [15]. 2) Shall be the UTC time for date and time. 3) Shall not contain the part corresponding to fraction of seconds. EXAMPLE: "2019-11-19T17:28:15Z". Before 2025-07-15T00:00:00Z this header parameter should not be incorporated in new JAdES signatures. Instead, the iaT header parameter should be included. Starting at 2025-07-15T00:00:00Z this header parameter shall not be incorporated in new JAdES signatures. NOTE 1: The former requirements do not recommend (although still allow it) the incorporation of the sigT header parameter in new JAdES signatures from the moment of the publication of the present document until just before 2025-07-15T00:00:00Z, and prohibit its incorporation in new JAdES signatures from 2025-07-15T00:00:00Z onwards. This is for giving time to applications that generate JAdES signatures to generate them incorporating iat header parameter instead of sigT. Applications validating JAdES signatures shall be able to parse and process this header parameter. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 17 NOTE 2: This is because validation applications can be requested the validation of JAdES signatures generated before 2025-07-15T00:00:00Z incorporating the sigT header parameter. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.2.2 Header parameters for certificate references | |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.2.2.1 Introduction | The present clause defines two new signed parameters namely, the x5t#o, which extends the semantics of x5t#S256 for allowing different digest algorithms than the SHA256, and the sigX5ts, which contains references to several certificates within the certification path, including one reference to the signing certificate, computed using a certain arbitrary digest algorithm. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.2.2.2 The x5t#o (X509 certificate digest) header parameter | Semantics The x5t#o header parameter shall be a signed header parameter that qualifies the signature. The x5t#o header parameter shall contain an identifier of a digest algorithm different than the identifier of SHA-256, and the digest value of the referenced certificate. NOTE 1: For instance, the signature validation policy can mandate the presence of references to all the certificates up to the trust anchor. NOTE 2: The identifier of SHA-256 is not allowed because for this algorithm, x5t#256 header parameter has been already specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2]. The x5t#o header parameter shall not contain any other information. Syntax The x5t#o header parameter shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1 and is copied below for information. "x5t#o": { "type": "object", "properties": { "digAlg": {"type": "string"}, "digVal": {"type": "string", "contentEncoding": "base64"} }, "required": ["digAlg","digVal"], "additionalProperties": false }, The digAlg member shall identify the digest algorithm. The identifier shall be one of the identifiers registered at the IANA "Named Information Hash Algorithm Registry" (https://www.iana.org/assignments/named-information/named- information.xhtml#hash-alg). The digVal member shall contain the base64url-encoded value of the digest computed on the DER-encoded certificate. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.2.2.3 The sigX5ts (X509 certificates digests) header parameter | Semantics The sigX5ts header parameter shall be a signed header parameter that qualifies the signature. The sigX5ts header parameter shall contain several references of certificates within the certification path of the signing certificate, each one formed by the identifier of a digest algorithm and the digest value of the referenced certificate. NOTE 1: This header parameter is not used when only the reference to the signing certificate is required. Instead, the x5t#o header parameter is used in such occasions. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 18 This element may contain digest values computed with algorithm SHA-256. NOTE 2: This is because in IETF RFC 7515 [2] there is not any header parameter that may contain a sequence of digest values of certificates. The first reference within the sigX5ts header parameter shall be the reference of the signing certificate. The sigX5ts header parameter shall not contain any other information. Syntax The sigX5ts header parameter shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and is copied below for information: "sigX5ts": { "type": "array", "items": {"$ref": "#/definitions/x5t%23o"}, "minItems": 2 }, |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.2.3 The srCms (signer commitments) header parameter | Semantics The srCms header parameter shall be a signed header parameter that qualifies JWS Payload. The srCms header parameter shall indicate the commitment made by the signer when signing. The srCms header parameter shall express the commitment type with a URI. The srCms header parameter may contain a sequence of qualifiers providing more information about the commitment. NOTE 1: The commitment type can be: defined as part of the signature policy, in which case, the commitment type has precise semantics that are defined as part of the signature policy; or be a registered type, in which case, the commitment type has precise semantics defined by registration, under the rules of the registration authority. Such a registration authority can be a trading association or a legislative authority. NOTE 2: The specification of commitment type identifiers is outside the scope of the present document. For a list of predefined commitment type identifiers, see ETSI TS 119 172-1 [i.7]. Syntax This header parameter shall be carried in the JWS Protected Header. The srCms header parameter shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and is copied below for information: "srCms":{ "type": "array", "items": { "type": "object", "properties":{ "commId": {"$ref": "#/definitions/oId"}, "commQuals":{ "type": "array", "items": {"type":"object"}, "minItems": 1 } }, "required": ["commId"], "additionalProperties": false }, "minItems": 1 }, ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 19 Each item of the srCms header parameter shall indicate one commitment made by the signer, which may be further qualified. The commId member of every array item is an instance of oId type, which is specified in clause 5.4.1 of the present document, whose id member shall have a URI as value, uniquely identifying one commitment made by the signer. The commQuals member provides means to include additional qualifying information on the commitment made by the signer. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.2.4 The sigPl (signature production place) header parameter | Semantics The sigPl header parameter shall be a signed header parameter that qualifies the signer. The sigPl header parameter shall specify an address associated with the signer at a particular geographical (e.g. city) location. Syntax This header parameter shall be carried in the JWS Protected Header. The sigPl header parameter shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and is copied below for information. NOTE: Its definition follows the specification of PostalAddress type in schema.org (https://schema.org/PostalAddress). "sigPl":{ "type": "object", "properties":{ "addressCountry": {"type": "string"}, "addressLocality": {"type": "string"}, "addressRegion": {"type": "string"}, "postOfficeBoxNumber": {"type": "string"}, "postalCode": {"type": "string"}, "streetAddress": {"type": "string"} }, "minProperties": 1, "additionalProperties": false }, This addressCountry member shall contain either the name of the country or its two-letter ISO 3166-1 [i.17] alpha-2 country code. This header parameter shall be carried in the JWS Protected Header. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.2.5 The srAts (signer attributes) header parameter | Semantics The srAts header parameter shall be a signed header parameter that qualifies the signer. The srAts header parameter shall encapsulate signer attributes (e.g. role). This header parameter may encapsulate the following types of attributes: • attributes claimed by the signer; • attributes certified in attribute certificates issued by an Attribute Authority; or/and • assertions signed by a third party. Syntax This header parameter shall be carried in the JWS Protected Header. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 20 The srAts header parameter shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and is copied below for information: "qArrays":{ "type": "array", "items": { "type": "object", "properties": { "mediaType": {"type": "string"}, "encoding": {"type": "string"}, "qVals": { "type": "array", "minItems": 1 } }, "required": ["mediaType", "encoding", "qVals"], "additionalProperties": false }, "minItems": 1 }, "srAts":{ "type": "object", "properties": { "certified":{ "type": "array", "items": {"$ref": "#/definitions/certifiedAttrs"}, "minItems": 1 }, "claimed": {"$ref": "#/definitions/qArrays"}, "signedAssertions": {"$ref": "#/definitions/qArrays"} }, "minProperties": 1, "additionalProperties": false }, "certifiedAttrs": { "type": "object", "properties": { "x509AttrCert":{"$ref": "#/definitions/pkiOb"}, "otherAttrCert":{"$ref": "#/definitions/pkiOb"} }, "oneOf":[ { "required":["x509AttrCert"] }, { "required":["otherAttrCert"] } ], "additionalProperties": false }, EXAMPLE: W3C Recommendation [i.11] defines a JSON model for credentials that could become content of the claimed member. As specified in the JSON schema above, the srAts header parameter may contain an array of claimed attributes (member claimed), an array of attribute certificates (member certified), an array of signed assertions (member signedAssertions), or any combination of the three mentioned arrays. NOTE 1: The incorporation of one of the mentioned arrays or a certain combination of arrays is use-case or policy dependent. Therefore, the present document does not make any recommendation in this sense. The certifiedAttrs member shall contain a non-empty array of certified attributes, which shall be one of the following: • the base64 encoding of DER-encoded X509 attribute certificates conformant to Recommendation ITU-T X.509 [6] issued to the signer, within the X509AttrCert member; or • attribute certificates (issued, in consequence, by Attribute Authorities) in different syntax than the one specified in Recommendation ITU-T X.509 [6], within the OtherAttrCert member. The definition of specific OtherAttrCert is outside of the scope of the present document. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 21 The signedAssertions member shall contain a non-empty array of assertions signed by a third party. NOTE 2: A signed assertion is stronger than a claimed attribute, since a third party asserts with a signature that the attribute of the signer is valid. However, it is less restrictive than an attribute certificate. The claimed member shall contain a non-empty array of attributes claimed by the signer. Both the signedAssertions and the claimed members shall be instances of qArrays type. Each instance of this type shall be a JSON array whose elements are JSON objects. Each JSON object shall contain three members, namely: a) The mediaType member, which shall contain a string identifying the type of the signed assertions or the claimed attributes present in qVals member, and shall meet the requirements specified in clause 8.4 of draft-handrews-json-schema-validation-01 [i.15]. b) The encoding member, which shall contain a string identifying the encoding of the signed assertions or the claimed attributes present in qVals member, and shall meet the requirements specified in clause 8.3 of draft-handrews-json-schema-validation-01 [i.15]. c) The qVals member, which shall be a JSON array of at least one item. The elements of qVals JSON array shall be the values of the signed assertions or the claimed attributes encoded as indicated within the encoding member. NOTE 3: Instances of qArrays type allow to incorporate signed assertions and/or claimed attributes of different types and different encodings. The definition of specific content types for signedAssertions and claimed attributes is outside of the scope of the present document. NOTE 4: A possible content for signedAssertions can be a signed SAML [i.8] assertion. Empty srAts header parameters shall not be generated. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.2.6 The adoTst (signed data time-stamp) header parameter | Semantics The adoTst header parameter shall be a signed header parameter that qualifies the JWS Payload. The adoTst header parameter shall encapsulate one or more electronic time-stamps, generated before the signature production, whose message imprint computation input shall be the JWS Payload of the JAdES signature. Syntax This header parameter shall be carried in the JWS Protected Header. The adoTst header parameter shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and is copied below for information. "adoTst": {"$ref": "#/definitions/tstContainer"}, The message imprint computation input for the electronic time-stamp shall be an octet stream built as indicated below: • If the sigD header parameter, as specified in clause 5.2.8 of the present document, is absent then: a) If the b64 header parameter specified in clause 3 of IETF RFC 7797 [14] is present and set to "false" then concatenate the JWS Payload value. b) If the b64 header parameter specified in clause 3 of IETF RFC 7797 [14] is present and set to "true", OR it is absent, then concatenate the base64url-encoded JWS Payload. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 22 • Else, if the sigD header parameter is present: a) If the value of its mId member is "http://uri.etsi.org/19182/HttpHeaders" then concatenate the bytes resulting from processing the contents of its pars member as specified in clause 5.2.8.2 of the present document except the "Digest" string element. The processing of the "Digest" string element in the pars array shall consist in retrieving the bytes of the body of the HTTP message. NOTE 1: The rationale for this is that the body of an HTTP message is signed indirectly: the JWS signature value is computed, not on its value, but on its digest value computed with a certain digest algorithm. Therefore, in order to protect the HTTP body against the risk of the digest value becoming weak, the input to the electronic time-stamp's message imprint computation, should contain the digest value of the HTTP body computed with a strong digest algorithm, which may be different from the initial one if this is expected to become weak soon. b) If the value of its mId member is "http://uri.etsi.org/19182/ObjectIdByURI" or "http://uri.etsi.org/19182/ObjectIdByURIHash" then concatenate the bytes resulting from processing the contents of its pars member as specified in clause 5.2.8.3.2 of the present document. NOTE 2: The rationale for applying the processing specified in clause 5.2.8.3.2 of the present document to the case of the mechanism identified by "http://uri.etsi.org/19182/ObjectIdByURIHash" is the fact that this is an indirect signing mechanism, i.e. based on signing digest values of data objects, instead of the data objects themselves. Time-stamping not the digest values but the retrieved data objects, protects against future weaknesses of the digest algorithms used in sigD. If the JWS Payload is detached and the JAdES signature does not incorporate the sigD signed header parameter, then it is out of the scope to specify how to retrieve the JWS Payload. The adoTst header parameter shall not contain the canonAlg member. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.2.7 The sigPId (signature policy identifier) header parameter | |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.2.7.1 Semantics and syntax | Semantics The sigPId header parameter shall be a signed header parameter qualifying the signature. The sigPId header parameter shall contain either an explicit identifier of a signature policy or an indication that there is an implied signature policy that the relying party should be aware of. NOTE: ETSI TS 119 172-1 [i.7] specifies a framework for signature policies. Syntax This header parameter shall be carried in the JWS Protected Header. The sigPId header parameter shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and is copied below for information. "sigPId": { "type": "object", "properties": { "id": {"$ref": "#/definitions/oId"}, "digAlg": {"type": "string"}, "digVal": {"type": "string", "contentEncoding": "base64"}, "digPSp": {"type": "boolean"}, "sigPQuals": { "type": "array", "items": {"$ref":"#/definitions/sigPQual"}, "minItems": 1 } }, "required": ["id"], ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 23 "additionalProperties": false }, The id member shall be used for referencing the signature policy explicitly. It shall uniquely identify a specific version of the signature policy. The digAlg and digVal members shall contain, respectively, the identifier of the digest algorithm and the base64url-encoded digest value of the object obtained after processing id. NOTE: The presence of digAlg and digVal members is use-case or policy dependent. Therefore, the present document does not include any recommendation in this sense. The digPSp member shall be a boolean. When present and set to "true", it shall indicate that the digest of the signature policy document has been computed as specified in a technical specification. Absence of this member shall be considered as if present and set to "false". If this member is present and set to "true", then the qualifier spDSpec qualifier shall be present and shall identify the aforementioned technical specification. The sigPQuals member shall be a non-empty array of qualifiers of the signature policy. The sigPQuals member may contain one or more qualifiers of the same type. Clause 5.2.7.2 specifies three signature policy qualifiers. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.2.7.2 Signature policy qualifiers | Semantics This clause specifies the following three qualifiers for the signature policy: • A URL where a copy of the signature policy document can be obtained (spURI choice). • A user notice that should be displayed when the signature is validated (spUserNotice choice). • An identifier of the technical specification that defines the syntax used for producing the signature policy document (spDSpec choice). Syntax The spURI , spUserNotice , and spDSpec qualifiers shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and are copied below for information. "sigPQual": { "type": "object", "properties": { "spUserNotice": {"$ref": "#/definitions/spUserNotice"}, "spURI": {"$ref": "#/definitions/spURI"}, "spDSpec": {"$ref": "#/definitions/spDSpec"} }, "minProperties": 1, "maxProperties": 1 }, "spURI": {"type": "string", "format": "uri"}, "spUserNotice": { "type": "object", "properties": { "noticeRef": { "type": "object", "properties": { "organization": {"type": "string"}, "noticeNumbers": { "type": "array", "items": {"type": "integer"}, "minItems" : 1 } }, "required": ["organization","noticeNumbers"], "additionalProperties": false }, ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 24 "explText": {"type": "string"} }, "minProperties": 1, "additionalProperties": false }, "spDSpec": {"$ref": "#/definitions/oId"}, The spURI qualifier shall contain a URL value where a copy of the signature policy document can be obtained. NOTE 1: This URL can reference, for instance, a remote site (which can be managed by an entity entitled for this purpose) from where (signing/validating) applications can retrieve the signature policy document. The spUserNotice qualifier shall contain information that is intended for being displayed whenever the signature is validated. The explText member shall contain the text of the notice to be displayed. NOTE 2: Other notices can come from the organization issuing the signature policy. The noticeRef member shall name an organization and shall identify by numbers (noticeNumbers member) a group of textual statements prepared by that organization, so that the application could get the explicit notices from a notices file. The spDSpec member shall identify the technical specification that defines the syntax used for producing the signature policy document. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.2.8 The sigD header parameter | |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.2.8.1 Semantics and Syntax | Semantics The sigD header parameter shall be a signed header parameter. The sigD header parameter shall not appear in JAdES signatures whose JWS Payload is attached. The sigD header parameter may appear in JAdES signatures whose JWS Payload is detached. A JAdES signature shall have at most one sigD header parameter within each present JWS Protected Header. NOTE 1: Note that when using the General JWS JSON Serialization Syntax, it is possible to build a JAdES signature which allows multiple signers to sign the same JWS Payload. Each element of the signatures member of this serialization includes its own JWS Protected Header; therefore, each signer can include its own sigD header parameter. The sigD header parameter shall: 1) Reference one or more detached data objects. 2) Specify how the aforementioned references shall be processed for contributing to build the sequence of octets that shall be the JWS Payload of the JAdES signature. 3) Allow to define different mechanisms for meeting the two aforementioned requirements. 4) Chaining of references shall not be allowed. Only the data objects directly referenced within the sigD header parameter shall contribute to build the JWS Payload. If some referenced object contains in its turn references to other data objects, these last data objects shall not contribute to build the JWS Payload. NOTE 2: This is for avoiding building trees of referenced and distributed data objects, which would complicate the validation of JAdES signatures. The sigD header parameter may also incorporate base64url-encoded digest values of the referenced data objects within one string. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 25 The sigD header parameter may also incorporate any additional information for meeting requirements 1) and 2) as required by the mechanisms mentioned in 3). Syntax This header parameter shall be carried in the JWS Protected Header. The sigD header parameter shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and is copied below for information. "sigD":{ "type": "object", "properties": { "mId" : {"type":"string", "format": "uri"}, "pars" : { "type": "array", "items": {"type": "string"}, "minItems": 1 }, "hashM" : {"type":"string"}, "hashV" : { "type": "array", "items": {"type": "string","contentEncoding": "base64"}, "minItems": 1 }, "ctys" : { "type": "array", "items": {"type": "string"}, "minItems": 1 } }, "required": ["pars","mId"], "additionalProperties": false }, The mId member shall be present. It shall be an URI identifying the mechanism used for referencing and processing each referenced data object for building the JWS Payload. The present document defines 3 referencing mechanisms with their corresponding identifiers in clauses 5.2.8.2, 5.2.8.3.2 and 5.2.8.3.3. The pars member shall be present. It shall be a non-empty array of strings. Each element of the array shall contain a reference to one data object, as required by the identification mechanism identified in the mId member. The hashM member shall be a string identifying a digest algorithm. Its value shall be one of the identifiers defined in IETF RFC 7518 [16], or any future specification that amends, complements, or supersedes it. The presence of this member shall be conditional on the definition of the identification mechanism. If this member is present, then hashV member shall be present. The hashV member shall be a non-empty array of strings. Each element of the array shall contain: 1) The base64url-encoded digest value of the data object referenced by the parameter value that is present in the same position of the pars array if the b64 header parameter is present and set to "false". 2) The base64url-encoded digest value of the base64url-encoded data object referenced by the parameter value that is present in the same position of the pars array if the b64 header parameter is absent or it is present and set to "true". The presence of the hashV member shall be conditional on the definition of the identification mechanism. If this member is present, then hashM member shall be present. The ctys member shall be a non-empty an array of strings. The contents of each element of this array shall have the same semantics of the cty header parameter specified in clause 4.1.10 of IETF RFC 7515 [2]. There shall be as many elements within the ctys array as elements within the array pars. Each element of the ctys array shall contain the information corresponding to the data object referenced by the parameter value that is present in the same position of the pars array, except if the content type is implied by the data object or the data object is a counter-signed signature: in these cases, the element of the ctys array shall have as value an empty string. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 26 |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.2.8.2 Mechanism HttpHeaders | The URL identifying this referencing mechanism shall be "http://uri.etsi.org/19182/HttpHeaders". If this mechanism is used, then the b64 header parameter shall be present and set to "false". For this referencing mechanism, neither hashV, neither hashM member, nor ctys shall be present. Using this referencing mechanism, a JAdES signature may explicitly reference several HTTP headers and sign them, as well as the HTTP message body. For this referencing mechanism, the contents of the pars member shall be an array of lowercased names of HTTP header fields. The HTTP message body may also be signed by incorporating into the HTTP message the Digest HTTP header specified in clause 4.3.2 of IETF RFC 3230 [13], whose content is the digest of the message body. The HTTP headers shall be processed and concatenated in the order their lowercased names appear within the pars member to form the JWS Payload, as follows; a) If the HTTP header name is "(request target)" then generate the header field value by concatenating the lower-cased method (e.g. get, put), a space character, and the path and query parts of the target URI (the "path-absolute" production and optionally a '?' character followed by the "query" production see clauses 3.3 and 3.4 of IETF RFC 3986 [17]). b) If the header name is "(response status)" then generate the header field value containing the Status line as specified IETF RFC 2616 [18] clause 6.1 (HTTP 1.1) or IETF RFC 7540 [24] clause 8.1.2.4 (HTTP 2) but not including the newline character, which is added as specified in Item c) below. c) For other HTTP header names create the header field string by concatenating the lowercased header field name followed with a colon ':', a space character, and the header field value. Any leading and trailing white spaces are removed. If there are multiple instances of the same header field, all header field values associated with the header field shall be concatenated, separated by a ASCII comma and an ASCII space ', ', and used in the order in which they will appear in the transmitted HTTP message. d) Insert newline character after all but the last HTTP header value. NOTE 1: The above are equivalent to the steps required for signature string construction as defined in clause 2.3 of Internet draft draft-cavage-http-signatures-10 [i.12]. NOTE 2: Clauses 5.2.6 and 5.3.6.2.3 of the present document specify the processing of the "Digest" string element in the pars array in clauses for building its contribution to the message imprint computation input when generating electronic time-stamps encapsulated within the adoTst and arcTst respectively. That processing is required because in this mechanism the body of the HTTP message is indirectly signed (what is signed is its digest, not the HTTP message body itself). |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.2.8.3 Mechanisms supported by URI-references | |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.2.8.3.1 General requirements | This clause specifies two mechanisms that use URI-references for referencing the data objects contributing to build the JWS Payload. For these referencing mechanisms, the contents of the pars member shall be an array of strings. Each string shall be an URI-reference, which, once resolved, shall result in an URI appertaining to the group of URIs that can be classified as locators according to clause 1.1.3 of IETF RFC 3986 [17]. Each URI-reference shall refer to one data object. NOTE: According to IETF RFC 3986 [17], URIs that can be classified as locators (URLs are the obvious example) "provide a means of locating the resource by describing its primary access mechanism". When resolving an URI-reference which is a relative reference, conforming applications shall set a default base HTTP scheme URI when applying clause 5.1.4 of IETF RFC 3986 [17]. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 27 Dereferencing URI-references in the HTTP scheme shall be supported. Dereferencing an URI-reference in the HTTP scheme shall comply with the Status Code Definitions specified in clause 10 of IETF RFC 2616 [18]. Dereferencing URI-references in other locator schemes may be supported. Dereferencing URI-references within one of such schemes shall be conducted as defined in the corresponding scheme specification. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.2.8.3.2 Mechanism ObjectIdByURI | The URL identifying this referencing mechanism shall be "http://uri.etsi.org/19182/ObjectIdByURI". For this referencing mechanism, neither hashV , nor hashM shall be present. Member ctys may be present. The semantics and syntax of ctys shall be as specified in clause 5.2.8.1 of the present document. The stream of octets corresponding to the contribution of the JWS Payload to the computation of the JWS Signature Value shall be generated as indicated below: 1) Initialize the stream of octets to an empty stream. 2) While there are URI-references in the pars array not visited: - Take the next one. - Dereference the URI-reference, as specified in clause 5.2.8.3.1 of the present document. - If the b64 header parameter specified in clause 3 of IETF RFC 7797 [14] is absent or is present and set to "true", then base64url encode the retrieved object octets. - Concatenate the resulting octets to the stream of octets to be signed. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.2.8.3.3 Mechanism ObjectIdByURIHash | The URL identifying this referencing mechanism shall be "http://uri.etsi.org/19182/ObjectIdByURIHash". For this referencing mechanism, the hashV, and the hashM members shall be present. Member ctys may be present. The semantics and syntax of hashM, hashV ,and ctys shall be as specified in clause 5.2.8.1 of the present document. For computing the digest values, whose base64url encodings appear within the hashV member, each data object referenced within the pars member, shall be retrieved as specified in clause 5.2.8.3.1 of the present document. When using this mechanism, the JWS Payload shall contribute as an empty stream to the computation of the JWS Signature Value. NOTE 1: As this sigD is a signed header parameter, and it already includes the digest of the components of the JWS Payload, the JWS Payload is indirectly signed by signing the sigD signed header parameter, and consequently, this referencing mechanism does not require that the JWS Payload directly contributes to the computation of the JWS Signature Value. If the JWS Payload is required for other purposes than computing the JWS Signature Value when this mechanism is used, it shall be generated as specified in clause 5.2.8.3.2. NOTE 2: The generation of this JWS Payload is required, for instance, for generating the adoTst or the arcTst header parameters. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 28 |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.3 New unsigned header parameter | |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.3.1 The etsiU header parameter | Semantics The etsiU unprotected header parameter shall be a JSON array whose elements contain JSON values that are not signed by the JAdES signature. NOTE 1: The rationale for this is as follows: the computation of certain electronic time-stamps message imprints is performed by digesting the concatenation of sets of unsigned header parameters, and this concatenation needs to be performed following an order; the JSON array allows to define such an order: the unsigned header parameters are concatenated following the order of appearance within the JSON array. NOTE 2: As it has been specified in clause 4 of the present document etsiU header parameter is incorporated in the JWS Unprotected Header specified in clause 3.2 of IETF RFC 7515 [2]. Consequently, all its elements will also be unprotected, and its elements will play in JAdES signatures the same role as the role played by the unsigned attributes for CAdES signatures, and the role played by the unsigned qualifying properties for XAdES signature. The etsiU header parameter shall contain JSON values that qualify the JAdES signature itself, or the signer, or the JWS Payload. NOTE 3: Because the etsiU header parameter is present within the JWS Unprotected Header, then JWS JSON Serialization as specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2], clause 3.2, needs to be employed as the alternative to JWS Compact Serialization. New JSON values shall always be added at the end of the etsiU array. NOTE 4: This implies that the order in the etsiU array reflects the order in the generation of the JSON values. This is of special relevance for containers of time-stamps and the unsigned attributes their electronic time- stamps time-stamp. The components present within the etsiU header parameter shall appear as clear instances of unsigned components or as their corresponding base64url encodings. NOTE 5: While clear instances of unsigned components require some type of canonicalization if they contribute to the computation of a time-stamp message imprint, their base64url-encoded values will not require such canonicalization. The present document is neutral about which alternative should be used. NOTE 6: The contents of the components of the etsiU header parameters can appear as clear instances of unsigned components or as their corresponding basee64url encodings regardless the presence or absence of the b64 header parameter and its value if present, as the b64 header parameter only affects to the JWS Payload representation and the input to the JWS Signature Value computation. The present document specifies: 1) A JSON object (sigPSt) containing details for facilitating access to a signature policy document, in clause 5.3.3. 2) A JSON object (cSig) containing details for containing a counter-signature of the JAdES signature itself, in clause 5.3.2. 3) A JSON object (sigTst) containing a electronic time-stamp on the JWS Signature Value, in clause 5.3.4. 4) A JSON array (xVals) containing CA certificates required for validating the signature, in clause 5.3.5.2. 5) A JSON object (rVals) containing values of revocation data required for validating the signature, in clause 5.3.5.3. 6) A JSON array (axVals) containing certificates of Attribute Authorities required for validating the signature, in clause 5.3.5.4. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 29 7) A JSON object (arVals) containing values of revocation data of Attribute Authorities required for validating the signature, in clause 5.3.5.5. 8) A JSON array (anyValData) containing revocation data on certificates in the certification path of the JAdES signature and/or the certification paths of present signatures, issued at a different time than the revocation data present in the rVals object for meeting freshness requirements for revocation data defined by a specific creation/augmentation/validation policy, in clause 5.3.5.6. 9) A JSON object (tstVD) containing validation data (certificate and values of revocation data) for electronic time-stamps present in the signature, in clause 5.3.6.1. 10) A JSON object (arcTst) containing one or more electronic time-stamps on all the components of the JAdES signature, in clause 5.3.6.2. 11) A JSON array (xRefs) containing references to certificates required for validating the signature, in clause A.1.1. 12) A JSON object (rRefs) containing references to revocation data required for validating the signature, in clause A.1.2. 13) A JSON array (axRefs) containing references to certificates of Attribute Authorities required for validating the signature, in clause A.1.3. 14) A JSON object (arRefs) containing references to revocation data of Attribute Authorities required for validating the signature, in clause A.1.4. 15) A JSON object (sigRTst) containing a electronic time-stamp on the references to the validation material and the JWS Signature Value, in clause A.1.5.1. 16) A JSON object (rfsTst) containing an electronic time-stamp on the references to the validation material, in clause A.1.5.2. All the JSON arrays and JSON objects listed above shall be placed within the etsiU header parameter if they are incorporated into the JAdES signature. Syntax The etsiU header parameter shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and is copied below for information. "etsiU": { "type": "array", "oneOf": [ { "items": {"$ref": "#/definitions/etsiUClearInstance"} }, { "items": {"type": "string", "contentEncoding": "base64"} } ], "minItems": 1 }, "etsiUClearInstance": { "type": "object", "properties": { "sigPSt": {"$ref": "#/definitions/sigPSt"}, "sigTst": {"$ref": "#/definitions/sigTst"}, "xVals": {"$ref": "#/definitions/xVals"}, "rVals": {"$ref": "#/definitions/rVals"}, "axVals": {"$ref": "#/definitions/axVals"}, "arVals": {"$ref": "#/definitions/arVals"}, "anyValData": {"$ref":"#/definitions/anyValData"}, "tstVD": {"$ref": "#/definitions/tstVD"}, "arcTst": {"$ref": "#/definitions/arcTst"}, "xRefs": {"$ref": "#/definitions/xRefs"}, "rRefs": {"$ref": "#/definitions/rRefs"}, "axRefs": {"$ref": "#/definitions/axRefs"}, "arRefs": {"$ref": "#/definitions/arRefs"}, "sigRTst": {"$ref": "#/definitions/sigRTst"}, ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 30 "rfsTst": {"$ref": "#/definitions/rfsTst"}, "cSig": {"$ref": "rfcs/rfc7515.json#/definitions/jws"} }, "minProperties": 1, "maxProperties": 1 } The etsiU header parameter shall be a non-empty array. The etsiU header parameter shall be incorporated as member of the header JSON object of the JAdES signature. NOTE 7: The JSON schema file rfc7515.json, referenced within the etsiUClearInstance, is distributed by ETSI within subfolder rfcs. See clause B.1 for details on the location of the JSON schema files. NOTE 8: The header member is the place reserved by IETF RFC 7515 [2] for unsigned header parameters in JSON Web Signatures. Clause 3.2 of IETF RFC 7515 [2] leaves its content open. The present document suitably profiles its contents. NOTE 9: The cSig member, specified in clause 5.3.2 of the present document, is a countersignature of the JAdES signature. Its inner structure is defined in a separate JSON schema file whose details appear in clause B.1 of the present document, which is provided for helping implementations to validate the inner structure of JSON Web Signatures. The content of any element of the etsiU array shall be either an unsigned JSON value in clear (clear JSON incorporation), or its base64url encoding (base64url incorporation). The array shall not contain JSON values in clear in some positions, and base64url encoded unsigned JSON values in others. Either all of them shall be incorporated in clear or shall be incorporated base64url encoded. The etsiU header parameter should be the only header parameter incorporated to the JWS Unprotected Header. Any unprotected JSON value that is not specified in the present document should be incorporated as an element of the etsiU header parameter. NOTE 10: Adding these components into the etsiU header parameter allows to properly secure them in the long- term using arcTst. If the etsiU header parameter contains JSON values in clear, instances of tstContainer type shall have the canonAlg member, except for the sigTst JSON object. If the etsiU header parameter contains bas64url-encoded JSON values, instances of tstContainer type shall not have the canonAlg member. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.3.2 The cSig (counter signature) JSON object | Semantics The cSig JSON object shall contain one counter signature of the JAdES signature where cSig is incorporated. This counter signature may also be a JAdES signature. Syntax The cSig JSON object contains one JSON Web Signature (which may also be a JAdES signature) that signs the JWS Signature Value of the embedding JAdES signature. NOTE 1: The use of a JWS or a JAdES as counter-signature is use-case or policy dependent. Therefore, the present document does not make any recommendation in this sense. Discriminating whether the counter-signature is a JWS or a JAdES can be done by checking its sets of protected and unprotected header parameters; if the contents of these sets are according to the requirements in Table 1 in clause 6.3 of the present document, then the counter-signature is a JAdES signature. Otherwise it is a non-JAdES JWS. A JWS counter-signature may be serialized as specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2]. A JAdES counter-signature may be serialized as specified in clause 4 of the present document. NOTE 2: The use of a specific type of serialization is use-case or policy dependent. Therefore, the present document does not make any recommendation in this sense. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 31 One JAdES counter signature may itself be counter signed using a cSig JSON object, signing the JWS Signature Value of the first counter signature, built as described above. NOTE 3: This is an alternative way of constructing arbitrarily long series of counter signatures, each one signing the JWS Signature Value of the one where it is directly embedded. Once an archive time-stamp has been added to the JAdES signature (see clause 5.3.6.2 of the present document) the contents of any enveloped countersignature can not be modified. Therefore, if there is the need of incorporating new validation material for these countersignatures, this may be done using the anyValData JSON object specified in clause 5.3.5.6 of the present document. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.3.3 The sigPSt JSON object | Semantics The sigPSt JSON object shall contain either: • the signature policy document which is referenced in the sigPId JSON object so that the signature policy document can be used for offline and long-term validation; or • a URI referencing a local store where the signature policy document can be retrieved. Syntax This JSON object shall be carried in the JWS Unprotected Header. The sigPSt shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and are copied below for information. "sigPSt": { "type":"object", "properties": { "sigPolDoc": {"type": "string", "contentEncoding": "base64"}, "sigPolLocalURI": {"type": "string", "format": "uri-reference"}, "spDSpec": {"$ref": "#/definitions/oId"} }, "oneOf": [ { "required": ["sigPolDoc"] }, { "required": ["sigPolLocalURI"] } ], "minProperties": 1, "additionalProperties": false }, The sigPolDoc member shall contain the base64url encoded signature policy. The sigPolLocalURI member shall have as value the URI referencing a local store where the present document can be retrieved. NOTE 1: Contrary to the spURI, the sigPolLocalURI points to a local file. The spDSpec member shall identify the technical specification that defines the syntax used for producing the signature policy document. NOTE 2: It is the responsibility of the entity incorporating the signature policy document to the signature-policy-store to make sure that the correct document is securely stored. NOTE 3: Being an unsigned JSON object, it is not protected by the digital signature. If the sigPId JSON object is incorporated into the signature and contains the digVal member with the digest value of the signature policy document, any alteration of the signature policy document present within sigPSt or within a local store, would be detected by the failure of the digests comparison. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 32 |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.3.4 The sigTst JSON object | Semantics The sigTst JSON object shall encapsulate one or more electronic time-stamps time-stamping the JWS Signature Value. Syntax This JSON object shall be carried in the JWS Unprotected Header. The sigTst JSON object shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and is copied below for information. "sigTst": {"$ref": "#/definitions/tstContainer"}, The input of the message imprint computation for the electronic time-stamps encapsulated by sigTst JSON object shall be the base64url-encoded JWS Signature Value. NOTE: In a signature serialized with JWS JSON Serialization, this is the same as the content of the signature member. The sigTst JSON object shall not contain the canonAlg member. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.3.5 JSON objects for validation data values | |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.3.5.1 Introduction | The present clause specifies the semantics and syntax for JAdES JSON values that enclose certificates and/or revocation data. A JAdES signature may contain certificates and/or revocation data within any of the JAdES JSON values specified in this clause 5.3.5 as long as the specific requirements defined for each qualifying property are met. NOTE 1: ETSI TS 119 182-1 v1.1.1 [i.19] defined several header parameters for placing validation material, namely: xVals, rVals, axVals, arVals, and tstVD. They mimic similar containers of validation data in ETSI EN 319 132-1 (XAdES) [4] and ETSI EN 319 122-1 (CAdES) [i.2]. Each one contains validation material (certificates or revocation data), required for validating digital signatures signing specific objects (the corresponding clauses below provide the required details). After the publication of ETSI TS 119 182-1 v1.1.1 [i.19], use-cases were identified where this compartmentation presented problems. That is why the present document defines the header parameter anyValData, able to contain validation material (certificate values, revocation data, or both) required for validating digital signatures regardless the objects that they are signing. NOTE 2: The decision of using any of the mentioned header parameters is use-case or policy dependent. Therefore the present document does not make any recommendation in this sense. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.3.5.2 The xVals JSON array | Semantics The xVals JSON array: 1) shall contain the certificate of the trust anchor, if such certificate does exist and if it is not already present within other component of the JAdES signature. If this certificate is present within another component of the JAdES signature, it should not be included; 2) shall contain the CA certificates within the signing certificate path that are not already present within other component of the JAdES signature. The certificates present within other component of the JAdES signature should not be included; 3) shall contain the signing certificate if it is not already present within other component of the JAdES signature. If this certificate is present within other component of the JAdES signature, it should not be included; ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 33 4) shall contain certificates used to sign revocation status information (e.g. CRLs or OCSP responses) of certificates in 1), 2) and 3), and certificates within their respective certificate paths that are not present in the signature. Certificate values present within the signature, including certificate values within the revocation status information themselves should not be included; 5) shall not contain CA certificates that pertain exclusively to the certificate paths of certificates used to sign attribute certificates or signed assertions within srAts, or electronic time-stamps; and 6) may contain a set of certificates used to validate any countersignature incorporated into the JAdES signature that are not present in other components of the JAdES signature or its countersignatures. This set may include any of the certificates listed in 1), 2), 3) and 4) referred to signing certificates of countersignatures instead of the signing certificate of the JAdES signature. The certificates present elsewhere in the JAdES signature or its countersignatures should not be included. Syntax The xVals array parameter shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and is copied below for information. "xVals": { "type": "array", "items": { "type":"object", "properties": { "x509Cert": {"$ref": "#/definitions/pkiOb"}, "otherCert": {"$ref": "#/definitions/pkiOb"} }, "oneOf": [ { "required": ["x509Cert"] }, { "required": ["otherCert"] } ], "additionalProperties": false }, "minItems": 1 }, An x509Cert item shall contain the base64 encoding of one DER-encoded X.509 certificate. An otherCert item is a placeholder for potential future new formats of certificates. NOTE: The main difference between xVals and the x5c header parameter defined in IETF RFC 7515 [2] clause 4.1.6, is that xVals may contain non X.509 certificates. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.3.5.3 The rVals JSON object | Semantics The rVals JSON object: 1) shall contain revocation values corresponding to CA certificates within the signing certificate path if they are not already present within another component of the JAdES signature. It shall not contain a revocation value for the trust anchor. The revocation values present within another component of the JAdES signature should not be included; 2) shall contain a revocation value for the signing certificate if it is not already present within another component of the JAdES signature. If it is present within another component of the JAdES signature, it should not be included; 3) may contain revocation values corresponding to certificates used to sign CRLs or OCSP responses of 1) and 2) and certificates within their respective certificate paths. The revocation values present already present within another component of the JAdES signature should not be included; ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 34 4) shall not contain revocation values corresponding to CA certificates that pertain exclusively to the certificate paths of certificates used to sign attribute certificates or signed assertions within srAts, or electronic time-stamps; and 5) may contain revocation values corresponding to the signing certificate of any countersignature incorporated into the JAdES signature as well as to the CA certificates in its certificate path. This set may include any of the revocation values listed in 1), 2) and 3) referred to signing certificates of countersignatures instead of the signing certificate of the JAdES signature. However, those revocation values among the aforementioned ones that are already present in other components of the JAdES signature should not be included. Syntax The rVals JSON object shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and is copied below for information. "rVals": { "type": "object", "properties":{ "crlVals": { "type": "array", "items": {"$ref":"#/definitions/pkiOb"}, "minItems": 1 }, "ocspVals": { "type": "array", "items": {"$ref":"#/definitions/pkiOb"}, "minItems": 1 }, "otherVals": { "type": "array", "items": {"type":"object"}, "minItems": 1 } }, "minProperties": 1 , "additionalProperties": false }, crlVals member shall be a non-empty array of encoded X.509 CRLs [8]. Each item of crlVals array shall contain the base64 encoding of a DER-encoded X.509 CRLs [8]. If the validation data contain one or more Delta CRLs, the crlVals member shall contain the set of CRLs required to provide complete revocation lists. ocspVals member shall be a non-empty array of encoded OCSP responses [9]. Each item of ocspVals array shall contain the base64 encoding of a DER-encoded OCSPResponse defined in IETF RFC 6960 [9]. The otherVals member provides a placeholder for other revocation information that can be used in the future. Their semantics and syntax are outside the scope of the present document. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.3.5.4 The axVals JSON array | Semantics The axVals JSON array: 1) shall contain the value(s) of the signing certificate(s) of the attribute certificate(s) and signed assertion(s) incorporated into the JAdES signature; 2) shall contain, if not present within the signature, the value(s) of the certificate(s) for the trust anchor(s) if such certificates exist, and the CA certificate values within path of the signing certificate(s) of the attribute certificate(s) and signed assertion(s) incorporated into the JAdES signature. Certificate values present within the signature should not be included; and ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 35 3) may contain the certificate values used to sign CRLs or OCSP responses and the certificates values within their respective certificate paths, used for validating the signing certificate(s) of the attribute certificate(s) and signed assertion(s) incorporated into the JAdES signature. Certificate values present within the signature, including certificate values within the revocation status information themselves should not be included. Syntax The axVals JSON array shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and is copied below for information. "axVals": {"$ref": "#/definitions/xVals"}, NOTE: The main difference between axVals and the x5c header parameter defined in IETF RFC 7515 [2] clause 4.1.6, is that axVals may contain non X.509 certificates. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.3.5.5 The arVals JSON object | Semantics The arVals JSON object: 1) shall contain the revocation value(s) of the certificate(s) that sign the attribute certificate(s) and signed assertion(s) incorporated into the JAdES signature; 2) shall contain, if not incorporated into the signature, the revocation values corresponding to CA certificates within the path(s) of the signing certificate(s) of the attribute certificate(s) and signed assertion(s) incorporated into the JAdES signature. It shall not contain revocation values for the trust anchors. Values already incorporated into the signature should not be included; and 3) may contain the revocation values on certificates used to sign CRLs or OCSP responses and certificates within their respective certificate paths, which are used for validating the signing certificate(s) of the attribute certificate(s) and signed assertion(s) incorporated into the JAdES signature. Revocation values already incorporated into the signature should not be included. Syntax The arVals JSON object shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and is copied below for information. "arVals": {"$ref": "#/definitions/rVals"}, If the validation data contain one or more Delta CRLs, this JSON object shall include the set of CRLs required to provide complete revocation lists. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.3.5.6 The anyValData JSON object | Semantics The anyValData JSON object shall contain the certificates identified in 1), or the revocation data identified in 2), or both of them: 1) certificate values that are used for validating any digital signature present within any other component of the JAdES signature regardless the objects that they are signing (these can be, for instance, the digital signature value of the JAdES signature itself, any countersignature of the JAdES signature, or the digital signatures within any electronic time-stamp, attribute certificate, signed assertion, OCSP response, or CRL, or any other digital signature), without any restrictions; 2) revocation value(s) of the certificate(s) supporting any signature present within any other component of the JAdES signature mentioned in the previous bullet. NOTE 1: This JSON object allows to mimic, within JAdES, features already incorporated in PAdES and CAdES, namely: a component whose purpose is to contain certificates and validation material that can be used for validating any signature present within JAdES signatures, regardless of what these signatures are signing. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 36 NOTE 2: This JSON object also allows to properly deal with situations where different creation/validation/augmentation signature policies can be used. They, for instance, may establish different requirements on acceptable freshness of revocation material, and also allow different certificate paths. Therefore, a certain set of revocation data fully acceptable for a certain policy A, may be unacceptable, from the point of view of its freshness, for another policy B. Also a verifier can accept a different certificate path. This JSON object allows, for instance, including within a JAdES signature a set of revocation data whose freshness is acceptable for this last policy B, making the signature valid under both policies. Syntax The anyValData JSON object shall be an instance of validationVals type. Both are defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and is copied below for information. "validationVals": { "type": "object", "properties": { "xVals": {"$ref": "#/definitions/xVals"}, "rVals": {"$ref": "#/definitions/rVals"} }, "minProperties": 1 , "additionalProperties": false }, "anyValData": {"$ref": "#/definitions/validationVals"}, The xVals member shall contain the base-64 encoding of DER-encoded X.509 certificates used in the full verification of the JAdES signature, as mentioned in bullet 1) of the semantics specification. These certificates should not appear anywhere else within the JAdES signature. The rVals member shall contain revocation values used in the full verification of the JAdES signature, as mentioned in bullet 2) of the semantics specification. Its syntax shall be as specified in clause 5.4.2 of the present document. These revocation values should not appear anywhere else within the JAdES signature. If the validation data contain one or more Delta CRLs, this child element shall include the set of CRLs required to provide complete revocation lists. 5.3.6 JSON values for long term availability and integrity of validation material |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.3.6.1 The tstVD JSON object | Semantics The tstVD JSON object shall be a container for validation data required for carrying a full verification of the electronic time-stamps embedded within any of the different electronic time-stamp container JSON objects defined in the present document. The tstVD JSON object shall allow incorporating certificate values. The tstVD JSON object shall allow incorporating revocation values. Syntax The tstVD JSON object shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and is copied below for information. "tstVD": {"$ref": "#/definitions/validationVals"}, The xVals member shall contain certificates used in the full verification of electronic time-stamps. The xVals member may contain all the certificates required for a full verification of the electronic time-stamps. The xVals member may also contain only some of the certificate values if the rest are present elsewhere in the JAdES signature (for instance within the electronic time-stamp itself, or in other tstVD created for other electronic time-stamps). ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 37 The rVals member shall contain revocation values used in the full verification of electronic time-stamps embedded in one JAdES time-stamp container. The rVals member may contain all the revocation values required for a full verification of the electronic time-stamps. The rVals member may also contain only some of the revocation values if the rest are present elsewhere in the JAdES signature (for instance within the electronic time-stamp itself, or in other tstVD created for other electronic time-stamps). If the tstVD JSON object contains validation data for electronic time-stamps encapsulated in the adoTst header parameter then it shall be added at the beginning of the array within the etsiU header parameter. NOTE: The incorporation of the aforementioned tstVD JSON object cannot take place after the incorporation of the first arcTst JSON object, as this would break the verification of its message imprint. If the tstVD JSON object contains validation data for electronic time-stamps that are encapsulated in a JSON object different than the adoTst header parameter, then it shall be added in the array of the etsiU header parameter immediately after the item containing the aforementioned JSON object containing the electronic time-stamp. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.3.6.2 The arcTst JSON object | |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.3.6.2.1 Semantics and syntax | Semantics The arcTst JSON object shall encapsulate electronic time-stamps computed on the JWS Payload, the JWS Protected Header, the JAdES Signature Value, and the etsiU JSON array within the JWS Unprotected Header at the time of generating each electronic time-stamp. The arcTst JSON object shall be placed within the etsiU JSON array within the JWS Unprotected Header. NOTE 1: The purpose of this JSON object is to tackle the long-term availability and integrity of the validation material. NOTE 2: As it has been anticipated in clause 4 any header parameter different than etsiU JSON array present within the JWS Unprotected Header is not protected by the time-stamps encapsulated by this JSON object. Syntax The arcTst JSON object shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and is copied below for information. "arcTst": {"$ref": "#/definitions/tstContainer"}, If the JAdES signature incorporates a cSig JSON object, all the required material for conducting the validation of the counter-signature shall be incorporated into the JAdES signature before generating the first arcTst JSON object. This may be done within the counter-signature itself or within the containers available within the counter-signed JAdES signature. The contents of the cSig JSON object should not be changed, once it has been time-stamped by the arcTst. NOTE 3: If a cSig JSON object is time-stamped by the arcTst, any ulterior change of its contents (by addition of unsigned JSON values if the countersignature is a JAdES signature, for instance) would make the validation of the arcTst, and, in consequence, the validation of the countersigned JAdES signature, fail. NOTE 4: The present document permits counter-signing a previously time-stamped countersignature with another cSig JSON object added to the JAdES signature after the time-stamp container. The tstContainer shall be as specified in clause 5.4.3.3 of the present document. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 38 |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.3.6.2.2 Generation and incorporation of arcTst | The present clause describes the steps to perform for augmenting a JAdES signature by incorporation of a new arcTst JSON object: 1) If the JAdES signature misses certificates and/or revocation data required for validating the signed objects present in the JAdES signature, then these missing certificates and/or revocation data shall be incorporated to the JAdES signature before generating the electronic time-stamp(s) to be encapsulated by the new arcTst JSON object. 2) Any missing certificate and/or revocation data may be placed in any JAdES JSON value specified in clause 5.3.5 as long as the specific requirements defined for each qualifying property are met. 3) If the new arcTst JSON object has to be incorporated to a JAdES signature that uses Base64url incorporation for incorporating elements in the etsiU JSON array, then compute the message imprint for the new electronic time-stamp(s), as indicated in clause 5.3.6.2.3; otherwise (JAdES signature uses clear JSON incorporation for incorporating elements in the etsiU JSON array) compute the message imprint for the new electronic time-stamps(s) as indicated in clause 5.3.6.2.4. NOTE: Notice that, while the arcTs JSON object has not been yet created at this point in time, the type of elements in etsiU JSON array, has already been made, and therefore, which clause to follow for building the input to the message imprint computation, is also known. 4) Request as many electronic time-stamp(s) as required to the corresponding electronic time-stamp(s) Service Providers. 5) Build a new arcTs JSON object, encapsulating the electronic time-stamp(s)issued in the previous step. 6) Incorporate the new arcTs JSON object generated in the previous step as the last element in etsiU JSON array. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.3.6.2.3 Computation of message-imprint with Base64url incorporation | For computing the input to the message imprint computation, performing step 3) in clause 5.3.6.2.2, when the JAdES signature uses Base64url incorporation for incorporating elements in the etsiU JSON array, the steps listed below shall be performed: 1) If the sigD header parameter is absent then: a) If the b64 header parameter specified in clause 3 of IETF RFC 7797 [14] is present and set to "false" then concatenate the JWS Payload value. b) If the b64 header parameter specified in clause 3 of IETF RFC 7797 [14] is present and set to "true", OR it is absent, then concatenate the base64url-encoded JWS Payload. 2) If the sigD header parameter is present: a) If the value of its mId member is "http://uri.etsi.org/19182/HttpHeaders" then concatenate the bytes resulting from processing the contents of its pars member as specified in clause 5.2.8.2 of the present document except the "Digest" string element. The processing of the "Digest" string element in the pars array shall consist in retrieving the bytes of the body of the HTTP message. NOTE 1: The rationale for this is that the body of an HTTP message is signed indirectly: the JWS signature value is computed, not on its value, but on its digest value computed with a certain digest algorithm. Therefore, in order to protect the HTTP body against the risk of the digest value becoming weak, the input to the electronic time-stamp's message imprint computation, should contain the digest value of the HTTP body computed with a strong digest algorithm, which may be different from the initial one if this is expected to become weak soon. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 39 b) Else if the value of its mId member is "http://uri.etsi.org/19182/ObjectIdByURI" or "http://uri.etsi.org/19182/ObjectIdByURIHash" then concatenate the bytes resulting from processing the contents of its pars member as specified in clause 5.2.8.3.2 of the present document. NOTE 2: The rationale for applying the processing specified in clause 5.2.8.3.2 of the present document to the case of the mechanism identified by "http://uri.etsi.org/19182/ObjectIdByURIHash" is the fact that this is an indirect signing mechanism, i.e. based on signing digest values of data objects, instead of the data objects themselves. Time-stamping not the digest values but the retrieved data objects, protects against future weaknesses of the digest algorithms used in sigD. 3) Concatenate the character '.'. 4) Concatenate the value of the JWS Protected Header, base64url encoded, followed by the character '.'. 5) Concatenate the value of the JAdES Signature Value, base64url encoded. 6) Concatenate the character '.'. 7) Concatenate all the elements in etsiU JSON array into the final octet stream in the order of appearance within the etsiU JSON array. As a consequence of the previous process, for validating an electronic time-stamp placed within one specific arcTst JSON object present in a JAdES signature as specified in the first paragraph of this clause, its message imprint shall be built as indicated in steps 1) to 7), BUT replacing 7) with the following one: 7a) Concatenate the JSON values present in etsiU JSON array, that precede (appear BEFORE) the arcTst JSON object that contains the electronic time-stamp that is being validated, in the order they appear within the etsiU JSON array, into the final octet stream. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.3.6.2.4 Computation of message-imprint with JSON clear incorporation | For computing the input to the message imprint computation, performing step 3) in clause 5.3.6.2.2, when the JAdES signature uses clear JSON incorporation for incorporating elements in the etsiU JSON array, the steps listed in clause 5.3.6.2.3 shall be performed BUT replacing step 7) with the following one: 7b) Take all the elements in etsiU JSON array, in the order they appear within the etsiU JSON array, canonicalize each one of them using the canonicalization algorithm identified in canonAlg member, and concatenate each resulting octet stream to the final octet stream. As a consequence of the previous process, for validating an electronic time-stamp placed within one specific arcTst JSON object present in a JAdES signature as specified in the first paragraph of this clause, its message imprint shall be built as indicated in steps 1) to 7) of clause 5.3.6.2.3, BUT replacing 7) with the following one: 7c) Take all the elements in etsiU JSON array that precede (appear BEFORE) the arcTst JSON object that contains the electronic time-stamp that is being validated, in the order they appear within the etsiU JSON array, canonicalize each one of them using the canonicalization algorithm identified in canonAlg member, and concatenate each resulting octet stream to the final octet stream. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.4 Generally useful syntax | |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.4.1 The oId data type | Semantics Instances of oId data type shall contain a unique and permanent identifier of one data object. Instances of oId data type may contain a textual description of the nature of the data object qualified by the instance of the oId data type. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 40 Instances of oId data type may contain a number of references to documents where additional information about the nature of the data object qualified by the instance of the objectId data type, can be found. Syntax The oId shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and is copied below for information. "oId": { "type": "object", "properties": { "id": {"type": "string", "format": "uri"}, "desc": {"type": "string"}, "docRefs":{ "type": "array", "items": {"type": "string", "format": "uri"}, "minItems": 1 } }, "required": ["id"], "additionalProperties": false }, The id member shall contain a permanent identifier. Once the identifier is assigned, it shall not be re-assigned again. The value of the id member shall be an URI. If the identifier of the object is an OID then the value of this member shall be encoded as an URN as specified by the IETF RFC 3061 [3]. If both an OID and a URI exist identifying one object, the URI value should be used in the id member. The desc member shall contain an informal text describing the object. The docRefs member shall contain an arbitrary number of URI values pointing to further explanatory documentation of the data object identified by the instance of this type. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.4.2 The pkiOb data type | Semantics The pkiOb data type shall be used to incorporate PKI objects, which can be non-JSON encoded, into the JAdES signature. NOTE: Examples of such PKI objects, include X.509 certificates and revocation lists, OCSP responses, attribute certificates, and electronic time-stamps. Syntax The pkiOb type shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and is copied below for information. "pkiOb": { "type": "object", "properties":{ "encoding": {"type": "string", "format": "uri"}, "specRef": {"type": "string"}, "val": {"type": "string", "contentEncoding" : "base64"} }, "required": ["val"], "additionalProperties": false }, The content of this data type shall be the PKI object, base64 encoded. The encoding member's value shall be a URI identifying the encoding used in the original PKI object. The values for the URI shall be one of the values defined in clause 5.1.3 of ETSI EN 319 132-1 [4]. If the encoding member is not present, then the contents of val member shall be the result of base64 encoding the DER-encoded ASN.1 data. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 41 |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.4.3 Container for electronic time-stamps | |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.4.3.1 Introduction | The present document specifies JSON objects that act as electronic time-stamps containers. Electronic time-stamps within the aforementioned containers may time-stamp isolated components or concatenations of several components of JAdES signatures. This clause specifies a JSON type for containers of electronic time-stamps. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.4.3.2 Containers for electronic time-stamps | Below follows the list of the electronic time-stamps containers that are defined by the present document: • Containers for electronic time-stamps proving that the JWS Payload has been created before certain time instant: adoTst. • Container for electronic time-stamps proving that the signature value has been computed before a certain time instant (to protect against repudiation in case of a key compromise): sigTst. • Container for electronic time-stamps time-stamping the signature and validation data values, for providing long term JAdES signatures: arcTst. • Containers for electronic time-stamps on components that contain references to validation data, namely: rfsTst and sigRTst. (specified in clause A.1.5 of the present document). |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 5.4.3.3 The tstContainer type | Semantics The tstContainer type shall: • allow encapsulating IETF RFC 3161 [7] electronic time-stamps as well as electronic time-stamps in other formats; • provide means for managing electronic time-stamps computed on a concatenation of JAdES components (including detached JWS Payload); and • allow encapsulating more than one electronic time-stamp generated for the same set of JAdES components (including detached JWS Payload), each one issued by different TSAs, for instance. Syntax The tstContainer type shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and is copied below for information. "tstContainer":{ "type": "object", "properties": { "canonAlg": {"type": "string", "format": "uri"}, "tstTokens": { "type": "array", "items": {"$ref":"#/definitions/tstToken"}, "minItems": 1 } }, "required": ["tstTokens"], "additionalProperties": false }, "tstToken":{ "type": "object", "properties":{ "type": {"type": "string"}, "encoding": {"type": "string", "format": "uri"}, "specRef": {"type": "string"}, ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 42 "val": {"type": "string", "contentEncoding" : "base64"} }, "required": ["val"], "additionalProperties": false }, The tstContainer's tstTokens member shall contain a non-empty array of JSON objects each one encapsulating one electronic time-stamp. The tstToken's type member shall identify the type of the electronic time-stamp. For IETF RFC 3161 [7] electronic time-stamps this member shall not be present. The tstToken's encoding member shall be an URI and shall identify the encoding used for the electronic time-stamp. For IETF RFC 3161 [7] electronic time-stamps this member shall not be present. The tstToken's specRef member shall identify the technical specification that has defined the used electronic time-stamp. For IETF RFC 3161 [7] electronic time-stamps this member shall not be present. Finally the tstToken's val member shall contain the base64 encoding of the electronic time-stamp itself. For IETF RFC 3161 [7] electronic time-stamps this member shall contain the base64 encoding of the DER-encoded electronic time-stamp. In JAdES signatures, the containers of electronic time-stamps time-stamping components within the etsiU unsigned header parameter, implicitly identify what components are time-stamped and how they contribute to the input of the message imprint's computation. No further information in the electronic time-stamp container is required. NOTE: This is because all the components of a JAdES signature are placed within JAdES signature itself. The tstContainer's canonAlg member shall contain the identifier of a canonicalization algorithm. If the tstContainer's canonAlg member is present, then the bytes concatenated for building the time-stamp's message imprint input, shall be the bytes resulting from applying the canonicalization algorithm to all the time-stamped JAdES components. If the tstContainer's canonAlg is absent then the bytes concatenated for building the time-stamp's message imprint input, shall be the bytes of each of the time-stamped JAdES components themselves. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 6 JAdES baseline signatures | |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 6.1 Signature levels | Clause 6 defines four levels of JAdES baseline signatures, intended to facilitate interoperability and to encompass the life cycle of JAdES signature, namely: a) B-B level provides requirements for the incorporation of signed header parameters and some unsigned components within the etsiU unsigned header parameter when the signature is generated. b) B-T level provides requirements for the generation and inclusion, for an existing signature, of a trusted token proving that the signature itself actually existed at a certain date and time. c) B-LT level provides requirements for the incorporation of all the material required for validating the signature in the signature document. This level aims to tackle the long-term availability of the validation material. d) B-LTA level provides requirements for the incorporation of electronic time-stamps that allow validation of the signature long time after its generation. This level aims to tackle the long-term availability and integrity of the validation material. NOTE 1: ETSI TR 119 100 [i.6] provides a description on the life-cycle of a signature and the rationales on which level is suitable in which situation. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 43 NOTE 2: The levels c) to d) are appropriate where the technical validity of signature needs to be preserved for a period of time after signature creation where certificate expiration, revocation and/or algorithm obsolescence is of concern. The specific level applicable depends on the context and use case. NOTE 3: B-LTA level targets long term availability and integrity of the validation material of digital signatures over long term. The B-LTA level can help to validate the signature beyond many events that limit its validity (for instance, the weakness of used cryptographic algorithms, or expiration of validation data). The use of B-LTA level is considered an appropriate preservation and transmission technique for signed data. NOTE 4: Conformance to B-LT level, when combined with appropriate additional preservation techniques tackling the long term availability and integrity of the validation material is sufficient to allow validation of the signature long time after its generation. The assessment of the effectiveness of preservation techniques for signed data other than implementing the B-LTA level are out of the scope of the present document. The reader is advised to consider legal instruments in force and/or other standards (for example ETSI TS 101 533-1 [i.9] or IETF RFC 4998 [i.10]) that can indicate other preservation techniques. Annex C defines what needs to be taken into account when using other techniques for long term availability and integrity of validation data and incorporating a new component in the etsiU unsigned header parameter derived from these techniques into the signature. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 6.2 General requirements | |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 6.2.1 Algorithm requirements | The algorithms and key lengths used to generate and augment digital signatures should be as specified in ETSI TS 119 312 [21]. NOTE: Cryptographic suites recommendations defined in ETSI TS 119 312 [21] can be superseded by national recommendations. In addition, MD5 algorithm shall not be used as digest algorithm. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 6.2.2 Notation for requirements | The present clause describes the notation used for defining the requirements of the different JAdES signature levels. The requirements on the header parameters and certain other signature's components for each JAdES signature level are expressed in Table C.1. A row in the table either specifies requirements for a header parameter, other signature's component, or a service. A service can be provided by different header parameters, by other signature's components, or by other mechanisms (service provision options hereinafter). In these cases, the specification of the requirements for a service is provided by three or more rows. The first row contains the requirements of the service. The requirements for the header parameters, other signature's components, and/or mechanisms used to provide the service are stated in the following rows. Table 1 contains 8 columns. Below follows a detailed explanation of their meanings and contents: 1) Column "Header parameters/Elements in etsiU unsigned header parameter/Services": a) In the case where the cell identifies a Service, the cell content starts with the keyword "Service" followed by the name of the service. b) In the case where the header parameter or other signature's component provides a service, this cell contains "SPO" (for Service Provision Option), followed by the name of the header parameter or the other signature's component. c) Otherwise, this cell contains the name of the header parameter or the other signature's component. 2) Column "Presence in B-B level": This cell contains the specification of the presence of the header parameter or other signature's component, or the provision of a service, for JAdES-B-B signatures. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 44 3) Column "Presence in B-T level": This cell contains the specification of the presence of the header parameter or other signature's component, or the provision of a service, for JAdES-B-T signatures. 4) Column "Presence in B-LT level": This cell contains the specification of the presence of the header parameter or other signature's component, or the provision of a service, for JAdES-B-LT signatures. 5) Column "Presence in B-LTA level": This cell contains the specification of the presence of the header parameter or other signature's component, or the provision of a service, for JAdES-B-LTA signatures. Below follow the values that can appear in columns "Presence in B-B", "Presence in B-T", "Presence in B-LT", and "Presence in B-LTA": - "shall be present": means that the header parameter or signature's component shall be incorporated to the signature, and shall be as specified in the document referenced in column "References", further profiled with the additional requirements referenced in column "Requirements", and with the cardinality indicated in column "Cardinality". - "shall not be present": means that the header parameter or signature's component shall not be incorporated to the signature. - "may be present": means that the header parameter or signature's component may be incorporated to the signature, and shall be as specified in the document referenced in column "References", further profiled with the additional requirements referenced in column "Requirements", and with the cardinality indicated in column "Cardinality". - "shall be provided": means that the service identified in the first column of the row shall be provided as further specified in the SPO-related rows. This value only appears in rows that contain requirements for services. It does not appear in rows that contain requirements for header parameters or signature's components. - "conditioned presence": means that the incorporation to the signature of the item identified in the first column is conditioned as per the requirements referenced in column "Requirements" and requirements in specifications and clauses referenced by column "References", with the cardinality indicated in column "Cardinality". - "*": means that the header parameter or signature's component (service) identified in the first column should not be incorporated to the signature (provided) in the corresponding level. Upper signature levels may specify other requirements. NOTE: Incorporating an unsigned component within the etsiU header parameter that is marked with a "*" into a signature can lead to cases where a higher level cannot be achieved, except by removing the corresponding component. 6) Column "Cardinality": This cell indicates the cardinality of the header parameter or other signature's component. If the cardinality is the same for all the levels, only the values listed below appear. Otherwise the content specifies the cardinality for each level. See the example at the end of the present clause showing this situation. Below follows the values indicating the cardinality: - 0: The signature shall not incorporate any instance of the header parameter or the signature's component. - 1: The signature shall incorporate exactly one instance of the header parameter or the signature's component. - 0 or 1: The signature shall incorporate zero or one instance of the header parameter or the signature's component. - ≥ 0: The signature shall incorporate zero or more instances of the header parameter or the signature's component. - ≥ 1: The signature shall incorporate one or more instances of the header parameter or the signature's component. 7) Column "References": This shall contain either the number of the clause specifying the header parameter in the present document, or a reference to the document and clause that specifies the other signature's component. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 45 8) Column "Additional requirements and notes": This cell contains numbers referencing notes and/or letters referencing additional requirements on the header parameter or the other signature's component. Both notes and additional requirements are listed in Table 1. |
56c69bb1addb2c7d832fdd049cafed81 | 119 182-1 | 6.3 Requirements on JAdES components and services | The four JAdES signature levels specified in the present clause shall be built as specified in clause 4 of the present document. Table 1 shows the presence and cardinality requirements on the signature header parameters, other components, and services indicated in the first column for the four JAdES baseline signature levels, namely: JAdES-B-B, JAdES-B-T, JAdES-B-LT, and JAdES-B-LTA). Additional requirements are detailed below the table suitably labelled with the letter indicated in the last column. NOTE 1: JAdES-B-B signatures that incorporate only the header parameters and other components that are mandatory in Table C.1, and that implement the mandatory requirements, contain the lowest number of header parameters and other components, with the consequent benefits for interoperability. In JAdES baseline signatures the components that act as electronic time-stamps containers shall encapsulate only IETF RFC 3161 [7] updated by IETF RFC 5816 [10] time-stamp tokens. Any header parameter specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2] or IETF RFC 7797 [14], and not further profiled in clause 5.1, may be present (cardinality of 0 or 1) in the four levels defined in Table 1. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 46 Table 1: Requirements for JAdES-B-B, JAdES-B-T, JAdES-B-LT, and JAdES-B-LTA signatures Header parameters/Elements in etsiU unsigned header parameter/Services Presence in B-B level Presence in B-T level Presence in B-LT level Presence in B-LTA level Cardinality References Additional requirements and notes alg shall be present shall be present shall be present shall be present 1 Clause 5.1.2 cty conditioned presence conditioned presence conditioned presence conditioned presence 0 or 1 Clause 5.1.3 2 kid may be present may be present may be present may be present 0 or 1 Clause 5.1.4 x5u may be present may be present may be present may be present 0 or 1 Clause 5.1.5 x5c Conditioned presence Conditioned presence Conditioned presence Conditioned presence 0 or 1 Clause 5.1.8 3 crit Conditioned presence Conditioned presence Conditioned presence Conditioned presence Clause 5.1.9 4 Service: Incorporation of claimed signing time shall be provided shall be provided shall be provided shall be provided iat Conditioned presence Conditioned presence Conditioned presence Conditioned presence 0 or 1 Clause 5.1.11 a sigT Conditioned presence Conditioned presence Conditioned presence Conditioned presence 0 or 1 Clause 5.2.1 a Service: signing a reference of the signing certificate Conditioned presence Conditioned presence Conditioned presence Conditioned presence 1 3 SPO: x5t#256 conditioned presence conditioned presence conditioned presence conditioned presence 0 or 1 Clause 5.1.7 SPO: x5t#o conditioned presence conditioned presence conditioned presence conditioned presence 0 or 1 Clause 5.2.2 SPO: sigX5ts conditioned presence conditioned presence conditioned presence conditioned presence 0 or 1 Clause 5.2.2 sigD may be present may be present may be present may be present 0 or 1 Clause 5.2.8 srAts may be present may be present may be present may be present 0 or 1 Clause 5.2.5 srCms may be present may be present may be present may be present 0 or 1 Clause 5.2.3 5 sigPl may be present may be present may be present may be present 0 or 1 Clause 5.2.4 sigPId may be present may be present may be present may be present 0 or 1 Clause 5.2.7 cSig may be present may be present may be present may be present ≥ 0 Clause 5.3.2 adoTst may be present may be present may be present may be present 0 or 1 Clause 5.3.3 6 sigPSt conditioned presence conditioned presence conditioned presence conditioned presence 0 or 1 Clause 5.3.3 b sigTst * shall be present shall be present shall be present B-B: ≥ 0 Clause 5.3.4 c, d 7 B-T, B-LT, B-LTA: ≥ 1 xVals * * conditioned presence conditioned presence 0 or 1 Clause 5.3.5.2 e anyValData * * conditioned presence conditioned presence ≥ 0 Clause 5.3.5.6 e, i ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 47 Header parameters/Elements in etsiU unsigned header parameter/Services Presence in B-B level Presence in B-T level Presence in B-LT level Presence in B-LTA level Cardinality References Additional requirements and notes xRefs * * shall not be present shall not be present B-B, B-T: 0 or 1 Clause A.1.1 f, g B-LT, B-LTA: 0 axVals * * conditioned presence conditioned presence 0 or 1 Clause 5.3.5.4 e axRefs * * shall not be present shall not be present B-B, B-T: 0 or 1 Clause A.1.3 f, g, h B-LT, B-LTA: 0 rVals * * conditioned presence conditioned presence 0 or 1 Clause 5.3.5.3 i rRefs * * shall not be present shall not be present B-B, B-T: 0 or 1 Clause A.1.2 B-LT, B-LTA: 0 arVals * * conditioned presence conditioned presence 0 or 1 Clause 5.3.5.5 i arRefs * * shall not be present shall not be present B-B, B-T: 0 or 1 Clause A.1.4 h B-LT, B-LTA: 0 sigRTst * * shall not be present shall not be present B-B, B-T: ≥ 0 Clause A.1.5.1 B-LT, B-LTA: 0 rfsTst * * shall not be present shall not be present B-B, B-T: ≥ 0 Clause A.1.5.2 B-LT, B-LTA: 0 Service: Incorporation of validation data for electronic time-stamps * * shall be provided shall be provided - - j, k 8 SPO: tstVD * * conditioned presence conditioned presence ≥ 0 Clause 5.3.6.1 SPO: certificate and revocation values embedded in the electronic time-stamp itself * * conditioned presence conditioned presence ≥ 0 - SPO: anyValData * * conditioned presence conditioned presence ≥ 0 Clause 5.3.5.6 j, k arcTst * * * shall be present ≥ 1 Clause 5.3.6.2 l, m ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 48 Additional requirements: a) Requirements for iat and sigT. Before 2025-07-15T00:00:00Z the generator should include the iat header parameter for indicating the claimed signing time in new JAdES signatures and should not include the iat header parameter for indicating the claimed signing time in new JAdES signatures. Starting at 2025-07-15T00:00:00Z the generator shall include the iat header parameter for indicating the claimed signing time in new JAdES signatures. b) Requirement for sigPSt. This header parameter may be incorporated into the JAdES signature only if the sigPId is also incorporated and it contains the digVal member with the digest value of the signature policy document. Otherwise, the sigPSt shall not be incorporated into the JAdES signature. c) Requirement for sigTst. Each sigTst shall contain only one electronic time-stamp. d) Requirement for sigTst. The electronic time-stamp encapsulated within the sigTst shall be created before the signing certificate has been revoked or has expired. e) Requirement for xVals, axVals, and anyValData. Duplication of certificate values within the signature should be avoided. f) Requirement for xRefs and axRefs. The references to certificates should not include the kid member. g) Requirement for xRefs and axRefs. The references to certificates shall not include the x5u member. h) Requirement for axRefs and arRefs. The axRefs and arRefs may be used when a at least an attribute certificate or a signed assertion is incorporated into the JAdES signature. Otherwise, axRefs and arRefs shall not be used. i) Requirement for rVals, arVals, and anyValData. Duplication of revocation values within the signature should be avoided. j) Requirement for service "incorporation of validation data for electronic time-stamps". The validation data for electronic time-stamps shall be present within the tstVD , within anyValData, or embedded in the electronic time-stamp itself. k) Requirement for service "incorporation of validation data for electronic time-stamps". The validation data for electronic time-stamps should not be embedded in the electronic time-stamp itself. l) Requirement for arcTst. Each arcTst may contain more than one electronic time-stamp issued by different TSAs. m) Requirement for arcTst. Before generating and incorporating a new arcTst, all the validation material required for validating the signed data in the JAdES signature shall be included. This validation material shall include all the certificates and all certificate status information (like CRLs or OCSP responses) required for: - validating the signing certificate; - validating the signing certificate of any countersignature incorporated into the signature; - validating any attribute certificate or signed assertion present in the signature; and - validating the signing certificate of any previous electronic time-stamp already incorporated into the signature within any JAdES electronic time-stamp container component (including any arcTst). NOTE 2: On cty, and ctys within sigD: see clauses 5.1.3 and 5.2.8.1 of the present document for details of their conditioned presence. NOTE 3: On x5c and service "signing a reference of the signing certificate". Clause 5.1.7 specifies the conditions that decide the presence or absence of the x5c, x5t#S256, sigX5ts, and x5t#o header parameters in a JAdES signature. NOTE 4: On crit. Clause 5.1.9 specifies the conditions that decide the presence or absence of the crit header parameter in a JAdES signature. NOTE 5: On srCms. As the content of srCms is a JSON array, it may contain several commitments. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 49 NOTE 6: On adoTst. This header parameter can contain more than one electronic time-stamp, coming from different TSAs. NOTE 7: On sigTst. Several instances of this component can be incorporated into the JAdES signature, coming from different TSAs. NOTE 8: On service "incorporation of validation data for electronic time-stamps": the incorporation of the validation material of the electronic time-stamps ensures that the JAdES signature actually contains all the validation material needed. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 50 Annex A (normative): Additional components Specification A.1 Components for references to validation data A.1.1 The xRefs JSON array Semantics The xRefs JSON array: 1) shall contain the reference to the certificate of the trust anchor if such certificate does exist, and the references to CA certificates within the signing certificate path; 2) shall not contain the reference to the signing certificate; 3) may contain references to certificates in the path of the certificates used for signing the electronic time-stamps already incorporated into the signature when the xRefs is incorporated, including references to the electronic time-stamps' signing certificates and references to certificates of trust anchors if such certificates do exist; 4) may contain references to the certificates used to sign CRLs or OCSP responses for certificates referenced by references in 1) and 3), and references to certificates within their respective certificate paths; and 5) shall not contain references to CA certificates that pertain exclusively to the certificate paths of certificates used to sign attribute certificates or signed assertions within srAts. NOTE 1: The references to certificates exclusively used in the validation of attribute certificate or signed assertions are stored within axRefs (see clause A.1.3). NOTE 2: The usage of this header parameter is use-case or policy dependent. Therefore, the present document does not make any recommendation in this sense. Syntax The xRefs member shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and is copied below for information. "x5Ids": { "type": "array", "items": {"$ref": "#/definitions/certId"}, "minItems": 1 }, "certId":{ "type": "object", "properties":{ "digAlg": {"type": "string"}, "digVal": {"type": "string", "contentEncoding": "base64"}, "kid": {"type": "string", "contentEncoding" : "base64"}, "x5u": {"type": "string", "format": "uri-reference"} }, "required": ["digAlg","digVal"] , "additionalProperties": false }, "xRefs": {"$ref": "#/definitions/x5Ids"}, The digAlg member shall identify the digest algorithm. The identifier shall be one of the identifiers registered at the IANA "Named Information Hash Algorithm Registry" (https://www.iana.org/assignments/named-information/named- information.xhtml#hash-alg). The digVal member shall contain the base64url-encoded value of the digest computed on the DER-encoded certificate. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 51 The content of kid member should be the base64 encoding of one DER-encoded instance of type IssuerSerial type defined in IETF RFC 5035 [5]. NOTE 3: The information in the kid member is only a hint, that can help to identify the certificate whose digest matches the value present in the reference. But the binding information is the digest of the certificate. The x5u member shall provide an indication of where the referenced certificate can be found. NOTE 4: It is intended that the x5u member is used as a hint, as implementations can have alternative ways for retrieving the referenced certificate if it is not found at the referenced place. If at least one of the following: xVals, axVals, or the arcTst, is incorporated into the signature, all the certificates referenced in xRefs shall be present elsewhere in the signature. A.1.2 The rRefs JSON object Semantics The rRefs JSON object: 1) shall contain a reference to a revocation value for the signing certificate; 2) shall contain the references to the revocation values (e.g. CRLs or OCSP values) corresponding to CA certificates within the signing certificate path. It shall not contain references to revocation values for the trust anchor; NOTE 1: A trust anchor is by definition trusted, thus no revocation information for the trust anchor is used during the validation. 3) may contain references to revocation values (e.g. CRLs or OCSP values) corresponding to certificates in the path of signing certificates of electronic time-stamps already incorporated into the signature when the rRefs is incorporated. It shall not contain references to revocation values for the trust anchors of these certificates; 4) may contain references to the revocation values corresponding to certificates used to sign CRLs or OCSP responses referenced in references from 1), 2) and 3) and to certificates within their respective certificate paths; and 5) shall not contain references to the revocation values corresponding to CA certificates that pertain exclusively to the certificate paths of certificates used to sign attribute certificates or signed assertions within srAts. NOTE 2: The references to revocation values exclusively used in the validation of attribute certificate or signed assertions are stored within arRefs (see clause A.1.4). NOTE 3: The usage of this header parameter is use-case or policy dependent. Therefore, the present document does not make any recommendation in this sense. References within rRefs may be references to CRLs, OCSP responses and other type of revocation data. Syntax rRefs shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and is copied below for information. "rRefs": { "type": "object", "properties": { "crlRefs": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "object", "properties": { "digAlg": {"type": "string"}, "digVal": {"type": "string", "contentEncoding": "base64"}, "crlId": { "type": "object", "properties": { ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 52 "issuer": {"type": "string", "contentEncoding" : "base64"}, "issueTime": {"type": "string", "format": "date-time"}, "number": {"type": "number"}, "uri": {"type": "string", "format": "uri-reference"} }, "required": ["issuer","issueTime"], "additionalProperties": false } }, "required": ["digAlg","digVal"] , "additionalProperties": false }, "minItems": 1 }, "ocspRefs":{ "type": "array", "items": { "type": "object", "properties": { "ocspId": { "type": "object", "properties": { "responderId": { "type": "object", "properties": { "byName": {"type": "string", "contentEncoding" : "base64"}, "byKey": {"type": "string", "contentEncoding" : "base64"} }, "oneOf":[ { "required": ["byName"] }, { "required": ["byKey"] } ], "additionalProperties": false }, "producedAt": {"type": "string", "format": "date-time"}, "uri": {"type": "string", "format": "uri-reference"} }, "required": ["responderId", "producedAt"], "additionalProperties": false }, "digAlg": {"type": "string"}, "digVal": {"type": "string", "contentEncoding": "base64"} }, "required": ["ocspId","digAlg","digVal"], "additionalProperties": false }, "minItems": 1 }, "otherRefs": { "type": "array", "items": {"type":"object"}, "minItems": 1 } }, "minProperties": 1, "additionalProperties": false }, Empty rRefs shall not be incorporated. The crlRefs member shall contain an array of references to CRLs. Each item within the CRLRefs array shall contain one reference to one CRL. The digAlg member of one item within the crlRefs shall identify the digest algorithm. The identifier shall be one of the identifiers registered at the IANA "Named Information Hash Algorithm Registry"(https://www.iana.org/assignments/named-information/named-information.xhtml#hash-alg). The digVal member of one item within the crlRefs array shall contain the encoded value of the digest computed on the DER-encoded CRL referenced. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 53 The crlId member needs not to be present if the referenced CRL can be inferred from other information. The crlId member of the items within the crlRefs array shall include the name issuer in its issuer member. The value of crlId's issuer member shall fulfil the requirements specified in IETF RFC 3494 [11] for strings representing Distinguished Names. The crlId member of the items within the crlRefs array shall include the time when the CRL was issued in its issueTime member. The crlId member of the items within the crlRefs array may include the number of the CRL in its number member. NOTE 4: The number member is an optional hint helping to get the CRL whose digest matches the value present in the reference. The crlId's uri member shall indicate one place where the referenced CRL can be found. NOTE 5: It is intended that this component be used as a hint, as implementations can have alternative ways for retrieving the referenced CRL if it is not found at the referenced place. If one or more of the identified CRLs are a Delta CRL, this component shall include references to the set of CRLs required to provide complete revocation lists. The ocspRefs member shall contain a non-empty array of references to OCSP responses. Each item within the ocspRefs array shall contain one reference to one OCSP response. The ocspId member of the items within the ocspRefs array shall include an identifier of the responder in its responderID member. If the responder is identified by its name, then the responderID's byName member shall contain the base64 encoding of the DER-encoded a forementioned name. If the responder is identified by the digest of the server's public key computed as mandated in IETF RFC 6960 [9], then the base64 encoding of the DER-encoded of byKey field specified in IETF RFC 6960 [9] shall appear within the responderID's byKey member. The ocspId member of the items within the ocspRefs array shall include the generation time of the OCSP response in its producedAt member. The value in ocspId's producedAt member shall indicate the same time as the time indicated by the ProducedAt field of the referenced OCSP response. The ocspId's uri member shall indicate one place where the referenced OCSP response can be found. NOTE 6: This value is not the address where the OCSP service can be reached. In addition to that, it is intended that this component be used as a hint, as implementations can have alternative ways for retrieving the referenced OCSP response if it is not found at the referenced place. The digAlg member of one item within the ocspRefs shall identify the digest algorithm. The identifier shall be one of the identifiers registered at the IANA "Named Information Hash Algorithm Registry"(https://www.iana.org/assignments/named-information/named-information.xhtml#hash-alg). The digVal member of one item within the ocspRefs array shall contain the encoded value of the digest computed on the DER-encoded referenced OCSPResponse field defined in IETF RFC 6960 [9]. References to alternative forms of validation data may be included in this component making use of the otherRefs member, a sequence whose items may contain any kind of information. Their semantics and syntax are outside the scope of the present document. If at least one of the following: rVals, arVals, or the arcTst, is incorporated into the signature, all the revocation data referenced in rRefs shall be present elsewhere in the signature. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 54 A.1.3 The axRefs JSON array Semantics The axRefs JSON array: 1) shall contain, if they are not present within xRefs or x5t#o header parameters, the references to the trust anchors if certificates exist for them, and the references to CA certificates within the path of the signing certificate(s) of the attribute certificate(s) and signed assertion(s) incorporated into the JAdES signature. References present within xRefs or x5t#o header parameters should not be included; 2) shall contain, if they are not present within xRefs or x5t#o header parameters, the reference(s) to the signing certificate(s) of the attribute certificate(s) and signed assertion(s) incorporated into the JAdES signature. References present within xRefs or x5t#o header parameters should not be included; and 3) may contain references to the certificates used to sign CRLs or OCSP responses and certificates within their respective certificate paths, which are used for validating the signing certificate(s) of the attribute certificate(s) and signed assertion(s) incorporated into the JAdES signature. References present within xRefs or x5t#o should not be included. NOTE 1: The usage of this header parameter is use-case or policy dependent. Therefore, the present document does not make any recommendation in this sense. Syntax axRefs shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and is copied below for information: "axRefs": {"$ref": "#/definitions/x5Ids"}, If at least one of the following: xVals, axVals, or the arcTst, is incorporated into the signature, all the certificates referenced in axRefs shall be present elsewhere in the signature. NOTE 2: The information in the kid member is only a hint, that can help to identify the certificate whose digest matches the value present in the reference. But the binding information is the digest of the certificate. NOTE 3: It is intended that the x5u member is used as a hint, as implementations can have alternative ways for retrieving the referenced certificate if it is not found at the referenced place. A.1.4 The arRefs JSON object Semantics The arRefs JSON object: 1) shall contain, if they are not present within rRefs, the references to the revocation values corresponding to CA certificates within the path(s) of the signing certificate(s) of the attribute certificate(s) and signed assertion(s) incorporated into the JAdES signature. It shall not contain a revocation value for the trust anchors. References present within rRefs should not be included; NOTE 1: A trust anchor is by definition trusted, thus no revocation information for the trust anchor is used during the validation. 2) shall contain, if they are not present within the rRefs, the references to the revocation value(s) for the signing certificate(s) of the attribute certificate(s) and signed assertion(s) incorporated into the JAdES signature. References present within rRefs should not be included; and 3) may contain references to the revocation values on certificates used to sign CRLs or OCSP responses and certificates within their respective certificate paths, which are used for validating the signing certificate(s) of the attribute certificate(s) and signed assertion(s) incorporated into the JAdES signature. References present within rRefs component should not be included. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 55 NOTE 2: The usage of this header parameter is use-case or policy dependent. Therefore, the present document does not make any recommendation in this sense. Syntax arRefs shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and is copied below for information. "arRefs": {"$ref": "#/definitions/rRefs"}, If one or more of the identified CRLs are a Delta CRL, this component shall include references to the set of CRLs required to provide complete revocation lists. If at least one of the following: rVals, arVals, or the arcTst, is incorporated into the signature, all the revocation data referenced in arRefs shall be present elsewhere in the signature. A.1.5 Time-stamps on references to validation data A.1.5.1 The sigRTst JSON object A.1.5.1.1 General Semantics The sigRTst JSON object shall encapsulate electronic time-stamps on the JWS Signature Value, the signature time- stamp, if present, and the JAdES components containing references to validation data. NOTE: The usage of this header parameter is use-case or policy dependent. Therefore, the present document does not make any recommendation in this sense. Syntax The sigRTst JSON object shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and is copied below for information. "sigRTst": {"$ref": "#/definitions/tstContainer"}, This JSON object shall contain an electronic time-stamp that time-stamps the member encapsulating the JWS Signature Value, and the following components when they are present: sigTst, xRefs, rRefs, axRefs, and arRefs. If none of the following components: xRefs, rRefs, axRefs, and arRefs is present, the sigRTst JSON object shall not be generated. A.1.5.1.2 Computation of the message imprint with Base64url incorporation When generating the sigRTst JSON object, the message imprint computation input shall be the concatenation of the components, in the order they are listed below: 1) The value of the base64url-encoded JWS Signature Value. NOTE: If the JAdES signature is serialized with JWS JSON Serialization, this is the value within the member signature. 2) The character '.'. 3) Those among the following components in their order of appearance within the etsiU array, base64url- encoded: - sigTst if it is present; - xRefs if it is present; - rRefs if it is present; ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 56 - axRefs if it is present; and - arRefs if it is present. A.1.5.1.3 Computation of the message imprint with JSON clear incorporation When generating the sigRTst JSON object, the message imprint computation input shall be the concatenation of the components, in the order they are listed below: 1) The value of the base64url-encoded JWS Signature Value. NOTE: If the JAdES signature is serialized with JWS JSON Serialization, this is the value within the member signature. 2) The character '.'. 3) Those among the following components in their order of appearance within the etsiU array, canonicalized using the canonicalization algorithm identified in canonAlg member: - sigTst if it is present; - xRefs if it is present; - rRefs if it is present; - axRefs if it is present; and - arRefs if it is present. A.1.5.2 The rfsTst JSON object A.1.5.2.1 Semantics and syntax Semantics The rfsTst JSON object shall encapsulate electronic time-stamps on the JAdES components containing references to validation data. Syntax The rfsTst JSON object shall be defined as in the JSON Schema file whose location is detailed in clause B.1, and is copied below for information. "rfsTst": {"$ref": "#/definitions/tstContainer"}, This JSON object shall contain an electronic time-stamp that time-stamps the following JAdES components when they are present: xRefs, rRefs, axRefs, and arRefs. If none of the aforementioned JAdES components is present, the rfsTst JSON object shall not be generated. A.1.5.2.2 Computation of the message imprint with Base64url incorporation When generating the rfsTst JSON object, the message imprint computation input shall be the concatenation of the components listed below, base64url encoded, in their order of appearance within the etsiU array: • xRefs if it is present; • rRefs if it is present; • axRefs if it is present; and • arRefs if it is present. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 57 A.1.5.2.3 Computation of the message imprint with clear JSON incorporation When generating the rfsTst JSON object, the message imprint computation input shall be the concatenation of the components listed below, canonicalized using the canonicalization algorithm identified in canonAlg member, in their order of appearance within the etsiU array: • xRefs if it is present; • rRefs if it is present; • axRefs if it is present; and • arRefs if it is present. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 58 Annex B (normative): JSON Schema files B.1 JSON Schema files location for JAdES components The file at https://forge.etsi.org/rep/esi/x19_182_JAdES/raw/v1.2.1/19182-jsonSchema.json (19182-jsonSchema.json) contains the definitions of the components specified in the present document. The file at https://forge.etsi.org/rep/esi/x19_182_JAdES/raw/v1.2.1/19182-protected-jsonSchema.json (19182-protected-jsonSchema.json) may be used by implementers to validate the conformance of the JWS Protected Header of a JAdES signature against the JSON Schema definitions within 19182-jsonSchema.json. The file at https://forge.etsi.org/rep/esi/x19_182_JAdES/raw/v1.2.1/19182-unprotected-jsonSchema.json (19182-unprotected-jsonSchema.json) may be used by implementers to validate the conformance of the JWS Unprotected Header of a JAdES signature against the JSON Schema definitions within 19182-jsonSchema.json. Additionally, ETSI provides additional JSON schema files, for facilitating implementers to check the structure of JWS signatures. In case of conflicts between these JSON schemas and the IETF RFC 7515 [2], IETF RFC 7517 [i.16], and IETF RFC 7797 [14], IETF RFC 7515 [2], IETF RFC 7517 [i.16] and IETF RFC 7797 [14] shall take precedence. Below follows the list of these additional JSON schema files: • The file at https://forge.etsi.org/rep/esi/x19_182_JAdES/raw/v1.2.1/rfcs/rfc7515.json (rfc7515.json). This file contains JSON schema definitions for the structures defined in IETF RFC 7515 [2]. • The file at https://forge.etsi.org/rep/esi/x19_182_JAdES/raw/v1.2.1/rfcs/rfc7515-jws.json (rfc7515-jws.json). This file may be used by implementers for checking conformance of a JWS signature against the JSON Schema definitions in file rfc7515.json. • The file at https://forge.etsi.org/rep/esi/x19_182_JAdES/raw/v1.2.1/rfcs/rfc7515-protected.json (rfc7515-protected.json). This file may be used by implementers for checking conformance of the JWS Protected Header of a JWS signature against the JSON Schema definitions in file rfc7515.json. • The file at https://forge.etsi.org/rep/esi/x19_182_JAdES/raw/v1.2.1/rfcs/rfc7515-unprotected.json (rfc7515-unprotected.json). This file may be used by implementers for checking conformance of the JWS Unprotected Header of a JWS signature against the JSON Schema definitions in file rfc7515.json. • The file at https://forge.etsi.org/rep/esi/x19_182_JAdES/raw/v1.2.1/rfcs/rfc7517.json (rfc7517.json). This file contains JSON schema definitions for the structures defined in IETF RFC 7517 [i.16]. • The file at https://forge.etsi.org/rep/esi/x19_182_JAdES/raw/v1.2.1/rfcs/rfc7797.json (rfc7797.json). This file contains JSON schema definitions for the structures defined in IETF RFC 7797 [14]. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 59 Annex C (informative): Correspondence between XAdES tags and JAdES tags C.1 Correspondence between XAdES qualifying properties tags and JAdES component tags Table C.1 shows the correspondence between the tags used by the XAdES qualifying properties and the tags used by the JAdES components. Table C.1: Correspondence between XAdES and JAdES tags XAdES tag JAdES tag UnsignedProperties etsiU SigningTime iat, sigT SigningCertificateV2 (reference to the signing certificate only -for extending semantics of x5t#256 specified in IETF RFC 7515 [2]) x5t#o SigningCertificateV2 (references to the signing certificate and other certificates within the cert path, for mimiking XAdES and CAdES). sigX5ts SignaturePolicyIdentifier sigPId SignatureProductionPlaceV2 sigPl SignerRoleV2 srAts DataObjectFormat cty AllDataObjectsTimeStamp adoTst CommitmentTypeIndication srCms CounterSignature cSig IndividualDataObjectsTimeStamp NA SignaturePolicyStore sigPSt SignatureTimeStamp sigTst OIdentifier oId EncapsulatedPKIDataType pkiOb ArchiveTimeStamp arcTst RefsOnlyTimeStampV2 rfsTst SigAndRefsTimeStampV2 sigRTst anyValData AnyValidationData CertificateValues xVals RevocationValues rVals AttrAuthoritiesCVals axVals AttributeRevocationValues arVals TimeStampValidationData tstVD CompleteCertificateRefs xRefs RevocationRefs rRefs AttributeCertificateRefsV2 axRefs AttributeRevocationRefs arRefs ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 60 Annex D (normative): Alternative mechanisms for long term availability and integrity of validation data There may be mechanisms to achieve long-term availability and integrity of validation data different from the ones described in clause 5.3.6. If such a mechanism is incorporated using an unsigned component into the signature, then for this mechanism shall be specified: 1) The clear specification of the semantics and syntax of the component including its unique identifier. 2) The strategy of how this mechanism guarantees that all necessary parts of the signature are protected by this component. 3) The strategy of how to handle signatures containing components defined in the present document. EXAMPLE: The objects defined in IETF RFC 4998 [i.10], annex A are examples of such alternative mechanisms but they only handle points 1) and 2). ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 61 Annex E (informative): IANA Considerations The present document registers the following header parameters in the IANA "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters" registry established by IETF RFC 7515 [2]. NOTE 1: Header parameters whose "Header Parameter Usage Locations" are JWS/JAdES are considered to be Header Parameters that can be present in non-JAdES JWS, for meeting certain (business, regulatory, etc.) requirements. NOTE 2: Header parameters whose "Header Parameter Usage Locations" are JAdES are considered to be Header Parameters that are used only by JAdES signatures for meeting the requirements associated to achieve long-term signatures, i.e. signatures that guarantee the long-term availability and integrity of their validation material, providing therefore mechanisms for being properly validated long after their generation. This capability requires the usage of certain Header Parameters (etsiU, arcTst and others) which convert the JWS in a JAdES signature. Registry Contents: • Header Parameter Name: x5t#o • Header Parameter Description: JSON object containing a digest algorithm identifier and the base64url-encoded digest value of an object computed using the mentioned digest algorithm • Header Parameter Usage Locations: JWS / JAdES • Change Controller: European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI hereinafter) Electronic Signatures and Trust Infrastructures (ESI hereinafter) Technical Committee (TC hereinafter) • Specification Document(s): Clause 5.2.2.2 of the present document • Header Parameter Name: sigX5ts • Header Parameter Description: JSON Array of x5t#o JSON Objects (each one containing a digest algorithm identifier and the base64url-encoded digest value of an object computed using the mentioned digest algorithm) • Header Parameter Usage Locations: JWS / JAdES • Change Controller: ETSI ESI TC • Specification Document(s): Clause 5.2.2.3 of the present document • Header Parameter Name: srCms • Header Parameter Description: JSON Array of JSON Objects. Each JSON Object identifies one commitment endorsed by the signer when generating the signature. It includes a unique identifier of the commitment itself. It also may contain an array of qualifiers to the commitment • Header Parameter Usage Locations: JWS / JAdES • Change Controller: ETSI ESI TC • Specification Document(s): Clause 5.2.3 of the present document ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 62 • Header Parameter Name: sigPl • Header Parameter Description: JSON Object for indicating the location where the signature was generated. It may contain an indication of the country, the locality, the region, a box number in a post office, the postal code, and the street address • Header Parameter Usage Locations: JWS / JAdES • Change Controller: ETSI ESI TC • Specification Document(s): Clause 5.2.4 of the present document • Header Parameter Name: srAts • Header Parameter Description: JSON Object that may contain: an array of attributes that the signer claims to be in possession of, an array of attribute certificates (X.509 attribute certificates or other) issued to the signer, an array of signed assertions issued by a third party to the signer, or any combination of the three aforementioned JSON arrays • Header Parameter Usage Locations: JWS / JAdES • Change Controller: ETSI ESI TC • Specification Document(s): Clause 5.2.5 of the present document • Header Parameter Name: adoTst • Header Parameter Description: JSON Object that encapsulates one or more electronic time-stamps, generated before the signature production, and whose message imprint computation input is the JWS Payload of the JAdES signature • Header Parameter Usage Locations: JWS / JAdES • Change Controller: ETSI ESI TC • Specification Document(s): Clause 5.2.6 of the present document • Header Parameter Name: sigPId • Header Parameter Description: JSON Object that contains one identifier, identifying a certain signature policy. It may contain the digest algorithm identifier and the base64url-encoded digest value of the document defining this signature policy, computed using the mentioned digest algorithm. It may contain signature policy qualifiers • Header Parameter Usage Locations: JWS / JAdES • Change Controller: ETSI ESI TC • Specification Document(s): Clause 5.2.7 of the present document ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 63 • Header Parameter Name: sigD • Header Parameter Description: JSON Object that manages the signing of one or more data objects detached from the JAdES signature. It contains one identifier, identifying the particular type of sigD parameter. It contains a JSON array of references to the signed detached data objects. It may contain a JSON Object encapsulating one digest algorithm identifier and a JSON Array with the base64url-encoded digest values of the detached data objects referenced in the pars JSON array. It may also contain a JSON Array of strings, each one identifying the commitment endorsed by the signer when signing a particular detached data object • Header Parameter Usage Locations: JWS / JAdES • Change Controller: ETSI ESI TC • Specification Document(s): Clause 5.2.8 of the present document • Header Parameter Name: etsiU • Header Parameter Description: JSON array that contains a number of JSON values that are placed within the array in the order they are incorporated into the JAdES signature • Header Parameter Usage Locations: JAdES • Change Controller: ETSI ESI TC • Specification Document(s): Clause 5.3.1 of the present document • Header Parameter Name: cSig • Header Parameter Description: JSON Object that contains a JWS signature or a JAdES signature that countersigns the JWS/JAdES signature where it is included • Header Parameter Usage Locations: JWS / JAdES • Change Controller: ETSI ESI TC • Specification Document(s): Clause 5.3.2 of the present document • Header Parameter Name: sigPSt • Header Parameter Description: JSON Object that contains either the signature policy document which is referenced in sigPId header parameter, or an URI referencing a local store the signature policy document can be retrieved • Header Parameter Usage Locations: JAdES • Change Controller: ETSI ESI TC • Specification Document(s): Clause 5.3.3 of the present document • Header Parameter Name: sigTst • Header Parameter Description: JSON Object that encapsulates one or more electronic time-stamps time- stamping the base64url-encoded JWS Signature • Header Parameter Usage Locations: JWS / JAdES • Change Controller: ETSI ESI TC ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 64 • Specification Document(s): Clause 5.3.4 of the present document • Header Parameter Name: xVals • Header Parameter Description: JSON array that may contain certificates (X.509 or other types) present in the certificate path of the JWS/JAdES signature and any countersignature that is present within the JWS/JAdES signature • Header Parameter Usage Locations: JWS / JAdES • Change Controller: ETSI ESI TC • Specification Document(s): Clause 5.3.5.2 of the present document • Header Parameter Name: rVals • Header Parameter Description: JSON array that may contain revocation data (CRLs, OCSP responses, or other) corresponding to certificates present in the certificate path of the JWS/JAdES signature and any countersignature that is present within the JWS/JAdES signature • Header Parameter Usage Locations: JWS / JAdES • Change Controller: ETSI ESI TC • Specification Document(s): Clause 5.3.5.3 of the present document • Header Parameter Name: axVals • Header Parameter Description: JSON array that contains certificates (X.509 or other types) present in the certificate path of the signer's attribute certificates or signed assertions generated by third parties and incorporated within the srAts header parameter • Header Parameter Usage Locations: JWS / JAdES • Change Controller: ETSI ESI TC • Specification Document(s): Clause 5.3.5.4 of the present document • Header Parameter Name: arVals • Header Parameter Description: JSON array that may contain revocation data (CRLs, OCSP responses, or other) corresponding to certificates present in the certificate path of the signer attribute certificates or signed assertions generated by third parties and incorporated within the srAts header parameter • Header Parameter Usage Locations: JWS / JAdES • Change Controller: ETSI ESI TC • Specification Document(s): Clause 5.3.5.5 of the present document • Header Parameter Name: anyValData • Header Parameter Description: JSON Object that may contain: a JSON array enclosing any certificate required for validating the JWS/JAdES signature, an array enclosing any revocation data (CRL, OCSP response, other revocation data) required for validating the JWS/JAdES signature, or both arrays ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 65 • Header Parameter Usage Locations: JWS / JAdES • Change Controller: ETSI ESI TC • Specification Document(s): Clause 5.3.5.6 of the present document • Header Parameter Name: tstVD • Header Parameter Description: JSON Object that may contain: an array enclosing any certificate required for validating electronic time-stamps present within the JWS/JAdES signature, an array enclosing any revocation data (CRL, OCSP response, other revocation data) required for validating the mentioned electronic time-stamps, or both arrays • Header Parameter Usage Locations: JWS / JAdES • Change Controller: ETSI ESI TC • Specification Document(s): Clause 5.3.6.1 of the present document • Header Parameter Name: arcTst • Header Parameter Description: JSON Object that encapsulates one or more electronic time-stamps time-stamping the JWS Payload, the JWS Protected Header, the JAdES Signature Value, and the contents of the etsiU JSON array within the JWS Unprotected Header at the time of generating each electronic time-stamp • Header Parameter Usage Locations: JAdES (long-term) • Change Controller: ETSI ESI TC • Specification Document(s): Clause 5.3.6.2 of the present document • Header Parameter Name: xRefs • Header Parameter Description: JSON Array that contains references to certificates present in the certificate path of the JWS/JAdES signature and any countersignature that is present. Each reference contains an identifier of a digest algorithm and the base64url-encoded digest value of the referenced certificate computed with that digest algorithm • Header Parameter Usage Locations: JWS / JAdES • Change Controller: ETSI ESI TC • Specification Document(s): Clause A.1.1 of the present document • Header Parameter Name: rRefs • Header Parameter Description: JSON Array that contains references to revocation data (CRLs, OCSP responses, or other) corresponding to certificates present in the certificate path of the JWS/JAdES signature and any countersignature that is present. Each reference contains an identifier of a digest algorithm and the base64url-encoded digest value of the referenced revocation data computed with that digest algorithm • Header Parameter Usage Locations: JWS / JAdES • Change Controller: ETSI ESI TC • Specification Document(s): Clause A.1.2 of the present document ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 66 • Header Parameter Name: axRefs • Header Parameter Description: JSON Array that contains references to certificates present in certificate path of the signer attribute certificates or signed assertions generated by third parties and incorporated within the srAts header parameter. Each reference contains an identifier of a digest algorithm and the base64url-encoded digest value of the referenced certificate computed with that digest algorithm • Header Parameter Usage Locations: JWS / JAdES • Change Controller: ETSI ESI TC • Specification Document(s): Clause A.1.3 of the present document • Header Parameter Name: arRefs • Header Parameter Description: JSON Array that contains references to revocation data (CRLs, OCSP responses, or other) corresponding to certificates present in the certificate path of the signer attribute certificates or signed assertions generated by third parties and incorporated within the srAts header parameter. Each reference contains an identifier of a digest algorithm and the base64url-encoded digest value of the referenced revocation data computed with that digest algorithm • Header Parameter Usage Locations: JWS/JAdES • Change Controller: ETSI ESI TC • Specification Document(s): Clause A.1.4 of the present document • Header Parameter Name: sigRTst • Header Parameter Description: JSON Object that encapsulates one or more electronic time-stamps time-stamping the on the base64url-encoded JWS Signature, the signature time-stamp, if present, and the JAdES components containing references to validation data • Header Parameter Usage Locations: JAdES • Change Controller: ETSI ESI TC • Specification Document(s): Clause A.1.5.1 of the present document • Header Parameter Name: rfsTst • Header Parameter Description: JSON Object that encapsulates one or more electronic time-stamps time-stamping the on the signature time-stamp, if present, and the JAdES components containing references to validation data • Header Parameter Usage Locations: JAdES • Change Controller: ETSI ESI TC • Specification Document(s): Clause A.1.5.2 of the present document ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 67 Annex F (informative): Change history Date Version Information about changes January 2020 0.0.1 Version based on previous version circulated in October 2019 at ESI 68 (with a wrong TS number) after amendments of relevant parts. January 2020 0.0.2 Consolidated version for getting feedback from ETSI ESI members and liaised entities. May 2020 0.0.3 Consolidated version with changes implemented as per disposition to comments for version 0.0.2. September 2020 0.0.4 Incorporated resolutions for all the comments received for v0.0.3. November 2020 0.0.5 Incorporated resolutions for comments received for v0.0.4. September 2020 0.0.6 Incorporated resolutions for comments received for v0.0.5. They include some changes in JSON schema. New JSON schema files have been added to the package, some referring to JWS. January 2021 0.0.7 Incorporated resolutions for comments to v0.0.6 received during the Remote Consensus process. April 2023 1.1.3 Incorporated resolutions from comments raised after the first Plugtest© and the request of having a component for placing validation material (both certificates and revocation data) for validating any signature present within JAdES. April 2023 1.1.4 Minor editorial changes mostly in bulleted lists. July 2023 1.1.5 Reformulation of how to incorporate arcTst and compute the input to its message imprint computation in generation and validation. This reformulation is aligned with the formulation in XAdES. Reformulation of requirements on the content of anyValData: the former formulation could be interpreted as if both certificates and revocation data must be present. The presence of certificates and/or revocation data will depend on the contents of the rest of JAdES signature. This new reformulation makes it clear that this qualifying property must contain certificates, or revocation data, or both of them. Deletion of notes for clause 6.3 which did not actually provide new information but just repeated what it had already been said, and could be misinterpreted (former notes 6, 7, 8, 9, and 11 on incorporation of xVals, rVals, axVals, arVals, and anyValData. November 2023 1.1.6 Clause 5.3.5 JSON objects for validation data values. Added new clause 5.3.5.1 Introduction for stating that a JAdES signature may have certificates and/or revocation data in any of the JSON vslurd specified within 5.3.5. Clause 5.3.6.2.1 Semantics and syntax (of arcTst) Deleted text requiring to incorporate all the validation data for counter-signature before adding the archive time-stamp. This is not mandatory in general. It is made mandatory for B-LTA level in clause 6.3 Clause 5.3.6.2.2 Generation and incorporation of arcTst Changed the rules for the incorporation of validation material before incorporating the new arcTst as follows: For first arcTst: incorporation of validation data is now optional. For N+1th arcTst: mandatory to incorporate all missing validation data required for validating all signed data time-stamped by electronic time-stamp(s) in Nth arcTst. Validation data in any of the JSON values specified in clause 5.3.5. NOTE: noting that these requirements can be changed in the specifications of levels. Also remarks that the JAdES-B-LTA level requirements have not changed since v.1.1.1 Dropped the paragraphs discussing the details of the incorporation of validation material to each JSON Value specified in clause 5.3.5. Editorial changes for improving sentences and fixing typos. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 68 Date Version Information about changes December 2023 1.1.7 Clause 5.3.6.2.2 Generation and incorporation of arcTst Reinserted text requiring to requiring to incorporate all the validation data for any signed data object within JAdES signature before adding the archive time-stamp for keeping backwards compatibility. Unfortunately, wrong wording in one sentence. December 2023 1.1.8 As v 1.1.7 with fixed wording in clause 5.3.6.2.2. December 2023 1.1.9 As v1.1.8 with fixed Clause 5.3.6.2.1 Semantics and Syntax (of arcTst) Reinserted text requiring to incorporate all the validation data for counter-signature before adding the archive time-stamp for keeping backwards compatibility. February 2024 1.1.10 • Replacement of sigT by iat as specified in RFC 7519. • Addition of informative annex JSON Web Signature Claims Registration. • Explicit reference added to the IANA registry on digest algorithms in the clauses specifying header parameters that contain references (digests) to validation material. • In reaction to designated experts for IANA registration of header parameters, notes added to several clauses making it clear that choices of inner components of certain header parameters, or usage of some other header parameters are use-case or policy dependent. • Changes in schemas of v1.1.1: − In rfc7515.json: added "minItems": 1 in the definition of crit. − In 19182-jsonSchema.json: Removed definition of sigT. Insertion of definition of iat as an integer. Make pars member mandatory in sigD ("required": ["pars","mId"],). Definition of validationVals type. Definition of tstVD and anyValData as instances of validationVals. April 2024 1.1.11 Recommended to use iat instead of sigT, but the specification of sigT is kept in the document. April 2024 1.1.12 Version that: Recommends to include the iat header parameter before 2025-05-15T00:00:00Z and recommends not to include the sigT header parameter in new JAdES signatures. Mandates to include the iat header parameter after 2025-05-15T00:00:00Z April 2024 1.1.13 Version that fixes only editorial issues detected in v1.1.12 June 2024 1.1.14 Fixed cardinalities of srCms and adoTst in Table 1 to 0 or 1. Both are signed header parameters, and therefore members of a JSON Object (a map), and only one instance may be present there. Added notes following Table 1 mentioning that srCms can contain several commitments because it is a JSON array, and that adoTst can also have several electronic time- stamps. Changed the requirement for the contents of kid from a shall to a should in clause 5.1.4. Changed the deadline for incorporating iat from 2025-05-15T00:00:00Z to 2025-07-15T00:00:00Z, for keeping one year more or less since the publication of the specification. Incorporated answers to editHelp questions. Implemented actions as a result of editHelp requests. ETSI ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 (2024-07) 69 History Document history V1.1.1 March 2021 Publication V1.2.1 July 2024 Publication |
59ab33982241d193112892bbe07db8ea | 119 172-4 | 1 Scope | The present document specifies a set of rules that aims at defining the technical requirements for determining, taking into account the EU Member States trusted lists [i.4], whether a digital signature is fit for meeting the requirements of EU qualified electronic signatures/seals in the sense of the applicable European legislation, i.e. either Directive 1999/93/EC [i.2] or Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 [i.1]. |
59ab33982241d193112892bbe07db8ea | 119 172-4 | 2 References | |
59ab33982241d193112892bbe07db8ea | 119 172-4 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found in the ETSI docbox. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI EN 319 102-1: "Electronic Signatures and Trust Infrastructures (ESI); Procedures for Creation and Validation of AdES Digital Signatures; Part 1: Creation and Validation". [2] ETSI TS 119 612 (V2.1.1): "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Trusted Lists". [3] ETSI TS 119 172-1: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Signature Policies; Part 1: Building blocks and table of contents for human readable signature policy documents". [4] ETSI EN 319 122-1: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); CAdES digital signatures; Part 1: Building blocks and CAdES baseline signatures". [5] ETSI EN 319 132-1: "Electronic Signatures and Trust Infrastructures (ESI); XAdES digital signatures; Part 1: Building blocks and XAdES baseline signatures". [6] ETSI EN 319 142-1: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); PAdES digital signatures; Part 1: Building blocks and PAdES baseline signatures". [7] ETSI TS 103 171: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); XAdES Baseline Profile". [8] ETSI TS 103 172: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); PAdES Baseline Profile". [9] ETSI TS 103 173: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); CAdES Baseline Profile". [10] ETSI TS 103 174: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); ASiC Baseline Profile". [11] IETF RFC 3161: "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP)". [12] ETSI TS 119 615: "Electronic Signatures and Trust Infrastructures (ESI); Trusted lists; Procedures for using and interpreting European Union Member States national trusted lists". ETSI ETSI TS 119 172-4 V1.2.1 (2026-02) 7 |
59ab33982241d193112892bbe07db8ea | 119 172-4 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents may be useful in implementing an ETSI deliverable or add to the reader's understanding, but are not required for conformance to the present document. [i.1] Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC. [i.2] Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures. [i.3] ETSI TR 119 001: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); The framework for standardization of signatures; Definitions and abbreviations". [i.4] Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1505 of 8 September 2015 laying down technical specifications and formats relating to trusted lists pursuant to Article 22(5) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market. [i.5] Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1506 of 8 September 2015 laying down specifications relating to formats of advanced electronic signatures and advanced seals to be recognised by public sector bodies pursuant to Articles 27(5) and 37(5) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market. [i.6] ETSI TS 119 312: "Electronic Signatures and Trust Infrastructures (ESI); Cryptographic Suites". [i.7] ETSI TS 119 101: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for applications for signature creation and signature validation". [i.8] ETSI TS 119 102-2: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Procedures for Creation and Validation of AdES Digital Signatures; Part 2: Signature Validation Report". [i.9] ETSI TS 119 441: "Electronic Signatures and Trust Infrastructures (ESI); Policy requirements for TSP providing signature validation services". [i.10] ETSI TS 119 511: "Electronic Signatures and Trust Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for trust service providers providing long-term preservation of digital signatures or general data using digital signature techniques". [i.11] ETSI EN 319 411-1: "Electronic Signatures and Trust Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 1: General requirements". 3 Definition of terms, symbols, abbreviations and notations |
59ab33982241d193112892bbe07db8ea | 119 172-4 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ETSI TS 119 441 [i.9] apply. ETSI ETSI TS 119 172-4 V1.2.1 (2026-02) 8 |
59ab33982241d193112892bbe07db8ea | 119 172-4 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
59ab33982241d193112892bbe07db8ea | 119 172-4 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in ETSI TR 119 001 [i.3] and the following apply: QES Qualified Electronic Signatures/Seals TARC Technical Applicability (Rules) Checking TL Trusted List |
59ab33982241d193112892bbe07db8ea | 119 172-4 | 3.4 Notations | The requirements in the present document are identified as follows: <REQ> - <the clause number> - <2-digit number - incremental> The management of the requirement identifiers for subsequent editions of the present document is as follows: • When a requirement is inserted at the end of a clause, the 2-digit number above is incremented to the next available digit. • When a requirement is inserted between two existing requirements, capital letters appended to the previous requirement identifier are used to distinguish new requirements. • The requirement identifier for deleted requirements are kept and completed with "VOID". • The requirement identifier for modified requirement are kept void and the modified requirement is identified by capital letter(s) appended to the initial requirement number. 4 Signature applicability rules for the validation of EU qualified electronic signatures/seals |
59ab33982241d193112892bbe07db8ea | 119 172-4 | 4.0 Introduction | The requirements defined by the present document are organized in terms of: a) Requirements on the validation constraints and validation procedures in the sense of ETSI EN 319 102-1 [1]. b) Requirements on signature validation and applicability rules checking practices. c) Requirements on the process of checking technical applicability (rules). d) Requirements on reporting the results of the applicability rules checking. |
59ab33982241d193112892bbe07db8ea | 119 172-4 | 4.1 Signature applicability rules | Signature applicability rules state the rules and assumptions used by a user to decide whether a signature is fit for purpose in its specific business and legal context. The present document defines two sets of signature applicability rules and allocates an OID for each of them: 1) The first set of signature applicability rules is suitable for contexts where real time validation response is required and basic signatures are acceptable. The corresponding OID is the id-etsi-sarc- realTimeReq OID defined in Annex A. ETSI ETSI TS 119 172-4 V1.2.1 (2026-02) 9 2) The second set of signature applicability rules is suitable for contexts where real time validation response is not required, a delay of up to 24h for the relying party to receive the validation response is acceptable, or the minimum acceptable class of signature is a signature with time. The corresponding OID is the id-etsi- sarc-realTimeNotReq OID defined in Annex A. NOTE 1: Under the second set of applicability rules id-etsi-sarc-realTimeNotReq, the relying party does not receive a signature validation report before a given time delay, which can be up to 24h. A signature validation service can return an indication of this fact to the relying party when the relying party requests validation, i.e. an indication that the relying party will receive a validation report in e.g. 24h. In the case of a basic signature, the time when the signature was received for validation can be passed as the time indication for signature existence parameter to the validation procedure specified in ETSI EN 319 102-1 [1], clause 5.5, and will in consequence also be indicated in the validation report, as specified by ETSI EN 319 102-1 [1], clause 5.1.3. NOTE 2: The present document defines two sets of applicability rules as a temporary solution for the validation of basic signatures in contexts where real-time validation responses are required. Improvements to the validation procedures specified in ETSI EN 319 102-1 [1] are expected to lead to a redefinition of the applicability rules defined here. |
59ab33982241d193112892bbe07db8ea | 119 172-4 | 4.2 Validation constraints and validation procedures | REQ-4.2-01: The driving application or the signature validation application shall follow the validation process, as specified in ETSI EN 319 102-1 [1], clause 5.1.2 and shall support the Validation process for Signatures providing Long Term Availability and Integrity of Validation Material. REQ-4.2-02: The present document gives the minimum requirements for QES as in the Regulation: a) The validation service may use additional inputs or additional requirements. b) If additional inputs and/or requirements are used, they shall be clearly indicated in the applicability rules checking report. REQ-4.2-03: The constraints to be used as input to the validation process referred to in REQ-4.2-01 shall be as follows: X.509 validation constraints a) The SetOfTrustAnchors constraint defined in ETSI TS 119 172-1 [3], clause A.4.2.1, table A.2 rows (m)1.1 shall be set to the relevant information from the 'Service digital identity' field(s) from the SI-Results output of the procedure specified in clause 4.3 of ETSI TS 119 615 [12], considering as input: i) the signing certificate, as successfully identified as per the execution of clause 5.2.3 of ETSI EN 319 102-1 [1] as part of step 2 of clause 5.3.4 of [1]; ii) the value http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/QC for the TLS-Sti Service type identifier; and iii) the NotBeforeDate value of the signing certificate for the Date-time indication. NOTE 1: The use of the NotBeforeDate value of the signing certificate here above is expected to identify the date at which the certificate has been issued as a valid (qualified) certificate, even if technically it can have been created before that date. NOTE 2: The validation of any time-stamp does not require that the corresponding trust anchor is defined as a time- stamping generation service within an EU Member State national TL. See also REQ-4.5-01 d) ii). b) Constraints defined in ETSI TS 119 172-1 [3], clause A.4.2.1, table A.2 rows (m)1.2 to (m)1.10 shall not be used. c) With regards to revocation constraints: i) The RevocationCheckingConstraints shall be set to "eitherCheck" as defined in ETSI TS 119 172-1 [3], clause A.4.2.1, table A.2 rows (m)2.1. ETSI ETSI TS 119 172-4 V1.2.1 (2026-02) 10 ii) The RevocationFreshnessConstraints defined in ETSI TS 119 172-1 [3], clause A.4.2.1, table A.2 rows (m)2.2 shall be set to either: 1) a maximum value of 24h for the signing certificate of the signature, when the signature applicability rules are the id-etsi-sarc-realTimeReq signature applicability rules; or 2) a maximum value of 0 for the signing certificate of the signature, when the signature applicability rules are the id-etsi-sarc-realTimeNotReq signature applicability rules; iii) Constraint defined in ETSI TS 119 172-1 [3], clause A.4.2.1, table A.2 rows (m)2.3 and (m)3 shall not be used. NOTE 3: ETSI TS 119 172-1 [3] clause A.4.2.1, table A.2, row (m)2 explicitly states that the constraints under RevocationConstraints, and therefore in particular the RevocationFreshnessConstraints, "[…] may be different for different certificate types (e.g. certificates issued to signer, to CAs, to OCSP responders, to CRL Issuers, to Time-Stamping Units)". NOTE 4: A RevocationFreshnessConstraints set to 24h ensures that the latest end-entity CRL published by a TSP complying to any of the ETSI EN 319 411-1 [i.11] CPs will be considered as fresh at current time. This is necessary for the validation of basic signatures. However, when the best signature time is not current time (e.g. in the case of a signature with time) the relying party could decide to only accept signatures with a revocation status information that has been published at least 24h after the best signature time to ensure that any revocation request has been processed by the QTSP in line with eIDAS [i.1] art. 24(3). In that case, the relying party can rely on the applicability rules checking report provided it meets the requirement REQ-4.5-01 i) of the present document. NOTE 5: ETSI standards and referenced IETF RFCs only support the concept of "certificate suspension without memory", meaning that when a certificate is suspended it is considered as having an indeterminate validity status (waiting for next status change to occur, if any), and once unsuspended it is considered as having been valid during the period for which it was previously suspended. d) No constraints shall be applied to end-entity certificates representing a trust anchor. NOTE 6: This means that the process specified in clause 5.2.6.4 of ETSI EN 319 102-1 [1] always returns PASSED when provided with an end-entity certificate representing a trust anchor. Cryptographic constraints NOTE 7: Guidance on cryptographic algorithms validity can be found in ETSI TS 119 312 [i.6]. e) The cryptographic verification process specified in ETSI EN 319 102-1 [1] shall enable the validation procedure to report the relying party with information related to cryptographic suites used to generate the signature being validated and potential security related issues against either national rules or ETSI TS 119 312 [i.6], indicating clearly which of the national rules or ETSI TS 119 312 [i.6] has been used to express potential security issues. f) When the signature validation application is not able to deal with a specific algorithm or cryptographic suite, it shall not invalidate the signature for that reason but lead to an INDETERMINATE result and raise a warning indicating the concerned cryptographic suite and the fact it is not supported. Signature elements constraints g) Failure to comply with one of the signature formats identified in REQ-4.3-01 shall not result in invalidating the signature but in a warning indicating such a failure and the reasons for such a failure. h) The signature elements constraints shall enforce the presence of a signed reference or signed copy of the signing certificate. 4.3 Requirements on signature validation and applicability rules checking practices NOTE 1: The requirements of the present clause refer to the practices whose related statements are referred to ETSI TS 119 172-1 [3], clause A.2. ETSI ETSI TS 119 172-4 V1.2.1 (2026-02) 11 REQ-4.3-01: The signature validation application should support signature formats compliant with: a) ETSI TS 103 171 [7]; b) ETSI TS 103 172 [8]; c) ETSI TS 103 173 [9]; d) ETSI TS 103 174 [10]; and e) ETSI standards on baseline profiles for CAdES digital signatures (ETSI EN 319 122-1 [4]), XAdES digital signatures (ETSI EN 319 132-1 [5]), and PAdES digital signatures (ETSI EN 319 142-1 [6]). NOTE 2: This aims to support CID (EU) 2015/1506 [i.5]. REQ-4.3-02: Signature validation applications should be compliant with ETSI TS 119 101 [i.7]. REQ-4.3-03: When provided as a service, the validation and applicability rules checking processes should be provided in compliance with ETSI TS 119 441 [i.9]. REQ-4.3-04: Relying parties shall be provided with unambiguous information with regards to any security relevant issue identified by the signature validation and applicability rules checking processes. REQ-4.3-05: Relying parties shall be provided with procedures and facilities to validate the signatures and obtain validation and applicability rules checking results data. REQ-4.3-06: Relying parties shall be provided with procedures and facilities allowing them to identify the relevance of further actions to be taken when the preservation of signed data and associated signatures is required. NOTE 3: Guidance on preservation of signed data and associated signatures can be found in ETSI TS 119 511 [i.10]. |
59ab33982241d193112892bbe07db8ea | 119 172-4 | 4.4 Technical applicability (rules) checking process | |
59ab33982241d193112892bbe07db8ea | 119 172-4 | 4.4.1 Overview | The present clause defines a process for implementing technical applicability (rules) checks aiming to facilitate the determination whether a digital signature can be considered technically suitable to implement EU qualified electronic signatures/seals using trusted lists in the sense of the applicable European legislation at the time of signing, i.e. either Directive 1999/93/EC [i.2] or Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 [i.1]. This process aims to support the "validation" process referred to in Article 32(1) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 [i.1]. The inputs of this process are the outputs of the process performed as specified in clause 4.2 of the present document and the main output is a status indicating the technical suitability of the digital signature to implement an EU qualified electronic signature or seal in the sense of Article 32 of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 [i.1]. |
59ab33982241d193112892bbe07db8ea | 119 172-4 | 4.4.2 Processing | NOTE 1: The next two requirements aim to support the verification of point (a) and (b) of Article 32(1), respectively Article 40, of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 [i.1]. REQ-4.4.2-01: The technical applicability (rules) checking (TARC) process shall perform the process specified in clause 4.4 of ETSI TS 119 615 [12], with CERT set to the signing certificate and Date-time set to the best signature time resulting from the process performed as specified in REQ-4.2-01. REQ-4.4.2-02: When, as a result of REQ-4.4.2-01, QC-Status include the value "PROCESS_PASSED" and QC-Results include either "QC_For_eSig" or "QC_For_eSeal": a) then, the signing certificate shall be technically determined, at the signing time being estimated at Date-time, respectively as an EU qualified certificate for electronic signatures or an EU qualified certificate for electronic seals; ETSI ETSI TS 119 172-4 V1.2.1 (2026-02) 12 b) otherwise: i) the process stops; ii) the signature shall be technically determined as indeterminate, i.e. neither an EU qualified electronic signature, nor as an EU qualified electronic seal; and iii) the above result and the results of processes of all the intermediate processes shall be reflected in the signature applicability rules checking report. REQ-4.4.2-03: Void. NOTE 2: The next two requirements aim to support the verification of point (f) of Article 32(1), respectively Article 40, of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 [i.1]. REQ-4.4.2-04: The TARC process shall perform the process specified in clause 4.5 of ETSI TS 119 615 [12], with CERT set to the signing certificate and Date-time set to the best signature time resulting from the process performed as specified in clause 4.2 of the present document. NOTE 3: The process specified in clause 4.5 of ETSI TS 119 615 [12] calls the process specified in clause 4.4 of the same TS. Since the process specified in clause 4.4 of ETSI TS 119 615 [12] has already been performed in REQ-4.4.2-01, with the same input as those provided to the process specified in clause 4.5 of ETSI TS 119 615 [12] when performing REQ-4.4.2-04, an application implementing REQ-4.4.2-04 can reuse the results of performing clause 4.4 of ETSI TS 119 615 [12] as part of REQ-4.4.2-01 when performing the process specified in clause 4.5 of that TS. REQ-4.4.2-05: When, as a result of REQ-4.4.2-04, QSCD-Status include the value "PROCESS_PASSED" and QSCD-Results include "QSCD_YES": a) then, the digital signature shall be technically determined, at the best signature time, as having been created by a qualified signature/seal creation device; b) otherwise: i) the process stops; ii) the signature shall be technically determined as indeterminate, i.e. neither an EU qualified electronic signature, nor as an EU qualified electronic seal; and iii) the above result and the results of processes of all the intermediate processes shall be reflected in the signature applicability rules checking report. NOTE 4: Requirements of points (g) and (h) of Article 32(1) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 [i.1] are expected to be met when the result of the signature validation procedure performed against ETSI EN 319 102-1 [1] as specified in clause 4.2 or against any equivalent purpose procedure leads to respectively TOTAL-PASSED [1] or any equivalent result, with regards to the best signature time. REQ-4.4.2-06: At that point of the TARC process, if the following conditions are met: a) the signing certificate is determined, at the best signature time, as an EU qualified certificate for electronic signatures (respectively for electronic seals), as specified in REQ-4.4.2-02 a); b) the digital signature is determined, at the best signature time, as having been created by a qualified signature (respectively seal) creation device, as specified in REQ-4.4.2-05 a); and c) the result of the process performed as specified in clause 4.2 of the present document is TOTAL-PASSED. then the digital signature shall be determined as technically suitable to implement an EU qualified electronic signature (respectively an EU qualified electronic seal), otherwise the signature shall not be determined technically either as an EU qualified electronic signature, or as an EU qualified electronic seal. |
59ab33982241d193112892bbe07db8ea | 119 172-4 | 4.5 Requirements on applicability rules checking report | NOTE 1: REQ-4.5-01 aims to support the implementation of Article 32.2 of the eIDAS Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 [i.1]. It can be structured using ETSI TS 119 102-2 [i.8]. ETSI ETSI TS 119 172-4 V1.2.1 (2026-02) 13 REQ-4.5-01: The signature applicability rules checking report shall include the following elements that shall be presented in a way that is meaningful to the verifier when this verifier is a natural person: a) the following text on the scope of the applicability rules checking (validation in the sense of [i.1]) executed on the validated signature: Signature applicability rules checking (validation rules) for European qualified electronic signatures/seals using trusted lists validation of digital signature to identify whether it can be considered technically suitable to implement a European qualified electronic signature/seal using EUMS trusted lists in the sense of the applicable European legislation at the time of signing, i.e. either Directive 1999/93/EC [i.2] or Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 [i.1]; b) the complete set of data representing the signer in its certificate, including the data available in the Subject field of the signing certificate and, when present, the data available in its Subject Alternative Name extension ETSI TS 119 612 [2]; c) the use of any pseudonym is clearly indicated if a pseudonym was used at the best signature time; d) the time reference against which the results of the signature applicability rules checking shall be provided as follows: i) the absence of the corresponding trust anchor from an EU Member State TL (i.e. 'Service type identifier' http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/TSA/QTST or http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/TSA) should be expressed via an information in the validation report; NOTE 2: Clause 4.3 of ETSI TS 119 615 [12] can be used to obtain for a certificate, for a 'Service type identifier' and for a specific date and time, a matching trust anchor service and its associated service information from an EU Member Sate TL. ii) the signature applicability rules checking report shall indicate, whenever applicable, the following timing information: 1) claimed signing time; 2) time of the document time-stamp/time assertion; 3) time of the signature time-stamp/time assertion; 4) time of revocation (or suspension) of the signer's certificate; 5) time of OCSP response/time of CRL issuance & next update, at least for the signer's certificate; 6) the best signature time; iii) for each of the indicated timing information from the list provided in point ii) above, the report shall indicate, whenever applicable, their evidential relevance and their level of assurance, including when applicable [11]: 1) the policy identifier for the time-stamping policy used by the time-stamping authority; 2) the accuracy of the time-stamp; 3) the indication whether the time-stamp is qualified under Regulation (EU) 910/2014 [i.1] or not; NOTE 3: Clause 4.6 of ETSI TS 119 615 [12] can be used to determine whether a time stamp token is confirmed by the applicable EUMS trusted list to have been an EU qualified time stamp. EXAMPLE: With regard to time-stamps, it addresses whether the time-stamping authorities issuing time stamps used in this context are trust service providers known and trusted by the relying party and the level of quality/security/accuracy of the time-stamping policy. e) the presentation of the data that is covered by the signature (i.e. signed data); NOTE 4: It is important that the relying party is provided with unambiguous information on what data has been actually signed by the signer. ETSI ETSI TS 119 172-4 V1.2.1 (2026-02) 14 f) any signature attributes that have been included in the signature and an indication of which attributes were signed and which were not signed; NOTE 5: This covers intention to sign, intention to seal and the potential expression of the commitment expressed alongside the signature, either implicitly or explicitly (e.g. through commitment types) ETSI TS 119 172-1 [3]. g) the overall status of the signature applicability rules checking, and the reasons having led to such a result; NOTE 6: ETSI EN 319 102-1 [1] specifies such status and reasons. h) information related to cryptographic suites used to generate the signature being validated and potential security related issues against either national rules or ETSI TS 119 312 [i.6]. It shall indicate clearly which of the national rules or ETSI TS 119 312 [i.6] failed when expressing potential security issues; i) the freshness value of the revocation status information used to determine the revocation status of the signing certificate with respect to the best signature time; and j) optionally, the detailed outcome of each step of the signature applicability rules checking, including those of the technical signature validation. REQ-4.5-02: The OIDs defined in Annex A may be used to identify the type of a digital signature and/or compliance with the requirements of the present document in the applicability rules checking report. ETSI ETSI TS 119 172-4 V1.2.1 (2026-02) 15 Annex A (normative): OIDs The following OIDs are defined in the present document: 1) Signature policies: a) Description: These OID indicate that the processing for validating the digital signature and generating the corresponding applicability rules checking report complies with the requirements of one of the signature applicability rules specified in the present document, as described in clause 4.2. b) Object identifiers: id-etsi-sars OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) id- sigapprules(191724) 1 } id-etsi-sars-SpCompliance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-etsi-sars 1 } id-etsi-sarc-realTimeReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-etsi-SpCompliance 1 } -- Applicability rules suitable for contexts where real time validation response is required and basic signatures are acceptable. id-etsi-sarc-realTimeNotReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-etsi-SpCompliance 2 } -- Applicability rules suitable for contexts where real time validation response is not required, a delay of up to 24h for the relying party to receive the validation response is acceptable, or the minimum acceptable class of signature is a signature with time. 2) Digital signature types: a) Description: These OIDs indicate that the digital signature to which the OID is associated is a digital signature of the following corresponding type: i) EU qualified electronic signature; ii) Advanced electronic signature supported by an EU qualified certificate for electronic signature; iii) Advanced electronic signature; iv) EU qualified electronic seal; v) Advanced electronic seal supported by an EU qualified certificate for electronic seal; vi) Advanced electronic seal; or vii) EU qualified electronic time stamp. b) Object identifiers: id-etsi-sars-SigType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-etsi-sars 2 } -- Digital signature type identifiers id-etsi-dst-euqesig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-etsi-sars-SigType 1 } -- EU qualified electronic signature id-etsi-dst-adesigqc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-etsi-sars-SigType 2 } -- Advanced electronic signature supported by an EU qualified certificate for electronic signature id-etsi-dst-adesig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-etsi-sars-SigType 3 } -- Advanced electronic signature id-etsi-dst-euqeseal OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-etsi-sars-SigType 4 } -- EU qualified electronic seal id-etsi-dst-adesealqc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-etsi-sars-SigType 5 } -- Advanced electronic seal supported by an EU qualified certificate for electronic seal id-etsi-dst-adeseal OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-etsi-sars-SigType 6 } -- Advanced electronic seal ETSI ETSI TS 119 172-4 V1.2.1 (2026-02) 16 id-etsi-dst-euqtst OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-etsi-sars-SigType 7 } -- EU qualified electronic time stamp ETSI ETSI TS 119 172-4 V1.2.1 (2026-02) 17 Annex B (informative): Change history Date Version Information about changes May 2021 V1.1.1 Publication February 2024 V1.1.2 CR#01 Fix issues linked to the "Zero" value being enforced for revocation freshness checking CR#02 Enforce X.509 validation constraint on directly trusted TSU certificates CR#03 Enforce signature elements constraint on signed reference or signed copy of the signing certificate February 2024 V1.1.3 CR#04 Various editorial fixes December 2025 V1.1.6 CR#01r1 Fix issues linked to the "Zero" value being enforced for revocation freshness checking ETSI ETSI TS 119 172-4 V1.2.1 (2026-02) 18 History Version Date Status V1.1.1 May 2021 Publication V1.2.1 February 2026 Publication |
b392cb6367becafeef785f2390da35ed | 119 461 | 1 Scope | The present document specifies policy and security requirements for trust service components providing identity proofing of trust service subjects. Such a trust service component can be provided by the Trust Service Provider (TSP) itself as an integral part of the trust service or by a specialized Identity Proofing Service Provider (IPSP) acting as a subcontractor to the TSP. The term "trust service component" is used because identity proofing is not considered as a trust service on its own but as a component of the trust service for which the identity proofing is done. The present document provides requirements for two Levels of Identity Proofing (LoIP), Baseline and Extended. These LoIPs aim to support identity proofing for ETSI trust services standards such as ETSI EN 319 411-1 [i.7], ETSI EN 319 411-2 [i.8] and ETSI EN 319 521 [i.12]. The present document also provides requirements to enhance an identity proofing from Baseline LoIP to Extended LoIP when the Baseline LoIP has been reached by use of electronic Identification means (eID) at Level of Assurance (LoA) 'substantial' according to the amended eIDAS regulation [i.25] or a similar LoA based on a comparable assurance level framework. The present document aims at supporting identity proofing in European and other regulatory frameworks. Specifically, but not exclusively, the Baseline LoIP aims to support identity proofing for qualified certificates as defined in Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 [i.1] (the original eIDAS regulation) Article 24.1, while the Extended LoIP aims to support identity proofing for qualified certificates and qualified attestations of attributes as defined in Articles 24.1, 24.1a, and 24.1b of the amended eIDAS regulation [i.25]. The present document aims to meet the requirements of the original eIDAS regulation [i.1] by the requirements in clause C.2 and the requirements of the amended eIDAS regulation [i.25] by the requirements in clause C.3. The present document is intended to be applicable for reference from an implementing act according to Article 24.1c of the amended eIDAS regulation [i.25], setting out minimum technical specifications, standards and procedures with respect to the verification of identity and attributes in accordance with Articles 24.1, 24.1a, and 24.1b of the amended eIDAS regulation [i.25]. The present document aims to meet the requirements of Article 44 of the aforementioned regulations on identity proofing for qualified electronic registered delivery services by the requirements in clause C.4. eIDAS has no specific requirements for identity proofing for other qualified trust services. The present document can be used by Conformity Assessment Bodies (CAB) as the basis for confirming that an organization is trustworthy and reliable in its identity proofing process. NOTE 1: See ETSI EN 319 403-1 [i.6] for guidance on the assessment of TSP processes and services. NOTE 2: The present document has the potential to have wider applicability than the defined scope, but any application for other purposes than trust services is out of scope. |
b392cb6367becafeef785f2390da35ed | 119 461 | 2 References | |
b392cb6367becafeef785f2390da35ed | 119 461 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found in the ETSI docbox. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI EN 319 401: "Electronic Signatures and Trust Infrastructures (ESI); General Policy Requirements for Trust Service Providers". ETSI ETSI TS 119 461 V2.1.1 (2025-02) 9 [2] ICAO Doc 9303 part 10: "Machine Readable Travel Document - Part 10: Logical Data Structure (LDS) for Storage of Biometrics and Other Data in the Contactless Integrated Circuit (IC)". [3] ISO/IEC 30107-3: "Information technology — Biometric presentation attack detection — Part 3: Testing and reporting". [4] ISO/IEC 19795-1: "Information technology — Biometric performance testing and reporting — Part 1: Principles and framework". [5] TS 18099: "Biometric data injection attack detection", (produced by CEN). [6] ISO/IEC 19989-3: "Information security — Criteria and methodology for security evaluation of biometric systems — Part 3: Presentation attack detection". [7] ETSI TS 119 172-4: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Signature Policies; Part 4: Signature applicability rules (validation policy) for European qualified electronic signatures/seals using trusted lists". |
b392cb6367becafeef785f2390da35ed | 119 461 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area. [i.1] Regulation (EU) 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC. NOTE: The eIDAS regulation as published in 2014 and before amendments approved in 2024, sometimes called "eIDAS v1", shorthand notation "original eIDAS regulation". [i.2] Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389 of 27 November 2017 supplementing Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards for strong customer authentication and common and secure open standards of communication. [i.3] Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1502 of 8 September 2015 on setting out minimum technical specifications and procedures for assurance levels for electronic identification means pursuant to Article 8(3) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market. [i.4] ETSI TR 119 001: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); The framework for standardization of signatures; Definitions and abbreviations". [i.5] ETSI EN 319 102-1: "Electronic Signatures and Trust Infrastructures (ESI); Procedures for Creation and Validation of AdES Digital Signatures; Part 1: Creation and Validation". [i.6] ETSI EN 319 403-1: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Trust Service Provider Conformity Assessment; Part 1: Requirements for conformity assessment bodies assessing Trust Service Providers". [i.7] ETSI EN 319 411-1: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 1: General requirements". [i.8] ETSI EN 319 411-2: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 2: Requirements for trust service providers issuing EU qualified certificates". ETSI ETSI TS 119 461 V2.1.1 (2025-02) 10 [i.9] ETSI EN 319 412-2: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Certificate Profiles; Part 2: Certificate profile for certificates issued to natural persons". [i.10] Void. [i.11] Void. [i.12] ETSI EN 319 521: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for Electronic Registered Delivery Service Providers". [i.13] ETSI TS 119 172-1: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Signature Policies; Part 1: Building blocks and table of contents for human readable signature policy documents". [i.14] Void. NOTE: Moved to normative reference [7]. [i.15] ENISA: "Remote ID proofing - Analysis of methods to carry out identity proofing remotely", February 2021. [i.16] ISO/IEC 30107-1: "Information technology — Biometric presentation attack detection — Part 1: Framework". [i.17] Void. NOTE: Moved to normative reference [4]. [i.18] Void. NOTE: Moved to normative reference [6]. [i.19] ISO/IEC TS 29003: "Information technology — Security techniques — Identity proofing". [i.20] Facial Identification Science Working Group (FISWG): "Facial Comparison Overview and Methodology Guidelines", Version 1.0, October 2019. [i.21] Facial Identification Science Working Group (FISWG): "Facial Image Comparison Feature List for Morphological Analysis", Version 2.0, September 2018. [i.22] Facial Identification Science Working Group (FISWG): "Minimum Training Criteria for Assessors Using Facial Recognition Systems", Version 1.0, July 2020. [i.23] European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI): "Best Practice Manual for Facial Image Comparison", ENFSI-BPM-DI-01, Version 01, January 2018. [i.24] ISO/IEC 15408-1: "Information technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security - Part 1: Introduction and general model". [i.25] Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC, consolidated version: 18/10/2024. NOTE: The eIDAS regulation including the amendments of Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 [i.34], sometimes called "eIDAS v2", shorthand notation "amended eIDAS regulation". [i.26] Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the European Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity Act). [i.27] Public Register of Authentic Travel and Identity Documents Online (PRADO): "Glossary - Technical terms related to security features and to security documents in general". [i.28] ENISA: "Methodology for Sectoral Cybersecurity Assessments", EU Cybersecurity Certification Framework, September 2021. ETSI ETSI TS 119 461 V2.1.1 (2025-02) 11 [i.29] ISO/IEC 19792: "Information technology — Security techniques — Security evaluation of biometrics". [i.30] ISO/IEC 19989-1: "Information security — Criteria and methodology for security evaluation of biometric systems — Part 1: Framework". [i.31] Directive (EU) 2019/882 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on the accessibility requirements for products and services. [i.32] ISO/IEC FDIS 29794-5: "Information technology — Biometric sample quality — Part 5: Face image data". [i.33] ISO/IEC DIS 20059: "Information technology — Methodologies to evaluate the resistance of biometric recognition systems to morphing attacks". [i.34] Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as regards establishing the European Digital Identity Framework. 3 Definition of terms, symbols, abbreviations and notations |
b392cb6367becafeef785f2390da35ed | 119 461 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ETSI TR 119 001 [i.4], ETSI EN 319 401 [1] and the following apply: amended eIDAS regulation: Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 and Directive (EU) 2022/2555 NOTE: The combination of the original eIDAS regulation [i.1] published in 2014 and the identified amendments approved in 2024, sometimes called "eIDAS v2" - see original eIDAS regulation below. applicant: person (legal or natural) whose identity is to be proven attack potential: measure of the effort needed to exploit a vulnerability in a Target Of Evaluation (TOE) NOTE: Source ISO/IEC 15408-1 [i.24], which has the following note to the definition: The effort is expressed as a function of properties related to the attacker (e.g. expertise, resources, and motivation) and properties related to the vulnerability itself (e.g. window of opportunity, time to exposure). Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER): proportion of attack presentations using the same presentation attack instrument species incorrectly classified as bona fide presentations in a specific scenario NOTE: Source ISO/IEC 30107-3 [3]. Measure for rate of successful presentation attacks. attended remote identity proofing: identity proofing process by remote use of identity document where the capture of the identity document (physical or digital document) and the face video of the applicant are performed in a session supervised by a registration officer authentic source: repository or system, held under the responsibility of a public sector body or private entity, that contains and provides attributes about a natural or legal person or object and that is considered to be a primary source of that information or recognized as authentic in accordance with Union or national law, including administrative practice NOTE: Source amended eIDAS regulation [i.25]. In the present document, the term "trusted register" is used as the general term while "authentic source" is used where the scope is explicitly the eIDAS legal context. ETSI ETSI TS 119 461 V2.1.1 (2025-02) 12 authoritative evidence: evidence that is presented by the applicant, holds identifying attribute(s) of the identity, and is trusted for the binding of these attributes to the applicant NOTE: In the present document, authoritative evidence for a natural person is a physical or digital identity document, an eID used for authentication, and a certificate of a digital signature. For a legal person, documents and attestations are typically used as authoritative evidence. authoritative source: any source irrespective of its form that can be relied upon to provide accurate data, information and/or evidence that can be used to prove identity NOTE: Source CIR (EU) 2015/1502 [i.3]. Authoritative evidence is an authoritative source, but also trusted register and other sources can be authoritative sources. Use can be to supply more attributes than those obtained from authoritative evidence, to validate attributes obtained from different sources, and to provide more updated attributes than those obtained from authoritative evidence. (identity) attribute: characteristic, quality, right or permission of a natural or legal person or of an object NOTE: Source amended eIDAS regulation [i.25]. Baseline LoIP: Level of Identity Proofing (LoIP) reaching a substantial level of confidence based on the fulfilment of good practice minimum requirements for the identity proofing process NOTE: This level is considered suitable for identity proofing for the NCP policy level defined in ETSI EN 319 411-1 [i.7] and for issuing qualified certificates according to the original eIDAS regulation [i.1]. binding to applicant: part of an identity proofing process that verifies that the applicant is the person identified by the presented evidence Bona fide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER): proportion of bona fide presentations incorrectly classified as presentation attacks in a specific scenario NOTE: Source ISO/IEC 30107-3 [3]. Measure of genuine presentations incorrectly classified as presentation attacks. digital identity document: identity document that is issued in a machine-processable form, that is digitally signed by the issuer, and that is in purely digital form NOTE 1: Machine-processable, in this case, does not include optical scanning and processing of a physical identity document. NOTE 2: A digital identity document can be contained in a physical identity document, e.g. an eMRTD contained in a passport or national identity card. NOTE 3: The eMRTD part of a passport or national identity card is sometimes called "electronic identity" or even "eID". In the present document, this part of a passport or national identity card is a digital identity document. electronic attestation of attributes: attestation in electronic form that allows attributes to be authenticated NOTE: Source amended eIDAS regulation [i.25]. In the present document, the term "attestation" is used as the general term while "(qualified) electronic attestation of attributes" is explicitly used in the eIDAS legal context. electronic Identification means (eID means, eID): material and/or immaterial unit containing person identification data and which is used for authentication for an online service or, where appropriate, for an offline service NOTE: Source amended eIDAS regulation [i.25]. eID scheme: governance model and technical specifications allowing interoperability between eID means from different eID providers eIDAS certified eID: eID or eID scheme certified according to Article 12a of the amended eIDAS regulation eIDAS high eID: eID or eID scheme fulfilling the requirements for assurance level high in Article 8 of the amended eIDAS regulation and CIR (EU) 2015/1502 ETSI ETSI TS 119 461 V2.1.1 (2025-02) 13 eIDAS notified eID: eID or eID scheme notified according to Article 9 of the amended eIDAS regulation eIDAS signature validation: validation of an electronic signature or electronic seal in compliance with the eIDAS regulation NOTE: Requirements for validation of signatures and seal are set by Article 32 of the amended eIDAS regulation [i.25]. The text of Article 32 is the same in the original [i.1] and the amended eIDAS regulation [i.25]. eIDAS substantial eID: eID or eID scheme fulfilling the requirements for assurance level substantial in Article 8 of the amended eIDAS regulation and CIR (EU) 2015/1502 NOTE: The text of Article 8 and Article 9 is the same in the original [i.1] and the amended [i.25] eIDAS regulation. CIR (EU) 2015/1502 [i.3] has not changed with the amended eIDAS regulation [i.25]. (identity) evidence: information or documentation provided by the applicant or obtained from other sources, trusted to prove that claimed identity attributes are correct extended LoIP: Level of Identity Proofing (LoIP) reaching a high level of confidence based on the fulfilment of good practice minimum requirements for the identity proofing process NOTE: This level is considered suitable for identity proofing for issuing of qualified certificates and qualified electronic attestations of attributes according to the amended eIDAS regulation [i.25]. False Acceptance Rate (FAR): proportion of verification transactions with false biometric claims erroneously accepted NOTE: Source ISO/IEC 19795-1 [4]. False Rejection Rate (FRR): proportion of verification transactions with true biometric claims erroneously rejected NOTE: Source ISO/IEC 19795-1 [4]. freshness: time between time of issuance of an evidence and time of use/validation of the evidence high attack potential: measure of the effort needed by a highly skilled adversary with significant resources and opportunity to exploit a vulnerability in a Target Of Evaluation (TOE) NOTE: Based on ENISA: "Methodology for Sectoral Cybersecurity Assessments" [i.28]. identity: attribute or set of attributes that uniquely identify a person within a given context identity document: physical or digital identity document issued by an authoritative source and attesting to the applicant's identity identity proofing context: external requirements affecting the identity proofing process, given by the purpose of the identity proofing, the related regulatory requirements, and any resulting restrictions on the selection of attributes and evidence and on the identity proofing process itself identity proofing (process): process by which the identity, and possibly additional attributes, of an applicant is verified by the use of evidence attesting to the required identity attributes identity proofing service policy: set of rules that indicates the applicability of an identity proofing service to a particular community and/or class of application with common security requirements injection attack: attack consisting of injecting content controlled by the attacker into the data capture process EXAMPLE: Bypassing the camera on the user device injecting a recorded or generated video stream purporting to come from the camera. A generated video stream can be a deep fake video of a face or of the visual appearance of a physical identity document. Injection Attack Detection (IAD): automated determination of an injection attack legitimate evidence holder: person for whom the evidence is issued Level of Identity Proofing (LoIP): confidence achieved in the identity proofing NOTE 1: Source ISO/IEC TS 29003 [i.19]. ETSI ETSI TS 119 461 V2.1.1 (2025-02) 14 NOTE 2: In the present document, the term applies to the Baseline LoIP and the Extended LoIP. liveness detection: measurement and analysis of anatomical characteristics or involuntary or voluntary reactions, to determine if a biometric sample is being captured from a living subject present at the point of capture NOTE: Source ISO/IEC 30107-1 [i.16]. Liveness detection is a subset of presentation attack detection. moderate attack potential: measure of the effort needed by a skilled adversary with significant resources and opportunity to exploit a vulnerability in a Target Of Evaluation (TOE) NOTE: Based on ENISA: "Methodology for Sectoral Cybersecurity Assessments" [i.28]. original eIDAS regulation: Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as published in 2014 and without the amendments approved in 2024 NOTE: Sometimes called "eIDAS v1" - see amended eIDAS regulation above. physical identity document: identity document issued in physical and human-readable form EXAMPLE: The printed (non-digital) representation of passports and national identity cards. physical presence: identity proofing where the applicant is required to be physically present at the location of the identity proofing (IPSP) practice statement: statement of the practices that an IPSP employs in providing the identity proofing trust service component NOTE: Source ETSI EN 319 401 [1]. presentation attack: presentation to the biometric data capture subsystem with the goal of interfering with the operation of the biometric system NOTE: Source ISO/IEC 30107-1 [i.16]. Presentation Attack Detection (PAD): automated determination of a presentation attack NOTE: Source ISO/IEC 30107-1 [i.16]. proof of access: any source irrespective of its form that can be trusted for reliable data, information and/or evidence that can be used in an identity proofing process, provided that the applicant is able to demonstrate access to the source EXAMPLE: Bank account, phone number, email or other resource owned by the applicant. pseudonym: fictitious identity that a person assumes for a particular purpose, which differs from their original or true identity NOTE: A pseudonym identity can, as opposed to an anonymous identity, be linked to the person's real identity. qualified electronic seal: advanced electronic seal, which is created by a qualified electronic seal device, and that is based on a qualified certificate for electronic seal NOTE: Source amended eIDAS regulation [i.25]. qualified electronic signature: advanced electronic signature, which is created by a qualified electronic signature device, and that is based on a qualified certificate for electronic signature NOTE: Source amended eIDAS regulation [i.25]. registration officer: human being carrying out all or selected parts of an identity proofing process remote identity proofing: identity proofing process where the applicant is physically distant from the location of the identity proofing subject: legal or natural person that is enrolled to a trust service subscriber: legal or natural person bound by an agreement with a trust service provider to any subscriber obligations ETSI ETSI TS 119 461 V2.1.1 (2025-02) 15 supplementary evidence: evidence that is used in addition to authoritative evidence to strengthen the reliability of the identity proofing and/or as evidence for attributes that are not evidenced by the authoritative evidence trusted register: public register, database, or other source that is an authoritative source for the conveyance of identity attributes in the identity proofing context trust service component: one part of the overall service of a TSP NOTE 1: Source ETSI EN 319 403-1 [i.6]. NOTE 2: A typical example of such component services are those identified in clause 4.4 of ETSI EN 319 411-1 [i.7], where an IPSP as a subcontractor to a TSP will take on all or core parts of the registration service component. unattended remote identity proofing: identity proofing process by remote use of identity document where the capture of the identity document (physical or digital document) and the face video of the applicant are performed in an automated, interactive session without human supervision NOTE: Validation of the captured evidence and binding to applicant can afterwards be done by manual, hybrid manual and automated, and fully automated means. validation: part of an identity proofing process that determines whether or not attributes are validated by the presented evidence and whether or not the evidence is genuine, authoritative, and valid |
b392cb6367becafeef785f2390da35ed | 119 461 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
b392cb6367becafeef785f2390da35ed | 119 461 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in ETSI TR 119 001 [i.4] and the following apply: AI Artificial Intelligence APCER Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate BPCER Bona fide Presentation Classification Error Rate CAB Conformity Assessment Bodies EAA Electronic Attestation of Attributes eID electronic Identification eMRTD electronic Machine Readable Travel Document ENISA European Cybersecurity Agency FAR False Acceptance Rate FRR False Rejection Rate GDPR General Data Protection Regulation IAD Injection Attack Detection ICAO Internation Civil Aviation Organization IPSP Identity Proofing Service Provider LEI Legal Entity Identifier LoA Level of Assurance LoIP Level of Identity Proofing MRZ Machine Readable Zone NCP Normalized Certificate Policy OID Object IDentifier PAD Presentation Attack Detection PRADO Public Register of Authentic travel and identity Documents Online QERDS Qualified Electronic Registered Delivery Service QTSP Qualified Trust Service Provider TLS Transport Layer Security TSP Trust Service Provider ETSI ETSI TS 119 461 V2.1.1 (2025-02) 16 |
b392cb6367becafeef785f2390da35ed | 119 461 | 3.4 Notations | The requirements identified in the present document include: a) requirements applicable to any actor conforming to the present document. Such requirements are indicated without any additional marking; b) requirements applicable under certain conditions. Such requirements are marked by "[CONDITIONAL]" or indicated by clauses introduced by "[CONDITIONAL]". The requirements in the present document are identified as follows: <the 3 letters identifying the elements of services > - < the clause number> - <2 digit number - incremental> The elements of services are: • OVR: General requirement (requirement applicable to more than 1 component) • INI: Requirements on the initiation of the identity proofing • COL: Requirements on attribute and evidence collection • VAL: Requirements on attribute and evidence validation • BIN: Requirements on binding to applicant • ISS: Requirements on issuing of result of the identity proofing and evidence of the identity proofing process • USE: Requirements on use cases • QTS: Requirements specific to identity proofing for EU qualified trust services (Annex C) The management of the requirement identifiers for subsequent editions of the present document is as follows: • When a requirement is inserted at the end of a clause, the 2 digit number above is incremented to the next available digit. • When a requirement is inserted at the start of a clause, the 2 digit number 00 is used. • When a requirement is inserted between two existing requirements, capital letters appended to the previous requirement identifier are used to distinguish new requirements. • The requirement identifier for a deleted requirement is left and completed with "VOID". • When a requirement is modified from the previous edition of the present document, the requirement number is amended by a capital 'X' letter. |
b392cb6367becafeef785f2390da35ed | 119 461 | 4 General concepts | |
b392cb6367becafeef785f2390da35ed | 119 461 | 4.1 Identity proofing actors | Neither the original eIDAS regulation [i.1] nor the amended eIDAS regulation [i.25] define identity proofing as a trust service on its own. In the present document, identity proofing is defined as a trust service component. The identity proofing service component can be an integral part of the Trust Service Provider's (TSP) service provisioning, but the service component can also be the task of a specialized Identity Proofing Service Provider (IPSP) acting as a subcontractor to the TSP under the TSP's responsibility. The present document is applicable to both of these scenarios. An IPSP as a specialized service provider can provide identity proofing subcontracted to many different TSPs as well as to other types of service providers. ETSI ETSI TS 119 461 V2.1.1 (2025-02) 17 The main actors of an identity proofing process are the TSP that requests the identity proofing and is the receiver of the identity proofing result, where relevant the IPSP that delivers the identity proofing service subcontracted to the TSP, and the applicant whose identity is to be proven. The applicant can be a natural person, a legal person, or a natural person representing a legal person. If the identity proofing process uses manual procedures, these procedures are carried out by personnel in the role of registration officer. |
b392cb6367becafeef785f2390da35ed | 119 461 | 4.2 Identity proofing process | Identity proofing is the process of proving with the required degree of reliability that the purported identity of an applicant is correct. In the present document, the required degree of reliability is assumed to be either the Baseline LoIP or the Extended LoIP. The applicant is identified by a set of identity attributes, and evidence is provided to link these attributes to the applicant. Especially for Electronic Attestation of Attributes (EAA), further identifying or non-identifying attributes can be collected and linked to the applicant; the term identity proofing as used in the present document covers proofing of such additional attributes where relevant. The identity proofing process can be carried out automated, by a registration officer, or by a combination of human-controlled and automated. The identity proofing process can be based on the physical presence of the applicant, or on remote identity proofing based on remote communication with the applicant using a communications network. The different approaches imply different risks. For each approach, the present document sets the minimum requirements to mitigate those risks to reach either Baseline or Extended LoIP. The identity proofing process is commonly broken down into five tasks: 1) Initiation. 2) Attribute and evidence collection. 3) Attribute and evidence validation. 4) Binding to applicant. 5) Issuing of identity proofing result. The subsequent use of the identity proofing result by a TSP or other type of service provider is out of scope of the present document. EXAMPLE 1: A typical case is issuing of a digital signature certificate for the proven identity. The process can be illustrated by Figure 1 (from [i.15]), also showing that an identity proofing process can be iterative. The tasks are not necessarily carried out as consecutive steps of an identity proofing process. For some processes, they can be intertwined, e.g. that attributes are collected from an identity document integral to the validation of the same document. An identity proofing process can be synchronous, meaning that all steps of the identity proofing process, including issuing of proof, are carried out in one continuous process, or asynchronous, where the validation and binding tasks and issuing of proof are done at a later time. Figure 1: Tasks of an identity proofing process The present document covers initial identity proofing of a new applicant to become a subject or a subscriber of a trust service. The present document does not consider possible simplifications of the process if the applicant is a known subject, e.g. in cases where identity proofing is required to be repeated regularly. ETSI ETSI TS 119 461 V2.1.1 (2025-02) 18 In some cases, identity proofing can be regarded as a continuous process, where the behaviour of the subject over time can be used to determine the risk or the likelihood that the identity is correct. In such cases, the reliability of the correct identity of a subject can increase or decrease over time. Continuous identity proofing is out of the scope of the present document. The present document poses requirements to identity proofing processes in the following structured manner. Clause 5 has requirements for risk assessment and threats intelligence to ensure the IPSP's service stays up to date. Clause 6 states requirements on identity proofing services practice statement, terms and conditions, and information security policy. Clause 7 sets requirements for service management and operation, requiring an IPSP to adhere to the same requirements as a TSP. Clause 8 is structured into subclauses that serve as building blocks for different identity proofing use cases: • Clause 8.1 states requirements for initiation of an identity proofing process. • Clause 8.2 states requirements for the collection of attributes, meaning the identity information to prove, and for collection of the evidence needed to prove the identity attributes. • Clause 8.3 states requirements for validation of attributes against the provided evidence and requirements to ensure that the evidence in itself is genuine and valid. • Clause 8.4 states requirements for binding to applicant, meaning ensuring that the applicant presenting the authoritative evidence really is the person identified by the evidence. Binding to applicant can be done manually by a registration officer, or automated, notably by face biometrics for natural persons, or by a combination of manual and automated. Other biometric modes than face are currently out of scope of the present document. • Clause 8.5 states requirements for issuing the identity proofing result and for the creation of evidence of the identity proofing process to be able to prove in retrospect why the identity proofing process yielded the given identity proofing result. Clause 9 sets requirements for the combination of the building blocks from clause 8 into some typical identity proofing use cases that are considered to fulfil the requirements for the Baseline and Extended LoIP. Requirements are specified for six use cases and sub-cases when the applicant is a natural person: 1) Use of an identity document in a physical presence context: a) Manual operation. b) Hybrid manual and automated operation. c) Automated operation. 2) Use of an identity document in an attended remote context, where the applicant presents an identity document in a remote session and communicates in real-time with a registration officer: a) Manual operation with validation and binding to applicant done manually by the registration officer - only accepted for Baseline LoIP. b) Hybrid manual and automated operation. 3) Use of an identity document in an unattended remote context, where the applicant presents an identity document in a remote session without human supervision: a) Manual operation with validation and binding to applicant done afterwards by a registration officer - only accepted for Baseline LoIP. b) Hybrid manual and automated operation with validation and binding to applicant done afterwards by a combination of automated analysis and a registration officer. c) Automated operation with no involvement of a registration officer. ETSI ETSI TS 119 461 V2.1.1 (2025-02) 19 4) Use of eID means. 5) Use of digital signature with certificate. 6) Additional identity proofing to enhance an identity proven to Baseline LoIP by use of eID means to Extended LoIP. Table 1 below shows an overview of the use cases for use of identity documents for identity proofing. Table 1: Use cases for identity proofing using identity documents Applicant presence Operation Clause Identity document Evidence validation Binding to applicant Example Physical Manual 9.2.1.2 Physical Manual Manual Manual enrolment at registration office. Hybrid 9.2.1.3 Digital Automated Manual Similar to manual border control, with automated validation of digital doc. and manual face verification by registration officer. Automated 9.2.1.4 Digital Automated Automated Similar to unassisted border control with automated validation of digital doc. and biometric face verification. Remote attended Manual 9.2.2.2 Physical Manual Manual Manual enrolment at a virtual registration office where registration officer manually verifies physical doc. and face - only for Baseline LoIP. Hybrid 9.2.2.3 Digital Automated Manual Manual enrolment at a virtual registration office with automated validation of digital doc. and manual face verification. Digital Automated Combined manual and automated Manual enrolment at a virtual registration office with automated validation of digital doc. and both biometric and manual face verification. Physical Combined automated and manual Manual Manual enrolment at a virtual registration office with both automated and manual validation of doc. and manual face verification. Physical Combined automated and manual Combined automated and manual Manual enrolment at a virtual registration office with both automated and manual validation of doc. and both manual and biometric face verification. ETSI ETSI TS 119 461 V2.1.1 (2025-02) 20 Applicant presence Operation Clause Identity document Evidence validation Binding to applicant Example Remote unattended Manual 9.2.3.2 Physical Manual Manual Remote enrolment process, with subsequent manual verification of doc. and manual face verification - only for Baseline LoIP. Hybrid 9.2.3.3 Digital Automated Manual Remote enrolment process with automated validation of digital doc. and subsequent manual face verification - only for Baseline LoIP. Digital Automated Combined manual and automated Remote enrolment process with automated validation of digital doc. and subsequent both manual and biometric face verification. Physical Combined automated and manual Manual Remote enrolment process with subsequent both automated and manual validation of doc. and manual face verification - only for Baseline LoIP. Physical Combined automated and manual Combined automated and manual Remote enrolment process with subsequent both automated and manual validation of doc. and both manual and biometric face verification. Automated 9.2.3.4 Digital Automated Automated Fully automated process. Annex B provides (from [i.15]) an overview of typical threats to identity proofing and how the present document addresses these threats. Annex C further profiles the use cases of clause 9 specifically for identity proofing to support EU qualified trust services according to both the original eIDAS regulation [i.1] and the amended eIDAS regulation [i.25]. To claim compliance with the present document, an IPSP is obliged to identify the use case(s) from clause 9 and/or Annex C that the IPSP applies in its service, and fulfil all relevant requirements from the present document for each use case. Automated operation is considered not relevant to the attended remote case since a registration officer is anyway needed for communication with the applicant. For the unattended remote case, while the communication with the applicant is automated, the tasks of validation and binding to applicant can be done by all the three alternatives manual, hybrid, or automated. Manual only validation of a physical identity document is considered to only be able to reach Baseline LoIP. For the unattended remote case, manual only binding to applicant is considered to only be able to reach Baseline LoIP. Use of hybrid manual and automated operation is strongly encouraged for both validation of physical identity document and binding to applicant. Fully automated, remote operation with use of an identity document requires the use of a digital identity document and face biometrics for binding to applicant. An identity proofing context can pose limitations on the selection of use cases to apply. Clause 8 specifies means that can be combined into identity proofing use cases in a flexible way to be able to fulfil restrictions imposed by a wide variety of identity proofing contexts. Other use cases than those specified in clause 9 can be possible to achieve the Baseline or Extended LoIP, notably when specific combinations of different evidence are required by an identity proofing context. The present document does not pose requirements on the process flow of an identity proofing process. Each of the use cases specified in clause 9 can be fulfilled by various process flows leading to the same LoIP result. The building block structure of clause 8 ensures that requirements regarding specific means are consistent across identity proofing use cases. ETSI ETSI TS 119 461 V2.1.1 (2025-02) 21 EXAMPLE 2: All use cases that use physical identity document as evidence will adhere to the same set of base requirements, whether the physical identity document is used with physical presence, remote with automated validation, or remote with manual validation, but conditional requirements are used where use cases differ. For example, some checks of a physical identity document are only possible with physical presence. |
b392cb6367becafeef785f2390da35ed | 119 461 | 4.3 Identity proofing context | The identity proofing context is the set of external framing conditions that an identity proofing process is subject to and that can impose requirements and restrictions on identity proofing. A core element of the identity proofing context is the regulatory requirements imposed on identity proofing for the defined purpose by the applicable legislation. EXAMPLE 1: Issuing of qualified certificates for electronic signatures in the EU is subject to the requirements of the amended eIDAS regulation [i.25] and possibly additional requirements from the national legislation of the country where the TSP is registered. The identity proofing context will vary between purposes of identity proofing and between countries. The identity proofing context can restrict at least the following aspects of an identity proofing process: • The required LoIP, assumed to be Baseline or Extended as defined by the present document. • The identity attributes to collect, meaning attributes that are mandatory, prohibited, or optional. EXAMPLE 2: In some countries, the collection of a national identity number can be mandatory for the identity proofing context, while other countries do not use such numbers or the use of the national identity number is prohibited for most identity proofing contexts. • The evidence to use, meaning evidence or combinations of evidence that can be mandated or prohibited by legislative rules or that can be assumed to be available. EXAMPLE 3: National legislation can restrict identity documents to passports and national identity cards from the same country or from selected countries. EXAMPLE 4: In some countries, validation of identity attributes against a national population register can be mandatory, while other countries do not have such registers. EXAMPLE 5: In some countries, all citizens can be assumed to possess a national identity card, while other countries do not issue such cards. • The means to use for attribute and evidence validation and for binding to applicant, meaning that certain process steps can be mandated or prohibited. EXAMPLE 6: In some countries, physical presence can be mandated for certain purposes of identity proofing, or remote identity proofing can be restricted to allow only specific use cases. • The issuing of the result of the identity proofing process and the evidence of the identity proofing process, meaning what information can be conveyed to the TSP and what information can be retained as evidence of the process. EXAMPLE 7: In some countries, a photo or photocopy of a physical identity document can be required as part of the evidence of the identity proofing process, while in other countries retaining such copies can be prohibited. Specification of identity proofing contexts is out of the scope of the present document, but the present document is intended to provide means to fulfil the requirements of a wide variety of identity proofing contexts. |
b392cb6367becafeef785f2390da35ed | 119 461 | 4.4 Authoritative evidence and supplementary evidence | An identity proofing process requires authoritative evidence on the identity of the applicant. Authoritative evidence is issued by an authoritative source and is hence trusted regarding the identity attributes the evidence conveys and for the binding of these attributes to the applicant presenting the evidence. ETSI ETSI TS 119 461 V2.1.1 (2025-02) 22 When the applicant is a natural person or a natural person representing a legal person, an identity proofing process compliant with the present document uses at least one of the following types of evidence as authoritative evidence: physical identity document, digital identity document, eID means used in an authentication protocol, or certificate of a digital signature. Use of these evidence types as authoritative evidence requires fulfilment of the relevant requirements of the present document. NOTE: This does not exclude the case where identity proofing for a trust service is done by a government authority, e.g. issuing of a (qualified) certificate in conjunction with issuing of a national identity card. If the identity proofing process is sufficient to issue an identity document that could subsequently be used in identity proofing for a trust service, then the process in itself is clearly also sufficient for identity proofing for the same trust service. The present document additionally specifies the use of the following as supplementary evidence: trusted register (including authentic source as defined by the amended eIDAS regulation [i.25]), proof of access (in particular of a bank account), and documents and attestations (including electronic attestation of attributes as defined by the amended eIDAS regulation [i.25]). Depending on the identity proofing context, such supplementary evidence can be the authoritative source for identity attributes, but, as specified by the present document, only when combined with the use of one of the authoritative evidence types listed above. EXAMPLE 1: A national population register can be considered as the authoritative source for information about the applicant, but only if the applicant's identity is additionally proven by one of the authoritative evidence listed above. EXAMPLE 2: In certain identity proofing contexts, identity information obtained from a bank can be regarded as authoritative. None of the authoritative evidence identity document, eID means, and digital signature can be expected to be commonly available for legal persons. While the use of eID means and digital signature is not ruled out, trusted register and documents and attestations are expected to take an authoritative role. Hence, the identity proofing use case for a legal person in clause 9.3 of the present document does not mandate use of any of the authoritative evidence types. Multiple evidence of the same type or different types can be used. Other evidence in addition to those covered by the present document can be used. |
b392cb6367becafeef785f2390da35ed | 119 461 | 4.5 Consideration of threats | The requirements in the present document are provided in the form of requirements (numbered controls) that aim to achieve security objectives perceived necessary to address operational risks (clauses 6 and 7) as well as the inherent risks specific to identity proofing (clauses 8 and 9). These specific risks result from two main categories of threats, namely: 1) The imposter attempts to use falsified or counterfeited evidence, meaning the evidence is fake or has been tampered with in order for the applicant to obtain an approved identity proofing with an incorrect identity. This can be the real identity of another person or a non-existent identity. 2) The imposter attempts an impersonation, meaning the imposter uses genuine evidence associated with another person in order to obtain an approved identity proofing under this other person's identity. Two other categories of threats are in scope: 1) Attacks on the system where the imposter breaks the security of the information systems used for identity proofing to illegitimately change information or enforce a specific identity proofing result. 2) Social engineering where the imposter misleads or forces the legitimate owner of the evidence to carry out the identity proofing in a way that results in the imposter obtaining control of credentials issued as a result of the identity proofing. Figure 2 summarizes typical attack scenarios for falsified/counterfeited evidence and impersonation and the related countermeasures specified by the present document. ETSI ETSI TS 119 461 V2.1.1 (2025-02) 23 Two specific attack types of concern for remote identity proofing using identity documents are: • Presentation attack, where use of falsified or counterfeited evidence or impersonation is attempted in front of the camera used to capture evidence. • Injection attack, where camera or other sensors are bypassed injecting recorded or artificially generated video streams as falsified or counterfeited evidence or impersonation. Artificially generated content, also called "deep fakes", is increasingly used by imposters. This can be a deep fake of a victim's face or an artificially generated representation of a physical identity document showing a victim's identity. An attacker needs to combine artificially generated content with presentation or injection attack. State of the art in artificially generated content is rapidly evolving, including artificial intelligence based logic, such as "face swapping", to react in real time to instructions such as movements or speech. At the same time, protection measures, also based on artificial intelligence, are rapidly evolving to detect deep fakes. Protection measures include both prevention of presentation and injection attacks and detection of the same types of attacks and of deep fakes. Related attack Countermeasures The identity proofing process is compromised by the use of evidence of insufficient quality AUTHORITATIVE EVIDENCE Use authoritative (trusted) sources Use the required set of attributes allowing unique identification ADRESSED IN CLAUSE 8.2 The identity proofing process is compromised by counterfeited and/or manipulated evidence GENUINE EVIDENCE Verify the security features and/or assurance level of the evidence ADRESSED IN CLAUSE 8.3 The identity proofing process is compromised by use of evidence that is terminated, revoked or reported as lost/stolen VALID EVIDENCE Verify that the evidence is still valid, have not been revoked or declared lost/stolen ADRESSED IN CLAUSE 8.3 The identity proofing process is compromised by manipulation of image capturing systems or transmission channels (for remote identity proofing) SECURE COLLECTION AND TRANSMISSION OF EVIDENCE AND APPLICANT APPEARANCE (see note) Use solutions that ensure authenticity and integrity of evidence from capture to the system that does the validation. Similarly for capture and transmission of the applicant's appearance where relevant. ADRESSED IN CLAUSES 8.3 and 8.4 The identity proofing process is compromised by an imposter claiming the legitimate identity of another person LEGITIMATE OWNERSHIP Ensure that only the legitimate holder of the evidence can claim the identity ADRESSED IN CLAUSE 8.4 NOTE: The secure collection and transmission of evidence dimension only applies to remote identity proofing and addresses both the falsified or counterfeited evidence and impersonation threats. Figure 2: Risks and countermeasure for identity proofing FALSIFIED OR COUNTERFEITED EVIDENCE IM PERSONATION ETSI ETSI TS 119 461 V2.1.1 (2025-02) 24 Following the EU Cybersecurity Act [i.26], it can be expected that the whole or parts of an identity proofing system or service serving the EU market in the future will become subject to European cybersecurity certification. Especially, this can be expected for biometrics, where CEN TC/224 WG18 is in the process of developing a multi-part standard for "European requirements for biometric products". TS 18099 [5] "Biometric data injection detection" can also be referenced from a European certification scheme. Several ISO/IEC standards cover testing of biometric systems, e.g. ISO/IEC 19792 [i.29] and ISO/IEC 19795-1 [4], ISO/IEC 30107 Parts 1 [i.16] and 3 [3], and ISO/IEC 19989-1 [i.30]. The Cybersecurity Act specifies three assurance levels for certification, 'basic', 'substantial', and 'high'. Identity proofing for EU qualified trust services could in the future be subject to certification at assurance level 'high', which will imply requirements for testing and certification by independent, accredited laboratories under the auspices of an accredited cybersecurity certification body. This could apply to all of manual, automated, and hybrid manual/automated services. The present document requires an IPSP's means for biometric injection attack detection and presentation attack detection to go through independent testing by an accredited laboratory every second year. To allow IPSPs, laboratories, and national accreditation authorities reasonable time to prepare for these requirements, the time for the first independent testing is set to before end of 2026. As the European cybersecurity certification system and related standards evolve, this can be referenced from future versions of the present document. The present document poses requirements for an IPSP to perform cyberthreat intelligence, keep the security of the service updated according to changes in the threats and risk landscape, and to test security and performance. No normative requirements on how to perform these tasks are defined in the present document, but a good reference, also considering preparation for possible cybersecurity certification schemes, is the ENISA report "Methodology for sectoral cybersecurity assessments" [i.28] under the EU Cybersecurity Certification Framework. The report covers topics such as cyberthreat intelligence, types of attackers, characterization of attackers, and attack potential. More detailed examples of threats are provided in Annex B, based on ENISA's report "Remote ID proofing - Analysis of methods to carry out identity proofing remotely" [i.15], with an indication of coverage by the countermeasures specified by the present document. Annex B can help organizations relying on an identity proofing process to assess the requirements of the present document against the organization's risk assessment for the identity proofing. |
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