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Defendant, a w orker in a metal working shop, had long been teasing Vincent. a young colleague. by calling him insulting names and ridiculing him. One dav'Vincent responded to the teasing by picking tip a metal bar and attacking Defendant. Defendant could have escaped from the shop. He parriied the blow with his left arm, and with his right hand struck Vincent a blow on his jaw from which the Young man died.
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
Involuntary manslaughter is defined as (1) the unintentional killing of another without malice, but while engaged in an unlawful activity not naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm; or (2) the unintentional killing of another without malice, while engaged in a lawful activity with reckless disregard for the safety of others. State v. Crosby, 355 S.C. 47, 51-52, 584 S.E.2d 110, 112 (2003). “To constitute involuntary manslaughter, there must be a finding of criminal negligence, statutorily defined as a reckless disregard of the safety of others.” Id. at 52, 584 S.E.2d at 112. Further, “a person can be acting lawfully, even if he is in unlawful possession of a weapon, if he was entitled to arm himself in self-defense at the time of the shooting.” Id.
Question and Possible Answers:
Select from the choices (A-D) the most serious offense of which the defendant could be properly convicted.
Defendant, a w orker in a metal working shop, had long been teasing Vincent. a young colleague. by calling him insulting names and ridiculing him. One dav'Vincent responded to the teasing by picking tip a metal bar and attacking Defendant. Defendant could have escaped from the shop. He parriied the blow with his left arm, and with his right hand struck Vincent a blow on his jaw from which the Young man died.
(A) Involuntary manslaughter
(B) Voluntary manslaughter
(C) Murder
(D) None of the above
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"D",
"None of the above"
] |
mbe_131
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Involuntary manslaughter is defined as (1) the unintentional killing of another without malice, but while engaged in an unlawful activity not naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm; or (2) the unintentional killing of another without malice, while engaged in a lawful activity with reckless disregard for the safety of others. State v. Crosby, 355 S.C. 47, 51-52, 584 S.E.2d 110, 112 (2003). “To constitute involuntary manslaughter, there must be a finding of criminal negligence, statutorily defined as a reckless disregard of the safety of others.” Id. at 52, 584 S.E.2d at 112. Further, “a person can be acting lawfully, even if he is in unlawful possession of a weapon, if he was entitled to arm himself in self-defense at the time of the shooting.” Id.
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Despondent over losing his job, Wilmont drank all night at a bar. While driving home, he noticed a car following him and, in his intoxicated state, concluded he was being followed by robbers. In fact, a police car was following him on suspicion of drunk driving. In his effort to get away, Wilmont sped through a stop sign and struck and killed a pedestrian. He was arrested by the police. Wilmont is prosecuted for manslaughter. He should be
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
To convict for a violation of Code § 18.2-36.1(B), the Commonwealth must prove, inter alia, conduct by an accused “so gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life[.]” Code § 18.2-36.1(B). 1 Such conduct “has come to be known as ‘criminal negligence’ ” in the context of common law vehicular involuntary manslaughter and requires “ ‘acts of commission or omission of a wanton or willful nature, showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights of others, under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce injury ... and the offender knows or is charged with the knowledge of, the probable results of his acts.’ ” Keech v. Commonwealth, 9 Va.App. 272, 277, 279, 386 S.E.2d 813, 816, 817 (1989) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
Question and Possible Answers:
Despondent over losing his job, Wilmont drank all night at a bar. While driving home, he noticed a car following him and, in his intoxicated state, concluded he was being followed by robbers. In fact, a police car was following him on suspicion of drunk driving. In his effort to get away, Wilmont sped through a stop sign and struck and killed a pedestrian. He was arrested by the police. Wilmont is prosecuted for manslaughter. He should be
(A) acquitted, because he honestly believed he faced an imminent threat of death or severe bodily injury.
(B) acquitted, because his intoxication prevented him from appreciating the risk he created.
(C) convicted, because he acted recklessly and in fact was in no danger.
(D) convicted, because he acted recklessly and his apprehension of danger was not reasonable.
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"D",
"convicted, because he acted recklessly and his apprehension of danger was not reasonable."
] |
mbe_885
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To convict for a violation of Code § 18.2-36.1(B), the Commonwealth must prove, inter alia, conduct by an accused “so gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life[.]” Code § 18.2-36.1(B). 1 Such conduct “has come to be known as ‘criminal negligence’ ” in the context of common law vehicular involuntary manslaughter and requires “ ‘acts of commission or omission of a wanton or willful nature, showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights of others, under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce injury ... and the offender knows or is charged with the knowledge of, the probable results of his acts.’ ” Keech v. Commonwealth, 9 Va.App. 272, 277, 279, 386 S.E.2d 813, 816, 817 (1989) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
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Andres conveyed Applewood Farm "to Bogatz, her heirs and assigns, so long as the premises are used for residential and farm purposes, then to Cohen and his heirs." The common law Rule Against Perpetuities, unmodified by statute, is part of the law of the jurisdiction in which Applewood Farm is located. As a consequence of the conveyance, Cohen's interest in Applewood Farm is
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
“As a formulation of the Rule Against Perpetuities, our cases have adopted Professor Gray's statement that ‘[n]o interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of **837 the interest.’ ”4 Dorado Ltd. P'Ship v. Broadneck Dev. *489 Corp., 317 Md. 148, 152, 562 A.2d 757 (1989) (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Mer.-Safe, Etc. Co., 220 Md. 534, 541, 155 A.2d 702 (1959)). The rule “ ‘is not a rule that invalidates interests which last too long, but interests which vest too remotely.’ ” Arundel Corp. v. Marie, 383 Md. 489, 495, 860 A.2d 886 (2004) (quoting Fitzpatrick, 220 Md. at 541, 155 A.2d 702).
Question and Possible Answers:
Andres conveyed Applewood Farm "to Bogatz, her heirs and assigns, so long as the premises are used for residential and farm purposes, then to Cohen and his heirs." The common law Rule Against Perpetuities, unmodified by statute, is part of the law of the jurisdiction in which Applewood Farm is located. As a consequence of the conveyance, Cohen's interest in Applewood Farm is
(A) nothing.
(B) a valid executory interest.
(C) a possibility of reverter.
(D) a right of entry for condition broken.
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"A",
"nothing."
] |
mbe_965
|
“As a formulation of the Rule Against Perpetuities, our cases have adopted Professor Gray's statement that ‘[n]o interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of **837 the interest.’ ”4 Dorado Ltd. P'Ship v. Broadneck Dev. *489 Corp., 317 Md. 148, 152, 562 A.2d 757 (1989) (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Mer.-Safe, Etc. Co., 220 Md. 534, 541, 155 A.2d 702 (1959)). The rule “ ‘is not a rule that invalidates interests which last too long, but interests which vest too remotely.’ ” Arundel Corp. v. Marie, 383 Md. 489, 495, 860 A.2d 886 (2004) (quoting Fitzpatrick, 220 Md. at 541, 155 A.2d 702).
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Supermarket is in a section of town where there are sometimes street fights and where pedestrians are occasionally the victims of pickpockets and muggers. In recognition of the unusual number of robberies in the area, the supermarket posted signs in the store and in its parking lot that read: Warning: There are pickpockets and muggers at work in this part of the city. Supermarket is not responsible for the acts of criminals. One evening, Lorner drove to Supermarket to see about a special on turkeys that Supermarket was advertising. She decided that the turkeys were too large and left the store without purchasing anything. In the parking lot, she was attacked by an unknown man who raped her and then ran away. If Lorner sues Supermarket, the result should be for the
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
In Tennessee, while there is generally no duty for business to protect their customers from crimes occurring on their premises,
a duty to take reasonable steps to protect customers arises if the business knows, or has reason to know, either from what has been or should have been observed or from past experience, that criminal acts against its customers on its premises are reasonably foreseeable, either generally or at some particular time. In determining the duty that exists, the foreseeability of harm and the gravity of harm must be balanced against the commensurate burden imposed on the business to protect against that harm.
McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. P'ship, 937 S.W.2d 891, 902 (Tenn.1996).
Question and Possible Answers:
Supermarket is in a section of town where there are sometimes street fights and where pedestrians are occasionally the victims of pickpockets and muggers. In recognition of the unusual number of robberies in the area, the supermarket posted signs in the store and in its parking lot that read: Warning: There are pickpockets and muggers at work in this part of the city. Supermarket is not responsible for the acts of criminals. One evening, Lorner drove to Supermarket to see about a special on turkeys that Supermarket was advertising. She decided that the turkeys were too large and left the store without purchasing anything. In the parking lot, she was attacked by an unknown man who raped her and then ran away. If Lorner sues Supermarket, the result should be for the
(A) plaintiff, if Supermarket failed to take reasonable steps to protect customers against criminal attack in its parking lot.
(B) plaintiff, because Supermarket is liable for harm to business invitees on its premises.
(C) defendant, if the warning signs were plainly visible to Lorner.
(D) defendant, because the rapist was the proximate cause of Lorner's injuries.
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"A",
"plaintiff, if Supermarket failed to take reasonable steps to protect customers against criminal attack in its parking lot."
] |
mbe_768
|
In Tennessee, while there is generally no duty for business to protect their customers from crimes occurring on their premises,
a duty to take reasonable steps to protect customers arises if the business knows, or has reason to know, either from what has been or should have been observed or from past experience, that criminal acts against its customers on its premises are reasonably foreseeable, either generally or at some particular time. In determining the duty that exists, the foreseeability of harm and the gravity of harm must be balanced against the commensurate burden imposed on the business to protect against that harm.
McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. P'ship, 937 S.W.2d 891, 902 (Tenn.1996).
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In preparation for a mountain-climbing expedition, Alper purchased the necessary climbing equipment from Outfitters, Inc., a retail dealer in sporting goods. A week later, Alper fell from a rock face when a safety device he had purchased from Outfitters malfunctioned because of a defect in its manufacture. Thereafter, Rollins was severely injured when he tried to reach and give assistance to Alper on the ledge to which Alper had fallen. Rollins's injury was not caused by any fault on his own part. If Rollins brings an action against Outfitters, Inc., to recover damages for his injuries, will Rollins prevail?
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
The elements of a products liability claim are that (1) a product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; (2) the defect existed at the time the product left the defendant's control; and (3) the defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 623 n. 3. When products liability is based on a manufacturing-flaw theory, a product is in a defective condition if the user could not have anticipated the danger that the product poses. Id. at 622; see also 4A Minnesota Practice, CIVJIG § 75.30 (4th ed.1999).
Question and Possible Answers:
In preparation for a mountain-climbing expedition, Alper purchased the necessary climbing equipment from Outfitters, Inc., a retail dealer in sporting goods. A week later, Alper fell from a rock face when a safety device he had purchased from Outfitters malfunctioned because of a defect in its manufacture. Thereafter, Rollins was severely injured when he tried to reach and give assistance to Alper on the ledge to which Alper had fallen. Rollins's injury was not caused by any fault on his own part. If Rollins brings an action against Outfitters, Inc., to recover damages for his injuries, will Rollins prevail?
(A) No, unless Outfitters could have discovered the defect by a reasonable inspection of the safety device.
(B) No, because Rollins did not rely on the representation of safety implied from the sale of the safety device by Outfitters.
(C) Yes, unless Alper was negligent in failing to test the safety device.
(D) Yes, because injury to a person in Rollins's position was foreseeable if the safety device failed.
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"D",
"Yes, because injury to a person in Rollins's position was foreseeable if the safety device failed."
] |
mbe_656
|
The elements of a products liability claim are that (1) a product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; (2) the defect existed at the time the product left the defendant's control; and (3) the defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 623 n. 3. When products liability is based on a manufacturing-flaw theory, a product is in a defective condition if the user could not have anticipated the danger that the product poses. Id. at 622; see also 4A Minnesota Practice, CIVJIG § 75.30 (4th ed.1999).
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If the Attorney General signs the indictment, the strongest argument Green could urge as a defense is that
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
Although the Constitution does not expressly authorize Congress to conduct investigations, Congress – and the courts – have long recognized that Congress has an inherent, constitutional prerogative to conduct investigations. In fact, the first congressional investigation occurred as early as 1792, when the House of Representatives convened a committee to investigate the defeat of General Arthur St. Clair in the Battle of the Wabash in what was then known as the Northwest Territory (and now known as Ohio). Congress has the authority to conduct investigations “in aid of its legislative function.” That authority can extend to investigations for the purpose of deciding whether legislation is appropriate, to information gathering on matters of national importance, to oversight of federal departments and executive agencies. As a result, a congressional committee has broad discretion regarding both the scope of its investigation and the relevance of the information it requests. Although congressional authority to investigate is broad, it is not unlimited. Because Congress’s authority to investigate is tied to its authority to legislate, limits on congressional investigations are necessarily linked to the limits on Congress’s constitutional authority. For example, Congress has no general authority to investigate the purely private affair of an ordinary citizen. The doctrine of separation of powers also places limits on congressional authority to investigate. Congress cannot, under the guise of an investigation, usurp the power of another branch of government. It cannot investigate matters where the means of redress is purely judicial. Nor can Congress investigate matters committed to the President’s discretion. For example, Congress could not undertake an investigation to determine an individual’s entitlement to a pardon because the Constitution granted the pardon power to the President, not Congress. While Congress can investigate conduct that may be criminal, Congress itself lacks the authority to bring criminal charges or otherwise initiate a criminal prosecution. If a congressional investigation uncovers evidence of criminal activity, however, Congress may refer the matter to the Department of Justice for investigation and, potentially, prosecution. Sometimes, the DOJ investigation predates the congressional investigation. No matter which branch of government moves first to investigate, however, the end result is that a congressional investigation often will run parallel to a criminal investigation. As a result, evidence developed in a congressional investigation might be used by the DOJ in its criminal investigation or in a prosecution. Ultimately, nearly any matter can be anchored in some fashion to Congress’s legislative authority, making its authority to investigate almost boundless in practice. That reality is compounded by expansive interpretations of congressional authority and a hesitation by the courts to intervene in congressional investigations.
Question and Possible Answers:
Green is cited for contempt of the House of Representatives after she refused to answer certain questions posed by a House Committee concerning her acts while serving as a United States Ambassador. A federal statute authorizes the Attorney General to prosecute contempts of Congress. Pursuant to this law, the House directs the Attorney General to begin criminal proceedings against Green. A federal grand jury indicts Green, but the Attorney General refuses to sign the indictment.
If the Attorney General signs the indictment, the strongest argument Green could urge as a defense is that
(A) Green may refuse to answer the questions if she can demonstrate that they are unrelated to matters upon which Congress may legislate
(B) the House may question Green only on matters pertaining to the expenditure of funds appropriated by Congress
(C) only the Senate may question Green on matters that relate to the performance of her duties
(D) Congress may not ask questions relating to the performance of duties executed by an officer of the executive branch
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"A",
"Green may refuse to answer the questions if she can demonstrate that they are unrelated to matters upon which Congress may legislate"
] |
mbe_200
|
Although the Constitution does not expressly authorize Congress to conduct investigations, Congress – and the courts – have long recognized that Congress has an inherent, constitutional prerogative to conduct investigations. In fact, the first congressional investigation occurred as early as 1792, when the House of Representatives convened a committee to investigate the defeat of General Arthur St. Clair in the Battle of the Wabash in what was then known as the Northwest Territory (and now known as Ohio). Congress has the authority to conduct investigations “in aid of its legislative function.” That authority can extend to investigations for the purpose of deciding whether legislation is appropriate, to information gathering on matters of national importance, to oversight of federal departments and executive agencies. As a result, a congressional committee has broad discretion regarding both the scope of its investigation and the relevance of the information it requests. Although congressional authority to investigate is broad, it is not unlimited. Because Congress’s authority to investigate is tied to its authority to legislate, limits on congressional investigations are necessarily linked to the limits on Congress’s constitutional authority. For example, Congress has no general authority to investigate the purely private affair of an ordinary citizen. The doctrine of separation of powers also places limits on congressional authority to investigate. Congress cannot, under the guise of an investigation, usurp the power of another branch of government. It cannot investigate matters where the means of redress is purely judicial. Nor can Congress investigate matters committed to the President’s discretion. For example, Congress could not undertake an investigation to determine an individual’s entitlement to a pardon because the Constitution granted the pardon power to the President, not Congress. While Congress can investigate conduct that may be criminal, Congress itself lacks the authority to bring criminal charges or otherwise initiate a criminal prosecution. If a congressional investigation uncovers evidence of criminal activity, however, Congress may refer the matter to the Department of Justice for investigation and, potentially, prosecution. Sometimes, the DOJ investigation predates the congressional investigation. No matter which branch of government moves first to investigate, however, the end result is that a congressional investigation often will run parallel to a criminal investigation. As a result, evidence developed in a congressional investigation might be used by the DOJ in its criminal investigation or in a prosecution. Ultimately, nearly any matter can be anchored in some fashion to Congress’s legislative authority, making its authority to investigate almost boundless in practice. That reality is compounded by expansive interpretations of congressional authority and a hesitation by the courts to intervene in congressional investigations.
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Assume for this question only that the court denied the motion to suppress the jewelry. Yancey moves to suppress the use of the statement Yancey made to his parents. The that best argument for excluding it would be
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
A confession is voluntary if, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the confession is the product of a rational intellect and not the result of physical abuse, psychological intimidation, or deceptive interrogation tactics that have overcome the defendant's free will.
Question and Possible Answers:
The police suspected that Yancey, a 16-year-old high school student, had committed a series of burglaries. Two officers went to Yancey's high school and asked the principal to call Yancey out of class and to search his backpack. While the officers waited, the principal took Yancey into the hall where she asked to look in his backpack. When Yancey refused, the principal grabbed it from him, injuring Yancey's shoulder in the process. In the backpack, she found jewelry that she turned over to the officers. The officers believed that the jewelry had been taken in one of the burglaries. They arrested Yancey, took him to the station, and gave him Miranda warnings. Yancey asked to see a lawyer. The police called Yancey's parents to the station. When Yancey's parents arrived, the police asked them to speak with Yancey. They put them in a room and secretly recorded their conversation with a concealed electronic device. Yancey broke down and confessed to his parents that he had committed the burglaries. Yancey was charged with the burglaries.
Assume for this question only that the court denied the motion to suppress the jewelry. Yancey moves to suppress the use of the statement Yancey made to his parents. The that best argument for excluding it would be
(A) Yancey was in custody at the time the statement was recorded.
(B) the police did not comply with Yancey's request for a lawyer.
(C) once Yancey had invoked his right to counsel, it was improper for the police to listen to any of his private conversations.
(D) the meeting between Yancey and his parents was arranged by the police to obtain an incriminating statement.
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"D",
"the meeting between Yancey and his parents was arranged by the police to obtain an incriminating statement."
] |
mbe_892
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A confession is voluntary if, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the confession is the product of a rational intellect and not the result of physical abuse, psychological intimidation, or deceptive interrogation tactics that have overcome the defendant's free will.
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A federal statute with inseverable provisions established a new five-member National Prosperity Board with broad regulatory powers over the operation of the securities, banking, and commodities industries, including the power to issue rules with the force of law. The statute provides for three of the board members to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. They serve seven-year terms and are removable only for good cause. The other two members of the board were designated in the statute to be the respective general counsel of the Senate and House of Representatives Committees on Government Operations. The statute stipulated that they were to serve on the board for as long as they continued in those positions. Following all required administrative procedures, the board issued an elaborate set of rules regulating the operations of all banks, securities dealers, and commodities brokers. The Green Light Securities Company, which was subject to the board's rules, sought a declaratory judgment that the rules were invalid because the statute establishing the board was unconstitutional. In this case, the court should rule that the statute establishing the National Prosperity Board is
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
The Appointments Clause of Article II of the Constitution reads as follows:
“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
5678As we recognized in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125, 96 S.Ct. 612, 685, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam), the Appointments Clause of Article II is more than a matter of “etiquette or protocol”; it is among the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme. By vesting the President with the exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) officers of the United States, the Appointments Clause prevents congressional encroachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches. See id., at 128–131, 96 S.Ct., at 686–688; Weiss, supra, at 183–185, 114 S.Ct., at 763–765 (SOUTER, J., concurring); Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 904, and n. 4, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2652, and n. 4, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (SCALIA, J., concurring). This disposition was also designed to assure a higher quality of appointments: The Framers anticipated that the President would be less vulnerable to interest-group pressure and personal favoritism than would a collective body. “The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty, and a more exact regard to reputation.” The Federalist No. 76, p. 387 (M. Beloff ed. 1987) (A. Hamilton); accord, 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 374–375 (1833). The President's power to select principal officers of the United States was not left unguarded, however, as Article II further requires the “Advice and Consent of the Senate.” This serves both to curb Executive abuses of the appointment power, see 3 Story, supra, at 376–377, and “to promote a judicious choice of [persons] for filling the offices of the union,” The Federalist No. 76, at 386–387. *660 By requiring the joint participation of the President and the Senate, the Appointments Clause was designed to ensure public accountability for both the making of a bad appointment and the rejection of a good one. Hamilton observed:
“The blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the president singly and absolutely. The censure of rejecting a good one would lie entirely at the door of the senate; aggravated by the consideration of their having counteracted the good intentions of the executive. If an ill appointment should be made, the executive for nominating, and the senate for approving, would participate, though in different degrees, in the opprobrium and disgrace.” Id., No. 77, at 392.
See also 3 Story, supra, at 375 (“If [the President] should ... surrender the public patronage into the hands of profligate men, or low adventurers, it will be impossible for him long to retain public favour”).
The prescribed manner of appointment for principal officers is also the default manner of appointment for inferior officers. “[B]ut,” the Appointments Clause continues, “the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” This provision, sometimes referred to as the “Excepting Clause,” was added to the proposed Constitution on the last day of the Grand Convention, with little discussion. See 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 627–628 (1911 ed.). As one of our early opinions suggests, its obvious purpose is administrative convenience, see United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510, 25 L.Ed. 482 (1879)—but that convenience was deemed to outweigh the benefits of the more cumbersome procedure only with respect to the appointment of “inferior Officers.” Section 323(a), which confers appointment power upon the Secretary of Transportation, can constitutionally be *661 applied to the appointment of Court of Criminal Appeals judges only if those judges are “inferior Officers.”
Our cases have not set forth an exclusive criterion for distinguishing between principal and inferior officers for Appointments Clause purposes. Among the offices that we have found to be inferior are that of a district court clerk, Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 225, 229, 10 L.Ed. 136 (1839), an election supervisor, Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397–398, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1880), a vice consul charged temporarily with the duties of the consul, United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343, 18 S.Ct. 374, 379, 42 L.Ed. 767 (1898), and a “United States commissioner” in district court proceedings, Go–Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 352–354, 51 S.Ct. 153, 156–157, 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931). Most recently, in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988), we held that the independent counsel created by provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–599, was an inferior officer. In reaching that conclusion, we relied on several factors: that the independent counsel was subject to removal by a higher officer (the Attorney General), that she performed only limited duties, that her jurisdiction was narrow, and that her tenure was limited. 487 U.S., at 671–672, 108 S.Ct., at 2608–2609.
Question and Possible Answers:
A federal statute with inseverable provisions established a new five-member National Prosperity Board with broad regulatory powers over the operation of the securities, banking, and commodities industries, including the power to issue rules with the force of law. The statute provides for three of the board members to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. They serve seven-year terms and are removable only for good cause. The other two members of the board were designated in the statute to be the respective general counsel of the Senate and House of Representatives Committees on Government Operations. The statute stipulated that they were to serve on the board for as long as they continued in those positions. Following all required administrative procedures, the board issued an elaborate set of rules regulating the operations of all banks, securities dealers, and commodities brokers. The Green Light Securities Company, which was subject to the board's rules, sought a declaratory judgment that the rules were invalid because the statute establishing the board was unconstitutional. In this case, the court should rule that the statute establishing the National Prosperity Board is
(A) unconstitutional, because all members of federal boards having broad powers that are quasi-legislative in nature, such as rulemaking, must be appointed by Congress.
(B) unconstitutional, because all members of federal boards exercising executive powers must be appointed by the President or in a manner otherwise consistent with the appointments clause of Article II.
(C) constitutional, because the necessary and proper clause authorizes Congress to determine the means by which members are appointed to boards created by Congress under its power to regulate commerce among the states.
(D) constitutional, because there is a substantial nexus between the power of Congress to legislate for the general welfare and the means specified by Congress in this statute for the appointment of board members.
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"B",
"unconstitutional, because all members of federal boards exercising executive powers must be appointed by the President or in a manner otherwise consistent with the appointments clause of Article II."
] |
mbe_1078
|
The Appointments Clause of Article II of the Constitution reads as follows:
“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
5678As we recognized in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125, 96 S.Ct. 612, 685, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam), the Appointments Clause of Article II is more than a matter of “etiquette or protocol”; it is among the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme. By vesting the President with the exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) officers of the United States, the Appointments Clause prevents congressional encroachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches. See id., at 128–131, 96 S.Ct., at 686–688; Weiss, supra, at 183–185, 114 S.Ct., at 763–765 (SOUTER, J., concurring); Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 904, and n. 4, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2652, and n. 4, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (SCALIA, J., concurring). This disposition was also designed to assure a higher quality of appointments: The Framers anticipated that the President would be less vulnerable to interest-group pressure and personal favoritism than would a collective body. “The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty, and a more exact regard to reputation.” The Federalist No. 76, p. 387 (M. Beloff ed. 1987) (A. Hamilton); accord, 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 374–375 (1833). The President's power to select principal officers of the United States was not left unguarded, however, as Article II further requires the “Advice and Consent of the Senate.” This serves both to curb Executive abuses of the appointment power, see 3 Story, supra, at 376–377, and “to promote a judicious choice of [persons] for filling the offices of the union,” The Federalist No. 76, at 386–387. *660 By requiring the joint participation of the President and the Senate, the Appointments Clause was designed to ensure public accountability for both the making of a bad appointment and the rejection of a good one. Hamilton observed:
“The blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the president singly and absolutely. The censure of rejecting a good one would lie entirely at the door of the senate; aggravated by the consideration of their having counteracted the good intentions of the executive. If an ill appointment should be made, the executive for nominating, and the senate for approving, would participate, though in different degrees, in the opprobrium and disgrace.” Id., No. 77, at 392.
See also 3 Story, supra, at 375 (“If [the President] should ... surrender the public patronage into the hands of profligate men, or low adventurers, it will be impossible for him long to retain public favour”).
The prescribed manner of appointment for principal officers is also the default manner of appointment for inferior officers. “[B]ut,” the Appointments Clause continues, “the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” This provision, sometimes referred to as the “Excepting Clause,” was added to the proposed Constitution on the last day of the Grand Convention, with little discussion. See 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 627–628 (1911 ed.). As one of our early opinions suggests, its obvious purpose is administrative convenience, see United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510, 25 L.Ed. 482 (1879)—but that convenience was deemed to outweigh the benefits of the more cumbersome procedure only with respect to the appointment of “inferior Officers.” Section 323(a), which confers appointment power upon the Secretary of Transportation, can constitutionally be *661 applied to the appointment of Court of Criminal Appeals judges only if those judges are “inferior Officers.”
Our cases have not set forth an exclusive criterion for distinguishing between principal and inferior officers for Appointments Clause purposes. Among the offices that we have found to be inferior are that of a district court clerk, Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 225, 229, 10 L.Ed. 136 (1839), an election supervisor, Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397–398, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1880), a vice consul charged temporarily with the duties of the consul, United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343, 18 S.Ct. 374, 379, 42 L.Ed. 767 (1898), and a “United States commissioner” in district court proceedings, Go–Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 352–354, 51 S.Ct. 153, 156–157, 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931). Most recently, in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988), we held that the independent counsel created by provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–599, was an inferior officer. In reaching that conclusion, we relied on several factors: that the independent counsel was subject to removal by a higher officer (the Attorney General), that she performed only limited duties, that her jurisdiction was narrow, and that her tenure was limited. 487 U.S., at 671–672, 108 S.Ct., at 2608–2609.
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According to a statute of the state of Kiowa, a candidate for state office may have his name placed on the official election ballot only if he files with the appropriate state official a petition containing a specified number of voter signatures. Roderick failed to get his name placed on the state ballot as an independent candidate for governor because he failed to file a petition with the number of voter signatures required by state statute. In a suit against the appropriate state officials in federal district court, Roderick sought an injunction against the petition signature requirement on the ground that it was unconstitutional. Which of the following, if established, constitutes the strongest argument for Roderick?
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
In assessing whether a State election law impermissibly burdens First Amendment rights, we examine the character and magnitude of the burden and the extent to which the law serves the State's interests. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). Laws imposing severe burdens must be narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests, but lesser burdens receive less exacting scrutiny. California Democratic Party, 120 S.Ct. at 2412; Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364.
Question and Possible Answers:
According to a statute of the state of Kiowa, a candidate for state office may have his name placed on the official election ballot only if he files with the appropriate state official a petition containing a specified number of voter signatures. Roderick failed to get his name placed on the state ballot as an independent candidate for governor because he failed to file a petition with the number of voter signatures required by state statute. In a suit against the appropriate state officials in federal district court, Roderick sought an injunction against the petition signature requirement on the ground that it was unconstitutional. Which of the following, if established, constitutes the strongest argument for Roderick?
(A) Compliance with the petition signature requirement is burdensome.
(B) The objectives of the statute could be satisfactorily achieved by less burdensome means.
(C) Because of the petition signature requirement, very few independent candidates have ever succeeded in getting on the ballot.
(D) The motivation for the statute was a desire to keep candidates off the ballot if they did not have strong support among voters.
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"B",
"The objectives of the statute could be satisfactorily achieved by less burdensome means."
] |
mbe_973
|
In assessing whether a State election law impermissibly burdens First Amendment rights, we examine the character and magnitude of the burden and the extent to which the law serves the State's interests. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). Laws imposing severe burdens must be narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests, but lesser burdens receive less exacting scrutiny. California Democratic Party, 120 S.Ct. at 2412; Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364.
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Dart is charged with the statutory offense of "knowingly violating a regulation of the State Alcoholic Beverage Control Board" and specifically that he knowingly violated regulation number 345-90 issued by the State Alcoholic Beverage Control Board. That regulation prohibits the sale of alcoholic beverages to any person under the age of 18 and also prohibits the sale of any alcoholic beverage to a person over the age of 17 and under the age of 22 without the presentation of such person's driver's license or other identification showing the age of the purchaser to be 18 or older. The evidence showed that Dart was a bartender in a tavern and sold a bottle of beer to a person who was 17 years old and that Dart did not ask for or see the purchaser's driver's license or any other identification. Which of the following, if found by the jury, would be of the most help to Dart?
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
Mistake of fact is a defense where the reasonable mistake of fact precludes the presence of any mental element required in that crime. La. R.S. 14:16; see State v. Converse, 529 So.2d 459, 465 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 533 So.2d 355 (La.1988).
Question and Possible Answers:
Dart is charged with the statutory offense of "knowingly violating a regulation of the State Alcoholic Beverage Control Board" and specifically that he knowingly violated regulation number 345-90 issued by the State Alcoholic Beverage Control Board. That regulation prohibits the sale of alcoholic beverages to any person under the age of 18 and also prohibits the sale of any alcoholic beverage to a person over the age of 17 and under the age of 22 without the presentation of such person's driver's license or other identification showing the age of the purchaser to be 18 or older. The evidence showed that Dart was a bartender in a tavern and sold a bottle of beer to a person who was 17 years old and that Dart did not ask for or see the purchaser's driver's license or any other identification. Which of the following, if found by the jury, would be of the most help to Dart?
(A) The purchaser had a driver's license that falsely showed his age to be 21.
(B) Dart had never been told he was supposed to check identification of persons over 17 and under 22 before selling them alcohol.
(C) Dart did not know that the regulations classified beer as an alcoholic beverage.
(D) Dart mistakenly believed the purchaser to be 24 years old.
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"D",
"Dart mistakenly believed the purchaser to be 24 years old."
] |
mbe_799
|
Mistake of fact is a defense where the reasonable mistake of fact precludes the presence of any mental element required in that crime. La. R.S. 14:16; see State v. Converse, 529 So.2d 459, 465 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 533 So.2d 355 (La.1988).
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Loomis, the owner and operator of a small business, encourages "wellness" on the part of his employees and supports various physicalfitness programs to that end. Learning that one of his employees, Graceful, was a dedicated jogger, Loomis promised to pay her a special award of $100 if she could and would run one mile in less than six minutes on the following Saturday. Graceful thanked him, and did in fact run a mile in less than six minutes on the day specified. Shortly thereafter, however, Loomis discovered that for more than a year Graceful had been running at least one mile in less than six minutes every day as a part of her personal fitness program. He refused to pay the $100. In an action by Graceful against Loomis for breach of contract, which of the following best summarizes the probable decision of the court?
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
“California law does not recognize a breach of contract as a ‘wrongful act’ predicate required for this claim.” “[A] breach of contract claim cannot be transmuted into tort liability by claiming that the breach interfered with the promisee's business.”83 This is true even when a party breaches in order to put the non-breaching party out of business and rid itself of a competitor.84 “[M]otive, regardless of how malevolent, remains irrelevant to a breach of contract claim and does not convert a contract action into a tort claim....” To the extent that Templeton *1194 is alleging a breach of contract, it must pursue this claim under that theory.
Question and Possible Answers:
Loomis, the owner and operator of a small business, encourages "wellness" on the part of his employees and supports various physicalfitness programs to that end. Learning that one of his employees, Graceful, was a dedicated jogger, Loomis promised to pay her a special award of $100 if she could and would run one mile in less than six minutes on the following Saturday. Graceful thanked him, and did in fact run a mile in less than six minutes on the day specified. Shortly thereafter, however, Loomis discovered that for more than a year Graceful had been running at least one mile in less than six minutes every day as a part of her personal fitness program. He refused to pay the $100. In an action by Graceful against Loomis for breach of contract, which of the following best summarizes the probable decision of the court?
(A) Loomis wins, because it is a compelling inference that Loomis's promise did not induce Graceful to run the specified mile.
(B) Loomis wins, because Graceful's running of the specified mile was beneficial, not detrimental, to her in any event.
(C) Graceful wins, because running a mile in less than six minutes is a significantly demanding enterprise.
(D) Graceful wins, because she ran the specified mile as requested, and her motives for doing so are irrelevant.
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"D",
"Graceful wins, because she ran the specified mile as requested, and her motives for doing so are irrelevant."
] |
mbe_778
|
“California law does not recognize a breach of contract as a ‘wrongful act’ predicate required for this claim.” “[A] breach of contract claim cannot be transmuted into tort liability by claiming that the breach interfered with the promisee's business.”83 This is true even when a party breaches in order to put the non-breaching party out of business and rid itself of a competitor.84 “[M]otive, regardless of how malevolent, remains irrelevant to a breach of contract claim and does not convert a contract action into a tort claim....” To the extent that Templeton *1194 is alleging a breach of contract, it must pursue this claim under that theory.
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Was the escrow agreement a valid modification?
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
For a valid modification to exist, there must be mutual assent *822 to the meaning and conditions of the modification and the parties must assent to the same thing in the same sense.... Modification of a contract may be inferred from the attendant circumstances and conduct of the parties.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tsionis v. Martens, 116 Conn.App. 568, 577, 976 A.2d 53 (2009). “A modification of an agreement must be supported by valid consideration and requires a party to do, or promise to do, something further than, or different from, that which he is already bound to do.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Christian v. Gouldin, supra, 72 Conn.App. at 23, 804 A.2d 865.
Question and Possible Answers:
On March 1, Computer Programs, Inc. (CP) orally agreed with Holiday Department Store (HDS) to write a set of programs for HDS's computer and to coordinate the programs with HDS's billing methods. A subsequent memo, signed by both parties, provided in its entirety: HDS will pay CP $20,000 in two equal installments within one month of completion if CP is successful in shortening by one-half the processing time for the financial transactions now handled on HDS's Zenon 747 computer; CP to complete by July 1. This agreement may be amended only by a signed writing. On June 6, CP demanded $10,000, saying the job was one-half done. After HDS denied liability, the parties orally agreed that HDS should deposit $20,000 in escrow, pending completion to the satisfaction of HDS's computer systems manager. The escrow deposit was thereupon made. On July 5, CP completed the programs, having used an amount of time in which it could have earned $18,000 had it devoted that time to other jobs. Tests by CP and HDS's computer systems manager then showed that the computer programs, not being perfectly coordinated with HDS's billing methods, cut processing time by only 47%. They would, however, save HDS $12,000 a year. Further, if HDS would spend $5,000 to change its invoice preparation methods, as recommended by CP, the programs would cut processing time by a total of 58%, saving HDS another $8,000 a year. HDS's computer systems manager refused in good faith to certify satisfactory completion. HDS requested the escrow agent to return the $20,000 and asserted that nothing was owed to CP even though HDS continued to use the programs.
Was the escrow agreement a valid modification?
(A) Yes, because it was the compromise of an honest dispute.
(B) Yes, because the Statute of Frauds does not apply to subsequent oral modifications.
(C) No, because it was oral.
(D) No, because it was not supported by consideration.
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"A",
"Yes, because it was the compromise of an honest dispute."
] |
mbe_233
|
For a valid modification to exist, there must be mutual assent *822 to the meaning and conditions of the modification and the parties must assent to the same thing in the same sense.... Modification of a contract may be inferred from the attendant circumstances and conduct of the parties.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tsionis v. Martens, 116 Conn.App. 568, 577, 976 A.2d 53 (2009). “A modification of an agreement must be supported by valid consideration and requires a party to do, or promise to do, something further than, or different from, that which he is already bound to do.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Christian v. Gouldin, supra, 72 Conn.App. at 23, 804 A.2d 865.
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Tess occupied an apartment in a building owned by Len. She paid rent of $125 in advance each month. During the second month of occupancy, Tess organized the tenants in the building as a tenants' association and the association made demands of Len concerning certain repairs and improvements the tenants wanted. When Tess tendered rent for the third month, Len notified her that rent for the fourth and subsequent months would be $200 per month. Tess protested and pointed out that all other tenants paid rent of $125 per month. Thereupon, Len gave the required statutory notice that the tenancy was being terminated at the end of the third month. By an appropriate proceeding, Tess contests Len's right to terminate. If Tess succeeds, it will be because
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
"Retaliatory evidence" is called the doctrine of "curative admissibility" in the cases. It is a doctrine which seeks to level the playing field in a way. Under it, when one party "opens the door" by introducing otherwise inadmissible evidence, the opposing party is provided with the unconditional right to rebut such evidence with other illegal evidence on the same subject.
The law is that "even though a party introduces evidence that may be immaterial or illegal, his opponent has the right to rebut such evidence and this right is unconditional." A party "who has brought out evidence on a certain subject has no valid complaint as to the trial court's action in allowing his opponent or adversary to introduce evidence on the same subject."
Question and Possible Answers:
Tess occupied an apartment in a building owned by Len. She paid rent of $125 in advance each month. During the second month of occupancy, Tess organized the tenants in the building as a tenants' association and the association made demands of Len concerning certain repairs and improvements the tenants wanted. When Tess tendered rent for the third month, Len notified her that rent for the fourth and subsequent months would be $200 per month. Tess protested and pointed out that all other tenants paid rent of $125 per month. Thereupon, Len gave the required statutory notice that the tenancy was being terminated at the end of the third month. By an appropriate proceeding, Tess contests Len's right to terminate. If Tess succeeds, it will be because
(A) a periodic tenancy was created by implication
(B) the doctrine prohibiting retaliatory eviction is part of the law of the jurisdiction
(C) the $200 rent demanded violates the agreement implied by the rate charged to other tenants
(D) the law implies a term of one year in the absence of any express agreement
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"B",
"the doctrine prohibiting retaliatory eviction is part of the law of the jurisdiction"
] |
mbe_284
|
"Retaliatory evidence" is called the doctrine of "curative admissibility" in the cases. It is a doctrine which seeks to level the playing field in a way. Under it, when one party "opens the door" by introducing otherwise inadmissible evidence, the opposing party is provided with the unconditional right to rebut such evidence with other illegal evidence on the same subject.
The law is that "even though a party introduces evidence that may be immaterial or illegal, his opponent has the right to rebut such evidence and this right is unconditional." A party "who has brought out evidence on a certain subject has no valid complaint as to the trial court's action in allowing his opponent or adversary to introduce evidence on the same subject."
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The National Ecological Balance Act prohibits the destruction or removal of any wild animals located on lands owned by the United States without express permission from the Federal Bureau of Land Management. Violators are subject to fines of up to $1,000 per offense. After substantial property damage was inflicted on residents of the state of Arkota by hungry coyotes, the state legislature passed the Coyote Bounty Bill, which offers $25 for each coyote killed or captured within the state. The Kota National Forest, owned by the federal government, is located entirely within the state of Arkota. Many coyotes live in the Kota National Forest. Without seeking permission from the Bureau of Land Management, Hunter shot several coyotes in the Kota National Forest and collected the bounty from the state of Arkota. As a result, he was subsequently tried in federal district court, convicted, and fined $1,000 for violating the National Ecological Balance Act. Hunter appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals. On appeal, the Court of Appeals should hold the National Ecological Balance Act, as applied to Hunter, to be
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
This failure is hardly surprising, for the Clause, in broad terms, gives Congress the power to determine what are “needful” rules “respecting” the public lands. United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S., at 29-30, 60 S.Ct., at 756; Light v. United States, 220 U.S., at 537, 31 S.Ct., at 488; United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet., at 537-538. And while the furthest reaches of the power granted by the Property Clause have not yet been definitively resolved, we have repeatedly observed that “(t)he power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.” United States v. San Francisco, supra, 310 U.S., at 29, 60 S.Ct., at 756. See Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-295, 78 S.Ct. 1174, 1185, 2 L.Ed.2d 1313 (1958); Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273, 74 S.Ct. 481, 98 L.Ed. 689 (1954); FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 21, 73 S.Ct. 85, 87, 97 L.Ed. 15 (1952); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 27, 67 S.Ct. 1658, 1662, 91 L.Ed. 1889 (1947); **2292 Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall 92, 99, 20 L.Ed. 534 (1872); United States v. Gratiot, supra, 14 Pet., at 537.
Question and Possible Answers:
The National Ecological Balance Act prohibits the destruction or removal of any wild animals located on lands owned by the United States without express permission from the Federal Bureau of Land Management. Violators are subject to fines of up to $1,000 per offense. After substantial property damage was inflicted on residents of the state of Arkota by hungry coyotes, the state legislature passed the Coyote Bounty Bill, which offers $25 for each coyote killed or captured within the state. The Kota National Forest, owned by the federal government, is located entirely within the state of Arkota. Many coyotes live in the Kota National Forest. Without seeking permission from the Bureau of Land Management, Hunter shot several coyotes in the Kota National Forest and collected the bounty from the state of Arkota. As a result, he was subsequently tried in federal district court, convicted, and fined $1,000 for violating the National Ecological Balance Act. Hunter appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals. On appeal, the Court of Appeals should hold the National Ecological Balance Act, as applied to Hunter, to be
(A) constitutional, because the property clause of Article IV, Section 3, of the Constitution authorizes such federal statutory controls and sanctions.
(B) constitutional, because Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution authorizes Congress to enact all laws necessary and proper to advance the general welfare.
(C) unconstitutional, because Congress may not use its delegated powers to override the Tenth Amendment right of the state of Arkota to legislate in areas of traditional state governmental functions, such as the protection of the property of its residents.
(D) unconstitutional, because Congress violates the full faith and credit clause of Article IV when it punishes conduct that has been authorized by state action.
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"A",
"constitutional, because the property clause of Article IV, Section 3, of the Constitution authorizes such federal statutory controls and sanctions."
] |
mbe_828
|
This failure is hardly surprising, for the Clause, in broad terms, gives Congress the power to determine what are “needful” rules “respecting” the public lands. United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S., at 29-30, 60 S.Ct., at 756; Light v. United States, 220 U.S., at 537, 31 S.Ct., at 488; United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet., at 537-538. And while the furthest reaches of the power granted by the Property Clause have not yet been definitively resolved, we have repeatedly observed that “(t)he power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.” United States v. San Francisco, supra, 310 U.S., at 29, 60 S.Ct., at 756. See Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-295, 78 S.Ct. 1174, 1185, 2 L.Ed.2d 1313 (1958); Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273, 74 S.Ct. 481, 98 L.Ed. 689 (1954); FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 21, 73 S.Ct. 85, 87, 97 L.Ed. 15 (1952); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 27, 67 S.Ct. 1658, 1662, 91 L.Ed. 1889 (1947); **2292 Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall 92, 99, 20 L.Ed. 534 (1872); United States v. Gratiot, supra, 14 Pet., at 537.
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Pedersen's counsel wants to introduce testimony from Sheriff concerning a discussion between Sheriff and Passerby at the police station after the accident, when Passerby excitedly exclaimed, "Pedersen ran out in the street and was not in the crosswalk!" Sheriff duly recorded the statement in an official police report. The trial judge should rule Sheriff's oral testimony
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
[I]n order for an excited utterance to be admissible, the following requirements must be met: (1) there must have been an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement; (2) the statement must have been made before there was time to contrive or misrepresent; and (3) the statement must have been made while the person was under the stress of excitement caused by the startling event.
Stoll v. State, 762 So.2d 870, 873 (Fla. 2000).
Question and Possible Answers:
Carr ran into and injured Pedersen, a pedestrian. With Carr in his car were Wanda and Walter Passenger. Passerby saw the accident and called the police department, which sent Sheriff to investigate. All of these people are available as potential witnesses in the case of Pedersen v. Carr. Pedersen alleges that Carr, while drunk, struck Pedersen who was in a duly marked crosswalk.
Pedersen's counsel wants to introduce testimony from Sheriff concerning a discussion between Sheriff and Passerby at the police station after the accident, when Passerby excitedly exclaimed, "Pedersen ran out in the street and was not in the crosswalk!" Sheriff duly recorded the statement in an official police report. The trial judge should rule Sheriff's oral testimony
(A) admissible as a spontaneous utterance
(B) admissible as based on past recollection recorded
(C) inadmissible because Passerby has not been shown unavailable as a witness
(D) inadmissible under the excited utterance exception because it can be a product of reflection and deliberation
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"D",
"inadmissible under the excited utterance exception because it can be a product of reflection and deliberation"
] |
mbe_377
|
[I]n order for an excited utterance to be admissible, the following requirements must be met: (1) there must have been an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement; (2) the statement must have been made before there was time to contrive or misrepresent; and (3) the statement must have been made while the person was under the stress of excitement caused by the startling event.
Stoll v. State, 762 So.2d 870, 873 (Fla. 2000).
|
Dobbs, while intoxicated, drove his car through a playground crowded with children just to watch the children run to try to get out of his way. His car struck one of the children, killing her instantly. Which of the following is the best theory for finding Dobbs guilty of murder?
|
Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
D.D.A. v. State, 650 So.2d 571, 578 (Ala.Cr.App.1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also McLaughlin v. State, 586 So.2d 267, 270 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (the element of “extreme indifference to human life” by definition does not apply to the life of the victim, but to human life in general); Gholston v. State, 494 So.2d 876, 883 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (to be reckless, a crime must be directed toward the general public, not toward a particular person); King v. State, 505 So.2d 403, 405 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (reckless murder “differs from intentional murder in that it results not from a specific, conscious intent to cause the death of any particular person, but from an indifference to or disregard of the risks attending appellant's conduct”); Baker v. State, 472 So.2d 700, 703 (Ala.Cr.App.1985) (reckless murder “is intended to embrace those cases where a person has no deliberate intent to kill or injure any particular individual”); Northington v. State, 413 So.2d 1169, 1171 (Ala.Cr.App.1981) (where the defendant's acts were specifically directed at a particular victim and no one else, she could not be convicted of reckless murder under § 13A–6–2(a)(2), Code of Alabama 1975).
Question and Possible Answers:
Dobbs, while intoxicated, drove his car through a playground crowded with children just to watch the children run to try to get out of his way. His car struck one of the children, killing her instantly. Which of the following is the best theory for finding Dobbs guilty of murder?
(A) Transferred intent
(B) Felony murder, with assault with a deadly weapon as the underlying felony
(C) Intentional killing, since he knew that the children were there and he deliberately drove his car at them
(D) Commission of an act highly dangerous to life, without an intent to kill but with disregard of the consequences
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"D",
"Commission of an act highly dangerous to life, without an intent to kill but with disregard of the consequences"
] |
mbe_472
|
D.D.A. v. State, 650 So.2d 571, 578 (Ala.Cr.App.1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also McLaughlin v. State, 586 So.2d 267, 270 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (the element of “extreme indifference to human life” by definition does not apply to the life of the victim, but to human life in general); Gholston v. State, 494 So.2d 876, 883 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (to be reckless, a crime must be directed toward the general public, not toward a particular person); King v. State, 505 So.2d 403, 405 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (reckless murder “differs from intentional murder in that it results not from a specific, conscious intent to cause the death of any particular person, but from an indifference to or disregard of the risks attending appellant's conduct”); Baker v. State, 472 So.2d 700, 703 (Ala.Cr.App.1985) (reckless murder “is intended to embrace those cases where a person has no deliberate intent to kill or injure any particular individual”); Northington v. State, 413 So.2d 1169, 1171 (Ala.Cr.App.1981) (where the defendant's acts were specifically directed at a particular victim and no one else, she could not be convicted of reckless murder under § 13A–6–2(a)(2), Code of Alabama 1975).
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In order to provide funds for a system of new major airports near the ten largest cities in the United States, Congress levies a tax of $25 on each airline ticket issued in the United States. The tax applies to every airline ticket, even those for travel that does not originate in, terminate at, or pass through any of those ten large cities. As applied to the issuance in the United States of an airline ticket for travel between two cities that will not be served by any of the new airports, this tax is
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
The only limitation upon the power of Congress to levy excise taxes of the character now under consideration is geographical uniformity throughout the United States. This court has often declared it cannot add others. Subject to such limitation Congress may select the subjects of taxation, and may exercise the power conferred at its discretion. License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 471, 18 L. Ed. 497. Of course Congress may not in the exercise of federal power exert authority wholly reserved to the states. Many decisions of this court have so declared. And from an early day the court has held that the fact that other motives may impel the exercise of federal taxing power does not authorize the courts to inquire into that subject. If the legislation enacted has some reasonable relation to the exercise of the taxing authority conferred by the Constitution, it cannot be invalidated because of the supposed motives which induced it. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 541, 19 L. Ed. 482, in which case this court sustained a tax on a state bank issue of circulating notes. McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 24 Sup. Ct. 769, 49 L. Ed. 78, 1 Ann. Cas. 561, where the power was thoroughly considered, and an act levying a special tax upon oleomargarine artificially colored was sustained. And see Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 147, 153, 156, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 55 L. Ed. 389, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1312, and cases cited.
Question and Possible Answers:
In order to provide funds for a system of new major airports near the ten largest cities in the United States, Congress levies a tax of $25 on each airline ticket issued in the United States. The tax applies to every airline ticket, even those for travel that does not originate in, terminate at, or pass through any of those ten large cities. As applied to the issuance in the United States of an airline ticket for travel between two cities that will not be served by any of the new airports, this tax is
(A) constitutional, because Congress has broad discretion in choosing the subjects of its taxation and may impose taxes on subjects that have no relation to the purpose for which those tax funds will be expended.
(B) constitutional, because an exemption for the issuance of tickets for travel between cities that will not be served by the new airports would deny the purchasers of all other tickets the equal protection of the laws.
(C) unconstitutional, because the burden of the tax outweighs its benefits for passengers whose travel does not originate in, terminate at, or pass through any of the ten largest cities.
(D) unconstitutional, because the tax adversely affects the fundamental right to travel.
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"A",
"constitutional, because Congress has broad discretion in choosing the subjects of its taxation and may impose taxes on subjects that have no relation to the purpose for which those tax funds will be expended."
] |
mbe_675
|
The only limitation upon the power of Congress to levy excise taxes of the character now under consideration is geographical uniformity throughout the United States. This court has often declared it cannot add others. Subject to such limitation Congress may select the subjects of taxation, and may exercise the power conferred at its discretion. License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 471, 18 L. Ed. 497. Of course Congress may not in the exercise of federal power exert authority wholly reserved to the states. Many decisions of this court have so declared. And from an early day the court has held that the fact that other motives may impel the exercise of federal taxing power does not authorize the courts to inquire into that subject. If the legislation enacted has some reasonable relation to the exercise of the taxing authority conferred by the Constitution, it cannot be invalidated because of the supposed motives which induced it. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 541, 19 L. Ed. 482, in which case this court sustained a tax on a state bank issue of circulating notes. McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 24 Sup. Ct. 769, 49 L. Ed. 78, 1 Ann. Cas. 561, where the power was thoroughly considered, and an act levying a special tax upon oleomargarine artificially colored was sustained. And see Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 147, 153, 156, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 55 L. Ed. 389, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1312, and cases cited.
|
Passenger departed on an ocean liner knowing that it would be a rough voyage due to predicted storms. The ocean liner was not equipped with the type of lifeboats required by the applicable statute. Passenger was swept overboard and drowned in a storm so heavy that even a lifeboat that conformed to the statute could not have been launched. In an action against the operator of the ocean liner brought by Passenger's representative, will Passenger's representative prevail?
|
Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
Under that doctrine, the unexcused violation of a statute or ordinance constitutes negligence per se if the provision (1) “protect[s] the class of persons in which the plaintiff is included” and (2) “protect[s] against the type of harm which has occurred as a result of the violation.” City of Fort Wayne v. Parrish, 32 N.E.3d 275, 277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.
Question and Possible Answers:
Passenger departed on an ocean liner knowing that it would be a rough voyage due to predicted storms. The ocean liner was not equipped with the type of lifeboats required by the applicable statute. Passenger was swept overboard and drowned in a storm so heavy that even a lifeboat that conformed to the statute could not have been launched. In an action against the operator of the ocean liner brought by Passenger's representative, will Passenger's representative prevail?
(A) Yes, because the ocean liner was not equipped with the statutorily required lifeboats.
(B) Yes, because in these circumstances common carriers are strictly liable.
(C) No, because the storm was so severe that it would have been impossible to launch a statutorily required lifeboat.
(D) No, because Passenger assumed the risk by boarding the ocean liner knowing that it would be a rough voyage.
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"C",
"No, because the storm was so severe that it would have been impossible to launch a statutorily required lifeboat."
] |
mbe_1133
|
Under that doctrine, the unexcused violation of a statute or ordinance constitutes negligence per se if the provision (1) “protect[s] the class of persons in which the plaintiff is included” and (2) “protect[s] against the type of harm which has occurred as a result of the violation.” City of Fort Wayne v. Parrish, 32 N.E.3d 275, 277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.
|
The President of the United States recognizes the country of Ruritania and undertakes diplomatic relations with its government through the Secretary of State. Ruritania is governed by a repressive totalitarian government. In an appropriate federal court, Dunn brings a suit against the President and Secretary of State to set aside this action on the ground that it is inconsistent with the principles of our constitutional form of government. Dunn has a lucrative contract with the United States Department of Commerce to provide commercial information about Ruritania. The contract expressly terminates, however, "when the President recognizes the country of Ruritania and undertakes diplomatic relations with its government." Which of the following is the most proper disposition of the Dunn suit by the federal court?
|
Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
The political question doctrine “ ‘excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.’ ” Bancoult, 445 F.3d at 432 (quoting Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986)). The doctrine applies where, “[p]rominent on the surface” of the case is:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). “ ‘[U]nless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar,’ we may not dismiss the claims as nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine.” Bancoult, 445 F.3d at 432–33 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691).
Question and Possible Answers:
The President of the United States recognizes the country of Ruritania and undertakes diplomatic relations with its government through the Secretary of State. Ruritania is governed by a repressive totalitarian government. In an appropriate federal court, Dunn brings a suit against the President and Secretary of State to set aside this action on the ground that it is inconsistent with the principles of our constitutional form of government. Dunn has a lucrative contract with the United States Department of Commerce to provide commercial information about Ruritania. The contract expressly terminates, however, "when the President recognizes the country of Ruritania and undertakes diplomatic relations with its government." Which of the following is the most proper disposition of the Dunn suit by the federal court?
(A) Suit dismissed, because Dunn does not have standing to bring this action.
(B) Suit dismissed, because there is no adversity between Dunn and the defendants.
(C) Suit dismissed, because it presents a nonjustifiable political question.
(D) Suit decided on the merits.
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"C",
"Suit dismissed, because it presents a nonjustifiable political question."
] |
mbe_962
|
The political question doctrine “ ‘excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.’ ” Bancoult, 445 F.3d at 432 (quoting Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986)). The doctrine applies where, “[p]rominent on the surface” of the case is:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). “ ‘[U]nless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar,’ we may not dismiss the claims as nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine.” Bancoult, 445 F.3d at 432–33 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691).
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Damson was short of money. He decided to go into Winston's house to take Winston's silverware and then to sell it. That night, while Winston was away, Damson entered by picking the lock on the front door. He picked up a chest of silverware from the dining room and went out the front door of the house to his car. As he was putting the chest of silverware into the trunk, he had second thoughts and decided that he did not wish to become a thief. He reentered the house and replaced the chest of silverware where he had found it. As he came out of the house the second time, he was arrested by the police, who had been called by a neighbor. Damson is
|
Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
Larceny is an element of robbery, and “ ‘there can be no robbery without a larcenous intent....’ ” Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 30, 553 A.2d 233 (1989) (citation omitted). Therefore, the elements of larceny are important to an understanding of robbery. Larceny is defined as “ ‘the fraudulent taking and carrying away of a thing without claim of right with the intention of converting it to a use other than that of the owner without his consent.’ ” Metheny, 359 Md. at 605, 755 A.2d 1088 (quoting Hook, 315 Md. at 31, 553 A.2d 233)(emphasis in Hook ).
Question and Possible Answers:
Damson was short of money. He decided to go into Winston's house to take Winston's silverware and then to sell it. That night, while Winston was away, Damson entered by picking the lock on the front door. He picked up a chest of silverware from the dining room and went out the front door of the house to his car. As he was putting the chest of silverware into the trunk, he had second thoughts and decided that he did not wish to become a thief. He reentered the house and replaced the chest of silverware where he had found it. As he came out of the house the second time, he was arrested by the police, who had been called by a neighbor. Damson is
(A) guilty of burglary and larceny.
(B) guilty of burglary and attempted larceny.
(C) guilty of burglary but not guilty of any larceny offense.
(D) not guilty of burglary or any larceny offense.
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"A",
"guilty of burglary and larceny."
] |
mbe_968
|
Larceny is an element of robbery, and “ ‘there can be no robbery without a larcenous intent....’ ” Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 30, 553 A.2d 233 (1989) (citation omitted). Therefore, the elements of larceny are important to an understanding of robbery. Larceny is defined as “ ‘the fraudulent taking and carrying away of a thing without claim of right with the intention of converting it to a use other than that of the owner without his consent.’ ” Metheny, 359 Md. at 605, 755 A.2d 1088 (quoting Hook, 315 Md. at 31, 553 A.2d 233)(emphasis in Hook ).
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Deeb was charged with stealing furs from a van. At trial, Wallace testified she saw Deeb take the furs. The jurisdiction in which Deeb is being tried does not allow in evidence lie detector results. On cross-examination by Deeb's attorney, Wallace was asked, "The light was too dim to identify Deeb, wasn't it?" She responded, "I'm sure enough that it was Deeb that I passed a lie detector test administered by the police." Deeb's attorney immediately objects and moves to strike. The trial court should
|
Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
As articulated by the Federal Advisory Committee in its Note to Rule 403, the “unfair prejudice” language contained in Rule 403 refers to an undue tendency on the part of admissible evidence to suggest a decision made on an improper basis. “Unfair prejudice refers to the tendency of the proposed evidence to adversely affect the objecting party's position by injecting considerations extraneous to the merits of the lawsuit, such as the jury's bias, sympathy, anger or shock.” People v. Goree, 132 Mich.App. 693, 349 N.W.2d 220 (1984). “Unfair prejudice as used in Rule 403 does not mean the damage to a defendant's case that results from legitimate probative force of the evidence.” United States v. Schrock, 855 F.2d 327, 334–35 (6th Cir.1988). Proffered evidence should therefore not be excluded by the district court as unfairly prejudicial simply because it damages the defendant's case. People v. District Court, 785 P.2d at 147. Obviously, evidence proffered by the prosecutor is prejudicial, but not all evidence unfairly prejudices a defendant. United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1308 (10th Cir.1987).
Question and Possible Answers:
Deeb was charged with stealing furs from a van. At trial, Wallace testified she saw Deeb take the furs. The jurisdiction in which Deeb is being tried does not allow in evidence lie detector results. On cross-examination by Deeb's attorney, Wallace was asked, "The light was too dim to identify Deeb, wasn't it?" She responded, "I'm sure enough that it was Deeb that I passed a lie detector test administered by the police." Deeb's attorney immediately objects and moves to strike. The trial court should
(A) grant the motion, because the question was leading.
(B) grant the motion, because the probative value of the unresponsive testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
(C) deny the motion, because it is proper rehabilitation of an impeached witness.
(D) deny the motion, because Deeb's attorney "opened the door" by asking the question.
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"B",
"grant the motion, because the probative value of the unresponsive testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."
] |
mbe_584
|
As articulated by the Federal Advisory Committee in its Note to Rule 403, the “unfair prejudice” language contained in Rule 403 refers to an undue tendency on the part of admissible evidence to suggest a decision made on an improper basis. “Unfair prejudice refers to the tendency of the proposed evidence to adversely affect the objecting party's position by injecting considerations extraneous to the merits of the lawsuit, such as the jury's bias, sympathy, anger or shock.” People v. Goree, 132 Mich.App. 693, 349 N.W.2d 220 (1984). “Unfair prejudice as used in Rule 403 does not mean the damage to a defendant's case that results from legitimate probative force of the evidence.” United States v. Schrock, 855 F.2d 327, 334–35 (6th Cir.1988). Proffered evidence should therefore not be excluded by the district court as unfairly prejudicial simply because it damages the defendant's case. People v. District Court, 785 P.2d at 147. Obviously, evidence proffered by the prosecutor is prejudicial, but not all evidence unfairly prejudices a defendant. United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1308 (10th Cir.1987).
|
Dan entered the police station and announced that he wanted to confess to a murder. The police advised Dan of the Miranda warnings, and Dan signed a written waiver. Dan described the murder in detail and pinpointed the location where a murder victim had been found a few weeks before. Later, a courtappointed psychiatrist determined that Dan was suffering from a serious mental illness that interfered with his ability to make rational choices and to understand his rights and that the psychosis had induced his confession. Dan's confession is
|
Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
Respondent would now have us require *167 sweeping inquiries into the state of mind of a criminal defendant who has confessed, inquiries quite divorced from any coercion brought to bear on the defendant by the State. We think the Constitution rightly leaves this sort of inquiry to be resolved by state laws governing the admission of evidence and erects no standard of its own in this area. A statement rendered by one in the condition of respondent might be proved to be quite unreliable, but this is a matter to be governed by the evidentiary laws of the forum, see, e.g., Fed.Rule Evid. 601, and not by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. “The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false.” Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 62 S.Ct. 280, 290, 86 L.Ed. 166 (1941).
We hold that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not “voluntary” within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We also conclude that the taking of respondent's statements, and their admission into evidence, constitute no violation of that Clause.
Question and Possible Answers:
Dan entered the police station and announced that he wanted to confess to a murder. The police advised Dan of the Miranda warnings, and Dan signed a written waiver. Dan described the murder in detail and pinpointed the location where a murder victim had been found a few weeks before. Later, a courtappointed psychiatrist determined that Dan was suffering from a serious mental illness that interfered with his ability to make rational choices and to understand his rights and that the psychosis had induced his confession. Dan's confession is
(A) admissible, because there was no coercive police conduct in obtaining Dan's statement.
(B) admissible, because Dan was not in custody.
(C) inadmissible, because Dan's confession was a product of his mental illness and was therefore involuntary.
(D) inadmissible, because under these circumstances, there was no valid waiver of Miranda warnings.
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"A",
"admissible, because there was no coercive police conduct in obtaining Dan's statement."
] |
mbe_632
|
Respondent would now have us require *167 sweeping inquiries into the state of mind of a criminal defendant who has confessed, inquiries quite divorced from any coercion brought to bear on the defendant by the State. We think the Constitution rightly leaves this sort of inquiry to be resolved by state laws governing the admission of evidence and erects no standard of its own in this area. A statement rendered by one in the condition of respondent might be proved to be quite unreliable, but this is a matter to be governed by the evidentiary laws of the forum, see, e.g., Fed.Rule Evid. 601, and not by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. “The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false.” Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 62 S.Ct. 280, 290, 86 L.Ed. 166 (1941).
We hold that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not “voluntary” within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We also conclude that the taking of respondent's statements, and their admission into evidence, constitute no violation of that Clause.
|
Desmond fell while attempting to climb a mountain, and lay unconscious and critically injured on a ledge that was difficult to reach. Pearson, an experienced mountain climber, was himself seriously injured while trying to rescue Desmond. Pearson's rescue attempt failed, and Desmond died of his injuries before he could be reached. Pearson brought an action against Desmond's estate for compensation for his injuries. In this jurisdiction, the traditional common-law rules relating to contributory negligence and assumption of risk remain in effect. Will Pearson prevail in his action against Desmond's estate?
|
Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
Under the rescue doctrine, an actor is usually liable for injuries sustained by a rescuer attempting to help another person placed in danger by the actor's negligent conduct. The question here is whether an actor is liable for injuries sustained by a person who is trying to rescue the actor from his own negligence. The answer is yes.
Question and Possible Answers:
Desmond fell while attempting to climb a mountain, and lay unconscious and critically injured on a ledge that was difficult to reach. Pearson, an experienced mountain climber, was himself seriously injured while trying to rescue Desmond. Pearson's rescue attempt failed, and Desmond died of his injuries before he could be reached. Pearson brought an action against Desmond's estate for compensation for his injuries. In this jurisdiction, the traditional common-law rules relating to contributory negligence and assumption of risk remain in effect. Will Pearson prevail in his action against Desmond's estate?
(A) Yes, if his rescue attempt was reasonable.
(B) Yes, because the law should not discourage attempts to assist persons in helpless peril.
(C) No, unless Desmond's peril arose from his own failure to exercise reasonable care.
(D) No, because Pearson's rescue attempt failed and therefore did not benefit Desmond.
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"C",
"No, unless Desmond's peril arose from his own failure to exercise reasonable care."
] |
mbe_652
|
Under the rescue doctrine, an actor is usually liable for injuries sustained by a rescuer attempting to help another person placed in danger by the actor's negligent conduct. The question here is whether an actor is liable for injuries sustained by a person who is trying to rescue the actor from his own negligence. The answer is yes.
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Dan, an eight-year-old, rode his bicycle down his driveway into a busy highway and Driver had to stop her car suddenly to avoid colliding with the bike. Because of the sudden stop, Driver's two-year-old son, Peter, who was sitting on the seat without any restraint, was thrown into the dashboard and injured. Had Peter been properly restrained in a baby car seat, as required by a state safety statute of which his mother was aware, he would not have been injured. In an action brought on Peter's behalf against Dan's parents to recover for Peter's injuries, Peter will
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
A duty of reasonable care generally encompasses a duty not to create an unreasonable risk of harm. See Reighard v. Yates, 2012 UT 45, ¶¶ 29–31, 285 P.3d 1168; B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, ¶ 21 & n. 11, 275 P.3d 228. What may be reasonable in one setting may not be reasonable in another. Ordinarily participants cannot reasonably expect instructors or coaches to insulate them from risks inherent in an activity in which they voluntarily engage. See, e.g., Kahn, 31 Cal.4th 990, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103, 75 P.3d at 38–43 (majority opinion). But whether, under the circumstances of this case, Instructor created an unreasonable risk of harm, increased the risk inherent in competitive ballroom dancing, or was otherwise unreasonable in his acts and omissions is a question for the trier of fact.
Question and Possible Answers:
Dan, an eight-year-old, rode his bicycle down his driveway into a busy highway and Driver had to stop her car suddenly to avoid colliding with the bike. Because of the sudden stop, Driver's two-year-old son, Peter, who was sitting on the seat without any restraint, was thrown into the dashboard and injured. Had Peter been properly restrained in a baby car seat, as required by a state safety statute of which his mother was aware, he would not have been injured. In an action brought on Peter's behalf against Dan's parents to recover for Peter's injuries, Peter will
(A) not prevail, because parents are not vicariously liable for the negligent acts of their children.
(B) not prevail, because Peter's injury was attributable to his mother's knowing violation of a safety statute.
(C) prevail, if Dan's parents knew that he sometimes drove into the highway, and they took no steps to prevent it.
(D) prevail, if Dan's riding into the highway was negligent and the proximate cause of Peter's injuries.
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"C",
"prevail, if Dan's parents knew that he sometimes drove into the highway, and they took no steps to prevent it."
] |
mbe_791
|
A duty of reasonable care generally encompasses a duty not to create an unreasonable risk of harm. See Reighard v. Yates, 2012 UT 45, ¶¶ 29–31, 285 P.3d 1168; B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, ¶ 21 & n. 11, 275 P.3d 228. What may be reasonable in one setting may not be reasonable in another. Ordinarily participants cannot reasonably expect instructors or coaches to insulate them from risks inherent in an activity in which they voluntarily engage. See, e.g., Kahn, 31 Cal.4th 990, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103, 75 P.3d at 38–43 (majority opinion). But whether, under the circumstances of this case, Instructor created an unreasonable risk of harm, increased the risk inherent in competitive ballroom dancing, or was otherwise unreasonable in his acts and omissions is a question for the trier of fact.
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On the evening of the day of the accident, Walter Passenger wrote a letter to his sister in which he described the accident. When Walter says he cannot remember some details of the accident, Pedersen's counsel seeks to show him the letter to assist him in his testimony on direct examination. The trial judge should rule this
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
In contrast, [u]nder present recollection refreshed the witness' memory is refreshed or jogged through the employment of a writing, diagram, smell or even touch, and he testifies from his memory so refreshed. Because of the independent origin of the testimony actually elicited, the stimulation of an actual present recollection is not strictly bounded by fixed rules but, rather, is approached on a case-by-case basis looking to the peculiar facts and circumstances present.
Gibson, 333 N.C. at 50, 424 S.E.2d at 107. Because “the evidence is the testimony of the witness at trial, whereas with a past recollection recorded the evidence is the writing itself,” “the foundational questions raised by past recollection recorded are never reached.” Id. The relevant test, then, “is whether the witness has an independent recollection of the event and is merely using the memorandum to refresh details or whether the witness is using the memorandum as a testimonial crutch for something beyond his recall.” State v. York, 347 N.C. 79, 89, 489 S.E.2d 380, 386 (1997).
Question and Possible Answers:
Carr ran into and injured Pedersen, a pedestrian. With Carr in his car were Wanda and Walter Passenger. Passerby saw the accident and called the police department, which sent Sheriff to investigate. All of these people are available as potential witnesses in the case of Pedersen v. Carr. Pedersen alleges that Carr, while drunk, struck Pedersen who was in a duly marked crosswalk.
On the evening of the day of the accident, Walter Passenger wrote a letter to his sister in which he described the accident. When Walter says he cannot remember some details of the accident, Pedersen's counsel seeks to show him the letter to assist him in his testimony on direct examination. The trial judge should rule this
(A) permissible under the doctrine of present recollection refreshed
(B) permissible under the doctrine of past recollection recorded
(C) objectionable because the letter was not a spontaneous utterance
(D) objectionable because the letter is a self-serving declaration in so far as the witness, Walter, is concerned
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"A",
"permissible under the doctrine of present recollection refreshed"
] |
mbe_381
|
In contrast, [u]nder present recollection refreshed the witness' memory is refreshed or jogged through the employment of a writing, diagram, smell or even touch, and he testifies from his memory so refreshed. Because of the independent origin of the testimony actually elicited, the stimulation of an actual present recollection is not strictly bounded by fixed rules but, rather, is approached on a case-by-case basis looking to the peculiar facts and circumstances present.
Gibson, 333 N.C. at 50, 424 S.E.2d at 107. Because “the evidence is the testimony of the witness at trial, whereas with a past recollection recorded the evidence is the writing itself,” “the foundational questions raised by past recollection recorded are never reached.” Id. The relevant test, then, “is whether the witness has an independent recollection of the event and is merely using the memorandum to refresh details or whether the witness is using the memorandum as a testimonial crutch for something beyond his recall.” State v. York, 347 N.C. 79, 89, 489 S.E.2d 380, 386 (1997).
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Defendant, a w orker in a metal working shop, had long been teasing Vincent. a young colleague. by calling him insulting names and ridiculing him. One dav'Vincent responded to the teasing by picking tip a metal bar and attacking Defendant. Defendant could have escaped from the shop. He parriied the blow with his left arm, and with his right hand struck Vincent a blow on his jaw from which the Young man died.
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
An essential element of first-degree murder is malice aforethought. See State v. Lee, 494 N.W.2d 706, 707 (Iowa 1993); see also Iowa Code § 707.1 (“A person who kills another person with malice aforethought either express or implied commits murder.”). “Malice aforethought” is defined as “ ‘a fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to another that exists before the act is committed.’ ” Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d at 49 (citation omitted).
D.D.A. v. State, 650 So.2d 571, 578 (Ala.Cr.App.1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also McLaughlin v. State, 586 So.2d 267, 270 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (the element of “extreme indifference to human life” by definition does not apply to the life of the victim, but to human life in general); Gholston v. State, 494 So.2d 876, 883 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (to be reckless, a crime must be directed toward the general public, not toward a particular person); King v. State, 505 So.2d 403, 405 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (reckless murder “differs from intentional murder in that it results not from a specific, conscious intent to cause the death
To convict for a violation of Code § 18.2-36.1(B), the Commonwealth must prove, inter alia, conduct by an accused “so gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life[.]” Code § 18.2-36.1(B). 1 Such conduct “has come to be known as ‘criminal negligence’ ” in the context of common law vehicular involuntary manslaughter and requires “ ‘acts of commission or omission of a wanton or willful nature, showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights of others, under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce injury ... and the offender knows or is charged with the knowledge
elements of both offenses because no element of either offense negates an element of the other. Even though reckless murder involves a situation in which the defendant does not intend to kill or injure another person, it does not require that none of his actions be intentional. For example, it does not exclude the possibility that he committed another intentional act, such as setting a fire. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the appellant acted with extreme indifference to human life but did not intend to kill or injure the victim when he threw gasoline around the den;
that the appellant acted intentionally when he started the fire; and that the victim died as a result of both of the appellant's actions. Therefore, the verdicts were not mutually exclusive. Cf. Martinez v. State, [Ms. CR-05-1669, March 2, 2007] --- So.2d ----, ---- (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (opinion on return to remand) (applying Heard and holding that the jury's verdicts were mutually exclusive because a single act cannot be both negligent and reckless). Accordingly, the appellant's argument is without merit, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Question and Possible Answers:
Select from the choices (A-D) the most serious offense of which the defendant could be properly convicted.
Defendant, a w orker in a metal working shop, had long been teasing Vincent. a young colleague. by calling him insulting names and ridiculing him. One dav'Vincent responded to the teasing by picking tip a metal bar and attacking Defendant. Defendant could have escaped from the shop. He parriied the blow with his left arm, and with his right hand struck Vincent a blow on his jaw from which the Young man died.
(A) Involuntary manslaughter
(B) Voluntary manslaughter
(C) Murder
(D) None of the above
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"D",
"None of the above"
] |
mbe_131
|
An essential element of first-degree murder is malice aforethought. See State v. Lee, 494 N.W.2d 706, 707 (Iowa 1993); see also Iowa Code § 707.1 (“A person who kills another person with malice aforethought either express or implied commits murder.”). “Malice aforethought” is defined as “ ‘a fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to another that exists before the act is committed.’ ” Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d at 49 (citation omitted).
D.D.A. v. State, 650 So.2d 571, 578 (Ala.Cr.App.1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also McLaughlin v. State, 586 So.2d 267, 270 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (the element of “extreme indifference to human life” by definition does not apply to the life of the victim, but to human life in general); Gholston v. State, 494 So.2d 876, 883 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (to be reckless, a crime must be directed toward the general public, not toward a particular person); King v. State, 505 So.2d 403, 405 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (reckless murder “differs from intentional murder in that it results not from a specific, conscious intent to cause the death
To convict for a violation of Code § 18.2-36.1(B), the Commonwealth must prove, inter alia, conduct by an accused “so gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life[.]” Code § 18.2-36.1(B). 1 Such conduct “has come to be known as ‘criminal negligence’ ” in the context of common law vehicular involuntary manslaughter and requires “ ‘acts of commission or omission of a wanton or willful nature, showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights of others, under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce injury ... and the offender knows or is charged with the knowledge
elements of both offenses because no element of either offense negates an element of the other. Even though reckless murder involves a situation in which the defendant does not intend to kill or injure another person, it does not require that none of his actions be intentional. For example, it does not exclude the possibility that he committed another intentional act, such as setting a fire. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the appellant acted with extreme indifference to human life but did not intend to kill or injure the victim when he threw gasoline around the den;
that the appellant acted intentionally when he started the fire; and that the victim died as a result of both of the appellant's actions. Therefore, the verdicts were not mutually exclusive. Cf. Martinez v. State, [Ms. CR-05-1669, March 2, 2007] --- So.2d ----, ---- (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (opinion on return to remand) (applying Heard and holding that the jury's verdicts were mutually exclusive because a single act cannot be both negligent and reckless). Accordingly, the appellant's argument is without merit, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.
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Despondent over losing his job, Wilmont drank all night at a bar. While driving home, he noticed a car following him and, in his intoxicated state, concluded he was being followed by robbers. In fact, a police car was following him on suspicion of drunk driving. In his effort to get away, Wilmont sped through a stop sign and struck and killed a pedestrian. He was arrested by the police. Wilmont is prosecuted for manslaughter. He should be
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
Involuntary manslaughter is defined as (1) the unintentional killing of another without malice, but while engaged in an unlawful activity not naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm; or (2) the unintentional killing of another without malice, while engaged in a lawful activity with reckless disregard for the safety of others. State v. Crosby, 355 S.C. 47, 51-52, 584 S.E.2d 110, 112 (2003). “To constitute involuntary manslaughter, there must be a finding of criminal negligence, statutorily defined as a reckless disregard of the safety of others.” Id. at 52, 584 S.E.2d at 112. Further, “a person can be
elements of both offenses because no element of either offense negates an element of the other. Even though reckless murder involves a situation in which the defendant does not intend to kill or injure another person, it does not require that none of his actions be intentional. For example, it does not exclude the possibility that he committed another intentional act, such as setting a fire. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the appellant acted with extreme indifference to human life but did not intend to kill or injure the victim when he threw gasoline around the den;
An essential element of first-degree murder is malice aforethought. See State v. Lee, 494 N.W.2d 706, 707 (Iowa 1993); see also Iowa Code § 707.1 (“A person who kills another person with malice aforethought either express or implied commits murder.”). “Malice aforethought” is defined as “ ‘a fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to another that exists before the act is committed.’ ” Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d at 49 (citation omitted).
Similarly, proximate cause may be proved by circumstantial evidence even though there is no eyewitness evidence. The law does not require every fact and circumstance which make up a case of negligence to be proved by direct and positive testimony or by the testimony of eyewitnesses. Negligence and freedom from contributory negligence may be shown by circumstantial, as well as the conditions and circumstances leading up to and surrounding the incident causing the plaintiff's injury. Similarly, the terms of an oral contract, and the assent of the parties to it, may be shown by the actions of the parties and
D.D.A. v. State, 650 So.2d 571, 578 (Ala.Cr.App.1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also McLaughlin v. State, 586 So.2d 267, 270 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (the element of “extreme indifference to human life” by definition does not apply to the life of the victim, but to human life in general); Gholston v. State, 494 So.2d 876, 883 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (to be reckless, a crime must be directed toward the general public, not toward a particular person); King v. State, 505 So.2d 403, 405 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (reckless murder “differs from intentional murder in that it results not from a specific, conscious intent to cause the death
Question and Possible Answers:
Despondent over losing his job, Wilmont drank all night at a bar. While driving home, he noticed a car following him and, in his intoxicated state, concluded he was being followed by robbers. In fact, a police car was following him on suspicion of drunk driving. In his effort to get away, Wilmont sped through a stop sign and struck and killed a pedestrian. He was arrested by the police. Wilmont is prosecuted for manslaughter. He should be
(A) acquitted, because he honestly believed he faced an imminent threat of death or severe bodily injury.
(B) acquitted, because his intoxication prevented him from appreciating the risk he created.
(C) convicted, because he acted recklessly and in fact was in no danger.
(D) convicted, because he acted recklessly and his apprehension of danger was not reasonable.
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"D",
"convicted, because he acted recklessly and his apprehension of danger was not reasonable."
] |
mbe_885
|
Involuntary manslaughter is defined as (1) the unintentional killing of another without malice, but while engaged in an unlawful activity not naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm; or (2) the unintentional killing of another without malice, while engaged in a lawful activity with reckless disregard for the safety of others. State v. Crosby, 355 S.C. 47, 51-52, 584 S.E.2d 110, 112 (2003). “To constitute involuntary manslaughter, there must be a finding of criminal negligence, statutorily defined as a reckless disregard of the safety of others.” Id. at 52, 584 S.E.2d at 112. Further, “a person can be
elements of both offenses because no element of either offense negates an element of the other. Even though reckless murder involves a situation in which the defendant does not intend to kill or injure another person, it does not require that none of his actions be intentional. For example, it does not exclude the possibility that he committed another intentional act, such as setting a fire. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the appellant acted with extreme indifference to human life but did not intend to kill or injure the victim when he threw gasoline around the den;
An essential element of first-degree murder is malice aforethought. See State v. Lee, 494 N.W.2d 706, 707 (Iowa 1993); see also Iowa Code § 707.1 (“A person who kills another person with malice aforethought either express or implied commits murder.”). “Malice aforethought” is defined as “ ‘a fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to another that exists before the act is committed.’ ” Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d at 49 (citation omitted).
Similarly, proximate cause may be proved by circumstantial evidence even though there is no eyewitness evidence. The law does not require every fact and circumstance which make up a case of negligence to be proved by direct and positive testimony or by the testimony of eyewitnesses. Negligence and freedom from contributory negligence may be shown by circumstantial, as well as the conditions and circumstances leading up to and surrounding the incident causing the plaintiff's injury. Similarly, the terms of an oral contract, and the assent of the parties to it, may be shown by the actions of the parties and
D.D.A. v. State, 650 So.2d 571, 578 (Ala.Cr.App.1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also McLaughlin v. State, 586 So.2d 267, 270 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (the element of “extreme indifference to human life” by definition does not apply to the life of the victim, but to human life in general); Gholston v. State, 494 So.2d 876, 883 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (to be reckless, a crime must be directed toward the general public, not toward a particular person); King v. State, 505 So.2d 403, 405 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (reckless murder “differs from intentional murder in that it results not from a specific, conscious intent to cause the death
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Andres conveyed Applewood Farm "to Bogatz, her heirs and assigns, so long as the premises are used for residential and farm purposes, then to Cohen and his heirs." The common law Rule Against Perpetuities, unmodified by statute, is part of the law of the jurisdiction in which Applewood Farm is located. As a consequence of the conveyance, Cohen's interest in Applewood Farm is
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
A life tenant can sell his or her life estate in property. See generally Reeside v. Annex Bldg. Ass'n of Balt. City, 165 Md. 200, 167 A. 72 (1933). The estate as sold becomes an estate pur autre vie (for the life of the original life tenant). Devecmon v. Devecmon, 43 Md. 335, 348 (1875). A life tenant who does not have the power to dispose of the property cannot convey the remainderman's interest, however. Reeside, supra, 165 Md. 200, 167 A. 72. A remainderman likewise can sell his remainder interest in the property, but cannot convey the life tenant's
An incorporeal hereditament is “[a]n intangible right in land, such as an easement.” In other contexts, Utah courts have recognized an incorporeal hereditament as an interest in real property. In addressing a case involving a license to prospect and mine ore, the Utah Supreme Court discussed the potential for a mining license to ripen into an incorporeal hereditament and stated: This is not to say that a license is an incorporeal hereditament; it means that the grant was a license as long as it remained executory because it was not in proper form for a conveyance of an incorporeal hereditament.
It ripened into an incorporeal hereditament when the licensee entered into enjoyment thereof and made expenditures and improvements. Other jurisdictions hold that revocation will not be allowed in such a case unless the licensee be compensated for his improvements. This language supports a conclusion that the holder of an incorporeal hereditament would be considered the holder of a form of property interest entitling it to compensation under Utah law.
Thus, the party claiming ownership by adverse possession must prove that the following five elements existed concurrently for 20 years: “(1) continuous, (2) hostile or adverse, (3) actual, (4) open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the premises, (5) under claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owner.” Joiner, 85 Ill.2d at 81, 51 Ill.Dec. 662, 421 N.E.2d at 174.
be carefully examined in order to determine whether that interest is legitimate and substantial, and inquiry must be made whether the means adopted to achieve the goal are necessary and precisely drawn.” Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S., at 605, 96 S.Ct., at 2283. See In re Griffths, 413 U.S., at 721-722, 93 S.Ct., at 2854-2855. Alienage classifications by a State that do not withstand this stringent examination cannot stand.8
Question and Possible Answers:
Andres conveyed Applewood Farm "to Bogatz, her heirs and assigns, so long as the premises are used for residential and farm purposes, then to Cohen and his heirs." The common law Rule Against Perpetuities, unmodified by statute, is part of the law of the jurisdiction in which Applewood Farm is located. As a consequence of the conveyance, Cohen's interest in Applewood Farm is
(A) nothing.
(B) a valid executory interest.
(C) a possibility of reverter.
(D) a right of entry for condition broken.
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"A",
"nothing."
] |
mbe_965
|
A life tenant can sell his or her life estate in property. See generally Reeside v. Annex Bldg. Ass'n of Balt. City, 165 Md. 200, 167 A. 72 (1933). The estate as sold becomes an estate pur autre vie (for the life of the original life tenant). Devecmon v. Devecmon, 43 Md. 335, 348 (1875). A life tenant who does not have the power to dispose of the property cannot convey the remainderman's interest, however. Reeside, supra, 165 Md. 200, 167 A. 72. A remainderman likewise can sell his remainder interest in the property, but cannot convey the life tenant's
An incorporeal hereditament is “[a]n intangible right in land, such as an easement.” In other contexts, Utah courts have recognized an incorporeal hereditament as an interest in real property. In addressing a case involving a license to prospect and mine ore, the Utah Supreme Court discussed the potential for a mining license to ripen into an incorporeal hereditament and stated: This is not to say that a license is an incorporeal hereditament; it means that the grant was a license as long as it remained executory because it was not in proper form for a conveyance of an incorporeal hereditament.
It ripened into an incorporeal hereditament when the licensee entered into enjoyment thereof and made expenditures and improvements. Other jurisdictions hold that revocation will not be allowed in such a case unless the licensee be compensated for his improvements. This language supports a conclusion that the holder of an incorporeal hereditament would be considered the holder of a form of property interest entitling it to compensation under Utah law.
Thus, the party claiming ownership by adverse possession must prove that the following five elements existed concurrently for 20 years: “(1) continuous, (2) hostile or adverse, (3) actual, (4) open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the premises, (5) under claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owner.” Joiner, 85 Ill.2d at 81, 51 Ill.Dec. 662, 421 N.E.2d at 174.
be carefully examined in order to determine whether that interest is legitimate and substantial, and inquiry must be made whether the means adopted to achieve the goal are necessary and precisely drawn.” Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S., at 605, 96 S.Ct., at 2283. See In re Griffths, 413 U.S., at 721-722, 93 S.Ct., at 2854-2855. Alienage classifications by a State that do not withstand this stringent examination cannot stand.8
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Supermarket is in a section of town where there are sometimes street fights and where pedestrians are occasionally the victims of pickpockets and muggers. In recognition of the unusual number of robberies in the area, the supermarket posted signs in the store and in its parking lot that read: Warning: There are pickpockets and muggers at work in this part of the city. Supermarket is not responsible for the acts of criminals. One evening, Lorner drove to Supermarket to see about a special on turkeys that Supermarket was advertising. She decided that the turkeys were too large and left the store without purchasing anything. In the parking lot, she was attacked by an unknown man who raped her and then ran away. If Lorner sues Supermarket, the result should be for the
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
A duty of reasonable care generally encompasses a duty not to create an unreasonable risk of harm. See Reighard v. Yates, 2012 UT 45, ¶¶ 29–31, 285 P.3d 1168; B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, ¶ 21 & n. 11, 275 P.3d 228. What may be reasonable in one setting may not be reasonable in another. Ordinarily participants cannot reasonably expect instructors or coaches to insulate them from risks inherent in an activity in which they voluntarily engage. See, e.g., Kahn, 31 Cal.4th 990, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103, 75 P.3d at 38–43 (majority opinion). But whether, under the
For these reasons, we reaffirm today that damages measured by diminution in value are an adequate and appropriate remedy for negligent harm to real or personal property, and that mental anguish based solely on negligent property damage is not compensable as a matter of law. The proper measure of Likes's damages—although she cannot recover on those claims for which the City has sovereign immunity from suit for property damages—is (1) the loss in market value of her property caused by the defendant's negligence and (2) for those items of small or no market value that “have their primary value in
sentiment,” Brown v. Frontier Theatres, 369 S.W.2d at 305, the loss in value to her. Because the injury to Likes's property was not intentional or malicious, or even grossly negligent, we need not decide whether mental anguish arising out of property damage may be legally compensable when a heightened degree of misconduct is found. Compare Luna, 667 S.W.2d at 117 (stating in dicta that mental anguish is recoverable for “willful tort, willful and wanton disregard, or gross negligence”), with Reinhardt Motors, Inc. v. Boston, 516 So.2d 509, 511 (Ala.1986) (limiting mental anguish for property damage to cases in which the
a landowner has a duty to maintain his or her property in a reasonably safe condition, which includes providing a safe means of ingress and egress to tenants (see Peralta v. Henriquez, 100 N.Y.2d 139, 144, 760 N.Y.S.2d 741, 790 N.E.2d 1170 [2003]; Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 352 N.E.2d 868 [1976]; Gallagher v. St. Raymond's R.C. Church, 21 N.Y.2d 554, 557, 289 N.Y.S.2d 401, 236 N.E.2d 632 [1968] ). The scope of such duty is determined “ ‘in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the
The elements of a products liability claim are that (1) a product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; (2) the defect existed at the time the product left the defendant's control; and (3) the defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 623 n. 3. When products liability is based on a manufacturing-flaw theory, a product is in a defective condition if the user could not have anticipated the danger that the product poses. Id. at 622; see also 4A Minnesota Practice, CIVJIG § 75.30 (4th ed.1999).
Question and Possible Answers:
Supermarket is in a section of town where there are sometimes street fights and where pedestrians are occasionally the victims of pickpockets and muggers. In recognition of the unusual number of robberies in the area, the supermarket posted signs in the store and in its parking lot that read: Warning: There are pickpockets and muggers at work in this part of the city. Supermarket is not responsible for the acts of criminals. One evening, Lorner drove to Supermarket to see about a special on turkeys that Supermarket was advertising. She decided that the turkeys were too large and left the store without purchasing anything. In the parking lot, she was attacked by an unknown man who raped her and then ran away. If Lorner sues Supermarket, the result should be for the
(A) plaintiff, if Supermarket failed to take reasonable steps to protect customers against criminal attack in its parking lot.
(B) plaintiff, because Supermarket is liable for harm to business invitees on its premises.
(C) defendant, if the warning signs were plainly visible to Lorner.
(D) defendant, because the rapist was the proximate cause of Lorner's injuries.
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"A",
"plaintiff, if Supermarket failed to take reasonable steps to protect customers against criminal attack in its parking lot."
] |
mbe_768
|
A duty of reasonable care generally encompasses a duty not to create an unreasonable risk of harm. See Reighard v. Yates, 2012 UT 45, ¶¶ 29–31, 285 P.3d 1168; B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, ¶ 21 & n. 11, 275 P.3d 228. What may be reasonable in one setting may not be reasonable in another. Ordinarily participants cannot reasonably expect instructors or coaches to insulate them from risks inherent in an activity in which they voluntarily engage. See, e.g., Kahn, 31 Cal.4th 990, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103, 75 P.3d at 38–43 (majority opinion). But whether, under the
For these reasons, we reaffirm today that damages measured by diminution in value are an adequate and appropriate remedy for negligent harm to real or personal property, and that mental anguish based solely on negligent property damage is not compensable as a matter of law. The proper measure of Likes's damages—although she cannot recover on those claims for which the City has sovereign immunity from suit for property damages—is (1) the loss in market value of her property caused by the defendant's negligence and (2) for those items of small or no market value that “have their primary value in
sentiment,” Brown v. Frontier Theatres, 369 S.W.2d at 305, the loss in value to her. Because the injury to Likes's property was not intentional or malicious, or even grossly negligent, we need not decide whether mental anguish arising out of property damage may be legally compensable when a heightened degree of misconduct is found. Compare Luna, 667 S.W.2d at 117 (stating in dicta that mental anguish is recoverable for “willful tort, willful and wanton disregard, or gross negligence”), with Reinhardt Motors, Inc. v. Boston, 516 So.2d 509, 511 (Ala.1986) (limiting mental anguish for property damage to cases in which the
a landowner has a duty to maintain his or her property in a reasonably safe condition, which includes providing a safe means of ingress and egress to tenants (see Peralta v. Henriquez, 100 N.Y.2d 139, 144, 760 N.Y.S.2d 741, 790 N.E.2d 1170 [2003]; Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 352 N.E.2d 868 [1976]; Gallagher v. St. Raymond's R.C. Church, 21 N.Y.2d 554, 557, 289 N.Y.S.2d 401, 236 N.E.2d 632 [1968] ). The scope of such duty is determined “ ‘in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the
The elements of a products liability claim are that (1) a product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; (2) the defect existed at the time the product left the defendant's control; and (3) the defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 623 n. 3. When products liability is based on a manufacturing-flaw theory, a product is in a defective condition if the user could not have anticipated the danger that the product poses. Id. at 622; see also 4A Minnesota Practice, CIVJIG § 75.30 (4th ed.1999).
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In preparation for a mountain-climbing expedition, Alper purchased the necessary climbing equipment from Outfitters, Inc., a retail dealer in sporting goods. A week later, Alper fell from a rock face when a safety device he had purchased from Outfitters malfunctioned because of a defect in its manufacture. Thereafter, Rollins was severely injured when he tried to reach and give assistance to Alper on the ledge to which Alper had fallen. Rollins's injury was not caused by any fault on his own part. If Rollins brings an action against Outfitters, Inc., to recover damages for his injuries, will Rollins prevail?
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
Under the rescue doctrine, an actor is usually liable for injuries sustained by a rescuer attempting to help another person placed in danger by the actor's negligent conduct. The question here is whether an actor is liable for injuries sustained by a person who is trying to rescue the actor from his own negligence. The answer is yes.
This court has previously recognized that contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort. “ ‘[W]here the defendant's conduct is actually intended to inflict *655 harm upon the plaintiff, there is a difference, not merely in degree but in the kind of fault; and the defense [contributory negligence] never has been extended to such intentional torts.’ ” **620 Omaha Nat. Bank v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 213 Neb. 873, 881–82, 332 N.W.2d 196, 202 (1983), quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 65 (4th ed.1971).
that the appellant acted intentionally when he started the fire; and that the victim died as a result of both of the appellant's actions. Therefore, the verdicts were not mutually exclusive. Cf. Martinez v. State, [Ms. CR-05-1669, March 2, 2007] --- So.2d ----, ---- (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (opinion on return to remand) (applying Heard and holding that the jury's verdicts were mutually exclusive because a single act cannot be both negligent and reckless). Accordingly, the appellant's argument is without merit, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.
“ ‘Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation impossible or highly impracticable.’ ” Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, ¶ 12, 232 P.3d 1081 (emphases omitted) (quoting Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 (1981) (“Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which
Consequential damages” cover all losses that are reasonably foreseeable to the actor, even if they do not result inevitably from the act complained of. See John Hetherington & Sons v. William Firth Co., 210 Mass. 8, 21, 95 N.E. 961 (1911); Smethurst, supra 148 Mass. at 265, 19 N.E. 387; H. L. Oleck, supra s 17. For example, consequential damages in an action based on contract or warranty may include personal *113 injuries caused by the breach. G.L. c. 106, s 2-715. Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 583-589, 296 N.E.2d 183 (1973).
Question and Possible Answers:
In preparation for a mountain-climbing expedition, Alper purchased the necessary climbing equipment from Outfitters, Inc., a retail dealer in sporting goods. A week later, Alper fell from a rock face when a safety device he had purchased from Outfitters malfunctioned because of a defect in its manufacture. Thereafter, Rollins was severely injured when he tried to reach and give assistance to Alper on the ledge to which Alper had fallen. Rollins's injury was not caused by any fault on his own part. If Rollins brings an action against Outfitters, Inc., to recover damages for his injuries, will Rollins prevail?
(A) No, unless Outfitters could have discovered the defect by a reasonable inspection of the safety device.
(B) No, because Rollins did not rely on the representation of safety implied from the sale of the safety device by Outfitters.
(C) Yes, unless Alper was negligent in failing to test the safety device.
(D) Yes, because injury to a person in Rollins's position was foreseeable if the safety device failed.
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"D",
"Yes, because injury to a person in Rollins's position was foreseeable if the safety device failed."
] |
mbe_656
|
Under the rescue doctrine, an actor is usually liable for injuries sustained by a rescuer attempting to help another person placed in danger by the actor's negligent conduct. The question here is whether an actor is liable for injuries sustained by a person who is trying to rescue the actor from his own negligence. The answer is yes.
This court has previously recognized that contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort. “ ‘[W]here the defendant's conduct is actually intended to inflict *655 harm upon the plaintiff, there is a difference, not merely in degree but in the kind of fault; and the defense [contributory negligence] never has been extended to such intentional torts.’ ” **620 Omaha Nat. Bank v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 213 Neb. 873, 881–82, 332 N.W.2d 196, 202 (1983), quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 65 (4th ed.1971).
that the appellant acted intentionally when he started the fire; and that the victim died as a result of both of the appellant's actions. Therefore, the verdicts were not mutually exclusive. Cf. Martinez v. State, [Ms. CR-05-1669, March 2, 2007] --- So.2d ----, ---- (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (opinion on return to remand) (applying Heard and holding that the jury's verdicts were mutually exclusive because a single act cannot be both negligent and reckless). Accordingly, the appellant's argument is without merit, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.
“ ‘Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation impossible or highly impracticable.’ ” Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, ¶ 12, 232 P.3d 1081 (emphases omitted) (quoting Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 (1981) (“Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which
Consequential damages” cover all losses that are reasonably foreseeable to the actor, even if they do not result inevitably from the act complained of. See John Hetherington & Sons v. William Firth Co., 210 Mass. 8, 21, 95 N.E. 961 (1911); Smethurst, supra 148 Mass. at 265, 19 N.E. 387; H. L. Oleck, supra s 17. For example, consequential damages in an action based on contract or warranty may include personal *113 injuries caused by the breach. G.L. c. 106, s 2-715. Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 583-589, 296 N.E.2d 183 (1973).
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If the Attorney General signs the indictment, the strongest argument Green could urge as a defense is that
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
United States, 282 U.S. 344, 352–354, 51 S.Ct. 153, 156–157, 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931). Most recently, in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988), we held that the independent counsel created by provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–599, was an inferior officer. In reaching that conclusion, we relied on several factors: that the independent counsel was subject to removal by a higher officer (the Attorney General), that she performed only limited duties, that her jurisdiction was narrow, and that her tenure was limited. 487 U.S., at 671–672,
the President's Powers Article II of the Constitution contains the vesting clause, which states: "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." This has historically been interpreted to mean that the President is the head of the Executive Branch, but that he is still subject to limits within that Branch (i.e. if the President fires members of the Executive Branch, Congress would have oversight and would be able to investigate the firings.) Some scholars, however, have interpreted the Vesting Clause under a much stronger lens, finding that the President has full power over
The political question doctrine “ ‘excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.’ ” Bancoult, 445 F.3d at 432 (quoting Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986)). The doctrine applies where, “[p]rominent on the surface” of the case is: [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
2, cl. 2. 5678As we recognized in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125, 96 S.Ct. 612, 685, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam), the Appointments Clause of Article II is more than a matter of “etiquette or protocol”; it is among the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme. By vesting the President with the exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) officers of the United States, the Appointments Clause prevents congressional encroachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches. See id., at 128–131, 96 S.Ct., at 686–688; Weiss, supra, at 183–185, 114 S.Ct., at 763–765 (SOUTER, J., concurring); Freytag
804(b)(3). Statements that are not inculpatory are not admissible pursuant to this rule even if they are part of a generally inculpatory statement or narrative. United States v. Ricardo, 472 F.3d 277, 287 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600–01). However, these rules cannot be applied except in the context of specific evidence.
Question and Possible Answers:
Green is cited for contempt of the House of Representatives after she refused to answer certain questions posed by a House Committee concerning her acts while serving as a United States Ambassador. A federal statute authorizes the Attorney General to prosecute contempts of Congress. Pursuant to this law, the House directs the Attorney General to begin criminal proceedings against Green. A federal grand jury indicts Green, but the Attorney General refuses to sign the indictment.
If the Attorney General signs the indictment, the strongest argument Green could urge as a defense is that
(A) Green may refuse to answer the questions if she can demonstrate that they are unrelated to matters upon which Congress may legislate
(B) the House may question Green only on matters pertaining to the expenditure of funds appropriated by Congress
(C) only the Senate may question Green on matters that relate to the performance of her duties
(D) Congress may not ask questions relating to the performance of duties executed by an officer of the executive branch
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"A",
"Green may refuse to answer the questions if she can demonstrate that they are unrelated to matters upon which Congress may legislate"
] |
mbe_200
|
United States, 282 U.S. 344, 352–354, 51 S.Ct. 153, 156–157, 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931). Most recently, in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988), we held that the independent counsel created by provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–599, was an inferior officer. In reaching that conclusion, we relied on several factors: that the independent counsel was subject to removal by a higher officer (the Attorney General), that she performed only limited duties, that her jurisdiction was narrow, and that her tenure was limited. 487 U.S., at 671–672,
the President's Powers Article II of the Constitution contains the vesting clause, which states: "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." This has historically been interpreted to mean that the President is the head of the Executive Branch, but that he is still subject to limits within that Branch (i.e. if the President fires members of the Executive Branch, Congress would have oversight and would be able to investigate the firings.) Some scholars, however, have interpreted the Vesting Clause under a much stronger lens, finding that the President has full power over
The political question doctrine “ ‘excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.’ ” Bancoult, 445 F.3d at 432 (quoting Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986)). The doctrine applies where, “[p]rominent on the surface” of the case is: [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
2, cl. 2. 5678As we recognized in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125, 96 S.Ct. 612, 685, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam), the Appointments Clause of Article II is more than a matter of “etiquette or protocol”; it is among the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme. By vesting the President with the exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) officers of the United States, the Appointments Clause prevents congressional encroachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches. See id., at 128–131, 96 S.Ct., at 686–688; Weiss, supra, at 183–185, 114 S.Ct., at 763–765 (SOUTER, J., concurring); Freytag
804(b)(3). Statements that are not inculpatory are not admissible pursuant to this rule even if they are part of a generally inculpatory statement or narrative. United States v. Ricardo, 472 F.3d 277, 287 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600–01). However, these rules cannot be applied except in the context of specific evidence.
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Assume for this question only that the court denied the motion to suppress the jewelry. Yancey moves to suppress the use of the statement Yancey made to his parents. The that best argument for excluding it would be
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
Consensual searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment “because it is no doubt reasonable for the police to conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so.” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250-51, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). In order for a consensual search to be valid, consent must actually be given (either express or implied), and the person giving consent must have (actual or apparent) authority to do so. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 185-86, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990).
291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. But neither the Fourth Amendment nor § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights expressly prohibits the use of evidence obtained in violation of their respective protections. 291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. Exclusion is not a personal constitutional right; rather, its purpose is to deter future violations by the State. Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2426; Daniel, 291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. Accordingly, exceptions to the exclusionary rule exist. See 291 Kan. at 492, 242 P.3d 1186.
intent, knowledge, fraud, or illicit sexual relations. Circumstantial evidence must do more than raise a suspicion. It must amount to proof. There must be some reasonable connection between the facts proved and the fact at issue. A fact cannot be established by circumstantial evidence where there is direct, uncontradicted, reasonable, and unimpeached evidence that the fact does not exist. In some instances, circumstantial evidence may outweigh or be more satisfactory or convincing than direct or positive testimony. Circumstantial evidence cannot be based on mere speculation, guess, or conjecture; it must justify an inference of probability as distinguished from possibility. The
To prove intentional vote dilution under the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs must show both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect. York v. City of St. Gabriel, 89 F.Supp.3d 843, 850, 864 (M.D. La. 2015); Backus v. S. Carolina, 857 F.Supp.2d 553, 567 (D.S.C.), summ. aff'd, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 156, 184 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012).
policy, as well as the relevancy and materiality of the testimony. In the absence of a statute or a valid and binding contractual provision to the contrary, circumstantial evidence is regarded by law as competent to prove any given fact in issue in a civil case and is sometimes as cogent and valuable as direct and positive testimony. Upon the issue of reasonableness of conduct, all the surrounding circumstances become facts material to the case. Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish liability where it negates other reasonable causes for injury. Tort claims may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence.
Question and Possible Answers:
The police suspected that Yancey, a 16-year-old high school student, had committed a series of burglaries. Two officers went to Yancey's high school and asked the principal to call Yancey out of class and to search his backpack. While the officers waited, the principal took Yancey into the hall where she asked to look in his backpack. When Yancey refused, the principal grabbed it from him, injuring Yancey's shoulder in the process. In the backpack, she found jewelry that she turned over to the officers. The officers believed that the jewelry had been taken in one of the burglaries. They arrested Yancey, took him to the station, and gave him Miranda warnings. Yancey asked to see a lawyer. The police called Yancey's parents to the station. When Yancey's parents arrived, the police asked them to speak with Yancey. They put them in a room and secretly recorded their conversation with a concealed electronic device. Yancey broke down and confessed to his parents that he had committed the burglaries. Yancey was charged with the burglaries.
Assume for this question only that the court denied the motion to suppress the jewelry. Yancey moves to suppress the use of the statement Yancey made to his parents. The that best argument for excluding it would be
(A) Yancey was in custody at the time the statement was recorded.
(B) the police did not comply with Yancey's request for a lawyer.
(C) once Yancey had invoked his right to counsel, it was improper for the police to listen to any of his private conversations.
(D) the meeting between Yancey and his parents was arranged by the police to obtain an incriminating statement.
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"D",
"the meeting between Yancey and his parents was arranged by the police to obtain an incriminating statement."
] |
mbe_892
|
Consensual searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment “because it is no doubt reasonable for the police to conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so.” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250-51, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). In order for a consensual search to be valid, consent must actually be given (either express or implied), and the person giving consent must have (actual or apparent) authority to do so. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 185-86, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990).
291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. But neither the Fourth Amendment nor § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights expressly prohibits the use of evidence obtained in violation of their respective protections. 291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. Exclusion is not a personal constitutional right; rather, its purpose is to deter future violations by the State. Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2426; Daniel, 291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. Accordingly, exceptions to the exclusionary rule exist. See 291 Kan. at 492, 242 P.3d 1186.
intent, knowledge, fraud, or illicit sexual relations. Circumstantial evidence must do more than raise a suspicion. It must amount to proof. There must be some reasonable connection between the facts proved and the fact at issue. A fact cannot be established by circumstantial evidence where there is direct, uncontradicted, reasonable, and unimpeached evidence that the fact does not exist. In some instances, circumstantial evidence may outweigh or be more satisfactory or convincing than direct or positive testimony. Circumstantial evidence cannot be based on mere speculation, guess, or conjecture; it must justify an inference of probability as distinguished from possibility. The
To prove intentional vote dilution under the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs must show both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect. York v. City of St. Gabriel, 89 F.Supp.3d 843, 850, 864 (M.D. La. 2015); Backus v. S. Carolina, 857 F.Supp.2d 553, 567 (D.S.C.), summ. aff'd, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 156, 184 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012).
policy, as well as the relevancy and materiality of the testimony. In the absence of a statute or a valid and binding contractual provision to the contrary, circumstantial evidence is regarded by law as competent to prove any given fact in issue in a civil case and is sometimes as cogent and valuable as direct and positive testimony. Upon the issue of reasonableness of conduct, all the surrounding circumstances become facts material to the case. Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish liability where it negates other reasonable causes for injury. Tort claims may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence.
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A federal statute with inseverable provisions established a new five-member National Prosperity Board with broad regulatory powers over the operation of the securities, banking, and commodities industries, including the power to issue rules with the force of law. The statute provides for three of the board members to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. They serve seven-year terms and are removable only for good cause. The other two members of the board were designated in the statute to be the respective general counsel of the Senate and House of Representatives Committees on Government Operations. The statute stipulated that they were to serve on the board for as long as they continued in those positions. Following all required administrative procedures, the board issued an elaborate set of rules regulating the operations of all banks, securities dealers, and commodities brokers. The Green Light Securities Company, which was subject to the board's rules, sought a declaratory judgment that the rules were invalid because the statute establishing the board was unconstitutional. In this case, the court should rule that the statute establishing the National Prosperity Board is
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
Circuit Court judges and Supreme Court justices and choosing the chief justice. These nominations must be confirmed by the Senate. While the President usually has broad appointment powers, subject to Senate approval, there are some limitations. In National Labor Relations Board v. SW General Inc. (2017), the Supreme Court found that the "Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 [FVRA], which prevents a person who has been nominated to fill a vacant office requiring presidential appointment and Senate confirmation from performing the duties of that office in an acting capacity, applies to anyone performing acting service under the FVRA." Further, the
President is constitutionally allowed to make recess appointments when Senate is not in session (which means that such appointments are not subject to Senate approval until the end of the session). However, In National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning, the Supreme Court found that "for purposes of the clause, the Senate is in session whenever it indicates that it is, as long as – under its own rules – it retains the capacity to transact Senate business." As such, the Senate can claim to always be in session, therefore preventing the President from making any recess appointments. Executive Orders
The Supremacy Clause restricts the power of state and local governments to regulate federal offices and officeholders. U.S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2.
of deciding whether legislation is appropriate, to information gathering on matters of national importance, to oversight of federal departments and executive agencies. As a result, a congressional committee has broad discretion regarding both the scope of its investigation and the relevance of the information it requests. Although congressional authority to investigate is broad, it is not unlimited. Because Congress’s authority to investigate is tied to its authority to legislate, limits on congressional investigations are necessarily linked to the limits on Congress’s constitutional authority. For example, Congress has no general authority to investigate the purely private affair of an ordinary citizen.
Powers Act attempted to define when and how the President could send troops to battle by adding strict time frames for reporting to Congress after sending troops to war, in addition to other measures, however it has not had much effect (see "War Powers Resolution" section in the Commander in Chief Powers article). Nominations The President is responsible for nominating candidates for the head positions of government offices. The President will typically nominate cabinet officials and secretaries at the beginning of his or her presidency and will fill vacancies as necessary. In addition, the President is responsible for nominating Federal
Question and Possible Answers:
A federal statute with inseverable provisions established a new five-member National Prosperity Board with broad regulatory powers over the operation of the securities, banking, and commodities industries, including the power to issue rules with the force of law. The statute provides for three of the board members to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. They serve seven-year terms and are removable only for good cause. The other two members of the board were designated in the statute to be the respective general counsel of the Senate and House of Representatives Committees on Government Operations. The statute stipulated that they were to serve on the board for as long as they continued in those positions. Following all required administrative procedures, the board issued an elaborate set of rules regulating the operations of all banks, securities dealers, and commodities brokers. The Green Light Securities Company, which was subject to the board's rules, sought a declaratory judgment that the rules were invalid because the statute establishing the board was unconstitutional. In this case, the court should rule that the statute establishing the National Prosperity Board is
(A) unconstitutional, because all members of federal boards having broad powers that are quasi-legislative in nature, such as rulemaking, must be appointed by Congress.
(B) unconstitutional, because all members of federal boards exercising executive powers must be appointed by the President or in a manner otherwise consistent with the appointments clause of Article II.
(C) constitutional, because the necessary and proper clause authorizes Congress to determine the means by which members are appointed to boards created by Congress under its power to regulate commerce among the states.
(D) constitutional, because there is a substantial nexus between the power of Congress to legislate for the general welfare and the means specified by Congress in this statute for the appointment of board members.
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"B",
"unconstitutional, because all members of federal boards exercising executive powers must be appointed by the President or in a manner otherwise consistent with the appointments clause of Article II."
] |
mbe_1078
|
Circuit Court judges and Supreme Court justices and choosing the chief justice. These nominations must be confirmed by the Senate. While the President usually has broad appointment powers, subject to Senate approval, there are some limitations. In National Labor Relations Board v. SW General Inc. (2017), the Supreme Court found that the "Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 [FVRA], which prevents a person who has been nominated to fill a vacant office requiring presidential appointment and Senate confirmation from performing the duties of that office in an acting capacity, applies to anyone performing acting service under the FVRA." Further, the
President is constitutionally allowed to make recess appointments when Senate is not in session (which means that such appointments are not subject to Senate approval until the end of the session). However, In National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning, the Supreme Court found that "for purposes of the clause, the Senate is in session whenever it indicates that it is, as long as – under its own rules – it retains the capacity to transact Senate business." As such, the Senate can claim to always be in session, therefore preventing the President from making any recess appointments. Executive Orders
The Supremacy Clause restricts the power of state and local governments to regulate federal offices and officeholders. U.S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2.
of deciding whether legislation is appropriate, to information gathering on matters of national importance, to oversight of federal departments and executive agencies. As a result, a congressional committee has broad discretion regarding both the scope of its investigation and the relevance of the information it requests. Although congressional authority to investigate is broad, it is not unlimited. Because Congress’s authority to investigate is tied to its authority to legislate, limits on congressional investigations are necessarily linked to the limits on Congress’s constitutional authority. For example, Congress has no general authority to investigate the purely private affair of an ordinary citizen.
Powers Act attempted to define when and how the President could send troops to battle by adding strict time frames for reporting to Congress after sending troops to war, in addition to other measures, however it has not had much effect (see "War Powers Resolution" section in the Commander in Chief Powers article). Nominations The President is responsible for nominating candidates for the head positions of government offices. The President will typically nominate cabinet officials and secretaries at the beginning of his or her presidency and will fill vacancies as necessary. In addition, the President is responsible for nominating Federal
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According to a statute of the state of Kiowa, a candidate for state office may have his name placed on the official election ballot only if he files with the appropriate state official a petition containing a specified number of voter signatures. Roderick failed to get his name placed on the state ballot as an independent candidate for governor because he failed to file a petition with the number of voter signatures required by state statute. In a suit against the appropriate state officials in federal district court, Roderick sought an injunction against the petition signature requirement on the ground that it was unconstitutional. Which of the following, if established, constitutes the strongest argument for Roderick?
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
If we determine that a statute treats similarly situated individuals differently, we then evaluate the statute under an equal protection analysis. To determine whether a statute violates equal protection, we will either apply strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review. State v. Hirschfelder, 170 Wash.2d 536, 550, 242 P.3d 876 (2010). Which test applies depends on the classification and rights involved: Suspect classifications, such as race, alienage, and national origin, are subject to strict scrutiny. “Strict scrutiny also applies to laws burdening fundamental rights or liberties.” Intermediate scrutiny applies only if the statute implicates both an important right and
To prove intentional vote dilution under the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs must show both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect. York v. City of St. Gabriel, 89 F.Supp.3d 843, 850, 864 (M.D. La. 2015); Backus v. S. Carolina, 857 F.Supp.2d 553, 567 (D.S.C.), summ. aff'd, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 156, 184 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012).
to safeguard the interests of its citizens. Sanelli v. Glenview State Bank, 108 Ill.2d 1, 23, 90 Ill.Dec. 908, 483 N.E.2d 226 (1985). Put differently, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once observed: “One whose rights, such as they are, are subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the power of the State by making a contract about them. The contract will carry with it the infirmity of the subject matter.” Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357, 28 S.Ct. 529, 531–32, 52 L.Ed. 828, 832 (1908). Furthermore, the police power “is not limited to health, morals
The Supremacy Clause restricts the power of state and local governments to regulate federal offices and officeholders. U.S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. This court interprets § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, which specifically addresses searches and seizures, as providing the same protection. Daniel, 291 Kan. at 498, 242 P.3d 1186. Warrantless searches are considered unreasonable unless they fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, such as consent, search incident to lawful arrest, stop and frisk, probable cause plus exigent circumstances, the emergency doctrine, inventory searches, plain view or feel, and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses. State v. Fitzgerald, *235 286 Kan. 1124,
Question and Possible Answers:
According to a statute of the state of Kiowa, a candidate for state office may have his name placed on the official election ballot only if he files with the appropriate state official a petition containing a specified number of voter signatures. Roderick failed to get his name placed on the state ballot as an independent candidate for governor because he failed to file a petition with the number of voter signatures required by state statute. In a suit against the appropriate state officials in federal district court, Roderick sought an injunction against the petition signature requirement on the ground that it was unconstitutional. Which of the following, if established, constitutes the strongest argument for Roderick?
(A) Compliance with the petition signature requirement is burdensome.
(B) The objectives of the statute could be satisfactorily achieved by less burdensome means.
(C) Because of the petition signature requirement, very few independent candidates have ever succeeded in getting on the ballot.
(D) The motivation for the statute was a desire to keep candidates off the ballot if they did not have strong support among voters.
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"B",
"The objectives of the statute could be satisfactorily achieved by less burdensome means."
] |
mbe_973
|
If we determine that a statute treats similarly situated individuals differently, we then evaluate the statute under an equal protection analysis. To determine whether a statute violates equal protection, we will either apply strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review. State v. Hirschfelder, 170 Wash.2d 536, 550, 242 P.3d 876 (2010). Which test applies depends on the classification and rights involved: Suspect classifications, such as race, alienage, and national origin, are subject to strict scrutiny. “Strict scrutiny also applies to laws burdening fundamental rights or liberties.” Intermediate scrutiny applies only if the statute implicates both an important right and
To prove intentional vote dilution under the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs must show both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect. York v. City of St. Gabriel, 89 F.Supp.3d 843, 850, 864 (M.D. La. 2015); Backus v. S. Carolina, 857 F.Supp.2d 553, 567 (D.S.C.), summ. aff'd, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 156, 184 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012).
to safeguard the interests of its citizens. Sanelli v. Glenview State Bank, 108 Ill.2d 1, 23, 90 Ill.Dec. 908, 483 N.E.2d 226 (1985). Put differently, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once observed: “One whose rights, such as they are, are subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the power of the State by making a contract about them. The contract will carry with it the infirmity of the subject matter.” Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357, 28 S.Ct. 529, 531–32, 52 L.Ed. 828, 832 (1908). Furthermore, the police power “is not limited to health, morals
The Supremacy Clause restricts the power of state and local governments to regulate federal offices and officeholders. U.S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. This court interprets § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, which specifically addresses searches and seizures, as providing the same protection. Daniel, 291 Kan. at 498, 242 P.3d 1186. Warrantless searches are considered unreasonable unless they fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, such as consent, search incident to lawful arrest, stop and frisk, probable cause plus exigent circumstances, the emergency doctrine, inventory searches, plain view or feel, and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses. State v. Fitzgerald, *235 286 Kan. 1124,
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Dart is charged with the statutory offense of "knowingly violating a regulation of the State Alcoholic Beverage Control Board" and specifically that he knowingly violated regulation number 345-90 issued by the State Alcoholic Beverage Control Board. That regulation prohibits the sale of alcoholic beverages to any person under the age of 18 and also prohibits the sale of any alcoholic beverage to a person over the age of 17 and under the age of 22 without the presentation of such person's driver's license or other identification showing the age of the purchaser to be 18 or older. The evidence showed that Dart was a bartender in a tavern and sold a bottle of beer to a person who was 17 years old and that Dart did not ask for or see the purchaser's driver's license or any other identification. Which of the following, if found by the jury, would be of the most help to Dart?
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Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:
Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]
Answer: [A, B, C, or D]
Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.
Relevant chunks:
To convict for a violation of Code § 18.2-36.1(B), the Commonwealth must prove, inter alia, conduct by an accused “so gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life[.]” Code § 18.2-36.1(B). 1 Such conduct “has come to be known as ‘criminal negligence’ ” in the context of common law vehicular involuntary manslaughter and requires “ ‘acts of commission or omission of a wanton or willful nature, showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights of others, under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce injury ... and the offender knows or is charged with the knowledge
making a truly informed and intelligent decision concerning the proposed medical procedure.” Pauscher, 408 N.W.2d at 359 (citing Cowman, 329 N.W.2d at 425, 427); accord Doe, 476 N.W.2d at 31 (“That duty is shaped, not by what the medical community would deem material, but by the patient's need for information sufficient to make a truly informed and intelligent decision.”). Several exceptions to the patient rule's disclosure requirement exist that are not applicable to this case. Generally, to succeed on a claim of informed consent, the plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) The existence of a material risk [or information] unknown
or from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.” See also Duncan v. Rzonca, 133 Ill.App.3d 184, 200, 88 Ill.Dec. 288, 478 N.E.2d 603, 613 (1985). 2To establish negligent parental supervision, a plaintiff must show that (1) the parents were aware of specific instances of prior conduct sufficient to put them on notice that the act complained of was
elements of both offenses because no element of either offense negates an element of the other. Even though reckless murder involves a situation in which the defendant does not intend to kill or injure another person, it does not require that none of his actions be intentional. For example, it does not exclude the possibility that he committed another intentional act, such as setting a fire. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the appellant acted with extreme indifference to human life but did not intend to kill or injure the victim when he threw gasoline around the den;
circumstances of this case, Instructor created an unreasonable risk of harm, increased the risk inherent in competitive ballroom dancing, or was otherwise unreasonable in his acts and omissions is a question for the trier of fact.
Question and Possible Answers:
Dart is charged with the statutory offense of "knowingly violating a regulation of the State Alcoholic Beverage Control Board" and specifically that he knowingly violated regulation number 345-90 issued by the State Alcoholic Beverage Control Board. That regulation prohibits the sale of alcoholic beverages to any person under the age of 18 and also prohibits the sale of any alcoholic beverage to a person over the age of 17 and under the age of 22 without the presentation of such person's driver's license or other identification showing the age of the purchaser to be 18 or older. The evidence showed that Dart was a bartender in a tavern and sold a bottle of beer to a person who was 17 years old and that Dart did not ask for or see the purchaser's driver's license or any other identification. Which of the following, if found by the jury, would be of the most help to Dart?
(A) The purchaser had a driver's license that falsely showed his age to be 21.
(B) Dart had never been told he was supposed to check identification of persons over 17 and under 22 before selling them alcohol.
(C) Dart did not know that the regulations classified beer as an alcoholic beverage.
(D) Dart mistakenly believed the purchaser to be 24 years old.
Reasoning:
Answer:
|
[
"D",
"Dart mistakenly believed the purchaser to be 24 years old."
] |
mbe_799
|
To convict for a violation of Code § 18.2-36.1(B), the Commonwealth must prove, inter alia, conduct by an accused “so gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life[.]” Code § 18.2-36.1(B). 1 Such conduct “has come to be known as ‘criminal negligence’ ” in the context of common law vehicular involuntary manslaughter and requires “ ‘acts of commission or omission of a wanton or willful nature, showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights of others, under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce injury ... and the offender knows or is charged with the knowledge
making a truly informed and intelligent decision concerning the proposed medical procedure.” Pauscher, 408 N.W.2d at 359 (citing Cowman, 329 N.W.2d at 425, 427); accord Doe, 476 N.W.2d at 31 (“That duty is shaped, not by what the medical community would deem material, but by the patient's need for information sufficient to make a truly informed and intelligent decision.”). Several exceptions to the patient rule's disclosure requirement exist that are not applicable to this case. Generally, to succeed on a claim of informed consent, the plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) The existence of a material risk [or information] unknown
or from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.” See also Duncan v. Rzonca, 133 Ill.App.3d 184, 200, 88 Ill.Dec. 288, 478 N.E.2d 603, 613 (1985). 2To establish negligent parental supervision, a plaintiff must show that (1) the parents were aware of specific instances of prior conduct sufficient to put them on notice that the act complained of was
elements of both offenses because no element of either offense negates an element of the other. Even though reckless murder involves a situation in which the defendant does not intend to kill or injure another person, it does not require that none of his actions be intentional. For example, it does not exclude the possibility that he committed another intentional act, such as setting a fire. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the appellant acted with extreme indifference to human life but did not intend to kill or injure the victim when he threw gasoline around the den;
circumstances of this case, Instructor created an unreasonable risk of harm, increased the risk inherent in competitive ballroom dancing, or was otherwise unreasonable in his acts and omissions is a question for the trier of fact.
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