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EU holds back on taxing US Big Tech
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As transatlantic trade tensions simmer, EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen has floated the idea of taxing digital advertising revenue — a so-called 'Amazon tax' — as a possible countermeasure to US tariffs. But with the EU now limiting retaliation to goods, the bloc appears to be backing away from that threat. Von der Leyen's ‘Amazon Tax’, proposed in April, would consist of a digital service tax on the gross revenue of large digital companies operating within the bloc. An EU tax is being pushed for by trade unions and some progressive MEPs as a bargaining tool in the trade conflict, given that the EU maintains a significant trade deficit in services with the US. Although an EU digital tax would apply to all large digital companies selling these services in the EU, it is largely seen as a way to tax US Big Tech companies, which dominate the global digital service sector. Opponents of the tax warn that the EU is highly dependent on US Big Tech for key services and that it could further escalate tensions with the administration of US president Donald Trump. But Oliver Roethig, regional secretary for UNI Europa , the trade union federation for service workers, told EUobserver that aside from its economic implications, a digital service tax would also serve to protect the EU's model of social dialogue. Citing US Big Tech companies’ hostility towards collective bargaining, he said: “Apart from the digital service tax targeting the only area where the EU has a trade deficit, it’s a highly symbolic move in defence of Europe’s economic model, built on social dialogue and collective bargaining.” Reforming tax rules Proposals for an EU-wide digital tax were first introduced in 2018, as a temporary measure while new global tax rules were being negotiated at the Paris-based wealthy nations' club, the OECD. Under the OECD’s deal, some tax burden would be shifted to where goods and services are sold or used, rather than where the companies providing them are located. Nevertheless, tax negotiations stalled when the Trump administration formally withdrew support from the OECD’s tax deal, arguing that it would discriminate against US companies. Meanwhile, several member states, including Spain, France, Italy, Austria, Portugal, Hungary, Poland, and Denmark, have implemented their own national digital tax. Several other EU states, including Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway have proposed or shown interest in national digital service taxes (DSTs). France’s DST taxes revenue from digital platforms and advertising services based on users’ data for companies exceeding a global revenue of €750m. Similarly, Spain’s digital tax consists of a three percent tax on companies selling data and digital advertisements, also for companies with global revenues reaching €750m. The digital taxes of Spain, France, Italy, and Austria are subject to repeal if the OECD’s is signed. “We simply have to be cautious with digital corporations because we have no real alternatives to the offering by the American digital industry” Opposition Digital service taxes have faced renewed opposition - both within and outside of the EU. Ireland has been a consistent opponent of an EU-level digital tariff and its Taoiseach, Micheál Martin, recently said he would oppose it, saying it would harm a sector vital to the country. Around 60 percent of Ireland’s corporate tax revenue comes from 10 US companies. In April, former German finance minister Jörg Kukies cautioned against pressuring US Big Tech, saying that “we simply have to be cautious with digital corporations because we have no real alternatives to the offering by the American digital industry.” Europe’s reliance on US Big Tech companies remains considerable, especially in key digital services. A report by UNI-Europa showed that Amazon received over €1.3bn in public contracts across Europe over a three-year span, mostly in contracts with the company’s web and cloud computing subsidiary, Amazon Web Services. Eliminating existing digital taxes has been an objective of the Trump administration as well. In February, the White House released a fact sheet referring to tax as “overseas extortion”. Late in April, US treasury secretary Scott Bessent attacked the digital service tax that member states have implemented, saying: “Some of the European countries have put on an unfair digital service tax”. “We want to see that unfair tax on one of America’s great industries removed”, he also said. Taxing Big Tech Taxing Big Tech multinationals has been the subject of prominent court cases within the EU. A decision by the European Court of Justice ruled last year that Apple must repay Ireland €13bn in unpaid taxes, citing that Ireland had provided the company unfair state aid in tax deals. A report from 2018 found that digital companies paid an average effective tax rate of around 9.5 percent throughout the EU, compared to around 23.3 percent for traditional businesses. Roethig also told EUobserver that “from our perspective, it’s unfair that US big tech companies on average pay two and half times less tax than European companies, while benefiting from European taxpayers' money in the form of lucrative public contracts.” An analysis by the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) sponsored by the Greens/EFA found that a five percent digital tax could generate around €37.5bn by 2026, representing nearly a fifth of the EU’s budget for 2025. Softening tone While von der Leyen told the Financial Times in April that the EU is prepared to implement a tax on US tech companies if talks with president Trump fail, the EU has not made explicit moves towards implementing such a move. A commission spokesperson told EUobserver that while they would not comment on the details of ongoing talks, a negotiated solution remains the commission’s preferred outcome. Nevertheless, the spokesperson said that “all options remain on the table.” Regarding national digital taxes, the spokesperson said that existing national digital taxes were in line with discussions of the OECD Global Tax Agreement. They also said that “should trade measures be taken against the Member States having a DST in place, appropriate measures will be considered in line with EU trade policy to defend EU interests.” And while some experts emphasise the security risks of relying on US Big Tech, Roethig told EUobserver that relying on US Big Tech also violates the EU's professed values: “The real problem is the model: we shouldn’t be subsidising union-busting, tax-avoiding, anti-democratic companies". Wouter van de Klippe is a freelance journalist covering labour mobilising, social, economic, and environmental justice, and social movements.
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Wouter van de Klippe
|
In April, EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen floated an 'Amazon tax' on digital ads as a counter to US tariffs. But with the EU now limiting retaliation to goods, the bloc appears to be backing away from that threat.
|
[
"Digital",
"EU Political"
] |
digital
|
2025-06-10T07:12:40.366Z
|
https://euobserver.com/digital/arb99e5fa7
|
Undocumented workers - EU can't live with them, can't live without them
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In the corridors of Brussels, the topic of undocumented migrants rarely occupies center stage in political dialogue, at least not in terms that reflect their de facto role within the Union. Debates around migration continue to orbit familiar binaries: legal versus illegal, humanitarian duty versus border control, integration versus deportation. Yet the day-to-day functioning of many EU member states quietly rests on the presence of millions of people who do not exist in official registers. Their labour is deemed illegal, yet their presence is tolerated; their contributions are unrecognised, yet essential. This is not merely a policy blind spot. It is a profound political contradiction, one that reveals the gap between what the EU claims to be and what it has become. At the heart of the matter is the quiet institutionalisation of a parallel reality: one where entire political economies operate under a regime of selective illegality. Not a flaw, but a feature This is not a matter of enforcement failure. It is the result of deliberate, if unspoken, political design. Member states uphold tough migration rhetoric while allowing the proliferation of legal grey zones. Border control agencies are expanded while amnesties are quietly issued in crisis years. Deportations are emphasised in public statements, while administrative backlogs conveniently delay removals for years. These contradictions are not accidents; they are mechanisms of political containment. What has emerged is a form of 'dual governance' in which one side of the state enforces visibility, legality, and compliance, while the other depends on invisibility and informality to preserve political stability. National governments, aware of voter sensitivities and far-right pressure, cannot openly embrace the idea of integrating undocumented migrants; neither can they afford to eliminate a labour force that provides essential services without demanding political rights. This is not hypocrisy, but rather, it is a strategy. Undocumented migrants are politically voiceless, and thus politically useful. Their very lack of legal status becomes a political tool, a way to satisfy multiple constituencies without committing fully to any of them. EU complicit in care work, construction, agriculture The EU itself is complicit in this arrangement. While it offers funding for border security and asylum processing , it rarely addresses the systemic dependence on undocumented workers in key sectors such as care, construction, or agriculture. Supranational institutions issue statements on human rights and integration, but rarely acknowledge the structural role played by people who live entirely outside their legal definitions. The result is an institutional silence that legitimises a two-tiered system — not just of labour, but of political being. The quiet endurance of this arrangement reveals something deeper about European governance. It reflects the EU’s difficulty in reconciling its normative identity — based on law, rights, and order with the practical realities of a fractured political union. Migration policy is technically shared between the EU and its member states, but the power dynamics are unbalanced. National politics dominate, and populist movements ensure that migration remains a toxic electoral issue. This has led to a kind of informal federalism-by-avoidance: Europe pretends to have a unified approach, while each state improvises its own unspeakable truths. The irony is sharp. The EU demands transparency from candidate countries, yet its own treatment of undocumented residents is opaque by design. It champions the rule of law abroad, but builds political structures at home that depend on the suspension of law for certain people. It claims to stand for equality, but perpetuates a caste of non-citizens whose lack of rights is politically expedient. These are not just inconsistencies, they are political technologies. Invisibility, in this context, is not a failure of policy. It is the method by which policy is sustained. Politically, the greatest risk is not the presence of undocumented migrants, but the exposure of the system that depends on them. Far-right actors exploit the fear of uncontrolled migration, yet they benefit from the same silent tolerance that allows undocumented labour to exist. Meanwhile, centrist parties attempt to triangulate between ethical responsibility and electoral caution, often landing in paralysis. This vacuum prevents the development of a coherent policy — not just on migration, but on the nature of citizenship itself. As Europe's geopolitical environment grows more volatile, with war, climate displacement, and economic asymmetries fuelling future waves of migration — the current model becomes unsustainable. Political actors will soon face a decision they have long postponed: to either acknowledge the undocumented as part of the polity, or to deepen the contradictions that already erode institutional trust. This is not merely a matter of border policy. It is a question of what kind of polity the EU wishes to be, one bound by law and rights, or one that survives through their strategic suspension. Binu Daniel is professor of finance at Berlin's CBS University of Applied Science . Binu Daniel is professor of finance at Berlin's
|
CBS University of Applied Science
|
The day-to-day functioning of many EU member states quietly rests on the presence of millions of people who do not exist in official registers. Their labour is deemed illegal, yet their presence is tolerated; their contributions are unrecognised, yet essential.
|
[
"Migration",
"EU Political",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] |
migration
|
2025-06-09T08:00:00.000Z
|
https://euobserver.com/migration/ar72f99fcf
|
Udo Bullmann — A lone voice for ‘spend to grow’ economics
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In a time of fleeting online fame and short-sighted opportunism, it’s reassuring to see politicians who’ve held the same values for decades — and behave as if they still matter. When he entered the European Parliament as a member of the Socialists & Democrats (S&D) in 1999, Udo Bullmann had already been an active member of the German SPD since 1975. Now S&D coordinator in the committees on development and trade and chair of the delegation for relations with South Africa , he started in the parliament’s economy committee, where he stayed for nearly 20 years, until 2018. One of the first issues he pushed for was a wealth levy to “control the damages of globalisation.” He also fought to close down tax havens to raise revenue for “education, healthcare and infrastructure.” He is, however, best remembered for his protest against austerity during the euro crisis years of 2010–2012. As lead negotiator for the S&D in the economy committee, he challenged the rampant spending cuts imposed on Greece and Italy by the European Commission, the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the eurozone finance ministers — then led by S&D heavyweight, the Dutchman Jeroen Dijsselbloem. Bullmann wasn’t afraid of being seen as fiscally irresponsible, as so many of his centre-left colleagues were — especially in the Netherlands and Germany. Instead, he argued that Europe’s fiscal woes could best be solved through investment.“It is a mistake to believe that we can [restore budget discipline] without additional programmes for growth,” he said in 2011, to largely deaf ears in both Brussels and Berlin. Trying to bypass the EU’s notoriously strict fiscal rules — since softened but never fully rethought — he pushed for what became known as a new ‘golden rule’: allowing green, infrastructure, and education spending to be exempt from deficit limits.“Millions of jobs were under threat. Our idea was that investing in the future of their societies will pay off, while looking backwards and standing still does not. Green investment, as well as human development and education, could have been key,” he says, looking back at this era. He never got his way. Green investment did briefly become the go-to policy for restarting the economy during the Covid-19 crisis, but only defence spending has since been granted lasting fiscal leeway. No such ‘golden rule’ applies to the EU’s other stated priorities in the social or climate realm.“We need sufficient resources to defend ourselves against Putin’s war of aggression,” Bullmann says. “But Europe seems to understand this only in terms of military spending. If we abandon the path of economic and technological sustainability, we risk losing both our future and our competitive edge.” “Far too often,” Bullmann says, “we adopt the narrative of fiscal limits and austerity, which is the dominant narrative from the conservative rule book." Scaling back social and green ambitions because of fiscal limits, he warned, could erode public trust in politics. “That plays directly into the hands of Putin and Trump’s agents: the rightwing extremists.” “The problem,” Bullmann says, “is that neither our fiscal rules nor our European governance system is currently up to the task.” He welcomed signs of flexibility, pointing to the incoming German government’s creation of off-budget funds to sidestep what he called “the liberals’ fiscal trap of the past.” But he warned against a growing imbalance. Prioritising defence over modernisation, or relying solely on national spending efforts, risks deepening inequalities across the eurozone. “Other European economies will face higher interest rates to refinance their debt, without being able to profit from the new German course,” he says. To address this, he argues, the EU needs joint borrowing. “A common bond market is essential. Not only for a flourishing European economy, but also to strengthen the euro as an international reserve currency and reduce our dependency on Trump’s political and economic ghost ride.” But he worries Europe isn’t ready for that politically, which he partly blames on the left. “Far too often,” Bullmann says, “we adopt the narrative of fiscal limits and austerity, which is the dominant narrative from the conservative rule book ." “If we complain about the rise of the far-right, we need to ask ourselves how we’re living up to our own promise of tangible change,” he said. “Our people expect us to lead and open up perspectives on affordable housing, decent jobs, education for their kids, and fair play.” Asked what it would take for care, education, and climate investment to become the default centre-ground of European politics, rather than a post-crisis exception, Bullmann says: “People will follow you if you offer a credible, inspiring vision that delivers results for the many, not just the few.” "More people are ready to engage than politicians often assume,” he says, “as long as they trust they won’t be left behind." And do let us know if you're interested in a physical copy of the magazine here .
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Wester is a journalist from the Netherlands with a focus on the green economy. He joined EUobserver in September 2021. Previously he was editor-in-chief of Vice, Motherboard, a science-based website, and climate economy journalist for The Correspondent.
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A rare and brave German voice against the austerity cuts imposed on Greece and Italy during the eurozone crisis, Udo Bullmann got involved in politics in 1975 — and 50 years later is still not afraid of being smeared as ‘fiscally irresponsible’.
|
[
"The EU's Unsung Heroes",
"Green Economy"
] |
the-eus-unsung-heroes
|
2025-06-06T08:32:00.000Z
|
https://euobserver.com/the-eus-unsung-heroes/ara795211c
|
Francesca Albanese: 'EU officials must face charges of complicity in war crimes'
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The UN’s special rapporteur on human rights in the occupied Palestinian territories, Francesca Albanese, doesn’t hesitate to use the term genocide. She repeats it deliberately during her conversation with EUobserver. “It is genocide. I know people are uncomfortable with that word, but what else can we call it?,” she says. Albanese references the systematic destruction of Gaza, the starvation of its people, and the open declarations of intent by Israeli officials as evidence of genocidal conduct. “In the past two months alone, 400 people have been killed each week. Children are being killed after politicians have explained why they should be killed. The destruction is total. If this isn’t genocide, then what is?,” she says. When asked why she attended the Cannes Film Festival, she said: “I had to come. I owe it to Fatma. I owe it to the more than 200 Palestinian journalists who’ve been killed for documenting this genocide from the inside”. The Italian legal scholar is not in Cannes to attend the film festival as a whole. She’s there specifically to support the film Put Your Soul on Your Hand and Walk , a documentary by Iranian director Sepideh Farsi. The film focuses on Palestinian photojournalist Fatma Hassouna, who was killed in a targeted Israeli airstrike the day after the film was selected for a sidebar at Cannes (16 April) — as evidenced by the research agency, Forensic Architecture . “Journalists are killed because they are truth-tellers,” Albenese told EUobserver. She emphasises the role of independent media and cinema in preserving Palestinian voices. “The media should give Palestinians a voice before they’re dead — before they become ‘comfortable victims’. Media nowadays are often ready to portray Palestinians once they’ve been killed, but not while they’re still alive and speaking with their own voices." That, she says, is the main reason she came to Cannes — to honour those voices and keep them heard. Asked whether the death of Hassouna might awaken public opinion, Albanese is more cautious: “I don’t think a single life or death will change the international community’s response. I only hope there will be no more Fatmas, Hassans, or Waels...” She criticises international inaction and ongoing economic ties with Israel , which she says amount to complicity: “How long will leaders continue supporting and profiting from genocide?” Banks, pension funds, universities and tech The UN rapporteur says that she is currently working on a report where she will expose the banks, the pensions funds, the tech companies and universities that are aiding and abetting Israel's violations of international law, human rights and war crimes. And she firmly rejects the framing of Israel’s war in Gaza as self-defence. “The International Court of Justice had already ruled — before October 7 — that Israel has no right to wage war on a territory it illegally occupies. So no, this is not self-defence.” Which, Albanese says, also means that EU officials such as Ursula von der Leyen and the foreign affairs chief, Kaja Kallas are complicit since the EU-relations with Israel is business as usual. “I call for these top EU officials, and others, to face charges of complicity of war crimes over their support for Israel’s 19 month of assault on Gaza. This cannot be met with impunity” A complaint against der Leyen for complicity of war crimes was filed at the International Court of Justice, by the Geneva International Peace Research Institute (GIPRI) in May. Albanese has been targeted for her outspoken position. Threats against her and her family continue. “I’m from a part of Italy known for the mafia, but I never imagined that in 2025, people would be calling my house in the middle of the night, saying they’ll kill me and my children", she tells EUobserver. Despite the personal toll, she feels a duty to speak directly to the public, given her lack of faith in the political will of UN member states. “I have no confidence in the member states at the moment” In response to ongoing allegations of antisemitism, including criticism of past tweets comparing Germany’s treatment of pro-Palestinian demonstrators to fascist tactics, and a controversial reply to French president Emmanuel Macron, Albanese is clear: “I have addressed many times that I am not antisemitic. I condemn the attacks on Israeli civilians. "However, I especially condemn the genocide and ethnic cleansing being carried out by the Israeli state, not just in Gaza, but in the West Bank as well, and that with the complicity of the world leaders. The killing of children has to stop” She calls the accusations part of a campaign against her mandate Albanese pauses during the interview. “I’m wondering how many Palestinians Israel will kill today, while you and I are standing here.” In fact, at least 71 Palestinians were killed in Gaza that day, according to the civil defence ministry. Several others remain missing under the rubble. Still, she adds: “Of course, Israel has the right to protect its citizens from attacks. But this is not protection, this is committing genocide. What Israel must do is withdraw troops, dismantle settlements, stop exploiting Palestinian resources, end control over airspace, land and sea, and pay reparations after 57 years of illegal occupation. Albanese concludes with a direct message to citizens: “By all means, donate to humanitarian aid organisations. But remember: this is political. It is not an inevitable disaster — it is a deliberate, strategic one. There are military, economic, and political interests behind this genocide.” Emma Sofia Dedorson is a Paris-based journalist covering politics, culture and society in France, Spain and Italy.
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Emma Sofia Dedorson
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At the Cannes Film Festival, the UN’s special rapporteur on human rights in the occupied Palestinian territories, Francesca Albanese, speaks with EUobserver about the genocide in Gaza, and global complicity.
|
[
"EU & the World"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2025-06-06T05:33:00.000Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar6303344c
|
Why Mercosur is only the start of the story
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The EU-Mercosur agreement could reshape not only transatlantic relations, but the economic map of Latin America itself. After a quarter-century of stop-go negotiations, Brussels and the four Mercosur states — Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay — finally have an agreement on the table that slashes more than 90 percent of tariffs, reins in non-tariff barriers, locks in sustainable-development commitments and contains other provisions that reach well beyond trade in goods. But signing on the dotted line is only the first step. The agreement needs to be ratified by the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, and parliaments in Buenos Aires, Brasilia, Asunción, and Montevideo. The question for policymakers, businesses, and civil-society leaders on both sides of the Atlantic is not simply 'if' the deal will pass, but 'where' it could lead next: could this agreement become the springboard for a transatlantic EU-Latin America bloc? Forging an integrated market If the EU-Mercosur agreement is ratified, the EU will have FTAs with 95 percent of Latin America's GDP, compared to just 44 percent for the US and 14 percent for China. Yet those numbers tell only part of the story. The EU-Mercosur agreement can be the foundation for something far more ambitious: an interconnected web of trade agreements that bind together the existing FTAs — from north to south of the region — between the EU and Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Chile and — hopefully soon — Mercosur itself. Very pragmatic-high impact mechanisms to make FTAs interoperable are through and (MRAs). Diagonal cumulation, provided for in several EU-LAC agreements, allows for the recognition of third country inputs as originating if the conditions set out in the agreement are met. Thus, inputs from anywhere in that network would count as domestic content, enabling a Brazilian manufacturer to use Mexican parts and still qualify for zero tariffs in Hamburg. Moreover, MRAs on testing, certification and technical regulations could blur regulatory borders, forging a single, high-standards market stretching from Lisbon to Lima. The adoption of such mechanisms would represent a strategic step towards an integrated bloc between the EU and Latin America. According to recent estimates , a fully-integrated economic space could increase trade between the two regions by up to 70 percent and intra-regional trade by 40 percent. This would allow the EU to achieve, apart from México, the relevance of the US and China as a trade partner. Both tools are technical, almost dull. Yet they speak to a deeper strategic imperative: creating an economic bloc of 1.1 billion people whose combined GDP rivals that of the US. By interconnecting the existing network of FTAs, Europe and Latin America can build an integrated bloc of sustainable, high-value industries, where the greatest strategic opportunity lies in facilitating the bi-regional integration of the industrial sectors involved in the green-digital transition. Latin America is rich in critical minerals and renewable energies, the EU rich in capital, technology and know-how that could spur a new wave of European investment in the region. Beyond geopolitics Yes, geopolitics matter. Yet the deeper promise goes beyond balancing Beijing or Washington. The ratification of EU-Mercosur pact sends a signal that Europe remains open for business, with a partner committed to a rules-based trading system, sustainable development, and shared values, all while fostering economic progress and deepening Latin America’s own intraregional market. For Brussels, the path is clear: ratify the EU-Mercosur agreement, then deploy technical negotiations on cumulation of origin and MRAs to weave the wider FTA network. For Latin America’s capitals, the task is equally vital: treat bilateral deals not as endpoints, but as stepping-stones toward region-wide integration at EU standards. If leaders on both sides rise to the challenge, this will not be 'just another trade deal.' It will mark the dawn of a new transatlantic era in which the EU and Latin America stand shoulder to shoulder as partners in a single, sustainable, rules-based, economic project. The time is right. The moment is now. Ernesto Talvi is an economist and former Uruguay foreign minister.
|
Ernesto Talvi
|
The question for policymakers, businesses, and civil-society leaders on both sides of the Atlantic is not simply 'if' the EU-Mercosur deal will pass, but 'where' it could lead next: could this agreement become the springboard for a transatlantic EU-Latin America bloc?
|
[
"EU & the World",
"Green Economy",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2025-06-05T08:45:00.000Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ara4c61699
|
Marion Lalisse — EU’s combating anti-Muslim hatred coordinator keeps us in the dark
|
Last May, the European Commission's former second-in-command, Margaritis Schinas, hosted a conference against racism and antisemitism. Its star speaker was Israel's minister of foreign affairs, Israel Katz. Katz has courted a slew of controversy over the years. He declared UN secretary-general António Guterres persona non grata and rejected an official visit by Josep Borrell when the latter was EU foreign affairs chief. More recently, as Israel’s defence minister, Katz called for the "total devastation" of Palestinians. The event in May was intended to highlight a worrying trend of anti-semitism throughout Europe, but it also put into sharp relief how criticism of Israeli military operations are often assumed to be racially-motivated. An audience member was reportedly escorted out of the event by security for posing questions on Israeli war crimes, at a time when the EU itself refused to reconsider its association agreement with Israel despite the human rights abuses. But it also demonstrates how hate against Islam has taken a back seat in Europe amid token efforts to curtail what the Fundamental Rights Agency says is mounting racial discrimination against people of Muslim faith. "Women, men, and children are victims of harassment and violence based on their religion, skin colour or ethnic background," said the Vienna-based agency in a report last year. Young Muslims are also more likely to leave school early, hampering their employment opportunities later in life. Almost one-in-two Muslims experienced discrimination , said the European Commission last November, noting that just six percent of all incidents are reported. Chief among those in Brussels fighting racial discrimination is Marion Lalisse, appointed by the European Commission in 2023 as coordinator for combating anti-Muslim hatred. She very quickly faced a backlash from far-right circles after posting on social media of herself speaking Arabic ahead of the International Day to Combat Islamophobia. "Muslim women and girls can face an extra burden of hatred, especially if they are visibly Muslim" The French former diplomat, who previously served as the deputy EU ambassador to Yemen, Lalisse has been tasked to raise awareness of anti-Muslim racism. "A first step is to acknowledge that it exists and that it can be ingrained in our own institutions, our own families, our own daily lives," she said at a United Nations event last October. " Muslim women and girls can face an extra burden of hatred, especially if they are visibly Muslim," she added. The lack of a unified definition of anti-Muslim hatred is also said to undermine coordinated efforts at the EU level. It also makes the collection of comparable data on anti-Muslim hate crimes difficult. Questions sent to Marion Lalisse by EUobserver via the European Commission spokesperson services have since gone unanswered despite repeated attempts. And Lalisse, when contacted directly for an interview, said she had to first wait for the commission's spokespeople for permission. "I await their decision. Apologies for that," she said in an email. Some of those questions sought responses to structural changes needed within the EU institutions to tackle discrimination, the holding of member states accountable for failing to curb Islamophobia and why there is no dedicated action plan to fight anti-Muslim racism. In public documents, the commission says an EU law from 2008 prohibits public incitement to violence or hatred based on race, colour, ethnicity and religion. It means those who preach hatred or call for violence, based on anti-Muslim prejudice, can be prosecuted by national authorities, it says. But an event last year co-hosted by the commission on combating anti-muslim hatred had also concluded that civil society, education and media have a key role to play. So it is not immediately clear why responses went unanswered. But Lalisse has been quoted in Hyphen, a media platform on Muslim life, as describing her job to help European officials improve their understanding of Islamophobia as “draining”. And in March, she told Anadolu, a Turkish media outlet, in an email, that anti-Muslim hatred and other forms of racism and discrimination are being normalised. “I have been working on making the internet a safer place for Muslims . I have been working with member states and other actors to make sure that the Digital Services Act is implemented in a way that tackles anti-Muslim hatred and intersecting forms of hatred,” she was also quoted as saying in Anadolu. For its part, the commission has launched talks for a new EU anti-racism strategy for 2026 to 2030. The Brussels-executive is now demanding the wider public to contribute in order to create, what it says, is a society free from racial discrimination. And do let us know if you're interested in a physical copy of the magazine here .
|
Nikolaj joined EUobserver in 2012 and covers home affairs. He is originally from Denmark, but spent much of his life in France and in Belgium. He was awarded the King Baudouin Foundation grant for investigative journalism in 2010.
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Marion Lalisse was appointed by the European Commission as coordinator for combating anti-Muslim hatred. But EUobserver’s attempts to squeeze responses out of the commission on her behalf have been a near impossible endeavour, highlighting possible institutionalised racism for a minority under constant attack.
|
[
"The EU's Unsung Heroes"
] |
the-eus-unsung-heroes
|
2025-06-05T06:51:29.186Z
|
https://euobserver.com/the-eus-unsung-heroes/ard65841db
|
Frivolous copyright claims ‘censor’ Investigate Europe's gambling exposé
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Anonymous actors are abusing Google's infringement process by submitting bogus copyright claims to silence an investigation into unlicensed casinos. Since Investigate Europe and its partners revealed gambling firm Soft2bet's connections to over 100 blacklisted betting sites in March, Google received a flurry of malicious complaints seeking to erase the articles from its search engine. In the weeks after the publication, unnamed complainants have impersonated Investigate Europe or uploaded copycats of the original articles dozens of times in order to have the genuine stories about Soft2bet de-indexed from Google results. Soft2bet did not respond to detailed questions about whether they had any knowledge of the complaints. In response to Investigate Europe’s earlier investigation, the company denied any wrongdoing and said they operated legally in all jurisdictions. Analysis of complaint records found that more than 50 "takedown notices" have so far been filed using the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), a law designed to protect copyright holders, but one increasingly being misused to muzzle journalists . "Malicious actors exploit copyright protection systems to censor the press online, and it is truly worrying," Tiemo Wölken, a German MEP who helped shape EU regulation targeting online platforms, said in response to the findings. "It is simply too easy to subtly bury an unwelcome piece of reporting." As an American company, Google must comply with the DMCA, which gives online content creators the right to request the removal of material they believe infringes on their copyrights. Simple but successful strategy Since the original investigation was published, 39 cases saw mystery claimants pose as Investigate Europe and pretend that our media partners — or anyone quoting the findings — was infringing on the original article. In other bogus claims, Investigate Europe uncovered that individuals copied critical reports about Soft2bet into the blogging platform Tumblr and backdated them, then filed claims to Google alleging the posts were the original content. Once real articles were de-indexed, they deleted the Tumblr pages. As simple as it sounds, the strategy targeting the investigation’s presence on Google was successful. While the version of the investigation published on the Investigate Europe website was never de-indexed, partners including Malta's Amphora Media , Poland's Frontstory , Reporters United in Greece and Delfi in Estonia all saw their work disappear from Google's search results. In Estonia, six days before Delfi received a takedown notice for its article, marketing content was purchased on the news site to promote Soft2bet, one of numerous online adverts seeming purchased by the company in the wake of the investigation. As a result, anyone searching Delfi's coverage of the company on Google would have found the paid-for feature rather than the critical reporting. The claims targeting Delfi originated from someone impersonating Investigate Europe, stating: "The infringing news website has blatantly disregarded copyright law by replicating our entire original work." The sender added that Delfi "continues to distribute this content illegally, without our consent, and in complete violation of Google's copyright policies." The tactics are relatively unsophisticated but highly-effective, said Aljosa Ajanovic, a policy advisor at Edri, the European Digital Rights network . This kind of abuse isn't rare," Ajanovic explained. "It's becoming a go-to tactic against journalism that targets unregulated industries, fraud, or organised crime. And the big tech platforms, through inaction and opacity, have become enablers." A Google spokesperson told Investigate Europe: "We actively fight fraudulent takedown attempts by using a combination of automated and human review to detect signals of abuse, including identifying tactics that are well-known to us like backdating.” They added that those targeted by bogus claims can “file counter notifications for us to re-review”. Some see the over-reliance on AI and automated filters as unsuitable for these serious instances of copyright claims. "These systems are clearly not up to the task. They make mistakes, and freedom of speech and the press suffer as a consequence,” said MEP Wölken, a Social Democrat. Although the affected media lodged successful counterclaims to re-index their work, more fake complaints were swiftly issued. DMCA notices sent to Google are published by Lumen Database , a third-party aggregator, but the sender is often anonymised in the process. Filing false DMCA claims is illegal and constitutes perjury. Google told Investigate Europe that as a general rule they could only release information about those behind frivolous claims to law enforcement. Similar tactics have previously been used to censor negative coverage of Soft2bet. In 2021, scores of DMCA claims were filed against news reports mentioning a police raid at Soft2bet's Ukrainian office . Tumblr posts have also been used to attack forums discussing the company. 'The European Union's silence is complicit with the big gambling companies that speculate on the fragility of millions of European citizens' Investigate Europe uncovered how Soft2bet's owner Uri Poliavich and his associates contributed to create at least 114 online casinos which have been blacklisted in various European states for operating without local licences. Soft2bet's involvement was concealed behind offshore shell companies, some of which have gone bankrupt following players' lawsuits in Germany and Austria. "The big issue with the gambling market is that we do not have a proper EU legal framework for dealing with it. The rise of online gambling has opened the floodgates for abuse of this regulatory fragmentation. Companies like Soft2bet benefit from this fragmentation," said Wölken. In spite of the revelations, European players continue to flock to the sites. According to Similarweb, a traffic data aggregator, one payment page which only handles incoming traffic from websites linked to Soft2bet, saw its visits increase by 12 per cent from Germany in March, while Poliavich's company holds no licence there. Nine casinos connected to Soft2bet received over five million visits from the UK between January and March, despite being unlicensed in the country. "Regulators must step up their efforts to combat the gambling black market, targeting operators like Soft2Bet," said UK MP Sir Iain Duncan Smith. The former Conservative Party leader, who chairs a cross-parliamentary group on gambling reform, added: "Regulators must deploy tougher measures and collaborate effectively with international counterparts where relevant to crack down on these unlicensed operators." Despite such calls, no gambling authority in any European country where reporters found unlicensed sites operating has publicised enforcement action against Soft2bet. The inaction domestically is compounded by the absence of EU-wide regulation scrutinising the gambling sector. "The European Union's silence is complicit with the big gambling companies that speculate on the fragility of millions of European citizens," said Carolina Morace, a Left Italian MEP and former football player. "The commission underestimates the phenomenon and a European directive is needed to set minimum binding rules for all member states." Meanwhile, in the weeks after the investigation, Soft2bet embarked on a PR blitz, flooding the Internet with positive content in outlets such as Reuters and CBS News . The group recently launched its Elabet brand in Greece and has received nominations for more industry awards in Europe . It is also gearing up to enter the US market and struck a sponsorship deal with a Canadian hockey team . Maxence Peigné is a reporter from Investigate Europe . Maxence Peigné is a reporter from
|
Investigate Europe
|
An investigation into blacklisted online casinos has been the target of bogus infringement claims sent to Google by unnamed actors. MEPs are asking for journalistic work to be better protected and for a Europe-wide crackdown on unlicensed gambling.
|
[
"Digital",
"Health & Society"
] |
digital
|
2025-06-05T06:27:13.184Z
|
https://euobserver.com/digital/ar386f4e45
|
US tariffs talks heading in 'right direction', says EU trade chief
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The EU and United States are “advancing in the right direction” to reach a trade agreement that will head off 50 percent steel tariffs, the bloc’s trade chief said on Wednesday (4 June). EU trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič met US trade representative Jamieson Greer at the margins of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)'s m inisterial council meeting in Paris. Šefčovič posted on social media that he had “had a productive and constructive discussion.” "We are moving steadily in the right direction regarding tariffs, and there is agreement on the necessity to continue joint efforts to find lasting and sustainable solutions," Šefčovič told a press conference on Wednesday. Šefčovič said that the meeting would be followed by a video conference between himself and Greer to then “assess the progress and charter the way forward”. “If the discussion and negotiation do not succeed, Europe is capable of having countermeasures on American products and services as well,” he added. EU and US trade officials have been in negotiations for several months since US president Donald Trump made clear that he would launch a tariff war unless the EU and other economies offer better trading terms to the US. A reciprocal zero-tariff rate on goods is at the heart of the EU commission’s offer to Washington. Brussels was blindsided by Trump’s decision last week to double tariffs on steel and aluminium products from 25 percent to 50 percent, a move which also came into effect on Wednesday. Trump also expressed frustration at the pace of trade talks with the EU. The commission dispatched a delegation of trade officials to Washington earlier this week. However, it has also stepped up its consultations with EU governments on potential counter-tariffs on US goods should talks fail. These had previously included tariffs worth €22bn on goods such as Harley-Davidson motorcycles and Levi’s jeans . Ahead of the ministerial meeting in Paris, the OECD released its own economic outlook which forecasts that global growth will slow from 3.3 percent in 2024 to 2.9 percent in both 2025 and 2026, attributing the slowdown in part to the volatility cause by the Trump tariffs. The slowdown is expected to be most concentrated in the United States, Canada, Mexico and China. The OECD reckons that economic growth in the US will fall from 2.8 percent in 2024 to 1.6 percent in 2025 and 1.5 percent in 2026. In the euro area, growth is projected to strengthen modestly from 0.8 percent in 2024 to 1.0 percent in 2025 and 1.2 percent in 2026. The UK has been exempted from the 50-percent steel tariffs, while the EU has been given until 9 July to work out a solution following a phone call between Trump and EU commission president Ursula von der Leyen. Irish foreign minister Simon Harris, who was at the gathering in Paris, described the meeting as “a positive step” and that “the objective remains to reach a mutually beneficial agreement that includes reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers, promoting economic security, as well as facilitating business opportunities and investment.”
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Benjamin Fox is a seasoned reporter and editor, previously working for fellow Brussels publication Euractiv. His reporting has also been published in the Guardian, the East African, Euractiv, Private Eye and Africa Confidential, among others. He heads up the AU-EU section at EUobserver, based in Nairobi, Kenya.
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The EU and United States are “advancing in the right direction” to reach a trade agreement that will head off 50-percent steel tariffs, the bloc’s trade chief Maroš Šefčovič said on Wednesday.
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[
"EU & the World"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2025-06-04T15:02:13.157Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ard64e93e0
|
The EU needs to research its own oligarchic capture
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Qatargate was not a blip. It was a warning. The European Union now faces a stark question: will it continue to claim democratic legitimacy while ignoring how its own policies, institutions, and public discourses are being warped by the power of the super-rich ? Oligarchic capture is not just corruption by another name. It is a structural, systemic condition where extreme wealth translates into political power — often legally, almost always quietly. Europe’s billionaires do not simply accumulate wealth—they help shape the very rules, narratives, and institutions that govern the European project. From tax codes to agricultural subsidies , from philanthropic networks to media empires , oligarchs are shaping the future of Europe—and perhaps few in Brussels dare to name it. In my recent article in the Journal of Common Market Studies , I outline a research agenda on what I term the “ oligarchic constitutional order ”—a mode of governance in which laws, institutions, and norms are substantially shaped by and aligned with the interests of the superrich. This is not a distant risk; it is fast becoming a defining feature of our era. Consider the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): The New York Times has exposed how vast EU subsidies flow to political insiders and billionaire landowners. Perhaps with fortuitous timing, I submitted a European Research Council proposal two years after the publication of the exposé, designed to investigate these dynamics through a comparative, transnational, and multidisciplinary approach grounded in empirical analysis and theories of democratic governance and oligarchic politics. The proposal was ultimately not funded — likely for a range of valid evaluative reasons. Still, the experience raises a broader concern: how often are research projects that scrutinise powerful interests within EU institutions deemed too politically sensitive or too risky to support? This is not to suggest deliberate censorship, but it does point to the need for a more open and pluralistic research funding culture — one that welcomes, rather than sidelines, critical scrutiny of the EU’s own structures and contradictions. The EU’s research frameworks profess objectivity , but when certain structural questions, such as elite capture and the distributional consequences of integration, remain persistently underfunded or avoided, neutrality becomes selective. This is perhaps not necessarily due to overt censorship but likely reflects deeper systemic preferences for politically safe, methodologically orthodox projects . The apparent emphasis on consensus, policy usability, and institutional compatibility often sidelines proposals that probe uncomfortable truths about power. In doing so, the funding system may inadvertently discourage intellectual risk-taking and marginalise scholarship that challenges prevailing hierarchies. This is not only an epistemic failure; it is a political one, for the knowledge the EU supports ultimately shapes the kind of Europe it imagines — and legitimises. We urgently need a bold research agenda that tackles what Brussels has systematically ignored: follow the money , expose the networks of power that trace back to the superrich, and confront the mechanics of power. Four asks This work must go beyond surface-level critique to unmask how oligarchs increasingly script EU policy and public life across four interconnected arenas — each revealing the scale and urgency of a transformation hiding in plain sight. 1. Legal Systems: How are regulatory decisions shaped by lobbying from the super-rich? Who gets appointed to powerful positions because of personal or financial connections? 2. Political Economy: Which billionaires and elite actors control monopolies in strategic sectors — energy, land, telecommunications, media? How do they distort supply chains and suppress competition? 3. Public Sphere: Who owns and influence powerful media conglomerates and social media tech companies that shape public opinion? What happens when oligarch-funded initiatives and programs in universities, museums, or think tanks produce knowledge tailored to elite interests? 4. Human Rights: How do oligarchs weaponise normative discourses, narratives, and principles to undermine claims by and perspectives from marginalised communities, whether racialised, gendered, disabled, or economically disenfranchised? And how are these communities resisting? This cannot be a job for academia alone. Investigative journalism has already done much of the heavy lifting — often at great personal and financial risk — exposing tax evasion, cronyism, and the capture of public funds by oligarchic networks. But the fight for democratic transparency requires a coordinated, multi-sectoral effort. The EU must actively support collaborations between scholars, independent media institutions, civil society organisations, and public-interest think tanks. Each plays a distinct but interlinked role: scholars generate conceptual and empirical insight; journalists uncover hidden dealings and communicate them to the public; civil society mobilises resistance for emancipatory politics; and think tanks shape discourse and policy impact in the corridors of power. These alliances need stable funding, political protection, and institutional autonomy to resist elite backlash. A credible, multisectoral, multidisciplinary research agenda on oligarchic capture must empower these actors, not marginalise them, if the EU is serious about defending its democratic foundations. A research agenda on oligarchic capture is not just about fairness or transparency. It is about the survival of the European project. If the EU continues to shield elite interests while preaching democratic values such as accountability, transparency, and human rights, its credibility will rot from within. It is profoundly hypocritical to denounce authoritarianism in Hungary or champion liberal democracy in Ukraine, while quietly outsourcing core aspects of governance to billionaires in Europe’s own political centres. Europe faces a defining question: will knowledge be mobilised in the public interest, or in service of concentrated wealth? A necessary first step is to support research that is willing to ask difficult questions. This includes investigating how EU agricultural subsidies may disproportionately benefit large landowners, how regulatory agencies could be influenced into passivity by organised private interests, and how media consolidation might be shaping the boundaries of public discourse. It also entails examining whether corporate philanthropy enables elite influence under the guise of civic engagement, and how networks of power may facilitate the appointment of business figures to influential EU policy roles. At the same time, such inquiry should explore the growing reliance of academic institutions and civil society organisations on funding from wealthy donors, and how this might affect their autonomy. Ultimately, confronting these dynamics requires a clear-eyed analysis of the structural imbalances that can leave civil society fragmented and constrained in its capacity to challenge entrenched power. And above all, it means building institutional protection — reliable publicly funded research initiatives, editorial independence, academic freedom, and political backing — for those who investigate these power asymmetries. Only then can the EU begin to reclaim its credibility as a democratic project — one grounded not in elite privilege, but in public accountability, transparency, and governance that serves all. Salvador Santino Regilme is associate professor and chair of the international relations program at the Institute for History, Leiden University . Salvador Santino Regilme is associate professor and chair of the international relations program at the
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Institute for History, Leiden University
|
From tax codes to agricultural subsidies, from philanthropic networks to media empires, oligarchs are shaping the future of Europe — and perhaps few in Brussels dare to name it.
|
[
"Rule of Law",
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] |
rule-of-law
|
2025-06-04T10:40:01.330Z
|
https://euobserver.com/rule-of-law/arab37afb7
|
Leak of EU's full 2024 Gaza report piles pressure on Israel
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Even though a suspension of commercial ties between the EU and Israel remains unlikely, the publication of an internal EU paper from 2024 spelling out Israel's "war crimes" in Gaza will make it harder to claim Tel Aviv deserves to keep free-trade perks. The EU foreign service and European Commission are currently "reviewing" whether Israel's actions merit freezing their association agreement, which helps it sell some €15bn a year of arms, wine, cosmetics, and other items to Europe on preferential terms. Diplomats expect them to complete the process by 23 June, when EU foreign ministers hold one of their last meetings before the summer recess. Civil society groups and some EU countries, such as Ireland and Spain, have been demanding to suspend the EU-Israel pact for over a year. But the EU commission, led by German conservative Ursula von der Leyen, has so far shied away from holding Israel accountable, posing a risk their review will come to weak conclusions. And in the European Parliament, only a small group of MEPs has called for the suspension. The EU foreign service, for its part, declined to tell EUobserver whether its review would even be made public. "No comment on the process," it said. But a human rights cell in the EU foreign service already audited Israel's actions on 11 November 2024, in a closely guarded, 35-page internal survey, ordered by the then EU foreign affairs chief, Josep Borrell. Isolated quotes from the 2024 report were first published by US news website The Intercept last December. But EUobserver's sources agreed to now publish the earlier report in full for the first time, to show exactly what von der Leyen and her officials already have in their inboxes as established EU facts on the Gaza war. And the earlier report is so damning, it would make a mockery of the EU if it were to say on 23 June that Israel had not broken article 2 of the association agreement on human-rights compliance. Article 2 states : "Relations between the parties [EU and Israel], as well as all the provisions of the agreement itself, shall be based on respect for human rights and democratic principles." The 2024 EU paper said it "does not include any value judgment by … the EU", but still said Israel was "in violation of the fundamental principles of IHL [international humanitarian law]" by killing tens of thousands of women and children. It also spoke of Israel's "use [of] starvation as a method of warfare, which … constitute[s] atrocity crimes", using authoritative sources, such as findings by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and rulings by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). "The evidence is so overwhelming the EU would make a joke of itself if it were to say Israel was in compliance with article 2 or with the laws of war," said Claudio Francavilla from Human Rights Watch (HRW). It would also amount to the EU "trashing the whole UN system and the world court" if Brussels now rejected the factuality of the OHCHR and ICJ findings it had earlier quoted, he added. H.A. Hellyer from a British think-tank, the Royal United Services Institute (Rusi), said: "The [leaked] document makes it abundantly clear that the EU recognised quite some time ago that abuses were taking place, and yet avoided taking actions that are mandated by its own rules". "The most disturbing aspect of this document is that EU officials have, for a long time, been continuously well aware of various abuses, violations, and even likely war crimes … [but] have utterly failed to take measures to tackle this", he added. And Israeli violations since November 2024 have only become worse. Volker Türk, the UN high commissioner for human rights, said on 16 May that Israeli actions in Gaza were "tantamount to ethnic cleansing", for instance. The UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory also said on 13 March , for example, that the Israeli army was guilty of "the crime against humanity of extermination" of Gaza civilians, as well as "sexual and gender-based violence" against Palestinian women and children, which "amounted to torture or inhuman and degrading treatment". And that is not to include Israeli abuses in the occupied West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, which the UN has also chronicled and which also relate to the EU's article 2 decision. But even if the new EU foreign service review says in black-and-white that Israel has violated the association pact, there is no guarantee that EU capitals will agree to take action. Suspending the whole Israel association agreement would require unanimity in the EU Council, where Israel's staunchest EU ally, Hungary, is expected to veto such a move, EU diplomats told this website. Suspending just the trade part of the accord, costing Israel some €1bn/year according to estimates by civil society groups, would require a qualified majority vote — but that also meant that either Germany or Italy would have to turn against Israel for the vote to pass. Neither the Israeli-friendly Germany nor Italy joined the 17 EU countries who called for the article 2 review on 20 May. The EU has already lost credibility in the Global South and in the eyes of its own general public by giving Israel a free pass on Gaza. And the past 20 months of sanctions-free EU diplomacy has achieved "nothing", said HRW's Francavilla. If anything, "Israel has done exactly the opposite" of what the UN, ICJ, and EU have been calling for, he added. If the forthcoming EU review "makes a clear-cut, unequivocal determination that Israel was guilty of war crimes … it will be much harder for Germany and Italy to ignore," he added. 'Nightmare of stupidity' But if Israel let in more aid to Gaza in the run-up to 23 June, prompting the EU to decide this was enough to let it off the hook, that would be a "nightmare scenario and incredible demonstration of political stupidity", Francavilla continued. Rusi's Hellyer also said: "It would cause substantial damage to the EU's credibility worldwide on issues of human rights". Hugh Lovatt, a Middle East expert in London at the European Council on Foreign Affairs think-tank, told this website: "The biggest risk is that the EU commission draws out the review process and ultimately does not make a conclusion on article 2, leaving it to member states to decide". "That is certainly one outcome being speculated in private amongst [EU] officials," he said. "With regard to Germany and Italy — Israeli actions in Gaza are driving growing and, in the German context, unprecedented criticism of Israel," Lovatt noted. "They are currently hoping to moderate Israeli actions in Gaza and arguing in favour of engagement to neutralise the article 2 review," he said. "But the more Israel's destruction of Gaza continues, the more likely it is Berlin and Rome will support, or at least not oppose, meaningful EU action", Lovatt added.
|
Andrew Rettman is EUobserver's foreign editor, writing about foreign and security issues since 2005. He is Polish, but grew up in the UK, and lives in Brussels. He has also written for The Guardian, The Times of London, and Intelligence Online.
|
The leak of an internal EU paper from 2024 spelling out Israel's "war crimes" in Gaza will make it harder to claim Tel Aviv merits keeping free trade perks.
|
[
"EU & the World",
"Rule of Law"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2025-06-03T14:20:30.628Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar13e20dff
|
Edgar Buckley — Author of Nato’s Article V on 9/11
|
The peak moment in transatlantic solidarity — 9/11 and the triggering of the famous Article V — was prompted by a little-known British official in Nato, who now worries that US appeasement of Russia risks wider war in Europe. The only time in Nato's history that allies invoked their treaty’s Article V mutual defence clause was after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the US in September 2001. And the little-known Nato official who authored the decision was Edgar Buckley, whose title at the time was assistant secretary general of Nato for defence planning and operations. Recalling that fateful Tuesday afternoon some 24 years ago, Buckley, who is now 78 and lives in the UK, says he was chairing a meeting at the Nato HQ in Brussels when a secretary passed him a note saying that a plane had hit a tower in New York. When news came some 20 minutes later that a second plane had hit a second New York tower, Nato in Belgium was on red alert, with all US and all non-essential staff ordered to evacuate the HQ building. “There were unconfirmed reports of suspicious planes also heading towards Brussels,” Buckley tells EUobserver. And it was amid this high drama, in an outer office of the Nato secretary general, and in a huddle between Buckley, the US ambassador to Nato (Nick Burns), and the Canadian ambassador (David Wright), that the Article V invocation idea struck Buckley, after Wright had mentioned the existence of the clause in passing. Buckley proposed the Article V move to two colleagues later that same evening, who helped him draft a formal statement, which he presented to Nato secretary general Lord George Robertson at 7.30AM the next morning. And from the moment it caught Robertson’s eye, the document took just 16 hours to fly up the US chain of command via ambassador Burns in Brussels, to secretary of state Colin Powell and president George W. Bush in Washington, then back to Brussels for a unanimous vote by Nato envoys, with hardly a word changed from Buckley’s original text. The move was badly needed to show Western solidarity, even though the US ultimately did not use formal Nato structures to attack Afghanistan in pursuit of the 9/11 mastermind, jihadist warlord Osama bin Laden. “It [9/11] was feared to be the greatest loss of US lives in a single day since the Battle of Antietam,” Buckley says, referring to a US Civil War-era battle which claimed 3,600 lives in one day. “He [Buckley] sold the idea [Article V activation] to secretary general Robertson, who sold it to Colin Powell, who sold it to George W Bush … but it was Buckley who had the idea in the first place and two years later Nato allies were in Afghanistan,” Jamie Shea, another former senior Nato official, tells EUobserver. Looking back, Buckley says there were other high watermarks in Nato cooperation - such as its post-Cold War expansion into eastern Europe in the 1990s and its concerted action in the Western Balkans wars. “If we had made clear then that we were truly ready to assist Ukraine to the extent we subsequently did, Putin would very likely not have invaded in 2022” “Joining Nato is a huge economic boost, as well as a security guarantee. It’s almost certain to lead to EU membership and a country’s credit rating score goes up immediately,” he says. Looking at Russia’s aggressive behaviour today, he says a strong deterrent was needed to stop Russian president Vladimir Putin waging war beyond Ukraine into Europe in future. “If we had reacted more strongly after Russia’s takeover of Crimea and shooting down of MH17, then we might not be where we are today,” Buckley warns, referring to the civilian flight bound for Malaysia shot down by Russian forces operating in eastern Ukraine in 2014. “If we had made clear then that we were truly ready to assist Ukraine to the extent we subsequently did, Putin would very likely not have invaded in 2022,” Buckley adds. Russia is also waging covert hybrid warfare against Europe, with sabotage attacks at airports and on undersea cables. And the 9/11 moment carried insights for when so-called hybrid attacks cross the red line into Article V territory, Buckley says, because the “scale” of the New York assault was big enough to merit treaty activation — even though it was an act of sabotage by a nebulous non-state actor. "The West as we knew it no longer exists" The 9/11 Article V decision also showed the political, rather than technical nature of the treaty threshold, Buckley adds. “An attack is only an Article V violation if Nato agrees to declare it as such,” he says. But if Europeans declaring themselves ready to fight and die in the name of a US war in 2001 was a high point in transatlantic ties, then the current US president Donald Trump’s Russia-appeasement and his isolationism appear to mark a nadir in relations. "The West as we knew it no longer exists," said European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen in April, referring also to Trump’s anti-EU trade war. Article V niceties aside, some in Nato fear that Trump might quit the alliance altogether and pull US forces and nuclear weapons out of Europe, leaving the door wide open to Russian imperialism. Buckley says the Ukraine war has shown that Russian conventional forces could not defeat combined European ones, even if the US did abandon its old allies. But even if Trump thought that by walking out of Europe, he was preventing World War III or the loss of US soldiers’ lives, then history might teach him a harsh lesson by dragging the US back in at a later and less advantageous stage, Buckley says. “Imagine a scenario in which an emboldened Putin fired a nuclear weapon on European territory in order to gain a battlefield advantage in what had, up till then, been a conventional conflict. What would Trump and the US do then? No one knows. Not even Trump knows what he’d do until it happens and history is full of great wars which started in this way,” the ex-Nato official ends. And do let us know if you're interested in a physical copy of the magazine here .
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Andrew Rettman is EUobserver's foreign editor, writing about foreign and security issues since 2005. He is Polish, but grew up in the UK, and lives in Brussels. He has also written for The Guardian, The Times of London, and Intelligence Online.
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With US-Europe relations at a swift and unprecedented nadir, one obscure Nato official remembers when Washington and Brussels spoke with one voice — the night of Tuesday, 11 September 2001.
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[
"The EU's Unsung Heroes"
] |
the-eus-unsung-heroes
|
2025-06-03T11:07:54.070Z
|
https://euobserver.com/the-eus-unsung-heroes/ar7d706407
|
PSG's victory shows 'sportwashing' now winning in football
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When Qatar hosted the FIFA World Cup, western media was flooded with reporting on Doha’s ‘sportswashing’ as a spotlight was shone on alleged human rights abuses, mistreatment of migrant workers and poor LGBT rights. But, after the tournament ended, attention moved elsewhere. Now, after a Champions League final involving Paris Saint-Germain (PSG), a club backed by not one but two states, there is worryingly little discussion about ‘sportswashing’ surrounding the game, when it should be front and centre. Does this comparative silence suggest that ‘sportswashing’ is working? Qatar and other states’ deepening involvement in football have become familiar and, in effect, normalised. When PSG, owned by Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund, first reached a Champions League final in 2020, the British newspaper was outraged that “a state-run club in the Champions League final is a landmark low for football.” Saudi Arabia World Cup Since then, another “state run club,” Manchester City, owned by the UAE’s vice-president, has won the competition and Saudi Arabia has been awarded the 2034 World Cup. Given such criticism, you would expect clubs and organisations to be wary of manipulation by states for their own agendas and exercise greater caution. Instead, sportswashing seems to be on the rise across the board. As well as Saudi Arabia following Qatar and the UAE, another autocratic state involved with PSG, Rwanda, is pursuing the same strategy. Rwanda The ‘Visit Rwanda’ logo was displayed proudly on PSG’s training kit before the final, as Kigali seeks to promote itself as a reliable western ally and tourist destination. Yet, like Qatar before it, Rwanda is accused of using football to distract from human rights abuses at home and sponsoring a violent insurgency in neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). That Kigali is looking to emulate Doha is understandable, with the latter being a ‘sportswashing’ trailblazer. Rwanda, in contrast, is comparatively new to the geopolitical football game. Since 2018, the Rwanda Development Board has sponsored Arsenal, adding PSG in 2019, Bayern Munich in 2023 and Athletico Madrid in 2025. Compared to the Gulf states, Rwanda is a relative minnow. The PSG deal is reportedly worth between $8.7m-$10m [€7.6m-€8.8m], a fraction of the amount lavished by Qatar. Indeed, some have marvelled how a landlocked African state with a GDP per capita below $1,000 can afford to spend millions sponsoring western football clubs. But this shows how much Rwanda’s president Paul Kagame values sport. Rwanda is close to Qatar, with Qatar Airways owning 49 percent of Rwanda’s national airline and 60 percent of a new Kigali airport Doha is building, and Kagame may well have noted how its ally has utilised football. Like Qatar, Kagame is promoting his country as a sports destination, hosting the 2025 Road World Cycling Championship and exploring bringing in Formula 1. Moreover, like Doha, Kagame has regional ambitions. Long-heralded as a development success story, especially after recovering from the horrors of the 1994 genocide, Kigali now positions itself as a powerful African actor. But like Qatar, Rwanda is no liberal democracy, with Freedom House labelling it ‘Not Free’ and accusing Kagame’s regime of suppressing political dissent. Rwanda has also been accused by the United Nations, the United Kingdom, the U.S. and the European Union of sponsoring the M23 rebel group in DRC. The UN has stated that over 4,000 Rwanda troops are present in eastern Congo, while UN experts have stated that the Rwandan army is in “de facto control of M23 operations.” The rebels have allegedly taken part in multiple executions, sexual violence and other atrocities. Rwanda is further accused of illegally exporting minerals from the regions M23 controls, including vast quantities of gold. Rwanda’s football strategy has not been untouched by this, especially after M23 captured the Congolese city of Goma in February, promoting widespread western condemnation and US sanctions. The offensive prompted DRC’s foreign minister to write to Arsenal, PSG and Bayern Munich to “question the morality” of their sponsorship deals, calling them “blood-stained.” But despite some Arsenal fans protesting outside games, and 70,000 PSG fans signing a petition urging an end to their deal with Kigali, the clubs remain committed to the deal. Of course, ‘sportswashing’ like this is not new. Nazi's 1936 ominous precedent Nazi Germany famously hosted the 1936 Olympics to project a positive image to the world as did the Argentinian Junta with the World Cup in 1978 and, more recently, Vladimir Putin in 2018. Concerningly, in all three cases, the leaders went on to invade neighbouring territory, possibly emboldened to act with impunity following their perceived acceptance by the world at these events. It is possible that Rwanda’s alleged involvement in the eastern DR Congo has similarly been influenced by a belief that its positive image-building in the west will limit criticism. And, so far, this might be a fair assessment. Criticism remains muted. It is notable that, though some PSG fans opposed Rwanda’s sponsorship, few were urging Qatar to divest from the club, suggesting they oppose only some ‘sportswashing’, but not all. The media, similarly, remain far less focused on sportswashing than during the 2022 World Cup, though no doubt attention will return when Saudi Arabia hosts in 2034. Meanwhile, the ‘sportswashers’ will continue to invest because, despite occasional scrutiny, the broader strategy seems to be working. Even if PSG had lost on Saturday night, their backers in Qatar and Rwanda are already reaping geopolitical rewards, at the expense of fans, clubs and UEFA. Christopher Phillips is professor of international relations at Queen Mary University of London. Christopher Phillips
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is professor of international relations at
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Pars St Germain won while wearing Qatar shirts, while Rwanda has sponsored Arsenal, PSG, Bayern Munich and Athletico Madrid. Some have marvelled how a landlocked African state with a GDP per capita below $1,000 can afford to spend millions sponsoring western football clubs.
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[
"EU & the World",
"Africa",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2025-06-03T08:21:20.948Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar740fce63
|
Climate scientists warn against carbon offset loophole in EU 2040 target
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Europe’s climate scientists have warned the European Commission not to rely on international carbon offsets to meet its 2040 emissions target, saying it would weaken the bloc’s credibility and risk undermining real efforts to cut emissions. In a new report the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change (ESABCC) said the EU should aim to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 90 to 95 percent by 2040 compared to 1990 levels, and crucially, do so without counting foreign carbon credits. “There is no doubt that we have to reduce emissions very significantly, very rapidly,” said Ottmar Edenhofer, who chairs the advisory board. But using carbon credits to account for part of the reduction would pose a “huge risk” and make the target “less credible,” he told press on Monday (2 June). The recommendation directly challenges EU climate commissioner Wopke Hoekstra’s push to include international carbon offsets in the EU’s 2040 climate target. Germany has already made its position clear: in its 2025 coalition deal, it pledged to support a 90 percent cut only if up to three percent could come from foreign offsets. French industry minister Marc Ferracci is backing an ambitious target of compensation measures for polluters. Projects that reduce deforestation often sell carbon credits, for example to consumers buying flight tickets or industries wanting to offset pollution. But the rejects the promise of foreign offsets. Peer-reviewed research previously found that in 90 percent of cases no carbon is offset. “The evidence is clear: most international offsets aren’t worth the paper they’re written on and have done nothing to cut emissions,” said Michael Sicaud-Clyet, climate governance policy officer at WWF EU. Rather than buy removals abroad, Edenhover said EU governments should scale domestic carbon removal technologies, such as direct air capture (DAC) and carbon capture and storage (CSS). These technologies however, are controversial as well, with many projects stopping prematurely or underdelivering on their initial promise. "Removal methods face significant feasibility and scale-up challenges," the ESABCC also concludes. The current capacity of the EU to remove carbon permanently through technological means "is miniscule," it adds, putting the burden of meeting the 2040 targets squarely on emissions reduction. The scientific advice lands as EU leaders work to finalise the 2040 climate target by early July. That target will then be used to shape the bloc’s 2035 commitment to the UN — a key benchmark ahead of the COP30 climate summit in Brazil this November.
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Wester is a journalist from the Netherlands with a focus on the green economy. He joined EUobserver in September 2021. Previously he was editor-in-chief of Vice, Motherboard, a science-based website, and climate economy journalist for The Correspondent.
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EU climate scientists warned that including carbon offsets in the 2040 target would pose a “huge risk” and make the emissions reduction goal less credible — urging real cuts and domestic removals instead.
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[
"Green Economy"
] |
green-economy
|
2025-06-02T16:05:03.278Z
|
https://euobserver.com/green-economy/ar68293da4
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Luisa Albera — Saving lives in the Mediterranean
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Luisa Albera peers through the binoculars into the vastness of the blue Mediterranean Sea. From the deck of the Ocean Viking rescue ship, she pans the horizon in the hopes of spotting people fleeing the coast of Libya. Having left the port of Marseille only days earlier, the plan was to patrol the international waters north of Al Khums towards the Tunisian border. But before heading out to the open seas, the ship passes the west side of Corsica and then towards the northeast of Sardinia where it will drop anchor so that the team can train. The hope is to rescue as many people as possible, while providing medical care and assistance onboard the Ocean Viking, a 70-metre former platform supply vessel from Norway. Some 1,000 life jackets are stored in a container at the bow of the ship, ready at a moment's notice. Three semi-rigid lifeboats with twin outboard engines are also hoisted to the side. It's the summer of 2021 and Albera, up until then, had been with the red-hulled ship for more than two years. At the time, she was SOS Mediterranee's rescue coordinator, a position that has helped save the lives of thousands. She didn't know it yet, but within a matter of days, the Ocean Viking would carry out its largest rescue in history and bring back some 572 people. A five-hour 30-minute-long operation during the night of 3 to 4 July some 80 nautical miles off the Libyan coast would alone save 369 people, almost half of them children. Her job comes with its own particular hazards — given the wider Italian state-led crackdown on charity rescue operations. In 2018, the then Italian minister of interior, Matteo Salvini , closed Italian ports to the 629 migrants aboard the MS Aquarius, another ship operated by SOS Mediterranée. Today, such rescue ships face even more obstacles after the Italian government, in early 2023, passed a decree that requires them to immediately sail to distant ports to disembark after a rescue. By the time the Ocean Viking had left the port of Marseille in the summer of 2021, the Geo Barents, a ship operated by Doctors Without Borders, had also been detained by the Italian government. "The major frustration is that there is a lack of coordination, because I am not aware of all the cases in distress," said Albera in an interview onboard the Ocean Viking on 30 June, 2021. Drones operated by the EU's border agency Frontex and Malta don't share information with civilian-led rescue operations, she said. "I know only what I can see, or if Alarm Phone is sending me an email, because someone called them," she said. The following day, she coordinated a rescue of 44 people from two wooden boats in distress, in two separate operations, in Malta's search and rescue zone. The next day the Ocean Viking witnesses the Libyans intercept a boat around 10 nautical miles inside Malta's search-and-rescue zone. For reasons not immediately clear, the Libyans then let those on the boat go. But the chase had caught Albera by surprise. "This is the first time that I am not in the Libyan search-and-rescue region and they come for an interception," she says. Among those rescued and eventually brought on deck were two small frail boys, including one in a wheelchair. Albera had sent a port of safety request to the Maltese in the hopes of disembarking those rescued. "No reply till now. I don't expect any answer from Malta," she says. [Malta never replied]. The next morning, she steers the Ocean Viking into the Libyan search and rescue zone somewhere north of Zuwara, a coastal city. Two reconnaissance planes operated by the French Association Pilotes Volontaires , an NGO, are flying in the area west of Tripoli. Three successive rescues bring an additional 159 people onboard. But the largest and most difficult rescue was still about to take place. The ship’s bridge had only five hours earlier been alerted of numerous people on a boat somewhere in the Libyan rescue region. A wooden boat had been spotted by one of the reconnaissance planes, some 80 nautical miles north of Zuwara. "We have a visual, it is only a blinking light. It is less than one mile away," said one of the rescue team leaders. "It is night time, we can't see shit. I don't want to hear any sound, I want everybody to be focused," he added. The two rescue speed boats are lowered into the water, with the bridge giving an estimated bearing of five degrees starboard side at a distance of three cables. It's in the middle of the night, and the dim flicker of platforms flaring near the Miskar gas fields can be seen in the far distance. Almost 25,000 people, and likely many more unaccounted for, have died crossing the central Mediterranean since 2014 In the darkness, they find the boat floating without a working engine. The freeboard and transom are precariously low, a sign of how overcrowded it is. The situation is critical. The speed boats approach with caution, pass out of life jackets and unload 25 people each at a time onto the Ocean Viking. Some 369 people were rescued. The last person, a middle-aged mechanic from Egypt with a long scar running up his forearm, was the last to step off at 3.30 in the morning. With 572 people on deck and the weather and ensuing three-metre swells making a turn for the worst, Albera steers the ship towards Italy in the hopes of a speedy disembarkation. But delays and uncertainty heighten tensions on deck with food rations on the verge of depletion. Fights break out as a prison-like separation of nationalities and zones begins to take place. The Libyans use cigarettes as barter for protection. A young man from Tunisia jumps into the sea only to be rescued again. “The last food distribution is made on Friday. For this number of people, only a military ship can come and refurbish us," says Albera. She keeps her cool and continues to press the Italians for a port. She had sent one on Monday and another three requests on Wednesday with Malta in copy. When finally a port was given on Thursday, an explosion of joy erupted on deck. The first person to disembark was a 16-year-old from Eritrea. Albera says the individual stories of each person rescued are etched in their eyes even if they don't speak. People are willing to die to reach Europe, and some prefer to die rather than turn back, she says. "This is a common phrase you will hear," she says. It is also one of a desperate hope fraught with potentially deadly consequences. Almost 25,000 people, and likely many more unaccounted for, have died crossing the central Mediterranean since 2014. And do let us know if you're interested in a physical copy of the magazine here .
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Nikolaj joined EUobserver in 2012 and covers home affairs. He is originally from Denmark, but spent much of his life in France and in Belgium. He was awarded the King Baudouin Foundation grant for investigative journalism in 2010.
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Luisa Albera is the lead rescue coordinator onboard the Ocean Viking rescue ship, operated by SOS Mediterranee, an international civil organisation dedicated to saving migrants’ lives at sea. Her skill and experience led to the largest rescue ever carried out by the Ocean Viking, some 80 nautical miles north of Libya during the summer of 2021.
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[
"The EU's Unsung Heroes"
] |
the-eus-unsung-heroes
|
2025-06-02T11:58:07.237Z
|
https://euobserver.com/the-eus-unsung-heroes/ardf2290db
|
EU Oceans Pact — time for commission to be enforcer, not just architect
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As ocean advocates and former stewards of Europe’s marine policies, we recognise the familiar tension facing EU commissioner for fisheries and oceans, Costas Kadis, this month: the final countdown before launching a major European Union initiative — this time, the EU Oceans Pact . We’ve stood where he now stands. One of us led the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), making sustainability a legal cornerstone of EU fisheries management. The other introduced the EU’s first Marine Action Plan, setting out a vision for healthy seas at the heart of maritime activity. These were bold steps forward at the time — and they remain essential parts of the foundation that today’s pact must build upon. But foundations alone are not enough. The state of Europe’s seas has worsened. More than 90 percent of EU marine waters are affected by overexploitation . Traditional pressures like industrial fishing and shipping have been joined by a growing list of human activities: offshore oil and gas, intensive coastal development, seabed mining, and a rapid expansion of offshore infrastructure. All this is unfolding as the ocean reels from climate-driven change — rising temperatures, acidification, and deoxygenation that threaten to unravel entire marine ecosystems and the communities that depend upon them. At the heart of these coastal communities are fishers, whose knowledge and daily work make them indispensable partners in both sustaining marine resources and driving effective ocean policy; they must not be left to face these challenges alone, as their engagement is key to the success of any lasting solution. This is not just an environmental challenge. It is an economic and social challenge as an unhealthy ocean can jeopardise the basis of the blue economy sector and the prosperity of European citizens, especially in coastal regions. It is also a security challenge, an important element in the current geopolitical context. The Oceans Pact must respond to this reality with action as strong as the threats we face. Lessons from being in office One clear lesson from our time in office: ambition on paper must be matched by accountability in practice. The CFP and Marine Action Plan contain the principles and tools needed for sustainable marine management. But they were not perfect, of course, especially in the field of securing implementation, control and enforcement. Too often, weak leadership and political hesitation have allowed member states to bypass or delay implementation. EU member states cannot be left to pick and choose which rules to follow. It’s time for the commission to step up as enforcer, not just architect. That’s the responsibility — and opportunity — commissioner Kadis now carries. Nowhere is this more evident than in marine protected areas (MPAs) — widely recognised in EU law, yet still open to damaging practices like bottom trawling in the vast majority of sites. The pact must go further than previous frameworks by introducing binding rules to ban bottom trawling in MPAs, with clear deadlines and real consequences for non-compliance. This is not about rewriting the past — it’s about using the lessons we’ve learned to finally turn commitments into results. Should the final pact fail to address clear issues such as bottom trawling in marine protected areas, it would risk falling out of step with both public opinion and scientific consensus . Bottom trawling remains one of the most destructive and least defensible practices taking place in areas designated not only for conservation, but for securing the long-term health of fisheries and the survival of small-scale, low-impact fishers. An effective pact must recognise this reality and provide a credible path toward phasing out such practices where they do the most harm. Anything less would weaken the pact’s credibility at a moment when global leadership from the EU is urgently needed. Commissioner Kadis faces additional pressures that we did not. The political climate has shifted. Populist forces have weaponised environmental policy, blaming green rules for social and economic hardship. Meanwhile, the EU’s internal agenda is increasingly dominated by a new one-sided competitiveness — a narrative that often frames ecological protections as obstacles rather than opportunities. The commissioner must navigate these currents carefully — and we believe he can. There is also opportunity. The release of the Oceans Pact, just ahead of the UN Ocean Conference in Nice, will place Europe at the centre of the global ocean agenda. With other major powers faltering, the EU has both a responsibility and a rare opening to lead by example. To do so, we must pair our ambitions with the regulatory power to achieve them. Commissioner Kadis will be judged not only on bringing good ideas into the content of the pact, but on whether it marks a turning point in how the EU approaches ocean governance, aiming to secure good results in real life. Can we shift from well-intentioned plans to enforceable progress? Can we finally protect our seas and our people’s prosperity as we’ve long promised to? We believe he can — and must. The Oceans Pact is the EU’s best chance in a generation to reset our relationship with the ocean, to defend its biodiversity, and to support the coastal communities and millions of European citizens who depend on healthy seas for their future. Commissioner, we offer not only our full support, but our experience. This moment demands boldness — not just in vision, but in law. Now is the time to act. Maria Damanaki was EU commissioner for maritime affairs and fisheries (2010-2014). Virginijus Sinkevičius was EU commissioner for the environment, oceans and fisheries (2019-2024). Maria Damanaki was EU commissioner for maritime affairs and fisheries (2010-2014).
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Virginijus Sinkevičius
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There is one clear lesson from our time in office regarding the new EU Oceans Pact — ambition on paper must be matched by accountability in practice, warn two former EU fisheries commissioners. Too often, weak leadership and political hesitation have allowed member states to bypass or delay implementation.
|
[
"Green Economy",
"Opinion"
] |
green-economy
|
2025-06-02T10:21:26.522Z
|
https://euobserver.com/green-economy/ar28c6f774
|
PiS-backed Nawrocki wins narrowly, imperilling Tusk’s reforms and EU ties
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A wafer-thin win by Karol Nawrocki, a conservative historian backed by Poland’s populist Law and Justice party in Sunday's (1 June) presidential election, has put back into question the future of the country’s relations with the European Union — and will block liberal reforms planned by the country’s government. A final exit poll gave Karol Nawrocki 50.7 per cent of the vote, leaving his rival Rafał Trzaskowski trailing him at 49.3 per cent. Trzaskowski, the current mayor of Warsaw, stood for the country’s ruling coalition led by Donald Tusk, which replaced the PiS in government 18 months ago and promised to roll back eight years of conservative rule, which had isolated Poland from the EU mainstream. The presidential election was key to Donald Tusk’s plans, since the president wields the power of veto and can block legal measures needed to continue with liberal policies. Now, with PiS buoyed by Nawrocki’s win and Polish society split politically right down the middle, the conservative-nationalists led by Jarosław Kaczynski will redouble efforts to destabilise Tusk's government coalition and win back full power in the next parliamentary elections in 2027. Nawrocki ran a fiercely nationalist, anti-European campaign and attacked the Trzaskowski camp for favouring the EU Green Deal's environmental policies. He also claimed Poland would be flooded with illegal immigrants at the Brussels' behest and said Poland’s Catholic Church would be undermined by Trzaskowski’s pro-LGBTQI stance, as well as plans to liberalise strict anti-abortion rules . The PiS candidate was also endorsed by Donald Trump in a brief meeting in the Oval Office. Kristi Noem, the US Homeland Security chief, told a CPAC conference in Poland last week that the US would be sure to stand by Poland if Nawrocki was elected. Despite Nawrocki’s victory being a major blow for Tusk's coalition government and the European People's Party (EPP), EU commission president Ursula von der Leyen said she expected "very good" cooperation. "I’m confident that the EU will continue its very good cooperation with Poland. We are all stronger together in our community of peace, democracy, and values. So let us work to ensure the security and prosperity of our common home," von der Leyen said on social media. 'German propaganda' The election proved that PiS voters, in line with Trump’s MAGA supporters, instinctively reject any criticism of their candidate. Ample evidence provided by the Polish media of Nawrocki’s past close contacts with criminal gangland leaders in his native Gdańsk saw his voters dismissing these damning reports as ‘German propaganda’ — a reference to an often-repeated charge by PiS that Tusk and his supporters’ loyalties lie with Germany. Meanwhile, Trzaskowski ran a campaign based on a promise to transcend political polarisation and build national unity. And he decided not to build his message on fears of a return of the PiS regime and even sought to adopt PiS themes such as a tougher approach to immigrants. These are the issues which the Tusk government will have to address urgently. A government reshuffle is expected, and a more open communications policy is much needed. The changes will prove a test for the coalition partners who are still learning to combine loyalty to the government’s main aim of delivering a viable democratic regime with the pursuit of their own distinctive policies, and the need to win future votes against competition from their current coalition partners. The next election in Poland is two years away, when PiS will redouble its efforts to regain power. The present ruling coalition, without major changes, will struggle to win. But the results of the first round of the present presidential election, two weeks ago, also showed deeper trends suggesting that Poland’s current political landscape is beginning to change fundamentally. In the first round on 18 May, around 20 percent of Poland’s voters, many of them young people, backed radically nationalist rightwing parties. Leftwing candidates, also with strong support from young people, won a 10-percent share of the vote. These results show that the next generation of voters is becoming impatient with both the PiS led by Kaczynski and their arch rival, Tusk’s Civic Coalition, which leads the present government. Both political movements are led by ageing politicians who remember Poland as it was before 1989 and governed the country in the post-Solidarity era. Krzysztof Bobinski is a board member of the Society of Journalists , in Warsaw, an independent NGO. He was the Financial Times correspondent in Warsaw from 1976 to 2000. He worked at the Polish Institute of Foreign Affairs (PISM) and was co-chair of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum. Krzysztof Bobinski is a board member of the
|
Society of Journalists
|
A wafer-thin win by Karol Nawrocki, a conservative historian backed by Poland’s populist Law and Justice party in this weekend's presidential election, has put back into question the future of the country’s relations with the European Union — and will block liberal reforms planned by the country’s government.
|
[
"EU Political",
"EU Elections"
] |
*
|
2025-06-02T08:12:35.150Z
|
https://euobserver.com/*/ar7e3d2be4
|
Flight delays, Moldova, 2026 budget and Nato meeting in focus This WEEK
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EU transport ministers will try to agree on changes to the current rules about air passenger rights and airline liability on Thursday (5 June). The revised proposal, which the European Commission adopted in March 2013, is far from dead. While member states in the Council have held many discussions on the topic for over a decade, they have not agreed on a general approach for negotiations with MEPs. And last week, EU ambassadors also failed to reach an agreement. Key issues over the years have included compensation rules for delays (from the current three-hour delay minimum, to five hours for short-haul flights, nine hours for medium-haul, and 12 hours for long-haul) and cancellations, as well as compensation for missed connections, and the definition of "extraordinary circumstances.” A long-standing dispute between Spain and the UK over Gibraltar's airport has also contributed to the impasse. When travelling by plane, most delays are between two and four hours (measured by arrival time) — which has prompted consumer organisations such as BEUC to demand the current standards are maintained. According to LENNOC, a European flight data company, the proposed new delay limits of five, nine, and 12 hours would take away compensation rights from 85 percent of passengers. And in a recent survey, AirAdvisor, a company helping passengers claim compensation, found that 92 percent of French travellers and 96 precent of UK travellers are against any reduction in compensation entitlements. As airlines argue that current rules require them to cancel flights due to compensation costs, a compromise prepared by the Polish EU presidency aims to give an incentive to air carriers to deliver passengers to their destination. Overall, more than 970 million people in the EU travel by air every year. Beyond air passengers' rights, ministers will also discuss rules for the registration documents for vehicles and commercial vehicles inspections. In the European Parliament, MEPs are expected to extend on Tuesday (3 June) the EU-Ukraine road transport agreement until the end of 2025 to facilitate cross-border trade. On Friday (6 June), EU ministers will aim to adopt a position on cyber crisis management and resilient connectivity. The 27 will also discuss the growing importance of satellite connectivity for the EU’s strategic autonomy, and the implementation of roaming in Ukraine and Moldova . 2026 budget Ahead of the upcoming Danish EU council presidency, political group leaders and EU parliament president Roberta Metsola will travel to Copenhagen this week, with a conference between Metsola and Danish PM Mette Frederiksen scheduled for Tuesday. On Wednesday (4 June), the European Commission will present its proposal for the annual budget of the European Union for 2026 — which will be presented to MEP in the budget committee on the same day by the EU commissioner Piotr Serafin. Also on Wednesday, the European Commission is expected to present its proposal for an EU Ocean Pact in a bid to strike a balance between environmental protection and the development of coastal communities and the fishery sector. Nato’s Ukraine defence contact group also meets on Wednesday, which will be followed by the transatlantic alliance defence ministers' meeting on Thursday. The meeting comes in the run-up to a key Nato summit later this month, where Donald Trump is expected to redouble his push for a five-percent of GDP defence spending target. Delegations from Russia and Ukraine are due to meet in Istanbul on Monday for a second round of ceasefire talks. Enlargement On Wednesday, EU and Moldovan officials will meet to discuss Moldova’s future within the European Union and Russia’s war in Ukraine. This comes ahead of the first-ever EU-Moldova summit on 4 July. Still on enlargement, MEPs in the foreign affairs committee will assess progress and reforms in several candidate countries for their future EU membership on Wednesday. Russian opposition figures Yulia Navalnaya, Vladimir Kara-Murza and Ilya Yashin, will also address the foreign affairs committee on Thursday, while foreign interference and Russian hybrid threats will be the subject of discussion in the special committee on the European Democracy Shield on Tuesday. Sharon McGuinness, chief of the European Chemical Agency, will be at the parliament’s environment committee on Wednesday, with the REACH revision and PFAS universal ban expected high on the agenda. And the next European Central Bank (ECB) interest rate decision is due on Thursday. Meanwhile, Poland’s EU Council presidency will host an EU-US informal ministerial meeting on justice and home affairs on Monday (2 June) and Tuesday in Warsaw. This comes amid trade tension and follows a US court decision last week that found many of the Trump administration's tariffs to be illegal. Also this week, a delegation of MEPs will travel to Bratislava to assess the developments in Slovakia in the area of democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights. “The political developments in Slovakia are clearly moving in the wrong direction. It is evident that the Fico government is pursuing a course that puts democracy and the rule of law under pressure,” said Green German MEP Daniel Freund, following a separate mission trip in which he participated last week.
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Elena is EUobserver's editor-in-chief. She is from Spain and has studied journalism and new media in Spanish and Belgian universities. Previously she worked on European affairs at VoteWatch Europe and the Spanish news agency EFE.
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EU ministers will focus on transport and digital issues this week, including flight-delay rights, vehicle registration, satellite connectivity, and cybersecurity. Items also on this week's agenda include Ukraine's Nato meeting, the 2026 EU budget, enlargement talks with Moldova, and rule-of-law concerns in Slovakia.
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[
"Agenda"
] |
agenda
|
2025-06-02T05:00:00.000Z
|
https://euobserver.com/agenda/arc350e517
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'Mid-term rentals': the new haven for investors to keep ahead of housing regulations
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As traditional hotels in hotspot tourist destinations can be expensive, short-term rentals such as Airbnb have boomed in city centres across Europe — putting pressure on the housing market and displacing residents from their own neighbourhoods. Local administrations have led the fight against the uncontrolled rise of accommodations listed on platforms such as Airbnb . Regulations such as licensing restrictions in Athens or Barcelona and night caps in Amsterdam or Paris are becoming increasingly common. Mounting pressure on short-term rentals is squeezing the profitability of housing investments, but investors appear to have found a new opportunity, so-called 'mid-term rentals' (which can go from 30 days to up to a year). Increased student and worker mobility, combined with a regulatory gap that often overlooks stays over 30 days, has made temporary rents an increasingly profitable option for property owners or real-estate investors. While the EU is pushing to regulate short-term rentals, the absence of a holistic approach to real estate market regulation risks deepening the ongoing housing crisis for residents. How short-term rentals fueled housing crisis Platforms like Airbnb emerged as a new form of the "collaborative economy," allowing homeowners to earn extra income by renting out underutilised rooms or their whole residence while away. However, the professionalisation of short-term accommodation rentals, where properties are first purchased and then operated for profit, has led academics to warn that these platforms are far from any longer being a community-based model for sharing idle space. As of the beginning of this year, Paris by far leads as the European city with the most accommodation offered on the platform, with over 91,000 rooms and houses. Southern European cities also hold top ranks in rooms and houses, ranging between 12,000 in Florence and almost 35,000 in Rome. The professionalisation of short-term rentals is reflected in the number of rentals owned by the same users on the platform. In all eight southern European cities analysed by EUobserver, between 50 percent and 70 percent of accommodations are managed by hosts with several properties — a strong indicator that these users are engaging in commercial activity rather than simply sharing unused space. The impact of Airbnb on housing shortages is particularly severe in historic city centres. Spain’s most popular cities show a striking concentration of short-term rentals in the most-desired neighbourhoods — with Airbnbs making up 20 percent of the housing stock in Madrid, 10 percent in Barcelona, and up to 85 percent in Málaga, according to recent findings . Reports from Italy reveal similar trends, with 25 percent of Florence’s historical centre listed on Airbnb. In response, many governments have been taking measures trying to protect the stock of long-term rental housing for residents. How governments have responded to touristification and housing displacement Cities facing intense pressure on their housing markets have required Airbnb hosts to register their properties before starting commercial activity. In Spain, despite it being mandatory to publish the licence number in listings, 84 percent of entire-unit listings in Madrid and 28 percent of listings in Barcelona had the licence field left empty, according to EUobserver’s analysis. While this doesn’t necessarily indicate that all those listings are irregular, just recently, Spain’s ministry of consumer affairs ordered Airbnb and similar platforms to remove over 65,000 illegal short-term rental listings across the country, further increasing pressure. Cities, such as Paris, Amsterdam, Berlin, and Lisbon, have implemented night caps, setting a maximum of 30 to 120 nights per year during which the entire-unit accommodations (whole apartments and houses) can be rented. The emergence of poor-quality accommodations has also pushed authorities to impose safety measures and quality standards. Athens, for instance, had to ban windowless basements and renovated warehouses, which were booming due to high demand. Italy has made it mandatory for hosts to meet their guests in person. In Florence, key storage boxes have been banned , not only to preserve the appearance of historic areas, but also to force a minimum level of human interaction between hosts and visitors. Last year, the EU put forward Regulation 2024/1028 to enforce state-level data collection to improve monitoring of short-term accommodation rental services. Obligations will enter into force from 2026. The EU parliament's Socialists & Democrats group also recently published a report calling on the newly-created housing commissioner, Dan Jørgensen, to take further action, advocating for standardised rules across Europe to better protect consumers and prevent the continued displacement of residents. Pressure is mounting on short-term rentals in an effort to free up some current options for long-term rentals, but investors appear to have found an even more lucrative investment opportunity: mid-term accommodation rentals. Investors bypass housing rules through regulatory gaps “The short-term rental business in major French cities is no longer for the faint of heart or the under-informed,” reads an article from a property investment consultancy. Pressure on short-term rentals has driven investors to seek more profitable and less restrictive alternatives. Many have turned to the relatively lightly-regulated market of accommodation for students and mobile workers, who typically stay for periods ranging from one month to under a year. “Mid-term furnished rentals have become a sweet spot in cities like Paris and Nice. [...] They’re perfectly legal, more stable than short-term lets, and carry fewer maintenance headaches,” the consultancy article continues. In 2018, France introduced the , a rental contract that applies to stays longer than 30 days in fully-furnished properties. While hosts must ensure that tenants provide proof of temporary mobility, these rentals do not require a licence, are exempt from zoning and night cap restrictions, and are not subject to the tourist tax. During the Paris Olympics, reports showed a surge in temporary rentals under the contract, with some properties offering just a few nights' stay at the price of a full month, generating revenues of up to €2,500 for just a three-night booking. In cities like Paris, Berlin, and Barcelona, between 18 percent and 28 percent of Airbnb whole property listings have a minimum stay of 30 nights or more. While Airbnb has been the go-to platform for short-term rentals for tourists, the top two hosts with the highest number of properties offer only rentals with a minimum stay of over 30 days. Companies like Blueground and Ukio have built successful models by leasing long-term apartments from homeowners and subletting them as mid-term rentals. These listings are then advertised on their own platforms as well as through third-party sites like Airbnb. Could mid-term rentals become the new norm? The appearance of these type of accommodationis in Airbnb could be just the tip of the iceberg, as mid-term rentals are spreading across all rent-seeking platforms. In Berlin, temporary rentals now make up between 64 percent and 70 percent of listings in the city’s most sought-after neighbourhoods. In Barcelona, academic research revealed that mid-term rentals grew from representing 1.9 percent of the total housing stock in 2018 to 7.1 percent in 2023. The analysis has discovered that in non-niche rental platforms mid-term rentals represented 42 percent of listings in 2024, a 48-percent rise from the previous year. According to the same research, the lack of regulation, combined with the post-Covid-19 surge in remote work and mobility, has fuelled demand for these types of mid-term rentals. The boom accelerated after Spain introduced new restrictions on long-term rentals to control prices, pushing some property owners into the legal vacuum between short and long-term rental contracts. Just one month ago, the Catalan parliament passed legislation to impose price caps on seasonal rentals (traditionally used for summer holidays) in an effort to close this loophole. Mid-term rentals are increasingly seen as a haven for investors, adding further strain to an already scarce housing supply for long-term residents in city centres. The pressure that short-term rentals apply to the housing market is far from being solved. Efforts from both local and national governments, and even the newly-established housing commissioner, could backfire if the rental market is not tackled as a whole. “A coherent and robust regulatory approach is essential to ensure that housing markets remain accessible and functional, particularly in high-demand urban areas,” states the European Housing Action Plan, which mayors from across Europe shared with EU Commission vice-president Teresa Ribera and commissioner Jørgensen at a meeting in May. Real-estate investors appear to be adapting quickly to evolving market trends and technological developments, taking advantage of legal loopholes and staying one step ahead of regulation. Will administrations be able to catch up and address the housing crisis in a truly holistic way?
|
Sergi Pijuan
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As short-term rental regulations grow, investors are shifting towards so-called 'mid-term' accommodation. With legal frameworks often ignoring rentals longer than 30 days, rising demand from students and mobile workers has created a new haven for real-estate capital — deepening pressure on housing markets.
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[
"Health & Society"
] |
health-and-society
|
2025-06-02T03:30:00.000Z
|
https://euobserver.com/health-and-society/ar2ed4b648
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Katherine Kondor — Watching the far-right culture ‘influencers’
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Katherine Kondor is used to being an outlier. While many of her colleagues study the far-right through voting patterns and party policies, her research covers clothing brands, Instagram aesthetics, food, and the top 40 music charts. “Culture creates the conditions for political movements to thrive,” she says. “It’s not just about who you vote for. It’s also what you wear, what you eat, what you listen to." Working from the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies and affiliated with the Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX), Kondor leads a six-country research project tracking h ow far-right ideologies become part of everyday life. She and her team study a wide, seemingly incoherent range of subjects; from far-right fashion brands in Hungary, to meme-driven t-shirts in Spain, folky far-right music in Sweden, and fitness influencers who fuse nationalism with nutrition advice. While the skinheads of the 90s are still around, the far-right is not as immediately recognisable anymore. “You don't look at them and go, ‘that guy's a Nazi’, unless you know what to listen for, unless you know what they're saying,” Kondor says. Today, rather than sporting a forehead swastika tattoo, the face of the far-right might look like a clean-cut wellness coach, a female influencer baking sourdough, or a young man talking about national pride while drinking a protein shake. Kondor says that there’s a misconception that people going down the far-right rabbit hole do so because they believe in the ideology . Or that it’s a conviction (like protecting fundamental rights is for the left). But that’s not necessarily the case. “People join for all sorts of reasons,” she says. The far-right’s embrace of things seen to be part of everyday ‘normal’ culture isn’t accidental. Kondor points to examples like a Hungarian far-right brand producing t-shirts celebrating a national football win over England — a design that could appeal to any patriotic fan — while also drawing them into a wider web of extremist merchandise, sometimes unwittingly. "Normalisation is more one-sided. It’s about how far-right actors push their views into the cultural bloodstream. We study what they supply, not how it's received" Music, too, plays a role. Several far-right-affiliated bands have had hits in Hungary’s national top 40 lists. The lyrics sound like generic patriotism at first, she says. “But there's a lot more in there. And of course, if you like one song, you might listen to more… and it snowballs from there.” These elements serve as gateways. A teenager might join a local far-right club not out of deep ideological conviction, but because their friends are in it, or because they like the music. “So we need to understand what everyday people are thinking and feeling and doing, particularly youth.” Kondor’s work highlights how far-right ideas are normalised through culture. This, she says, is different from what researchers often call "mainstreaming," which implies a two-way shift between fringe and centre. "Normalisation is more one-sided. It’s about how far-right actors push their views into the cultural bloodstream. We study what they supply, not how it's received." The internet can accelerate this process. Kondor sees online culture not as separate from the real world, but as its extension. " Online is real . It’s where people form opinions, build identities, and spend most of their time. It's not a separate space." The far-right movement has grown into a fully-fledged cultural system that can be accessed through pretty much all aspects of ‘normal’ life. For almost any niche interest, there will be someone supplying news and information, mixed in with far-right ideology — there are even a few far-right trans influencers. An upcoming project co-written by Kondor explores how the far-right even weaponises food — from anti-kebab campaigns to nationalist meal kits. "It sounds absurd, until you realise how powerful food is as a marker of identity and belonging." The spread is obviously not confined to any single country. Kondor’s team is studying trends in Norway, Sweden, Hungary, Germany, Italy and Spain. "Hungary may be more advanced in normalising far-right culture, but we see similar mechanisms everywhere," she says. “It’s transnational — they share memes, tactics, even branding. But always with a strong local identity." "This isn’t just about politics. It’s about who we are as a society" What worries Kondor is how focused these tactics are on targeting youth, especially teenage boys. Like everyone else, “they are being bombarded online by the far-right,” and the content is crafted to appeal to them — videos, memes, influencers. Some join out of boredom or curiosity, others because it gives them a sense of community, she says. Researching these dynamics takes its toll. Kondor speaks candidly about the emotional strain of her work. Threats are common, and the material she examines — images, messages, songs — can be psychologically exhausting. "You develop a wall, a kind of professional distance. But it's not healthy." Still, she sees hope in awareness. Her team is developing an exhibition focused on how teenagers can recognise extremist content in everyday digital life. "This isn’t just about politics. It’s about who we are as a society." Asked what she most wants Europeans to understand about the culture of the far-right, she pauses. “It's this anti-gender mobilisation that's happening right now. And what's really crucial is that trans rights are women's rights and are human rights. We should care about them because they're humans – and important – but we need to understand that taking away rights from one group of people takes away rights from more groups of people, and it just spreads.” And do let us know if you're interested in a physical copy of the magazine here .
|
Alejandro Tauber is Publisher of EUobserver. He is Ecuadorian, German, and American, but lives in Amsterdam. His background is in tech and science reporting, and was previously editor at VICE's Motherboard and publisher of TNW.
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Far-right movements across Europe are no longer confined to rallies or party platforms. They are shaping entire cultural ecosystems through music, fashion, food and wellness, and attracting new followers along the way. Researcher Katherine Kondor believes understanding these everyday influences is key to confronting their rise.
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[
"The EU's Unsung Heroes"
] |
the-eus-unsung-heroes
|
2025-05-29T09:00:00.000Z
|
https://euobserver.com/the-eus-unsung-heroes/arffd5bd75
|
Forests are not following the European Commission’s script
|
The Paris Agreement gave us the net-zero concept. Intentions were good, and net-zero became a focal point for climate action. Many have followed the call, and few climate initiatives exist that do not refer to it. The two-degree goal – and the 1.5-degree ambition – were linked to “a balance between anthropogenic emissions and removals by sinks in the second half of this century.” In short, sinks are expected to compensate for emissions. However, the Paris Agreement provides no guidance on how emitters should compensate those who remove carbon. Nor does it consider the interaction between reducing emissions and enhancing sinks. Emissions and removals are treated as separate tracks in climate policy, which has led to inefficiencies. European climate legislation applies the net-zero ambition mainly by offsetting emissions in sectors like energy and transport against removals in the land use, land use change, and forestry (LULUCF) sector. By 2050, a balance is expected in line with the Paris vision. To reach this, the LULUCF regulation sets a target to remove 310m tonnes of CO₂ annually by 2050 and beyond. As agricultural land is a net emitter, this depends almost entirely on European forests continuing to stock up carbon. Forests have removed billions of tonnes over past decades. It’s been a success story—and a sequel is now expected. But forests are not following the commission’s script. Past expansion stemmed from post-war reforestation and forest growth on former farmland. While net CO₂ removals remain high – above 300m tonnes per year in addition to 600m cubic metre annual wood harvest – carbon accumulation is slowing. Mature forests grow less and face more climate-related risks. Forests cannot build biomass indefinitely. Several member states now project that LULUCF targets may not be met. This has become a hot issue in forest-rich countries like Sweden and Finland. In Sweden, a parliamentary committee suggested short-term LULUCF compliance via reduced wood harvests to keep more carbon in trees. Large-scale financial incentives to landowners were proposed. But does this make sense? It doesn’t. We must rethink the LULUCF targets, the role of forests as offsets for other emissions, and ultimately the net-zero framework. The primary focus must be to reduce fossil emissions at pace—while also securing competitiveness, jobs and security. Using tax money to lower output from a key climate sector is then a bad idea. Here’s why. First, reduced harvests do little for the climate. Less wood may raise carbon stock locally, but global leakage means increased harvest elsewhere. Substituting wood-based products with steel, plastics or fossil energy will increase emissions—contradicting the climate goal. In the long run, less active forestry reduces growth and increases risks like fires. Active forest management with harvest is key to maintaining and enhancing the sink. Harvesting only two-thirds of growth is already cautious. Second, the wood-based value chain supports vast production and consumption, underpinning an estimated 7 percent of EU economic output and 18m jobs—often in rural areas. Reducing raw material supply through policy will be costly and counterproductive. Third, wood is a strategic resource. In today’s geopolitical landscape, domestic wood and wood-based industries help reduce dependency on problematic trade partners, improving European security and self-sufficiency. We need constructive solutions to the LULUCF dilemma. Keeping the Green Deal while reducing forest sink expectations – e.g., by better valuing wood-based solutions – may work, though imperfectly. A clearer separation between ETS/ESR emission goals and LULUCF removals may be more appropriate. This also reflects growing doubts about meeting emissions goals, casting doubt on forests’ ability to compensate. That means rethinking net-zero. And why not? Instead of a compensation-driven net-zero, focus on rapid fossil reduction with near-zero goals. Wood-based solutions could be valued for displacing fossil emissions, as outlined in ISO 13391. Forests could be appreciated for providing wood—not for keeping it. That would make sense. But it takes courage to challenge a Paris pillar and propose structural change to EU Climate Law. The motivation is obvious. We must allow Europe to grow with its forests. Ulf Larsson is President and CEO of Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget , SCA - Europe’s largest private forest owner. Ulf Larsson is President and CEO of
|
Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget
|
Instead of a compensation-driven net-zero, focus on rapid fossil reduction with near-zero goals. Wood-based solutions could be valued for displacing fossil emissions and forests could be appreciated for providing wood—not for keeping it.
|
[
"Green Economy"
] |
green-economy
|
2025-05-28T15:56:15.124Z
|
https://euobserver.com/green-economy/ar566da87e
|
Serhiy Nigoyan — First victim of the Ukrainian revolution
|
A small stone tablet on a grassy bank in Hrushevskoho Street in Kyiv city centre marks the spot where police shot dead the first victim of the largest "colour revolution" of the 21st century — the Euromaidan . Serhiy Nigoyan’s name is hardly known outside Ukraine, but the 20-year-old is also celebrated in a mural in Kyiv and in Ukrainian songs, while Ukrainian leaders used to lay flowers at the Hrushevskoho Street memorial on the anniversary of his killing on 20 January 2014. Two other protesters were also shot dead later the same day, and 108 demonstrators were killed in total before the pro-Russian regime fell on 22 February 2014. They are known as the “Heavenly Hundred” by Ukrainians, even if that number now looks small compared to the hundreds of thousands of people killed by Russia’s subsequent full-scale invasion. Meanwhile, the Euromaidan was just the end of a decade-long fight for freedom inside Ukraine , which began with the 2004 Orange Revolution. Ukraine was also part of a wider wave of non-violent protests which toppled corrupt and authoritarian regimes in former communist countries in the past 25 years, alongside Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), Kyrgyzstan (2005), Moldova (2009), and Armenia (2018). And the European events were echoed by the Arab Spring on the other side of the Mediterranean Sea, where regimes in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, and Syria also fell after initially non-violent uprisings starting in 2010. There are, of course, many little-known or forgotten victims. In Ukraine, for instance, the rapes of two ordinary women by regime-linked thugs in separate incidents in 2012 and 2013 — Iryna Krashkova and Oksana Makar (who was also murdered) — led to mass protests, which acted as a precursor to the 2014 climax. In Tunisia, the self-immolation in 2010 of a street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, in Sidi Bouzid, unable to bear local corruption, was a catalyst for wider outrage. "To be a hero, you have to fight, not only to suffer” Names such as Krashkova, Makar, and Bouazizi are also important to remember because they show that the colour revolutions and Arab springs had specific, local causes, linked to abuse of basic human rights, instead of being geopolitical chess moves orchestrated by Western intelligence agencies — as the dictators have tried to claim. But for one of those Ukrainians who stood in the freezing winter cold of the Euromaidan in 2014, Nobel Peace Prize winner and human-rights lawyer Oleksandra Matviichuk: “To be a hero, you have to fight, not only to suffer”. And for Matviichuk, Nigoyan, the first of the Heavenly Hundred, also embodies the story of a broader fight for basic values, while giving the lie to the Russian narrative of a geopolitical “putsch”. “Serhiy Nigoyan was Ukrainian, but it’s important to know that he came from an Armenian family, and he went to the maidan out of simple solidarity for his friends, because of the violence being used by riot police to try to disperse us,” Matviichuk says. And his symbolic death gave an insight into how several of the other revolutions unfolded — starting with peaceful protests, which prompted escalating regime violence, and sometimes ended in war. “The Syria war started with children’s graffiti,” Matviichuk says. The police in Dara’a in southern Syria arrested and brutalised a small group of teenage boys on 22 February 2011, who had written anti-regime graffiti on a high-school wall. The police attacked and killed older relatives who protested at the boys’ mistreatment, then they killed people at the funerals of the protesters, prompting even wider anger, and by April the Syrian army laid siege to Dara’a, killing 244 locals and starting a civil war which lasted until December 2024, when Syrian president Bashar al-Assad fled to Russia. “There are new victims and new heroes almost every day, most of whom are completely unknown, even to human-rights organisations” Turning back to Europe, Belarus and Russia stand out as two former Soviet states who still remain in the grip of Soviet-type dictatorships in 2025. But for Matviichuk, they should both be added to the list of colour-revolution states, even if protesters there have failed to bring about change — so far. Belarus also saw mass protests against bogus elections, first in Minsk in 2006, then on a national scale in 2020, leading to a violent crackdown after which 1,190 political prisoners remain in jail today. “Many people in Belarus and in Russia are still quietly fighting for the same values [as the Euromaidan],” Matviichuk says. “There are new victims and new heroes almost every day, most of whom are completely unknown, even to human-rights organisations”, she adds. One of the most recent martyrs was a Russian called Pavel Kushnir, a 39-year-old pianist, who died after a hunger strike in prison on 27 July 2024 in Birobidzhan, in Russia’s far east, after protesting against the Ukraine war. Russia also has some 1,500 political prisoners. “Even the human rights defenders didn’t know that Kushnir existed until after he had died. So he received no help. He died all alone. And there are many others like him both in Russia and in Belarus today,” Matviichuk warns. And do let us know if you're interested in a physical copy of the magazine here .
|
Andrew Rettman is EUobserver's foreign editor, writing about foreign and security issues since 2005. He is Polish, but grew up in the UK, and lives in Brussels. He has also written for The Guardian, The Times of London, and Intelligence Online.
|
Serhiy Nigoyan’s name is hardly known outside Ukraine, but the 20-year-old is celebrated in a mural in the capital, Kyiv, and in Ukrainian songs, while the country’s leaders laid flowers at the Hrushevskoho Street memorial on the anniversary of his killing on 20 January 2014.
|
[
"The EU's Unsung Heroes"
] |
the-eus-unsung-heroes
|
2025-05-28T09:26:05.377Z
|
https://euobserver.com/the-eus-unsung-heroes/ar9f2abd01
|
36 MEPs demand end of Israel trade agreement now to stop the Gaza genocide
|
Images keep appearing, each reaching new heights of horror. Reports from the UN, independent experts, and NGOs are piling up, all unanimous. Statements from Israeli officials leave no doubts regarding their intentions. Since World War II, no genocide has been so well-documented, yet so long ignored by Western powers. It took a year-and-a-half of war crimes being committed, 52,928 people being killed, including 15,613 children, 119,846 people being injured, including 34,173 children, and 470,000 people facing famine, for EU foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas to finally announce that the European Union will review its association agreement with the state of Israel. Finally. This agreement is supposed to “be based on respect for human rights and democratic principles”. The review launched by the European Union must lead to its denunciation, as provided in its Article 82. If “starvation as a weapon of war, the possibility of genocide in Gaza and an apartheid system in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, including East Jerusalem”, the “systematic destruction of sexual and reproductive healthcare facilities” of Palestinians in Gaza, are not enough to denounce the agreement, what will it take for Europeans to act? To wait until all Palestinians in Gaza have starved to death? The Israeli economy heavily depends on Europe, its main trading partner, with which it conducts a third of its trade. The State of Israel is also the main third-state recipient of European Union research programmes. Denouncing the agreement is a decisive step in confronting the far-right Israeli government. But this step, alone, will not be enough to alter the course of the Israeli authorities. Sanctions must be immediately taken by the European Union against all Israeli actors involved in the ongoing genocide in Gaza, and in the illegal occupation and colonisation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. It is now up to Ursula von der Leyen and Kallas to act. They must urgently propose to the Council the adoption of sanctions and the denunciation of the association agreement between the European Union and the State of Israel. For too long, Europeans have remained silent on the multiple violations of international law committed by Israeli authorities. If they persist in condemning without acting accordingly, then the European Union will forever be complicit in the ongoing genocide, and the ideals that presided over its birth will have died in Palestine. Manon Aubry, MEP La France insoumise, The Left Leïla Chaibi, MEP La France insoumise, The Left Younous Omarjee, MEP La France insoumise, The Left Arash Saeidi, MEP La France insoumise, The Left Marina Mesure, MEP La France insoumise, The Left Damien Carême, MEP La France insoumise, The Left Anthony Smith, MEP La France insoumise, The Left Irene Montero, MEP Podemos, The Left Isabel Serra, MEP Podemos, The Left Pernando Barrena, MEP Bidu, The Left Ilaria Salis, MEP Sinistra Italiana, The Left Pasquale Tridico, MEP Movimento 5 Stelle, The left Danilo Della Valle, MEP Movimento 5 Stelle, The left Dario TAMBURRANO, MEP Movimento 5 Stelle, The left Gaetano Pedulla', MEP Movimento 5 Stelle, The left Mario Furore, MEP Movimento 5 Stelle, The left Catarina Martins, MEP Bloco de Esquerda, The Left Özlem Demirel, MEP Die Linke, The Left Carola Rackete, Independent MEP, The Left Jussi Saramo, MEP Vasemmistoliitto, The Left Hann Gedin, MEP Vänsterpartiet, The Left Jonas Sjöstedt, MEP Vänsterpartiet, The Left Per Clausen, MEP Enhedslisten, The Left Anja Hazekamp, MEP Partij voor de Dieren, The Left Níkos Pappás, MEP Syriza, The Left Giorgos Georgiou, MEP AKEL, The Left Ana Miranda Paz, MEP BNG Galice, Greens / EFA Maria Ohisalo, MEP Vihreä liitto, Greens / EFA Saskia Bricmont, MEP Ecolo, Greens / EFA Mounir Satouri, MEP EELV, Greens / EFA Mélissa Camara, MEP EELV, Greens / EFA Vladimir Prebilič, MEP Vesna – zelena stranka, Greens / EFA Cristina Guarda, MEP Europa Verde - Verdi, Greens / EFA Matjaž Nemec, MEP Socialni demokrati, S&D Thomas Bajada, MEP Partit Laburista, S&D Cecilia Maria Strada, MEP Partito Democratico, S&D Rima Hassan, MEP La France insoumise/The Left Manon Aubry, MEP La France insoumise, The Left Leïla Chaibi, MEP La France insoumise, The Left Younous Omarjee, MEP La France insoumise, The Left Arash Saeidi, MEP La France insoumise, The Left Marina Mesure, MEP La France insoumise, The Left Damien Carême, MEP La France insoumise, The Left Anthony Smith, MEP La France insoumise, The Left Irene Montero, MEP Podemos, The Left Isabel Serra, MEP Podemos, The Left Pernando Barrena, MEP Bidu, The Left Ilaria Salis, MEP Sinistra Italiana, The Left Pasquale Tridico, MEP Movimento 5 Stelle, The left Danilo Della Valle, MEP Movimento 5 Stelle, The left Dario TAMBURRANO, MEP Movimento 5 Stelle, The left Gaetano Pedulla', MEP Movimento 5 Stelle, The left Mario Furore, MEP Movimento 5 Stelle, The left Catarina Martins, MEP Bloco de Esquerda, The Left Özlem Demirel, MEP Die Linke, The Left Carola Rackete, Independent MEP, The Left Jussi Saramo, MEP Vasemmistoliitto, The Left Hann Gedin, MEP Vänsterpartiet, The Left Jonas Sjöstedt, MEP Vänsterpartiet, The Left Per Clausen, MEP Enhedslisten, The Left Anja Hazekamp, MEP Partij voor de Dieren, The Left Níkos Pappás, MEP Syriza, The Left Giorgos Georgiou, MEP AKEL, The Left Ana Miranda Paz, MEP BNG Galice, Greens / EFA Maria Ohisalo, MEP Vihreä liitto, Greens / EFA Saskia Bricmont, MEP Ecolo, Greens / EFA Mounir Satouri, MEP EELV, Greens / EFA Mélissa Camara, MEP EELV, Greens / EFA Vladimir Prebilič, MEP Vesna – zelena stranka, Greens / EFA Cristina Guarda, MEP Europa Verde - Verdi, Greens / EFA Matjaž Nemec, MEP Socialni demokrati, S&D Thomas Bajada, MEP Partit Laburista, S&D
|
Cecilia Maria Strada, MEP Partito Democratico, S&D
|
Since World War II, no genocide has been so well-documented, yet so long ignored by Western powers. Denouncing the EU-Israel trade agreement is a decisive step in confronting the far-right Israeli government. But this step, alone, will not be enough to alter the course of Israeli authorities, warn MEPs from the Left, the Greens, and the S&D.
|
[
"EU & the World",
"Opinion"
] |
*
|
2025-05-28T09:21:44.162Z
|
https://euobserver.com/*/ar3be3d1da
|
'Qualified majority' of EU states sign anti-Orbán pushback
|
Homophobia, as well as Russophilia, could cost populist Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán his EU veto, 20 other EU countries have shown. The 20 capitals signed a letter on Tuesday (27 May) urging the European Commission to fine Orbán over his de facto ban of Budapest Pride , a major LGBTI event. Some of their envoys also gave Orbán's EU affairs minister, János Bóka, a hard time at a now-routine hearing about abuse of rule of law in Hungary in the EU Council in Brussels the same day. "We need to consider next steps because this is getting pointless, these hearings," said Swedish EU affairs minister Jessica Rosencrantz, for one. The clash on EU values comes amid a wider crisis on whether Hungary is on the Western side or Russian side in the Ukraine War, with Bóka, on Tuesday, pledging to uphold a veto on starting Ukraine's EU accession talks , on grounds of unproven allegations that Ukrainian spies were trying to topple Orbán's rule. And some EU affairs ministers, who normally discussed kitchen-sink issues such as carbon tax, brought up geopolitics as well as LGBTI rights in the EU talks on Tuesday. "Some things Hungary is doing on Ukraine's accession I just think it's wrong. It's wrong," said Ireland's EU affairs minister, Thomas Byrne, for instance. The "next steps" could see the EU Commission amp up financial pressure on Orbán. They could also see fellow EU states strip him of his EU Council vote and veto under Article 7 of the EU treaty on violating basic rights. The commission could seek an EU court injunction to lift the anti-Budapest Pride law or other anti-civil society laws on pain of fines, such as previous €1m/day penalties against Poland. It could withhold further EU budget funds, on top of €18bn in frozen Hungarian money for Orbán's earlier abuses. Triggering Article 7.2 of the EU treaty on establishing the "existence" of an EU-values crisis in Orbán's Hungary requires unanimity of the other 26. The pro-Russia and pro-Orbán populist Slovakian prime minister Robert Fico might object, but this could also see Fico pressured over losing EU money by France and Germany. Subsequently triggering Article 7.3 on stripping Hungary's Council vote is done by a qualified majority vote. And the 20 EU states who signed the anti-Orbán and pro-LGBTI letter on Tuesday have big enough populations for a QMV majority even if Poland, the EU presidency, abstained. Poland did not sign the LGBTI letter due to protocol reasons, as the current holder of the EU presidency, which is meant to be neutral, Poland's EU affairs minister Adam Szłapka explained to press on Tuesday. The other countries who didn't sign were: Bulgaria, Croatia, Italy, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. Tuesday's LGBTI talks come as EU diplomats discuss the 18th round of Russia sanctions. Wider Russia clash But Orbán has also threatened to veto the rollover of EU trade sanctions on Russia, due in July, creating a potential foreign policy crisis on top of the values clash. There was "growing frustration with Hungary in general," said Ireland's Byrne on Tuesday. "Certainly some member states want to move on with Article 7 and to bring it to the next level," he said. Commenting on Orbán’s EU sanctions rollover threat, Byrne added: "We've seen threats of vetoes that haven't materialised [in the past]". "It's premature to start talking about workarounds when the process [of agreeing the EU sanctions extension] is still ongoing," Byrne added. But despite his caveat, Orbán-workarounds are being discussed in Brussels by lower-level diplomats, EU sources said. These include replicating EU sanctions in the 26 other national jurisdictions to nullify Hungary's EU hack, or using tariffs to replicate EU anti-Russian trade measures. Tariffs are also decided by QMV and the EU aims to impose taxes on Russian fertiliser from 1 July using the trade route, an EU diplomat told EUobserver, following record-quick EU Parliament-EU Council talks. Tuesday's EU Council talks on EU values in Hungary were also being followed by Ukraine sanctions hawks for their geopolitical implications. "As we can see, Hungary's behaviour has already tired the big European countries. We will see the consequences in the near future," Ukrainian MP Oleksiy Goncharenko told EUobserver on Tuesday. Going back to populism, Bóka said in Brussels on Tuesday it wasn't true Orbán's Fidesz wanted to ban Budapest Pride. But its new laws would see the government use facial-recognition to analyse the crowd and impose up to €500 fines for attendance. Orbán values The Fidesz party has also previously used antisemitic propaganda — despite Orbán's close ties with Israel's war crime-tainted prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. One of Orbán's closest party allies, former Hungarian MEP József Szájer, faced disgrace in 2020 when Belgian media spotted him at a gay orgy in Brussels, in a show of Fidesz cynicism with regard to its avowed anti-LGBTI values. Orbán gave Szájer a second chance by letting him start a new think-tank in Hungary last year. But the drainpipe Szájer climbed down to escape the Covid-era party in Brussels after a Belgian police raid was still a monument to Fidesz hypocrisy five years later, said David Manzheley, who organised the 2020 Szájer-sex party. "As before" Hungarian tourists to the EU capital still put anti-Orbán stickers on the pipe, Manzheley told EUobserver on Tuesday. And "they [Fidesz] shouldn't base important laws, for the good of Hungarian people, on their own repressed sexual deviance by banning LGBTI pride," he told this website.
|
Andrew Rettman is EUobserver's foreign editor, writing about foreign and security issues since 2005. He is Polish, but grew up in the UK, and lives in Brussels. He has also written for The Guardian, The Times of London, and Intelligence Online.
|
Homophobia, as well as Russophilia, could cost populist Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán his EU veto, 20 other EU countries warned on Tuesday.
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[
"Rule of Law",
"EU Political"
] |
rule-of-law
|
2025-05-27T18:18:06.283Z
|
https://euobserver.com/rule-of-law/ar3581b752
|
Decoupling and fastracking Moldova's EU accession ahead of Ukraine could work
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Ukraine and Moldova have been set to join the European Union together by the end of the decade. Both countries were granted EU candidate status in 2022 a few months after Russia launched its full-scale invasion. But the EU has indicated a dramatic shift in this proposed timetable for enlargement. Marta Kos, the EU commissioner for enlargement, recently stated that she would not rule out “decoupling” Moldova’s accession process from that of Ukraine. While the suggestion has been met with criticism from Kyiv, fast-tracking Moldova into the EU might not be such a bad idea strategically, as Russia’s brutal war continues to rage. Notwithstanding its small size, Moldova is situated in an area of profound strategic importance on the European map. Odessa, a city that is critical to Ukraine’s economic capacity as a major export hub, lies in close proximity to the Moldovan border. What happens in Moldova politically has direct consequences for the Ukrainian effort to resist Russia’s all-out aggression. Maia Sandu, who was re-elected as Moldova’s president last year, has been instrumental in keeping her country as a provider of regional security. For the first time since it achieved independence in 1991, Moldova is committed to core EU values in democracy and the rule of law thanks to her leadership. Russia has all but lost its influence in a country that many believed to be in Moscow’s traditional sphere of influence. The EU has become Moldova’s main trading partner . 54 percent of total Moldovan trade is with the EU, while the share with Russia has fallen dramatically, to 2.5 percent. On a societal level, Moscow can no longer claim to be a protector of the Russian-speaking population in the country as a result of its aggressive foreign policy. Gazprom’s decision to freeze its supply of gas to Transnistria earlier in the year has pushed Moldova’s breakaway enclave closer to the West. Under Sandu, Moldova has achieved substantial progress on the path towards European integration. The country’s national security strategy named Russia as the primary threat for the first time. Last year, Moldova signed a comprehensive security and defence partnership with the EU that will allow it to receive structured support from Brussels to counter Russia’s destabilising activities, such as weaponising political proxies and disinformation. Russia's orbit But despite the strong orientation towards the EU, Moldova still remains vulnerable to falling back into Russia’s orbit. Sandu’s anti-corruption Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) faces a formidable political challenge in the upcoming parliamentary elections . Previous failed efforts to strengthen democracy in Moldova have left many in the country sceptical about whether PAS can make concrete reforms. The party has also been criticised for marginalising other voices in Moldova’s democratic process. With the EU candidate country experiencing a fragile political situation, it is likely that Russia will intensify its campaign of destabilisation in an effort to reverse Moldova’s European integration. Moscow has actors at its disposal in the former Soviet state that can be used to undermine Sandu’s legitimate pro-European government. Evghenia Gutsul, the governor of Moldova’s autonomous region of Gagauzia, has utilised Russian propaganda to frame her arrest for electoral fraud and vote buying as political persecution. If Moldova were to lose its pro-European trajectory, it would have profound implications for Ukraine and its ability to withstand Russia. A pro-Russian administration in Chisinau would afford Moscow a springboard to launch attacks on Ukrainian territory from the southwest in addition to its use of Belarusian military infrastructure from the north. In this scenario, Ukraine finds itself having to repel Russian forces from multiple directions with the additional challenge of uncertain US support. Making concrete advances on Moldova’s path towards EU membership is essential to thwart Russia’s campaign to turn the country into a launchpad for further aggression. Ukraine would simply find it much harder to resist Russia without Moldova becoming a strong state rooted in European values. A summit of the European Council will take place in Brussels next month. In this meeting, discussions should consider ways to fast-track Moldova’s entry into the EU and, if necessary, decouple Moldova from Ukraine in the enlargement process altogether. This would send a strong signal to the Moldovan population that the EU is serious about realising their ambition to live in a secure country free from Russia’s control. But pushing Moldova forward on its European path would also significantly strengthen Ukraine’s position in their fight for national survival. Hugo Blewett-Mundy is a non-resident associate research fellow from the EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy in Prague. Hugo Blewett-Mundy is a non-resident associate research fellow from the
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EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy
|
Marta Kos, the EU commissioner for enlargement, recently stated she would not rule out “decoupling” Moldova’s accession process from that of Ukraine. While the suggestion has been met with criticism from Kyiv, fast-tracking Moldova into the EU might not be such a bad idea strategically, writes Hugo Blewett-Mundy.
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[
"EU & the World",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2025-05-27T13:17:26.635Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar6dc6f166
|
Laura Espinosa — Europe’s first line of defence against contagious diseases
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“To put it briefly, we are the detectives of potential public health threats”, Laura Espinosa tells EUobserver. Espinosa is an expert on epidemic intelligence at the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), a group few people have heard about — thankfully. Alongside her relatively small team of colleagues in Stockholm, she every day sifts through about 8,000 articles and data signals — from social media posts and news headlines to official health reports — searching for potential outbreaks of infectious diseases. Their task is deceptively straightforward: to detect, validate, and alert European countries about emerging threats before they escalate into crises. 24 hours a day, seven days a week, every day of the year. The complexity lies in interpreting signals. Suspicious signals could be anything from a new strain of influenza reported in a local newspaper to social media chatter about unusual pneumonia cases, Espinosa explains. Each piece of information must be quickly validated, first through official national health sites or reliable social media accounts — and, if needed, through direct outreach to a network of public health officials across the EU and globally. Timing is critical. Espinosa stresses that information must be not only accurate but also timely. "We can’t sit on information. We need to be fast and good," she says. Her team's effectiveness relies on well-practised collaboration across borders, a quiet but powerful demonstration of European unity in public health. Yet, despite the high stakes, the success of Espinosa’s work is largely invisible. "Covid changed everything. It required all hands on deck, constantly" Success often means nobody notices they’ve done anything at all, she admits, adding that some of the most satisfying days are those when threats are identified early enough to prevent widespread alarm or even awareness. She recalls one instance clearly: the early days of the 2022 Mpox (monkeypox) outbreak. Espinosa and her colleagues noticed scattered reports of unusual cases outside Europe. They swiftly connected with global partners, confirmed the cases' significance, and alerted European countries to be vigilant. Airports soon after put out public notices describing Mpox symptoms, advising travellers to report concerns immediately upon return. It was a subtle yet effective intervention. Espinosa explains that while there might be uncertainty, the biggest effort goes into verification of the signals they receive. “But we have to strike a balance. We cannot spread alarm prematurely, yet we must act swiftly enough to make a difference." Espinosa’s team is trained precisely for these moments, continuously refining protocols and improving tools to manage such delicate decisions. "Diseases don’t respect borders" At the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, Espinosa faced perhaps her most challenging period. The sheer scale and duration of the pandemic — lasting over three years — were unprecedented in her tenure. "Covid changed everything. It required all hands on deck, constantly," she says. But what many might overlook is that amid the global chaos of Covid-19, Espinosa and her team also had to maintain vigilance for other threats like hepatitis outbreaks among children and the Mpox surge in Africa. Espinosa is clear-eyed about the lessons learned: "Diseases don’t respect borders," she emphasises. Behind Espinosa’s calm and methodical demeanour lies deep satisfaction with her highly-consequential yet largely below-the-radar role. "It's fulfilling work," she reflects, highlighting the quiet triumph in daily accomplishments, like verifying a suspicious signal before it becomes news. She also praises the collaboration that defines Europe's epidemic intelligence network , a cooperative system built on trust and mutual responsibility. She concludes with a simple hope for European citizens: understanding. "People may not see the coordination and effort that goes into keeping Europe safe from outbreaks, but it’s there," Espinosa says. She is a quiet guardian, part of a crucial, invisible shield protecting Europe's health. And to her — and the dozens of Epidemic Intelligence workers across the EU and the world — anonymity is a badge of success. And do let us know if you're interested in a physical copy of the magazine here .
|
Alejandro Tauber is Publisher of EUobserver. He is Ecuadorian, German, and American, but lives in Amsterdam. His background is in tech and science reporting, and was previously editor at VICE's Motherboard and publisher of TNW.
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Laura Espinosa spends her days sorting through thousands of signals, as part of a team that quietly protects millions across Europe from disease outbreaks. Her role at the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) usually means ‘success’ goes unnoticed — but that's exactly how she knows she's done her job well.
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[
"The EU's Unsung Heroes"
] |
the-eus-unsung-heroes
|
2025-05-27T03:49:00.000Z
|
https://euobserver.com/the-eus-unsung-heroes/are8cea047
|
Top firms urge EU to stick to 90% climate target
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A coalition of over 150 businesses, associations and investors — including Ikea, Google, Vattenfall and Allianz — is urging the EU to stick to its target of cutting emissions by 90 percent by 2040. In a joint letter sent to EU leaders on Tuesday (27 May), they warn that “90 percent should be considered as the floor rather than the ceiling for ambition,” warning that anything less would jeopardise Europe’s industrial future and energy security. “Integrating the target into a comprehensive industrial strategy … will allow the EU to lead the global race of development of sustainable industrial ecosystems and industries,” the letter says. The EU Commission is drafting a law to formally adopt its earlier pledge to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 90 percent by 2040, but is under pressure from some member states to lower the target. Most countries, including the pivotal one Germany, remain (mostly) committed to the 90 percent reduction figure. But Italy has called for an 80 percent target instead. And Berlin will allow emission-cutting projects abroad, like forest protection, to count toward its own climate goals through carbon credits. The commission may let other countries do the same, though the practice is controversial. Past analysis found that 90 percent of rainforest offsets were likely worthless. On Monday the commission confirmed it would present its plans before the summer break, but declined to give a clear date. Until then, the 150+ signatories of the letter will continue to push the commission to hold the line. An ambitious target, they argue, will “accelerate clean tech innovation, create jobs, and boost demand for sustainable products.” The signatories include Anna Borg, chief executive of Swedish energy firm Vattenfall, Matt Brittin, president for EMEA at Google, and Ignacio S. Galán, executive chairman of Spanish utility Iberdrola. They also point out that the commission’s own modelling shows full decarbonisation of Europe’s power sector is possible by the late 2030s. But this is only achievable if fossil-fuel subsidies are scrapped, electrification and deployment of renewables are tripled, and much higher carbon pricing is phased in. The firms also want the commission to include an “explicit maximum” on how much the EU expects to rely on carbon removals, adding that “mitigation should be the absolute priority.” Failure to act decisively, they warn, will leave the EU exposed to external shocks, stranded assets, and long-term industrial decline. Conversely, having a “robust” climate target of 90 percent will improve the EU’s resilience to shocks, energy security, and competitiveness. Businesses are ready to play a “key role” in decarbonisation, they say, but need clearer direction from Brussels.
|
Wester is a journalist from the Netherlands with a focus on the green economy. He joined EUobserver in September 2021. Previously he was editor-in-chief of Vice, Motherboard, a science-based website, and climate economy journalist for The Correspondent.
|
Over 150 firms, investors and business associations, including Ikea, Google, Vattenfall and Allianz, are urging the commission to stick to its 90 percent climate target, which is due to be presented before the summer.
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[
"Green Economy"
] |
green-economy
|
2025-05-26T22:12:00.000Z
|
https://euobserver.com/green-economy/ar4221546b
|
EU officials advised to keep Gaza misgivings internal
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EU officials who were unhappy about Europe's handling of the Gaza War should file internal grievances instead of going public, the EU Commission has indicated. "As a member of staff of the European Commission one has the right of freedom of expression, but ... it's not an absolute right," a commission spokesman told press in Brussels on Monday (26 May). He spoke after more than 2,000 officials from the commission, the EU Parliament, and EU agencies signed a protest letter to their bosses on Gaza that was seen by The Guardian newspaper earlier the same day. "EU institutions have failed to bring the European Union's political, diplomatic, and economic influence to bear in order to ameliorate the situation in Gaza," the letter said. A new review of EU-Israel free trade perks by the EU foreign service was "devastatingly late for thousands killed in Gaza", the letter added. And the EU was guilty of a "double standard", the signatories said, because several member states had told Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu he could visit them even though he was wanted on war crimes charges by the International Criminal Court. The EU staff letter comes after Israel killed over 54,000 people in Gaza over the past 20 months of war and amid UN warnings that 1.5 million people were at risk of starvation due to an Israeli aid blockade. But the commission spokesman said on Monday he had not yet read the letter of complaint and that he would "zoom in on the HR [human resources]" implications of the protest note, instead of tackling its root complaints. He noted that EU officials' right to issue protest statements was limited by their internal rulebook, the 238-page staff regulation, whose article 17a says: "An official has the right to freedom of expression, with due respect to the principles of loyalty and impartiality". More than 1,500 EU staff also signed a leaked letter of protest in January and in May last year, while some have held small rallies in the EU district in Brussels. But the commission spokesman said on Monday "dialogue between staffers and the hierarchy has been encouraged", instead of media outreach. He also advised unhappy staff to rely on "internal letters" and "staff [trade] unions" as appropriate channels to vent their misgivings. Meanwhile, an EU foreign service spokesman said on Monday the EU was considering "different tracks of sanctions" against Israel, including against "extremist settlers" , but sanctions have been "blocked by one member state" until now, alluding to Hungary. He declined to say when the review of EU-Israel trade relations would be completed. Some 17 out of 27 EU countries called for the review last week , which could also see Israel excluded from EU science funding. The EU Commission chief, German conservative Ursula von der Leyen, is firmly pro-Israeli. But her centre-left Maltese sports commissioner Glenn Micallef also voiced dissent, telling the Politico news website on Monday that he sympathised with Israel boycotts at sporting events. "When it comes to sports, I think there should be no space in sporting events for those who do not share our values," he said. Protests against Israeli killing of civilians in Gaza have also continued across European cities and university campuses.
|
Andrew Rettman is EUobserver's foreign editor, writing about foreign and security issues since 2005. He is Polish, but grew up in the UK, and lives in Brussels. He has also written for The Guardian, The Times of London, and Intelligence Online.
|
EU officials who were unhappy about Europe's handling of the Gaza War should file internal grievances instead of going public, the EU Commission has indicated.
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[
"EU & the World"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2025-05-26T15:56:48.026Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar9ef26836
|
Europe's Gaza protests are starting to have results
|
Prabowo Subiante, Indonesia's new president, struggled to hide his annoyance. He was speaking at the annual Antalya Forum in Turkey a few weeks ago. For decades, he said, Europe has given us lessons — often with a pointed finger — on how Indonesia should strive for and adhere to international law, democracy and human rights. In itself, this was not a bad thing, he added, because it helped his country progress in many areas. But (and here it comes) why then does this not apply to Israel ? Why is Europe now suddenly silent and letting this Israeli government break every possible rule of law? The Indonesian president is not alone. His criticism of European hypocrisy and double standards are shared around the world. It is no coincidence South Africa started a case at the International Court of Justice in The Hague to have what is happening in Gaza deemed a genocide. The definitive verdict has not yet been rendered, but the court has demanded that Israel do all it can to avoid a genocide. Israel's now nine-week refusal to let food, relief supplies and medicine into Gaza shows that Benjamin Netanyahu's government does not care about those demands. Such criticism of Europe is not new. When the Russian army invaded Ukraine, more than half of countries worldwide refused to impose sanctions against Russia. The reason is not that they think this war is right or legal. Hypocrisy No, they mainly think the West is hypocritical to ask this of the world now, when it illegally invaded Iraq in 2003, based on lies, and then almost forced those same countries for support. It is clear that the rest of the world takes it less and less that international law only applies to countries not belonging to the West and their friends. Apparently, the West does not see what the rest of the world does. However, it would be wrong to talk about the whole of Europe or the whole of the West. There are protests everywhere, including here in Belgium. On Sunday (11 May), tens of thousands of Belgians took to the streets in Brussels to demand an end to the blockade and the war on Gaza. A week later, on 18 May, a hundred thousand Dutch people held a march through The Hague with the same demands. Geert Wilders, the de-facto political leader of the Netherlands, wrote on X : "Today demo in Dhaag against Israel + for Hamas. Thousands of confused people draw a red line. I also draw a red line. Against terror and starving their own people by Hamas and for maximum destruction of their murderous infrastructure. And for Israel." So the rest of the world sees this differently. But Israeli newspapers also show a different story. A few months back, in a rare moment of criticism, the Israeli army spokesman declared that Hamas could not be defeated militarily. Reports have since appeared showing that this assessment is correct and that even after more than a year and a half of war, Hamas has not even been weakened in numerical strength. By the way, one need not have the slightest sympathy for Hamas to see that it is not they who are responsible for the massive famine in Gaza. Who is confused here? The hundreds of thousands of people who take to the streets or otherwise make their voices heard in Europe are not confused. They know very well that the European Union was built on the idea that there should never be another war and there should never be another genocide. The world order established by Europe and the United States after the devastating Second World War rests on the pillars of international law and human rights. This is what both frontrunners have always defended and spread, or at least tried to spread to the rest of the world. Those who try to convince today's European and American leaders to hold that line when it comes to Israel are not confused. The red line they draw is very clear. I am often asked by ordinary people, not just the media, whether it makes sense to keep protesting, and to keep reminding Belgian and European politicians of their responsibilities. Many get discouraged to see how little is moving. Tipping point? I reply that I read Israeli newspapers every day, and in them I notice that European protests do get coverage and are thus noticed. Nor should one doubt that Israeli embassies relay every protest to the foreign ministry in Jerusalem. And European politicians are not insensitive to these protests either, even if they often seem not to be. But then I get the follow-up question — when will we notice any of this? When will come the 'tipping-point' from doing nothing to doing something? I think we have reached this tipping point just in the past few days. For about a week now, we have been reading increasing criticism of Israeli and US policy in US newspapers. France, the UK and Canada are suddenly threatening concrete action if Israel continues the blockade and war. Belgian rectors took the lead with the joint demand to suspend the European Association Agreement with Israel . This was put on the European agenda by the Belgian government, and supported by a majority of other European countries. A resolution was also voted in the chamber for the first time. Many will feel that all this does not go far enough. Indeed, that resolution can be criticised. The decision by the European Foreign Affairs Council to first "investigate" whether or not Israel is in compliance with human rights before it wants to review the association agreement is also more than cynical. But at the very least, things are moving and politicians are finally taking action. The pressure of the many protests is starting to bear fruit. However, if mass starvation deaths are to be avoided, that pressure will have to be equally stepped up. Above all, let us hope it will not be too late. Koert Debeuf is professor of Middle East at the Vrije Universiteit Brussels (VUB), and chair of the board of EUobserver. This column appeared first in Dutch in De Standaard . Koert Debeuf is professor of Middle East at the Vrije Universiteit Brussels (VUB), and chair of the board of EUobserver. This column appeared first in Dutch in
|
De Standaard
|
I read Israeli newspapers every day, and in them I notice that European protests do get coverage and are thus noticed. Nor should one doubt that Israeli embassies relay every protest to the foreign ministry in Jerusalem. And European politicians are not insensitive to these protests either, even if they often seem not to be, writes Koert Debeuf.
|
[
"EU & the World",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2025-05-26T09:13:02.606Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar12aa73a8
|
Nato's Achilles heel? The Suwałki Gap, and Lithuania's fears of a Russian attack
|
Even though the Baltic countries are arming themselves massively, everyone is talking about a possible invasion by Moscow. There is even a new evacuation plan for Vilnius. Sunshine and a temperature of nearly 20 degrees promise a wonderful spring day in Vilnius. The River Neris meanders through the Lithuanian capital and people stroll along its banks in sunglasses and high spirits. It is a similar scene in the magnificent old town, which was made a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1994. Locals and tourists alike stroll through the charming little alleyways, some of them traffic-calmed. They sip their coffee or perhaps a Lithuanian Humulupu IPA in the pub gardens while enjoying the picturesque surroundings with their baroque buildings. At first glance, it is hard to tell that Vilnius, the whole of Lithuania and actually the entire Baltic region have been more or less on alert for over three years now. Ever since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, many countries in northern and eastern Europe have been asking themselves who could be next – who could become the next target of Vladimir Putin’s imperialism? Moldova is often mentioned, as is Georgia. Finland and Sweden have joined Nato because of the threat from the east. The three Baltic states of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia have long been members of both Nato and the EU. Nevertheless, people in Vilnius do not really feel safe. “We must be blind if we can’t see what is coming our way,” says Lithuanian deputy defence minister Karolis Aleksa Question mark over Trump This is partly because no one knows whether, in the event of a Russian attack, US president Donald Trump would abide by Article 5 of the Nato treaty, which requires all Nato members to come to the aid of any member country under attack. A possible Russian invasion is being talked about everywhere in Vilnius, “in lunch breaks, at parties, in small talk”, 32-year-old Gabija Stasiukyne told the Ukrainian online newspaper, The Kyiv Independent : “The conversation inevitably comes round to the question of what people would do if that happened.” Lithuania’s massive rearmament efforts have not changed this, and nor have the government’s constant appeals to the international community to take seriously the threat posed by Russia to countries other than Ukraine. “We must be blind if we can’t see what is coming our way,” says Lithuanian deputy defence minister Karolis Aleksa, speaking in Vilnius to journalists from the Pulse project , of which Der Standard and EUobserver are members. “Russia is making preparations and expanding its military capabilities.” He argues that the Western world must finally wake up to what Putin wants to achieve: a Greater Russia. “I lived in Brussels for three years until my return last year. I saw for myself that societies there believe that a peaceful solution can be reached with Moscow.” Lithuania recently joined Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Finland in withdrawing from the Ottawa Treaty prohibiting anti-personnel mines Aleksa is convinced that this is not the case, and that Russia will never give up until it has achieved its goal. “It is our responsibility to prevent a major conflict,” he says, adding that there will be further escalation “if we don’t show that we can defend ourselves”. The Baltic countries have been rearming for some time now. In January, Lithuania’s Defence Council, consisting of representatives from the country’s political and military leadership, decided to increase the defence budget from about 3.0 to 5.5 percent of GDP each year from 2026 to 2030 — an additional €10bn to €14bn, according to analysts. Lithuania recently joined Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Finland in withdrawing from the Ottawa Treaty prohibiting anti-personnel mines. They all justified their move on the basis of the military threat posed by neighbouring Russia, pointing out that Moscow has never signed the Ottawa Treaty and has used anti-personnel mines in its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Lithuanian president Gitanas Nauseda spoke of a “logical and consistent step” that had been explained to the country’s allies. The reason is that mines will form part of the “ Baltic Line of Defence ” agreed between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in January 2024. This will see both mines and explosives deployed swiftly at the border in an emergency, as well as the construction of concrete barriers, fences, supply lines and around 600 bunkers. Nato's 'Achilles Heel' Despite all this, a major vulnerability remains — something that has even been dubbed 'Nato’s Achilles’ heel.' This is the Suwałki Gap, once described by Politico as the “most dangerous place in the world”. This narrow strip of land, just 65km long, connects the Baltic states with Poland and thus also with the other Nato countries. To the west of it lies the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, to the east, Moscow-loyal Belarus. If Putin were to strike here, it would be relatively easy for him to cut the Baltic states off from their allies. In the autumn of 2022, the German broadcaster MDR interviewed people living near the Suwałki Gap. One respondent, a librarian, said, “I don’t think the Russians could attack us at the moment anyway because all their key troops are in Ukraine. The war there is enough for them for now.” Many experts share this view. But what about when the war in Ukraine ends, whatever form that might take? In that scenario, it would not be all that long before Putin had enough armed forces at his disposal for a new attack. In early May, the US think-tank the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) warned that Moscow was gradually preparing the rhetorical case for an attack on the Baltic states. It cited a 2 May report by the independent Russian media Meduza and Agentstvo stating that foreign minister Sergei Lavrov had written a foreword for a book about the history of Lithuania in which he claimed that the Baltic states were using “falsified” historical narratives to stir up Russophobic and anti-Russian feeling among the local population. The ISW quoted Lithuania’s foreign minister Kęstutis Budry as saying that the book in question was a Russian propaganda tool designed to provide the Kremlin with scholarly literature to support its denial of the separate statehood and histories of Russia’s neighbours. This narrative would allow Russia to claim a right to all the countries that were once part of the Soviet Union — Lithuania included. Survival training in schools Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that Lithuanian schools are already teaching survival skills, including how to administer first aid and use a weapon. Or that April saw the publication of an evacuation plan for Vilnius that would move the capital’s 500,000-plus residents to safety via 150 different routes if the worst came to the worst. The city is about 30km from the Belarusian border. However idyllic Vilnius may seem, preparations for the worst-case scenario are busily being made in the background. And deputy defence minister Aleksa stresses once again: “The threat is real. We know that from our history.” Der Standard Kim Son Hoang is a foreign editor at the Austrian media outlet Der Standard Kim Son Hoang
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is a foreign editor at the Austrian media outlet
|
Despite massive rearmament and evacuation plans, a major vulnerability remains — the Suwałki Gap, sometimes dubbed 'Nato’s Achilles’ heel', a narrow strip of land connecting the Baltic states with Poland. To the west lies the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, to the east, Moscow-loyal Belarus. If Putin were to strike here, it would be relatively easy for him to cut the Baltic states off from their allies.
|
[
"EU & the World",
"Ukraine"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2025-05-24T07:30:00.000Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/arfe612e44
|
EU tells Hungary to scrap its anti-NGO bill or face court
|
The European Commission has told Hungary to scrap its Transparency of Public Life bill or face possible legal consequences. "The Commission has great concerns with this draft. If adopted as it is, it would constitute a serious breach of EU principles and law," said a commission spokesperson, in an email on Friday (23 May). "Therefore, we ask that this draft be withdrawn from the legislative process. We will not hesitate to take the necessary action if this draft is adopted," he added. The statement comes a day after over 300 civil society organisations demanded the Brussels-executive intervene after Hungary had tabled the bill, which critics say is a full frontal attack against NGOs and independent media. The letter , sent to commission president Ursula von der Leyen, warned that the Hungarian bill would enable the government to defund and dissolve any organisation it designates as a threat to Hungarian sovereignty. The bill gives Hungary's Sovereignty Protection Office (SPO) extra crackdown powers against the perceived threats. The office is already the centre of a legal case launched by the commission against Hungary last year at the European Court of Justice. The NGOs are now demanding the commission to request interim measures at the court in order to "halt the progress and impact of the bill." The European Commission had only last week told reporter s that it was unable to make any public comments because the bill had yet to become law. But the latest statement on Friday now suggests a shift in tone, with the commission threatening legal action if Hungary moves ahead with the bill. Some 26 European lawmakers, including MEPs from the centre-right European People's Party, are also demanding the commission take further action against the Hungarian government led by its nationalist premier, Viktor Orbán. Given the widespread abuse, they are now demanding the commission also suspend "all EU funding for Hungary". The commission is already withholding some €18bn of EU funding, due, in part, to corruption in the country. The docked funds is meant to pressure Hungary into rule of law reforms. But the MEPs say Orbán's government has failed to make any meaningful progress. In some cases, it has taken several steps back, they say. "We therefore consider a freezing of all funds proportionate to the risk posed to the Union’s financial interests. Continuing to fund a corrupt regime openly undermining European values is unacceptable," say the MEPs, in their letter sent to EU budget commissioner Piotr Serafin and justice commissioner Michael McGrath. For its part, a spokesperson for the Hungarian government says the bill, dubbed the Transparency of Public Life, aims to expose organisations that seek "to manipulate voter sentiment and policy outcomes to suit external interests." The bill was tabled on 13 May. Hungary's parliamentary elections are set to take place next April.
|
Nikolaj joined EUobserver in 2012 and covers home affairs. He is originally from Denmark, but spent much of his life in France and in Belgium. He was awarded the King Baudouin Foundation grant for investigative journalism in 2010.
|
"The Commission has great concerns with this draft. If adopted as it is, it would constitute a serious breach of EU principles and law. ... We will not hesitate to take the necessary action if this draft is adopted", a commission spokesperson emailed.
|
[
"Rule of Law",
"EU Political",
"Health & Society"
] |
rule-of-law
|
2025-05-23T20:17:32.767Z
|
https://euobserver.com/rule-of-law/ar67861009
|
Denmark leads attack on European Court of Human Rights
|
Nine EU states are targeting the Strasbourg-based European Court of Human Rights in a wider bid to deport unwanted migrants. A letter spearheaded by Denmark , which is set to take over the rotating EU presidency from July, is demanding more leeway on deporting people who have committed crimes. Published on Thursday (22 May), the letter was signed by leaders of Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Italy, and Poland. It faults the court for placing rights restrictions on deportations of "criminal foreign nationals". They are also unhappy on how the court interprets the European Convention on Human Rights, drafted in 1950 by the human-rights watchdogs at the Council of Europe. A spokesperson from the Council of Europe said they are discussing the letter but have yet to formulate an official response. But critics say the latest move by Europe's leaders seeks to undermine human rights and rule of law. Human Rights Watch says the letter is a sign of the willingness by some governments to throw human rights and the rule of law overboard. "The European Court of Human Rights is there to protect us all, is deeply respectful of the role of national governments and courts, and careful not to overstep," said HRW's Judith Sunderland, in an email. She described the letter as an unjustified and dangerous attack to the citizens of Europe, migrants and to Europe's global standing. Similar comments were made by Brussels-based Picum , an umbrella organisation fighting for the rights of undocumented migrants. "This is a textbook case of 'crimmigration' — the conflation of migration and crime to crack down on people seeking safety and livelihood in Europe," said Picum's Silvia Carta. "If leaders genuinely care about people's safety and protecting victims, they should stop dismantling welfare systems and start investing in care, instead of scapegoating migrants for political gain," she added, in an emailed statement. The letter also sets a tone for Denmark's upcoming EU presidency, whose prime minister Mette Frederiksen has pursued a 'zero refugee' policy since coming into power in 2019. Denmark received a record low of asylum applications last year, in total some 864 people. It had also passed a law in 2021 allowing the state to deport asylum seekers abroad, in order for the applications to be processed in a foreign country. Such proposals have in the past been condemned by the European Commission, which said the transfer of asylum-seekers to foreign states is contrary to the spirit of the Geneva Convention. The mood tune has since shifted with the European Commission now proposing to make it easier for member states to reject asylum seeker applications and instead have their claims for protection heard in foreign countries, even if they have never been there.
|
Nikolaj joined EUobserver in 2012 and covers home affairs. He is originally from Denmark, but spent much of his life in France and in Belgium. He was awarded the King Baudouin Foundation grant for investigative journalism in 2010.
|
Nine EU states are targeting the Strasbourg-based European Court of Human Rights in a wider bid to deport unwanted migrants.
|
[
"Migration"
] |
migration
|
2025-05-23T13:00:37.956Z
|
https://euobserver.com/migration/ar0ba3543b
|
Why it matters that the EU is pushing to offshore asylum: 10 questions
|
For years, EUobserver has been tracking the European Union's increasing efforts to move asylum processing and responsibilities beyond its borders — a policy euphemistically referred to as "externalisation" and “border management”. This controversial trend raises significant legal, ethical, and humanitarian questions — but recently has been gaining increasing political acceptability. It's a policy that has been years in the making, and one that raises serious concerns about the EU's adherence to rule of law and guaranteeing fundamental rights to people. Here, because it’s not always easy to piece together the context from individual news stories, we answer some of the most pressing questions — and offer further reading based on our extensive reporting. 1. What exactly is 'externalisation of asylum' in the EU context? It refers to a range of policies and practices where the EU or its member states aim to transfer responsibility for asylum seekers — including their reception, processing of their claims, and potentially their long-term protection — to countries outside the EU. The EU’s deal with Ankara back in 2016, for instance, helped pioneer the approach whereby Syrians would be returned from Greece to Turkey without having their cases for international protection heard based on a so-called ‘safe third country’ concept. EU leaders to discuss offshoring asylum centres to Turkey (2015) Europe's solution to migration is to outsource it to Africa (2018) 2. How does ‘externalisation’ actually work? The policy can involve formal agreements with third countries — countries outside of the EU — to host asylum processing centres (like the proposed Italy-Albania deal), funding third countries to intercept and manage migrants before they reach EU borders (like in the EU-Tunisia deal ), or exploring models where certain protection claims sought in the EU could be processed elsewhere in a country, like Turkey, deemed ‘safe’ to send people back to. Libyan coast guard infiltrated by criminals, says EU commissioner EU unclear on legality of Italy-Albania deal to offshore asylum 3. Why is the EU pursuing these policies? Our reporting has identified a few different factors that play a role in the development and acceleration of implementing policies that would allow the EU to offshore asylum cases. A primary goal is to deter asylum seekers from attempting to reach EU territory in the first place. : To lower the number of asylum applications lodged within EU member states. To respond to domestic political pressure in some member states concerned about migration numbers. An attempt (often criticised) to shift the 'burden' of asylum processing away from EU states, even if it means transferring it to countries with fewer resources and oversight. The asylum files: deadlock and dead-ends (2017) The secrecy behind the EU's plans to 'externalise' migration (2023) 4. Is this a new development? No. A European Parliament briefing from early 2024 lays out the timeline of the concept. Already back in 1986, Denmark tabled a draft resolution in the United Nations General Assembly to create “UN centres where asylum claims could be processed, in order to coordinate the resettlement of refugees among all states.” In the early 2000s, several proposals were made to ‘externalise’ the processing of asylum claims. Both the UK (then in the EU) and Germany proposed the establishment of asylum centres in 2003 and 2005. None of these proposals passed. After the 2014-2016 rise in asylum seeker’s requests, the EU-Turkey asylum deal was signed, which stated that “all new irregular migrants and asylum seekers arriving from Turkey to the Greek islands and whose applications for asylum have been declared inadmissible should be returned to Turkey,” effectively implementing externalisation. EU looks to African dictators for migration solutions (2014) EU leaders to discuss offshoring asylum centres (2015) 5. What are some key examples of these offshoring efforts? Albania: Italy’s 2023 deal aims to transfer people plucked from international waters to then have their asylum claims processed in Albania. Crucially, the processing of the claims in the Albanian centres would fall under Italian jurisdiction - an innovation praised by European Commission president Ursual Von der Leyen. Tunisia: The EU’s €1bn deal with Tunisia, including €105m specifically for migration control, sought to stem irregular migrant arrivals towards Italy. The deal was described as a blue-print for future cash-for-migrant deals. Libya: EU states cannot return asylum seeker hopefuls and refugees back to Libya given the rights abuses. So the European Commission helped bankroll Libya’s own search-and-rescue zone so that its Libyan coast guard could intercept and return people to the war-torn country. UN investigators in 2023 accused Libyan authorities of “widespread practice” of arbitrary detention, murder, torture, rape, enslavement and enforced disappearance of migrants. A few months later, the Libyan coast guard received its first EU-funded patrol boat with the European commission openly admitting that some of its ranks were infiltrated by criminal gangs. Turkey: The EU’s 2016 deal with Turkey sought to curb arrivals of Syrian refugees on the Greek islands in exchange for billions of euros in funds and political concessions to Ankara. But Turkey stopped accepting returns leading to a containment policy in Greece, described as inhumane by rights defenders. In the new migration pact: The EU’s pact on asylum and migration, specifically its Asylum Procedures Regulation, included a review of the safe-third country concept. The European Commission recently finalised its review, which resulted in making it easier for member states to send asylum seekers abroad to have their protection claims examined — even if they have never set foot in that country. EU backs launch of Albania-Italy migrant 'offshoring' deal (2024) EU lays groundwork to more easily offshore asylum (2025) 6. What are the main criticisms and concerns surrounding these policies? Why are they called "cruel"? Our reporting consistently highlights several major concerns raised by human rights organisations, legal experts, and international bodies: Risk of 'refoulement' (sending people back to danger), substandard conditions in offshore centres, lack of access to fair and efficient asylum procedures, and potential for abuse in third countries. Questions about compatibility with international asylum law (e.g., the 1951 Refugee Convention), EU law (including the Charter of Fundamental Rights), and national constitutions. Difficulty in ensuring oversight and accountability when asylum processes are outsourced to countries outside the EU's legal framework. The morality of shifting responsibility for vulnerable people to countries often less equipped to handle them, and the potential for creating a two-tiered system of rights. Many proposed schemes face immense logistical hurdles and can be extremely expensive, with questionable effectiveness in achieving their stated aims. The label "cruel" often stems from the potential human suffering, the denial of access to asylum on EU territory, and the abdication of legal and moral responsibilities. The leaked plans to detain migrant children also contribute to this perception of harshness. EU commission takes stand against Danish asylum law (2021) North Africa and the human cost of Europe's 'safe' labels (2025) 7. Who is pushing for these policies within the EU, and who is resisting? EUobserver has reported that certain member states (e.g., Italy, Denmark, Hungary, Austria, Netherlands, Germany) have been strong advocates. At the EU-level, the European Commission under Ursula von der Leyen has shown openness to, or even endorsement of, some externalisation initiatives, seeing them as part of a broader migration management strategy. The EU's new migration pact also reflects a compromise that includes elements facilitating externalisation. Resistance comes from human rights organisations (Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, etc.), refugee advocacy groups, UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency), many legal scholars, and parts of the European Parliament (particularly Green and Left MEPs). They raise the legal and ethical concerns mentioned above. Commission divisions open over asylum ahead of EU elections (2024) EU to expand deportation regime as Europe turns against migrants (2025) 8. Does EU law currently allow for widespread offshoring of asylum seekers? This is a highly contested area. While the EU's new Migration Pact includes concepts like "safe third countries" and border procedures that could be interpreted as facilitating externalisation, direct offshoring of individuals who have reached EU territory to have their asylum claim processed elsewhere by a third country (as in the UK-Rwanda or Italy-Albania model) faces significant legal challenges under existing EU asylum directives and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The legality often hinges on specific interpretations and whether sufficient safeguards can be guaranteed. Polish and Danish EU presidencies press to strip safeguards from asylum outsourcing (2025) Does the fundamental right to seek asylum still exist in the EU of 2024? (2024) 9. What are the potential long-term consequences if these policies become widespread? Based on expert analysis covered by EUobserver, potential consequences include: - Erosion of the international refugee protection system and the principle of asylum. - Increased human rights abuses and suffering for asylum seekers. - Damage to the EU's credibility as a champion of human rights and the rule of law. - Potential for instability in third countries tasked with hosting asylum seekers if not adequately supported or if deals are poorly designed. - A 'race to the bottom' where more countries globally try to offload their asylum responsibilities. O'Flaherty: state of human rights in Europe 'worst in my professional life' (2025) EU asylum and anti-racism policies 'inadequate' and 'abusive', says Human Rights Watch (2025) 10. What's next? Is this trend likely to continue? All indications from our reporting suggest that the push for externalisation will continue, and possibly intensify. In the new Pact on Migration and Asylum the commission proposes solidarity mechanisms to manage arrivals of asylum seekers. A part of the pact is that member states can organise and pay for the deportation of people of specific nationalities, if they have bilateral agreements with those states – again, effectively externalising the asylum procedure. The political appetite in several member states remains strong and the new EU Migration Pact provides a framework that could be used to further these aims. We are likely to see more bilateral agreements, ‘pilot projects’, and continued political debate over the legality and morality of these approaches. Further reading: EU to expand deportation regime as Europe turns against migrants (2025) Language battle over 'deportation' shines light on EU spin (2025) What would *you* like to know about asylum and migration? Let us know.
|
Externalising asylum is the hottest trend in EU migration policy; but just 10 years ago the European Commission opposed it on humanitarian and legal grounds. Here's what you need to know.
|
[
"Migration"
] |
migration
|
2025-05-23T11:36:35.883Z
|
https://euobserver.com/migration/aredb505d6
|
|
What is Europe doing about deepfake porn? Not enough
|
The Take It Down Act is a landmark US bipartisan federal law that mandates swift removal of non-consensual sexualising deepfakes (AI-generated fake explicit imagery of real people) and grants victims stronger legal protection. The rise of such content not only violates personal rights. It is a silent epidemic striking at the foundations of our democracy, as shown in our recent report published by CEE Digital Democracy Watch . In May 2024, the EU passed the which, inter alia, mandates the member sates to criminalise the creation and distribution of non-consensual sexualising deepfakes by June 2027. However, member states must take action before that deadline, and provisions must be backed up by political will and concrete enforcement. The directive rightly recognises that non-consensual sexualising deepfakes constitute image-based violence and warrant a decisive response. While deepfakes have long been associated with disinformation, more than 90 percent of video deepfakes are actually sexualising in nature . Almost all cases target women. And given the increasing public access to and quality of deepfake technology, sexualising deepfakes are on the rise. At many South Korean schools and universities, a veritable “abuse industry” has emerged, with explicit synthetic materials, many depicting minors, being exchanged on a mass scale in closed chat-groups. In Spain, minor girls fell victim to their peers: the teenage perpetrators used free, downloadable software to create nude images. Similar cases have been reported in other countries. Recent reports also unmasked countless subscription-based services offering to “nudify” uploaded photos. Trauma, depression, fear Consequently, thousands of women worldwide are victims of such attacks on their physical and psychological integrity. These attacks leave an indelible mark in the form of trauma, depression, or fear. Moreover, collectively, they attack women’s dignity, safety, and democratic participation, objectifying them and reinforcing negative stereotypes. Female politicians, journalists, activists, and schoolgirls alike are being targeted. In addition to sexual motivations, perpetrators often seek to silence women through blackmail or humiliation and force them to withdraw from public life and political participation. And they often succeed. In South Korea, thousands of young women have deleted their social media accounts out of fear of respective victimisation. Yet as of today, most EU countries lack clear criminal provisions addressing such deepfakes. Penal codes are riddled with ambiguities. Existing regulations protecting image or reputation were written for the analogue world; their application to synthetic depictions remains uncertain. This leaves victims without clear legal safeguards. The EU Directive provides a vital roadmap for action. Although an implementation deadline is set for 2027, every delay continues to grant perpetrators a sense of impunity. Member states must go beyond symbolic compliance and see the directive as an opportunity to act swiftly, and establish multidimensional practices to protect women and minors. First, they must introduce unambiguous laws that explicitly criminalise both creating and sharing non-consensual sexualising deepfakes to replace vague provisions and legal loopholes. Second, they must hold the platforms and AI providers facilitating this abuse accountable: concerning digital platforms, the directive rightly encourages swift takedown mechanisms as self-moderation apparently does not work. Platforms have repeatedly failed to act against sexualising deepfakes, despite proclaiming policies to counter them, as demonstrated in the case of synthetic intimate imagery targeting singer Taylor Swift. This content circulated for hours and was viewed around 50 million times before being taken down by X. Concerning the AI providers, controlling the consensuality of images entered into so-called “nudifying apps” is illusory, and their business model is built upon “undressing” someone else’s photo. This directly violates the rights of third parties, as do commercial services offering sexualising images. Both should be met with legal responses and should be excluded from app stores and search engines. Third, actions must go beyond the legal sphere and take a systemic approach. Public education, digital literacy, and awareness campaigns are necessary to shape a society that rejects and can effectively counter digital abuse and misogyny. Without addressing the social culture that trivialises such abuse — particularly among minors — laws will remain ineffective. Lastly, a pan-European dialogue is needed to harmonise criminal law standards, avoid jurisdictional gaps, increase detection capabilities, and send a unified message: deepfake violence is real violence, and it will be treated and combated as such. The first deepfakes were created as early as 2017 and were based on superimposing celebrity faces onto pornographic recordings. It did not take a visionary to predict that the quality, accessibility, and abuse potential of the synthesis would increase. Notwithstanding, we have largely slept through the last eight years. This must change. Countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom, South Korea, and now the US have already criminalised non-consensual sexualising deepfakes. Europe must swiftly follow suit. Member States should not wait until 2027 to transpose the respective EU Directive into national law and undertake complementary non-legal countermeasures. We must act now to protect women and minors and, thereby, the foundations of our democracy. Mateusz Łabuz is a researcher on internet cybersecurity at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg . Maria Pawelec is an expert in deepfakes and disinformation at the International Center for Ethics in the Sciences and Humanities, University of Tübingen . Mateusz Łabuz is a researcher on internet cybersecurity at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg . Maria Pawelec is an expert in deepfakes and disinformation at the
|
International Center for Ethics in the Sciences and Humanities, University of Tübingen
|
Thousands of women worldwide are victims of such attacks on their physical and psychological integrity. These attacks leave an indelible mark in the form of trauma, depression, or fear. Yet as of today, most EU countries lack clear criminal provisions addressing such deepfakes.
|
[
"Digital",
"EU Political",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] |
digital
|
2025-05-23T10:52:28.978Z
|
https://euobserver.com/digital/ar5f48cc16
|
Mendi Mengjiqi — Making music to build countries with
|
There is an artist wandering alone in the mountains of north-eastern Kosovo who deeply cherishes the EU ideal — of a united and peaceful Europe — but who is losing hope the Western Balkans will follow his beloved Poland on the path to accession. "There's a dangerous situation in the world today — so many crises, in Ukraine, in the Balkans, in America — in the whole world, something strange is happening, a new era is coming," he tells EUobserver. Mendi Mengjiqi is a 66-year-old Kosovar Albanian classical music composer who wrote Kosovo's national anthem shortly before it declared independence on 17 February 2008 . He lives in the mountain village of Lupçi i Epërm, where he is now composing a piece for a string quartet to be played at a music festival in Kraków, Poland, in summer. "I live alone, with no people around, but I have six friends — my two dogs and the four street dogs I feed every day," he says. “I don’t eat meat, because I don’t like to kill animals, not even my chickens, but I do eat their eggs,” he adds. "I write music in my attic and I read [Swiss psychologist] Carl Jung. I read [Roman philosopher] Seneca,” Mengjiqi says. "I follow the news a bit, but I try to stay far from politics, because it upsets me." "I have found solace in nature. The hills here are so beautiful in spring, the grass is so green and the wild flowers are so pure," he adds. But for all his self-imposed isolation, Mengjiqi is a consummate European. He studied in Sweden and Poland (under the famous Polish composer Krzysztof Penderecki) and speaks English, Italian, Polish, Serbo-Croat, and Swedish, as well as his native Albanian. "It's like [Roman philosopher] Marcus Aurelius said: 'My city is here, it is Rome, but since I'm a man, it's also the whole world'," Mengjiqi says. And the anthem he wrote, which is entitled Europe, was his contribution to EU enlargement, as it sought to bring reconciliation to a people still traumatised by one of the most cruel ethnic wars of modern times. “Most anthems have a martial theme, but that’s not my taste, I don’t accept that, and my ‘Europe’ has the same musical scale as the European anthem, the Ode to Joy [by German composer Ludwig van Beethoven],” he said. “Penderecki told me something I’ll never forget: ‘Your music is rooted in the Balkans, but cultivated in European schools’,” Mengjiqi said. “Music is everything to me. It brings peace. In any culture where music is not developed, people are more aggressive,” he adds. “EU enlargement in 2004 never threatened anyone. Nobody forced Poland or the Baltic States to join, but Putin’s sickness made them fearful of Russia” He also loves Poland, partly for its history of eminent scientists and artists, but also for the humanitarian values that he sees in Polish society. “Polish people will never accept that someone is treated unjustly. They’re always on the side of the good”, he says. But turning back to the politics which so disappointed him, he says: “After the fall of the Berlin Wall, I thought even Russia would open up to Europe, that we could live together in a continent with no visas or hard borders, that one day we’d all unite, but then this cretin [Russian president Vladimir] Putin came along with his imperial ambitions and divided everybody”. “In Russia, many people don’t have indoor toilets, but Putin has golden toilets in his palace, and that shows the kind of country this is,” Mengjiqi tells EUobserver. “EU enlargement in 2004 never threatened anyone. Nobody forced Poland or the Baltic States to join, but Putin’s sickness made them fearful of Russia,” he says. The enlargement process continues amid the Ukraine war, with Ukraine itself, as well as Georgia and Moldova, now official candidates to join, alongside the six Western Balkan states and Turkey. But Kosovo is the last in line , since five EU member states still don’t recognise its sovereignty , while Serbia is increasingly drifting back into Russia’s sphere of influence. Meanwhile, for Mengjiqi, strict Islam, as well as Putin, is holding back the unification he dreamed of when he was a young man in the 1990s. People in Europe have become scared of Muslim fanatics and of Arab migrants by association, he says, in a trend which feeds far-right EU identity politics and “helps only Russia”. Aside from Roman philosophy, Mengjiqi also admires the 13th century Persian poet Rumi, he says, but he can't relate to the mystical Sufi Islam sect of Bektashism that Rumi inspired, which is now based in Albania, for instance. “Islam has done a lot of harm in Kosovo. Democracy is freedom to believe or say what you want, but not to do what you want,” he adds. “European culture and values come from Judaeo-Christian and Greco-Roman traditions and Muslims need to adapt to this if we are to live happily together,” he says. “Some people pacify their souls in nature, some in art, others in religion - and wherever you find this peace, that’s where you belong,” the musician says. “The problem is that too many Serbs find this comfort in their historical ties with Russia, while too many Albanians find it in their links with strict Muslim societies in the Middle East. Until we can renounce this, it will be hard for either of us to integrate with Europe,” he warns. And do let us know if you're interested in a physical copy of the magazine here .
|
Andrew Rettman is EUobserver's foreign editor, writing about foreign and security issues since 2005. He is Polish, but grew up in the UK, and lives in Brussels. He has also written for The Guardian, The Times of London, and Intelligence Online.
|
Most national anthems have a martial theme, to put it mildly. That’s not the ethos of Mendi Mengjiqi, who composed the anthem for Kosovo, when it declared independence in 2008.
|
[
"The EU's Unsung Heroes"
] |
the-eus-unsung-heroes
|
2025-05-23T05:35:00.000Z
|
https://euobserver.com/the-eus-unsung-heroes/ard29e42ec
|
The EU's Rwanda raw materials deal — profits before Congolese lives
|
Few Europeans realize how much the EU and Donald Trump actually have in common: a hunger for minerals from Congo and Rwanda. In February 2024, the European Commission signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), agreeing with Rwanda to develop “sustainable value chains” for critical raw minerals. According to the United Nations and other international organisations , some of the minerals processed and shipped from Rwanda such as coltan, a rare mineral used to manufacture electric car batteries, mobile phones and other electronic devices, come illicitly from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). While this agreement is not yet up and running, as EUobserver reported previously, a commodities trader in at least one EU member state has already benefited from minerals likely smuggled into Rwanda from the DRC. In eastern DRC, the Rwandan-backed M23 armed group has committed serious abuses and brutalised Congolese civilians. The EU’s attempt to thread the diplomatic needle by denouncing Rwanda’s support for M23 while refusing to suspend the critical raw materials agreement without adequate safeguards to ensure that this agreement does not contribute to human rights abuses is revealing. In taking this approach, the EU is putting profits before Congolese lives – a slap in the face to people in DRC who are desperate for international actors to exert sustained public pressure on all parties to the conflict. Gang-rape and torture Amnesty International research found that M23 fighters have gang-raped women and tortured detainees. M23 has also threatened, detained and tortured human rights defenders and civil society members. Between February and May of this year, M23 fighters entered hospitals in Goma five times, searching for members of the Congolese army or abducting patients, and later beating many of them with wooden rods and sticks. Detainees at some M23 detention sites have been so badly beaten that they had open wounds and required hospitalization after their release. Families are often prevented from visiting detainees, who are also denied access to lawyers and healthcare. Conditions at these sites violate international law, they are so appalling that they may amount to war crimes of torture or cruel treatment. Early in the conflict, the EU recognised abuses committed by M23, calling on Rwanda to remove its troops from DRC and working to establish a fact-finding mission at the UN Human Rights Council. In February 2025, the EU and its member states agreed to suspend defence consultations with Rwanda and to review the MoU with the country. In March, the Council imposed sanctions on nine individuals and one entity responsible for acts that constitute serious human rights violations and abuses in the DRC, including the head of the Rwanda Mines, Petroleum and Gas Board — a nod to EU and member state concerns about the country’s involvement in processing illicit minerals. In the same spirit, the European Parliament called for the suspension of the minerals agreement , highlighting how, along with the EU’s defence cooperation with Rwanda, it had “contributed to sending an inconsistent message to the Rwandan authorities”. And now silence However, since March, despite rampant M23 abuses, the EU has fallen entirely silent on the DRC, and commission officials continue to defend the agreement to MEPs. The reasons for the EU’s defensiveness about the minerals deal aren’t clear. If EU officials believe the agreement gives them leverage over Rwanda to ensure human rights are protected, war-weary Congolese are still waiting for them to use it. To date, there has been no visible EU effort to engage with Rwanda to ensure that minerals in its supply aren’t contributing to or financing human rights abuses in the DRC. At the same time, the EU appears content to sit on the sidelines while abuses continue and the US and Qatar attempt to facilitate a peace deal between Rwanda and the DRC. The EU’s failure to hold Rwanda accountable for M23 abuses makes its human rights commitments ring hollow to many Congolese who fear losing their lives simply for speaking out. Taking timely action will be crucial. EU and AU ministers missed the mark on Wednesday (21 May) by sending blatantly mixed messages giving a nod to “shared values” of human rights and “deep concerns” on the consequences of conflict on civilians, including in the DRC — while simultaneously trumpeting the “positive results and transformational impact” of EU-AU cooperation, including on raw minerals. EU High Representative Kaja Kallas spoke not a word on human rights publicly, instead declaring that key priorities for the EU-AU partnership will include greater collaboration on critical raw materials. With Washington negotiating minerals deals with the DRC and Rwanda, which will likely intensify mining in eastern Congo, the EU’s review of the Rwanda minerals deal is now even more crucial. If the EU doesn’t press Rwanda on its responsibility to uphold human rights, it’s a signal that it favours minerals over the rights of Congolese. That’s a transactional message that shouldn’t sit well with anyone, in Brussels and beyond. Tigere Chagutah is Amnesty International 's regional director of east and southern Africa. Tigere Chagutah is Amnesty International
|
's regional director of east and southern Africa.
|
The EU’s attempt to thread the diplomatic needle by denouncing Rwanda’s support for M23 while refusing to suspend the critical raw materials agreement without adequate safeguards to ensure that this agreement does not contribute to human rights abuses is revealing, write Amnesty International.
|
[
"EU & the World",
"Africa",
"Green Economy",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2025-05-22T12:27:57.312Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ara5bb207b
|
The EU's defence splurge — a gold rush for arms lobbyists
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Europe is entering a new era of defence spending. Alarmed by Russia’s war on Ukraine and the US’ waning commitment to European defence, EU leaders have pledged to rearm fast, aiming to be “ ready by 2030 .” This surge in budgets may be necessary for security, but it’s triggering a lobbying gold rush in Brussels as arms manufacturers scramble to shape how new funds get spent. The result? An uptick in lobbying that risks outpacing the rules meant to keep influence peddling in check. If Europe wants its rearmament plans to succeed, it must couple the spending spree with a transparency spree. Otherwise, it could win the arms race but lose the public trust and support. When money floods in, lobbyists are never far behind. In the past, national capitals were the prime targets for defence contractors. Now, with the European Commission’s ambitions to create a single market for defence, the EU itself has become a key target of influence. According to a recent investigation by Politico Europe, the lobbying budgets of the largest European defence companies grew by roughly 40 percent from 2022 to 2023. Nearly all major players are hiring extra lobbyists. Lobbying is not inherently nefarious. In the best case it makes policies better informed, more targeted, and adapted to the needs and realities of industry and various stakeholder groups. Red flags But the speed and scale of the lobbying boom in Brussels raises a red flag. If transparency is not championed, defence budgets can quickly be squandered on weapons that fulfil the sales targets of private companies, not Europe’s security needs. Whilst it might look like European ministries of defence will soon have endless money at their disposal, if we look closely at the investments that are needed across innovation, production, logistics, infrastructure and capabilities — money is still tight. To get this right, decisions need to be made carefully and efficiently. The EU does have lobbying regulations, but they’re a patchwork quilt full of holes. Transparency International EU analysed the regulatory frameworks for all 27 member states, as well as the three main EU institutions, the results showed a fragmented lobbying regulation landscape. 15 member states have adopted mandatory or partially mandatory lobbying provisions, while the remaining 12 have virtually no — or only voluntary — rules. Out of the EU’s biggest defence spenders per percentage of GDP — Poland, Estonia and Greece — Estonia has voluntary reporting regulations whilst the other two have mandatory ones, but with significant enforcement and implementation gaps. Only the European Commission, European Parliament and five EU countries publish lobby meetings proactively, and even the EU’s Council of Ministers (where national governments wield influence) sticks to a voluntary disclosure system, resulting in an incomplete picture of who is whispering what in whose ear. This fragmented landscape is an invitation to exploit weak links. To get to Brussels, go via national capitals If lobbying in Brussels requires disclosure, a firm might instead lobby through a member state with lax rules, knowing those efforts won’t be visible or reported systematically. They can route influence via national ministries, hire consultancies or think-tanks in countries where oversight is minimal, and then have those governments advocate industry-friendly positions in EU meetings. The result is the same: policy gets shaped, but we cannot be sure in whose interest. If the EU is serious about being “ready by 2030”, it must also get serious about regulating lobbying more effectively, including updating it to reflect the landscape of doing business in 2025 and demanding, for example, that WhatsApp messages and other digital communications are properly recorded. We don’t have to speculate about what happens when big money meets weak oversight — Europe has recent cautionary tales to heed. In the Covid-19 pandemic, the rush to secure masks, vaccines and medical gear meant normal procurement rules were widely tossed aside. As governments scrambled to respond, transparency was an early casualty. Many countries suspended their usual public procurement rules, leading to billions of euros in emergency contracts being barely scrutinised. Scandal on scandal followed. From over-priced PPE deals brokered by politically connected middlemen to questions about how vaccine contracts were negotiated via text message, the pandemic response showed how secrecy breeds trouble. Europe cannot afford to repeat the same mistakes with tanks and missiles. The stakes are too high. European leaders understandably want speed - Denmark’s prime minister recently told her military to “buy, buy, buy” weapons as fast as possible, announcing that procurement would be made without going through the normal tendering procedures. The recent European Commission’s joint white paper on defence also mentioned the “need to immediately simplify and streamline regulations and procedures and ensure priority access.” Not to say that EU bureaucracy doesn’t have room for improvement, but as Europe opens the spending taps, every shortcut around transparency and due process can carry a heavy price down the line in accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness. Money well spent on defence means getting the best value for the right equipment, not lining the wrong pockets or funding the loudest lobbyists. A defence strategy built on public funds must be protected by public scrutiny. That means regulating lobbying seriously. It means treating backroom deals with as much caution as battlefield threats. If Europe wants to be “ready by 2030,” it must also be ready to police the politics of procurement. Anything less, and Europe may find itself armed but not protected. Emily Wegener is senior policy & campaigns officer for defence & security at Transparency International . Emily Wegener is senior policy & campaigns officer for defence & security at
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Transparency International
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This defence spending splurge in budgets may be necessary for security, but it’s triggering a lobbying gold rush in Brussels as arms manufacturers scramble to shape how new funds get spent. The result? An uptick in lobbying that risks outpacing the rules meant to keep influence peddling in check, warns Transparency International.
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[
"EU & the World",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-and-the-world
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2025-05-22T11:28:22.011Z
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https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar624355af
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Denmark hires US lobbyists, amid Greenland dispute
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Denmark has hired influential K-Street lobbyists with Republican party links as it seeks warmer relations with US president Donald Trump. Denmark's Washington ambassador Jesper Møller Sørensen has agreed a contract with Mercury Public Affairs worth $263,000, according to filings under the US state department's foreign agents' registration act. David Vitter, a former Republican congressman and senator for Louisiana, who stood down in 2017 after being losing a gubernatorial election in Louisiana, will handle the contract for Mercury. The filing states that the contract, which came into force on 25 April, will involve "providing strategic consulting, public affairs, marketing and communications". Denmark has found itself in the Trump administration's crosshairs over the status of Greenland, an autonomous Danish territory rich in mineral resources, which Trump wants to purchase. Despite Danish prime minister Mette Fredriksen stating that Greenland is not for sale, Trump has threatened Denmark with trade tariffs if they refuse to sell, and has refused to rule out military intervention. However, obtaining Republican-linked lobbyists to argue its cause has not been straightforward. In March, Denmark was turned down by Ballard Partners, led by Brian Ballard, a major Trump fundraiser in Florida. The European Commission, as well as a handful of EU member states, have also been in talks with Washington lobby shops in a bid to get closer access to Trump's inner circle. In late March, Trump's vice president JD Vance appeared to tone down US rhetoric on Greenland's future, but warned that Denmark had "not done a good job for the people of Greenland." "This is why Trump's policy is what it is [that Greenland should become part of the US]," Vance said, speaking to US soldiers at the Pituffik Space Base. But he also said: "We respect the self-determination of the people of Greenland". Trump's bid for Greenland appears to have driven an increase in anti-US sentiment on the Arctic Island. March's general elections in Greenland were dominated by fears of losing autonomy to the US. The elections on 11 March were won by the centre-right Democrats party, whose leader, Jens Frederik Nielsen, said that the results should be a clear message to the United States and Trump that "We don't want to be Americans. No, we don't want to be Danes. We want to be Greenlanders. And we want our own independence in the future."
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Benjamin Fox is a seasoned reporter and editor, previously working for fellow Brussels publication Euractiv. His reporting has also been published in the Guardian, the East African, Euractiv, Private Eye and Africa Confidential, among others. He heads up the AU-EU section at EUobserver, based in Nairobi, Kenya.
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Denmark has hired influential K-Street lobbyists with Republican party links, as it seeks warmer relations with US president Donald Trump.
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[
"EU & the World"
] |
eu-and-the-world
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2025-05-22T07:30:00.000Z
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https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar2b764a88
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Led By Donkeys — How four blokes with a ladder took on Brexit
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They say that ‘strongmen’ leaders can stand anything — apart from being laughed at. And they say that the best way to win an argument is to quote your opponents' own words back at them. Well, Will Rose, James Sadri, Oliver Knowles and Ben Stewart — better known as the (initially) anonymous Brexit ad-busting British guerilla outfit “Led By Donkeys” — certainly proved those two suppositions correct. The four former environmental activists emerged out of nowhere in London (actually, out of an evening at an east London pub) at the height of the UK parliament paralysis caused by Britain’s 2016 wafer-thin shock referendum result (52 percent vs 48 percent) to leave the EU. Armed only with a bucket of glue, a ladder, and presumably some torchlights (their work was done undercover, at night), the four ‘unsung heroes’ of the Remain camp plastered billboards across the capital, London, with blow-up images of tweets, campaign speeches and newspaper articles of the chief Leave protagonists’s failed promises (and lies).The main victims, really targets, were Nigel Farage (leader of the then UKIP party), Boris Johnson (then Conservative foreign secretary, plotting his route to Downing Street thanks to Brexit), Jacob Rees-Mogg (a Conservative MP who dresses and acts like a Victorian gentleman but is actually co-founder of a hedge fund), Dominic Cummings (the behind-the-scenes ‘brains’ of the ‘Leave’ campaign) and Dominic Raab (the Conservative Brexit minister who no one accused of being the ‘brains’ of anything after blurting out, two years after the Brexit vote, and whilst the actual Brexit minister, that he “hadn’t quite understood the full extent” of how much UK-EU trade depended on the Dover-Calais sea crossing). That final quote, of course, soon became a meme after LedByDonkeys blew it up and put it clandestinely on advertising sites across London. “Only after the [2016] referendum did it become clear that Brexit was a deregulation project; a threat to environmental regulations that we had fought for, a threat to workers’ rights and protections.” But to rewind — the name Led By Donkeys (shortened to the hashtag #LedByDonkeys on social media campaigns), comes from a famous British saying about frontline soldiers during World War I being “Lions led by donkeys”, ie brave but disposable cannon fodder dying in the trenches of the Somme, while the generals were behind the frontlines, living it up in some commandeered chateau. That was certainly the case with the 2016 Brexit referendum . Enraged by six years of so-called “austerity” cuts to British public services, which Farage skillfully blamed on the number of migrants in the UK, the voting public was sold the idea Brexit would be a “Take Back Control” moment. Plus the outright lie that Turkey was about to join the EU. Instead of “take back control”, which was the public messaging, the true agenda was soon revealed, as Knowles told The Guardian in 2024 (after their identities were revealed). “[Prior to Brexit] I definitely saw the EU as a distant power, very remote. It didn’t sit comfortably with my politics,” he admitted. “Only after the [2016] referendum did it become clear that Brexit was a deregulation project; a threat to environmental regulations that we had fought for, a threat to workers’ rights and protections.” The promises of “the easiest deal in history” and “of course we’ll remain in the single market” and “the German carmakers will be knocking on the door to give us a good deal” evaporated almost overnight, as from 2016 to 2021 the Conservative government hit parliamentary stalemate over how, and what sort, of Brexit it actually wanted . Meanwhile, our four intrepid heroes were putting the original tweets of the victorious Leave camp on billboards at first across London, and later across the country. For example, Nigel Farage in 2017 “If Brexit is a disaster, I will go and live abroad, I’ll go and live somewhere else”. (He didn’t.) Boris Johnson, in February 2016, “Leaving would cause at least some businesses uncertainty, while embroiling the government for several years in a fiddly process of negotiating new agreements, so diverting energy from the real problems of this country.” (It did.) Boris Johnson again, a year later in 2017: “There’s no plan for ‘No Deal’ because we’re going to get a great deal”. (We didn’t). Theresa May, the later Conservative prime minister who then pressed for the hardest-possible Brexit, in April 2016: “I believe it is clearly in our national interest to remain a member of the European Union”. (It was). Rose, Sadri, Knowles and Stewart had previously been activists and environmentalists with groups such as Greenpeace and the League against Cruel Sports, and post-Brexit, have not stopped — although they’ve swapped the ladder and glue for video installations, and pop-up interventions, highlighting the hypocrisies of official government Covid memorials, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the child death toll in Gaza, among other hot-button topics. Last year, they were back in the news for surreptitiously lowering an image of a cabbage, with the slogan “I Cashed The Economy” on stage behind Liz Truss, Britain’s shortest-lived prime minister, while she was on a pro-Trump speaking tour. The cabbage is a reference to a tabloid newspaper live-streaming an image of a lettuce decaying, to see who would last longer during her disastrous September-October 2022 premiership. The lettuce won. The actually Remain-voting Truss managed a record-low 49 days as prime minister.) Truss immediately stormed off stage, calling the stunt “not funny”. (It was funny). Rather proving the point that would-be ‘strong women’ leaders, as well as strong men, cannot bear being laughed at. And do let us know if you're interested in a physical copy of the magazine here .
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Matthew is EUobserver's Opinion Editor. He joined EUobserver in June 2018. Previously he worked as a reporter for The Guardian in London, and as editor for AFP in Paris and DPA in Berlin.
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Hatched over drinks in a London pub, and anger over the lies fuelling the UK’s exit from the EU, four friends took on Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson armed only with a ladder and some posters. Their guerilla ad campaign didn’t ultimately work — but it had more cut through than most mainstream media coverage.
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[
"The EU's Unsung Heroes"
] |
the-eus-unsung-heroes
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2025-05-22T05:35:00.000Z
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https://euobserver.com/the-eus-unsung-heroes/aree7a7c9c
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Language battle over 'deportation' shines light on EU spin
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The European Commission won't use the word "deportation" to describe kicking out failed asylum seekers and rejected migrants from the European Union. It is a word loaded with historical horrors of World War II, where Nazi Germany deported millions of Jews to extermination camps in eastern Europe. The ensuing genocide of millions have left inedible scars and soul-searching for a European leadership that has since promised never to repeat history. It also has its antecedents in Stalinist deportations. So whenever the word comes up to help describe an EU policy, the European Commission will insist on using terminology such as "returns", "voluntary returns", "forced returns" or even transfers. The euphemisms are meant to neutralise the negative connotations, including "voluntary returns". Yet one European Commission official, at a background briefing in March, still managed to frame even "voluntary returns" as a threat. "One way of incentivising voluntary return is the clarity of what happens if you think that you can play the system," he said. "It also can concentrate the mind and stimulate a very serious discussion and choices around voluntary return," he added. In public, the phrase seeks to distance the commission from the likely human rights abuses that sometimes arise when coercion is used to remove people — even if only psychological. When it comes to the word "deportation", the commission also argues it is not legally defined at the EU level. "While deportation and removal often are understood as synonyms, deportation is not used as a legal term in all EU member states," it says. Earlier this week, journalists in Brussels attending a technical briefing on asylum organised by the commission were reminded once again not to say deportation. Please 'refrain' "I would refrain from using the word deported," said a commission official. The request came when pressed on how its latest proposal would allow member states to turn back asylum seeker hopefuls and possibly send them abroad to a country they have never been to. Historical and legal spin aside, however, the word deportation remains an appropriate description of what is happening. Former migration commissioner, Ylva Johansson, herself used the word after the New York Times revealed that Greece had deported a Frontex interpreter to Turkey. "He's [Frontex interpreter] been humiliated and victim of violence and robbed and deported to a third country he has no relation to," she said in December 2021. "[It] seems to be clear deportation and this is not the first time that we had this situation," she again said of the Frontex interpreter, in June 2023 while addressing the European Parliament's civil liberties committee. The interpreter was a victim of a pushback, a form of deportation that is a reality along much of the EU's external border. But the commission, for all its careful posturing, does not now get to decide why "deported" is a word that cannot be used to describe policies that rights defenders say are cruel and inhumane. Its latest iteration opens up the possibility for an asylum hopeful to be deported to a third country he has no relation to, echoing the phrase used by its own former commissioner. Catherine Woollard, director at the Brussels-based European Council of Refugees and Exiles, was more direct. "More people will be deported to countries that are not safe in reality," she said, i n an op-ed.
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Nikolaj joined EUobserver in 2012 and covers home affairs. He is originally from Denmark, but spent much of his life in France and in Belgium. He was awarded the King Baudouin Foundation grant for investigative journalism in 2010.
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The European Commission doesn't use the word "deportation" to describe kicking out failed asylum seekers and rejected migrants from the European Union. It prefers the euphemisms "forced returns" and "voluntary returns."
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[
"Migration",
"EU Political"
] |
migration
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2025-05-22T03:30:00.000Z
|
https://euobserver.com/migration/ar6eb0b0bd
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The trillion dollar question — what next for EU financing for development?
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EU member states are feeling the heat to come up with a credible offer for the UN Financing for Development Conference , set to take place in Seville at the end of June. The EU is under pressure to honour its commitments to multilateralism and stand up against attacks on sustainable development within the UN ’s system. The question is whether the EU will demonstrate the political will to do so, and whether Spain, as host country, can move the bloc forward. The EU’s current stance will become clearer when European foreign affairs ministers publish their council conclusions on financing for development next Monday (26 May). Back in 2002, the EU played a crucial role in the successful negotiation of the first UN Conference on Financing for Development, the . Governments collectively agreed to raise national revenues through fair taxation, fulfil their aid commitments and tackle the obstacles posed by Global South debt, and the financial system itself. So far, the EU’s ambition for Seville is a shadow of the political will shown in 2002. Global economic uncertainty, rising inequalities, and a debt crisis, exacerbated by development and climate emergencies, coupled with drastic aid budget cuts , make international cooperation more urgent than ever. Debt is the biggest stumbling block in the negotiations. All parties at the table recognise that something needs to be done to address the acute and growing debt crisis. Many countries in the Global South face a financial dead end, with no viable path compatible with achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), pursuing gender equality or fighting the climate emergency. In 2023 alone, lower-income countries spent $138bn [€121.8bn] to service their debt — $40bn more than what is needed to cover all education financing from 2023 to 2030. Using the promising blueprint of the UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation , many African countries, small island states and civil society groups want the Seville outcome to lay the foundations for rewriting global debt rules. The proposed intergovernmental process towards a debt convention , which gained public support this week from both the European Parliament's development committee and the African Union , would facilitate a democratic process to govern debt restructuring and prevent future crises. Yet, the 'half-way' offer from within the EU ranks, to create an annual meeting in the UN with the current players, is not the inclusive and comprehensive process that Global South countries need and want, where debtors and creditors would negotiate on an equal footing. The canary in the coal mine Another contentious issue is reforming Official Development Assistance (ODA) or aid, the canary in the coal mine of development finance. The 2024 ODA figures show a 7.1 percent drop in foreign aid compared to 2023. But this is just the tip of the iceberg . In 2025, wealthy countries have continued to double down on cuts to their aid budgets, with OECD estimates indicating a further drop of between 9 - 17 percent. This places human rights in peril. For too long, countries failing on their ODA commitments have faced no accountability . This is because wealthy countries both set and monitor the rules that govern aid and development cooperation more broadly through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Current negotiations include a proposal for a UN-led process which would provide all countries with equal footing in governance and accountability for ODA. This could track all commitments and provide a universally understood and airtight definition of ODA. To hold rich countries accountable, it could take the already agreed-upon UN target of 0.7 percent GNI as the baseline for ODA. Here again, Europe’s position in the negotiations will determine the extent to which the aid agenda can shed the critique of its colonial legacies, unpredictability and paternalism and instead actually deliver on its original promise — poverty reduction and reducing inequalities. The EU could also build up some goodwill in the negotiations by endorsing the terms of reference — the mandate — of the ongoing UN tax convention negotiations. Spearheaded by the Africa Group, the UN General Assembly decided to negotiate a new convention by 2027. International tax cooperation is a cornerstone of the current effort to shore up finance for development and climate. It remains the most sustainable source of funding for public services such as healthcare, education and environmental protection. However, the current global tax system is littered with loopholes and undermined by tax havens. It also disproportionately benefits the home countries of investors and corporations. As a result, multinational corporations and wealthy individuals can reap financial rewards from developing countries without paying much — if any — tax, neither in these countries, or globally. And when wealthy individuals and corporations use tax havens to dodge their fair share of tax, governments often shift the burden onto the poorest through higher taxes on consumers and workers. These regressive tax systems exacerbate inequalities. Like aid, this system has been largely designed through the OECD, where countries from the Global South lack an equal footing. It also demands a rethink to ensure a fair tax system. The key to progress is global political will. Across aid, tax, debt, and many other issues, the cost of inaction is unfathomable: not only for the 1.1 billion people living in poverty, but also for the strength of the global economic system. Christina Fenandez-Duran is interim head of Oxfam 's EU Office. Javier García de la Oliva is Action Aid head of country engagement and transformation Europe and Americas. Jean Saldanha is director at the European Network on Debt and Development (Eurodad). Christina Fenandez-Duran is interim head of Oxfam 's EU Office. Javier García de la Oliva is Action Aid head of country engagement and transformation Europe and Americas. Jean Saldanha is director at the
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European Network on Debt and Development
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EU member states are under pressure come up with a credible offer for the UN Financing for Development Conference in Seville at the end of June. The question is whether the EU will demonstrate the political will to do so, and whether Spain — as host country — can move the bloc forward, warn Oxfam, Action Aid and Eurodad.
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[
"EU & the World",
"Africa",
"Opinion"
] |
*
|
2025-05-21T10:37:55.994Z
|
https://euobserver.com/*/ar2474eeac
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Francesca Albanese — Anatomising Israel’s genocide comes at a cost
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Of all the unsung heroes featured in this magazine, Francesca Albanese’s name and face might be one of the most recognisable. Her speeches at the United Nations and elsewhere have garnered tens of millions of views online. She often speaks of the “love and compassion” shown to her by people moved by her work. And yet, the forces arrayed against her appear near-total, especially when compared to the minimal support she receives to carry out her role. For instance, it’s a little-known fact that the UN special rapporteur on the human rights situation in the occupied Palestinian territories is an unpaid position. In a recent interview, she described herself as a “volunteer working with a network of volunteers,” while facing hostility and hate from some of the world’s most powerful and well-connected states. The US administration, under both Joe Biden and now Donald Trump, opposes her mandate, and officials have smeared her as antisemitic. Israel has labelled her persona non grata and barred her from entering the country. France and Germany both accused Albanese of “hate speech and antisemitism” at the UN, criticising her for focusing on Israel’s alleged genocide while rarely acknowledging its right to self-defence. In March last year, Albanese presented a report to the UN Human Rights Council on Israel's war in Gaza, titled It concluded there were reasonable grounds to believe Israel is committing genocide against Palestinians, in Gaza and now, she says, in the West Bank as well. The report was immediately rejected by Israel, the US, France, Germany and others. Albanese later said she had received death threats in its aftermath. And yet, her findings are in line with conclusions drawn by other international bodies. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled last year that South Africa’s genocide claim was plausible . Far from trading in diplomacy, her message is unavoidably political: that the law either applies equally, or it doesn’t apply at all And holocaust historian Barry Trachtenberg testified before the ICJ that a consensus was emerging among genocide scholars: “We are watching the genocide unfold as we speak,” he said. “We are in this incredibly unique position where we can intervene to stop it.” Albanese has since concluded that the moment for prevention has passed. “We have failed to prevent genocide,” she said in a recent interview on the podcast The Rest is Politics. She now describes her job as a “chronicler of genocide,” adding that “the mask has fallen off” — a reference to the brazen disregard for international law not only by Israel , Russia, and the US under Trump, but also by European states, most of which have ignored the ICJ’s July ruling requiring UN members to suspend trade and investment tied to Israel’s illegal occupation. In this climate, where legal standards are openly ignored, Albanese has not softened her tone. She has, instead, grown more precise. “Impunity,” she wrote recently, “has been the rule, not the exception” since Israel’s founding 76 years ago. But it is now “at a climax.” Far from trading in diplomacy, her message is unavoidably political: that the law either applies equally, or it doesn’t apply at all. In this spirit, she has championed the formation of The Hague Group, a coalition of nine countries from the Global South — Belize, Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, Honduras, Malaysia, Namibia, Senegal and South Africa — described as a “bulwark to protect international law” in an increasingly “lawless world.” The group has pledged to support arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court , impose arms embargoes, and refuse safe haven to individuals accused of grave crimes. Albanese has urged others to join, particularly European countries, whose governments (outwardly at least) still speak the language of law and values. “If we are to salvage an international legal order in this current moment, the international community must see this initiative grow,” she wrote. So far, no one has answered her call. And do let us know if you're interested in a physical copy of the magazine here .
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Wester is a journalist from the Netherlands with a focus on the green economy. He joined EUobserver in September 2021. Previously he was editor-in-chief of Vice, Motherboard, a science-based website, and climate economy journalist for The Correspondent.
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Francesca Albanese takes on death threats, smears and accusations of hate speech and anti-semitism for calling out Israel’s actions in the occupied territories. She doesn’t even get paid.
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[
"The EU's Unsung Heroes"
] |
the-eus-unsung-heroes
|
2025-05-21T05:35:00.000Z
|
https://euobserver.com/the-eus-unsung-heroes/ar413c877b
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Journalists helped shape the EU — now it needs us more than ever
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Journalists are an unruly bunch, always have been, always will be. But they are also the lifeblood of democracy. Without us there would be no accountability for the powerful, no pushbacks against the corrupt, no visibility for the honorable. There would also be no European Union. The EU would exist of course but it’s journalists — whether good, bad or ugly — who give life and traction to the EU story. That’s no clueless boast. Post-war idealists chronicled the EU’s earliest moves toward unity, national and international correspondents hold EU institutions to account today and legend has it that the Brussels-bashing “exaggerated tales ” by the Daily Telegraph’s erstwhile reporter in Brussels, Boris Johnson, helped set Brexit in motion. Today, as the EU struggles to find its place in a MAGA world, our role as watchdogs of ethical standards, transparency and accountability is more critical than ever. For proof look no further than the European Court of Justice’s ruling last week on “Pfizergate”. Instigated by tenacious journalists who filed a Freedom of Information request with the European Commission, asking for access to text messages exchanged between commission chief Ursula von der Leyen and Pfizer CEO Albert Bourla during early Covid-19 vaccine negotiations, the case spotlights the wide gap between EU institutions’ public vows on openness and public scrutiny and a tendency to engage in selective transparency and strategic delay. The Brussels-based press corps is one of the largest contingents of journalists in the world. Quantity does not always translate into quality, however, and there is shrinking space for smaller national outlets and increased pressure on often-poorly paid freelancers. Interests also vary. For some the focus is on titillating scandals and missteps by Europe’s movers and shakers. Others keep track of the EU’s lack of action on Israel’s ongoing genocide in Gaza, quick-moving developments in Russia’s war in Ukraine, ever harsher Fortress Europe policies, the bloc’s seemingly unstoppable deregulation drive and pushbacks on the green transition. The importance of life beyond the EU bubble is vividly demonstrated in EUobserver’s latest magazine , with its focus on Europe’s unsung heroes. This interest in the EU began as early as 1953. That’s when Italian journalist Emanuele Gazzo set up Agence Europe , an initially small agency with a mandate to report every single day on a rapidly transforming Europe. Agence Europe soon became one of the world’s most respected news services and Gazzo himself emerged as a much-sought-out journalist who was arguably as influential as any commissioner. Full disclosure: I had the privilege of being an intern at Agence Europe straight after university. Terrified at first of the iconic “Monsieur Gazzo”, I soon started calling him Bibbo as did his two journalist daughters, Lidia and Marina (who later became the newsletter’s editor-in-chief). Bibbo was a hard taskmaster but somehow made the daily grind of reporting on Europe a fun, learning experience. We were instructed to know our facts, be meticulous and clear in our reporting but also to question, interrogate and challenge. Agence Europe’s editorials with their pressure for greater transparency and informed debate set the tone for the small number of EU-focused publications that began to emerge. In 1995, European Voice, a weekly established by the Economist Group, started to offer in-depth, insider reporting on the EU at a time when such scrutiny was rare in mainstream European media. This year, EUobserver celebrates its 25 anniversary . Reporting and commenting on the EU continues to be a fascinating adventure, albeit a perilous one. 'Existential battle' From Hungary to Slovenia, and from Poland to Malta, the erosion of press freedom is becoming a litmus test for the EU’s commitment to its principles and values. As the Civil Liberties Union for Europe recently reported , weak ownership transparency rules, growing government influence over public media and threats against journalists, mean that media freedom and pluralism are “under attack across the EU, and in some cases in an existential battle.” There is also a systematic co-option of media outlets by political or corporate interests and a dangerous increase in Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPS), often initiated by powerful corporations, politicians, or oligarchs, which are not really aimed at winning in court but designed to intimidate, silence, and financially drain reporters investigating corruption, abuse of power, or environmental and human rights violations. Years spent in EU press rooms, interrogating ministers, policymakers and “spokespeople” and reporting on Europe for domestic and global audiences has taught me the value and appeal of the EU’s story. I have also learned the importance of speaking truth to power. In a climate of disinformation, authoritarian resurgence, and geopolitical uncertainty, Europe needs journalists who spotlight the good news but can also track the money, trace the lobbying, confront the evasions, and conduct cross-border investigations that go beyond national silos. Europe’s democratic future requires a fiercely independent press which is willing to expose institutional failures, corruption, and policy incoherence. To do this more effectively, EU journalism must become more inclusive both in its recruitment and in the stories it chooses to tell. We owe a debt to pioneers like Emanuele Gazzo who helped write the early chapters of integration with rigour and honesty. Over the years, journalists have helped steer the EU, one question, one leaked report and one tenacious investigation at a time. Our task today may be to help save the EU from complacency, double standards and irrelevance. Shada Islam is an EUobserver columnist, and independent EU analyst and commentator who runs her own strategy and advisory company New Horizons Project . She has recently won the European Woman in Media award and the Media Career Award 2023 for her outstanding work and powerful voice on EU affairs and focus on building an inclusive Union of Equality. Shada Islam is an EUobserver columnist, and independent EU analyst and commentator who runs her own strategy and advisory company New Horizons Project . She has recently won the European Woman in Media award and the
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Media Career Award 2023
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In a climate of disinformation, authoritarian resurgence, and geopolitical uncertainty, Europe needs journalists who spotlight the good news but can also track the money, trace the lobbying, confront the evasions, and conduct cross-border investigations that go beyond national silos, writes Shada Islam.
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[
"Rule of Law",
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] |
rule-of-law
|
2025-05-20T11:25:31.706Z
|
https://euobserver.com/rule-of-law/are3969bb2
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The EU's strategic dialogues — are they just 'participation washing'?
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Strategic Dialogues, the European Commission’s latest effort to engage stakeholders, target contentious issues like the green transition and agricultural reform. It is a promising step — but risks falling flat without deeper reform. To avoid becoming a missed opportunity for EU democratic strengthening, these dialogues must embrace greater inclusivity, transparency, and genuine deliberation. With key initiatives ahead, the Commission now has a chance to turn them from symbolic exercises into meaningful democratic tools. The promises… Since 2023, the European Commission has launched several Strategic Dialogues to involve stakeholders in shaping EU policies on critical issues — from the future of agriculture and the clean industrial transition to the car and metal industries . The pace has picked up in 2025, with further dialogues planned. These dialogues hold real promise. Research consistently shows that public participation — especially when introduced early — can improve the quality of policies and boost their legitimacy. The 1998 Aarhus Convention , a cornerstone of environmental democracy, makes this clear: involving the public at the agenda-setting stage is crucial. Strategic Dialogues could offer just that — a way to open up EU policymaking before decisions are set in stone. … and pitfalls But for that promise to translate into real impact, quality matters. Effective participation requires three things: broad and balanced representation, transparency and accountability, and space for meaningful discussion. So far, Strategic Dialogues have fallen short on all three fronts — undermining both their credibility and their potential. First, stakeholder representation has been strikingly unbalanced. Industry voices have dominated the discussions, while civil society organisations and independent experts have been sidelined. As a result, the dialogues have missed the opportunity to fully reflect the public interest and integrate scientific evidence. Second, the process has lacked transparency and accountability. Most dialogues have taken place behind closed doors, with minimal public information about the agenda, participants, or outcomes. With no detailed records and no clear reporting, the public is left in the dark — unable to follow discussions or assess how stakeholder input shapes EU strategies. Third, genuine debate has been largely absent. Many dialogues have been one-off events with little room for interaction. Rather than fostering two-way deliberation, they have operated as a one-way input collection exercise. This undermines their potential to strengthen policy quality, encourage dialogue between opposing views, and build consensus. One exception proves what is possible. The 2024 Dialogue on the Future of Agriculture offered a more balanced, transparent, and deliberative model. It included a wide range of voices, unfolded over multiple meetings, and resulted in a largely consensual and generally well-regarded final report . Yet, despite its success, it has not been used as a blueprint for future Dialogues — a missed chance to institutionalise best practices. Risk of 'participation washing' Poorly-executed Strategic Dialogues risk turning into what critics call 'participation washing': using stakeholder engagement as a symbolic gesture to legitimise pre-decided outcomes. Without a real commitment to meaningful participation, these dialogues become tools for optics, not substance. Their true value lies in filling a gap — bringing in early public input where it is often lacking in EU policymaking. But if they are used to justify political decisions retroactively, or worse, to bypass established mechanisms like the commission’s public consultations or proper impact assessments, they risk eroding trust instead of building it. A recent example highlights this concern. The commission’s legislative proposal to relax CO₂ standards for cars referenced a preceding Strategic Dialogue that had produced no agreed outcome. Meanwhile, the commission ignored its own Better Regulation Guidelines by skipping both broader consultations and an impact assessment. It is little wonder this raised suspicions of undue industry influence and damaged the proposal’s credibility. For Strategic Dialogues to fulfil their potential, the EU Commission must clarify their purpose and process. Vague formats and unclear roles discourage meaningful engagement and risk turning participation into a box-ticking exercise. By specifying how these dialogues complement existing mechanisms and committing to robust participation standards, the commission can enhance public trust and its credibility. The commission now has a chance to integrate Strategic Dialogues with its broader participatory agenda, including initiatives like the European Democracy Shield and the " EU Strategy to support, protect and empower civil society ”. A commission communication, based on thorough public consultations, could provide the foundation for transforming these dialogues into a real asset. Done right, Strategic Dialogues could become a vital tool for inclusive, solution-oriented engagement and a powerful driver of deeper EU democracy — both symbolically and substantively. Lea Schewe is a researcher at the Brussels School of Governance / Vrije Universiteit Brussels , where Simon Otto is also a researcher and Sebastian Oberthür is director of the Research Centre for Environment, Economy and Energy. Lea Schewe is a researcher at the Brussels School of Governance / Vrije Universiteit Brussels , where Simon Otto is also a researcher and
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Sebastian Oberthür
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Most dialogues have taken place behind closed doors, with minimal public information about the agenda, participants, or outcomes. With no detailed records and no clear reporting, the public is left in the dark — unable to follow discussions or assess how stakeholder input shapes EU strategies.
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[
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] |
*
|
2025-05-20T09:31:51.793Z
|
https://euobserver.com/*/ar68785150
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Hungary’s independent media — ‘A battle of the wills, but worth the struggle’
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The Hungarian government of Viktor Orbán has been systematically undermining independent media, many of which have been pushed to the brink of closure or left struggling to survive under relentless political and economic pressure. EUobserver spoke to various independent journalists who describe changes in the Orbán government's attitude towards the press as akin to a frog in slowly-boiling water — initially, the erosion of press freedom was gradual and subtle. Until it became unbearable, then fatal. “As soon as Orbán came back to power in 2010 [after previously serving as prime minister from 1998 to 2002], we started to receive text messages from politicians with good advice on what not to write about,” Lukács Csaba, managing director at Magyar Hang (Hungarian Voice), recalls. “The Magyar Hang has been an enemy in the eyes of the government from the moment it was born [seven years ago],” he tells EUobserver, who describes the outlet as the “only” independent conservative media in Hungary not aligned with government propaganda. This hostile approach has led to significant operational challenges, including printing the newspaper in Slovakia due to fears of censorship, plus frequent lawsuits and cyberattacks. “The atmosphere is tense, and insults are becoming more frequent, especially on the internet,” Viktória Serdült, an editor at HVG and EUobserver contributor, says Hungary ranked 67 out of 180 countries in the 2024 Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index — a sharp decline from its 40th place more than a decade ago. Independent journalists in Hungary say they are facing mounting government pressure, growing isolation, and systematic exclusion from official channels. “At first, the government was less and less cooperative with the independent press, but in recent years its attitude has become increasingly hostile,” says the founder and former deputy editor in chief of Telex.hu , Márton Kárpáti, pointing to recent legislative efforts aimed at curbing media outlets that receive foreign funding. Telex.hu was set up after government pressure on Index.hu led to the resignation of 90 staff members. Kárpáti also criticises Orbán for routinely sidestepping independent media, granting no interviews and often brushing off their questions by branding them as ‘fake news’ — a label he (and his ally Donald Trump) use to delegitimise critical outlets. “The atmosphere is tense, and insults are becoming more frequent, especially on the internet,” Viktória Serdült, an editor at HVG and EUobserver contributor, says, adding that the Budapest government has crossed some “red lines” in recent months. “Politicians are not afraid to call journalists by name, make personal comments and insult them verbally”. For Csaba, being an independent journalist has meant being smeared as a “paedophile” or a “foreign agent”, and being accused of treason. He was put through a lie-detector test last December by Hungary’s secret service (along with the paper’s editor-in-chief and a journalist) due to an erroneous report, for which a correction was issued. “There are many journalists who leave the profession, and those who stay often show signs of burnout,” he tells EUobserver, adding that many, including himself, feel that this might be their last job in journalism. “Burnout in Hungarian journalism is real,” agrees Serdült, who has colleagues who left the profession to become lorry drivers or bakers. “I ask myself if I would be happier if I did the same. Then I go back to the office and realise that it is worth the struggle,” she said. “The modus operandi of this government is economic pressure,” says Zsolt Kerner, senior editor at 24.hu Orbán is often accused of having installed an Orwellian system in which his government controls the majority of the media landscape . But taking over control of the media wasn’t done overnight. It involved weakening of oversight bodies, such as the Constitutional Court and the Ombudsman’s office, and manipulating market resources. Take, for example, Heinrich Pecina, an Austrian businessman with Fidesz ties, who acquired major Hungarian media assets in 2014, including the opposition newspaper Népszabadság , which was then controversially shut down in 2016 after it published investigations into government corruption. But it was in 2018, with the creation of KESMA, a media conglomerate controlling over 470 outlets, when Orbán further consolidated media control in the country. “The modus operandi of this government is economic pressure,” says Zsolt Kerner, senior editor at 24.hu, one of the biggest independent newspapers in Hungary. “‘Strawman’ owners acquire and then close down or enlist newspapers critical of the government.” Behind the scenes, Hungary’s advertising market has also been skewed by political interference, with state funds funnelled to pro-government outlets. For example, in 2018, the pro-government broadcaster TV2 received 67 percent of state advertising in the broadcast sector, whereas the independent RTL Klub, with a similar reach, got just one percent, according to a report from the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom. "The advertising market is completely distorted. The state is the biggest advertiser and they only advertise in what they consider to be friendly places,” explains Kárpáti, arguing that some advertisers don’t even dare advertise in independent papers for fear of being “blacklisted” by the state. Outlets like 24.hu and Magyar Hang have shifted toward a subscription model — although they still rely heavily on advertising and sales. In its latest rule-of-law report, among many other concerns, the European Commission noted “no progress” was made in ensuring fair state advertising in Hungary and warned that media regulators and public broadcasters remain vulnerable to political interference. This lack of progress is starkly reflected in the experience of journalists like Csaba, who describes journalists’ efforts as a “battle of the mills” [a Hungarian phrase meaning a battle between two powerful institutions]. “With few exceptions, investigative articles have no effect. No matter how corrupt or worn-out the ruling party is, Fidesz keeps winning elections with a two-thirds majority every time, thanks to its brutally strong propaganda and targeted discrediting of opponents, including the media and their journalists”. Despite facing mounting challenges, many independent journalists in Hungary remain committed to truth and public service. “We can see and feel that the audience likes and needs our work,” Kárpáti says, arguing that it is journalists' mission to let people know what is happening in Hungary and in the rest of the world. “We will never give up”. Echoing this sentiment, Kerner of 24.hu says: “Good journalism has a longer lifespan than governments”. And do let us know if you're interested in a physical copy of the magazine here .
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Elena is EUobserver's editor-in-chief. She is from Spain and has studied journalism and new media in Spanish and Belgian universities. Previously she worked on European affairs at VoteWatch Europe and the Spanish news agency EFE.
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Authoritarian leaders don’t appreciate a free and independent media investigating their affairs. But, previously, that has only been a problem outside the EU’s borders. Hungary’s government now smears and attacks its own journalists, starves their newspapers and TV stations of income, whilst happy to bask in the power and resources of being a member of the 27-strong bloc. For how much longer can Hungary’s journalists fight back?
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[
"The EU's Unsung Heroes"
] |
the-eus-unsung-heroes
|
2025-05-20T05:35:00.000Z
|
https://euobserver.com/the-eus-unsung-heroes/ar8f388ae7
|
Marathon Putin-Trump call leaves EU in limbo on Ukraine war
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Russia and Ukraine might sign a "memorandum of understanding" as a "prelude" to a peace deal if "root causes" of the war were eliminated – that was the outcome of a two-hour phone call between Russian president Vladimir Putin and US president Donald Trump on Monday (19 May), according to Putin, quoted by Russia state media Tass and RIA. The talks were "detailed, frank, informative, and useful", Putin said. "For my part, I noted that Russia also favours a peaceful settlement," he added. And Putin said lower-level talks between Russian and Ukrainian diplomats, which began in Istanbul last week, were to resume. Trump posted on social media that the Vatican was willing to host Russia-Ukraine talks. He said his Putin call went "very well" and that the "tone and spirit" were "excellent". He had spoken with the leaders of Finland, France, Germany, Italy, and with European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen after his Putin call, he added. Monday's talks came after more than three years of Putin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which is killing some 1,500 soldiers a day on both sides, as well as dozens of Ukrainian civilians. Trump, in his election campaign last year, said he would end the war in one day after he was voted in, in his bid to win the Nobel peace prize. Trump spoke to Putin from Washington on Monday, while the Russian leader spoke from a children's music school in Sochi, in southern Russia, in a minor snub, indicating Putin couldn't be bothered to interrupt his daily schedule, for a conversation that EU leaders saw as key to the future of European security. The EU had been "waiting with anxiety" for the "essential" conversation, EU Council chairman António Costa said earlier on Monday. EU leaders and Ukrainian president Volodomyr Zelenskyy had also been pressing for a 30-day unconditional ceasefire to come out of the US-Russia call, instead of a "prelude" to a "memorandum". Trump had threatened he would impose sanctions on buyers of Russian oil, such as India and China, if Putin declined a ceasefire. But he, and his vice-president, JD Vance, had also said they might walk away from involvement in the conflict if there was no chance of peace, in what would amount to a gift for Putin, if that meant no more US military or intelligence support for Ukraine. And Trump had shown strong interest in resuming business ties with Russia and ending Western sanctions , in ideas that might have taken up part of the two-hour long talks on Monday. Trump even noted in his Truth Social post after Monday's call that there was "unlimited potential" in US-Russia trade "once this [the Ukraine war] is over". Root causes But as Costa, von der Leyen, and other EU leaders pondered the meaning of Monday's events, they might also have in mind the words of the US ambassador to Kyiv, Bridget Brink, who resigned last month in protest at US policy. Putin's mention of "root causes" on Monday highlighted that his idea of peace meant: Ukraine should cede territory to Russia, disband its army, never join Nato, not host Western peacekeepers, and that Nato forces should retreat to pre-1990s enlargement lines. Brink, the ex-US ambassador told US broadcaster CBS on Sunday: "I resigned from Ukraine and also from the foreign service, because the policy since the beginning of the [Trump] administration was to put pressure on the victim Ukraine, rather than on the aggressor, Russia". "I fully agree that the war needs to end, but I believe that peace at any price is not peace at all. It’s appeasement and, as we know from history, appeasement only leads to more war," she said. And as if to prove her right, Putin intensified drone strikes on Ukraine in the run-up to Monday, as well as beefing up military bases on the border with Finland. Russia also detained an oil tanker, the Green Admire, sailing out of Estonia on Sunday, in a minor act of aggression against Nato. And Putin's forces continue to make advances on the battlefields of eastern Ukraine, suggesting he doesn't want an off-ramp to the war, despite any Vatican or Istanbul talks with Kyiv. "Putin isn't interested in a collapse of the talks. He's trying to manoeuvre so that these negotiations continue alongside the military offensive", said Russian political consultant Sergei Markov, speaking to Bloomberg on Monday. There is also little prospect of Putin meeting with Ukrainian president Volodmyr Zelenskyy face-to-face to advance peace, an EU diplomat told EUobserver. 'Ukrainian khohol' "Putin's propaganda has depicted him [Zelenskyy] as a Nazi and a 'Ukrainian khohol', so I can't imagine Putin 'stooping down' to ever talk to him," the diplomat said. 'Khohol' is an anti-Ukrainian ethnic slur. Meanwhile, even if Russia and Ukraine were to stop shooting and sign a memo, the rhetoric and military build up in Russia augur badly for long-term peace in Europe. "The increase of military force in our nearby areas will [really] happen after the fighting in Ukraine quiets down," Janne Kuusela, the defence policy director at the Finnish ministry of defence, told the New York Times on Monday. The EU diplomat told this website: "If there is a ceasefire in Ukraine, we should expect Russia's hybrid warfare in Europe to escalate, because Putin will be able to divert his resources from Ukraine". 'Hybrid warfare' refers to propaganda, sabotage, and targeted assassinations designed to fall below Nato's threshold for triggering its treaty's Article V mutual defence clause.
|
Andrew Rettman is EUobserver's foreign editor, writing about foreign and security issues since 2005. He is Polish, but grew up in the UK, and lives in Brussels. He has also written for The Guardian, The Times of London, and Intelligence Online.
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The Vatican might host future Russia-Ukraine talks on a peace "memorandum", but Putin refused any immediate ceasefire in a phone call with Trump on Monday.
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[
"EU & the World",
"Ukraine"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2025-05-19T18:29:19.528Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar616b9682
|
Europol's deepening aversion to transparency
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Buried deep in Europol’s most recent programming document lies a somewhat abstruse yet extraordinary admission of the agency’s aversion to external scrutiny. “The agency is exposed to the risk of not accomplishing its mandate…resulting from new legislative and policy initiatives, as well as not meeting the demand from [member states]”, reads the over 200-page-long document setting out Europol’s priorities for the next three years. Among the main reasons listed is the “increase in the complexity and volume of demands from supervisory stakeholders,” which “reduces implementation pace and binds significant resources”. The reference is to the annual “audit activities” by external oversight bodies like the European Court of Auditors and the EU’s chief privacy watchdog, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS). Another obstacle, writes The Hague-based agency, is the “increasing volume” of access to information and data subject requests from EU citizens, which “consume significant resources”. External scrutiny, Europol seems to be implying, is simply too burdensome, obstructing its ability to get on with the task of combating cross-border crime. For the past four years, we have worked together to shed light on the role of an agency that sits at the core of the EU’s emerging surveillance apparatus . Terabytes of sensitive personal data We have reported on the EDPS’ repeated warnings that Europol’s harvesting of terabytes of information, including sensitive personal data of EU citizens and third-country nationals with no evident links to criminal activities, poses serious risks for fundamental rights and privacy. Through our investigation into the proposed, and deeply controversial, regulation to fight children sexual abuse (CSAM) online, we revealed how Europol was seeking “unlimited” access to personal data . Much of our work in probing the internal workings of an opaque EU agency like Europol relies on the EU’s access to documents procedure that allows citizens to request precious information and undisclosed files. But, in our experience, Europol routinely obstructs access to key documents through procedural delays, heavy redactions, or blanket rejections on ‘public security’ grounds. In February, after the outgoing European Ombudsman, Emily O’Reilly, urged Europol to release a draft data protection impact assessment for an envisaged AI-powered classifier of children sexual abuse material, Europol simply disregarded the recommendation. This is just one of seven complaints we have filed with the ombudsman due to Europol’s disregard for its transparency obligations. Those range from email exchanges with the US-based foundation Thorn concerning CSAM to advice issued by its own, quasi-autonomous, Fundamental Rights Officer regarding Europol’s nascent artificial intelligence (AI) tools. Six of these complaints are still pending. We have also encountered more brazen attempts by Europol to pre-empt scrutiny. In September 2024, one of our team members was barred from the annual Europol Data Expert Network (EDEN) conference . In December, we filed a series of questions to Europol’s press office regarding the agency’s rapidly expanding AI programme. A month later, we learned that “after careful consideration”, Europol decided not to respond. The level of detail, Europol said, exceeded “the scope of a media enquiry” and did not meet “the broader needs of our European and global media audience”. It escapes us how Europol defines its audiences’ needs. But determining who has the right to ask questions seems to be part of how the agency conceives of its “media relations” — a relationship where detailed questions are met with an invitation to change jobs. “We kindly ask you to consider whether this approach aligns more closely with advocacy than journalism,” ends Europol’s reply. Europol’s career advice aside, there may be another reason why the agency is not keen on close scrutiny. This became apparent in the case of Europol’s screenings for conflicts of interest when its former employees take jobs in the private sector. During a rare EU Parliament hearing in 2023, provoked by our investigatio n, Jean-Philippe Lecouffe, the agency’s deputy director, dismissed our reporting as mere “assumptions”, telling MEPs you cannot ask staff “to open a pizzeria after leaving Europol”. Europol’s conduct, he argued, was solid and realistic. Yet, the European Ombudsman’s inquiry, concluded in February, uncovered serious flaws in the screenings and an admission from Europol that it needs to revise its existing processes. Surveillance and secrecy We do not question the idea that some information held by Europol may be too sensitive for public disclosure. But we are alarmed by Europol arrogating to itself the right to develop surveillance tools, which are likely to dramatically transform the landscape of policing across the EU, in almost complete secrecy. Indeed, it is not only journalists who struggle to access essential information about Europol’s activities. Even members of the Europol Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group — an oversight body that brings together MEPs and national parliamentarians — have complained to us about being kept in the dark. Yet, despite this opacity, political support for Europol is growing in Brussels and EU capitals. "We are going to make Europol a truly operational police agency," European Commission executive vice president Henna Virkkunen said in April , when unveiling latest plans to revamp Europol — with more funds, more personnel, more powers to collect personal data, and closer collaboration with national police and other EU agencies like Frontex and Eurojust. Under the guise of combating smuggling, a 2023 proposal to expand Europol’s operational foothold in the migration domain is being pushed through Brussels’ corridors, with a key vote taking place at the European Parliament’s civil liberties committee this week. Meanwhile, Europol’s director, Catherine de Bolle, has been spearheading contentious efforts for law enforcement agencies to gain access to encrypted communication. In democracies, more powers granted to law enforcement bodies, whose day-to-day activities impinge upon the rights and freedoms of ordinary citizens, should be matched by more transparency and oversight. Our recent experience suggests the very opposite, however. As its mandate extends, Europol’s aversion to transparency and its evasion of uncomfortable questions should be of concern to all. Luděk Stavinoha is associate professor at the University of East Anglia researching EU migration management and transparency. Apostolis Fotiadis is a journalist focusing on EU policies regarding data protection and migration, and Giacomo Zandonini is a journalist covering migration, surveillance, and EU border policies. Luděk Stavinoha is associate professor at the University of East Anglia researching EU migration management and transparency. Apostolis Fotiadis is a journalist focusing on EU policies regarding data protection and migration, and
|
Giacomo Zandonini
|
We are alarmed by Europol arrogating to itself the right to develop surveillance tools, which are likely to dramatically transform the landscape of policing across the EU, in almost complete secrecy. Yet, despite this opacity, political support for Europol is growing in Brussels and EU capitals.
|
[
"Migration",
"Rule of Law",
"Opinion"
] |
migration
|
2025-05-19T09:41:19.821Z
|
https://euobserver.com/migration/ara76e008c
|
Right of Reply: Volga shipping responds to EU sanctions report
|
In the article " EU names Emirati and Chinese firms in new Russia sanctions ," published by EUobserver on 7 May 2025, the following is mentioned: "The shipping firm, Volga Shipping ... [is] allegedly running shadow oil tankers to evade a Western oil embargo". Volga Shipping wishes to correct this, as the information is not true. Please be informed that the fleet of Volga Shipping does not contain oil tankers and the company is not engaged in transportation of any liquid cargoes, including oil, oil products, or liquid natural gas (LNG). In fact, Volga Shipping operates exclusively small dry bulk vessels (with deadweight from 3,000 to 7,000 tonnes), suitable for the shallow ports of the Azov Sea and internal river waterways in Russia. The company does not own, operate, or manage any oil tankers, since all Volga Shipping's tanker vessels were sold in 2023, and you can find more detailed information on our official website. Volga Shipping also doesn't provide any kind of services to oil tanker operators or oil/LNG gas exporters. Furthermore, all our shipments are performed in strict compliance with national and international legislation. And all our vessels operate with activated AIS (Automatic Identification System). Our company's primary cargoes are: grain (46 percent), coal (13 percent), and construction materials, such as crushed stone and gravel (24 percent). River shipments inside Russia represent 70 percent of the total shipments of Volga Shipping. A major part of our export shipments (97 percent in 2024) is performed from the Azov Sea to Turkey. We represent a very small share of the total sea shipping fleet of Russia by deadweight – less than one percent.
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Pavel Vinogradov is general manager of Volga Shipping
|
Russia firm Volga Shipping does not transport Russian oil, its general manager has said, despite EU allegations of sanctionable behaviour.
|
[
"EU & the World",
"Ukraine"
] |
*
|
2025-05-19T08:43:31.265Z
|
https://euobserver.com/*/ar05849ab0
|
Romanians elect pro-EU Bucharest mayor Nicușor Dan as new president
|
Nicușor Dan, the pro-European mayor of Bucharest, has been elected president of Romania following a dramatic and closely-watched electoral campaign. After finishing second in the first round of voting on 4 May with 20.99 percent of the vote, Dan made a remarkable comeback in the runoff on Sunday (18 May), securing 53.6 percent of the vote to defeat far-right nationalist George Simion. Simion was threatening Romania’s future in the EU and Nato, challenging current relations with the West and saying Romania under him would cut off help to Ukraine. Right after the partial results of the elections were announced, large crowds of supporters gathered in front of the Bucharest City Hall, chanting “Unity”. "What you did as a society was extraordinary. Romania begins a new stage as of tomorrow and will need each of you. We need to build Romania together, irrespective of who you voted for," Dan told them. Dan, 55, is a mathematician and the mayor of the capital of Bucharest since 2000. Although he ran as an independent, he was supported by the centrist political party Uniunea Salvați România (USR), affiliated with Renew Europe group in the European Parliament. He is committed to keeping Romania in the EU and Nato and he has expressed strong support for Ukraine. Domestically, Dan's positions reflect a blend of traditional and progressive values. He is also in favour of the traditional family, but he has taken a pro-choice stand on reproductive rights. On Sunday night, Dan received the swift congratulations of EU commission president Ursula von der Leyen and of his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron, among others. Macron stressed that "despite numerous attempts at manipulation, Romanians tonight chose democracy, the rule of law and the European Union" and promised that France would stand by Romania's side. Socialists call for unity In the past two weeks, as far-right attacks intensified across Europe, Nicușor Dan received broad support from nearly all pro-European political groups in Brussels. However, in Romania, the Social Democratic Party (PSD) withheld its endorsement after its own candidate, Crin Antonescu, failed to advance beyond the first round of the presidential election. This is largely due to Dan representing a considerable departure from the way the country has been run so far, one dominated for decades by PSD. The former prime minister Marcel Ciolacu, of the PSD, who resigned after the first round of the presidential election, only expressed support for Dan after the final outcome was confirmed. In a Facebook post, he also encouraged Dan to “unite the nation” — a sign widely interpreted as a signal that PSD expects Dan to now appoint a social-democrat prime minister. With PSD holding around 26 percent of seats in the chamber of deputies and 27 percent in the senate, the party remains a major force in parliament. As a result, despite Dan’s presidential victory, Romania may soon find itself still governed by the same party which has been in power, on and off, for the past 35 years, and which has been criticised for undermining the country's rule of law. Simion, 38, Dan’s rival in the presidential race, is a former football merchandise entrepreneur turned far-right politician. He topped the first round of voting on 4 May but ultimately lost the runoff by a margin of more than five percentage points. He had hoped until the last moment that he could win with the help of the diaspora (around six million Romanians living abroad) and with strong support in the big cities. On Sunday night, he conceded defeat in a message on Facebook. During the last week of the campaign, Simion travelled around Europe to meet supportive diaspora Romanians, including a stop in Paris. There, he gave an interview to CNews and said that Emmanuel Macron has interfered in the Romanian elections and that France is a dictatorship. While most Romanians were outraged by this performance in the French media, his supporters praised him. Tight election The presidential race became very tight during the last three days and the overall situation in Romania is concerning. The president-elect of the country is aware a recession is likely, due to the political instability caused by the extensive electoral campaign. The politically hostile climate has been unnerving the economy since last November, when the presidential elections first took place. Due to foreign interference and fraud, the first round of elections won by the pro-Russian “TikTok candidate” Călin Georgescu was annulled. Furthermore, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development last week (13 May) revised its estimates for the Romanian economy in 2025 downward, to 1.6 percent. The bank expects Romania’s GDP to grow 0.2 percent less than the 1.8 percent estimate made in February, and to increase by 2.4 percent in 2026. Meanwhile, more and more Romanians are leaving the country in search of a better future, mostly in western Europe. Young people complain about not having access to the job market, doctors quit because of a lack of investment in the health sector, while teachers deplore the very low salaries. In general, 18 years after joining the EU, Romanians still complain about access to health services, jobs, housing, and education, with large disparities between urban and rural development. Mihaela Gherghisan Naum is a Romanian journalist accredited to the European institutions since 1995.
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Mihaela Gherghisan Naum
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Nicușor Dan, the pro-European mayor of Bucharest, has been elected president of Romania following a dramatic and closely-watched electoral campaign.
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[
"EU Political",
"EU Elections"
] |
eu-political
|
2025-05-19T08:20:47.138Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-political/arfc921f7e
|
Yuliia Paievska — 'We don't fight against the wounded'
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Moscow’s war on Ukraine has been marked by the surprising brutality of Russian forces and resilience of Ukrainian fighters, but one of its heroes is a woman who has been saving lives on both sides for over 10 years. Yuliia Paievska is a 56-year-old Ukrainian martial arts coach and paramedic who is also known by her nom-de-guerre, ‘Taira’ (a nickname she first used in the online game World of Warcraft). Her activism began in the winter of 2013, when she worked as a volunteer helping protesters who were being attacked by police in Kyiv's pro-democracy protests, and she has not stopped since. “I have now joined the ‘Khartia’ brigade of the National Guard as an officer responsible for moral and psychological support,” she tells EUobserver. “My task is to maintain morale and fighting spirit. I also take care of the wounded.” When Russia first invaded Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014, Paievska moved to the frontline to train over 100 other medical volunteers in a group which became known as ‘Taira's Angels’ and which helped not just Ukrainian civilians and soldiers, but also wounded Ukrainian separatist fighters and Russian soldiers. She briefly joined the Ukrainian army between 2018 and 2020, when she commanded a mobile military hospital in Mariupol, before returning to volunteer in the city. And she was there during the Siege of Mariupol in February and March 2022 after Russia's full-scale invasion, where she recorded her work on a body cam, and where she was captured on 16 March by Russian soldiers while trying to help a bus-load of women and children to flee to safety. Paievska is not popularly known in the West, but she has long been a big personality to those with an interest in the war. She was in Ukraine’s team in the Invictus Games for wounded veterans (she has two hip replacements due to a battlefield injury) and wore the body cam in Mariupol because the Invictus patron, Britain’s prince Harry, was producing a Netflix documentary about inspirational people. But it was the popularity of Taira’s Angels and Paievska’s signature look — short blond hair and arms full of tattoos — which saw the Russian soldiers recognise her on the Mariupol bus and drag her off to captivity. When she was released in a prisoner swap in June 2022, her freedom was announced by Ukrainian president Volodomyr Zelensky to boost national morale. She also received the International Women of Courage Award from the then US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, in the White House in 2023, who noted that Kremlin propaganda had “maligned her … as a fascist and war criminal”. And, right on cue, the Russian ambassador to the US at the time called her a “terrorist thug”. The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine shocked EU governments and the general public and turned into a conflict on a scale not seen in Europe since World War II. By March 2023, for instance, the two sides were firing over 50,000 artillery shells a day at each other in eastern Ukraine, reminding war historians of the second battle of El Alamein in Egypt in 1942. But what caused equal surprise was the level of Russian cruelty toward Ukrainian civilians, despite the two countries’ close cultural ties. It became abundantly clear after the massacre in the Ukrainian town of Bucha in April 2022. But Paievska’s body cam footage , which was smuggled out of Mariupol by AP reporters on a memory card prior to her capture, became one of the war’s first documents of Russian atrocities against women and children. And Paievska’s own treatment in captivity testified to more of the same. She was held for three months in a freezing cold, three-by-six-metre cell with 21 other women, never let outside, never able to change clothes, and allowed just once to have a shower. She was also repeatedly interrogated, beaten, forced to sing the Russian anthem, and told lies that Kyiv had fallen to Russia. “A person who has never been through something like this cannot even begin to imagine what prisoners go through. Not even remotely,” she said. But if her Mariupol body cam had recorded Russian brutality, it also created a document of Ukrainians’ enduring humanity. In one clip, Paievska, the battle-hardened frontline medic, is seen nursing an infant boy, who died in her arms, prompting her to burst out crying against a wall, before turning back to him and saying “I hate this”, as she closed his eyes. But in another clip, Paievska was seen asking staff to wrap a cold and wounded Russian soldier in a blanket, while telling him: “We treat everyone equally”. “During the battles for Mariupol and earlier, I provided medical assistance to wounded Russian soldiers. The medical aid was given in full accordance with current protocols, as required by the rules of war,” she tells EUobserver. “We do not fight against the wounded.” “It never even crossed my mind to take any action that could harm them, either morally or physically. I am a medic, and I acted as a medic,” Paiveska said. “Of course, the occupiers did not evoke any sympathy, but there was no aggression either.” And yet, as the war drags on into its 11th year, Paiveska’s medical vocation toward wounded fighters has become mixed with harsher feelings toward wider Russian society. “There can be no trust in the future [between Ukrainians and Russians], first of all because of the widespread support by ordinary Russians for unprovoked aggression and mass crimes against humanity,” she says. “They will never be trusted.” And in line with her new task to give Ukrainians “moral and psychological” strength, Paievska also voiced love for doctors on the frontlines of other wars around the world, such as Gaza and Sudan. “I fully support with all my heart the humanitarian mission of medics, wherever they are,” she said. “The Lord sees everything, and He will remember it all,” Paievska tells EUobserver. And do let us know if you're interested in a physical copy of the magazine here .
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Andrew Rettman is EUobserver's foreign editor, writing about foreign and security issues since 2005. He is Polish, but grew up in the UK, and lives in Brussels. He has also written for The Guardian, The Times of London, and Intelligence Online.
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A Ukrainian nurse and martial arts expert, who has treated both the fallen of her own country — and that of its enemy.
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[
"The EU's Unsung Heroes"
] |
the-eus-unsung-heroes
|
2025-05-19T05:35:00.000Z
|
https://euobserver.com/the-eus-unsung-heroes/are0e23580
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UK-EU summit, Russian sanctions and reforming carbon levy in focus This WEEK
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European leaders and UK prime minister Keir Starmer will meet in London on Monday (19 May) for the first formal EU-UK summit since Brexit, hoping to sign off on a new defence agreement and to improve post-Brexit trade ties. Starmer came to power in mid-2024, promising to "reset" relations between London and Brussels, and talks have been frequent since then. While defence and support for Ukraine remain central topics, negotiations have also focused on a veterinary agreement, fishing quotas, and youth mobility schemes. In the run-up last week to the summit, EU member states pushed back against UK positions on a fishing and a youth mobility deal, with diplomats pointing to frustrations over what they describe as a UK strategy of divide-and-rule, attempting to exploit divisions within the EU to gain leverage. The path is far from easy, as political and economic uncertainties continue to weigh heavily on both sides. The success of Nigel Farage’s rightwing Reform UK — the rebranded successor to the Brexit Party — in UK local elections earlier in May is likely to dampen Starmer's pro-EU tone. Meanwhile, in the EU, the experience of Brexit has left many leaders wary. And there is a deep reluctance to offer the UK any special treatment. While the €800bn ‘ReArm’ programme launched by the EU Commission in March offers the possibility of UK firms having access to some joint procurement, UK officials are pushing to formalise and expand this through a new security pact — similar to the one the EU signed with Norway in May 2024. A security and defence partnership between the EU and the UK could serve mutual interests, bolstering defence collaboration and providing economic stability amid global uncertainties. On Tuesday (20 May), EU foreign affairs ministers are expected to officially adopt the 17th round of sanctions against Russia during a meeting in Brussels. Talks will also cover EU military support to Ukraine, with discussions held via videoconference with Ukraine’s defence minister Rustem Umerov, and Nato chief Mark Rutte, who will join in person. This will be followed by a videoconference with Ukriane’s foreign affairs minister Andrii Sybiha. Gaza EU ministers will also discuss the situation in the Middle East, and specifically Gaza. Talks come after the Netherlands became the latest member state to call for a revision of the EU's trade agreement with Israel, worth €46.8bn annually, due to concerns over human rights violations. The European Parliament will also hold a debate in Brussels on the EU’s response to the crimes being committed in Gaza on Wednesday (21 May). Meanwhile, there are modest expectations of a foreign ministers meeting between the EU and African Union in Brussels on Wednesday. Diplomats have said that they are not expecting any major announcements but that the meeting will prepare the ground for an EU-AU summit later this year. Simplifying carbon levy Also on Wednesday, the European Commission's proposal to simplify the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) will be discussed by MEPs during a mini-plenary session in Brussels, with a vote scheduled for Thursday (22 May). The proposed changes aim to reduce administrative burdens by exempting small importers (those importing less than 50 tonnes of CBAM-covered goods annually) from compliance obligations. This adjustment reportedly still maintains coverage of over 99 percent of emissions from imports of iron, steel, aluminium, cement and fertilisers, while exempting approximately 90 percent of importers (who are small or medium enterprises). EU trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič will address MEPs in the internal market committee on Tuesday. He is likely to face questions on EU’s plans to counter US tariffs and the state of play of the customs reform. Still on Tuesday, MEPs in the development committee will address challenges linked to the Global Gateway, the future of international aid, and humanitarian funding. The state of media in the EU will be discussed in the new special committee European Democracy Shield. EU’s economic forecast The European Commission is expected to present its latest economic forecast on Monday. Later in the week, the EU-European Economic Area (EEA) Summit will take place on Wednesday, bringing foreign affairs ministers from Liechtenstein, Iceland, and Norway to Brussels. Talks will be mainly focused on economic security amid current global instability. On Thursday, ministers responsible for the internal market will meet in Brussels to discuss the EU’s Competitiveness Compass. During the meeting, the European Commission will present the 2025 single market strategy, which draws on the findings of Enrico Letta’s recent report . These discussions on competitiveness will be followed on Friday (23 May) by talks on the EU’s flagship research programme, Horizon Europe, as well as space policy.
|
Elena is EUobserver's editor-in-chief. She is from Spain and has studied journalism and new media in Spanish and Belgian universities. Previously she worked on European affairs at VoteWatch Europe and the Spanish news agency EFE.
|
This week, European and UK leaders meet in London to finalise a defence agreement and aim to improve post-Brexit trading ties, while EU foreign ministers are set to officially adopt the 17th sanctions package against Russia. Meanwhile, MEPs are expected to approve the simplification of the carbon levy.
|
[
"Agenda"
] |
agenda
|
2025-05-19T05:00:00.000Z
|
https://euobserver.com/agenda/arfb62b33d
|
Invisible wounds: a generation of Ukrainians may be lost to mental trauma
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The devastation of the war in Ukraine continues to dominate news cycles. Families are displaced, infrastructure is in ruins, and the lives of millions are upended. Yet, another crisis brews beneath these headlines, quieter but no less destructive. The psychological toll of the war threatens to leave the country’s next generation with wounds that could take decades to heal. As Ukraine’s partner, and a long-standing advocate of principled humanitarian aid, the European Union must ensure that mental health does not fall through the cracks, helping address immediate needs while laying the foundation for the country’s recovery. Since the war began, the EU has firmly stood by Ukraine. EU institutions and member states have provided military, financial and humanitarian assistance, and consistently expressed unwavering political and diplomatic support to the country. While much of the public discourse centres around the war’s geopolitical implications, though, a deepening humanitarian crisis continues to demand urgent action. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) estimates that 12.7 million persons will require aid in 2025, as needs remain overwhelming. The targeting of schools, hospitals and energy infrastructure has severely disrupted even the most routine aspects of life. Over 3.6 million Ukrainians are displaced, and nearly every day brings new reports of civilians killed or maimed. The 'silent casualty' of war Amidst this humanitarian catastrophe, a quieter emergency is unfolding: the war’s devastating toll on Ukrainians’ mental health. According to UN OCHA, “the prolonged war has exposed millions to trauma and psychological distress due to constant uncertainty, fear of attacks, grave protection risks and aggravated mental health among all age groups.” Young people themselves shared these concerns, especially highlighting the unseen barriers boys and men face in accessing Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS). In response, Plan International engaged with hundreds of boys and young men across Ukraine, Poland, Romania, and Moldova. Our conversations revealed a sobering reality. Many are battling with anxiety, depression and emotional numbness. The sense of isolation emerged as a recurring theme. Asking for help is seen as a weakness, with boys expected to “be tough” and cope on their own. As a 15-year-old boy said: “They are problems, I have to solve them by myself.” Unaddressed psychological needs, however, can be harrowing, resulting in a sense of hopelessness that is hard to come back from. While support exists, it is often inaccessible. Services can be scarce and expensive. Language barriers can prove hard to overcome for refugees and displaced persons. For many, the biggest obstacle is simply not knowing where to go. Still, there is hope. Organisations are offering safe spaces and counselling for people to process what they have been through. In cities like Kharkiv and Sumy, psychologists are using art therapy and play as tools for children to express painful feelings. Parents are getting help too, learning how to manage stress and create more nurturing environments for their children. As needs outweigh support, however, we need donors to step up. The upcoming European Humanitarian Forum (19-20 May), a space aspiring to diplomatic significance, is an opportune moment for the EU to reaffirm its commitment to assist Ukraine in healing its wounds. Three steps can move us in that direction. First, children and young people must be able to contribute to the solutions proposed by donors. Disproportionately affected by crises, children and youth have repeatedly demonstrated their skills and willingness to design answers to their problems. Decision-makers must create spaces for them to inform humanitarian responses, including boys and young men who are key allies in breaking the stigma that keeps many silent. Second, DG ECHO must prioritise MHPSS under both health and protection priorities. The distinction might seem subtle but is key for effective interventions. In a volatile war context, robust protection funding can establish reliable referral pathways, ensuring individuals receive treatment at various points of care. Schools, youth centres and local organisations could, then, offer safe spaces that complement national structures like hospitals — typically funded through the health priority. Third, if attention is our most valuable currency, funding is a close second. As global Official Development Assistance declines , the EU needs to secure sustained resources for MHPSS efforts, particularly in frontline areas and refugee-hosting countries. Funding must anticipate MHPSS that is gender and age responsive, allowing aid workers to deliver tailored support that acknowledges the unique lived experiences of those seeking help. Faced with immense needs and limited resources, humanitarians are often asked to make impossible choices. But even in such circumstances, mental health cannot be an afterthought. MHPSS is not a luxury. It is a lifeline to ensure Ukraine’s next generation is not lost to trauma. Sven Coppens is the director of east and central Europe for the Ukraine humanitarian crisis response at Plan International , the NGO working for children and girls' rights. Sven Coppens is the director of east and central Europe for the Ukraine humanitarian crisis response at
|
Plan International
|
The psychological toll of the war threatens to leave the country’s next generation with wounds that could take decades to heal.
|
[
"Ukraine",
"Opinion"
] |
ukraine
|
2025-05-16T09:51:00.919Z
|
https://euobserver.com/ukraine/ar327312a7
|
'Forever chemicals' are everywhere: so why isn’t the EU banning them all?
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One of the most lobbied files in Brussels right now is the proposed universal restriction on PFAS, per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances, better known as the ‘forever chemicals’. These persistent, harmful substances are in everything from your waterproof coat to your fridge, from your frying pan to your mobile phone, from your drinking water to your glass of wine . It's likely we all have PFAS in our blood and this could have serious implications for our health. Growing scientific research shows that exposure to PFAS may lead to negative health impacts, including by altering the immune system, increasing cancer risk, or affecting reproductive functions. A comprehensive ban is long overdue. The universal PFAS restriction proposal, covering almost all PFAS uses, is currently undergoing scientific analysis at the EU’s Chemicals Agency before it is passed to the EU Commission for final drafting, and then a vote by member states. Earlier this year journalists via the Forever Lobbying Project , alongside Corporate Europe Observatory , mapped the intense lobby battle underway on this file, revealing the extent of the lobbying and the disinformation put forward by the industry to defend these substances, the dire health and environmental effects of which have been known for years. EU environment commissioner Jessika Roswall has said that the commission will implement a ban on consumer uses of PFAS, “such as cosmetics, food contact materials, and outdoor clothing.” Commission vice-president Stéphane Séjourné has made a similar commitment . Implementing a ban focused only on consumer uses rather than the currently proposed universal restriction, which also covers professional and industrial uses of PFAS, would be a wholly inadequate response to the massive PFAS pollution crisis that we face. PFAS pollution is ubiquitous... Judging by Roswall’s comments, the commission seems minded to adopt a narrow interpretation of "consumer uses" – an interpretation which would be deeply problematic. After all, consumers also use mobile phones, paints, electric vehicles, air conditioning, and many other products which also contain PFAS. But however you define "consumer uses", we all end up most exposed to PFAS pollution via our diets . Widespread pollution is created by the production, use, and disposal of any and all PFAS which contaminate water sources, soils, and air. Quite frankly, it makes little difference if the PFAS in our blood originates from consumer or industrial uses. It’s vital that the commission recognises the ubiquity of PFAS and of PFAS exposure, and maintains the universal restriction to ban all uses, with exemptions only where the use is really essential and no safe alternative exists. … and so is the PFAS industry lobby The PFAS industry lobby shares at least one characteristic with its products: outrageous persistence. It has consistently opposed the universal PFAS restriction from the start and used a variety of tactics to try to weaken, delay, or derail the proposal. Worryingly Europe’s top decision-makers have increasingly adopted industry’s narrative and demands. Specifically some industry lobbies have been trying to shepherd the commission down the route of a limited, partial ban, as a tactic to head it away from a far more comprehensive, universal ban. It’s vital that the commission avoids handing such a major lobby victory to the PFAS industry. And it is not as if even a weak ban on consumer uses of PFAS would simply be waved through by the PFAS industry and implemented quickly. During the recent development of the French national ban on some consumer uses of PFAS, an “intensive lobbying campaign” was waged by Tefal’s parent company Groupe SEB which succeeded in excluding cookware from the ban. However weak a proposal on PFAS regulation the Commission comes up with, we can be assured that some industry lobbies will still lobby hard to try to derail it. As consumers we should be outraged that industry continues to put PFAS in frying pans, waterproof coats, and many other day-to-day items, when PFAS in these items are hardly essential and safer alternatives are readily available. A PFAS ban should be far more ambitious than just tackling these ‘low-hanging fruits’. Von der Leyen’s second term as commission president is dominated by the buzzwords of ‘competitiveness’ and ‘simplification’ , which imply that industry should be relieved of the so-called ‘burden’ of some social and environmental rules and requirements. Weakening the scope of the PFAS restriction to consumer uses would be a really short-sighted decision which ignores the public health, social, environmental, and economic consequences of allowing PFAS pollution from other sources to continue. We need to turn off the tap of PFAS whether produced for consumer, industrial, or professional uses, as soon as possible, and make sure that the polluter pays the huge bill of health damage and environmental clean-up which it has incurred, now and into the future. Vicky Cann is a researcher with Corporate Europe Observatory . Hélène Duguy is a lawyer at ClientEarth Vicky Cann is a researcher with Corporate Europe Observatory . Hélène Duguy
|
is a lawyer at
|
The EU Commission is talking up its ban on the consumer uses of forever chemicals. This might sound good in theory, but it would fail to effectively tackle PFAS pollution – and hand a major lobby win to the PFAS industry.
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[
"Green Economy",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] |
green-economy
|
2025-05-16T08:11:35.432Z
|
https://euobserver.com/green-economy/araaf3ce41
|
Esther Lynch — A shy but unwavering force for Europe’s workers
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Four minutes before the interview was due to start, a call from the comms department: Esther Lynch is hesitant to be featured in a magazine about unsung heroes, because she doesn’t see herself as a hero. Which is exactly why she’s featured in this magazine. Lynch never imagined herself in the spotlight. Her first encounter with organised labour came not in a boardroom but on a factory floor, where she noticed that part-time women workers were routinely overlooked. “They weren’t being listened to,” she recalls. “Particularly women workers who were part-time workers. They were given the worst shifts. They didn’t have a loud voice, even within the trade union.” So she became a voice. Today, Lynch leads the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), representing 45 million members across the EU. Her leadership reflects the same principle she has championed from the beginning: that workers must speak for themselves, and that solidarity is a force for real, lasting change. The story of her life, she says, "has been believing in change and believing that sticking with your workmates and standing with your workmates, is how you get that change." For Lynch, the job of a union isn’t to impose solutions from above. It’s to create space for workers to identify what’s wrong and fight for what’s right, together. While ETUC engages directly with European lawmakers, she resists the idea that rights come only from institutions. Instead, she sees a constant interplay between grassroots mobilisation and legislative pressure. “What we have tried to do,” she says, “is to legally strengthen the hands of workers so that they could join a union and when they then get to the bargaining table, to have a stronger bargaining power.” That dynamic is especially visible in recent wins. Lynch points to the Pay Transparency Directive and new protections for platform workers as tools that empower negotiations at the local level. “Trade union officials now have stronger arms to argue for the true value of work that’s predominantly done by women — carers, cleaners. That wasn’t possible before.” “Democracy isn’t only when you turn up and vote. It’s also in the role of social dialogue.” But victories don’t come without struggle. Despite legal progress, Lynch is still frustrated by "old-fashioned employers who say, 'I know best, I’m the boss, and it’s my way or the highway’." She sees this mindset mirrored at the highest levels of power. “There’s still this idea that if companies do well, workers will do well automatically. But that’s not universally true.” This is where Lynch says trade unions step in as a vital counterweight , sometimes as a partner, sometimes as a challenger, to EU institutions. Not as an interest group, but as democratic actors. “Democracy isn’t only when you turn up and vote,” she says. “It’s also in the role of social dialogue.” Lynch bristles at how technocratic language can strip urgency from real-life struggles. “The language of policymakers obscures real oppression. It’s a polite way of discussing something that’s immoral, that’s wrong, that’s exploitation. That’s cruelty.” She prefers to speak plainly, and always with the voices of working people in mind. “I’m sitting in that seat because all these working people put me in it. So I feel a responsibility to tell their reality.” Sometimes, that means going against the grain. “More than likely, I’m the only person in the room who will say these things,” she says. Lynch has successfully fought for police officers’ right to collective bargaining, pushed back against efforts to weaken minimum wage directives through the European Court of Justice, and secured early-access funds for workers facing redundancy. Even when it’s just pre-empting a potentially harmful policy, she counts it as a win. "Every time we manage to prevent something bad from happening, every time we secure an improvement — that matters." Her drive, however, is never self-serving. “The movement is the hero,” she insists. Yet behind her modesty lies a confident optimism, especially when she talks about young people. “They’re so much more full of confidence. I see young leaders coming forward in trade unions now, and I’m absolutely convinced that when they’re in leadership positions, the world of work will only improve.” In Lynch’s eyes, the trade union movement isn’t just about wages or hours. It’s about agency, dignity, and democracy. “Jobs are people’s lifeline,” she says. “It’s how your family succeeds. Everything is invested in a job. So we owe it to our children and grandchildren to come together, identify what’s wrong, and fight for what’s right.”
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Alejandro Tauber is Publisher of EUobserver. He is Ecuadorian, German, and American, but lives in Amsterdam. His background is in tech and science reporting, and was previously editor at VICE's Motherboard and publisher of TNW.
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Esther Lynch, general secretary of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), has spent a lifetime standing up for the rights of workers across Europe. Quietly forceful and deeply committed, she sees unions not only as a mechanism for negotiation, but as pillars of democracy itself.
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[
"The EU's Unsung Heroes"
] |
the-eus-unsung-heroes
|
2025-05-16T06:28:55.941Z
|
https://euobserver.com/the-eus-unsung-heroes/ar9b3b4d7e
|
Why doesn't the EU recognise the anniversary of the Nakba?
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Recognising the Nakba [the 1948 Palestinian 'catastrophe' of expulsion and displacement] should not be a controversial matter. The ethnic cleansing of Palestine by Zionist militias in 1948 is one of the most factually proven events in history. Failure to recognise the Nakba means an endorsement of the narrative that justified the atrocities committed against the Palestinian people. The matter is of utter importance: without recognising the Nakba, it would be impossible to tackle the root causes of the situation of Palestine, including the ongoing genocide in Gaza. From a policy perspective, Israeli goals have not changed since 1948, and are largely based on the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian people and the annexation of Palestinian land. The Nakba is an ongoing process, and failure to recognise it becomes a failure to recognise the Palestinian reality. The Nakba has been largely ignored for several reasons, including a western endorsement of the Israeli narrative for 1948. The celebrations of the creation of Israel continue to take place in several western capitals without even mentioning the need to bring justice to the Palestinian people. In 2023, the European Commission promoted a video by its president Ursula von der Leyen who largely endorsed the Israeli narrative of Israel “making the desert bloom”. At that moment, Palestinians accused the European representative of racism, something that largely angered European diplomacy. 'Clowns' and 'anti-semites' Those same diplomats, though, were not as angry when a few months later, the then-Israeli foreign minister Israel Katz (now defence minister) referred to Spanish prime minister Pedro Sánchez as a “clown” or to the former EU high representative for foreign affairs Josep Borrell as an “anti-semite.” The European Commission never apologised for employing a talking point largely used to whitewash the ethnic cleansing of Palestine. Failure to recognise the Nakba also helps in understanding the limits that Palestinian rights and the Palestinian experience have in the west. Put simply, “Never again” doesn’t apply in Palestine. There is no criminalisation for negating the Israeli crimes against the Palestinian people, rather, there have been attempts, through endorsing the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism, to criminalise pro-Palestinian activism. The calls for reviewing the EU–Israel Association Agreement are an important step forward, but they go alongside several EU countries ignoring the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrants on Benjamin Netanyahu, including France, Italy, Greece and Germany, among others. This has a direct effect on the ground, where Israeli politicians have been clear about their goals of occupation, annexation and ethnic cleansing (referred to as “voluntary immigration” after over two-thirds of Gaza have been destroyed by Israeli forces). At the core of the failure of the Middle East Peace Process has been the Israeli refusal to accept the implementation of international law and the UN Charter, two basic components of the rules-based international system, at the same time that Israel utterly objects to the principle of equality for the Palestinian people. Israeli legislation promotes that only Jews have the right to self-determination and bans the recognition of the Palestinian state. In other words, Israeli legislation opposes both equality under one democratic state, or the existence of two sovereign and independent states living side by side. Denying the Palestinian right to self-determination is at the heart of the Israeli policies vis-à-vis the Palestinian people. This is the continuation of the Nakba. There is an interesting movement within the European Union regarding Palestine. Demands to review the Israel–EU Association Agreement cannot continue to be ignored by EU foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas, just like there is talk about further European recognition of the Palestinian state by European countries to be announced next month, in the context of a French-Saudi-led international peace conference. Those are all basic requirements to make clear that the EU will only support a political outcome based on respecting human rights and honouring the Palestinian right to self-determination. Recognising the Nakba goes in the same direction: it is about establishing that ethnic cleansing is a crime rather than a “solution”, it's about bringing historical justice to the Palestinian people after 77 years of western powers negating or ignoring what our parents and grandparents went through, it is about committing to comprehensively restore the rights of the Palestinian people on its homeland. It is about making clear that “never again” is also about Palestine. Xavier Abu Eid is a former senior adviser to the Palestine Liberation Organization negotiations affairs department. Xavier Abu Eid is a former senior adviser to the
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Palestine Liberation Organization
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The 15 May marks the forced expulsion and displacement of 700,000 thousand Palestinians during the conflict that created the State of Israel in 1948. Not that you would know that from the EU.
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[
"EU & the World",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2025-05-15T12:22:25.373Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/arf0ed37ea
|
Hungary’s new anti-NGO law is a full-frontal assault on the EU Commission
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Europe has been facing illiberal, authoritarian challenges to pluralist democracy with growing intensity and frequency since the inauguration of the second Trump administration. Emboldened by both the retreat of US democratic leverage and the disturbingly familiar aspirations of the current US government , Europe’s illiberal actors are increasingly willing to deploy authoritarian tactics to maintain their grip on power — often amid mounting domestic opposition and eroding legitimacy. Following the introduction of Slovakia’s anti-CSO law on 16 April, a Hungarian MP from the ruling Fidesz party submitted a draft bill on 13 May that may soon become the fifth piece of anti-NGO legislation in Hungary since 2017. This time, however, the bill’s design surpasses all previous efforts in its open attack on basic democratic norms and fundamental rights in Hungary, as well as on the core principles of EU law and the authority and competences of the European Commission. If the draft law titled On Transparency in the Public Sphere enters into force, it will make it outright impossible for civil society organisations (CSOs) that are critical of the government or advocate for women’s and LGBTQI+ rights to receive any form of support from abroad — including dedicated EU funding under the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme. According to the draft legislation, the country’s Sovereignty Protection Office — a state authority established in December 2023 to intimidate civil society and independent media in Hungary — will be empowered to propose that the government place organisations it deems as allegedly threatening Hungary’s sovereignty on a special list. Once listed, these organisations will lose their tax-benefit status, including the right to receive one percent of Hungarian citizens’ income tax donations, and will be barred from receiving any form of financial support from foreign sources. If they do, they will be fined up to 25 times the original grant amount, which must be paid within 15 days of the relevant authority’s decision. With severely restricted rights to appeal in court and their bank accounts subject to monitoring and even suspension of transactions, the law effectively eliminates the ability of critical CSOs and independent media outlets to receive grants and donations from abroad. This further amplifies the already significant resource advantage held by government-controlled NGOs (GONGOs) and media outlets. Even Hungarian supporters of these organisations must attach a “private deed with full evidentiary force” to their donations, proving the domestic origin of the funds. Should the Sovereignty Protection Office accuse them of channelling foreign funding, they risk facing criminal charges for alleged forgery. The domestic political logic behind the law is more than evident. Any critical act that may cast doubt on the democratic or constitutional character of Hungary — or question the primacy of marriage, family, and a person’s biological sex at birth — is deemed a threat to the country’s sovereignty if allegedly supported by foreign funding aimed at influencing public opinion or voting behaviour. Suffocate any opposition The clear goal is to suffocate what remains of Hungary’s critical civil society and to intimidate independent media ahead of the highly contested 2026 elections — elections that, according to all available independent polling data, the incumbent Fidesz party would lose if held today. This is an explicitly authoritarian piece of legislation, surpassing even Russia’s foreign agent law in its lack of legal remedies, and it serves unambiguously anti-democratic purposes. However, the challenge posed by the law to the authority of EU law and institutions is equally serious. Labelling entire EU policy fields — such as anti-discrimination — and specific commission programmes — like CERV — as threats to a member state’s sovereignty goes far beyond the typical infringement on the free movement of capital, as seen with Hungary’s 2017 anti-CSO law. This new legislation directly challenges the primacy of EU law and the legitimacy of the European Commission’s policy agenda. Furthermore, introduced in close proximity to Slovakia’s anti-CSO law and set against a political backdrop in which both European radical-right groups and MEPs from the European People’s Party (EPP) are attacking EU funding provided by the commission to civil society organisations — including through the CERV program — the Hungarian government is attempting to exploit the commission’s divided attention and its potentially limited capacity to respond robustly amid this wave of coordinated political attacks. Despite these complicating factors, the EU Commission must recognise the unprecedented nature of this attack, not only on the last remaining bulwarks of pluralist liberal democracy in an increasingly authoritarian Hungary, but also on the EU legal order and the commission’s own institutional prerogatives. If the commission fails to respond with equal determination, the damage to the integrity of the EU legal order could be far-reaching. It must recognise the urgency of the situation and the fact that it cannot allow this law to enter into force and unleash its destructive impact. Instead of pursuing separate approaches to the Slovak and Hungarian anti-CSO laws, the commission must recognise their shared roots and characteristics — and respond with a unified approach: by immediately requesting interim measures from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to suspend their implementation following the initiation of the respective infringement procedures. Based on past infringement proceedings and ECJ case law concerning previous Hungarian legislation, there is no doubt that the draft law constitutes a fundamental violation of EU law, nor that the damage it would cause will be impossible to remedy if its implementation is not suspended. In an era of increasingly emboldened would-be EU autocrats, the commission must step up its game and respond with determination and vigour. Daniel Hegedüs is regional director for central Europe at the German Marshall Fund of the United States . Daniel Hegedüs is regional director for central Europe at the
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German Marshall Fund of the United States
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The clear goal is to suffocate what remains of Hungary’s critical civil society and to intimidate independent media ahead of the highly contested 2026 elections — elections that the incumbent Fidesz party would lose if held today, writes Daniel Hegedüs
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[
"Rule of Law",
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] |
rule-of-law
|
2025-05-15T10:05:21.706Z
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https://euobserver.com/rule-of-law/ar96012839
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Why the lack of transparency on European political parties public funding?
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If the European Union wants to act on the global stage as a democracy with moral standing, it cannot be an exception to rules on political transparency. This is in line with the principle of subsidiarity: affairs should be handled at the level at which they are best handled. However, this increased involvement and decision-making power devolved to European institutions and politicians, albeit alongside national executives, must go hand-in-hand with a greater democratic control by European citizens. Act in our name, but with our consent. Political parties are cornerstones of modern democracies. They allow us to carry political projects beyond individual politicians' personalities and egos. They ensure the durability of political ideas. The flip side of this coin is the political power amassed by parties, and repeated scandals have highlighted the need for strong ethics and transparency provisions written into law. In particular, the transparency of political finance is a core principle of, and often a major challenge for, democratic societies. Data — online, complete, contextual, accessible, timely Data on the funding of political activities must not merely be published online, but should also be complete, contextualised, available in a timely manner, directly accessible, and easy to scrutinise by civil society and the general public. These principles form the preconditions for accountability. And while transparency provisions may have gained ground at the national level, the same cannot be said of the European level, where transparency on European parties and their funding often falls short of expected standards. This impacts not only the public funding of European parties, but also the donations and contributions they receive, and is the result of a culture averse to transparency. Public funding from the EU's budget is a crucial element for European parties, and regularly accounts for 85-90 percent of parties’ funding — even more so when factoring in national public funding indirectly gathered from the contributions of national member parties. Four years ago Since 2004, over €600m was made available to European parties, and around €360m was actually disbursed between 2004 and 2021. And yet, as of April 2025, due to a convoluted funding mechanism, the most recent year for which European parties' final amount of public funding is known is 2021. Information on donations and contributions is provided with less delay, but with its own shortcomings. Donations by individuals under €3,000, which form the vast majority of donations, are not identified by name, and donations by individuals or companies under €12,000 may take up to two years before being made public. These limitations are compounded by an unwillingness to put transparency first. For instance, over the past seven years, the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations (APPF, the body regulating European parties) has consistently refused to publish official EU data on European party funding before its entry into force, which would greatly help citizens grasp the evolution of this funding over the past decades. It has also not sought to accompany its data with any graph, table or interactive tool to make its information more readable, and has regularly deleted past information, hiding it from public view. For its part, the European Parliament has sought to redact its funding decisions for up to eight years after the fact, and even argued that MEPs' party affiliation was personal data that should not be made public. It only relented on both counts following action by European Democracy Consulting. Even staying clear of more political and wide-ranging proposals, a lot can be achieved via concrete, technical proposals . Among the most important elements is the development of an online reporting and disclosure system to facilitate the reporting of information by European parties, and its review and publication by the APPF. Well-designed, in conjunction with all stakeholders, this tool would not only bolster transparency for European citizens, but also ease the burden on parties and institutions. A more symbolic, but nonetheless essential reform is to give the APPF a mandate of public information, so as to clearly make it part of its role to inform citizens on their common parties. To be clear, providing information and data will not suffice to create a European democracy or make citizens genuinely interested in European parties. This requires a broader reform of our Union and electoral law . However, transparency is a clear precondition for public trust and for the functioning of democratic institutions, and, if it wants to act on the global stage as a democracy with moral standing, the EU can be no exception to this rule. Louis Drounau is the founder of European Democracy Consulting , an Austrian non-profit, and of the European Democracy Consulting Stiftung (EDCS), a non-profit foundation dedicated to advancing the study of European institutions and democracy. EDCS operates the European Party Funding Observatory . Louis Drounau is the founder of European Democracy Consulting , an Austrian non-profit, and of the European Democracy Consulting Stiftung (EDCS), a non-profit foundation dedicated to advancing the study of European institutions and democracy. EDCS operates the
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European Party Funding Observatory
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Transparency on European parties and their funding often falls short. As of April 2025 (due to a convoluted funding mechanism), the most recent year for which European parties' final amount of public funding is known is 2021, warns the European Democracy Consulting Stiftung.
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[
"Rule of Law",
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] |
rule-of-law
|
2025-05-14T09:18:06.182Z
|
https://euobserver.com/rule-of-law/ar0149ddf9
|
The EU Commission’s drift towards authoritarianism
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The second Ursula von der Leyen EU Commission lists ”protecting our democracy, upholding our values ” among its key priorities. These are commendable words but, as always, actions speak louder. Judging by its actions, the commission’s commitment to democracy seems to stop at the vocabulary, and definitely does not extend to upholding basic principles of participatory democracy in its own institutional practices. As a researcher, following the von der Leyen presidency demonstrate its attitudes towards participatory democracy has been a journey from disbelief to frustration, and then to worry and anger. These emotions have been shared by members of civil society and journalists working with EU affairs . The commission’s general policy towards public access requests can be characterised as one of strategic delay. Legal time limits are ignored as a matter of policy, and the simplest request can take months or even years to respond. The European Ombudsman sees these systematic failures amounting to maladministration. The commission denies the existence of documents, even when this is obviously a big fat lie, and destroys documents to avoid disclosure obligations. It disregards the European Court of Justice’s established case law. The commission’s general policy towards public access requests can be characterised as one of strategic delay In its responses to access requests, the commission sees democratic debate as ‘external pressure’ , which it needs to be insulated from. The way to do that is by further limiting transparency. The whole point of the commission’s policy is to make timely and informed debate impossible. Finding effective ways to redress such failures has proven nigh on impossible. The commission pays no heed to the views of the European Ombudsman, an attitude demonstrated by its total non-engagement with her inquiries and recommendations. In recent years, the commission has spent a lot of time monitoring authoritarian governments and their playbooks. It seems to have learned a trick or two. When disclosure is so unlikely and slow as to frustrate even the most hard-core EU geek, we — the academia, the media, the public — will just stop asking. This, of course, is the whole point. The commission will then be free to manoeuvre as it sees fit, while feeding passive citizens with curated information from the commission’s PR department or the president’s cabinet. And every commission initiative will always be a success. In this vision, democracy is reduced to the right to visit a ballot box every five years — an act that has limited impact on Europe’s future direction. And the sorry absence of the EU as an integrated political community, with a strong and independent EU-level media and civil society, continues unabated. An informed EU public sphere cannot develop without the commission’s active cooperation, and the commission should do its utmost to promote the emergence of one. If it believes in truly integrated Europe, it should embrace the right of the public to call power-holders to account, even when this feels inconvenient and risks short-term embarrassment. Instead, von der Leyen’s second commission seems to continue where the first one left off. Read the small print In its first meeting on 4 December 2024, the new commission revised its Rules of Procedure . In an annex, the commission unilaterally sets numerous limitations on the application of the EU transparency law, with the obvious aim of excluding as many of its own documents as possible from the scope of public access rules. The new rules make it explicit that the commission has no intention of applying the court’s case law relating to proactive disclosure of legislative documents. Documents that should be automatically disclosed to facilitate timely debate of legislative options become accessible only through complex, time-consuming and, ultimately, likely unsuccessful access request. The new rules also formalise the practice of destroying documents and establish new categories of general presumptions of secrecy with nearly unlimited temporal scope. Instead of a presumption of openness, vast areas of commission action are presumed secret. The ‘Guardian of Treaties’ chooses to overlook that transparency is a normative choice made in the Treaty of Lisbon and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Exceptions to public access are to be laid down in law, not in internal rules of individual institutions at their own discretion. The commission’s new rules also constitute a breach of the EU’s international obligations under the Aarhus Convention. This has led to a request for internal review by the environmental NGO ClientEarth under the Aarhus Regulation , which may also lead to proceedings before the Court. Separately, I have, together with Emilio de Capitani and NGO AccessInfo Europe , challenged the new rules before the General Court. The democratic credentials of the European Commission have always been weak. The formal retort to this is that the EU is not a state, nor is the commission a government. It leads with expertise and promotes the European interest. Hence, there would be little point to broad democratic debate or citizen involvement. But as part of an ever-deeper Union, the commission keeps gathering powers that reach ever deeper into national policy making. Being a supranational executive is no excuse. It is a reason to do your utmost to remain transparent, to remain accountable to the people that you claim to serve. Päivi Leino-Sandberg is professor of transnational European law at the University of Helsinki.
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Päivi Leino-Sandberg
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As a researcher, following the Ursula von der Leyen presidency demonstrates its attitude towards participatory democracy has been a journey from disbelief to frustration, and then to worry and anger, warns professor Päivi Leino-Sandberg.
|
[
"Rule of Law",
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] |
rule-of-law
|
2025-05-13T08:27:28.176Z
|
https://euobserver.com/rule-of-law/ar038e6ec2
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The carbon footprint of EU's defence spurge
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We have faced two of the hottest years on record consecutively; the Mediterranean is warming a fifth faster than the rest of the world’s seas, and lives and livelihoods are at risk across the continent. Yet despite more intense climate risks than ever, Europe is investing in weapons with more zeal and aggression than it has ever approached the climate emergency. Figures released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute last week show that world military expenditure reached a record $2.7 trillion [€2.43 trillion] in 2024, driven most of all by a huge 17-percent increase in military spending by Europe (including Russia). This European arms race has only deepened in 2025. On 22 April, the Spanish prime minister announced a 50-percent boost of €10.5bn to annual military spending (€34bn) while saying the country remained “pacifist”. This follows the announcement by the European Commission in March that it will mobilise over € 800bn for European militaries over the next four years , breaking with fiscal spending rules but for military expenditure. UK prime minister Keir Starmer in February not only promised an additional £13.4bn [€15.9bn] more on the military from 2027, but unashamedly took the money from the most climate vulnerable in the world by slashing development assistance aid to pay for it. In Germany, the government has announced a “Zeitenwende” [turning point], changing its constitution to enable a €100bn fund for “comprehensive investment” into the German military. This was initiated by former chancellor Olaf Scholz, but his successor Friedrich Merz has promised to supercharge the spending. Europe’s climate ambition meanwhile is in retreat. Ursula von der Leyen who took the reins of the commission in 2019 on the platform of a Green New Deal, has replaced her environmental rhetoric of global collaboration to tackle a planetary crisis with dark warnings of military threats, tightened security and aggressive economic competition. The European Environment Agency reports that the EU is likely to miss more than two-thirds of its 2030 environmental targets . The commitments are being weakened further with the commission this year diluting emission standards for cars and currently considering loopholes for industry and agriculture that will undermine EU’s commitment to cut 90 percent of greenhouse gas pollution by 2040. How to respond? How should climate activists and those concerned with global heating respond to Europe’s embrace of a ‘security’ emergency that has completely displaced its commitment to tackle the far bigger climate emergency? So far, the response from climate groups has been rather muted, with few statements by climate organisations and little evident public resistance. Some perhaps feel that taking on this issue is not a priority or a front they want to open up given the already difficult battle against fossil fuel interests. Others may even see a potential ally in the military, which has included climate science in military planning and talked of climate change as a ‘threat multiplier.’ There is a real danger, however, that the rapid escalation of the global arms race could completely derail all efforts to tackle the climate crisis, absorbing all political attention, diverting resources from climate action and adding to the problem through increased military greenhouse gas emissions. A joint report by Transnational Institute, Tipping Point North South and Stop Wapenhandel [Stop the arms trade] estimated that if all Nato members meet the target of two-percent GDP spending, between 2021 and 2028 their total collective military carbon footprint would be 2 billion tCO2e, greater than the annual GHG emissions of Russia, a major petroleum-producing country. For European Nato members, the €1 trillion extra spending needed to achieve the two percent of GDP target for military expenditure is equivalent to the €1 trillion needed for the EU Green Deal. Even before the recent rush to war, Europe was spending more than three times as much on arms as Russia. A global arms race will only ratchet up spending everywhere, bolster authoritarian governments, and reward arms companies that thrive on instability and conflict. It is a deeply dangerous and counter-productive investment when the overriding urgency is to invest in preventing dangerous levels of global heating that threatens ever more extreme weather and disruption of complex global systems from food to trade to finance. Climate organisations and all those concerned with a liveable future on the planet know that true security and collective safety depend on cooperative and collaborative action and policies rooted in justice. This is the only way to tackle the root causes of the climate crisis, where the greed and pollution of a small rich few, together with Big Oil, have created a crisis that threatens the living conditions for the marginalised majority. That is why the resounding call of the climate movements has not just been for climate action but for climate justice. An ever more armed planet threatens to undermine all possibility of climate justice — building walls, jets and tanks in place of zero-carbon, resilient and just communities. The resources currently being thrown towards military spending could and should be used to end, not extend, the crisis. The $693bn spent by Europe on the military in 2024 could instead be invested in good-quality green jobs, a clean energy revolution that reduces energy bills and addresses the cost of living crisis, repairing damaged ecosystems, and protecting people and communities worldwide against the impacts of climate change. Deborah Burton is a co-founder of Tipping Point North South . Nick Buxton is knowledge hub coordinator at the Transnational Institute . Dr Stuart Parkinson is executive director of Scientists for Global Responsibility . Deborah Burton is a co-founder of Tipping Point North South . Nick Buxton is knowledge hub coordinator at the Transnational Institute . Dr Stuart Parkinson is executive director of
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Scientists for Global Responsibility
|
How should climate activists respond to Europe’s embrace of a ‘security’ emergency that has completely displaced its commitment to tackle the far bigger climate emergency? So far, the response from climate groups has been rather muted, with few statements by climate organisations and little evident public resistance.
|
[
"EU & the World",
"Green Economy",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2025-05-12T10:27:59.233Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/arec5a86ca
|
Murder inside a French mosque: not an outlier, the inevitable result of Islamophobia
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On 25 April, Aboubakar Cisse was executed in cold blood inside a mosque in southern France. In the days after, following political pressure, French MPs held a minute of silence for Aboubakar. However, this assassination continues to be portrayed as an isolated act of hatred and derangement. This is missing the point. To treat Cisse's killing as no more than the act of a disturbed individual is to ignore the political order and long historic shadow of racism that has criminalised and dehumanised racialised communities, and licensed violence in the name of the French Republic and across the West. But it also ignores a more recent shift toward a more permissive environment for open, unashamed racism — in traditional and social media, in politics, and from the state. On both 24 April and April 25, the very same day Cissé was assassinated, I and my employer, the European Network Against Racism (ENAR) were the target of a vitriolic campaign by two French newspapers, Le Figaro and Le Journal du Dimanche accusing me and ENAR of links to the Muslim Brotherhood, of being a security threat, and "obsessed with race." These are not just baseless accusations – they are dangerous. Familiar tactic This is also not the first time that ENAR employees and members are targeted and it demonstrates a familiar tactic of securitising racialised voices and defaming civil society organisations that do racial justice work under the guise of protecting 'Republican or European values.' On a personal level, these attacks are not just an attempt at character assassination, but also expose me to real-life risks — including harassment, threats, physical attacks, and political blacklisting — by portraying me as a security threat. As someone who has already experienced racial profiling and violence, these articles further compound my personal security by using Islamophobic and racialised tropes to delegitimise my activism and expose me to intensified scrutiny and harm. This project of criminalisation and dehumanisation is a familiar tactic of the far-right and part of a broader, deliberate shrinking of civic space. In both France and Europe, institutions have become increasingly intolerant of racialised voices that challenge the status quo. Civil society organisations working on racial justice, especially those confronting Islamophobia, are branded as extremist or dangerous, with conspiracy theories actively fuelled by political actors, the media, and institutions. Within this context, Cisse's assassination is not an outlier. It is the result of policies and discourses that have actively furthered the dangerous securitisation of racialised people and in this particular instance Muslim and Black communities. His assassination was made possible by a society that saw his life as disposable. He was killed in the same way that so many others have been killed before him — through policies, through discourse, through dehumanisation, and through racism. Cisse was not killed outside the state — he was killed within its ideological architecture. To frame this as the work of a lone extremist is to deny this reality. While France officially promotes a colourblind model, denying the significance of race as a social construct, it obscures the racism and racial hierarchisation that persist in the structure of French society. The invisibility of race in French public discourse and policies has allowed whiteness to remain the unexamined norm. Racialised minorities, particularly those of African, Maghrebi, and Muslim descent, face entrenched social, economic, and political exclusion even when born and raised in France. However, this goes beyond mere exclusion to the active weaponisation of political, economic, social, and institutional violence against these communities, resulting in violence, discriminatory laws, smear campaigns, and the erosion of civil liberties. The contradiction between France’s self-proclaimed colorblind ideals and the lived experiences of racialised populations is self-evident. 'Laïcité' instrumentalised Nowhere is this clearer than in the relentless instrumentalisation of [state secularism] What began as a principle to separate religion from the state has morphed into a tool of repression – selectively applied to regulate and punish Muslim visibility. From the 2004 ban on religious symbols in public schools to the 2021 “Anti-Separatism Law,” France has systematically framed Islam and Muslims as a threat to French identity and values. Veils, prayer, beards, mosques – all are cast as signs of deviance, extremism, or disloyalty to the Republic. These laws do not encourage unity; they institutionalise paranoia. But this is not simply about exclusion. It is about remaking Muslims – and those perceived to be Muslim or allies – into internal enemies, creating a climate where surveillance is normalised, racial profiling is routine, and violence is predictable. It is in this environment that someone could feel justified, even righteous, in walking into a place of worship and livestreaming the murder of a Muslim man. For Black Muslims in particular, this violence is layered. Their lives sit at the intersection of anti-Blackness and Islamophobia — two structural forces deeply rooted in France’s history of slavery, colonialism, and imperial rule. In this environment, Islamophobia has become politically expedient; racism, electorally profitable The erasure, suspicion, and criminalisation they face is compounded, and their lives are routinely dehumanised. This production of racialised violence in France is not new; what is new is the boldness with which it now asserts itself, fed by decades of institutional impunity and media and political complicity. These attacks on racialised bodies and civil society organisations are not limited to France. They are part of a broader authoritarian turn across much of the Global North, in which human rights activists are increasingly surveilled, smeared, and criminalised. Across the Atlantic, the Trump administration is systematically targeting human rights and aid institutions with funding cuts and political delegitimisation. Borders have hardened, police powers have expanded, and dissent has been criminalised through the arrests of pro-Palestinian activists, revoking of visas and deportation of international students, AI-driven surveillance to monitor dissent, and pressure on universities to silence campus protests. In this environment, Islamophobia has become politically expedient; racism, electorally profitable. What was once covert is now declared policy. To call this environment hostile would be an understatement. It is an ecosystem of racial violence – fostered by laws, propagated by politicians, legitimised by media, and reinforced by silence. To understand Cissé's death, we must be clear: he was not simply a victim of hate. He was the target of a long-standing political project that casts racialised people as permanent outsiders, whose faith, names, colour of their skin, origins, migration status, and neighbourhoods are coded as problems to be managed. His assassination was not a rupture – it was a continuation. To honour Cissé is to refuse the narratives of exception. It is to see his death as a mirror held up to France, Europe and the Global North, and to say loudly, this is white supremacy. Simply condemning Cissé's assassination is not enough. We must call on the French state to publicly acknowledge its responsibility in enabling an environment where anti-Blackness, Islamophobia, and racism flourish, and commit to dismantling systemic racism. At the same time, the European Commission and member states should integrate measures against islamophobia into EU and national anti-racism frameworks (including in the upcoming EU anti-racism strategy and the National Action Plans against Racism) to address its systemic and institutional dimensions that are leading to such hate crimes. Emmanuel Achiri joined the European Network Against Racism in 2023 as policy and advocacy advisor. His work centres on advocating for a racial justice approach to migration governance in Europe. He also holds a PhD in International politics and migration. Emmanuel Achiri joined the
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European Network Against Racism
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The killing of Aboubakar Cisse in cold blood inside a French mosque is not an outlier. It is the result of policies and discourses that have actively furthered the dangerous securitisation of racialised people and in this particular instance Muslim and Black communities, writes Emmanuel Achiri from the European Network Against Racism.
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[
"Migration",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] |
migration
|
2025-05-09T12:20:56.585Z
|
https://euobserver.com/migration/ar37136891
|
On Europe day, meet the inner workings of the EU
|
Happy Europe day! To celebrate the work of hundreds of institutions across the continent, the vision of the EU’s founders, the quiet everyday contributions of Europeans, and the quirks (and yes, the chaos) that make the Union what it is, we’ve pulled together a selection of our favourite stories exploring the inner workings (the mechanisms, mysteries, and deficiencies) of the EU. Whether you're curious about how trilogues really work, fascinated by Hungary’s veto powers, surprised about the quiet power of comitology, amazed by legislative drama and institutional never-ending infighting, or just here seeking to be an informed citizen, we've got you covered. Here’s to legislation, treaties, expert groups, too many acronyms, and 25 years of EUobserver’s archives shedding light on how the EU machinery works — enjoy the read! EU files: How to get them, how to leak them, and what's the point? Leaked EU papers are clickbait for Brussels media, but how do journalists get them and what are they good for? How Article 7 could actually defeat Orbán already The unanimity criteria should not discourage member states from seeking the deployment of Article 7 against Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán. If exercised wisely and strategically, peer pressure may bear fruit. Getting secret EU trilogue documents - a case study In 2018, EUobserver explained the details of a five-month odyssey to get access to the secret documents that led to the deal on organic farming. Rule 241: the EU’s hidden ‘bombshell’ against anti-democratic forces Legal scholars have dubbed it a "sleeping beauty" — a potent yet practically unused EU Parliament instrument akin to the EU's own Article 7, designed to safeguard the rule of law and the integrity of its institutions. How to talk about Europe without boring the pants off people In this oped, Gareth Harding argues that to connect EU politics with voters, speak clearly, show relevance, tell stories, avoid jargon, focus on impact, and never bore. What is 'SECRET UE' anyway? EU countries have a protocol for sharing official "secrets." But motives for classifying files are not always pure, and the number of really hush-hush papers in Brussels is tiny. When the EU found the political will to act on rule of law In 2012, it was against Orbán's Hungary that the EU first proposed to suspend cohesion funds under strengthened budgetary rules, after Budapest failed to step up efforts to end the country's excessive government deficit. Then Orbán toed the line. The 'proof' problem with EU sanctions — and how to fix it EU sanctions policies have one notable omission — they do not include corruption as an offence warranting restrictive measures. Decoding the language and hierarchy of condemnation Inside the EU’s diplomatic dictionary. The example of how the EU diluted criticism of Israel in a summit communiqué, after Israeli airstrikes killed hundreds of civilians in Gaza. Do trilogues make EU law-making more or less transparent? In 2017, journalist Nikolaj Nielsen dove into the shift towards secret law-making in the form of trilogues — behind-closed-doors negotiations between the European Parliament, the Council of the EU, and the European Commission. How EU party finance rules short-circuit accountability How the EU's response to weeding out corruption when it comes to financing European political parties is a lesson in how to short-circuit accountability. A European Commission 'terminologist' lifts the lid on EU jargon From 2006, a piece by Andrew Rettman looked into how poor translations of EU jargon can alienate ordinary people. Could a common law for businesses lead to genuine simplification? Anybody who has ever tried to read EU legislation knows it's frustratingly complicated. So, what constitutes genuine simplification?
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Why the EU keeps declaring war on bureaucracy
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From EU nerds to EU nerds, with love.
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[
"EU Political"
] |
eu-political
|
2025-05-09T09:45:03.333Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-political/arfad23491
|
EU trolls Putin's 'aberration' of WW2 parade
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EU flight bans and Ukrainian drones have made two of Russia’s VIP guests look silly on the eve of a monumental parade. The only EU leader going, Slovak prime minister Robert Fico, almost didn't make it after the Baltic countries closed their airspace to him on Thursday (8 May). Serbia’s president Aleksandar Vučić also had to land and wait in Baku for two hours due to the Baltic states’ restrictions and to Ukrainian drone strikes in Russia, which grounded 60,000 civilian air passengers on Thursday. It left Fico and Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov fulminating on the airwaves. “This is a deliberate attempt to thwart my visit to Moscow,” said Fico on Facebook. Lavrov said: “I abide by the rules of television and censorship so will not express what I [really] think about it ... of course, it's a disgrace”. But Estonian foreign minister Margus Tsahkna said “use of Estonian airspace to go to Moscow for the 9 May parade is out of the question,” calling it a “propaganda event”. The annual parade used to commemorate the Soviet Union’s defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945. But Russian president Vladimir Putin has turned it into a glorification of his war against Ukraine and the wider West, which is why most EU leaders have boycotted it since his first invasion of Ukraine in 2014. He is hosting 29 foreign leaders this year, including those from Brazil, China, Cuba, DR Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. “The celebrations are clearly slanted towards building Russia’s image in the Global South as a country actively fighting back against the influence of what the Russians call the ‘collective West’,” said John Lough, from the Chatham House think-tank in London. Putin has also called a unilateral three-day truce for his celebration, which includes a re-enactment of the storming of the Reichstag by Russian soldiers on a giant replica. Ukrainian president Volodomyr Zelenskyy declined the Russian truce as a gimmick, theoretically putting Putin’s VIP guests, including Chinese president Xi Jinping, at risk from more drone strikes on Moscow on Friday. But for Jamie Shea, a former senior Nato official, it would be a PR mistake for Kyiv to bomb Putin’s big day. “The Russians deserve their day of [WW2] commemoration as well, whatever we think of Putin and his regime. It would be a political mistake for Ukraine to try to disrupt it,” he said. The Soviet Union lost 27 million people in the war. And Kyiv had already made its point by grounding the 60,000 passengers on Thursday, Shea added. “Nicely embarrassing for Putin,” he said. An EU diplomat also said the Fico and Vučić flight snafus meant “Putin’s parade has already been compromised”. “The whole world was laughing at Fico,” the diplomat said. And Putin had twisted the meaning of the WW2 parade so much, he had made it into an “aberration … the whole Western world should be trolling him,” the EU source said. Meanwhile, for Chatham House’s Lough it was “surprising” that Russia's top EU ally, Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán, didn’t go. Shea, the ex-Nato official said: “He [Orbán] may be happy to let Fico take the political flak for once”. One EU diplomat called Fico’s trip a “pure provocation”, but another one voiced apathy over both Fico and Orbán’s Putin ties. “I don’t care much … he [Fico] can go where he wants to. Plus, it is not like he is hiding his pro-Russian stance [anyway],” the European diplomat said. A third diplomat said the EU couldn’t do anything against Fico or Orbán, but could make Vučić, whose country still aspired to join Europe, pay a price for siding with Moscow. “Can’t see how Serbia’s [EU] accession process progresses without a fundamental realignment,” the EU diplomat said Russia also managed to attract a handful of far-right and far-left MEPs to Moscow, in its campaign to project EU disunity. At the same time, top EU officials and more than 24 EU foreign ministers are planning to meet in Lviv, western Ukraine, also on 9 May, to unveil plans for a new international war crimes tribunal aimed at putting Putin behind bars one day. And all that left the 72-year-old Russian leader and his Global South guests to spend hours watching ageing Russian tanks roll by. “Things that look good on the parade ground are the big old Soviet era tanks and missile launchers. They make a lot of noise and are highly visual … but their relevance to modern warfare is not the same,” said Shea, who now teaches war studies at Exeter University in the UK. “Modern Russian military equipment will stay on the Ukrainian front line. So I don’t expect there will be much to capture the attention of the Western military attachés attending the parade,” he said.
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Andrew Rettman is EUobserver's foreign editor, writing about foreign and security issues since 2005. He is Polish, but grew up in the UK, and lives in Brussels. He has also written for The Guardian, The Times of London, and Intelligence Online.
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EU flight bans and Ukrainian drones have made two of Russia’s VIP guests look silly on the eve of a monumental parade.
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[
"EU & the World",
"Ukraine"
] |
eu-and-the-world
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2025-05-09T05:35:00.000Z
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https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/areaaf8639
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EU trade deal at risk without exemption from carbon tax, India warns
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Indian officials have warned that the EU’s carbon levy could be a deal-breaker in trade talks with the bloc, after securing the promise of compensation for the costs of carbon taxes in a similar trade pact with the UK. “We will retaliate for whatever non-tariff barriers come in,” India’s commerce and industry minister Piyush Goyal,” said at an event on Wednesday (7 May). At a separate event on Tuesday, meanwhile, Delhi’s finance minister Nirmala Sitharaman described the EU carbon levy as a “repeat of colonialism”. “This should no longer be the spirit with which international cooperation, international trade, can happen,” she said, adding that developing countries should be left to “green” themselves. India’s complaints about CBAM (the carbon border adjustment mechanism) are not new. Last year it threatened to take a case to the World Trade Organization over CBAM, after accusing the EU of breaching the WTO’s non-discrimination principle. New Delhi wants small companies to be exempted from CBAM as part of a trade deal with the EU. Last week, Goyal and EU trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič repeated their commitment to conclude talks on a trade pact by December. The EU Commission sees an India trade deal as being a key part of its plans to diversify its trade relations amid the threat of tariffs on EU goods by the US Trump administration. Though the commission insists that it has no plans to scale back CBAM, the UK’s trade agreement with India, which was announced earlier this week, includes the right to retaliate or seek compensation from the UK for its industry for losses incurred due to CBAM. Though the UK is outside the EU, it tabled draft legislation to create its own CBAM, based on the EU levy, on Wednesday. EU Commission officials say that the levy, which is part of the bloc’s green deal laws, will push other countries to jump in and transition towards more ambitious environmental regulation. The CBAM is expected to be fully in place as of 2026. They add that CBAM will create a level playing field for domestic EU firms, who are already required to comply with the bloc’s strict new rules on decarbonising industry. In March, the EU executive promised to review CBAM by the end of this year but has indicated that it would be “extending the scope of CBAM to certain steel and aluminium-based downstream products” rather than looking at exemptions. CBAM will apply to imports of a range of products, including iron and steel, aluminium, cement, electricity, hydrogen and fertilisers, which are linked to high carbon emissions. The tax will be imposed on all imports of these products to the EU if the carbon emission at the emission stage is higher than a prescribed threshold. It is expected to apply additional costs of between 20 and 35 percent. “It (the carbon tax) will actually lead to inflation, infrastructure becoming more expensive, automobiles becoming more expensive in Europe. It will also open up a plethora of opportunities for us. Not only in Europe but also in the rest of the world,” Goyal said.
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Benjamin Fox is a seasoned reporter and editor, previously working for fellow Brussels publication Euractiv. His reporting has also been published in the Guardian, the East African, Euractiv, Private Eye and Africa Confidential, among others. He heads up the AU-EU section at EUobserver, based in Nairobi, Kenya.
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Indian officials have warned that the EU’s carbon levy could be a deal-breaker in trade talks with the bloc, after securing the promise of compensation for the costs of carbon taxes in a similar trade pact with the UK.
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[
"EU & the World",
"Green Economy"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2025-05-08T15:46:05.898Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar59f2c61e
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O'Flaherty: state of human rights in Europe 'worst in my professional life'
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The current state of human rights in Europe is the worst ever witnessed by Michael O'Flaherty — the commissioner for human rights at the Strasbourg-based Council of Europe. "What's new, and which makes things all the more disturbing is the extent to which people in power are willing to distance themselves from human rights obligations," he said, in a 30-minute interview with EUobserver earlier this week. O'Flaherty discusses some of the most pressing issues under his radar, from attacks against civil society, the roll-back of asylum rights along the EU's external borders, and the plight for peace in Ukraine. Before taking up his role at the Council of Europe, O'Flaherty led the Vienna-based Fundamental Rights Agency. Today's World Press Freedom Day and so UNESCO organises this annual event, and for their own reasons, they brought me to Brussels this year. But I'm delighted to participate because I have a strong traditional media and journalism is something we have to fight to uphold. The idea of a few short years ago that we were going to migrate to citizen journalism has some merit, but never at the expense of or in substitution of classic professional journalism. So I have to stand up for that and the human rights of journalists, just like anybody else. Media freedom? No. My work in Greece has been migration and also the situation of the Roma communities, the latter because I'm doing a Europe-wide examination of the situation of our 12 million Roma with a view to somehow moving forward a bit in the efforts to do a better job of respecting their human rights. The central difference is that while I was at the Fundamental Rights Agency, I was running an EU agency with all that involves in terms of management, as well as representation in a context of very high demands from the European institutions for data on the basis of which decisions could be made. And so, in large part, not exclusively, but in large part, the Fundamental Rights Agency is a data-producing operation which invests heavily in things like EU-wide surveys. That's really very different to the job I do today. My current function as the commissioner is essentially a diplomatic function using the tools of diplomacy, which are essentially words to encourage and persuade and work with our 46 member states to do a better job of upholding human rights. There's another difference in that it's all human rights. It's not just that fairly narrow band of rights that the so-called fundamental rights that the EU is upholding. My mandate is a much broader one in terms of the material covered. Of course there is. The first thing is, diplomacy yields results only with persistence and only with impeccable analysis. If you're found wanting in your facts, or in the legal implications of those facts, you undermine yourself. So you have to go very, very carefully. You also have to send different messages to different communities. So one set of messages for governments, one set of messages for civil society and so on. You have to build up alliances. For me, a very important relationship is with the Human Rights Commission of Greece and the Ombudsman of Greece . These are my natural partners on the ground. And together, we can achieve things. So there's an interesting work being done in Greece around independent monitoring on the borders and I'm closely associated, I'm not doing it, but closely associated with that. And indeed, I'm calling for independent monitoring on, let's call them, on troublesome borders right across Europe. And we need to make progress there. It's called for in the migration pact as well, the EU migration pact. And of course, another dimension of the diplomatic tools is working, not just bilaterally with the government, but working multilaterally with the community of member states. So just last week, I actually presented my annual report to the Committee of Ministers, which is the governmental oversight body of the Council of Europe, and it was debated there. And so we debated issues like migration, as that you've brought up, but also Ukraine, which is a huge concern of mine at the moment. We have built up over decades a way of making peace, which carries with it a concern for human beings, and I don't see any of that acquis of knowledge and of expertise and of experience visibly being applied in the context of the great power negotiation that seems to be taking place right now. Where are the people? And by the way, when you see people, where are the women? You look at pictures from Riyadh, you won't see any woman, any women in these pictures. So, I've issued a, I guess it's just a category of things I produce called 'shout outs' and I've done one on putting humans back into the heart of the path to peace for Ukraine. And it has 10 elements, and it's, you know, nothing in there is rocket science. It's just bringing together, what we've learned over the years. You work on accountability, including criminal accountability. You very sensitively plan for the return of IDPs [internally displaced people] and refugees. You embed human rights in the reconstruction efforts. You come carefully and consequently out of a situation of martial law. You ensure women are involved in the process. You know this UN resolution 1325 , women, peace and security? So women have to be integrated. And you have all the right people at the table. So you have Ukraine at the table, obviously, but you also have those bits of civil society, and you have the relevant international actors, like the human rights specialists. So my task now is to challenge everybody with an interest in the future of Ukraine to work on ensuring that these 10 elements will be embedded in whatever, I don't even call it a peace process, but whatever the pathway is, or will be, towards peace in that country. Look, you have to ask them that, come on. I have no idea. I learn about steps towards peace for Ukraine from the media. I don't have any inside track. But there are many states that may not be playing a core central role in working towards peace right now, but which will inevitably be involved. There are important initiatives on reconstruction, for example, from Italy. There are very serious efforts to look at the future, facilitated by Switzerland. At some point, the Council of Europe, well, the Council of Europe is already very involved in one thread, the thread of reparations and of criminal accountability, above all, for the crime of aggression. The UN will be at some point invited to become more...well the UN was already engaged, it has a very good monitoring mission, human rights monitoring mission on the ground. It has conducted a commission of inquiry investigations. But I have to anticipate that it'll be at a certain point, it'll have the opportunity to become more engaged. Sorry, it's also doing a fantastic job of supporting internally displaced people. So I need to remind everybody, states like the ones I've mentioned, the international organisations, that there are these 10 elements, and we have to pay attention to each and every one of them if we're to have a peace that's sustainable and honours humans at its heart. I'm not, I'm not going to make some kind of moral judgment about the US administration. I'm taken aback by the transactional nature of what I'm reading. I'm disappointed by the absence of reference in public statements to human well-being and human dignity. And I think that the vast acquis of how to build a peace that we have accumulated over all those decades needs to be drawn from as Ukraine moves forward with Ukraine and its government and its people always at the heart and in the lead. The reception of these ideas has been good so far. I discussed exactly these points with the ambassadors of the member states just last week. It's not even a week ago. It was Wednesday of last week, and I, there were a lot of expressions of support for the ideas in this paper, and my efforts to try and bring a light to bear upon them Yes, yeah. I consider that one of the most worrying human rights situations on the European continent is the plight of its Roma population . For the Council of Europe, it's something like 12 million people, and across every imaginable indicator...they're seriously lagging behind the general population, and they're subject to shocking degrees of racism and exclusion. The challenges vary enormously for these communities, I should say Roma and Travellers, the Irish Travellers. They range from impunity for police violence against them, through shocking suicide rates among young people to to living in some places in Europe, in the worst slums I've ever seen. And I've worked in the poorest countries world, when I used to work for the UN. I was not expecting that I would be in a European neighbourhood, I would see slum conditions of a degree that's absolutely appalling and, frankly, inexplicable. You know, I don't want to pick out. The reason I don't want to pick out an example, I could easily do it, but the reason I don't want to do it is because I see these problems everywhere, and I don't, I don't want to give the impression that we should focus on this or that country. The challenges are enormous everywhere. There is no country in Europe that has somehow come to grips with the challenge of delivering genuine respect for its Roma communities. There are some good practices in some places. I was in North Macedonia a few days ago last week. And there, for example, I saw two things that impressed me. One is Roma women in senior government positions. That's really important to give leadership roles in society and to Roma women, by the way, that's notable because often I find that the best ideas in the Roma community, the best energy, the best vision of how to move things forward, comes not from men, but it comes from women. The other thing that impressed me was that they have a very serious drilled-down, comprehensive action plan to promote the human rights of Roma. Why is that notable? Because unlike for EU member states, they're under no obligation to do it. EU member states have to have an action plan to gain access to the relevant resources of the EU. North Macedonia is not in such a situation, and still, it took upon itself all of the obligations and the implications of such a planning exercise. I'm seeing a persistence of very worrying situations. There have been some modest improvements. Early childhood education, the EU will tell you, in fact, the Fundamental Rights Agency from its surveys that there have been some improvements for small children and early childhood education. There have been some improvements in educational outcomes. Undoubtedly, in the last few years, we've all seen a strengthening in many places of Roma civil society. Ireland, for example, where the Irish Traveller community has become a very sophisticated dimension of civil society in terms of it, analysing what's needed and advocating to receive it. The worst in my professional life. There are multiple elements. First, there's the war of aggression. You'll never forget that just a few hundred kilometres from here, a war of aggression against another state is being waged with unspeakable consequences for humans. And the second there, there are very worrying levels of human rights violations in many places. But that's not new. What's new, and which makes things all the more disturbing is the extent to which people in power are willing to distance themselves from human rights obligations. This was already very disturbing when we saw it in countries where democracy already seemed to be under threat, and where populism seemed to be getting a foothold. But what's all the more worrying recently, and I literally mean in the past year, is the extent to which the political middle ground is also willing to say that when human rights get in the way of public policy objective, that they'll go ahead nevertheless. That's what we're seeing on the securitisation of the borders with Belarus and indeed the Finnish border with Russia, where it is considered. It is considered that such precious human rights as the right to apply for asylum and the duty not to commit an act which could run the risk of refoulement, that these can be put aside. I have a genuine appreciation for why the impacted countries are securing their borders. The Belarusian authorities, for example, are instrumentalising migrants. Nobody challenges that. That's a given and the bordering states are entitled to respond. But what I don't understand is why they consider it necessary to include in the package of responses violations of their international law obligations. They can secure their borders without risking refoulement. They can secure their borders without removing the right to apply for asylum. You know, these countries have the capacity, they currently have the capacity, to catch people who cross their fences, round them up and bring them to a border crossing and send them back over the border. So why can't they use that capacity to round them up and bring them to a reception centre where a proper, serious vulnerability analysis can be done and where people who wish can apply for asylum? And you know, if people don't qualify for asylum, you're entitled to return them to their places of origin. So it's not as if it's...I'm not advocating for a global free entry, whatever the word is, a free pass. Just the opportunity to apply be considered and then carry the consequences of success or failure. I already have. I wouldn't call them reports, but I've done public statements in multiple contexts. If you look on my website, you'll find letters to governments, the Polish government and the Polish parliament twice, and to other governments. They're all public, as are the responses of the states. I've also done a very detailed critique of the practices on the Belarus border in the form of an intervention to the European Court of Human Rights. And again, that's on my website. So if you go to the website, you'll find a lot of country-specific information. I'm very concerned about the situation of civil society in multiple European countries at the moment. The issues of civil society have kept me very busy since I took up this job, much more than I had expected. I've had to intervene, excuse me, I just want to get the figure here, I don't want to be inaccurate. I've intervened in 10 countries. I'm going to check that number just very clear it's right, in 10 countries since I took up the job, and, excuse me, yeah, 10 countries since I took up this job to deal with a plethora of issues. The first one is the so-called foreign funding laws which are which, which are not the benign oversight laws that governments would typically present them as. They're highly discriminatory, and they serve to suffocate certain organisations, and as a contagion of them. We saw last year in particular, how the laws were very close to almost identical to each other in a number of countries. If you look at last year's legislative developments in places like Slovakia, Hungary, Georgia, Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They're still a big worry, but they've evolved now. In some countries, they've been pulled back like in Georgia and some other legal frames have been substituted, such as laws on lobbying, but which actually served a purpose. Or, as we've seen also in Europe recently, some governments have stumbled on the 1938 FARA [Foreign Agents Registration Act] law. It's an American law 1938 it was adopted to deal with Nazi incursion into US affairs. It was designed for a very specific context, and now it's being used in widely differing contexts in Europe. Here we are, what is it, 80 years later? And again, it looks to me like another instrument to close down the operation of those bits of civil society that might annoy the state. Another dimension is that some particular communities are being especially hard hit civil society, I mean, and I think of the LGBTI communities laws in, for example, Georgia, and there's a family values law that was adopted in Georgia, which is, which is irredeemably oppressive. And then the last dimension, this non-exhaustive list of why I'm very worried about civil society right now is the impact of the departure of USAID and the loss of the resources that it provided. I have met with organisations who tell me that they'll have to close where they've lost 50 percent or more of their income without any planning, without any warning, typically in places where they're most needed. The impact is similar, by the way, for small, independent media operators. And then one dimension, one further dimension of the departure of USAID, which was brought to my attention only last week, is the the fact that in in Serbia, NGOs told me that they had been raided by police, and when they asked what the context was, they were told, and I have this from the NGOs, they were told that the American government says that USAID was corrupt, so we have to check to make sure that you're not corrupt. So this is a scary further dimension. So why do I care so much about civil society? Because it's the blood of any society. Without civil society, services don't get delivered without civil society, our authorities don't get challenged to do a better job. And by the way, from the context of human rights, without civil society, we don't have the bright ideas that advance the human rights protection systems in the way that they've developed over all those years. . Maybe ask me one question? I'm very concerned about the situation in Hungary . I'm just so concerned about the extent to which these communities are being targeted for no obvious reason that I saw, no obvious social good. These are small communities. Think of the community of trans people, for instance, tiny and all they want to do is live their lives at peace in their own identities. And yet they're being, they're being scapegoated and almost a proxy for so many things in society, in a way that's hideous. And they're committing suicide, and they're, they're suffering depression, and they're, they're hiding, and they're suffering from a lack of access to the necessary medicines and medical facilities. And this is, this is a violation of human rights at its most profound. The first thing is, debates need to be evidence-based. So show me the evidence of these patterns with regard to which civil society stands accused. Second, I mentioned earlier, the extent to which civil society is the oil in the engine, the lifeblood of our societies. How could any parliament envisage doing its job without a healthy, vigorous, engaged and sustained exchange with civil society? Third, the relationship of civil society to a parliament is a subject of legitimate interest, but it has to be in the interest of serving democracy, and not of repressing an essential voice.
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The current state of human rights in Europe is the worst ever witnessed by the commissioner for human rights at the Strasbourg-based Council of Europe, Michael O'Flaherty.
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[
"Migration",
"Rule of Law",
"EU Political",
"Ukraine"
] |
migration
|
2025-05-08T12:36:27.679Z
|
https://euobserver.com/migration/ar2478e43d
|
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The EU has simply abandoned human rights in Tunisia
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In the early morning of 19 April, a Tunis court issued sentences in a mass trial of 40 lawyers, opposition figures, and critics of the president. Thirty-seven defendants were sentenced to heavy prison terms of up to 66 years after just three court sessions, during which they were not heard or given a real opportunity to present their defence. They were charged with conspiracy against state security and terrorism, connected to political activities like meeting with European diplomats, such as the French and Italian ambassadors. The 'Conspiracy Case', as it has become known, reflects just how far Tunisia has fallen from the birthplace of the Arab Spring back to an era of political prisoners. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights condemned the convictions and called on the Tunisian authorities to put an end to the wider pattern of political prosecution. But the EU had the most feeble reaction possible. A commission spokesman said it “has taken note of the heavy verdict,” and that “the EU regularly recalls the importance of freedom of expression, respect for the right to a fair trial and due process in its exchanges with the Tunisian authorities.” The defendants didn’t get so much as a semblance of a fair trial, with authorities using the case to muzzle what’s left of political opposition in the country. Many defendants have been forced into exile and those in Tunisia face years in prison. Following the verdict, the authorities arrested a defence lawyer in the case, Ahmed Souab, after he issued statements to the media. He was placed in custody under the country’s counterterrorism law and is accused of “terrorist and common law offences.” In 2021, following a decade in which Tunisia passed reforms and made progress on human rights, president Kais Saied seized control of Tunisia’s state institutions and dramatically intensified repression of dissent. The authorities have crushed political opposition; threatened, intimidated, and targeted civil society groups ; drastically curtailed freedom of expression and the press; undermined the independence of the judiciary; cracked down on migrants, asylum seekers and refugees; and criminalised assistance to them. Brussels' shameful silence Yet the EU, one of Tunisia’s main international partners, has been largely silent in the face of this escalating repression, focusing on cooperation on other issues like migration control. In 2023, EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen signed a Memorandum of Understanding with president Saied, in return seeking Tunisia’s cooperation to prevent boats carrying migrants and asylum seekers from irregularly departing for Europe. The migration control part of the deal failed to include genuine human rights guarantees, despite mounting evidence that Tunisian security forces are committing serious violations . Tunisians are paying a steep price for the European Union’s singular focus on migration and abandonment of human rights priorities. While the bloc attempts to seal its borders — irregular boat arrivals to Italy from Tunisia decreased 80 percent in 2024 — Tunisians are being robbed of hard-won civil and political rights gained after the 2011 revolution. And African foreign nationals in Tunisia are suffering serious rights violations under the EU externalisation policy, under which Tunisian authorities have put in place abusive border controls, used excessive force, and carried out mass expulsions following interceptions at sea and arbitrary arrests on land. Since 2021, Tunisian authorities have taken full advantage of the lack of international condemnation to move forward with their crackdown. The authorities have weaponised arbitrary detention and abusive prosecutions against people perceived as critical of the government, targeting opponents from across the political spectrum. Some of those detained on abusive charges face the death penalty if convicted. Last year, Saied won reelection after excluding or arresting almost all opposition candidates. Despite the escalating repression and full-scale crackdown on dissidents, the commission recently proposed including Tunisia in a list of seven “safe countries of origin.” If adopted by the European Parliament and Council, the proposal would fast-track asylum procedures — and rejections — for Tunisians under the presumption that they do not really need protection in the EU. Such a system would prejudice their cases and could mean those who do face risks will not get a fair assessment. The European Union and its member states should stop pretending they can satisfy their immediate interests by cosying up with an increasingly repressive leadership in Tunis. Rubber-stamping Tunisia as safe will not make it so for those fleeing persecution and detention. Similarly, banking on Tunisian authorities’ record of violating migrants’ rights in the hope that fewer people will try to cross to Europe cannot be a winning strategy. The EU leadership should end its silence, publicly condemn the deteriorating human rights situation in Tunisia, and make it clear that future partnerships will be linked to genuine human rights progress and key reforms. The EU should review cooperation agreements with Tunisia to ensure they are tied to compliance with international human rights obligations, and end support to security agencies committing human rights violations. Bassam Khawaja is deputy Middle East and north Africa director at Human Rights Watch . Bassam Khawaja is deputy Middle East and north Africa director at
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Human Rights Watch
|
37 Tunisian lawyers and opposition figures have been given prison sentences of up to 66 years for conspiracy against state security and terrorism, for offences such as meeting with European diplomats like the French and Italian ambassadors, writes Human Rights Watch.
|
[
"Migration",
"Africa",
"Opinion"
] |
migration
|
2025-05-08T11:28:57.351Z
|
https://euobserver.com/migration/ar72293cab
|
No surrender to tech oligarchs: EU must build alternative social media platforms
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A sigh of relief and hope was felt throughout Europe last week. With the European Commission's sanctions against Apple and Meta, executive vice-president Teresa Ribera demonstrated that the EU is still the leading force in the world when defending and executing tech regulation. The message was clear: no matter where a company is from and who is running it, in Europe, you need to abide by the law. These first steps in the enforcement of the Digital Markets Act must not make us lose focus. Today, our EU laws protecting citizens online remain under pressure. After US vice-president JD Vance accused Brussels of “excessive regulation of AI” at France’s AI summit, it was revealed that Washington put pressure on the European Commission to water down and postpone the general-purpose AI Code of Practice, comprised in the EU’s AI Act. The EU must not bow to blackmailing Elon Musk’s plans to pivot away from his US government position seems like good news, but we shouldn’t expect him or his tech bros to lose influence. Zuckerberg has, on multiple occasions, indicated that deregulation in Europe is necessary to protect free speech from censorship — a stance that aligns with Donald Trump’s foreign policy agenda. The crude reality is that online interference in our European elections is part of the MAGA (Make America Great Again) approach. We have recently seen how interference in our public debate is also coming from the West, in the form of a new conservative or even fascist agenda, which is pushed and promoted online. This happened recently with the AfD in Germany, and is also currently unfolding in the Romanian presidential election . The algorithms of the Big Tech Platforms are pushing and supporting harmful and extreme content, while suppressing the content made by quality media and journalists. There is even the suspicion that the algorithms on some platforms are not politically neutral. They are promoting extremist parties over the centrist forces that make up the basis of European democracy. One thing is certain; when it comes to the posts of Musk, the X algorithm is biased. The same can go for the extreme right in Europe. We cannot afford to let our guard down now. That is why, we keep urging EU Commission vice-president Henna Virkkunen to rapidly conclude the investigation on X, TikTok and Meta under the Digital Services Act. But the enforcement of our laws represents one of the crucial pillars to protect citizens from unsafe online environments. EU tech capacity building and providing alternatives should be the second one. We should look beyond the EU defence industry debate and realise that our total dependency on US and Chinese tech has become a liability. The EU must be equally swift when it comes to tech solutions and come up with innovative proposals . A European social media platform based on EU values We can put an end to exploitative and toxic business models that threaten not only mental health but also our democracies. If X, Meta and TikTok do not play by our rules and are damaging to our citizens, we need to consider a full suspension on these platforms, as it happened in Brazil. For this to work, we need to develop European alternatives that ensure citizens can still enjoy freedom of speech in a safe, inclusive and respectful online environment; one which guarantees that future social media ecosystems are not big machines benefitting at the expense of our democracies. To this end, we call on the commission to build a democratic European social media platform for trustworthy news and information that would centralise existing content from European public service media and licensed broadcasters. We should never forget that we are a market of more than 440 million consumers This platform could serve as a common access point to a joint EU database of information, allowing citizens to find news and other content produced by publicly funded and licenced media in their own language. On the other hand, the EU also needs to keep up with its digital legislation to fill the gaps left by the main digital laws approved in the last mandate such as the Digital Services Act or the AI Act. It has been proven, for example, that an increased use of social media and disinformation by the youth has an impact on anxiety, depression and self-esteem problems. This is what makes the adoption of the postponed Digital Fairness Act to set targeted rules on these crucial issues so important. Investing in a European digital ecosystem Last but not least, the EU should not forget about fostering its competition and providing Europeans with a transparent, interoperable, accountable and democratic digital ecosystem. This would move us away from Europe's dependence on a few US tech oligarchs. In this context, we would call for the launch of a Digital Sovereignty Fund from the EU Budget to build the European digital ecosystem. This could be done with European tax on digital companies such as Meta Platforms, Google and X to decrease the bloc’s dependence on US and Chinese social media platforms and broad-based cloud providers. With more of our own resources, we will be able to create alternatives based on the EU values needed to protect our democracies and freedom of speech. Besides new investments, we could use incentives for public procurement as a means to strengthen EU investment in European digital infrastructure, such as cloud operators. We should never forget that we are a market of more than 440 million consumers. This is our strength, our advantage. Europe is not a land of power, but rather a land where we regulate to protect our citizens, especially the most vulnerable. The message is very clear: if international big techs companies want to continue making profit thanks from to European consumers, they have to comply with our digital laws. On this, our response to continued attacks on the EU’s tech laws must be firm and decisive, but also innovative. Alex Agius Saliba is a Maltese MEP and vice-president of the Socialists & Democrats for the digital agenda. Laura Ballarín Cereza is a Spanish MEP and coordinator of the Socialists & Democrats on the internal market and consumer protection committee. Last April, S&D MEPs put on the table a
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set of proposals
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We can put an end to exploitative and toxic business models that threaten not only mental health but also our democracies. If X, Meta and TikTok do not play by our rules and are damaging to our citizens, we need to consider a full suspension on these platforms, as it happened in Brazil, write the Socialists & Democrats.
|
[
"Digital",
"Opinion"
] |
digital
|
2025-05-08T09:22:16.811Z
|
https://euobserver.com/digital/ar813b9410
|
Ukraine in the EU – the end of the Common Agricultural Policy?
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To build support for Ukraine’s EU accession across Europe, the key policy implications of Ukrainian membership need to be discussed in a clear and inclusive manner. One step in this direction is to dispel some of the myths that generate worries in some member states about the social and economic implications of Ukraine joining the European Union, not least in the sphere of agriculture. As one of the world’s largest grain exporters, and with agricultural land the size of Italy, Ukraine is perceived as a threat by many farmers in the EU. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) accounts for around one-third of the EU’s budget and makes a significant contribution to farm incomes across the EU. There are fears that Ukrainian farmers would receive large agricultural subsidies immediately on accession, thereby diverting funds from existing member states. There are also fears that Ukraine might not adhere to as high standards of food safety and environmental protection as other EU member states, leading to unfair competition and pushing prices down on the internal market. While Ukraine’s membership would impact the EU’s agricultural sector, five points indicate how the effects might be alleviated and managed. Rebutting five myths First, implementing transition periods to limit Ukrainian farmers’ access to full CAP subsidies, as when Spain joined the EU in 1986, could balance out the costs of integrating Ukraine into the common agricultural market over time. For a certain period after its EU accession, Ukraine would be granted a smaller CAP share compared to existing member states. This could allow Ukraine to gradually adjust to EU standards while at the same time reducing immediate strains on the EU budget. Second, the EU could introduce capped payments that limit the share of CAP funds that a member state or individual farm would receive. Mandatory capping has been discussed by the European Commission as a means of coping with Ukraine’s accession. Third, large Ukrainian agro-holdings might not even qualify to receive CAP funds. The current CAP features a redistributive payment scheme that caps direct payments to large farms. Moreover, many companies in Ukraine’s agricultural sector are competitive and do not need subsidies to continue their businesses, reducing the likelihood that CAP payments will be diverted away from existing member states. Fourth, in order to meet EU standards to join the single market, Ukraine would need to implement reforms on food safety, water quality, nature protection, animal welfare and pesticide use. These reforms are likely to increase production costs in Ukraine, which reduces the risk of unfair competition. Fifth and last, internal competitive pressure within the EU could be eased by channelling Ukrainian agricultural products to third markets, where Ukraine is already well established . These food exports would also make the EU a stronger player in the global food market. And some opportunities In addition to the above points, it should be noted that Ukraine’s EU accession offers opportunities for the EU. Over 71 percent of Ukraine is agricultural land and 56 percent is arable land, making the country the world’s largest exporter of sunflower oil, the third largest exporter of barley, the fourth largest exporter of maize and the fifth largest exporter of wheat. Ukraine’s agricultural industry could reduce Europe’s dependence on imports of agricultural products and strengthen the EU’s food security. Furthermore, regardless of the outcome of Ukraine’s EU accession process, it will be necessary to reform the CAP to increase productivity. Previous EU enlargements involving countries with large agricultural sectors have led to reforms of the CAP; for example, a second pillar of the CAP dedicated to rural development was created in anticipation of the 2004 enlargement. This time, Ukraine’s EU integration could generate the necessary impetus to move ahead with reforms, which could benefit the EU as a whole. Klara Lindström is an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies . Klara Lindström is an analyst at the
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Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies
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There are fears that Ukrainian farmers would receive large agricultural subsidies immediately on accession, diverting funds from existing member states. Plus worries Ukraine might not adhere to as high standards of food safety and environmental protection as other EU member states, writes Klara Lindström.
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[
"EU Political",
"Ukraine",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-political
|
2025-05-06T09:50:02.230Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar5e501bb3
|
10 reasons why you should support EUobserver
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We won't lie: EU democracy is not dependent on journalism, but on a well-informed public. By supporting EUobserver you are contributing to that mission. Our coverage of overlooked pan-European stories is not controlled by corporations or billionaires and as a non-profit, any support goes straight back into reporting. But there are many other reasons to support EUobserver. 1. A quarter‑century (and counting) of sticking to what we’re good at We’ve reported on everything from the euro crisis to Russia’s war on Ukraine for 25 straight years—without compromising our editorial compass even once. Some of our journalists have been with us for decades. That hard‑won continuity is rare in EU media, and worth safeguarding. 2. Nobody tells us what to write EUobserver is a non‑profit foundation and is financed chiefly by its readers, so there’s no corporate, national or party interest that guides us. This model allows us to chase and follow stories that are not commercially interesting — sometimes for years on end. Independence isn’t our slogan; it’s the business model. 3. Investigative from the outset From exposing dark‑money lobbying to scrutinising asylum “safe‑country” shortcuts , our reporters – and a network of cross-border journalists – chase stories others won’t touch, and we keep publishing even when the lawsuits roll in . And we’ve had our share of lawsuits. 4. We are not a influence broker Unlike our commercial counterparts, our journalism is our core competence. We don’t organise events to bring ‘stakeholders’ and policy makers together, we don’t hold back information for ‘pro’ customers or create tailored article bundles designed to influence policy for whoever pays us. Our mission is to inform you, and as many other people as possible, on what the EU does (and does not) do. 5. Tiny newsroom, heavyweight impact We run a small, battle‑tested team that punches well above its weight. We’ve consistently ranked among the most influential EU affairs news publishers for decades. Every euro you invest goes into reporters, not shareholders or investors. 6. We aim to be fully reader‑funded Algorithms decide who sees what online; members decide whether we can outsmart those algorithms. Your support isn’t a donation, it’s an act of asserting your position in EU democracy. Your support funds work that has the potential to inform millions of others — including yourself. “Facts matter because they help us not to lose the connection with reality. Without them, it is impossible to make the right decisions and solve problems. When social networks are overloaded with fakes and rumours, professional journalism such as EUobserver becomes especially important,” as Nobel laureate and Ukrainian human rights lawyer Oleksandra Matvichuck says. 7. A pan‑European lens, free of capital‑city tunnel vision Brussels is our home, but our perspective is continental. We report the view from Lisbon to Tallinn so EU decisions make sense wherever you live – without national politics clouding the lens. "Since its inception, EUobserver has played a unique role in the underdeveloped and fragmented EU media landscape. As a Brussels-based but reader-funded media outlet, it does not rely on EU institutional funding or corporate sponsors (as its competitors do), making its journalism bolder and more investigative. It also systematically exposes the most persistent black holes in EU integration—from the culture of impunity of the national political elites running the EU to unchecked corporate power. Without EUobserver, the EU would be a different, poorer, entity”, says Alberto Alemanno, Jean Monnet Professor of EU Law at HEC Paris. 8. Access for as many as we can afford The bulk of our content stays free so students, smaller NGOs and anyone on a tight budget can still stay informed. Members make that possible — and keep it that way. We also offer €1 memberships to those under 25 to stay informed, without straining their finances. 9. Future‑proofing honest media Disinformation, deep fakes and AI‑generated clickbait are only getting louder. Supporting EUobserver today means guaranteeing there’s a reliable voice in the EU noise tomorrow. So far, we are the only independent, non-profit news media publisher in the Brussels bubble. You can secure your access to the quality news, analysis and opinion by signing up to our newsletter. 10. Democracy is a participation sport Reading us already makes you a player in EU civic life. Backing us turns you into a co‑owner of its watchdog — a pretty powerful position for the price of less than a weekly coffee. We believe an informed public is the bedrock of EU democracy. Every article we publish aims to give citizens the facts they need to make informed decisions that eventually hold power to account. Or as John Morijn, Hertie law professor says: “Lots of people ask me: what can I do myself to strengthen liberal democracy? My reply: pay for good journalism! EUobserver has consistently delivered on the EU bubble, and improved the European public debate.” Join us . Or if you’re already a member, spread the journalism we do – it makes a difference.
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Alejandro Tauber is Publisher of EUobserver. He is Ecuadorian, German, and American, but lives in Amsterdam. His background is in tech and science reporting, and was previously editor at VICE's Motherboard and publisher of TNW.
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Strong democracies need strong watchdogs — but more than that, people like you who care about what the watchdog discovers.
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[
"Inside EUobserver"
] |
inside-euobserver
|
2025-05-06T09:19:17.287Z
|
https://euobserver.com/inside-euobserver/ard8e4db6d
|
Right of Reply: Vazil Hudak
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Although the article has already been amended by EUobserver following Vazil Hudák's request for correction, and some incorrect and false information has been removed, it still contains false and misleading statements about Hudák. Hudák is therefore interested in removing the false and misleading impression that the article continues to create about his person. Following are key misinterpretations contained in the article: • There is currently no investigation held against Hudák. In fact, there was only one investigation carried by OLAF, which was closed without further action in October 2024. • Hudák started working for the two companies mentioned in the article — Budapest Airport and Inobat, only after the expiry of the cooling-off period following the departure from the EIB and thus did not breach any EIB rules. • Hudák never misused his position as the EIB vice president to influence financing of a particular company or individual. As regards the two cases mentioned in the article: Inobat never received any financing from EIB; the loan to the Budapest Airport was pre-approved by the EIB’s internal decision-making process that includes approvals by several departments within the EIB as well as by the EIB management committee as a collegiate decision-making body composed of EIB’s president and vice presidents. More detailed explanation is provided below: The article published on 5 December 2024 entitled “ The European Investment Bank has a chronic 'revolving doors' problem ” states that “Over the past few months, two investigations have exposed how former European Investment Bank vice president Hudák had in multiple cases joined the leadership of companies for which he had either helped arrange or even approve loans while working at the bank” This statement is untrue and misleading. Firstly, there is currently no investigation into Hudák´s actions referred to in the article and the only investigation previously conducted found no violation and was closed without further action in October 2024. Secondly, Hudák only actively joined and started working for the referred companies after the expiry of the cooling-off period following his departure from the EIB and thus did not breach any EIB rules. Finally, Hudák joined only one company that received a loan from the EIB, and this loan, like all other loans approved by Hudák as EIB vce-president, was pre-approved by the EIB's internal decision-making process. Hudák could not influence the EIB's decision-making process on loan applications (i.e. he couldn't help arranging loans), nor could he sign anything that hadn't been approved by several departments within the EIB including the EIB management committee. The article published on 5 December 2024 entitled ” The European Investment Bank has a chronic 'revolving doors' problem ” states that "In one instance, he (Hudák) was appointed board member of Budapest airport — after he had signed a €200m loan for a controversial expansion project.“ This statement is untrue and misleading. As explained above, Hudák only signed loans that had been pre-approved by the EIB's internal decision-making process and could not influence the decision-making process on loan applications from his position within the EIB (i.e. he could not help arranging loans). The article published on 5 December 2024 entitled ” The European Investment Bank has a chronic 'revolving doors' problem ” states that “In both cases, according to business registries in Slovakia and Hungary, he (Hudák) was in the process of joining the companies during his 12-month cooling-off, without even seeking the approval of the EIB’s Ethics and Compliance Committee.“ This statement is untrue and misleading. Hudák did not work as an active member of the board of directors of Budapest Airport or at Inobat during the 12-month cooling-off period. Hudák also communicated the requirement for an approval of the EIB's Ethics and Compliance Committee to the Budapest Airport prior to his appointment as a member and did not, nor did he attempt to, circumvent the approval by EIB's Ethics and Compliance Committee. Therefore, while he was in the process of joining the companies during his 12-month cooling-off period, he only joined both companies and started working for them after the cooling-off period had expired.“ The article published on 5 December 2024 entitled ” The European Investment Bank has a chronic 'revolving doors' problem ” states that “Not only has the EIB failed to condemn Hudak’s blatant violation of EIB´s Management Committee Code Conduct, for example, it has continued to forge ahead in a similar way in other cases.” This statement is untrue and misleading. As follows from previous statement, Hudák did not violate EIB´s Management Committee Code Conduct as he only started working for the mentioned companies after the cooling-off period had expired. The article published on 5 December 2024 entitled ” The European Investment Bank has a chronic
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'revolving doors' problem
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A right of reply from Vazil Hudak, former vice president of the European Investment Bank.
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[
"Opinion"
] |
opinion
|
2025-05-05T15:44:26.573Z
|
https://euobserver.com/opinion/ar31a04bcf
|
Libya and the EU: How many times can we do the same thing and expect a different result?
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The US’ retreat from its global role has renewed intense conversations about a more “geopolitical” Europe. They have focused on where Europe stands in relation to the world’s great powers — sometimes at the expense of the places where EU foreign policy has a more immediate, widespread, and lasting impact. This may shift somewhat this autumn, when the European Commission will unveil a new strategy for the Mediterranean neighbourhood. It’s a chance to reverse a short-term strategy which has made both Europe and her neighbours more — not less — unstable. It marks a decade since the summit that gave rise to the EU Trust Fund for Africa , which helped shape European regional policy into something more short-term, transactional, and counterproductive — with mistakes repeated rather than learned from. Nowhere have the shortcomings of Europe’s approach been clearer than in Libya , which earlier this year expelled international aid agencies, amid a government clampdown on migration, which has involved a surge of violence. The EU has sought cooperation from Libya on oil access, migration control, and combating organised crime. However, the country remains deeply unstable, with evidence mounting daily of EU funding being funnelled toward organised crime, in an environment where the line between official state institutions and militias remains thin. Numerous state and non-state actors are involved in the exploitation of migrants and trafficking in persons, as confirmed by migrant testimonies and reports from humanitarian organisations. Large-scale human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law are prevalent, often linked to organised criminal groups. High-level individuals in the Libyan state are implicated in these violations, which include exploitative labour, forced labour, slavery, trafficking, detention, kidnapping for ransom, sexual and gender-based violence, torture, and extortion. Their business model involves organising migrant departures while simultaneously receiving international funds, with re-trafficking being a common occurrence. The EU has inadvertently made itself vulnerable to blackmail and further destabilised Libya The fragmentation and diversity of actors in Libya make it difficult to create a clear picture of the situation. Migrants and refugees are frequently passed between multiple intermediaries, including the Department for Combating Irregular Migration (DCIM) centres, often moving northward towards the Mediterranean Sea, even if Europe was not their intended destination. Meanwhile, the Libyan Coast Guard plays a significant role in intercepting and returning migrants to Libya, increasing the risk of re-trafficking. Funding provided to Libyan authorities for border and migration management lacks oversight, leading to misuse and further exploitation. The EU has inadvertently made itself vulnerable to blackmail and further destabilised Libya. Not a one-off The reputational damage done to the EU in the Global South through its links to torture, slavery, violence, and death in Libya is not easily recoverable. And sadly, the Libyan story is not a one-off experience but reflected in a wider foreign policy approach. Following the Libyan revolution, Agadez, Niger, became a key transit hub for migrants from West Africa heading to Libya and Europe. The EU pressured the Nigerian government to criminalise migrant smuggling in 2015. This led to the implementation of Law 2015-36 , which effectively disrupted the migration economy in Agadez. The law primarily targeted low-level migration facilitators, such as drivers and “passeurs”, or guides, rather than influential businessmen involved in larger smuggling networks. This led to the professionalisation and consolidation of organised smuggling, whilst ordinary people providing commercial services were found criminalised. This shift contributed to the development of a conflict economy, with local armed actors exerting increasing control over economic activity. In 2019, the UN Human Rights Committee reported that Niger’s EU-backed landmark anti-smuggling law had “forc[ed] migrants to go underground and face conditions that expose them to many forms of abuse and human rights violations.” Migrants had to take more dangerous, circuitous paths through the desert to avoid detection, leading to higher fatalities. The crackdown also resulted in a loss of income for many in Agadez, pushing former smugglers and those involved in the migration economy to turn to gold mining and other illicit activities. Criminalisation exacerbated longstanding tensions, with local people perceiving the government's actions as prioritising European interests over their own. This led to strained relationships between local and national authorities and increased dissatisfaction with the international community. Backlash against EU This backlash was far from the only factor which brought to power a new government in a 2023 coup, which was more hostile to EU interests generally. But it is striking that repealing the unpopular law was one of the new government’s first actions — and already it appears that doing so may have made movement safer. Again, transactional European diplomacy appears to have caused harm, failed to achieve its aims, and risked increasing the perception of the EU in Africa as a neocolonial force, at a time when Brussels urgently needs to build bridges in the Global South. Across the region, from Egypt to Tunisia to Mauritania, the EU has deprioritised its human rights and democratic values in order to achieve short-term aims in its deal-making. This loss of moral credibility is dangerous for the EU, and risks backfiring even as discontent linked to European policy can produce a sudden and powerful backlash, potentially including cooperation with Europe’s rivals. The current approach also burns bridges with civil society and potential allies, whilst placing European strategic interests in the hands of unreliable actors who can and do misuse their leverage. If the EU continues to make short-term goals like migration control and resource access the centre of its Mediterranean policy, it will undermine those aims. And it will also mean lost opportunities to help create a stable and thriving region more broadly. The Mediterranean Pact , a new framework for European dealmaking in the region, is a chance to change course. This dangerous global moment urgently demands leaders with the courage to stand by human rights and universal values, whilst too many abandon them. Europe can begin doing so in its own neighbourhood. We need a strategy that stops trying to fix single problems, like smuggling, with blunt force, and instead looks at connections between systemic risks and tries to address them in the interests of all. A complex mix of climate and ecological insecurity, unequal systems of exchange, and political and economic fragility, continues to drive conflict, displacement, and crisis on both sides of the Mediterranean. Through long-term investment, commitment to human rights and the rule of law, mutually beneficial international partnerships that include communities and civil society, and a serious attempt to improve quality of life, Europe can make a positive difference toward achieving genuine safety and security for all. Katia Golovko is a research fellow with the Clingendael Institute 's conflict research unit, based in Dakar, Senegal. Katia Golovko is a research fellow with the
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Clingendael Institute
|
Nowhere have the shortcomings of Europe’s approach on migration been clearer than in Libya, which earlier this year expelled international aid agencies, amid a government clampdown on migration which has involved a surge of violence.
|
[
"Migration",
"Africa",
"Opinion"
] |
migration
|
2025-05-05T09:58:52.214Z
|
https://euobserver.com/migration/arddad4085
|
We are looking for 2,500 new members to ensure EUobserver's next 25 years
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This year, EUobserver turns 25-years old. A quarter century. Since our little online newspaper was founded in Brussels in 2000, we have covered the EU through its ups and downs. Through treaty changes, enlargement, the financial crisis, the euro crisis, Covid-19 and Russia’s war in Ukraine, our small but dedicated team of reporters have strived to provide straight reporting. Not coloured by national, corporate or political biases, and always through the lens of fundamental values which unite the countries of our beleaguered bloc, we’ve focused both on the most important developments and the issues that others ignore. During these years, we’ve seen other EU affairs publications come and go, and others develop varying ways to serve certain needs or audiences. In many ways, we’ve remained unchanged. First, when it comes to our independence. Despite financial hardship at times, we’ve maintained an absolute stance on who has a say about our coverage; nobody, but us and our readers. EUobserver has never positioned itself as a broker between different stakeholder groups, and thus has never had to compromise on investigating anyone or anything. Second, our dedication to factual reporting. Even when attacked by numerous lawsuits seeking to expunge damning coverage, we’ve fought back and relied on our "high deontological standards", as the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom put it. Third, our belief in journalism as a tool for protecting democracy. That might sound lofty, but in simple terms it means that we firmly hold to the fact that a well-informed public is the best way to ensure functioning and representative institutions that benefit us all. And that third point brings us to where we would like to change. Not in our belief, but in the way we aim to serve and reach a growing audience of diverse citizens. As anyone does, we see the way people consume information changing around us. In some ways it has never been easier to reach people with journalism, but in others it has never been harder to keep doing so. Fragmentation of the information environment — we’re now not only competing with other news media, but also with individual creators, streaming services, games and anything else people can choose to spend time on — means that it’s more important than ever to have a direct connection with the people who want to spend time with us. Additionally, according a report released by Reporters Without Borders on Friday 2 May, the funding situation for independent media has never been more dire. “The global state of press freedom is now classified as a “difficult situation” for the first time in the history of the Index,” it reads. So to celebrate this — honestly quite amazing — anniversary, and to address these challenges, we’re looking to introduce more ways to interact with and serve you, our members and readers. And at the same time we’re kicking off a campaign to find 2,500 new supporting members who believe, like us, that EU democracy needs independent watchdogs — not to punish wrongdoing, but to provide citizens with better information to make decisions. We need your help. As you know, the number of people reached by our articles is determined for a large part by algorithms. But just like democracy, those algorithms are informed by choices of individuals. If you care about what we do, and what we can do for you in the future, we’d like to ask you to take your stake in EU democracy and help spread our goal, our mission and our journalism far and wide. And if you can, sign up for a supporting membership to ensure that EU citizens can get the information they need to make decisions that affect policy that has consequences for all of us. By reading us, you're already an active participant in EU democracy. By supporting us, you're taking a stake in it. Join us
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.
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Today, we kick off an anniversary campaign to convince new supporting members to join EUobserver's mission of providing the information citizens need to safeguard EU democracy.
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[
"Inside EUobserver"
] |
inside-euobserver
|
2025-05-05T07:31:18.694Z
|
https://euobserver.com/inside-euobserver/ar3760742f
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€50bn trade offer to Trump, Moscow parade, and EU budget in focus This WEEK
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The European Commission is poised to present a revised trade proposal to the Trump administration this week, aiming to resolve the escalating tariff dispute between Washington and Brussels. The updated package closely resembles earlier offers, calling for zero tariffs on industrial goods, reduced non-tariff barriers, and joint efforts to tackle China’s overcapacity in steel and aluminium. It also includes increased purchases of US products and pledges for greater investment. In concrete terms, the EU appears ready to boost imports of American goods by €50bn, including liquefied natural gas (LNG), soybeans, and other agricultural exports. But optimism is limited. With Washington showing no enthusiasm and the July deadline for the temporary suspension of US tariffs approaching, the window for a resolution is narrowing. In search of trade allies, the EU is looking to improve its relations with economies of the Asia Pacific. The EU has signed trade deals with South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Vietnam, and New Zealand, and is negotiating others with Australia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and India. And Maroš Šefčovič, EU trade commissioner, is expected this week in Tokyo for high-level economic talks. “Geopolitical shifts make it clear: boosting economic security through trusted partnerships is vital,” he said on social media last week, announcing the trip. On Monday (5 May), EU Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen is set to travel to Paris to meet with French president Emmanuel Macron. After attending the plenary in Strasbourg, she will meet Ireland’s taoiseach Micheál Martin on Friday (9 May). In Berlin, two-and-a-half months after the elections of February 2025, conservative leader Friedrich Merz will assume the chancellorship from Olaf Scholz on Tuesday (6 May) — amid a big domestic fiscal bang and trade tensions with the US and China. Putin’s parade & Russian energy Meanwhile, this week also marks the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II — although the Russian war in Ukraine is set to cast a long shadow over commemorations. On Wednesday (7 May) and Thursday (8 May), EU foreign affairs ministers will gather for an informal meeting in Warsaw. The so-called Gymnich will focus on EU-UK discussions (in preparation for a summit on 19 May), transatlantic relations, and Ukraine. There will also be a working session with candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine and Kosovo) focused on security and defence cooperation. On Friday, Vladimir Putin will use the country’s traditional annual military parade on Moscow's Red Square to rally domestic support and frame his invasion of Ukraine as part of Russia's historical role. Last month, EU foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas warned EU candidate countries and member states against attending the parade. But despite the EU warning, Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić and Slovak prime minister Robert Fico are expected there, alongside Belarusian president Aleksandr Lukashenko, Chinese president Xi Jinping or Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán won't attend. Meanwhile, the European Commission is expected to present a roadmap for ending dependency on Russian energy imports on Tuesday. In 2022, the EU Commission launched its REPowerEU plan to fully end Russian fossil fuel imports by 2027 — a task that has been proven difficult. In 2024, the EU imported a total of €21.9bn of Russian fossil fuels, according to a report by the Ember think tank. Strasbourg In Strasbourg, MEPs will gather for their monthly plenary session, with Ukraine peace talks and trade, the EU’s response to Trump’s trade policy and the new long-term budget high on the agenda. In the report adopted in April by the parliament's budget committee, MEPs set out their priorities for the next EU budget post-2027, arguing that the current spending ceiling of one percent of the EU-27’s gross national income (GNI) is not sufficient to address the needs of Europe. MEPs have also said no to the commission’s idea to replicate national plans used for spending in the recovery funds. They also argue that the repayments of the Covid recovery funds borrowing costs should not come at the expense of other programs or priorities. After a debate on Tuesday, the European Parliament will vote on the budget report on Wednesday, feeding into the commission proposal, which is expected in July. On Thursday, MEPs will vote on the renewal of the suspension of trade barriers for certain imports from Ukraine, such as iron and steel, due to expire on 5 June 2025. In the wake of the blackout that affected Spain, Portugal and France last week, lawmakers will also debate on Wednesday evening how to ensure that Europe's electricity grid is sufficiently resilient. Turkey's EU membership progress and relations with Ankara will be the subject of discussions with EU foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas on Tuesday, followed by a vote on Wednesday. Also on Tuesday, MEPs will vote on a proposal that would make compliance with vehicle CO2 emissions targets from 2025-2027 more flexible, easing obligations for automakers. Across Europe, various events will be held on Friday to mark Europe Day, celebrating the historic Schuman Declaration.
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Elena is EUobserver's editor-in-chief. She is from Spain and has studied journalism and new media in Spanish and Belgian universities. Previously she worked on European affairs at VoteWatch Europe and the Spanish news agency EFE.
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The EU is set to unveil a fresh trade offer to the US this week, while the bloc's foreign affairs ministers will gather for an informal meeting in Warsaw. The EU Commission will unveil its roadmap to end fossil-fuel imports from Russia, while MEPs will meet in Strasbourg — all against the backdrop of World War II commemorations and ongoing fears over the war in Ukraine.
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[
"Agenda"
] |
agenda
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2025-05-05T05:05:00.000Z
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https://euobserver.com/agenda/arad6898d1
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Spain's attack on independent media is unprecedented in a core EU state
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Since taking office 100 days ago, the Trump administration has taken targeted action against press freedom in the USA. Reporters critical of Trump have been barred from the White House, media outlets have been put under pressure and prison sentences have been threatened against freelance journalists. State-run foreign broadcasters such as Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which provide democratic information in crisis regions around the world, are also threatened with closure. But autocratic tendencies in media policy and press freedom are also becoming increasingly noticeable in Europe. Despite all the criticism of Trump's actions, the European Union would do well to put its own house in order and step up its efforts to protect fundamental European values, especially freedom of the press. An OSCE report released in July 2024 highlights the indispensable role of media freedom in preserving democracy. The report also reinforced studies showing that democracies don’t go to war with one another, linking the freedom of the press to peace and security. For years, media freedom organisations have been ringing alarm bells about far-right European governments threatening democratic institutions. Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán, Slovak prime minister Robert Fico, and Italian PM Giorgia Meloni are well-known for their anti-liberal policies restricting the freedom of the press. But there’s a new aspiring autocrat in Europe who appears to be using the same textbook as Orbán, Fico, and Meloni to crack down on media freedom — except this time, he’s doing so from the Left. Spanish prime minister Pedro Sànchez claims to be protecting Spanish democracy from misinformation and far-right political actors. But according to his critics, he is using a very real threat to our information landscape to tighten his own grip on power and silence his critics. 'Policing' Spanish journalism? Sànchez’ crackdown on media freedom began with a July 2024 law claiming to counter "pseudo-media" and restore "truth" to Spain’s media landscape. The law claims to enforce the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) but has effectively allowed the government to police journalism. Sànchez’ government then pushed through a restructuring of the board of Radiotelevisión Española (RTVE), Spain’s public broadcaster, to install PSOE (Sànchez’ Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party) loyalists on the board. A similar move at Telefónica in early 2025 installed Sànchez’ ‘political fixer’ as the head of Spain’s largest telecoms group , suggesting a concerted effort by Sànchez to assert political control over Spain’s airwaves. Sànchez now has his sights set on PRISA Group, owner of Spain’s most influential newspaper, El País. At an upcoming board meeting, through close allies with shares in the company, he is attempting to oust the company chairman, Joseph Oughourlian, CEO of its largest shareholder, Amber Capital. The move to remove Oughourlian comes in response to his refusal last year to launch a pro-government left-leaning TV station under the group. If they are successful and, as is predicted, a government loyalist is installed in Oughourlian’s place, Sànchez will have gained control of the national broadcaster, the company’s largest telecoms business and media buyer and its most important print and online publication. Such control of the audiovisual landscape is unprecedented in one of Europe’s core member states. When it comes to the issue of media freedom, Europeans have a double standard. We rail against Donald Trump’s handling of the media and against the US’s oligarchic media landscape, perhaps most notably Jeff Bezos’ assertion of control over the Washington Post’s opinion section earlier this year. Yet, in Europe, we too have failed to enforce the freedom of the press, as we can see from the situations in Spain, Hungary, Italy, and Slovakia. Germany is not exempt from criticism either when it comes to media pluralism. The public media, which is funded by large state budgets, is criticized for one-sided reporting and the crowding out of private media companies in the digital markets of the future, while extreme parties are influencing a growing audience with targeted disinformation on social media. Our public media offering is largely one-sided and underfunded, leaving a gap filled by extreme voices on social media. Sànchez’ attempts to shackle the free press should alarm us, because they don’t just threaten Spanish journalists — they threaten Spanish democracy and European security. By putting Spanish democracy at risk, Sànchez threatens the fragile peace that unity has maintained since the Second World War. His attack on the core democratic institution of the free press compounds his weak support for European defence, and his reluctant support for Ukraine, which remains vital to European security. Sànchez's attempts to restrict Spanish press freedom should concern us in Europe, as they not only threaten free reporting, but also Spanish democracy and thus the security and stability of Europe, which is already under attack from targeted disinformation campaigns, particularly from Russia. Europe will not succeed in defending our liberal values against growing global authoritarianism if more and more member states take an increasingly anti-democratic course, whether from the right or the left. Media freedom campaigners from the Balkans, a region that is all too familiar with the stifling effects of government control over the free press have called on Spain to lead by example in order to support those in the region, most notably Serbia, protesting against autocracy and aspiring for EU membership. For the sake of European security and the future of the values upon which the European Union was founded, EU leaders must do more to protect democracy and lead by example. On Saturday (3 May), the world will mark International Press Freedom Day. The EU would do well to use this global commemoration of media freedom to strongly rebuke Europe’s aspiring autocrats and call on all member states to redouble their efforts to preserve European values — at the core of which is the freedom of the press. Oliver Rolofs is a strategic security and communication expert and the director of the Austrian Institute for Strategic Studies and International Cooperation . He was previously the head of communications at the Munich Security Conference . Oliver Rolofs is a strategic security and communication expert and the director of the Austrian Institute for Strategic Studies and International Cooperation . He was previously the head of communications at the
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Munich Security Conference
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If successful, Spain's Pedro Sànchez will have gained control of the national broadcaster, the company’s largest telecoms business and media buyer and its most important print and online publication. Such control of the audiovisual landscape is unprecedented in one of Europe’s core member states.
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[
"EU Political",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-political
|
2025-05-03T05:31:00.000Z
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https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar4dbd4763
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How to tackle the extremist attempts to destabilise pro-European Romania
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It has been 18 years since Romania became a full member of the European Union. During this time, the country has undergone a fundamental positive transformation — one that is both visible and widely-felt by its citizens. Beyond the opportunities and freedoms offered by EU citizenship, including the right to live and work across the Union, Romanians have experienced, in their own country, real improvements in quality of life driven by EU membership. Today, Romanians can afford nearly four times more than they could 25 years ago. Romania is now significantly closer to the standard of living of Western European countries than to that of neighbouring states that have not yet joined the EU. More time has passed since Romania became an EU member than the entire period between the 1989 anti-communist revolution and the moment of accession. Romanians understand these facts. That’s why they remain overwhelmingly pro-European: 78 percent support EU membership and 87 percent support Nato. Therefore, we have to ask: why are anti-European extremist politicians performing well in the polls ahead of the Romanian presidential elections? Beyond a natural and understandable fatigue with mainstream parties — and a growing attraction toward so-called anti-system alternatives — this surge in support for extremist politicians in Romania has a clear cause: manipulation and disinformation. The pro-Russian extremists from our country are exploiting social media — sometimes using illegal micro-targeting — to manipulate public opinion with oversimplified messages and disinformation. These extremist campaigns are not all organic; they are often supported by external actors like Russia. Their propaganda is subtle. They may not always overtly criticize the EU or praise Russia, but they spread narratives akin to Russian disinformation — false patriotism and anti-globalist messages that appeal to emotion rather than reason, swaying voters who would otherwise support the EU. This is why, during this electoral campaign, we have seen the pro-Russian extremist candidates such as George Simion deliberately avoiding public debates with the pro-European candidates and serious confrontations with well-prepared journalists. They know they lack real solutions to people’s needs and are aware that their manipulative tactics would be exposed. It is a mistake to believe that Russian influence stops at Ukraine’s borders. Romania was targeted in last year’s elections, as were Moldova and Georgia. These are coordinated efforts aimed at destabilising democratic processes across the region. We must therefore be prepared for new and innovative tactics that Russia may use to undermine democracy, both in Romania and throughout the EU in elections in the near future. This is why we, as pro-European politicians, must remain united in supporting pro-European candidates with the largest chances to win against pro-Russian candidates, not only in Romania, but across Europe. We have to confront the false platforms extremists are building — platforms based solely on fear, disinformation, and manipulation. At the same time, national and EU institutions must strengthen their investigations and ensure that national and European laws are respected, and that illegal attempts to undermine democracy are sanctioned. Siegfried Mureșan is a Romanian MEP and vice-president of the European People's Party (EPP), the largest group in the European Parliament.
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Siegfried Mureșan
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More time has passed since Romania became an EU member than from the 1989 anti-communist revolution to the moment of accession. 78 percent support EU membership and 87 percent support Nato. So why are anti-European extremist politicians performing well in the polls, asks Romanian centre-right MEP Siegfried Mureșan?
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[
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-political
|
2025-05-02T10:01:45.128Z
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https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar56c20106
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Why is Bayer seeking legal impunity in US over glyphosate?
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German agrochemical company Bayer — last week holding its annual shareholders meeting ( AGM ) – should not be seeking legal impunity. Nor should any other corporation. In an o pen letter to Bayer's shareholders , over 100 organisations from the EU, US and around the world warned them that Bayer is doing precisely that. The organisations — representing consumers, farmers, academics, human rights and environment defenders — called on the shareholders to question and stop Bayer's lobby campaign in the US, aiming to prevent citizens from going to court when suffering health damage after using Roundup - or any other harmful pesticide. Bayer's toxic weedkiller Roundup is one of the company's best-selling products, with glyphosate as main ingredient (Bayer is responsible for 40 percent of global glyphosate production). The golden hen (Monsanto, aka ‘the most hated company in the world’) that Bayer bought in 2018 for €53bn, appeared to lay merely toxic eggs . Monsanto made huge profits by selling the world the ‘toxic twins revolution in agriculture’ — genetically modified seeds resistant to RoundUp — but which came with huge environmental damage and painful and expensive health consequences . As a result Bayer has had to deal with 180,000 lawsuits in the US from people suffering from cancer. Very soon after the deal with Monsanto was closed Bayer shares plunged because Monsanto lost one of the first trials, brought by a US citizen who developed non-Hodgkin lymphoma due to his exposure to RoundUp. An avalanche of litigations followed. Many US citizen have won multi-million-dollar and even multi-billion-dollar jury verdicts, and tens of thousands have received settlements from Bayer. But many more trials continue. Bayer was forced to agree in 2020 to pay around $11bn [€9.67bn] in an attempt to settle similar claims. Bayer’s purchase of Monsanto was called one of the “worst corporate deals” in recent history by the Wall Street Journal. US Farm Bill 'drafted with the aid of Bayer' Bayer is now responding by lobbying US federal and state authorities to block citizens from taking producers to court when they suffer damage to their health after using their toxic products. As reported in the Washington Post , a draft of the US Farm Bill contained a section, “drafted with the aid of Bayer”, that would prevent state and local authorities from setting their own standards on pesticide safety warnings. Laws to this end have been introduced in at least eight US states and are being prepared in more than 20 states. Bayer's CEO Bill Anderson's speech at last week’s AGM, is crystal clear: to stop litigations is a top priority for the pesticide maker. In doing so, Bayer attempts to scare farmers by announcing that the company might stop producing glyphosate altogether, because the US litigations over their harmful weedkiller is costing them billions in profits. This is what we call plain and simple "blackmailing" and "scaremongering". It’s another step in Bayer’s aggressive lobbying for its business interests. As a Wall Street Journal article stated "more than 90 percent of soybean, corn and cotton crops planted in the US are genetically modified to withstand glyphosate-based weedkiller, according to the agriculture department. American farmers apply almost 300 million pounds of glyphosate, the main ingredient in Roundup, to their fields each year." Seeking corporate impunity like this, is both unethical and irresponsible. The signatories of the open letter are telling the shareholders to demand Bayer to cease promoting the pesticide makers’ legal immunity bills in the US and to refrain from any further lobbying efforts that are damaging to the public interest, and to stop undermining scientific integrity by attacking independent science. Court documents show that Bayer and Monsanto have long and aggressively fought the science on glyphosate and glyphosate-based herbicides such as Roundup. In an open letter of April last year, Bayer called scientific studies brought forward in the litigations against Roundup “ junk science ”. This i ncludes studies by scientists working independently of pesticide companies, which were reviewed by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) and led it to classify glyphosate as a probable human carcinogen. There are indeed alternatives to the use of glyphosate-based herbicides, though it often requires a different approach. Scientists have made it abundantly clear that pesticide reduction is a prerequisite for a more sustainable food production. Just like Donald Trump got impunity for crimes he was involved in, Bayer is now also seeking legal immunity, by attacking the legal provisions in US law that protect citizens. Bayer’s efforts to change laws that protect people and planet indeed fits with the anti-democratic political wave ruling in Washington. With Bayer’s CEO Bill Anderson personally attending Trump's inauguration, Bayer seems to be cosying up to the new administration . Anderson was accompanied by Bayer's US CEO Sebastian Guth who posted on social media : "Congratulations to president Trump and vice president Vance on today's inauguration. (..) Ready to do my part in working with the Trump administration to make the impossible possible for all Americans." Immunity for Bayer from citizens seeking justice and repair should be the impossible here. Hans van Scharen and Nina Holland are researchers at Corporate Europe Observatory , the NGO monitoring Brussels lobbying. Hans van Scharen and Nina Holland are researchers at
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Corporate Europe Observatory
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With Bayer’s CEO Bill Anderson personally attending Donald Trump's inauguration, the German agri-giant Bayer seems to be cosying up to the new administration. Now a draft of the new US Farm Bill contains a section, reportedly “drafted with the aid of Bayer”, that would prevent state and local authorities from setting their own standards on pesticide safety warnings.
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[
"EU & the World",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2025-05-01T08:37:35.649Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ardebce703
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Smart Fortress Europe: How Greece uses tech to crack down on migration
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At 5AM on a chilly winter morning in 2022, a group of migrants were preparing an inflatable boat to cross the Evros River that forms the land border separating Turkey and Greece. After battling the strong current, they managed to reach EU soil and hide in the thick vegetation near the river bank – unaware that they had been under constant Greek surveillance long before they had even left Turkish soil. Shortly after the group emerged from their hiding spot, they were ambushed by a special unit of the Greek police dispatched there after an alert from the Automated Border Surveillance System that Athens has installed and is continuously upgrading in the region . Now covering much of the border described by European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen as Europe’s “shield” , this system can look deep into Turkish territory, boasting a range of up to 15 km, significantly enhancing pre-frontier surveillance for Greece and the EU. The incident, detailed in a police record obtained during this investigation, illustrates Greece’s and Europe’s growing reliance on technology to secure their borders and curb irregular migration. The arsenal at Europe’s disposal includes AI systems, drones, thermal cameras, dialect detectors, data phone extraction and sophisticated surveillance networks. Depending on the country using them, the aim of deploying these advanced and often costly systems is to help prevent migrant arrivals, scrutinise asylum claims and disrupt smuggling networks. Proponents argue that they are effective, provide safety, and can even be life-saving, helping, for example, to locate people in distress quicker than any border patrol ever could; critics counter that they are full of legal and moral pitfalls, undermining human rights, limiting access to asylum, infringing on migrants’ privacy, and can be used to facilitate collective expulsions - a practice that has been extensively documented and was recently described by the European Court of Human Rights as “systematic.” A Europe-wide border tech drive What is indisputable is that Europe is engaged in a technological push at its borders that spans from the Evros River in the southeast to the English Channel in the northwest. This push is set against a backdrop of voter anxiety over migration , a widespread resentment toward migrants recorded across the continent , rising far-right movements riding high on anti-migration platforms, and the adoption of hardline policies by traditional parties in response to those developments almost everywhere in Europe. Migration has played a key role in upending the continent’s political landscape, most notably in the EU’s three largest and most influential member-states, Germany , France and Italy , and has also bolstered the UK’s anti-migrant, right-wing Reform party . In Greece, polls suggest a strong majority wants tougher border protection, while 17 percent of Greeks name migration as one of the two greatest threats facing the country. A months-long investigation published today in Solomon, Tagesspiegel (Germany), Inkstick (USA), El País (Spain) and the Wochenzeitung (Switzerland) offers a comprehensive account of Europe’s tech-oriented approach to border control and its many risks, drawing on field reporting from nine countries, more than 100 interviews with policymakers, NGOs, security officials, asylum seekers and refugees, and an extensive review of public and confidential documents. Greece: a smart borders leader As a frontline EU state bordering Turkey (the country hosting the world’s largest refugee population ), Greece is spearheading Europe’s efforts to implement AI and other tech solutions in border control. “Secure your borders, and the money will keep flowing. That’s the message from the EU in a nutshell,” said a top Greek official, who has been privy to discussions between Athens, Brussels, and European capitals for years. Greece has secured €1.6bn from the EU’s home affairs funds for 2021-2027. Athens will invest heavily in border security and surveillance, including in AI-based systems, while a very small chunk of these funds is earmarked for improving search-and-rescue capacities, arguably reflecting where European priorities lie. One flagship EU-funded project is called Reaction. AI-powered drones and vehicles will monitor borders in real-time, detect “threats” before they reach the border, and integrate with systems like Eurosur, the EU’s border surveillance system . In a promotional video of the project , a swarm of drones can be seen autonomously identifying and tracking persons of interest. “These drones will have adaptive algorithms learning where to look and what to do, covering vast areas without human intervention,” said a senior migration official familiar with the project, adding that Reaction will be particularly useful in surveilling remote and difficult to reach areas near the border, and will be operational in 2025. Justifying the drive for border tech, a senior Greek government source said that “arrivals of more than 30,000 a year are challenging, so we have to focus on stopping criminal smugglers from pushing migrants into Greece any way we can.” This informal target was dwarfed, however, in 2024, when more than 62,000 new migrant arrivals were recorded – double the limit considered tolerable by Athens, and 40 percent higher compared to previous year. Government officials expect migratory pressures to continue in 2025. This “aggravated period” for migration was the main reason Greece’s migration ministry declined to provide any answers or comments for this investigation on “sensitive operational issues that concern the security of the country.” Sleepless watchers While most 2024 arrivals were recorded on Greece’s Aegean islands, the Evros land border remained relatively quiet, and this has not gone unnoticed in the EU. In late 2024, at a gathering of law enforcement officials from across the bloc in Warsaw, where the EU’s border agency Frontex is headquartered, participants lauded Greece’s success in keeping migrant arrivals at the land border under control. This success was largely attributed to the effective use of what participants called “technical barriers,” people familiar with the meetings recounted. These barriers include a 5-meter-tall steel fence, already covering a substantial part of the 192-km land border with Turkey. The fence, which is planned to expand, likely with EU funding that had been previously denied to Athens , is augmented by a sophisticated array of technologies, including AI-equipped drones, ubiquitous cameras, and rapid-response teams. Tech in the service of thwarting migrant arrivals was the focus of a detailed report published in late 2024 by BVMN, an independent network of NGOs that monitor human rights violations at external EU borders. The report describes Evros as a “technological testing ground” for Europe. The borderline, along with the watchtowers and surveillance antennas dotting the Evros landscape, were recently mapped for the first time by the research group Forensis using satellite imagery, public tenders, and open source material. Camera feeds are relayed to monitoring hubs near border towns, where officers sit behind wooden desks surrounded by screens, watching nearly every inch of the border and pre-frontier areas. When drones or cameras detect activity, an alarm is triggered. Greek law enforcement will then often alert their Turkish counterparts, sharing coordinates based on shared maps, according to descriptions of the procedure by security officials. Turkish authorities often respond, while Greek patrols step in when they don’t. This type of bilateral cooperation, which also includes regular in-person meetings between senior Greek and Turkish officials, was confirmed by both Greek and Turkish sources. According to official data , Turkey apprehended more than 225,000 migrants in 2024, with thousands picked up near the border with Greece . A senior Greek official described these automated systems as akin to sleepless watchers that improve the efficiency of border personnel. Their AI capabilities can “interpret camera footage to identify potential threats such as individuals carrying a weapon” as opposed, say, to a fishing rod. But ultimately, the same official said, the decision on how to act still stays with flesh-and-blood officers. Erosion of the right to asylum Pre-frontier screening capabilities raise concerns. These systems not only make crossing the Evros harder, but can potentially prevent people in search of international protection from even coming close to the river. Frontex’s fundamental rights officer, Jonas Grimheden, for example, warned in an interview that while these technologies can make border management more efficient, they may also prevent people from exercising their right to seek asylum. This right is guaranteed both by Greek and EU law . “The use of technology and AI in migration management is increasingly deployed for border control and deterrence, and investment is focused on preventing persons entering [EU territory], which, of course, often comes at a high human cost, while overlooking the broader socio-economic drivers of migration,” said Hanne Beirens, the Migration Policy Institute Europe director. Greece is supposed to replicate the Evros model at its northern borders with North Macedonia and Albania, again with EU funding secured. A €48m project under the EU’s 2021-2027 migration and home affairs fund envisions the installation of automated surveillance systems at these two borders. This time, however, the goal will be to prevent migrants from moving along the Balkan route towards Western Europe, in what is known as “secondary movement”. Destination countries like Germany have been concerned about secondary migration, raising the issue time and again, including publicly and at the highest level . Greece has been traditionally reluctant to apply the same level of vigilance at exit as in entry points, police officials said, a deliberate policy that has been well-documented . Evading Greece through Bulgaria With Greece’s land border with Turkey becoming increasingly impenetrable, many asylum seekers are opting for an alternative entry point into the EU: Bulgaria. While human rights violations have been consistently reported there as well, and Bulgarian authorities thwart tens of thousands of migrant crossings , the Bulgarian border with Turkey is considered more permeable than Greece’s. Asylum applications in Bulgaria more than doubled between 2021 and 2023 . Greek border officials speculated that this trend could also be attributed to Bulgaria’s softer penalties for migrant smuggling compared to draconian Greek laws , corruption, as well as smuggler networks often being run by Bulgarians as opposed to foreigners in the case of Greece. The town of Harmanli, just a few kilometres from the Turkish border, illustrates the trend. This is where we meet Hamid Khoshseiar, an Iranian refugee working for Mission Wings , a small NGO. It was in August, the heat was scorching, and Mission Wings had just received GPS coordinates via WhatsApp from a group of asylum seekers who said they were severely dehydrated and in urgent need of medical help. The NGO passed on the coordinates to the police, requesting an ambulance. “Such cries of help are increasingly common,” Khoshsiar says. Bulgaria has also been moving toward “smart border” solutions, partly under EU requirements to be fully admitted into the border-free Schengen area. Drones and cameras have been bought with funding from Brussels, though implementation has lagged, according to Hope Barker, a researcher from the UK, who has studied the technologisation along the Turkish-Bulgarian border . Bulgaria finally secured admission into Schengen in December 2024, with the EU Commission expecting that both Sofia and Bucharest (Romania was concomitantly admitted) “will … tackle migratory challenges.” A tech bonanza in the Aegean Back in Greece, the more porous sea border with Turkey which accounted for most irregular border crossings in the EU last year , is also becoming increasingly reliant on tech to deter irregular crossings. As in Evros, Greek authorities use radar systems and thermal cameras for the early detection of vessels before they leave Turkish waters. In a written response, the Hellenic Coast Guard explained that once suspicious vessels are detected, Greek authorities typically notify their Turkish counterparts asking them to prevent them from entering Greek territorial waters. “Greek authorities employ sophisticated surveillance tools to monitor maritime activity around Greek territorial waters [that] allow for the early detection of vessels, particularly those suspected of engaging in illegal activities such as human trafficking or irregular migration,” it said. These advanced systems include long- and short-range radars that provide real-time data to patrol units, thermal imaging and high resolution optical cameras that allow the monitoring and detection of vessels 24/7, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and drones equipped with high-definition cameras and tracking systems which provide aerial surveillance, especially over difficult to access areas and the open sea. Tech at the sea border still plays, however, a comparatively minor role, according to a senior government official with direct knowledge of the situation, but the goal is for this to change soon. Currently no systems are based on AI, but the official said that Athens plans to improve this with new EU-funded systems and equipment. The Coast Guard and police are indeed upgrading their capabilities with substantial EU funding. More than €25m has been allocated for mobile surveillance technologies, including thermal cameras and heartbeat detectors, while €35.4m is earmarked for electronic border surveillance systems. Investments also include unmanned helicopters, SUVs equipped with thermal cameras, and maritime surveillance tools. On top of that, the Greek defence ministry has earmarked €21m for the procurement of sea border surveillance systems, of which €4m will be spent on the purchase of drones. With legal pathways to asylum still limited and preventive tech amplified, migrants are increasingly turning to well-armed smugglers using speedboats, prone to resorting to violence and dangerous manoeuvres to evade apprehension, making an already dangerous journey even more perilous . The International Organization for Migration has recorded 173 dead and missing migrants in the Eastern Mediterraean in 2024, including 27 children. As for those who do manage to reach the Greek islands, they often encounter another type of border tech: sophisticated surveillance systems. Island panopticons When hundreds of asylum seekers gathered to protest Israel’s response to the October 7 Hamas attacks at the migrant camp on the island of Samos, Greek authorities acted swiftly and decisively. According to eyewitnesses, an AI-equipped drone was immediately deployed. It hovered over the protestors, capturing images and video in real time, the feed also relayed to Athens. Almost instantly, the gates separating the different sections of the EU-funded camp were locked, and five asylum seekers were arrested. “The cameras have an AI algorithm that allows them to centre in where there’s commotion, sending alerts to both the Migration Ministry and the camp’s camera hub,” a migration ministry official explained. High security, drones, and AI systems have been hailed as innovative and essential features of the barb-wired, EU-funded camp in Samos. These systems can track movement, identify individuals, and lock down sections of the camp with minimal human intervention. “The camp is designed to protect those outside, not inside it,” a person familiar with the camp’s operations said. But several officials disputed this perspective. “Protection of [privacy] is important, but security is also a grave issue. The new camps are unfairly criticised; they provide safety. There is no more violence,” a former senior migration official countered, contrasting the situation at the new camp in Samos to the “lawless situation” that preceded its opening. Nevertheless, sources close to the asylum process suggested that the data collected could even influence asylum decisions, with behaviour flagged by the surveillance systems potentially used as grounds for rejection. Asylum officers are independent according to Greek law, but periodically receive “guidelines” from central authorities, which leaves room for more ad hoc practices, the same sources said. Hyperion and Centaur: two controversial systems The Samos camp boasts two flagship surveillance systems, meant to serve as models for similar facilities across Greece: Hyperion and Centaur, named after a Titan and a creature that was half-human and half-horse in Greek mythology, respectively. Hyperion controls entry and exit, requiring asylum seekers to present electronic cards that contain the biometric data of the holder: an electronic photo, fingerprints and the signature of the holder, read by Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) devices, as well as fingerprint authentication for access. Centaur handles electronic and physical security in and around the facility using AI-powered motion analysis cameras and drones managed by the migration ministry. Both systems have faced scrutiny . In April 2024, Greece’s Data Protection Authority (DPA) imposed a record fine of 175,000 euros on the migration ministry for “serious shortcomings” regarding compliance with GDPR rules. Christos Kalloniatis, a professor at the University of the Aegean and a member of Hellenic DPA’s board, said the ministry has since responded to the authority’s observations and the government’s responses are currently under review. Kalloniatis warned that every system was susceptible to bias and it was up to humans to eliminate such risks. “Bias exists if the people running these systems are depending only on them, rather than using them as tools that help them make a decision,” he said. He added that preventing and addressing violence was welcome, but it was a problem if asylum seekers, who found themselves in a situation of clear imbalance of power, were not adequately informed about their rights, what happens to their data, who has access to it and why, and did not give their informed consent. Data privacy concerns What is worrying Kalloniatis is already a reality on the ground. Migrants’ phones are often confiscated, passwords obtained, and personal data extracted. In some cases, specialised software is used; in others, officials simply photograph the contents on the screens of unlocked phones. The Greek police did not respond to requests for comment for this investigation. The Hellenic Coast Guard said that they can and do confiscate migrants’ phones, but officers follow “strict legal procedures” under judicial oversight, and only as part of broader criminal investigations such as human trafficking or smuggling. “The phones can contain critical evidence, including communication records, GPS data, or contact information, [that can] help authorities track and disrupt trafficking networks,” the coast guard said. This is not always the case, however. Three young Syrian asylum seekers interviewed in Samos said that their phones, as well as those of everyone they knew, had been seized by the authorities and returned later without explanation or any suspicion of them being involved in criminal activities. They were never told why their phones had been taken, did not sign any consent forms, and were not told when their devices might be returned. “They kept mine for a week after asking me to unlock it. Others were asked to write down their passwords alongside the phone model,” said one of the asylum seekers. Security sources confirmed that confiscations did occur regularly without judicial oversight or proper documentation. The data extracted from phones is used not only in criminal proceedings, but also in risk assessments and reports by security agencies, such as the Greek police, Frontex and Interpol. “The data analysis is aimed at assisting authorities in identifying individuals, uncovering criminal networks, and ensuring public order and security” the coast guard said. We reviewed three reports based on extracted phone data. One, authored by Frontex, included information and pictures from social media and texts from messaging apps found on migrants’ phones to map smuggling networks. A second report, this time by the Greek police, included geolocation data, message exchanges with facilitators, and photos of tickets and itineraries. The third said migrants had offered their passwords “voluntarily.” Greek law enforcement officials said that even private photos and other data are sometimes accessed. Even when migrants had them deleted from their physical devices, they are sometimes still accessible from the cloud. Though one official said that law enforcement is not interested in things like the private photos or moments of owners, this casualness regarding migrants’ privacy appears at odds with the preoccupation of Europeans with protecting their own personal data. Law enforcement officials also disclosed the informal sharing of information on migrants with counterparts from non-EU countries, bypassing the EU’s GDPR - touted as the toughest privacy and security law in the world - and other legal restrictions. This is done through informal channels like messaging apps between border guards who want to expedite the sharing of information, a process described as too time-consuming when proper channels are used. Germany: institutionalised intrusiveness In Germany, unlike the often ad hoc Greek approach to migrants’ data, the extraction of information from phones and the use of contentious AI technology is part of the standard asylum process. The agency responsible for processing asylum claims is the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF). Greek government officials and civil servants who spoke on condition of anonymity described BAMF as one of the most technologically advanced asylum agencies in Europe. BAMF itself is not modest about its technological prowess, boasting on its website that it is “a pioneer in the digitalisation of the asylum process” and touting its reliance on “innovative technologies.” The agency employs several such systems, with four standing out: automated dialect recognition, AI-assisted reviews of asylum applications, mass data extraction from mobile phones and transliteration software for Arab names. BAMF uses the systems “exclusively to support the asylum procedure,” while decisions on asylum applications “will continue to be made exclusively” by specialists, the agency said. Despite these assurances, all these systems have drawn criticism, be it for their impact on the fundamental rights and privacy of asylum seekers, low accuracy, high cost or a combination thereof. Stephan Scheel, a professor of political sociology at Leuphana University Lüneburg in Germany, who has researched the identification technologies used by BAMF, says mobile phone data extraction is the most problematic of the systems used by the agency. While asylum seekers theoretically have the right to refuse the extraction of their phone data, the consequences can be severe - refusal may result in the termination of their asylum process, according to documents asylum seekers have to sign. BAMF gains, therefore, access to an inordinate amount of personal information, including call logs, text messages, photos, metadata, contacts, and even passwords stored in browsers and social media accounts, even from the phones of minors. This data trove is analysed by automated systems and often used during asylum interviews to evaluate the legitimacy of claims and the trustworthiness of asylum seekers. Despite being declared unlawful by a federal court in early 2023 unless less intrusive methods are used to identify the person, BAMF continues to sidestep the ruling . The system is also riddled with glitches: data is frequently inadequate, older devices are incompatible with BAMF software, and phones with multiple previous owners can produce contradictory results. Efficiency is far from stellar: the system failed to provide usable results in 73 percent of cases, according to the most recent available data . Another controversial tool in BAMF’s arsenal is the Dialect Recognition Assistant System (DIAS), intended to verify if asylum seekers originate from the regions they claim, having them speak into a telephone receiver and describe a picture. This technology has garnered interest from other countries, including Greece. “This is a tool we would like to have,” a senior official with direct knowledge of the country’s asylum system said, commenting on the perennial lack of human translators and cultural mediators in the Greek system. The third tool used by BAMF is the AI-assisted review for asylum applications (ASM), which analyses asylum seekers’ interview transcripts to flag security-related issues. If the system raises an alert, asylum officers have the option to notify the security authorities. This can result in the rejection of asylum applications . The fourth system automatically converts Arabic names into Latin script to standardise spellings and infer a person’s region of origin. This technology aims to detect false statements from refugees and is used when no identification documents with Latin spellings are available. The transliteration software is not a precise science either: it suggests three to four possible name origins and in the first half of 2023, 49 percent of the software’s results could not be verified. Hiding in WWII bunkers to avoid drones Across the continent, the UK has long cooperated with Greece, with which it shares the same challenge : preventing boat crossings. Last year, more than 33,000 people crossed the English Channel from France in small boats, prompted by factors such as having family in the UK and knowledge of the English language. These highly politicised crossings can prove fatal. The Channel saw its deadliest year on record in 2024, with 82 people declared missing, according to the International Organization for Migration . In late July, a solemn memorial was held in a quiet park in central Calais, the port city in France that is the major departure point of small boats crossing the channel. The memorial was to honour Dina Al Shammari, a 21-year-old woman crushed to death in an overcrowded dinghy that had departed from here. Attendees, many of whom work with displaced individuals hoping to reach the UK, added her name to a growing list of victims recorded on a scroll that stretched several meters when laid down on the grass. Al Shammari’s death occurred despite the millions invested by the UK government in border deterrence measures. In November, newly elected Labour prime minister Keir Starmer announced an additional £75m (€89.45m) in funding for border security, bringing the total investment in the newly established Border Security Command to £150m over the next two years. Downing Street emphasised technology as a cornerstone in the effort to “investigate and break people smuggling networks.” A Home Office spokesperson described the English Channel crossings as “lethally dangerous and totally unnecessary.” Several companies have capitalized on this focus, including Anduril Industries, a US defense technology firm headed up by Donald Trump supporter Palmer Luckey , known for its autonomous watchtowers along the US-Mexico border. Anduril has sold similar technology to the British government. The company claims its sentry towers utilise cutting-edge AI, machine learning, and computer vision to detect border crossings. These maritime towers can identify vessels up to 20km offshore. Human rights groups in northern France reported that this extensive surveillance infrastructure fails to deter crossings or prevent deaths. Instead, these expensive systems often serve as passive observers, watching people drown or suffocate during perilous journeys. Drones have also been used in the UK to support prosecutions of people who are criminalised for driving the dinghies into British territory, with sources saying the new government in London will continue this policy. On the beaches of northern France, migrants now evade drones and patrols by hiding in old World War II bunkers. Those interviewed in Calais are acutely aware of the drones, recognising their sound and knowing where to take cover. Faheem*, a 42-year-old Sudanese economics graduate, recounted hearing drones during his recent attempt to cross. “It’s always there,” he said. “You can hear and see the flash.” Others, like Mustafa*, a young Sudanese man living in a tent, remains undeterred despite frequent tear-gassing by police. For many, returning to their war-torn homelands is not an option, and no deterrence measure - no matter how advanced - is sufficient to dissuade them. “Is there any other way?”, Mustafa asks. “War is everywhere in Sudan.” Hibai Arbide Aza , Giorgos Christides , Katy Fallon and Florian Schmitz are investigative journalists based in Greece, covering migration and the EU external borders. Marguerite Meyer is an investigative journalist and writer based in Switzerland, covering human rights. Deana Mrkaja is a journalist based in Germany, covering tech. This investigation was originally published on Solomon. Hibai Arbide Aza , Giorgos Christides , Katy Fallon and Florian Schmitz are investigative journalists based in Greece, covering migration and the EU external borders. Marguerite Meyer is an investigative journalist and writer based in Switzerland, covering human rights. Deana Mrkaja is a journalist based in Germany, covering tech. This investigation was originally
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published
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With EU funding, Greece is ramping up its use of drones and AI to monitor migration. A cross-border investigation by Solomon, Tagesspiegel, Inkstick, El País and Wochenzeitung reveals how far the surveillance system stretches.
|
[
"Migration",
"Digital"
] |
migration
|
2025-04-30T10:29:14.367Z
|
https://euobserver.com/migration/ar7dc60b94
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Deregulation of green reporting rules – how business fooled us all
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Business got what it wanted — the gutting of the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) will be examined by the European Parliament and EU ministers. The deregulation package called Omnibus will probably be adopted and corporate obligations will be significantly weakened. How the proposal was handled, and its lack of substantive justification, causes outrage, but what escapes many commentators is that the corporations have managed to deceive us all. First, they have convinced the European Commission that they are unable to meet the CSDDD requirements, while they claim to meet more far-reaching standards, such as the OECD Guidelines and the UN Guiding Principles , called “minimum safeguards”. In a nutshell, under the EU Taxonomy, companies must report whether they operate following the above-mentioned principles. Both outline what responsible business conduct entails and expect companies to identify, prevent, mitigate, and account for how they address actual and potential adverse impacts on people and the environment. They are far-reaching, and certainly, one cannot meet their requirements "by accident." For example, the OECD Guidelines expect companies to take responsibility for their whole value chain – from the source of the first raw material to supermarket shelves. At the same time, the CSDDD requires companies to take care of their supply chains (calling it “a chain of activity” because as we know the EU is all about avoiding confusion) only “when relevant” and insofar as their business partners are related to the production of goods or the provision of services of the company. Additionally, the CSDDD only partly includes harms related to what happens after the product leaves the company, excluding many risks tied to sales or design, and giving especially light obligations to sectors like finance or consulting. Regarding human rights and environmental impacts covered by the OECD Guidelines, the scope is open-ended, meaning that virtually all internationally recognised human rights and harmful environmental impacts should be considered by companies while performing due diligence. In contrast, the CSDDD covers only the impact linked to one of the international agreements explicitly listed in Annexes to the directive. This means that, unlike the OECD Guidelines, the CSDDD leaves out many rights and environmental harm that result from irresponsible business activity. Most notably, the Paris Agreement is not on the list. These examples are intended to convey two key messages: the OECD Guidelines, hence "minimum safeguards," require a lot of work to be implemented, and they go beyond the CSDDD. In that light, it should be assumed that it would be more difficult to comply with the guidelines than with the CSDDD, right? Well, apparently not. Companies have succeeded in lobbying for deregulation at the expense of all of us. However, this does not mean that civil society should give up Based on the research conducted by Morningstar Sustainalytics 90 percent of companies report compliance with the minimum safeguards. At the same time, companies call obligations stemming from the CSDDD “ extensive ”, “ not workable in practice ” and causing an overwhelming amount of new financial and administrative burden on companies ”. Putting aside that this overwhelming new financial burden is equal to just 0.13 percent of the total dividend s paid out to shareholders in 2023 ( , not profits), the two statements cannot be true. About 90 percent of companies cannot comply with minimum safeguards and at the same time believe that less far-reaching CSDDD will crush European companies and their competitiveness. Either the companies, the overwhelming majority of them, are lying about meeting the minimum safeguards, or the CSDDD is not a regulation they cannot meet, as they already report doing much more. The deregulation package proposed by EU commission president Ursula von der Leyen will further dilute the CSDDD, stripping the directive of any meaning. Observing the atmosphere in the European Parliament and the Council, this is likely to succeed. So what can be done about it? There is a high probability that companies lie in their operations reports. These reports are subject to oversight, and lying about minimum safeguards is the same as lying about financial data. The legal path that seems possible, therefore, is to call on the auditors to look into the matter in depth, as well as potential breach notices under commercial law. Companies have succeeded in lobbying for deregulation at the expense of all of us. However, this does not mean that civil society should give up. The best sanitiser is light. So let's not let companies lie in the dark. Franciszek Nowak is a lawyer specialising in climate law and human rights. He co-authored a guide on EU greenwashing regulations and a publication on the EU Taxonomy , offering businesses practical compliance insights. Franciszek Nowak is a lawyer specialising in climate law and human rights. He co-authored a guide on EU greenwashing regulations and a publication on the EU Taxonomy
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, offering businesses practical compliance insights.
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Despite most companies claiming compliance with the OECD's tougher environmental standards, the EU's decision to water down its new green reporting law (CSDDD) raises serious questions. Environmental lawyer Franciszek Nowak argues that companies that lie in their operations reports should be held accountable.
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[
"Green Economy",
"Opinion"
] |
green-economy
|
2025-04-29T16:10:38.251Z
|
https://euobserver.com/green-economy/ar8134fa80
|
Inspirations for democracy from pope Francis' legacy
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One man was elected to an autocratic office with a large majority, but ruled in a democratic manner. Another man was narrowly elected to a democratic office, but rules like an autocrat. We live in strange times. I am talking about pope Francis and US president Donald Trump. The pope is the leader of the Catholic Church, which has 1.4 billion followers, and in that role, he enjoys full supremacy. In the words of the catechism: "The pope enjoys, by divine institution, supreme, full, immediate, and universal power in the care of souls." He alone also represents the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of Vatican City, the small territory in Rome. There were high hopes and fears when cardinal Jorge Mario Bergoglio was elected pope Francis in 2013. Catholics are divided between social liberals, who are mostly found in Europe, and social conservatives, who are mostly found in the US and many parts of the 'Global South'. This division is well known in many societies, but within the global Catholic community, it gives rise to issues of a complexity similar to those faced by the UN. Given his background, left-leaning Catholics expected pope Francis to make progressive decisions. His parents fled Italian fascism for Argentina, and as an archbishop he worked in the shantytowns of Buenos Aires. He had a down-to-earth, approachable style that contrasted sharply with the often formal, ceremonial demeanour of the high clergy. He was a man of the people. They thought: Now that he held supreme power, he could simply enact the changes they longed for, whether relating to same-sex marriage, birth control, or the celibacy of priests. Such changes were feared by social conservatives. The familiar battle lines of the culture war were drawn. However, Francis did not use his supreme power to decisively arbitrate in either direction. He disappointed the left's expectations of clear victories, but that did not make him a social conservative. Instead of outcomes, he looked at process. When asked about gay people, he responded "who am I to judge?". He announced that he wanted pastoral work to be more open and inclusive. He used the Synod, the authoritative meeting of bishops on church matters, to listen to ideas and positions, rather than imposing his own . He wanted the clergy, theologians, and laypeople to freely discuss the issues, without the formulaic language that means little to today's publics. He gave local priests more freedom to decide how to deal with divorced and remarried Catholics. He permitted priests to bless same-sex couples, while not obliging those who opposed the idea to do so too. Although he rejected the idea of women becoming priests, he promoted women into important administrative positions. Democracies should take some inspiration from Francis' legacy. The solution to highly polarised issues is not to use narrow majorities to overpower dissent with laws and policy, but to broaden support in society for a given position. It is an aberration that a US president, who is supposed to oversee the day-to-day running of the government, makes himself the sole arbiter of significant moral issues. Pope Francis also urged his church to present their case in simple language and to speak from the heart rather than using abstractions to shame others into superficial acceptance. On these points, the pope has been an inspiration. Most analysts agree that he has changed the culture of the Roman Catholic church to make it more accessible and less hierarchical. He has tried to distil opinions from discussions rather than impose them, and has allowed more freedom for local approaches. In management science, organisational culture is considered to be of great importance. In fact, it is considered to be more relevant than documents or guidelines. The popular slogan is 'culture eats strategy for breakfast'. In this context, Francis' cultural change has been significant. However, there is another side to Francis' legacy: The question of the Church's dogma and the role of the pope — in other words, the institutional repercussions of his papacy. In this respect, Francis was conservative. He largely upheld dogma and did nothing to diminish the pope's overwhelming power. He could have done so. The pope's supremacy also means that he can reduce his own power. Two millennia of church history provide precedents for different institutional design. Institutions do matter for organisations. Culture does not eat institutions for breakfast. It is more likely that institutions eat culture for dinner. Once a new pope has settled in, he could use the institution of supremacy and undivided power to steer the church and its culture in a very different direction. Therefore, pope Francis' achievements should not be overstated. Much will depend on his successor. However, his emphasis on discussion and consensus-building could serve as an inspiration to democracies that have become overly focused on policies and laws. Michael Meyer-Resende is the executive director of Democracy Reporting International , a non-partisan NGO in Berlin that supports political participation. He is currently a fellow of the Mercator Foundation. Michael Meyer-Resende is the executive director of Democracy Reporting International
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, a non-partisan NGO in Berlin that supports political participation. He is currently a fellow of the
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Democracies should take some inspiration from pope Francis' legacy. The solution to highly polarised issues is not to use narrow majorities to overpower dissent with laws and policy, but to broaden support in society for a given position, writes Michael Meyer-Resende.
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[
"EU & the World",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] |
*
|
2025-04-28T15:10:56.342Z
|
https://euobserver.com/*/ar62bd7c9c
|
Trump's upturning of trade risks five million European jobs
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While the ideology underpinning US president Donald Trump’s disruptive trade policy remains uncertain, one thing is clear: the postwar settlement is quickly changing. The EU must take domestic action to protect jobs, but this new reality has far-reaching implications for the bloc’s trade strategy. The new reality really sank in for many during the security conference in Munich in mid-February. US vice-president JD Vance explained that the European security arrangement had come to an end, which was later confirmed by Trump. Then, with the tariffs on steel and aluminium and the already historic press conference in the Rose Garden of the White House, Trump also put the knife in the second leg of the institutional postwar settlement: economic liberalism, underpinned by free trade. As we in Europe are grappling with the consequences of these decisions, EU responses have so far been quite well-balanced and measured. Trade retaliatory measures against the US are currently on hold , but it is increasingly clear that further measures will be needed. Firstly, demand within Europe will have to be increased: we will need to spend more, jointly, but also in every member state and for this wages must increase and austerity must come to an end; and we will need to deepen our single market as a mere two percent increase in intra-EU trade will offset the impact of the tariffs. Secondly, our export markets must be expanded through new trade agreements. Chinese dumping? Thirdly, Chinese goods that would have been going to the US and might now come our way. This will require an assertive use of anti-dumping measures as well as a way of tackling overcapacity. Behind all the drama in news headlines, we find the reality that much of Trump’s disruptive and damaging politics will hit workers the hardest. The European Trade Union Institute estimates that about five million jobs in the EU are dependent on the export of goods to the US, mainly in the industrial sectors, but also in food production. This would come on top of already challenging conditions for workers in Europe facing deindustrialisation. For these reasons, the ETUC calls for a suspension of economic governance rules to allow for investments, a SURE 2.0 mechanism to mitigate the employment impact and support workers, as well as measures to prevent price-gouging and profiteering. However, in the shadows, we now see the European Commission increasing its negotiating activity for new free trade agreements. India, Thailand, Mexico, Mercosur One with India and Thailand might be just around the corner. Recently, an updated agreement with Mexico was announced. Ratification of the Mercosur agreement is being debated, and the changed geopolitical setting has intensified that debate. All of these new free trade agreements will have important consequences for workers. As trade unions, we have clear criteria to determine our support or opposition to trade agreements. The respect a democratic process with a role for trade unions from negotiation to monitoring and evaluation of the agreement is key. Labour and social rights must be at the centre with clear binding clauses and strong enforcement mechanisms, including sanctions, to address violations of workers’ rights. The agreements must also lead to a genuine diversification, not create further dependencies, and ensure sustainable supply chains especially in critical raw materials and clean energy. As the EU commission is finalising negotiations with various partners, let us therefore be clear trade unions will continue to demand meaningful involvement and strong enforcement mechanisms to protect rights and ILO standards. These are not only part of European values, but are also what upholds European competitiveness and our social model. Let us not, like the man who, in fear of death, committed suicide, give up on our European competitiveness and social market economy. As Europe and its security and economic architecture get a new footing, we must assure that our social model prevails. Workers and their unions must be fully involved at all stages in this process, and we stand ready to engage. Claes-Mikael Stahl is the deputy general secretary of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) Claes-Mikael Stahl
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is the deputy general secretary of the
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As the EU adapts to Trump's new trade agenda — with five million jobs at stake — it must protect its social model through investment, fair trade deals, and full union involvement in shaping the bloc’s strategy.
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[
"EU Political",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-political
|
2025-04-25T10:21:46.118Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-political/arf4f6ec7f
|
How the EU and Africa can partner to overhaul global finance
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This month marks twenty-five years since African and European leaders met in Cairo for the first Africa-Europe Summit. It was a time when much of the world was embracing multilateralism and globalisation. The African Union was established soon after, China joined the World Trade Organization, and the EU was expanding. While it had its imperfections, this era of multilateralism underpinned significant efforts to lift millions of people out of poverty, protect nature and fight climate change. Fast forward a quarter of a century, and the multilateral architecture is creaking and globalisation is reversing. Increased isolationism, spiralling debts, and rising insecurity have seen many high-income countries cut development aid, favouring defence spending and domestic interests. With each geopolitical shift, financing has also shifted. And it is the world’s most vulnerable who are left to pay the price. The reality is that multilateralism now faces a dual crisis — one of trust and one of financing. If the system cannot meet people’s needs, trust in its viability will further erode. We need a fundamental shift — a ‘Grand Bargain’ to transform the global financial landscape to deliver shared prosperity. The Africa-Europe partnership is well-positioned to champion such a Grand Bargain through ‘win-win’ multilateralism rather than a zero-sum approach to global economic and environmental governance. Increased competition does not have to equal increased isolationism. Instead, Africa and Europe together could rethink traditional financing models and lean into innovative solutions that bring real change, moving away from outdated models that push developing nations further into debt. Globally, 3.3 billion people live in countries whose debt payments exceed spending on health or education. The debt crisis has become an investment crisis, and by extension, a security one, limiting a country capacity to ensure critical economic, social and environmental safety nets. This is neither fair nor sustainable. With G20 finance ministers, the International Monetary Fund , and the World Bank Group gatherings this week, we have an opportunity to set in motion the required paradigm shift, underpinned by three core actions. Firstly, addressing the flow of funds. Too often, financing from international institutions is being used to service debts to private creditors and non-Paris Club lenders. In 2024, half of the $102 billion in debt service paid by African countries went to private creditors. The Financing for Development Lab’s Bridge proposal offers a potential solution to empower countries to break free from the debt trap and grow their economies. It’s a three-pronged approach where debtor countries develop an ambitious national investment push; multilaterals scale up their support; and all other creditors refrain from withdrawing capital prematurely. Secondly, putting in place global solidarity levies. Adopting internationally coordinated levies on heavy emitters and polluters - sectors benefitting from globalisation and yet undertaxed - would raise essential funds and increase tax fairness. The IMF recently estimated that taxes on international shipping and aviation could raise up to $200 billion a year in revenues by 2035. Achieving global consensus is, however, increasingly difficult in the current context. A pragmatic ‘coalition of the willing’ approach is needed, whereby a group of countries can lead the way in implementing coordinated levies at domestic level and commit to using the proceeds to invest in resilience and global public goods. Progress has been made, with 14 countries forming a Coalition for Solidarity Levies, nine of which are in Africa and Europe, supported by the European and African Union Commissions. But 14 is not enough. Other nations need to follow suit and align on how to establish such levies across multiple industries without exacerbating inequalities. Safeguards to protect developing countries and their citizens could include designing levies in the most progressive way, factoring per capita emission intensity and development stages, alongside dedicating a fair share of revenues to the most climate-vulnerable nations, channelling proceeds toward green investment and adaptation. Thirdly, tackling illicit financial flows. Africa is haemorrhaging money from illicit outflows to the tune of at least $88bn [€77.3bn] annually, equivalent to losing 3.7 percent of its annual GDP. A more coordinated Africa-Europe approach to curbing illicit financial flows is needed. This means enhancing accurate trade invoicing, tax compliance, corporate responsibility, and information sharing by leveraging advanced technologies and capacity building to track flows and generate innovative asset repatriation methods. These three shifts are by no means the only actions needed, but they can advance an Africa-Europe partnership that is built on shared respect, equity and ambition. And, critically, they can help steady a creaking multilateral financial system that, as a precondition for resilience, must address imbalances in representation and amplify the Global South’s voice. With the world undergoing rapid geopolitical shifts, we must avoid dynamics that threaten our planetary future, fuel inequality, and undermine win-win multilateralism. Now is the time to choose bold, innovative ideas that unite us in our shared pursuit of a peaceful, prosperous, and sustainable future. Members of Africa-Europe Foundation’s Women Leaders Network include: Mary Robinson, former Irish president and honorary president of the Africa-Europe Foundation, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, honorary president of the Africa-Europe Foundation, Nobel laureate, and former president of Liberia, Abla Abdel Latif, executive director and director of research at the Egyptian Center for Economic Studies, Hanan Morsy, deputy executive secretary and chief economist of the UN Economic Commission for Africa; Leah Seligmann, CEO of The B Team, Gunhild Stordalen, co-founder & executive chair EAT and Laurence Tubiana, CEO of the European Climate Foundation
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Members of Africa-Europe Foundation’s Women Leaders Network
|
With each geopolitical shift, financing has also shifted. And it is the world’s most vulnerable who are left to pay the price. A transformative 'Grand Bargain' is needed to address the dual crises of trust and financing in the multilateral system, say members of the Africa-Europe Foundation Women Leaders Network.
|
[
"EU & the World",
"Green Economy",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2025-04-24T15:06:39.366Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ard57382b9
|
Poland’s demographic crisis: a growing security threat for Nato eastern flank
|
Poland is widely viewed as a model Nato ally. The country is on track to spend nearly five percent of its GDP on defence—more than double the Nato target—while rapidly modernising its military and aiming to expand its professional armed forces to 300,000 troops. The Polish economy continues to post a strong performance, with a projected annual growth rate of three percent in the coming years. But behind this robust image lies a deep structural vulnerability that could undermine the country's defence posture in the decades ahead: demographics. Poland is shrinking—and aging. And this demographic decline is not just a social or economic concern. It is a strategic one. Without bold action, Poland’s dwindling and greying population risks hollowing out the country’s military potential and weakening Nato’s deterrence posture on its most exposed frontier. Poland has entered its seventh consecutive year of population decline, with the number of inhabitants falling to roughly 36.6 million in early 2024 — the steepest absolute drop in the European Union. Depending on the statistical methodology used, estimates of Poland’s population vary slightly, with some placing the figure closer to 38.5 million. But all data points in the same direction: sustained demographic contraction. The number of births has reached historic lows not seen since World War II. Fertility rates remain among the lowest in the EU, compounded by the shrinking cohort of women of childbearing age and persistent emigration, particularly among the young and educated. The Covid-19 pandemic further worsened the situation, contributing to excess deaths and reduced life expectancy. As of now, deaths have exceeded births in Poland for over a decade. According to the UN , the country's median age is already 42. By 2050, it will reach 52. The old-age dependency ratio—measuring the proportion of people aged 65 and over relative to those aged 15–64—is projected to rise to a staggering 56 by mid-century. Some forecasts suggest Poland’s population could fall to as low as 26.7 million by 2060, a 25 percent decline from current levels. UN projections indicate a possible drop to just 19 million by 2100. This is not an isolated trend in Europe, but Poland’s decline is particularly sharp and consequential. For comparison, Germany's population is projected to decline from 84 million to 70 million by 2100. Russia, from approximately 144 million to 126 million. Poland’s proportional decline is far more severe. Strategic Implications for NATO This demographic trajectory poses a direct threat to Poland’s military capacity. Fewer young people means a smaller recruitment pool for the armed forces at a time when the country aspires to play a leading role in Nato’s defence of the Eastern Flank. Military planners in Warsaw have already acknowledged that shrinking demographics are complicating efforts to staff the armed forces, even as the geopolitical pressure from Russia and Belarus intensifies. Poland’s position is not unlike that of Japan, where the defence forces are struggling to meet recruitment targets due to a dramatic fall in the number of young adults. Japan's 18-to-26-year-old population has shrunk by around 40 percent over the past three decades. The country now faces the daunting challenge of recruiting more than one percent of its total population to maintain defence readiness—a near-impossible task. For Poland, the consequences could be even more severe given its geographic exposure and its frontline role in regional security. Rethinking the Answer Boosting fertility rates is a long-term and uncertain endeavour. In the short to medium term, Poland will likely need to embrace immigration as a tool of national security. This would serve not only to stabilise the country’s population but also to ensure sufficient manpower for economic and military needs. There are models to draw from. The United States allows legal permanent residents to serve in its armed forces, and offers a pathway to citizenship through honourable service. France has its famed Foreign Legion. Israel recruits foreigners of Jewish heritage through its Mahal program. Poland, too, has an asset few countries can match: a diaspora of roughly 20 million people with Polish roots living abroad. Poland should consider offering structured pathways for members of the Polish diaspora—and other qualified immigrants—to serve in its armed forces in exchange for residency or eventual citizenship. Not only would this help close the recruitment gap, but it would also foster deeper bonds between Poland and its global community. Demographic decline not only erodes military strength, but it also weakens economic output, tax revenue, and geopolitical clout. Germany, despite facing its own demographic challenges, has been far more effective in using immigration to stabilise its population and workforce. This has allowed it to preserve its position as Europe’s economic powerhouse and political anchor. For Poland, failure to address demographic decline risks falling further behind, not just economically, but strategically. An ageing, shrinking population cannot sustain the ambitions of a regional power or the responsibilities of a security keystone. Moreover, the demographic collapse of neighbouring Ukraine—already battered by war—could exacerbate the problem. A depopulated Ukraine may become more vulnerable to long-term Russian influence, shifting the regional balance and further exposing Nato’s eastern frontier. Demographics are destiny—but they do not have to be a death sentence. Poland still has time to act. But confronting the demographic crisis requires bold, sometimes politically sensitive choices, particularly in immigration and defence recruitment policy. The strength of NATO’s Eastern Flank hinges not only on tanks and defence spending, but also on people. Without them, even the best-equipped armies are shells. The West should help Poland not only to rearm but also to repopulate. Piotr Arak is an assistant professor of economic sciences at the University of Warsaw and chief economist at VeloBank Poland.
|
Piotr Arak
|
Poland is widely viewed as a model Nato ally, being on track to spend nearly five percent of its GDP on defence. But behind this robust image lies a deep structural vulnerability that could undermine the country's defence posture in the decades ahead: demographics. Here's why.
|
[
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] |
health-and-society
|
2025-04-24T10:52:53.504Z
|
https://euobserver.com/health-and-society/ar2161cc04
|
Europe's health at a crossroads: Stronger efforts needed to achieve 2030 targets
|
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted by the United Nations in 2015, offer a shared global vision for a more prosperous and equitable world. SDG 3 focuses on ensuring healthy lives and promoting well-being for all, and target 3.3 sets the ambitious aim of ending the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), and combating hepatitis and sexually transmitted infections (STIs) by 2030. Although preventable, 820,000 people were living with HIV, 3.2 million with hepatitis B and 1.8 million with hepatitis C in the EU/EEA as of the end of 2023, and tens of thousands were diagnosed with TB or STIs such as gonorrhoea, chlamydia or syphilis. While Europe has made strides in public health, progress towards SDG 3.3 reveals a critical moment requiring renewed focus and urgent action. Where do we stand? The data that the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) has collected and presented in its newly released progress report shows a concerning picture. While progress has been made in reducing new HIV and TB infections, the current pace is insufficient to meet the 2030 targets. Alarmingly, some STIs, such as gonorrhoea and syphilis, are also resurging across Europe, and a lack of crucial data obscures the true scale of the challenges posed by chronic hepatitis B and C. More than a quarter of a million cases of HIV, TB, viral hepatitis, and STIs were reported last year in the EU/EEA, but these aren't just statistics. The numbers represent human suffering, lives at risk, families affected, and a significant burden on healthcare systems and economies. Despite being preventable, every year, over 57,000 people in the EU/EEA die from AIDS, TB, and hepatitis – a high toll for a continent with available resources, knowledge and effective tools for prevention and control. Key areas for urgent action The path forward needs courage and commitment, requiring a ramping up of efforts across three key areas: : Proven interventions like condom use, medication (PrEP) for HIV, preventative TB treatment, needle exchange programs, and hepatitis B vaccination should be scaled up and equitable access ensured. : Early detection and effective treatment are crucial, both for the health of the individuals impacted and for stopping onward transmission of these infections. We must break down barriers to access and ensure everyone receives the care they need. : Robust data collection and surveillance systems are essential to tailor interventions effectively for everyone, including vulnerable populations. Moving forward together Addressing these challenges requires focused action. Greater emphasis must be placed on scaling up proven prevention measures and ensuring equitable access to testing and treatment. Sustained efforts are needed to reduce mortality from preventable diseases, and improving the availability and quality of surveillance data is fundamental to track progress accurately. Europe needs a strong and united effort at all levels to accelerate progress, securing health for all today and the years to come. Established in 2005, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) is an EU agency dedicated to enhancing Europe's protection against infectious diseases. Its mission is to protect human health by identifying, assessing, and communicating current and emerging health threats. Established in 2005, the
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European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)
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While progress has been made in reducing new HIV and tuberculosis infections, the current pace is insufficient to meet the 2030 SDG 3 targets for HIV, TB, viral hepatitis, and STIs.
|
[] |
stakeholders
|
2025-04-23T14:00:02.181Z
|
https://euobserver.com/stakeholders/ar427b8248
|
Slovakia’s crackdown on NGOs echoes Putin’s playbook
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Just as the United States is scaling back its enforcement of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), Donald Trump’s acolytes in Eastern Europe are doubling down on legislation that is ostensibly presented as local versions of FARA, though true inspiration for it comes from Russia, rather than from the US. The Slovak parliament approved a draft bill last week which will crack down on civil society organisations that receive foreign funding, as well as on those that do not. Originally, parliamentarians from Robert Fico’s governing coalition were seeking to impose far-reaching disclosure requirements on NGOs involved in ‘political lobbying’ – a category that their proposal left undefined. While ‘lobbying’ and even references to ‘foreign agents’ were dropped from the final version of law, the new legislation subjects civil society organisations to the same freedom of information obligations as the public sector – supposedly because some NGOs receive public funding and also because the Slovak tax code allows for a version of tax-deductible gifts to charities. Clearly, the requirement can be selectively weaponised, and quite easily so, particularly against smaller NGOs who are unlikely to be in a position to dedicate resources to comply with a flood of requests for information. Instead of FARA, the Slovak law shares its DNA with Vladimir Putin’s infamous 2012 foreign agents law, which introduced far-reaching disclosure requirements on NGOs receiving foreign funding and involved in political activities, including mandatory labelling of all their written output as coming from ‘foreign agents’. Furthermore, non-compliance was criminalised – individuals caught participating in activities of ‘illegitimate’ NGOs could be sentenced to up to two years of prison or forced labour. In 2017, Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán sought to introduce a similar law, masquerading as a version of FARA, into the Hungarian legal system, only for it to be struck down by the European Court of Justice. Unconstrained by EU niceties, Georgia adopted its own law, prompting mass public protests. Most Georgian NGOs have refused to comply, and some have registered abroad to bypass the law’s requirements. This year, however, the ruling Georgian Dream Party is turning up the pressure by introducing new criminal penalties . “Over the past four years,” Georgia’s prime minister Irakli Kobakhidze claims , “there have been four attempts to organise a revolution in Georgia, all involving foreign agents and NGOs financed from abroad. This is completely unacceptable, and the transparency law is intended to prevent such attempts in the future.” While more cautious about clashing against EU law, such rhetoric is not alien to Slovakia’s Fico, who blamed George Soros, the Hungarian-American investor and philanthropist, and the US embassy for his ouster in 2018. Earlier this year, as his slim parliamentary majority faced large-scale protests, he suggested that “foreign specialists,” with experience from Georgia and Ukraine’s Maidan, were present in the country to orchestrate a putsch. One of his party officials, Erik Kaliňák, even made a trip to Georgia, supposedly to uncover connections between those opposing Georgian Dream and Slovakia’s political opposition. It is not a conspiracy to suggest that budding authoritarians, from Moscow through Tbilisi to Budapest and Bratislava, are learning from each other. In fact, in addition to Fico’s well-publicised trip to Moscow before Christmas last year, a group of Slovak parliamentarians followed in his footsteps in early January – including , lo and behold, one of the authors of the new Slovak legislation, Adam Lučanský. Fico himself is a former member of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, a vocal nostalgist of the communist era, and one of the few European leaders who have vowed to join Putin in Moscow again at the 9 May parade. However, that did not prevent him from being a guest of honour at the Conservative Political Action Conference in Washington DC in February. With a thin governing majority, Fico is not acting from a position of strength. Scapegoating NGOs and their supposed interference in Slovak politics might be a welcome distraction from the country’s looming economic woes, as Trump’s tariffs will likely drive Slovakia’s export-oriented automotive sector into a ditch in the coming months. But don’t expect Fico to back down. Things will likely have to get worse for Slovak democracy before they get any better. Dalibor Rohac is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington DC Dalibor Rohac is a senior fellow at the
|
American Enterprise Institute
|
Russia’s infamous foreign agent law has prompted a wave of imitators in Eastern Europe – most recently in Slovakia.
|
[
"EU & the World",
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] |
*
|
2025-04-23T12:55:45.227Z
|
https://euobserver.com/*/ard700cb80
|
How Trump both fuels and dims Europe’s anti-migration populism
|
The Trump administration’s policies have proven to be a force of disruption in the global political and economic landscape. While many expected Trump’s presidency to embolden far-right, anti-migration populist parties across Europe, the reality is far more complex. His tenure could both strengthen and inadvertently weaken the forces of anti-migration sentiment on the continent. The shifting global security landscape, trade wars, and the realignment of political alliances he has triggered are shaping the future of European migration politics in contradictory ways. Despite early fears that Trump’s presidency would embolden Europe’s far-right movements, an unexpected shift appears to be underway. Centrist and pro-European parties are gaining ground, and EU approval ratings among European citizens have reached record highs. Populations in countries that once flirted with populist leaders are showing renewed trust in moderate governance. In Canada, for instance, the Liberal Party, previously trailing the Conservatives, regained support after Trump’s election, as his policies alienated Canadian voters. A similar dynamic is emerging in Europe, where the chaotic nature of Trump’s administration is causing many to reconsider the viability of far-right populist leadership. Two key factors are contributing to this realignment. First, the changing global security landscape. Trump’s foreign policy decisions - including alienating Nato allies and cosying up to authoritarian leaders - have amplified Europe’s sense of geopolitical vulnerability. Combined with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, his unpredictable stance on alliances has led many Europeans to prioritise stability over populist posturing. Second, Trump’s direct impact on European trade. His imposition of tariffs on EU goods has angered business leaders and policymakers alike. While populists had long campaigned against the European Union, Trump’s actions are making EU membership more appealing. Confronted with external economic threats, many Europeans are rediscovering the value of collective strength over nationalist isolation. In this context, once a dominant political discourse issue, migration may take a backseat, as national security and economic resilience become more urgent. Indeed, polls across several European countries show that the importance people attach to the topic of migration and asylum is rapidly dropping. Economic turmoil: anti-migration sentiment catalyst or labour demand booster? Trump’s protectionist economic policies - especially his aggressive use of tariffs - are reshaping the global economic order. Trade wars with major economies are sparking global uncertainty, spooking stock markets, and pushing up inflation. Fears of a worldwide recession are mounting, and the cost of living is becoming a central political issue. Far-right leaders in Europe have long exploited economic anxiety by scapegoating migrants, linking financial strain to immigration. Trump’s trade wars could amplify this narrative, providing fresh momentum to anti-migration movements , especially in countries already struggling with economic discontent. Yet Trump’s economic approach contains a core contradiction. While trade tariffs aim to revitalise domestic industry, such protectionism collides with anti-migration policies. Ageing societies like the US face deep labour shortages, and revitalised industries will inevitably require more workers, many of whom will have to come from abroad. Instead of creating jobs in migrants' countries of origin to reduce the economic need to migrate, this strategy may ironically increase demand for migrant labour in destination countries. European economies face the same dilemma, underscoring the challenge of reconciling industrial renewal with restrictive migration agendas. In short, rather than curbing migration, Trump’s policies may highlight just how essential it is. What lies ahead for European migration policy? The long-term impact of Trump’s presidency on European migration policy remains uncertain. But his example serves as a cautionary tale. While populist rhetoric can be a powerful political tool, it often fails to translate into effective governance. The chaos and contradictions of Trump’s leadership have made many European voters wary of embracing similar figures - and reinforced the appeal of stability, moderation, and global cooperation. Probably quite contrary to his intentions, it seems that Trump, rather than a boost, might be a big blow to some of the far-right populist parties, which usually campaign on anti-migration agendas . At the same time, the populist wave is far from extinguished. Economic instability and social unrest can still serve as fuel for anti-migration sentiment. But migration is also a necessity. Many sectors across Europe rely on foreign labour, and demographic decline is a growing concern. Countries that have previously embraced hardline anti-migration policies have been forced to rethink their positions out of economic necessity. If centrist leaders can harness this moment - by offering pragmatic responses to economic and geopolitical challenges - they may succeed in also steering migration debates away from fear and toward reasoned, evidence-based policymaking. Bram Frouws is the director of the Mixed Migration Centre (MMC) Bram Frouws
|
is the director of the
|
The chaos and contradictions of US president Donald Trump’s leadership have made many European voters wary of embracing similar figures. Probably contrary to his intentions, it seems that Trump, rather than a boost, might be a big blow to some of the far-right populist parties, which usually campaign on anti-migration agendas.
|
[
"Migration",
"Opinion"
] |
migration
|
2025-04-23T09:44:30.016Z
|
https://euobserver.com/migration/ar1c473f38
|
Easter under siege — Gaza starvation and Europe’s moral reckoning
|
Even in the valley of death, the human spirit strains toward light. This Easter, in the land where resurrection was first proclaimed, there were no lilies, no hymns, no candlelit vigils — only the stubborn pulse of survival under siege. In Gaza, the bells are silent. The Holy Family Church, Gaza’s oldest and last-standing Catholic sanctuary, is now a shell — its stone walls scarred by artillery, its altar buried beneath rubble. Here, father Gabriel once welcomed hundreds for Easter Mass. This year, he buried entire families. The pews are broken. The stained glass shattered. Only the cross remains upright — a lone silhouette against a sky blackened by drones. Still, the faithful gathered. They came not dressed in white but wrapped in keffiyehs and blankets, displaced, grieving, defiant. Children painted Easter eggs not with dye, but with ash from burned homes. On scraps of cardboard, they scrawled the words, “We are still here.” And when the priest whispered, a mother in mourning whispered back, This year, Easter was not celebrated in Gaza. It was resisted. Across occupied Palestine, the story was the same. In Bethlehem — the cradle of Christianity — the procession of palms wound through checkpoints and surveillance towers. In Ramallah, young people staged a Passion Play where Jesus was not only crucified by empire, but stopped at an Israeli military checkpoint. And in Jerusalem, the Stations of the Cross were walked by grieving mothers, bearing the names of sons and daughters starved, sniped, or disappeared. In every step, they asked: What resurrection is possible in a land where children die of hunger before their first breath ? What redemption is there when the wombs that carried life are cut off from food, medicine, and water by siege and design? The truth is stark: this Easter unfolded in the shadow of genocide. Starvation — the most ancient of crimes — is being used as a method of war against Palestinians. It is not incidental. It is intentional. It is engineered. Since October 2023, Israel has declared a “complete siege” on Gaza, blocking the entry of food, fuel, electricity, and clean water. Israeli forces have bombed bakeries, destroyed water infrastructure, and attacked aid convoys. More than 30 children — including infants — have already died from malnutrition and dehydration. UN agencies warn that famine is imminent in northern Gaza, where nearly every child now suffers from “wasting,” the most severe form of hunger. Mothers are unable to produce breast milk. Infants are born underweight and die within days. Families grind animal feed into flour. Children chew on leaves. This is not a natural disaster. It is policy. The use of starvation as a weapon of war is prohibited under international humanitarian law, including Article 54 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. It is also defined as a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Where committed with genocidal intent — the intent to destroy a people in whole or in part — it may also constitute genocide. And yet, Europe remains complicit. While Palestinian children starve, the EU continues to fund, arm, and normalise relations with the very regime imposing the siege. Despite Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement conditioning cooperation on respect for human rights, the agreement remains in force. Despite the EU common position on arms exports, which prohibits transfers when there is a clear risk of violations of international humanitarian law, weapons continue to flow. Easter in Gaza, then, is not just a tragedy. It is a moral indictment. Because while Europe celebrates the rebirth of spring with chocolate and daffodils, Palestinian Christians — among the oldest Christian communities in the world — are burying their children under olive trees and rubble. In Rafah, youth volunteers painted cracked walls with sunrises and doves. In Beit Sahour, they held candlelight vigils for the children of Gaza — Christian and Muslim — whose names will never be read in any European parliament. In Jenin, they planted olive trees — not as symbols of peace, but of permanence. They do not ask Europe for charity. They ask for courage. To recognise the Christian heritage of Europe is to recognise the Christian presence in Palestine. The land that bore Christ now bears mass graves. The olive groves where Jesus walked were bulldozed by military tanks. The land of resurrection has become a place of engineered starvation. This is not only a legal failure. It is a theological one. If Easter means anything — if resurrection still holds meaning — then let it be this: life must rise where death reigns, justice must rise where impunity governs, and international law must rise where it has long been buried. The youth of Palestine are not asking for symbols. They are demanding structural change. They ask Europe not to pray for peace while profiting from war. Not to light candles while extinguishing rights. Not to lament tragedy while enabling it through policy. This Easter, Europe must rise. Suspend the EU-Israel Association Agreement. Enforce an arms embargo. Uphold international humanitarian and criminal law. Recognize the State of Palestine — not as an act of sentiment, but as a commitment to ending permanent displacement, siege, and dehumanization. Because in Gaza, Easter is not about tradition. It is about survival. And the children of Gaza are watching. So is history.
|
What resurrection is possible in a land where children die of hunger before their first breath? What redemption is there when the wombs that carried life are cut off from food, medicine, and water by siege and design? The truth is stark: this Easter unfolded in the shadow of genocide, writes the Palestinian ambassador to the EU, Amal Jadou Shakaa.
|
[
"EU & the World",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2025-04-22T10:10:37.719Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar647a7503
|
|
A free Syrian media? They've waited 14 years for this moment
|
Following the Arab Spring in Syria, a wave of independent media emerged aiming to support the transition to democracy. For 14 years, Syrians awaited the fall of the Assad regime which finally became a reality in December 2024. But paradoxically, these media are now on the verge of collapse themselves. And sadly, without them the dream of a united and democratic Syria risks remaining just that; a dream. “Now we can finally walk freely on the streets with our cameras, we can write under our own names, we can open offices in Damascus, in Aleppo, in Latakia,” the Syrian journalist Sara Ajlyakin told me on 9 December 9 — the day after Syrian dictator Bashar Al Assad fled to Russia and the brutal Assad regime collapsed. Ajlyakin fled Syria in 2013 and has since lived and worked in exile. As a central part of the Al-Jumhuriya media platform and alongside other Syrian journalists and independent media outlets, she has fought to bring critical journalism, in-depth analysis and debate to the Syrian people — despite censorship, threats and financial pressure. Assad's Syria — the 'Kingdom of Silence' For decades, the Assad regime’s survival depended on the brutal suppression of any critical voices. The Syrians called it the ‘Kingdom of Silence’. Now, with the fall of the regime, a historic opportunity for Syria to build a free and pluralistic media landscape has emerged. The independent media that International Media Support works with, however, are nonetheless facing an acute economic crisis. Support for free media is dwindling drastically, exacerbated by Donald Trump’s decision to close large parts of USAID’s development programme. At the same time, international sanctions are still in place. Intended to weaken the regime , they now make it extremely difficult for independent media — previously working in exile — to establish themselves back home in Syria. Without swift action, critical voices risk being silenced right when they are more important than ever. A successful transition to a freer and more democratic Syria largely depends on the existence of independent and credible media. Without a media free from sectarian bias, economic and political pressure, and foreign interference, it is almost impossible to create public debate that can support democratic reform. When I visited Damascus in February for the first time since the fall of Assad, I could clearly sense that the Syrians I spoke to were both hopeful and anxious. With the fall of the regime, state institutions collapsed, institutions which now must be rebuilt. Exactly how and what this leads to will be determined over the coming months and years. Media by WhatsApp Regrettably, we are already witnessing the collapse of the Syrian information infrastructure. State media is closed, the new regime communicates with its citizens via WhatsApp, and social media is overflowing with disinformation and hate speech. At the same time, Gulf-funded media outlets stand ready to fill the information void. If independent media disappears, the population will lose access to credible information, allowing for disinformation, propaganda and hate speech to thrive. Those in power can act without checks, threatening democratic reforms and prolonging instability. In the past month, brutal sectarian violence has flared up in the Latakia province, and in this context, we have seen free media play a crucial role in holding political leaders accountable and calling for reconciliation rather than deepening ethnic and religious divisions under the slogan of "Justice, Not Revenge’. To understand what we risk losing, it is important to know the role of the free Syrian media sector. In the years that followed the Arab Spring in 2011, a wealth of new media emerged — a sprouting of seeds driven by the realisation that the revolution needed independent and critical journalism. Many of the new media outlets subsequently had to close due to political persecution or economic collapse. Journalists were killed in unprecedented numbers, while others were forced into exile. Despite such extreme circumstances, several independent media outlets survived. They had to operate with anonymous reporters inside Syria, who daily risked torture, imprisonment and death for their work. If the international community hesitates, Syria's independent press risks succumbing — and with it, a central building block for democracy. Several European countries that have already invested in independent Syrian media must act now to secure the media's role in countering disinformation and state-building after Assad's fall. A strong press is also crucial to exposing corruption and ensuring that future investments in Syria's reconstruction are used as intended. The European Union must work to ensure the protection of press freedom — otherwise Syria risks once again becoming a ‘kingdom of silence’. If we let that happen, we extinguish the hope for a free and democratic Syria — a hope for which the Syrians have already paid an unbearable price. Camilla Bruun Randrup is team leader for Iraq, Syria and Yemen at the Copenhagen-based International Media Support , which defends journalists worldwide. Camilla Bruun Randrup is team leader for Iraq, Syria and Yemen at the Copenhagen-based
|
International Media Support
|
For 14 years, Syrians awaited the fall of the Assad regime. But paradoxically, a wave of Syrian independent media is now on the verge of collapse themselves. And sadly, without them the dream of a united and democratic Syria risks remaining just that.
|
[
"EU & the World",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2025-04-22T04:00:00.000Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar7715c605
|
Crisis-proofing Europe: Why Brussels must rethink corporate restructuring
|
The European Union finds itself at a turning point where economic policy and industrial resilience must be more closely aligned. After years of pandemic-driven disruptions, geopolitical uncertainty still persists, and rapid technological shifts, the EU’s industrial policy is under pressure to do more than stimulate growth. Further, it must also build lasting stability. Yet despite all the focus on green transition, digitalisation, and global competitiveness, one essential element remains overlooked: the role of corporate restructuring as a pillar of crisis resilience. Traditionally, restructuring has been viewed as a reactive measure — a last resort to salvage failing enterprises. This outdated approach no longer fits the pace and complexity of today’s economic shocks. Restructuring must be seen as a strategic, forward-looking tool that is integrated into industrial policy, not separated from it. Without this shift, the EU risks losing vital parts of its industrial base, particularly among small and medium-sized enterprises, which are most vulnerable in times of crisis yet remain essential to Europe's economic structure. The pandemic laid bare how fragile European industry can be. Supply chain breakdowns, business closures, and insolvencies exposed weaknesses in the system. Recovery funds and government aid helped temporarily, but many businesses needed more than short-term support. They needed tools to adapt structurally — redefining operations, refocusing investments, and reshaping their business models. The lack of a coherent EU-level restructuring strategy meant that many of these firms were left to navigate that alone. At the same time, the twin transitions — the green and the digital — require companies to undergo significant transformation. Transforming companies that produce goods or deliver services such as retraining employees, upgrading infrastructure or meeting environmental regulations, requires significant financial and organisational investment. Many companies, especially those with limited margins or high debt levels, struggle to make these transitions without external support. If these businesses are not supported and begin to fail, the EU risks creating policies that promote innovation and sustainability in theory while in reality facing a decline its industrial base. Uneven implementation To prevent this, restructuring must be elevated to a policy priority. The 2019 EU Restructuring Directive introduced early intervention mechanisms and aimed to harmonise legal frameworks. However, implementation has been uneven, and the directive is still treated primarily as a legal measure rather than a tool of industrial governance. For restructuring to support resilience, it must be embedded into economic policy at both the national and European levels. A crisis-proof restructuring strategy should begin with early diagnostics. Member states and EU institutions need systems that can identify firms under stress before insolvency becomes inevitable. Using data analytics and digital tools, these early warning systems can monitor performance and trigger timely intervention. Advisory services should accompany them to help companies evaluate their options and access suitable restructuring frameworks. A second step is creating cross-border support mechanisms. Many companies operate in more than one EU country, but jurisdictional differences often slow down or complicate restructuring efforts. An EU coordination hub could work alongside national actors to streamline procedures and resolve cross-border issues. EU funding instruments, including recovery and industrial funds, should be linked to structured transformation plans that include clear restructuring strategies. Public investment must be tied to long-term business viability, not just temporary solvency. Restructuring is often associated with job losses, but it also presents opportunities to reskill workers, redeploy talent, and build more agile labour structures. EU's human capital By linking restructuring programs to employment initiatives, training schemes, and regional development, we can ensure these changes strengthen rather than weaken the EU’s human capital. Improving transparency and governance is equally important, as restructuring decisions made behind closed doors often lead to mistrust and resistance. A participatory approach that includes social partners, civil society, and local stakeholders can enhance legitimacy, ease implementation, and promote public understanding of the broader economic benefits of restructuring. Future crises — economic, environmental, or political — are inevitable, and the EU’s industrial strategy must be built to adapt and respond proactively. Crisis-proof restructuring is about enabling companies to evolve, safeguard workers, and remain competitive in an unpredictable world. Integrating restructuring into EU industrial policy does not mean centralising all decisions or replacing national frameworks, whereas it means creating a shared understanding that restructuring is part of resilience, and that proactive transformation is more effective and less painful than emergency response. If the EU wants to build an economy that is sustainable, inclusive, and adaptable, it must treat restructuring as an essential policy tool — not a stigma, and not an afterthought. Europe’s economy is built on diversity, innovation, and adaptability. These qualities must be preserved and reinforced through a coherent strategy that supports firms not only when they are thriving but also when they face difficult transitions. A truly resilient industrial policy is one that helps companies change before they collapse. The time to embed that thinking into EU strategy is now. Dr Binu Daniel is professor of finance at CBS University of Applied Sciences in Berlin. Dr Binu Daniel is professor of finance at
|
CBS University of Applied Sciences
|
If the EU wants to build an economy that is sustainable, inclusive, and adaptable, it must treat restructuring as an essential policy tool — not a stigma, and not an afterthought.
|
[
"EU Political",
"Green Economy",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-political
|
2025-04-18T05:00:00.000Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar8f20e7a1
|
EU's arms spending splurge may outpace its strategic control
|
Europe is rearming . Defence budgets are rising, stockpiles are being replenished, and long-overdue capabilities are re-emerging as political priorities. The European Union’s sense of urgency is no longer conceptual. It is active, accelerating, and broadly welcomed. But urgency alone does not create power. Behind this momentum lies a quieter concern. Within defence ministries, EU institutions, and industrial circles, it is increasingly recognised that rearmament is outpacing Europe’s capacity to steer it strategically. Ammunition shortages persist. Major system deliveries are routinely delayed. The European Defence Industrial Strategy, presented in March 2025, set forth an ambitious agenda to consolidate efforts and accelerate production. Its centrepiece, the ReArm Europe plan, outlines over €800bn in defence investment over the next decade. Yet the gap between vision and delivery remains wide. The problem is not a lack of political will. It is structural. National preferences continue to outweigh collective logic. Europe’s armed forces remain fragmented, with redundant platforms, divergent operational doctrines, and limited interoperability. The result is a lack of critical mass, sluggish force generation, and vulnerable logistics chains. Institutions are better aligned than in the past, but alignment does not equal integration. Policy frameworks are multiplying; military cohesion remains elusive. Paris and Berlin France and Germany remain the indispensable pillars of the European defence project. Each contributes distinct, vital strengths. France is the Union’s only nuclear power, with a global diplomatic presence, strategic autonomy in operations, and world-class intelligence capabilities. Its permanent seat on the UN Security Council and combat-tested forces provide a credibility that no treaty can replicate. President Macron’s recent meeting with Donald Trump served as a reminder of France’s singular ability to operate confidently across both European and transatlantic spheres. Germany brings industrial and fiscal scale. The [era change] initiative marked a historic shift in Berlin’s defence posture, committing €100bn to modernisation. German firms such as Rheinmetall and Hensoldt are now central to Europe’s rearmament effort. Yet many inside planning circles quietly question whether Germany’s financial surge is being matched by a coherent military vision. The strength of the Franco-German axis will determine whether European defence becomes a shared strategic reality or remains a patchwork of national ambitions. London Equally significant is the United Kingdom, which remains a crucial strategic reservoir for European security. Despite Brexit, Britain's advanced military capabilities, global intelligence networks, and expeditionary experience continue to underpin Europe’s collective defence. The UK’s leadership within Nato, particularly in high-readiness forces, cyber warfare, intelligence sharing (notably via the Five Eyes alliance), and nuclear deterrence, remains irreplaceable. Maintaining close alignment with the UK is not just beneficial. It is strategically essential. As Europe accelerates its rearmament, practical and political cooperation with Britain will significantly enhance overall readiness and resilience. What remains missing is assertive political leadership at the European level. But Brussels? Brussels has made notable progress. The European Commission, the EU foreign affairs chief, and the European Defence Agency have brought defence firmly into the mainstream of EU policy. Their efforts to develop funding tools, support industrial coordination, and foster a shared strategic culture deserve recognition. The Defence Industrial Strategy and the ReArm plan are important achievements. But institutions alone cannot drive transformative change. Clear priorities must be defined. Procurement must be streamlined. Fragmentation must be corrected, not tolerated. Strategic convergence cannot rely solely on member states’ goodwill. This was the underlying theme at recent high-level meetings. At the informal gathering of EU defence ministers in Warsaw on 2–3 April 2025, ministers reaffirmed the need for readiness and resilience. They acknowledged that Europe must prepare for high-intensity scenarios, not theoretical ones. Ukraine’s defence minister, Rustem Umerov, joined remotely to underscore the continued urgency of support. Nato deputy secretary general Radmila Shekerinska reminded participants that Europe’s credibility now depends on sustained commitment, not declarations. Dual-use sectors and critical technologies are increasingly exposed to foreign capital with limited oversight Just days earlier, Nato foreign ministers convened in Brussels to prepare for the July 2025 summit in The Hague. The message from allies was clear. European nations must assume greater responsibility within the Alliance. Not merely to meet spending targets, but to ensure that capabilities genuinely match ambitions. Simultaneously, Europe must address vulnerabilities within its own defence ecosystem. Dual-use sectors and critical technologies are increasingly exposed to foreign capital with limited oversight. Sovereignty today is not only about who commands forces, but also about who owns the means to build and sustain them. Financial openness must be balanced with strategic responsibility. Trusted partnerships remain essential. Israel’s battlefield innovation, particularly in missile defence, counter-drone systems, and rapid tactical adaptation, continues to shape European procurement and doctrine. This cooperation is not a political gesture, but a recognition of operational value grounded in shared strategic logic. Meanwhile, president Donald Trump’s recent tariffs on EU imports serve as a reminder of shifting geopolitical winds. The US remains Europe’s indispensable ally , and Nato its most credible defence framework. Yet no external relationship, however robust, can replace internal resilience. Strategic autonomy cannot be rhetorical. It must be grounded in capability, coherence, and control. Europe’s rearmament is not only justified. It is overdue. But without strategic leadership to define common goals, coordinate procurement, and enforce discipline, Europe risks fragmentation rather than unity. In today's volatile environment, where threats evolve faster than institutions respond, time is no longer a neutral variable. It is the decisive one. António Brás Monteiro is a Portuguese specialist in EU and Nato affairs, serving as a defence expert at the European Commission and as a member of the Nato Industrial Advisory Group. He holds board positions in various security and defence associations and companies, and has published articles in , , , , among others. António Brás Monteiro is a Portuguese specialist in EU and Nato affairs, serving as a defence expert at the European Commission and as a member of the Nato Industrial Advisory Group. He holds board positions in various security and defence associations and companies, and has published articles in , ,
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,
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Within defence ministries, EU institutions, and industrial circles, it is increasingly recognised that rearmament is outpacing Europe’s capacity to steer it strategically.
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[
"EU & the World",
"Ukraine",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-and-the-world
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2025-04-17T10:21:10.491Z
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https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/arb81f37b0
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Trailing in the polls, who will Orban's scapegoat be at 2026 election?
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When elections draw near, authoritarian leaders hiding behind a thin facade of democracy frequently resort to fabricating 'enemies' against whom they can contrast themselves as solution-finders and saviours. They blame foreign forces and allege plots to undermine national stability, security, and traditions. It is a well-worn tactic, and one in which Hungary’s Viktor Orbán is particularly well versed. Since reclaiming office in 2010, the Hungarian premier’s ruling Fidesz-KDNP coalition has routinely conjured illusory adversaries for political gain. In 2014, the external enemy was “foreign entities”, seeking to “ assert their authority ” over ordinary Hungarians. In 2018, it was the Hungarian-born American philanthropist, George Soros, who was portrayed prominently on billboards, leaflets and across government-allied media channels, as plotting a “full frontal” attack on the Hungarian state. And, in 2022, it was civil society and independent media, who were accused of working hand-in-glove with US allies to “manipulate” global press reporting of developments in Hungary. In just over a year from now, the county’s citizens will again give their verdict at the ballot box. Opinion polls suggest an insurgent party, fronted by Péter Magyar, could topple the prime minister. Magyar's TISZA has gained significant ground over the past year, achieving impressive results from a standing start at the 2024 European Parliament elections, and growing public support for a campaign that centres on the need to clean-up Hungary’s political system. The insider turns on Orbán For Orbán, Magyar poses a new and troubling problem. Unlike previous opponents, who have been targeted on the basis of their political background, or association with critical institutions, Magyar is one of the Fidesz family. He was married to Orbán’s former justice minister, Judit Varga, and was a long-time ally of the governing elite. His breakout into a politician who could realistically depose Orbán in 2026 has rendered offensive action, which worked in previous election cycles, incompatible or ineffective. Still, in recent weeks, the Fidesz propaganda machine has tried, and failed, to charge Magyar and others — “bought politicians, judges, journalists, fake NGOs, and political activists” — of plotting to “overthrow Hungarian democracy”. These campaigns, which are orchestrated through a network of government-aligned media — which account for the majority of the country’s information space — have sought to smear Magyar as a “puppet” of foreign forces. In his annual state of the union address, in February, Orbán labelled him and others as “stink bugs [that] survived the winter”, and vowed to “dismantle” their financial machinery. But attacks on scapegoats — a smokescreen routinely deployed to divert public frustration away from issues, such as a floundering economy and creaking health service — are not landing as previously. While Soros continues to be central to Fidesz-KDNP propaganda, the reality is Soros is now 94 years-old, has largely withdrawn from the public eye, and is no longer a voter-driver he once was for the ruling coalition. Recent victims of government assault and misinformation, including European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, and European People’s Party group leader, Manfred Weber, have also failed to resonate — and, indeed, belie the fact that most Hungarians are pro-European and overwhelmingly favour continued EU membership. Attacks on the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, in the context of EU funding and security, are similarly failing to peel voters away from Magyar’s movement. This has led an increasingly desperate Orbán to widen his attack, and lean, further, into more extreme — and increasingly authoritarian — tactics in a bid to cling to power. The creation and subsequent harnessing of a government institution — the National Sovereignty Office — to target political opponents , independent media outlets, NGOs, and other critical voices, evidences the trajectory of the ruling coalition ahead of the campaign proper. The prime minister’s leveraging of the suspension of USAID development funds to portray independent media in Hungary as a corruption imbroglio, and fuel animosity towards foreign-funded journalists and activists, has further raised concerns among Hungarians about just how far he is prepared to go to maintain his rule, and whether the country’s already diminished democratic apparatus can survive further assault. Whether Orbán is prepared to go all-out, and countenance the subversion of democracy, remains to be seen. However, investigations by the independent news site, Direkt36, show a coordinated and, troublingly, deep-rooted and ominous network of self-aggrandisement and preservation-building. This extends beyond Hungary’s borders, and includes coordination with Europe’s radical right and autocratic leaders of the east, in the form of asset laundering, and intermediary financing of parties of the Patriots grouping at the European Parliament. Germany's Merz already on the case The EU, which, for years, has kicked the 'Orbán problem' into the long grass, could face a moment of peril in 2026. If it stands by, and allows the Hungarian premier to further erode and hijack his country’s democracy, we could well see total state capture play out in an EU member state. The incoming German chancellor Friedrich Merz , has already sensed this danger and, in recent weeks, called on the bloc to be more “consistent” in its application of “infringement proceedings”. Roughly €22bn in European funds — equal to 11 percent of Hungary’s estimated GDP in 2024 — have been withheld from Orban’s government, in response to ongoing rule-of-law breaches. This is leverage that must continue to be used to ensure that the 2026 election is fought in a free manner. Another avenue of strength, from a European perspective, lies in curtailing Hungary’s voting rights at the European Council. The European Parliament initiated efforts to this end in 2018, and, as Mertz and others have since suggested, this is something that should be revisited as a means of preventing further democratic vandalism in Hungary. The next 12 months will be critical for Hungarians and those of the wider European project. Clear-sighted interventions, by the EU and other democrats of the international community, have the potential to restrain Orbán, ensure the country’s parliamentary elections are fought in a cleaner information space, and, crucially, thwart any plotted efforts to subvert democracy in a European member state. Marius Dragomir is director of the Media and Journalism Research Center (MJRC) , an independent think-tank that seeks to improve the quality of media policymaking and the state of independent media and journalism. Marius Dragomir is director of the
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Media and Journalism Research Center (MJRC)
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For Viktor Orbán, Péter Magyar poses a new and troubling problem. Unlike previous opponents, who have been targeted on the basis of their political background, or association to critical institutions, Magyar is one of the Fidesz family.
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[
"Rule of Law",
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] |
rule-of-law
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2025-04-16T11:37:34.642Z
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https://euobserver.com/rule-of-law/ar04791582
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Europe's mayors stand in solidarity with their Turkish counterparts
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The recent arrests and dismissals of democratically-elected mayors in Turkey, and their replacement by appointed trustees, mark a dangerous turning point for local democracy, not only in Turkey but for Europe as a whole. At its core, democracy is not just about casting ballots; it is about ensuring that those elected by the people can govern freely, without fear of persecution. The replacement of elected mayors through judicial intervention— without full transparency and due process — raises serious questions about democratic standards and political freedom. This is not an isolated event. It is part of a worrying trend of democratic backsliding that threatens the fundamental values upon which modern Europe has been built. From the ashes of World War II, Europe emerged with a commitment to decentralization, democracy, and human rights. The European Charter of Local Self-Government, adopted in 1985, was a direct response to past authoritarianism, ensuring that local governments have the autonomy to serve their communities without undue interference from central authorities. This principle of local self-government is a safeguard against the concentration of power and a guarantee that democracy remains rooted in the daily lives of citizens. Yet today, these hard-won principles are being undermined. The detention of local leaders in Turkey is a blatant violation of the commitments the country made as a member of the Council of Europe. It is a direct assault on the principles enshrined in the charter and an ominous signal to other governments that such actions might be tolerated. Local democracy is the first line of defence for our freedoms. When it is attacked, it is not just a city or a region that suffers — it is the very foundation of democracy. As local-elected representatives, mayors are the bridge between national governments and citizens, the leaders who turn democratic principles into tangible actions — whether in public services, social cohesion, or crisis response. Ignoring the crackdown on local leaders in Turkey is not just a failure to support our colleagues — it is a failure to defend democracy itself. If Europe allows the erosion of local democracy anywhere on the continent, it sets a dangerous precedent that could spread. EU institutions, together with member states of the EU and of the Council of Europe, must take a clear and firm stance. The defence of democracy must not be selective or conditional on political expediency. The right of people to choose their leaders — and for those leaders to govern without fear — must be upheld at all costs. Democracy in Europe was never guaranteed; it was built through struggle and commitment. In the face of new threats, we must show the same commitment. The free election of representatives is not a privilege; it is the foundation of a just and stable society. If we fail to defend it today, we risk losing it tomorrow. Marc Cools is president of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe . Kata Tüttő is president of the Committee of the Regions . Nataša Vučković is president of the European Association for Local Democracy (ALDA). Gunn Marit Helgesen is president of the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR). Marc Cools is president of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe . Kata Tüttő is president of the Committee of the Regions . Nataša Vučković is president of the European Association for Local Democracy (ALDA). Gunn Marit Helgesen is president of the
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Council of European Municipalities and Regions
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The replacement of elected mayors through judicial intervention— without full transparency and due process — raises serious questions about democratic standards and political freedom in Turkey.
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[
"EU & the World",
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-and-the-world
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2025-04-15T09:41:31.956Z
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https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar9f81aba5
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What next for Ukraine's economy, the 'Day After'?
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Earlier this month, US secretary of state Marco Rubio warned that the world will “soon know” whether Russia is serious about ending the conflict in Ukraine. The Kremlin’s refusal to halt its bombardments and its ever-growing list of demands certainly question Moscow’s genuine commitment to pursuing peace. Putin’s game is an old one — paying lip service to peace negotiations while in reality quickly reneging on even the smallest diplomatic breakthrough. A case in point: while the White House announced on 25 March that Kyiv and Moscow had reached a tentative deal to “eliminate the use of force” in the Black Sea and halt attacks on energy infrastructure, the Kremlin wasted no time in qualifying this apparent breakthrough, tying its compliance to a sweeping list of demands, including sanctions relief for its financial institutions and agricultural exports, as well as restored SWIFT access. Donald Trump cannot be trusted to credibly push back against what even he has described as Moscow's feet-dragging. Rather than rejecting this diplomatic brinkmanship, Trump has concerningly acknowledged “there are five or six conditions,” and that “we are looking at all of them,” offering Putin an open invitation to continue moving the goalposts. The US’s bowing to Russia’s demands without extracting meaningful concessions or coordination with European allies could rejuvenate the country’s considerably weakened economy and military apparatus. It could even fuel the conflict’s expansion in Europe, with Moldova, Georgia and the Baltics Putin’s likely next targets. Under the circumstances, the ‘Old Continent’ should start drawing up the death certificate of transatlantic relations – at least for the duration of the Trump presidency. As Germany’s next chancellor, Friedrich Merz, recently suggested , the very survival of Nato in its “current form,” is at stake, meaning that Europe must become independent. Europe is faced with a task of historic proportions: rapidly and massively arming itself to ensure its defence without the US’s security umbrella, while ramping up its support of Ukraine to compensate for America’s shift towards the aggressor’s camp. London's 'coalition of the willing' Europe has taken some steps in the right direction, such as the 'Coalition of the Willing' which assembled in London in March — a group of like-minded nations striving to devise a plan to help end the war in Ukraine. While the summit at Lancaster House yielded few tangible outcomes, it marked a step in the right direction. Ukraine will continue to receive arms, while EU nations will expand domestic weapons production — not only to bolster military strength in support of any potential peace agreement but also to reduce reliance on Washington’s weaponry and enhance their credibility on the global stage. The flurry of recent events has made the need for this clear: Europe must offer Ukraine mutually-beneficial diplomacy that counterbalances the US’s brazenly transactional, ‘America First’ approach that considers the EU a footnote in geopolitics at best. The continent should begin this new era by refusing any so-called ‘peace agreement’ that fails to offer Ukraine meaningful security guarantees, the repatriation of Ukrainian children deported to Russia, substantial compensation for war damages, and the enforcement of justice against Moscow’s various criminals. Paradoxically, a European stand against such a fundamentally-flawed deal will be made easier by the fact that neither it nor Ukraine have been invited to the negotiating table . The 'day after' Europe must go still further, looking beyond enhanced military support for Ukraine to the ‘day after’ a potentially looming peace deal. Indeed, whether as initial deterrence in the context of a long war or a peacekeeping role in the context of security guarantees, European ground troops will make a major contribution to Ukraine’s economic recovery, a principle that European leaders are finally uniting behind. The Kremlin would likely respond to a Europe-led peacekeeping mission by doubling down on its exploitation of Europe’s anti-Ukraine farmer protests last year Buoyed by this convergence, Europe must waste no time in establishing a framework for Ukrainian reconstruction, which should notably prioritise projects for the development of its industrial and agricultural sectors. The latter industry is particularly vulnerable, as many farms have been destroyed, fields have been mined or permanently polluted, and agricultural workers have been called upon to join the Ukrainian army. What’s more, considering its disinformation campaign after French president Emmanual Macron initially floated the idea of European boots on the ground in Ukraine last year, the Kremlin would likely respond to a Europe-led peacekeeping mission by doubling down on its exploitation of Europe’s anti-Ukraine farmer protests last year. Countering Ukraine agriculture disinformation At the core of Russia’s propaganda offensive is the claim that Ukrainian agricultural exports are flooding EU markets and undermining the competitiveness of European farmers. In the months ahead, EU governments will have to patiently debunk the Kremlin’s narrative, which, as I have already shown , is largely a fantasy. In France, for example, Ukrainian chicken accounts for less than one percent of total imports, primarily displacing third-country suppliers rather than harming EU producers. In fact, 93 percent of the chicken consumed in France comes from within the EU. Similarly, claims targeting Ukrainian grain do not hold up to scrutiny, with its wheat and maize exports to the EU peaking in late 2022 and early 2023, and declining ever since. The reality is that European and Ukrainian agriculture are complementary . Europe has recently increased tariffs on Russian and Belarusian agricultural, including fertilisers and it is in the continent’s best interest to increase its support of Ukrainian agriculture . Indeed, as Ukraine’s agricultural industry develops and modernises, the risk of unfair competition with the bloc’s domestic agriculture will decrease. As the press has often reported, Russia has paired its misinformation attack against Ukrainian agriculture with its systematic, methodical destruction of Ukraine’s energy network to undermine public morale. In a sign of defiance, Kyiv has already begun to gradually rebuild its network, notably with the assistance of several European countries and the European Investment Bank (EIB). Crucially, the EU integration of Ukraine’s energy sector offers considerable potential , with Ukraine having the potential to become a major energy supplier for the bloc, contributing majorly to its reindustrialisation and competitiveness drive. In that context, it’s crucial that Brussels continue preferential trade with Ukraine to show support and provide Ukraine with reliable monetary flows. However, the EU will reportedly not extend its current preferential trade agreement past 5 June and is considering new rules. While the European Commission does not plan to reinstate pre-invasion trade rules, it is exploring alternatives under the 2016 Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), including quotas and safeguards for agricultural products. Although any agreement that promises deepened trade is to be welcomed, applying new rules is only injecting unnecessary red tape and confusion at a crucial time for both the EU and Ukraine. High-tech Finally, the high-tech sector represents a key area in which Ukraine could have a remarkable comparative advantage, with likely ripple effects in Europe. Ukraine in fact has one of the best-connected administrations in the world, and we have witnessed the country’s remarkable technological prowess with drones–now capable of hitting strategic Russian targets over 2,000km from Ukrainian territory. Amid Moscow’s all-out war, the Ukrainian technology sector has not only resisted , but grown to become the world-leading nation in drone innovation — a result notably enabled by its development of other upstream technologies. In a context of increased competition, especially from China, the strengthening of Ukraine’s advanced technologies will contribute to Europe’s strategic autonomy in this field. From energy and food sovereignty to defence and advanced technology, Ukraine is a nation of the future whose freedom Europe must protect to ensure its own long-term security and resilience—particularly in an emerging world order that could see the United States drift irreversibly away from the historic transatlantic alliance. Nicolas Tenzer is a guest professor at Sciences-Po Paris, author of three official reports to the French government and 24 books, including Notre Guerre: le crime et l'oubli. Pour une pensée stratégique (Paris, Ed. de l’Observatoire, 2024) was awarded the Nathalie Pasternak Prize. He writes a blog, Tenzer Strategics . Nicolas Tenzer is a guest professor at Sciences-Po Paris, author of three official reports to the French government and 24 books, including Notre Guerre: le crime et l'oubli. Pour une pensée stratégique (Paris, Ed. de l’Observatoire, 2024) was awarded the Nathalie Pasternak Prize. He writes a blog,
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Tenzer Strategics
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At the core of Russia’s propaganda offensive is the claim that Ukrainian agricultural exports are flooding EU markets and undermining the competitiveness of European farmers. EU governments will have to patiently debunk the Kremlin’s narrative, which is largely a fantasy, writes Nicolas Tenzer.
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[
"EU & the World",
"Ukraine",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2025-04-14T10:06:03.277Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar79e976cf
|
EU foreign affairs summit and Meloni in Washington in focus This WEEK
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EU foreign affairs will gather in Luxembourg on Monday (14 April), with Ukraine, the Middle East, EU-Africa relations and the Western Balkans on the agenda. There is growing momentum among 26 EU member states — all except Hungary — to begin preparing the next round of sanctions against Russia. However, serious doubts hang over the renewal of the whole sanctions regime (due to expire in July and September), as unanimity is required and Budapest has repeatedly used its veto in the past to secure the removal of Russian individuals and entities from the blacklist. On Ukraine, ministers are expected to discuss contributions to the so-called ' Kallas Plan' , which involves spending €5bn on two million rounds of large-calibre artillery ammunition this year. Talks on the Middle East will range from the situation in Gaza to Syria , where a new transitional government is now in place. The first-ever EU-Palestinian Authority high-level dialogue will follow the foreign affairs summit — a meeting that resembles previous conversations with Israel in February . EU-Africa relations will be discussed ahead of the ministerial meeting in Brussels in May, which will bring together over 80 governments from the African Union and the EU. The conflict in Sudan, which has triggered one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises with more than 15 million forcibly displaced individuals, will also be on the table. EU ministers are set to discuss possible sanctions against Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, including Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik — but efforts are unlikely to fly due to opposition from Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and the unanimity requirement for EU sanctions. With EU-wide action stalled, some countries are going alone. Austria and Germany are set to slap travel bans on Dodik and two other top officials earlier this month, while other countries are considering potential entry bans. The discussion on the Western Balkans will focus on security and defence cooperation as well as EU integration. This will follow a Sunday (13 April) dinner hosted by EU foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas and the leaders of the region's six countries. Also on Monday, the Polish EU Council presidency is organising a meeting with Albanian ministers to discuss further reforms needed for its EU’s membership bid. In Warsaw, an informal meeting of ministers for social affairs will take place on Monday and Tuesday (15 April). Talks will cover the impact of algorithms and digital technologies on the labour market and active integration policies. Right after, on Wednesday (17 April), ministers responsible for gender equality will meet in the Polish capital. During the meeting, Poland, Denmark and Cyprus (the last two due to follow Poland as the next host countries of the EU Council presidency) are expected to sign a declaration on gender equality. Meloni to court Trump On Monday, European trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič will be in Washington for talks with US officials aimed at reaching a deal on tariffs. Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni will meet US president Donald Trump in the US on Wednesday for an official working visit. According to an EU diplomat, such trips are not seen as problematic so long as the Italian PM not only delivers her national message but also the official line from the EU. Meloni’s visit follows Washington’s announcement of a 90-day pause on tariffs, prompting Brussels to also suspend its €22bn counter-tariffs, which were originally set to take effect on Tuesday. But the negative reactions of the markets are still evident. Meloni is in a tricky spot because while she is a close ally of Trump, she also has to defend Italy’s economy, which is already feeling the hit from US tariffs . While the pause buys time for Brussels to negotiate, the EU still faces Trump's new standard 10-percent import tariff. "We want to give negotiations a chance,” said EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen last week on social media. But different member states have different strategies, while France has advocated for a more aggressive response targeting US tech, others like Ireland , Italy or Spain are urging caution and continued dialogue to avoid escalating the dispute. Italy’s foreign affairs minister, Antonio Tajani, said last week that Europe should avoid “uncontrolled reactions that would cause damage" to both sides of the Atlantic. The meeting with Trump this week will allow Meloni, who has previously portrayed herself as a bridge-builder between Brussels and Washington, to showcase her diplomatic abilities and position Italy as a key player in transatlantic relations. Meloni was the only EU leader at Trump's inauguration in January.
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Elena is EUobserver's editor-in-chief. She is from Spain and has studied journalism and new media in Spanish and Belgian universities. Previously she worked on European affairs at VoteWatch Europe and the Spanish news agency EFE.
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EU foreign affairs will gather in Luxembourg on Monday, with Ukraine, the Middle East, EU-Africa relations and the Western Balkans on the agenda. Also this week, Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni will travel to Washington meet Donald Trump.
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[
"Agenda"
] |
agenda
|
2025-04-14T05:00:00.000Z
|
https://euobserver.com/agenda/ar72b8175c
|
Nato official: 'We depend on the US, without them, there is no alternative'
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Javier Colomina is the Nato secretary general's special representative for the southern neighbourhood. Colomina, who joined the alliance in 2017, reflects on how US president Donald Trump's criticism of Nato and his friction with some allies have shaken the confidence of many Europeans in the transatlantic bond. In the many years I have been involved in diplomacy, I have never seen such an unstable moment in international relations. That is why Nato now plays a more important role than ever in guaranteeing stability and prosperity in the Atlantic region. The number of threats and challenges has increased dramatically in recent years. If Nato is not relevant in these circumstances, I cannot imagine when it will be. I fully understand that there is anxiety and a degree of distress in Europe. We have all read, heard and seen things that we do not like. But the reality is that in all the meetings we have had behind closed doors with various US officials, from president Trump to his national security advisor and various secretaries, they have all confirmed their commitment to a strong Nato and to Article 5. What they have insisted on is that our financial contributions have to change, with Europe putting in more. Yet what the US puts in is still absolutely essential. It is so essential that today there is no alternative . Why would we look for alternatives to something that has worked for 75 years? We have to ensure it continues to work in spite of everything. No. It would lose its raison d’être, its essence. Nato depends on the US in essential areas. Without them, it would be something else, something that, in my opinion, would not work. What we must do now is work on strengthening Nato’s European pillar. The US provides military capabilities that only they have and the nuclear umbrella, which is the essence of our deterrent. The only European country with autonomous nuclear capability is France, but it is limited in size. The UK has a nuclear capability linked to and dependent on the US. Only the US has the capacity to use nuclear deterrence, due to the size and sophistication of its arsenal, against other nuclear powers with similar capacities, which include Russia and, in a few years’ time, probably China. Would we Europeans be capable of generating our own nuclear deterrent capacity? It would be complicated and would open up a lot of national debates. The withdrawal of US troops was a threat that president Trump repeated a lot during the election campaign. But to date, we have not seen any indication that this will happen. And the movement of troops in the quantities that were discussed during the election campaign would require many months of preparation. It is true that there is a large American presence in Europe. In some places they fulfil an absolutely strategic function of projecting American, as is the case in Spain, Italy or northern Europe. But in other cases there could perhaps be a withdrawal of a limited number of soldiers to fulfil their own electoral promises. But I repeat, there is no sign, no signal that this is going to happen for now. 'The analysis of our military needs made it clear that more than two percent was needed' Europeans are currently working very seriously on providing security guarantees for Ukraine , which could take the form of a security force. Some countries estimate that around 20,000 and 30,000 soldiers would be necessary; others estimate that it would be more like 50,000 or 100,000, depending on the functions and objectives of that force. In any case, we believe that they will need the US to contribute in some way. There are parts of US support that are irreplaceable. The deterrent capacity that we have already talked about, but also aspects that would be essential for a mission on the ground, such as intelligence, command and control, logistics, and facilitators. Europe would probably find it difficult to deploy, for example, 100,000 troops in Ukraine without affecting its capacity to deploy them on other fronts. It is therefore necessary for Nato to remain involved in any ongoing talks. The Europeans are doing what they have to do, led by France and the United Kingdom. But it is important to have an overview of all our threats so that our collective defence is not compromised. It is still early days, and the allies will have to sit down and discuss the agenda for the next summit. Moreover, the new US administration is not yet fully formed. But it will be difficult for the main issues not to be Ukraine, industry and investment in defence. Especially the latter aspect. At the Washington Summit, when president Biden was still in office, the US made it clear that two percent (of GDP allocated to defence) was a floor and not a ceiling. The analysis of our military needs made it clear that more than two percent was needed. It will be closer to three percent than to two percent, possibly above three percent. But there will be negotiations, which will not be easy, about the figure itself, and how that figure is calculated, what components it has, what type of contributions and equipment. 'I am convinced that we will live with this instability in the Sahel for the next decade and that these threats will in turn push the Maghreb into greater fragility' It is impossible to know what that new formula will contain, but it will possibly have new elements. The verticals that have existed since the [2014] Wales summit will be maintained and I would not be surprised if the calculation will be refined a little so that everyone feels comfortable. The figure of three percent is not only complicated for Spain, but also for many others such as Italy or Canada. France is at two percent and going up to three percent would mean going from approximately €50bn to €75bn. The British themselves, one of the major countries most committed to defence investment, have announced 2.5 percent, and three percent in only a few years’ time, which may not be enough either. We’ll see how the conversation goes. What we do have to try to do is reach two percent before the summit and this is a message that the secretary-general has clearly conveyed to all his counterparts. Before the summit or, at least, within 2025. That is what the EU itself is calling for. The plan seems clear . There is €150bn that would come from the European institutions, the details are not yet known. But the remaining €650bn is money that has to come from the member states. Brussels is saying: you have to spend more than two percent. That alone would add tens of billions of euros from countries that have not yet reached that threshold. That would already be a very significant step forward. From there, we must continue to plan investment in defence to meet the capability goals that we ourselves have agreed within the Nato framework. There must be cooperation. We have a very good relationship with the European Union. Secretary general Rutte was the Dutch prime minister and sat on the European Council for 14 years. He knows his colleagues and the structures of the European Union very well. The programme launched by the European Commission has to form part of the transatlantic strategy. More than an alternative, it should complement transatlantic capabilities, particularly North American capabilities. 'It is clear that decisions such as the withdrawal of USAID will have a significant impact on the West’s presence in the Global South' I am convinced that we will live with this instability in the Sahel for the next decade and that these threats will in turn push the Maghreb into greater fragility. This is already reaching the Mediterranean and will continue to affect us directly in terms of terrorism, illegal migration and all kinds of illicit trafficking. Many of the bad things that happen in the world happen on a terrible scale in the Sahel and there is hardly any territorial control by the state in many of the Sahelian countries. It will therefore be important that the countries that pushed hardest for the southern Flank to be recognised as a priority, specifically Spain, Italy and Portugal, together with the other allies who are now convinced of this, continue to promote its importance. It is true that the threats in the east, and specifically that of Russia, are the most imminent from the conventional point of view. But it is also true that the countries in that region are a little more insistent on the threat facing them than we in the south are, where we have less of a ‘culture’ around defence and security. There are countless factors that lead to crises like the one facing the Sahel. But one important one was that the West decided to take a step back and when that happens, Russia is usually waiting as well as, increasingly, China or Iran. And these countries don’t take steps back. On the contrary, when they see that we do, they stay there, waiting at the door and willing to come in with whatever is necessary. Let’s not fool ourselves: the US is the country with the greatest capacity for global geostrategic presence. And while the US has much greater military capacity and than we do, in the gap is twice as wide. It is clear that decisions such as the withdrawal of USAID will have a significant impact on the West’s presence in the Global South. It is important that the US remains committed, and work will have to be done on aspects and angles of foreign policy and defence that are sufficiently relevant and fit in with US national priorities, such as the fight against terrorism, Iran or China. Possibly the American approach will become more transactional, less altruistic, so to speak; but their commitment is essential for the work we can do in Nato with our southern neighbourhood. There is a lot of noise these days, and of course, it makes it very difficult to make decisions and see the situation clearly, particularly when we hear things that are unacceptable or difficult to digest. But we have to stay focused on what is essential, and for us, the transatlantic link is essential. It is understandable, given that citizens and politicians live in the immediate, in electoral cycles, and therefore respond to impulses much faster than a security and defence strategy requires. In the field of geostrategy and defence, a longer-term view is taken. The cycles of the defence industry , for example, are very long. From a military and security point of view, it makes little sense to make plans for three or four years. We must try to keep our feet on the ground. Enrique Andrés Pretel is a Spanish journalist specialising in politics and economics. He is International editor-in-chief at El Confidencial Enrique Andrés Pretel
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is a Spanish journalist specialising in politics and economics. He is International editor-in-chief at
|
Javier Colomina, Nato secretary general's special representative for the southern neighbourhood, reflects on how current events have shaken the confidence of many Europeans in the transatlantic bond. "Nato depends on the US in essential areas. Without them, it would be something else, that, in my opinion, would not work."
|
[
"EU & the World",
"Migration",
"Africa"
] |
*
|
2025-04-12T04:00:00.000Z
|
https://euobserver.com/*/ar12ebb496
|
Is the EU now gaming its climate targets?
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The European Commission is once again delaying its proposal for the European Climate Law amendment to set a 2040 climate target. Behind the missed deadlines lies a more concerning trend: an apparent willingness, by parts of the commission, some member states and parliamentarians, to water down the very target that should position the EU as a global climate leader. As new options are reportedly being considered to make the 90 percent net-emissions reduction target more ‘flexible’, it is important to say plainly: these are not pragmatic tweaks. They are dangerous shortcuts. The 90 percent net-reduction by 2040, announced in the commission’s February 2024 communication and enshrined in the Clean Industrial Deal and the Competitiveness Compass, was already a middle-ground. While politically significant, it sits at the bottom end of the 90-95 percent reduction range recommended by both the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change (ESABCC) and the commission’s own impact assessment. These assessments also indicate that the higher the ambition, the fairer the EU contribution and the greater the benefits for the Union, not only for the climate, but for health, the economy, and resilience. Critically, it also falls short in equity considerations. For example, the UN secretary general highlighted the need for so-called developed countries to already reach climate neutrality (net zero) by 2040 (a demand backed by CAN Europe ), and significantly earlier than poorer countries who have contributed less to historic pollution. Let’s examine the shortcut four options that are reportedly under consideration: One option being discussed would slow emissions reductions in the early 2030s and concentrate action later in the decade. This not only delays progress, it increases overall emissions over time, especially at a time when early action is more effective and cheaper. A backloaded trajectory would also weaken the Union’s next Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) which must have a 2035 reduction target as its centrepiece, expected ahead of COP30 in Brazil. At a time when global climate diplomacy is faltering, the EU must strengthen, not erode, its leadership. Allowing international carbon credits to count toward the 90 percent target would be at odds with the European Climate Law’s current approach, which, for good reasons, is grounded in domestic emissions reductions. It contradicts the ESABCC's advice and introduces serious risks to environmental integrity, with evidence of greenwashing and weak accountability plaguing many carbon credit schemes. Worse still, some member states seem to be eyeing the possibility of counting these purchases as climate finance, a move that would amount to double counting, at the expense of developing countries that need genuine support. Moreover, it would channel some of the investments elsewhere and potentially undermine the affordability of domestic climate solutions due to lower carbon price levels from cheap credits. The commission is also considering increasing the share of carbon removals in the net target. These include both natural methods, like land-based sequestration, and technological options, such as carbon capture and storage. Removals cannot be treated as equivalent to real emissions reductions though. Natural sinks are temporary and vulnerable to disturbances. Technological removals are still unproven at scale and often face sustainability constraints. Using removals to mask continued emissions delays the structural transformation required across the economy. Another option considered is to introduce more flexibility for member states to meet sectoral targets, allowing underperformance in one area to be offset by over-performance in another. While some flexibility already exists in the EU’s climate framework, expanding it further would weaken incentives for progress in key sectors like transport, buildings, or agriculture. This undermines the core logic of economy-wide decarbonisation and delays action where it is needed most. Watering down the 2040 target does not only threaten the EU’s environmental credibility, it undermines its long-term competitiveness. Research conducted by CAN Europe shows that more ambitious climate action would bring significant co-benefits: a stronger economy, cleaner air, improved public health, and millions of new jobs across the Union. This message is also echoed by the business community — who underline the importance of clear, science-based targets to drive investment, innovation, and economic resilience. The EU cannot lead globally by outsourcing, delaying, or disguising its climate efforts. A 2040 target riddled with loopholes may be easier to negotiate, but it will be harder to justify to citizens, businesses, and the international community. The time to act with clarity and resolve is now. The EU must stick to the science, uphold its legal commitments, and reject options that trade ambition for accounting tricks. In the climate crisis, shortcuts are not solutions. Silvia Valentini is climate policy officer at Climate Action Network Europe , Europe's leading NGO coalition fighting dangerous climate change. Silvia Valentini is climate policy officer at
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Climate Action Network Europe
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The European Commission is once again delaying its proposal for the European Climate Law amendment to set a 2040 climate target. Behind the missed deadlines lies a more concerning trend, warn Climate Action Network Europe.
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[
"Green Economy",
"Opinion"
] |
green-economy
|
2025-04-10T12:55:56.261Z
|
https://euobserver.com/green-economy/ar53c4a199
|
How will MEPs respond to Huawei scandal? The three D’s – Deny, Diffuse, Dilute
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Another parliamentary term, another corruption scandal. This time, the Belgian police sealed office doors inside the European Parliament as part of an investigation into allegations that lawmakers have accepted bribes from Chinese telecoms firm Huawei. According to the information leaked to the press , the bribes have come in the form of lavish hospitality and cash transfers channeled via a Portuguese company. For now these remain allegations that need to stand up in court, but there have been credible reports of murky behaviour swirling around for some time. The typical parliamentary response to such scandals is captured by the three D’s – Deny, Diffuse, Dilute. First of all, deny that the problem lies in the parliament (Metsola’s disingenuous "European democracy is under attack" remarks post-Qatargate). Then announce a raft of diffuse reforms that have the appearance of activity without tackling the actual problem (the Metsola 14-point plan to address the Qatargate scandal). Finally, when the media fuss has died down, dilute such proposals in a way that renders them ineffective (e.g. limiting the ‘ cooling off period’ for MEPs to the first six months of the mandate when there is little or no legislative activity). Denial and dilution at least have the merit of sincerity. Diffusion of reform efforts is more insidious since it promises much while doing little to address root causes. It also wastes the limited political appetite there is for these issues on pointless theological debates over what constitutes an ‘ official friendship group’ . So far, what little official response there has been indicates that the parliament is still in the ‘deny’ phase, insisting — vaguely — that the post-Qatargate reforms are working. But we are only a revelation or two away from another spasm of soul-searching and reform proposals. To save time and energy, here are a few rabbit-holes that the parliament should avoid. Blame the lobbyists “Qatargate is a corruption scandal, not a lobbying scandal” was the refrain from many in the Brussels bubble, either lobbyists wanting to avoid the taint of scandal, or those resisting more lobbying regulation. Whatever the motivation, there was much truth to the assertion. The fact that former the Qatargate ringleader Panzeri and his pseudo-NGO could gain access to the parliament without registering on the lobby register said much about the loopholes in the transparency regime, but it is highly unlikely that it would have prevented corruption or led to its detection. That goes double for the Huawei, whose lobbying activities in Brussels have been somewhat transparent (if perhaps under-reported) and support from MEPs for their positions has largely been a matter of public record. Broader transparency about who influences the legislative process is important, but if the focus is on rooting out graft there are more important battles to fight. Blame the foreigners There is a tendency to blame all of Europe’s problems on covert foreign interference by hostile powers and proxies from the Gulf states to Russia to China. The interference is real, but when it comes to attempted bribery the focus should be on the demand-side : why our political class is vulnerable to, complacent about or complicit in corruption. Nobody, after all, forced an MEP or staffer to accept gifts from a company that were in breach of the parliament’s own code of conduct . Focusing on the incentives and opportunities available to MEPs will also bolster defenses against all kinds of corruption, foreign and domestic, hostile governments and unscrupulous corporations. Some of the gifts allegedly offered by Huawei — tickets to football games, travel junkets — are a standard feature of corporate lobbying repertoires. Many in parliament will be familiar with these tactics. I was once told by a parliament official about a case of a company from South Korea (not a hostile power by any stretch) that was touting all-expenses-paid trips to visit its production facilities. Only one of many staffers contacted had the reflex to contact the parliament's ethics advisors for guidance. Blame the rules Lawyers wield a disproportionate influence in the parliament and naturally feel most comfortable framing and arguing over legal texts. The pattern since at least the 2011 cash-for-amendments affair is for each fresh scandal to be followed by new codes of conduct, new rules and amendments to rules, each with their own set of lawyerly caveats. The end result is a complex architecture of ethical regulation that scarcely anyone fully comprehends, while the ethical culture within the institution languishes. The hallmark of a healthy culture is how it treats those who speak up and report misbehaviour. By this standard, the parliament has fallen dismally short. There have been only a handful of official whistleblowing cases since the rules came into force a decade ago. And no wonder. The three cases reported in 2016 all resulted in the dismissal of the staffers concerned. Late last year, the European Court of Justice issued a damning indictment of the institution’s failure to provide the protection to a whistleblower in breach of its own rules. A survey by the European Court of Auditors found that two-thirds of staffers would hesitate to report wrongdoing to their hierarchy. Building a genuinely ethical culture will be a slow, thankless grind. It will require long-term, cross-party commitment in an age marked by polarization and attention deficits. It may be this parliament’s greatest challenge. Carl Dolan is senior adviser on ethics and transparency at the European Policy Centre . Carl Dolan is senior adviser on ethics and transparency at the
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European Policy Centre
|
The pattern since at least the 2011 cash-for-amendments affair is for each fresh scandal to be followed by new codes of conduct, new rules and amendments to rules, each with their own set of lawyerly caveats. The end result is a complex architecture of ethical regulation that scarcely anyone fully comprehends
|
[
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-political
|
2025-04-09T09:52:47.852Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ard43e1329
|
Some easy wins for the planned 'digital euro'
|
European central bankers and politicians are increasingly framing the digital euro in the rapidly-changing geopolitical context, emphasising strategic autonomy. Generally, they mention the absence of attractive pan-European digital payment solutions, which makes Europe reliant on foreign, in particular American, payment providers. The introduction of the digital euro could provide a secure and universally accepted digital payment option under European governance, reducing reliance on foreign providers. However, the current proposed design does not fully align with achieving this objective. The €3,000 limit for consumers and the zero limit for merchants impose significant restrictions on the digital euro's competitiveness against well-established retail payment services and emerging dollar stablecoins. Furthermore, the restriction of access to eurozone citizens limits the digital euro's geopolitical potential. To grasp the geopolitical potential of the digital euro, one should examine the development of the role of the US dollar. For eight decades, the US dollar has dominated international finance, actively supported by the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve through extensive issuance of safe assets and generous central bank swap lines. These swap lines, along with the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) in New York, have facilitated the creation and use of dollars outside the US, thereby strengthening the dollar's global position. The Eurodollar market currently stands at approximately $13 trillion [€11.86 trillion]. The value of physical US banknotes in circulation internationally is estimated to be between $1.07 trillion and $1.42 trillion, representing approximately 45 percent to 60 percent of all physical dollars. European central bankers often argue that the digital euro is a natural extension of cash into the digital age. The cash analogy helps illustrate the digital euro's potential. Today, individuals can carry euro banknotes worldwide, and any economic actor can choose to accept these notes, joining the currency network effortlessly. Open design is crucial A digital euro would amplify this capability, enabling economic agents both within and beyond the EU to easily accept, store, and transact in euros digitally. To achieve this global usability, an open design is crucial, allowing economic actors everywhere to join as seamless as possible the euro network. This approach mirrors the expansion of the dollar over recent decades, as individuals physically brought and accepted dollars abroad and opened digital dollar accounts outside the US. An open design could significantly strengthen the international role of the euro. Furthermore, it would create attractive opportunities for EU banks and fintech companies to offer digital euro wallets and accounts to consumers worldwide. European merchants would also likely benefit, as consumers globally could easily purchase products and services using digital euros. A key advantage of settling with digital euros compared to other international means of payment is the instant settlement and thus the absence of credit, liquidity and settlement risks. Additionally, if the adoption of the digital euro is widespread, the currency could potentially serve as one of the safe assets underpinning Europe’s financial markets. Over recent decades, the US has enjoyed the advantages of the well-developed global dollar infrastructure. However, the dollar's global dominance is now under threat due to the uncertainty and inconsistencies stemming from the second Trump administration. This has led to new risks, as illustrated by, for example, concerns about scenarios where the Federal Reserve might restrict access to dollar swap lines, and has created opportunities for other countries, notably the EU and China. Over the past decade, China has made significant efforts to develop a new global monetary system. These efforts have included developing the digital yuan and an electronic payment system, launching the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), and actively participating in several multilateral cross-border CBDC initiatives, notably the mBridge project. Coupled with the Belt and Road Initiative , the Digital Silk Road Initiative, and BRICS cooperation , China appears eager to create a monetary and financial system that is less dependent on Western-controlled institutions such as SWIFT, CHIPS, and Fedwire. The next step may involve the international rollout of the digital yuan among allies, authoritarian states, developing nations, and the 1.4 billion people unbanked. Europe should now consider developing and implementing a digital euro that is accessible to the global community and has little to no holding limit. The question is whether European politicians will have the courage to do this and transform the digital euro into a genuine geopolitical instrument, which could empower Europe to assert its independence from both American dominance and a potential Chinese alternative, while enhancing the international role of the euro. Dr Martijn Jeroen van der Linden is professor of practice in new finance at The Hague University of Applied Sciences. Dr Martijn Jeroen van der Linden
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is professor of practice in new finance at
|
Europe should now consider implementing a digital euro that is accessible to the global community and has little-to-no holding limit. The question is whether European politicians will have the courage to do this — and transform the digital euro into a genuine geopolitical instrument.
|
[
"Digital",
"Green Economy",
"Opinion"
] |
digital
|
2025-04-07T12:21:42.319Z
|
https://euobserver.com/digital/arfd23c17a
|
Why is EU Parliament using a 'bullshit generator' AI for archive access?
|
Leopold I, Leopold II, and Leopold III. They were kings of Belgium. Robert Schuman 7. That is not the first president of the European Parliament. That’s an address. You know this. Anthropic’s Claude does not. A few months ago, the European Parliament began using Anthropic’s AI models to provide access to its archives. You can access it on the parliament’s website. It is called ‘ Ask the EP Archives ’. You can ask all you want but do not trust the response. “Generated content should not be considered authoritative.” (That’s the parliament’s disclaimer.) It is a valid question to ask whether a European company should have been chosen over Anthropic. I will leave that to someone else. I had much more basic questions for the parliament. Why was generative AI chosen for this purpose? What was the procurement process? Is generative AI fit for purpose? The parliament wants to provide digital access to its archive. The access should be swift and the responses should be correct. Not 97 percent of the time, but 100 percent of the time. In computer science, this is a well-studied problem. It is called information retrieval . Earliest research on this topic goes back to the 1940s and deployments have been known since 1960s. Search engines such as AltaVista and Duckduckgo are modern day examples. The parliament’s case of course does not require crawling the web as it possesses a large millions of documents going back to 1952. Generative AI systems like Claude, on the other hand, are bullshit generators. They are like a gossiper. Sometimes the gossip includes facts. Sometimes it does not. You would not know which is which. The gossiper might augment the bullshit with retrieval, as Claude does, but it is still a gossiper. When you want facts, you do not ask the gossiper. When you want facts, you do not ask generative AI. So why did the parliament choose a gossiper when it needed an information retrieval tool? If we believe the parliament’s head of the archive’s unit, it is Constitutional AI : a set of principles chosen by Anthropic, which the company claims will minimise harm. This approach is based on “ simple and memorable ” criteria and has not been independently verified. The parliament believes in Anthropic’s Constitution instead of the EU rules on AI. Anthropic uses web scraped data to train its AI models, an approach that is likely unlawful due to the processing of sensitive personal data. Was there a procurement process? No. When I asked the parliament for contract and tender documents, I was informed that “there is no direct contract for parliament’s use of Amazon Bedrock, and Claude as provided by Anthropic.” This is because the parliament depends on “the European Commission acting as an intermediary for cloud brokering service.” Let us break this down. The commission has a contract for cloud services with Amazon AWS. The parliament uses this contract for cloud services. But this contract was not for AI. Neither the commission, nor the parliament has a contract with Anthropic for AI. Why is this possible? Amazon runs a market place for AI models: Amazon Bedrock. If you have a contract for Amazon AWS, you can access “ fully managed [AI] models ” on Amazon Bedrock. The parliament accesses AWS through the commission’s contract, and accesses Claude through Amazon Bedrock. Over the years, guidelines have been proposed for public sector organisations when procuring AI systems or services. The UK has guidelines since 2020. Such guidelines usually consider whether AI is necessary for the intended purpose, whether there is a vendor lock-in, suggests risk assessments and other governance aspects. These guidelines are intended to complement the laws that the public administration is expected to follow anyway. Amazon Bedrock is an additional service from Amazon to lock-in customers. What we see in the parliament’s case is that they have bypassed public procurement processes by using Amazon Bedrock. Without a direct contract with Anthropic, the parliament skipped risk assessment, skimped on environmental assessment and did not consider data protection impact assessment relevant. Between 2020 and 2023, the commission paid Amazon AWS nearly € 55m for cloud services. With the commission and parliament’s use of AI services in 2024, it is not yet known how many more millions the commission and the parliament are paying Amazon, which also funds Anthropic. The parliament’s head of archive unit, when promoting Anthropic, made a Freudian slip and said, “we permanently need to be under [sic] control of the solution that we’ve built.” The parliament is indeed under the control of Amazon. Dr Kris Shrishak is a senior fellow at Enforce , the Irish NGO campaigning for human rights in technology, and a public interest technologist and advises legislators on emerging technologies and global AI governance. He is regularly invited to speak at the European Parliament and has testified at the Irish Parliament. His work focusses on privacy tech, anti-surveillance, emerging technologies, and algorithmic decision making. Previously, he was a researcher at Technical University Darmstadt in Germany where he worked on applied cryptography, privacy enhancing technologies and Internet security. Dr Kris Shrishak is a senior fellow at Enforce , the Irish NGO campaigning for human rights in technology, and a
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public interest technologist
|
The parliament wants to provide digital access to its archive. The access should be swift and the responses should be correct — 100 percent of the time. Generative AI systems, however, are bullshit generators. When you want facts, you do not ask generative AI. So why did the parliament choose a gossiper when it needed an information retrieval tool?
|
[
"Digital",
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] |
digital
|
2025-04-07T09:56:17.748Z
|
https://euobserver.com/digital/are5b83cc3
|
Trump's tariffs, Europe's AI, Ukraine's trade in focus This WEEK
|
Following last week’s imposition by the US of a 20-percent tariff on all European products, as part of a wider package of global levies, EU foreign affairs ministers responsible will meet in Luxembourg on Monday (7 April). Ministers are expected to discuss ways to find “ a constructive solution ” over the US tariffs, but also potential countermeasures to protect Europe's interests, a senior EU diplomat said. France and other countries such as Austria are in favour of hitting US tech firms as part of the bloc's response to Donald Trump's tariffs, while Ireland — home to many US tech giants such as Facebook, Google and Apple — is reluctant to such a move . Meanwhile, Germany has argued that all options are on the table. Talks will also continue over the list compiled by the EU Commission of American products that could be hit with tariffs, alongside countermeasures on US steel and aluminium duties. This comes after 25-percent US tariffs came into force on steel and aluminium imports, at an estimated annual cost to the EU economy of around $28bn [€25.7bn]. The meeting aims to bring unity, amid fears over US attempts to reach unilateral deals with individual EU countries. Moreover, EU trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič is also expected to debrief ministers on his recent three-day visit to China . In late March, Šefčovič said on social media that it was necessary to ensure the EU-China "relationship is based on a level playing field, in terms of trade flows as well as investment, with symmetrical markets opening”. And in the wake of Trump’s tariffs last week, Brussels and Beijing agreed to restart talks on minimum price commitment on Chinese EVs, according to China’s commerce ministry. Commission president Ursula von der Leyen is also expected to meet representatives of the automobile, steel and pharmaceutical sectors this week. Meanwhile, defence spending needs and financial markets will be discussed at the informal meeting of EU ministers for economic and financial affairs (with central bank governors), taking place on Friday (11 April) and Saturday (12 April) in Warsaw. The eurogroup will also meet in the Polish capital on Friday. Ukraine trade Also this week, a new round of negotiations under the EU-Ukraine Association Council will take place on Wednesday (9 April). During the meeting in Brussels, Kyiv is expected to call on the commission to extend the suspension of import duties and quotas on Ukrainian exports — which are set to expire on 5 June — until the end of the year. Duties on products from Ukraine had been suspended since June 2022 following Russia’s invasion — in a bid to support the beleaguered and cash-strapped Ukrainian economy. But, following unilateral bans by Ukraine's neighbours in 2023, the EU moved to revise trade benefits, and tightened the ceiling for tariff-free imports for a number of "sensitive goods". In parallel, there will be an EU-Ukraine business summit this week focused on the current business climate in Ukraine. Also on Wednesday, the commission will present the AI Continent Action Plan, aiming to boost Europe’s AI ecosystem through AI factories. EU commissioners in parliament On Monday, MEPs in the internal market committee will hold an exchange with the commissioner for tech, Henna Virkkunen. The following day, they will hear from justice commissioner Michael McGrath and industry commissioner Stéphane Séjourné. On Wednesday, McGrath will return to address MEPs in the same committee on the European Democracy Shield, which focuses on foreign interference and its impact on democratic systems. The rule of law conditionality mechanism, the European Defence Industry Programme, and Ukraine will be on the agenda of the budget committee, meeting on both Monday and Thursday (10 April). On Tuesday (8 April), EU commissioner for international relations Jozef Síkela will speak to MEPs in the development committee. The session will also cover the recent earthquake in Myanmar and Thailand, as well as developments in South Sudan and Lebanon. That same morning, competition and Green Deal commissioner Teresa Ribera will join the economic and monetary affairs committee for an exchange of views, followed in the evening by financial services commissioner Maria Luís Albuquerque. MEPs will also discuss the digital euro with a member of the executive board of the European Central Bank. Still on Tuesday, environment commissioner Jessika Roswall will appear before the environment committee. Meanwhile, agriculture commissioner Christophe Hansen and health commissioner Olivér Várhelyi will attend the agriculture committee meeting on the same day.
|
Elena is EUobserver's editor-in-chief. She is from Spain and has studied journalism and new media in Spanish and Belgian universities. Previously she worked on European affairs at VoteWatch Europe and the Spanish news agency EFE.
|
EU ministers will discuss relations with China and how to respond to the crippling new US tariffs, with some countries calling for countermeasures targeting Big Tech. Ukrainian trade and Europe's AI strategy are also on the agenda. EU commissioners will visit the European Parliament to discuss topics such as digital policy, international relations, and agriculture.
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[
"Agenda"
] |
agenda
|
2025-04-07T05:00:00.000Z
|
https://euobserver.com/agenda/ar25b51518
|
Eggs won’t win the EU a trade war against the US
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As Washington slaps new 20 percent tariffs on European goods across the board, the idea of retaliating with agricultural exports might seem tempting. Eggs, surprisingly, entered the picture earlier this year, when the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) approached several EU countries about emergency egg imports to ease a domestic supply crisis. Could Europe use the US egg shortage as leverage in Donald Trump’s newly-launched trade war? “We have been in the past trying to get market access to export table eggs for consumption [but] it's almost impossible because the requirements are very difficult to meet and very costful”, notes Stig Munck Larsen, chief consultant at the Danish Agriculture and Food Council. US egg woes In recent weeks, rising egg prices have brought back scenes of empty shelves in several US cities, reminiscent of the pandemic era, when fears of food shortages led to panic buying. Wholesale egg prices began climbing sharply in late December, reaching over $8 [€7.30] per dozen by February — double the price from the same time last year. The surge was driven by a widespread outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI), which led to the death or preventive culling of millions of laying hens, causing a sharp drop in egg production and triggering a supply and price crisis. In March, however, egg prices have sharply declined, driven by falling demand in response to high prices and a partial recovery in supply as avian flu outbreaks eased. The USDA responded to the egg crisis with a $1bn plan to combat avian flu, which included exploring temporary import options to ease supply shortages. The USDA first secured 15,000 tonnes of eggs from Turkey, followed by import commitments from South Korea. While wholesale egg prices have recently declined sharply, the USDA has raised its overall 2025 price forecast: from a projected 41.1 percent increase in February to 57.6 percent in March. The US egg hunt also reached EU doorsteps, as the USDA contacted several EU member states, including Denmark, to inquire about potential imports. Although no follow-up occurred after initial outreach, Denmark and other EU producers are unlikely to meet US demand due to sanitary barriers and limited production capacity, according to Munck Larsen. Can Europe help ease the US egg prices crisis? Before egg exports can be considered, Europe would need surplus supply — which right now is falling behind demand. “Very few countries have a stock to sell,” admits Munck Larsen, “if everybody starts to supply the US, prices [in Europe] will go up,” he adds. Meeting that demand could also come at a cost to existing trade relationships. Failing to fulfil regular customers’ needs would be bad business, especially since any deal with the US would likely be temporary. “If you go into the US market, it would only be for a short time, maybe three, six, or nine months,” Munck Larsen explains. Washed or unwashed? Even if surplus eggs became available, sanitary regulations would be a major obstacle. “In Europe you are not allowed to wash the eggs, [but] in the US you have to wash them.” In the EU, egg washing is prohibited in all countries except Sweden (where consumer preference favours washed eggs). This process could pose “a risk of substances penetrating inside the egg,” Munck Larsen points out, explaining why the regulation was established. In contrast, the US requires eggs to be both washed and refrigerated throughout the supply chain until consumption. Beyond that, Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) standards add another layer of complexity. These regulations make egg trade with the US “almost impossible,” Munck Larsen concludes. Meanwhile, the EU has seen a recent rise in table egg prices, with an overall increase of 18.5 percent since the first week of 2025. Major producing countries — including France, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, and Poland — have experienced similar price rises since the start of the year. How severe is the impact of avian influenza in EU? Avian influenza has inflicted significant losses on the poultry industry over the past two years, with the US market particularly hard hit. While the disease itself can cause bird deaths, the impact is worsened by containment measures: once an outbreak is detected on a farm, all birds on the premises must be culled, regardless of infection status, sometimes multiplying the overall losses. The US egg-laying industry is dominated by megafarms, where outbreaks of HPAI can be devastating. According to the latest European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) report , between September and December 2024, several farms with more than 100,000 chickens — including two with over two million birds — were forced to cull their flocks to prevent the spread of the virus. The EU poultry industry may be better prepared for avian flu, as it has “stronger rules when it comes to biosecurity” and is “less exposed due to our industry structure,” as Munck Larsen notes, referring to a smaller concentration of laying hens per farm. Between July and December 2024, the US reported losses of 33.42 million birds, while EU member states recorded 7.69 million, according to the World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS), which monitors animal diseases globally. As of 26 March, just halfway through the current semester, the HPAI death toll in both the EU and the US has already reached levels comparable to the previous full semester. Avian influenza concerns now extend beyond poultry and wild birds. “We are equally concerned about avian influenza spreading into other species like cows, [...] we have seen the virus in dairy products, in milk,” Munck Larsen adds. The UK recently reported the first-ever recorded case in a sheep. Europe needs to keep its eggs in check Despite USDA forecasts that egg prices in the US are still expected to rise, Europe can hardly weaponise its eggs to gain leverage in ongoing trade tensions. “The global situation in egg is that there's no balance actually. There's a lot of demand and the supply is lacking,” says Munck Larsen. Eurostat and USDA data reflect only wholesale egg prices, but the Spanish consumer association FACUA has raised alarm over rapidly rising retail prices in recent weeks, with some egg categories increasing by up to 25 percent in major grocery chains. The recent rise in wholesale prices, combined with growing avian flu outbreaks, should serve as a warning for the EU to prioritise securing its own egg supply and price stability — rather than stretching production to ease US table egg prices. Moreover, these imports would now be subject to Trump's 20-percent tariff — undermining the very purpose of such a trade deal. Sergi Pijuan joined EUobserver in 2025, focusing on data analysis and visualisation. After years of experience in the digital marketing sector, he pivoted to economic analysis. Originally from Catalonia, Sergi relocated to Brussels to deepen his understanding of European affairs.
|
Sergi Pijuan
|
Amid escalating tariff threats, the US Department of Agriculture turned to the EU for egg imports. We crack open whether Europe can help — beyond the question of whether it should.
|
[
"EU & the World",
"Health & Society"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2025-04-04T13:23:19.138Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar00eab35c
|
Europe’s regulatory retreat on AI: a free lunch for Big Tech?
|
The noise surrounding 'competitiveness' in Brussels is reaching a fever pitch. A recent casualty of this push for 'simplification' is the AI Liability Directive (AILD) — a legislative proposal that would introduce clear rules on accountability when AI systems cause harm. Its conspicuous absence from the EU Commission’s 2025 work programme leaves a worrying gap in Europe's AI framework. At the AI Action Summit earlier this year, EU leaders signalled a shift of priorities, away from safety and towards “competitiveness.” Commission president Ursula von der Leyen declared that “we have to cut red tape” to “make it easier” for AI to grow in Europe. Just days later, the commission translated rhetoric into action and effectively withdrew AILD. Unlike the AI Act, which focuses on reducing damage caused by high-risk AI systems, AILD was designed to ensure accountability when harm does occur and provide a clear route to compensation for those affected. The commission’s decision to drop the file, despite its obvious importance for consumer protection, looks less like a technical decision, and more like a political concession. The directive would have introduced legal liabilities for major AI developers, a prospect Big Tech fiercely resisted. Ultimately, tech giants do not want to be held accountable for the products they develop, and neither do the firms using them. But someone needs to be accountable when things go wrong. If an AI system denies credit, triggers a market crash, or locks a vulnerable consumer out of basic services, who is responsible? As a recent Finance Watch report makes clear, financial regulation is built on the principles of accountability, responsibility and transparency. Until recently, supervisors could identify the source of a trading error or an unjustified denial of insurance. Even the most complex software-driven decisions were ultimately explainable. Faulty code could be identified, and responsibility assigned. This chain of accountability is embedded in financial regulation, and firms are obliged to comply. If they fail to do so, they face consequences. But AI breaks this chain. If an AI system denies credit, triggers a market crash, or locks a vulnerable consumer out of basic services, who is responsible? AI Deep learning systems operate by detecting correlations in vast datasets, not through a transparent logic of cause and effect. These models function in a ‘take it or leave it’ manner, where even their own developers struggle to explain outputs. This 'black-box logic' renders effective oversight impractical, if not impossible. Credit assessments, insurance pricing, or investment decisions made by AI resist explanation, and regulators may struggle to detect errors, biases, or even systemic risks. AI is not business as usual. It challenges the application of financial regulation’s core principles. And when the commission backs away from liability, a concerning gap opens in the regulatory framework. A free market without accountability is simply a license to exploit. AI is already an oligopoly dominated by a handful of US enterprises, and the EU’s retreat hands them even more power. By abandoning the AI liability regime, the commission is effectively telling these companies they can benefit from the single market without bearing any responsibility for the harm their systems may cause. EU policymakers should not get swept up in a competitiveness frenzy that confuses sound regulation with red tape. They must step back and take stock. What’s needed now is not deregulation, but a reassessment of the AI rulebook. Pragmatic steps can be taken to ensure that, as AI use cases in finance proliferate, citizens are protected from harmful practices. Thierry Philipponnat is chief economist at Finance Watch , the Brussels-based NGO dedicated to reforming finance in the interest of citizens. He co-founded Finance Watch and steers the organisation's research and policy work. He previously worked in investment banking and held senior roles in financial regulation, including at the French financial markets authority and the European Commission’s Platform on Sustainable Finance. Max Kretschmer is press officer at Finance Watch. Thierry Philipponnat is chief economist at Finance Watch , the Brussels-based NGO dedicated to reforming finance in the interest of citizens. He co-founded Finance Watch and steers the organisation's research and policy work. He previously worked in investment banking and held senior roles in financial regulation, including at the French financial markets authority and the European Commission’s Platform on Sustainable Finance.
|
Max Kretschmer
|
The EU Commission’s decision to drop the Artificial Intelligence Liability Directive, despite its obvious importance for consumer protection, looks less like a technical decision, and more like a political concession.
|
[
"Digital",
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] |
digital
|
2025-04-04T09:31:56.870Z
|
https://euobserver.com/digital/arcbd1284c
|
Rightwing MEPs get support for anti-green EU inquiry
|
The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group has secured enough signatures to launch a formal inquiry committee into what they call 'green lobbying' and the use of EU funds by climate and environmental groups, sources told EUobserver on Wednesday (2 April). The probe will focus on organisations funded by the EU’s 'Life' programme, the bloc’s main tool for financing environmental and climate action, and follows months of growing hostility from conservative and far-right lawmakers. The inquiry committee still has to be formally approved by the European Parliament's conference of presidents, a governing body representing political groups in parliament that will meet at the end of April. "They will also decide its numerical strength," an ECR spokesperson said. Green NGOs in Brussels receive €15m out of the ‘operating fund’ of Life, the commission’s programme for environmental projects. This money is used for rent, staff, and other ongoing costs. And ensuring that civil society, “by appropriate means,” can “make known their views” is constitutionally enshrined in article 11 of the EU treaty. Meanwhile, what began as a technical debate about transparency has morphed into a political offensive, with parts of the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) now lining up alongside the far right to go after environmental groups and EU-funded climate programmes. “Through a shadow lobby, the commission is influencing parliament. Our investigation continues - no stone will be left unturned,” EPP euro-deputy Dirk Gotink said on Bluesky. “They are trying to fabricate a story around funding as if we’re part of some sort of covert operation,” retorted Ariel Brunner, director of the NGO BirdLife, describing the EPP attack as a “slanderous witch-hunt.” Earlier this week, the push to defund Life suffered a setback when right-wing parties lost a symbolic vote in the parliament’s environment committee (Envi), with some EPP members breaking ranks. On the morning after the vote, co-chair Nicola Procaccini told reporters in Strasbourg that the ECR wanted to set up a parliamentary committee of inquiry into what he described as a green corruption scandal. In parallel, the European Commission and the EPP reached a behind-closed-doors agreement on the future of Life funding. In a statement released on Tuesday, the commission formally reaffirmed the importance of the programme, while also suggesting that some grant-funded work includes “specific advocacy actions and undue lobbying activities”, which green groups say was lifted straight out of the EPP playbook. “This isn’t over. The objection may have failed, but the political intent behind it remains,” said Faustine Bas-Defossez, policy director at the European Environmental Bureau group. “There is no 'shadow lobbying', only public funding that enables NGOs to operate and advocate for the common good," she said. “If that’s considered undue lobbying by EPP standards, we should all be deeply concerned about the future of democratic accountability in Europe,” she added. Next week, on Tuesday, MEPs in the budget committee will vote on the annual budget report, which includes scrutiny of how EU funds - including those under the Life programme - have been used. Earlier versions included direct attacks on Life grants and green NGOs. If the language is softened, it would be a small win for green groups, but the inquiry will likely still go ahead.
|
Wester is a journalist from the Netherlands with a focus on the green economy. He joined EUobserver in September 2021. Previously he was editor-in-chief of Vice, Motherboard, a science-based website, and climate economy journalist for The Correspondent.
|
The ECR group secured enough signatures to launch a formal inquiry committee into what they call 'green lobbying' and the use of EU funds for green NGOs.
|
[
"Green Economy"
] |
green-economy
|
2025-04-02T16:57:00.365Z
|
https://euobserver.com/green-economy/arb4fbde5e
|
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