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Democracy for sale? Why the EU must break with Serbia's Vučić | The recent student-led mass protests in Serbia have shown the EU’s cooperation with the country's president Aleksandar Vučić to be deeply misguided. The EU must realise that Vučić can no longer offer stability. Vučić has enjoyed relative support from the European Union since he came to power in 2014. Criticism of his regime has been muted despite his crackdowns on media freedom, manipulation of election results through ballot-stuffing and importing of voters from neighbouring Bosnia, close relations with China and Russia, and a lack of progress on relations with Kosovo. As the EU has ignored these concerns to maintain political stability in the Balkans by working with president Vučić, political scientists have satirically labelled Vučić’s regime a ‘stabilocracy’. The EU’s relative silence on the recent protests has been deafening for liberals and pro-Europeans in Serbia. Here is a peaceful protest movement that is calling for the development of a European-style democratic government in Serbia. The European Parliament has made statements in support of the protests. But the EU has not followed up with any practical support. Compare this to the Maidan uprising in Ukraine in 2014, when the EU responded by banning visas and freezing the financial assets of those it deemed responsible for the violence. It also prohibited the export of equipment to Ukraine that could be used by the government for "internal repression." Democracy vs minerals The EU’s support for Vučić is now widely perceived in Serbia to be a quid pro quo for a corrupt mining deal. Anglo-Australian mining conglomerate Rio Tinto has been trying for years to mine lithium - essential to producing electric car batteries – in Serbia’s Jadar Valley. In response to mass protests against the proposed mining deal between the Serbian government and Rio Tinto in 2022 just before an election, the government declared that the project was over. Then, after another election in 2024 (Vučić likes to hold snap elections about every two years to keep everyday politics mired in campaigning rather than governing), the Constitutional Court suddenly declared that the 2022 annulment of the deal was unconstitutional. The decision showed that the judiciary serves the interests of president Vučić. Days later, outgoing German chancellor Olaf Scholz, vice-president of the European Commission in charge of the Green Deal, Maroš Šefčovič, and representatives of car manufacturers BMW and Stellantis signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on a strategic partnership on the Jadar lithium mining project. The peculiar way that elections, a decision of the constitutional court, and the MoU were all signed within days makes the EU complicit in Vučić’s corrupt undemocratic manoeuvre to get the deal done. Written statements that the mining operation will conform to EU environmental standards are not believed in Serbia, where the government and private companies regularly flout domestic environmental laws. Also, the environmental impact of lithium mining has proven too controversial to tap into Germany’s own reserves – seemingly confirming Serbs’ suspicions that lithium mining is fundamentally incompatible with European environmental standards. The mining deal is regularly portrayed in Serbia as a colonial project - lithium for BMW in return for a polluted country and a richer President using his money to further strangle democracy. It seems the EU is happy to have a dictator on their doorstep if German car makers get lithium to make electric cars that Serbs cannot afford. Think of it as the EU’s equivalent of Trump’s minerals deal with Ukraine. Public support for EU membership has steadily fallen in Serbia in recent years. EU backing for the protesters might have swayed some Serbs back towards the EU. Instead, for many Serbs, the EU’s hypocrisy has been confirmed. Democracy is the most important thing unless there are precious minerals to be had . Vučić'sexit or democracy's demise Vučić’s supposedly stable regime is weaker than ever. Pro-European liberals and pro-Russian ultra-nationalists alike have participated in the protests. The Serbian president and his SNS party, supposedly a centre-right party, have lost Serbia’s farmers. He has lost military veterans. Vučić’s choice is clear – pursue genuine reform and lose power or become more authoritarian, more pro-Russian and pro-Chinese and turn Serbia into a Balkan Belarus. There is a clear way for authoritarian dictators to shore up their popularity – starting a war. We’ve seen it with Putin, and the wounds of the conflict of 1990s are still raw in Serbia. Even civil unrest within Serbia would likely spill over into neighbouring countries given that they contain Serbian minorities. If the EU stands for democracy rather than just for lithium, it must take a new position in Serbia soon. Support for Vučić is no longer support for stability if it ever was. Luke Bacigalupo is a history researcher and political analyst based in Belgrade, Serbia. He holds degrees in South Eastern European Studies and Modern History from the University of Belgrade and the University of Oxford. He has previously worked at the Office of the EU special representative in Kosovo and at UNDP in Serbia. | Luke Bacigalupo | If the EU stands for democracy rather than just for lithium, it must take a new position in Serbia soon. In the wake of student-led mass protests, support for president Vučić is no longer support for stability if it ever was, writes political analyst Luke Bacigalupo from Belgrade. | [
"EU & the World",
"Rule of Law"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-04-02T12:31:01.434Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/are778ca53 |
How the EU’s competitiveness agenda ignores Europe’s true strength | Last year was the hottest year on record. In fact, every year for the past 10 years has been a record-breaking year, a not-so-subtle reminder to all of us that climate change is by no means under control. The vast majority of Europeans agree that environmental issues have a direct effect on their daily life and their health. Yet, the urgency needed to address this worsening crisis was noticeably lacking in the new European Commission’s 2025 Work Programme, an omission that could have serious consequences not just for the environment but for society at large. The shift in priorities is unmisteakable. While the commitments to advance the EU’s sustainability agenda as set out in the European Green Deal still stand, they are no longer the end goal. The path to achieving sustainable, fair societies is now firmly intertwined with the new mandate’s real focus: boosting competitiveness, growth and productivity. The race to “safeguard Europe’s future as an economic powerhouse” might not immediately sound alarming, as economic stability is necessary to protect and finance the EU’s social and environmental objectives. However, the Commission’s guiding vision outlined in the Competitiveness Compass reveals a concerning reality – the wellbeing of people and planet is at risk of being undermined for economic gains. Missing the mark The publication of several new Commission proposals on 26 February solidified this concern. The Clean Industrial Deal, the Affordable Energy Action Plan and the Omnibus package all contain measures that look to benefit businesses and industry, relying on the flawed assumption that competitiveness gains for companies will automatically trickle down into benefits for all people. Unless proactively addressed, the deep socio-economic inequalities in our societies only stand to get worse. Transitioning to a greener Europe, for example, will likely have a disproportionate impact on marginalised or disadvantaged groups less able to adapt quickly to new policies, or absorb the economic impact of the move towards net-zero greenhouse emissions. For a just transition to a sustainable, fair future, it is therefore vital that climate and social policy go hand-in-hand. Unfortunately, the Commission’s legislative proposals largely miss the mark. Flawed assumptions As the Commission’s new strategy to align competitiveness with decarbonisation, the Clean Industrial Deal does take some positive steps to acknowledge the need for fair workforce transitions, quality jobs, and skills development. Given that an estimated 40% of workers in the EU are in occupations that will be directly impacted by the green transition (as reported by Eurofound ), initiatives like the Union of Skills and the forthcoming Quality Jobs Roadmap reflect the needs of workers in the industrial transition. The bottom line is that Europe can only be competitive if it invests in its greatest strength; socially fair, green and resilient societies. However, the Clean Industrial Deal’s emphasis on skills development and workforce transitions assumes that all displaced workers will be able to retrain and re-enter the labour market. The reality faced by many workers, particularly older workers, those in precarious employment, and those in sectors where alternative opportunities are limited is that reskilling alone is not enough. Access to social protection, adequate social safety nets and essential services is also necessary for those who struggle to find new employment. The Affordable Energy Action Plan also aims to support competitiveness and decarbonisation in the EU by lowering energy prices. As energy poverty affects over 46 million people in Europe, targeted support to ensure affordable energy for groups in vulnerable situations will be an important lifeline. However, for the Affordable Energy Action Plan to truly deliver on the promise of a just transition, it must be embedded within a broader EU Just Transition Policy Framework. A comprehensive approach would ensure that social protection, housing renovations, and community-led energy initiatives receive the same level of attention and investment as industrial competitiveness. Finally, the Omnibus package, presented as a means to cut red tape and enhance competitiveness, seems to completely contradict other just transition commitments. If the Clean Industrial Deal claims it will protect the rights of workers, the blatant deregulation attempts of the Omnibus will only weaken these rights. While there is need to ensure that regulatory requirements do not disproportionately burden small businesses, the proposed measures risk significantly weakening corporate accountability and transparency. The bottom line is that Europe can only be competitive if it invests in its greatest strength; socially fair, green and resilient societies. The European Parliament and the Council of the EU now have a responsibility to ensure that the EU balances its ambitions between reducing administrative burdens and upholding its commitment to a just transition. To ensure that competitiveness is not achieved through a social race to the bottom, we call on Member States and MEPs to work across political divides to ensure climate, environmental, economic and social policies are consistently and meaningfully aligned. Laura de Bonfils is Secretary General of Social Platform, the largest, leading non-governmental organisation working on social issues in Europe. Laura de Bonfils is Secretary General of | Social Platform, | We can’t boost our competitiveness without future-proofing our foundations. Securing a just transition to fair, sustainable societies is essential, but noticeably lacking in the EU Commission’s recent proposals. | [] | * | 2025-04-01T12:35:42.217Z | https://euobserver.com/*/ar97c2442c |
What would it take for euro to dethrone king US dollar? | Could the euro finally be pushed to rival the dollar as a global reserve currency? Until recently , that seemed a distant prospect. But US president Donald Trump’s trade aggression has already wiped out trillions from stock markets in recent weeks, sending the dollar lower against nearly all major currencies as investors fled to gold, the yen, and European stocks. Most experts still expect de-dollarisation to be a slow process, not sudden death (you don’t drain an ocean overnight). But Trump’s next tariff offensive, planned for Wednesday (2 April), which he has called “Liberation Day” could provoke further market turmoil and has already prompted a strong response. European Central Bank (ECB) chief Christine Lagarde on Monday said it was the beginning of Europe’s “march to independence.” “This is a moment when we must together decide to take better control of our destiny,” she said. The missing euro strategy Lagarde did not spell it out, but one path to greater independence is to strengthen the euro’s role as a reserve currency. As the world’s second-largest currency, the euro is well-positioned to step in. But a lot has to go right politically for that to happen. And EU decision-makers do not have a great track record in this regard. A key driver behind the euro’s creation was to act as a counterweight to the dollar, but later EU and ECB officials largely left the euro's international expansion to market forces, neglecting, and at times even discouraging, a serious push to strengthen its global role. “The infrastructure is there — what’s missing is political will” The US by contrast, spent decades cementing dollar supremacy, sometimes aggressively so. As a result, the euro today is underdeveloped relative to the size of its economy. It lacks sufficient safe assets, has too little offshore liquidity, and no coherent financial diplomacy. “The ECB has been sleeping,” Jens van ’t Klooster, professor of political economy at the University of Amsterdam, told EUobserver. “For decades, we just assumed we could rely on the US dollar. That now proves to have been a costly mistake. We have to very quickly prepare replacement systems that took the US a century to build.” Together with the Berlin-based economist Steffen Murau, van 't Klooster has tracked the euro’s “failed” internationalisation project and laid out a three-pronged strategy to revive it: - The ECB needs to expand the supply of tradable euro-denominated debt — the lifeblood of any international currency — by loosening the strict rules that currently limit which bonds can qualify as safe assets. - Second, it needs to broaden its network of swap lines — the credit lines that allow foreign banks and governments to access euros during crises — a role still dominated by the US federal reserve. - Finally, EU authorities must foster more trade in euros, especially along supply chains linked to the energy transition. That means making it easier for companies to borrow, trade, and invest in euros - which, in turn, will help deepen euro-based financial markets. The euro won’t be able to fully replace the dollar outright. But it could become the anchor of a more multipolar financial system, alongside the Yen, Sterling, and Renminbi. This could stabilise the financial sector if Trump’s trade policies destabilise dollar markets, and could help embed European (green) norms into the global financial system. Why the dollar looks shaky Before we get there, it’s worth asking why de-dollarisation is on the table in the first place. The short answer is: Trump. Tariffs and trade wars are bad enough. But there are signs he’s willing to go even further and weaponise the dollar to get what he wants. In an off-the-cuff remark during a White House press point last month, he told reporters that the €34 trillion in outstanding US debt would be “looked at” because some of it might be “fraudulent.” “Toying with the idea of not paying back holders of US debt is a more fundamental threat to the dollar than the end of Bretton Woods.” This was widely interpreted to imply that the Trump administration was considering a “selective default” as part of a cost-cutting drive led by the unelected tech tycoon and White House aide Elon Musk. Treasury secretary Scott Bessent, regarded by some as one of the ‘saner’ voices in Trump’s camp, later softened the statement. But Bessent himself backs the so-called “century bond” plan. This scheme would allow the treasury to convert foreign-held US debt (much of it in five- or 10-year treasury bonds) into low-interest 100-year bonds, and potentially subject it to an additional tax. In effect, this also amounts to a partial default. Creditors would be “encouraged” to accept bonds they neither want nor trust, with little hope of recouping their claims in full. To enforce it, Trump’s advisors lean on a familiar playbook: more tariffs and the threat of withdrawing military support through Nato. The same logic could easily escalate. Trump could threaten to withhold dollar access or selectively default on debt to punish adversaries or coerce “ungrateful” allies. “Threatening to default on debt could trigger a fire sale of dollar assets,” van 't Klooster said. “Not paying back US debt would tear through the international monetary system far more violently than the end of Bretton Woods.” Whether the Trump administration will take it this far is unclear. But the danger is taken seriously at the highest levels. European central bankers have raised doubts about the reliability of US institutions to provide dollar funding during market strain, and former US treasury officials have warned that the “spectre of default” could destroy US credibility. “The mood could shift,” van 't Klooster said. “People could simply decide that exposure to dollar assets is no longer desirable.” Is the euro safe? Even those eager to see the dollar dethroned — Chinese president Xi Jinping not least among them — have no interest in a disorderly collapse of the global financial system. As van 't Klooster puts it bluntly: “The dollar = the financial system.” The euro is best placed to cushion the blow, but it is still far too small. The sheer scale of dollar markets is hard to match. Tens of trillions in dollar debt can’t simply be poured into gold, equities, or scattered across the shallow bond markets of a handful of mid-sized countries. What global finance needs is another deep pool of safe assets — stable in value, easily turned into cash, and widely accepted. That’s where ‘king dollar’ is hard to beat. It still accounts for 88 percent of cross-border trade and 58 percent of global reserves. The US government has €34 trillion in debt, with €21 trillion available as safe assets for global markets. “We left internationalisation to the market. We never seriously thought about how to promote a euro-denominated global payment and credit system” China’s bond market is the second biggest (approximately €22 trillion ), but most of it consists of local government and state-owned enterprise debt, with limited foreign access. The eurozone comes next, with almost €13 trillion in total debt, but only €4 trillion counts as safe. This is nowhere near enough to replace the dollar. As a share of total debt, eurozone safe assets are about half of what the US offers — one-third compared to two-thirds. The eurozone could expand its supply of safe assets by broadening guarantees for individual member states or by issuing more common debt, but both require a political agreement. Instead, it relies on a patchy and opaque system, leaving investors uncertain about the status of individual countries' debt. Italian debt may be deemed safe today, but what happens if a crisis hits? This uncertainty stems in part from a 2005 ECB decision: European debt is still graded using US rating agencies like Moody’s and Fitch, whose verdicts can prevent major EU countries such as Poland, Spain, and Italy from qualifying as safe assets in ECB operations. The ECB has long avoided setting its own standards to dodge politically fraught debt disputes. Yet, as van 't Klooster and Murau note with some understatement, it is “questionable” whether US agencies should remain the ultimate judges of European solvency. Going offshore Whatever approach EU and ECB officials choose to fix the safe asset problem, it is only one step. The real missing link is the euro's limited use as trade currency, and a lack of infrastructure to support offshore euro creation: banks and firms outside Europe need to be able to issue euro-denominated financial instruments easily, just as they have done for decades with dollars. The dollar’s strength comes from a century of proactive — sometimes aggressive — offshore monetary policy. “The US has flat-out threatened the Saudis in the past: keep selling oil in dollars, or we’ll invade,” said van 't Klooster, referring to 1970s declassified documents showing US offers of 'military protection' helped ensure oil would continue to be priced in dollars. “Oil is the root of why the whole system is dollar-based. Everyone needs dollars to access energy,” he added. This was supported by the eurodollar market, which allowed dollars to circulate globally beyond US borders and was forcefully backed by the Fed, the Treasury, and the State Department. But the euro never had such a deliberate strategy. “We left internationalisation to the market,” van 't Klooster said. “We never seriously thought about how to promote a euro-denominated global payment and credit system.” “Oil is the root of why the whole system is dollar-based. Everyone needs dollars to access energy” The ECB’s first president, Wim Duisenberg, argued in 1999 that stable prices would “automatically foster” international use of the euro. It didn’t — and although the ECB has since distanced itself from this view, it still treats euro internationalisation as a domestic issue, one that will somehow emerge from “deeper [EU] capital markets.” Yet the energy transition offers Europe a second chance. Currency of the green transition Just as coal anchored the pound and oil anchored the dollar, the euro could be tied to critical minerals and green technologies. “If the prices of batteries, solar panels, and renewable energy investments are increasingly set and financed in euros, the currency’s global role would grow,” said van ‘t Klooster. Trump’s hostility to the green transition only sharpens this possibility. Europe, at least in principle, could forge a cleaner alternative to the petrodollar. But the starting position is weak. China dominates much of the supply chain for minerals and rare earths and is already building its own financial channels. "Internationalising the euro could embed European norms into the system” But the more value chains Europe manages to price and finance in euros, the stronger the network effects will become, this time anchored not in oil, but in metals, critical minerals, and renewable infrastructure. This wouldn't necessarily make the system fairer. “The global financial system is deeply unequal,” said van 't Klooster. “But internationalising the euro could embed European norms into the system." Unlike in the US, where even looking at climate risk is restricted, "Europe could make sustainable finance the norm," he also said. In some ways, this is already happening. The largest share of green bonds globally is denominated in euros. “The infrastructure is there — what’s missing is political will,” said van ‘t Klooster. “National ministries, the central bank, the EU — there needs to be a coherent strategy to roll out the euro. But the pushback is still that the central bank could become too political, but I think doing nothing is also a political choice.” | Wester is a journalist from the Netherlands with a focus on the green economy. He joined EUobserver in September 2021. Previously he was editor-in-chief of Vice, Motherboard, a science-based website, and climate economy journalist for The Correspondent. | As Trump ramps up his trade war, two economists outline how Europe could finally turn the euro into a global currency. | [
"Green Economy"
] | green-economy | 2025-04-01T09:29:00.526Z | https://euobserver.com/green-economy/arbbd7567a |
Why the UN aid summit is the EU's best shot at financial justice | Counterintuitive as it may seem, a crumbling world order offers the EU a golden opportunity to champion justice, multilateralism, and the fight against inequality. Last month’s public commitment in this direction by EU leaders in their exchange with UN secretary-general António Guterres is a wise move . But so far, there's been a big gap between what they say and what they're actually willing to do to make this a reality. An important first test will be in June, in Seville (Spain), when the Fourth United Nations Financing for Development (FfD4) international conference takes place the first time it is being held on European soil. There, EU leaders must choose between the growing trend of isolationism or tackling once and for all the deep crises driving today’s instability. This summit is a pivotal moment to promote fair global finance rules that fight inequality, extreme wealth concentration, and the climate crisis that is burning our futures. This week, EU representatives in New York will join a new round of negotiations on the road to Seville. So far, the EU’s positions in the FfD process have been deeply disappointing. Instead of backing proposals for more democratic decision-making on global economic issues, the bloc has systematically opposed any meaningful reform, defending an unfair and dysfunctional status quo, and limiting their offer to the Global Gateway an investment initiative that barely scratches the surface of the challenges we face. The system we live in marginalises the world's poorest, shackles countries with crushing debt, and lets the super-rich plunder our planet and take control of our economies. These are the three key issues that the EU should fight for in the FfD process if they truly want to walk the talk: First is debt. We are in the worst-ever global debt crisis . According to the UN, 3.3 billion people live in countries that spend more on debt interest than on health or education. The UN is the only global institution where all countries are equally represented and, therefore, the only one that can guarantee that the interests of creditors are not put before the needs of millions of people. The EU must throw its weight behind reforms that would make the UN responsible for resolving this suffocating debt crisis. Attempts to deal with it by organisations like the International Monetary Fund and the G20, where rich countries hold power over the poorest, have been both insufficient and slow, protecting creditors’ interests and condemning millions to poverty. Aid is the second pillar - and it is under attack. In the name of national security, governments are slashing aid budgets and diverting these already scarce funds to defence spending. This is both a moral failure and a strategic blunder. True security isn’t just about military power; it hinges on stability, diplomacy, democracy, and development. Since first agreed, over 50 years ago, only a handful of wealthy countries have met the commitment to allocate 0.7 percent of their gross national income to aid. Yet, they face no accountability for this broken promise - because they set the rules themselves within the rich countries’ club, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). That’s why the EU must back a new UN convention to make sure all countries are included on an equal footing. You can’t deal with the cards and stack the deck. Tax is the third pillar. Global tax abuse by the richest corporations and individuals is a shared crisis for the EU and the Global South. The European Commission admits the EU alone loses €100bn annually to corporate tax havens . Meanwhile, the ultra-wealthy dodge fair contributions, amassing fortunes so fast that the world will see its first trillionaires within a decade. The UN is already working on a global Tax Convention and the EU should be actively supporting it. Instead, they are lagging behind and have yet to endorse the Terms of Reference. Backing these reforms in global economic governance is not only the right thing to do, but it will also strengthen the EU’s geopolitical standing. It's an unprecedented strategic opportunity. By aligning with hundreds of governments and promoting UN-led reforms, the EU can help drive a multilateral transformation that puts equality, gender justice, and climate action ahead of crippling debt repayments, corporate interests, and billionaire-boosting policies. | In these troubled times, EU countries must move from words to action. | The upcoming UN summit in Seville, Spain, is a pivotal moment for the EU to fight extreme wealth concentration and the climate crisis burning our futures. | [
"Green Economy",
"Opinion"
] | green-economy | 2025-04-01T08:41:46.704Z | https://euobserver.com/green-economy/ar6f070fa5 |
When home turns unsafe: war toll on Ukrainian women | Last week, severe bombardment of Kyiv continued despite talks of ceasefires. By the following morning, the news of three more lives tragically lost — a five-year-old girl, her father, and an 80-year-old woman— had spread across a city already battered by years of war. Streets covered with debris, neighbours going through the rubble. These scenes shape how the world sees the war in Ukraine. Yet hidden behind the visible devastation is another consequence of this daily brutality that is not in the public spotlight: an escalating struggle in countless homes, where women and girls face a rising tide of gender-based violence, worsened by the mental health consequences of war, of family losses, blackouts due to the attacks on energy infrastructure, and displacement across and outside Ukraine. In Ukraine, UNFPA has released a new report ‘Voices from Ukraine’ — a qualitative study grounded in listening closely to women and girls, amplifying and centring their voices, and elevating their experiences to guide humanitarian responses. The ongoing war contributes to new forms of gender-based violence, exacerbates pre-existing ones, and hinders survivors’ access to support. From this study, we've come to understand a few things about what women and girls are going through in the country: even during continued shelling, the home can be the most dangerous place for women. And gender-based violence in Ukraine has significantly intensified, with increased intimate partner violence and other forms of domestic violence. Emotional exhaustion Women also feel increasingly unsafe in public spaces, on the streets and public transport, and in shelters. Attacks have severely damaged the once-strong national energy infrastructure, with Ukraine operating on one-third of the energy it had prior to the war . Streets that were previously lit and relatively safe, now disappear into darkness. Local organisations continue to warn that dark streets create unsafe environments for women and girls. Curfews force families indoors for hours on end, and in cramped quarters, tension escalates with nowhere to escape. Neighbours cannot intervene if they cannot see or hear what happens behind the curtains of a darkened home. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, reports of intimate partner violence, domestic abuse, sexual assault, and other forms of gender-based violence have surged. Nearly 2.4 million people —mostly women and girls—urgently need gender-based violence prevention and response services. At times, many cannot reach help lines because phone networks fail during power cuts. Others, living in temporary shelters or unfamiliar collective housing, feel trapped and fearful of exposing themselves to further risk. The emotional toll across the country is staggering. Almost two-thirds of households report anxiety, depression, or extreme stress. Mass job losses, displacement, and constant uncertainty push families to the brink. In some areas, substance abuse is rising, compounding the likelihood of violence. Those who survive domestic abuse often have no safe place to go. Living in a small apartment with extended relatives or strangers becomes a breeding ground for further harm. Men returning from war frequently bear unprocessed trauma. Without solid mental health support, some channel distress into harmful behaviour at home. Communities often regard these men as heroes, which can make survivors hesitant to speak out — deterring some from seeking the justice they deserve. A pause in fighting may spare families from the immediate horrors of war. Yet attacks are only part of Ukraine’s crisis: If the weapons were silenced tomorrow, the psychological and social damage could remain for generations. Invest in lifelines, not just infrastructure Ukraine’s future rests on more than rebuilding roads and power lines. Local organisations, many of which are led by women, provide emotional and social support to those most at risk; they support the needed process of healing. They run shelters, helplines, counselling sessions, and legal aid. They also travel to rural or heavily damaged areas to reach women who cannot leave. Many frontline workers have been displaced themselves. They understand first-hand the fear and disruption that follow every strike. Their work bridges the gap between immediate crisis relief and long-term recovery. Yet without stable funding and resources, their ability to respond dwindles. Comprehensive mental health support is essential. Survivors of violence need specialised counselling. Men returning from war require avenues to address their trauma. Many couples now find themselves needing to relearn how to communicate, understand each other, and build healthy connections once again. Research from indicates that early interventions — community counselling, survivor support groups, and structured psychosocial programs — help break cycles of violence before they become deeply ingrained. We must ensure that the services on the ground—shelters, hotlines, psychosocial care, and economic opportunities—are funded and scaled up. These initiatives are crucial to rebuilding trust in communities traumatised by war. A just and peaceful Ukraine is one where a woman can walk the streets after dusk without dread, where she can seek help if danger emerges within her own four walls, and where she can heal from the traumas of war. Let us build a society where women and girls can freely navigate, work, and live in peace—for the well-being of all. Tackling the hidden battle against gender-based violence requires visible commitment, one that goes hand in hand with the nation’s broader reconstruction. Let us centre the voices of women and girls in every humanitarian plan, every budget allocation, every training for healthcare workers, and every dialogue on peace. Ulla Müller is the UNFPA representative to Ukraine | Ulla Müller | A pause in fighting may spare families from the immediate horrors of war. Yet attacks are only part of Ukraine’s crisis: If the weapons were silenced tomorrow, the psychological and social damage could remain for generations. | [
"Ukraine",
"Opinion"
] | ukraine | 2025-03-31T11:02:27.805Z | https://euobserver.com/ukraine/ar5f874c89 |
Serbia's alarming path toward media suppression | Following last weekend’s historic protests, the Serbian government has intensified its crackdown on independent media, using state-backed disinformation, intimidation tactics, and commercial pressure to undermine journalistic integrity. Independent outlets have been directly targeted by a government-led smear campaign designed to delegitimise independent reporting and restrict public access to truthful information. Between 9-15 March, the president of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, and speaker of the parliament, Ana Brnabić, publicly labeled independent channels such as N1, a CNN affiliate, and Nova S as “enemies of Serbia.” Pro-government media falsely reported that a United Media (owner of N1 and Nova S) employee attacked minister Nikola Selaković. Meanwhile, government-affiliated networks systematically harass UM journalists online. The European Federation of Journalists has warned that these tactics create a hostile environment for press freedom. For months, Serbia has been in turmoil following the tragic collapse of a structure in Novi Sad that killed 15 people. What began as national mourning turned into a mass movement against corruption, demanding accountability and transparency. Instead of engaging in democratic dialogue, the Serbian authorities have responded with intimidation, legal threats, and open hostility toward independent journalists. President Vučić has labelled independent media and their reporters as enemies of the state and accused them of criminal activity without evidence. These are not just attacks on media — they are attacks on democracy itself. This is not just Serbia’s fight — it is a test for Europe. Serbia is an EU candidate country, and one of the fundamental requirements for accession is media freedom. Yet, despite the clear and growing assault on independent journalism, Brussels has largely remained silent . The European Commission’s routine statements of concern are not enough. With European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen set to meet president Vučić next week, this moment presents a critical opportunity for the EU to address the erosion of media freedom in Serbia. The EU has learned painful lessons from Hungary’s backsliding into authoritarianism, where a once-independent press has been turned into a government mouthpiece. Those lessons mean nothing if Brussels allows Serbia to follow the same path. The EU has the tools to act, and it must use them now. The media suppression playbook Serbia’s government is employing well-known authoritarian tactics to control information: · Discredit independent journalism — label critical media as foreign agents, enemies of the state, or criminals. · Control the narrative — flood the airwaves with pro-government messaging while using state influence to marginalise independent voices. · Financially suffocate dissent — cut off advertising revenue and impose restrictive regulations to make independent outlets unsustainable. Threaten, intimidate, and, if necessary, silence smear campaigns, legal harassment, and direct threats against journalists. Serbia is already deep into this process. Government-aligned media push disinformation daily, regulatory bodies selectively enforce rules to punish independent outlets, and there are open discussions about banning N1 altogether. The next step? A state of emergency that would give Vučić sweeping powers to further control information. EU can't afford another Hungary The EU has made the mistake of waiting too long before addressing democratic backsliding. In Hungary, by the time real pressure was applied, it was too late. Brussels must: · Condition Serbia’s EU accession on media freedom — no negotiations without concrete protections for press independence. · Hold Serbia accountable for attacks on journalists — apply diplomatic pressure to halt disinformation and intimidation tactics. · Demand independent regulatory oversight — Serbia’s media landscape must not be dominated by government-aligned broadcasters. · Engage European businesses and investors — suppressing press freedom threatens Serbia’s economic stability and international reputation. Europe’s leaders must decide: will they continue issuing weak statements while another country slides into authoritarianism, or will they take decisive action to protect fundamental democratic values? The crackdown on independent media in Serbia is escalating. The European Commission, national governments, and international organisations must intervene before the window for meaningful action closes. Allowing Serbia to continue down this path unchecked sends a clear message to other aspiring autocrats: silencing the press comes without consequences. In the 1990s, the West watched as democracy collapsed in parts of Eastern Europe, leading to war, instability, and suffering. Today, the collapse is quieter but no less dangerous. Media freedom is the canary in the coal mine. If Serbia’s free press falls, it will signal that democracy is no longer a priority for the European Union, setting a dangerous precedent for the entire region. Igor Božic is news director at N1 Serbia , the CNN-affiliate. In the past two months, N1 has been the most-watched cable channel in Serbia. N1 provides independent and fact-based journalism in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia. N1 is part of United Media, the media company owned by United Group, which operates 120 media outlets and over 60 TV stations. Igor Božic is news director at | N1 Serbia | Instead of engaging in democratic dialogue, the Serbian authorities have responded with intimidation, legal threats, and open hostility toward independent journalists. President Aleksandar Vučić has labelled independent media and their reporters as enemies of the state and accused them of criminal activity — without evidence. | [
"EU & the World",
"Rule of Law",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-03-28T11:02:19.857Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ardd7db9e1 |
Why EU's 'suspend, not lift' Syria sanctions policy will backfire | You have probably read that last week European states wanted to help Syrians rebuild their country after the fall of the Assad regime, generously throwing a few billion euros to address skyrocketing humanitarian needs. What you may not have heard, however, is that the EU 27 have actually decided to let Syria down, at the worst possible time. When the EU-27 announced they suspended their sanctions on energy, transport or financial services, that meant the sanctions remained in place. There is a fundamental difference between "suspending" and "lifting" sanctions — and European businesses will not invest in bridges, hospitals and schools if sanctions are not lifted. The EU’s decision to not lift these Assad-era sanctions undermines its stated goal of helping Syrians rebuild their country, it will create even more instability and a vacuum in which Russia and Iran will re-anchor themselves. First, we should remember sanctions are supposed to be a tool to change the behaviour of people in power. For example, in 2011 Syrian human rights defenders documented that Assad was using European tech companies to track down thousands of citizens, so the EU sanctioned telecom companies Syriatel and MTN and Sweden's tech giant had to stop supplying them. Assad's repression continued, but with an ever increasing economic and political cost, as he fully relied on Iranian and Russian technology. Today, the very same Syrians who successfully called for Assad's telecoms to be sanctioned are urging the EU to lift sanctions so they can reconnect with the rest of the world after Assad's fall. Just as the EU was right to listen to human rights defenders, it should now listen to them and lift all sectoral sanctions — the only sanctions that should remain are those targeting individuals, not the entire country. Not lifting sectoral sanctions, without presenting any clear roadmap for Syrians to understand the purpose of this perpetuation, is a disturbing lack of strategy. In sharp contrast with the EU's detailed justification for the sanctions it enforced on Assad for many years, the EU issued vague and contradictory statements of "longstanding EU support" noting "positive developments" but expecting an inclusive process for all Syrians including women, "beyond faith and ethnicity". No benchmarks, no target The EU does not even bother to articulate what their new conditions were to lift them: no benchmarks, no target. The consequences, however, are all too clear for both Syrians and Europeans. For example, you may have heard some governments rejoice at the prospect of seeing millions of Syrian refugees return to their homeland. Fact is, Syrian parents say that will not happen without the infrastructure of daily life: schools, internet, health care. Without it, they see no future for their children. Like elsewhere, most companies do not invest if their business could become illegal in a few months. Building a school, for instance, may require a bank loan. Yet local banks have no cash as they cannot access the international financial system, as sanctions are not fully lifted and therefore regulatory overcompliance remains. Banks remember what happened when sanctions on Iran were suspended then unexpectedly reinstated a couple of years later: most investments had to stop, resulting in a net loss for business. An even deeper inconsistency in the EU-27’s strategy is its incoherent attempts to justify not yet lifting sanctions. Some Europeans worry that the Syrian rebels, who ousted Assad and his Iranian and Russian allies on 8 December, would violate women’s and minorities’ rights. Despite the exact contrary on the ground. Maintaining these sanctions fully ignores the repeated calls by Syrian women’s organisations’ to lift them, as that would empower Syrian women with better access to education and higher revenues. Women I will never forget my visit to Jordan’s Al Azraq refugee camp last year, in the middle of the desert. The future looked bleak for these Syrian women. Their men had been killed, they had fled and had to support themselves, making painful decisions on when to marry their daughters to protect them from soldiers, or when to pull them from school to work and bring meagre revenues to survive. Their daily economic contortions to feed their families will not cease if sanctions remain. How can the 27 governments, of which only three are led by a woman, go as far as maintaining sanctions on a war-ravaged country to allegedly champion women's rights, when they are backtracking on those rights themselves? It is actually significant that a former jihadi leader ordered his security forces to let women dress freely, appointed women as governor of the Central Bank or as minister. Instead of alleviating some of the suffering of these women and encouraging Syria's reconstruction, the EU is keeping its country-wide sanctions preemptively. Another striking example of a lack of focus is the claim to protect Syria's religious and ethnic minorities. Whether Christian or Druze, Alawite or Kurdish, all of Syria's components have been remarkably united in wanting sanctions to be lifted. Unfortunately many in Europe fell into the trap of online disinformation and believed Christians were massacred despite Syrian Christian leaders from Latakia to Aleppo denying it. The risk of violence is real after 53 years of sectarian politics, which is why the new authorities have consistently engaged with minorities . I have worked on EU-Syria sanctions since 2011, I have rarely seen such strong consensus within Syria's diverse society to call for sectoral sanctions to be fully lifted. Aimless and outdated, they will only fuel popular resentment, which will be exploited by Iran and Russia — the latter has already confirmed it will happily continue to issue Syria's banknotes. While it is true that US sanctions remain an essential impediment regardless, the EU must have a coherent policy of its own on Syria. US not in the neighbourhood Contrary to the US, the EU will have to live with the consequences of more instability in the Middle East. Syrian refugees may not be able to rebuild their country. Russia, Iran and Hezbollah, who have no sectoral sanctions on Syria, will return as Syria's main providers of energy with oil tankers, loans with financial institutions, even salaries through drug trafficking. Worst of all perhaps, without sufficient economic resources, thousands of Syrians will have no choice but to join armed groups again. State employees will be forced to return to their old patrons, including pro-Assad militias. ISIS will find new recruits who need to survive one way or another. This means empowering sectarian politics with a high risk of more conflict. At last, a final inconsistency: how the EU-27 is dealing with Syria's new authorities and their leader Al Sharaa. Leaders like France's Emmanuel Macron have invited him to Europe, announcing the re-opening of EU embassies in Damascus. Their intelligence services have cooperated with Al Sharaa for years to combat ISIS and al Qaeda in Syria, Ukrainian intelligence even trained his soldiers last year. And yet they remain designated as terrorists, creating a legal conundrum for civil society to interact with new authorities. As yet another hazy precondition to lifting sanctions, the EU is calling for an inclusive dialogue with terrorists it warmly hosted in Brussels last week. This is not a strategy. It's a farce. Lest we forget, the EU's legacy on Syria is remarkable, beyond the billions it has spent to alleviate the suffering of refugees. Its consistent fight against impunity in Syria has been decisive at the UN to uphold the rights of half a million victims. In the darkest days, when many non-EU countries were normalising relations with Assad, most EU countries resisted attempts to normalise. Today's inaction will backfire against Europe's strategic interests in the region. Syrians deserve more than empty words. Schams El Ghoneimi was policy adviser for Middle East and North Africa for Renew Europe at the European Parliament until February 2025. He was Crisis Action 's political analyst on Syria during the Arab spring. Schams El Ghoneimi was policy adviser for Middle East and North Africa for Renew Europe at the European Parliament until February 2025. He was | Crisis Action | By deciding to suspend rather than lift sanctions on Syria, Europe is losing a historical opportunity to help stabilise the Middle East. There is a fundamental difference between "suspending" and "lifting" sanctions — and European businesses will not invest in bridges, hospitals and schools if sanctions are not lifted. | [
"EU & the World",
"Opinion"
] | * | 2025-03-27T15:15:12.400Z | https://euobserver.com/*/ar9499a187 |
Enough red flags have been ignored, EU must reconsider Rwanda relations | The European Union’s response to the armed conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo has not matched the rapid advance of the Rwanda-backed M23 armed group. But the March 17 targeted sanctions give hope that Europe is finally waking up to the seriousness of the abuses taking place, Rwanda’s role, and the EU’s own involvement with Rwanda. The onslaught of suffering in eastern Congo did not start with the M23’s January offensive — civilians have long endured abuses by armed groups and national armies with Rwanda’s support. The resurgence of the M23 in late 2021 has brought with it a trail of violations and a humanitarian disaster. In areas it occupies, the M23 has carried out forced labor and recruitment, dismantled camps , and threatened, detained, and attacked journalists, critics, and civil society activists . The EU, in addition to sanctioning several M23 leaders, listed key Rwandan officials and a gold company for their role in supporting abuses in eastern Congo. Kigali’s cutting diplomatic ties to Belgium should not distract from the obvious next steps. By sanctioning the Gasabo Gold Refinery, identified by United Nations experts as the location where gold fraudulently transported from Congo is refined before export, and the head of the Rwanda Mines, Petroleum and Gas Board, EU ministers clearly pointed to Rwanda’s role in illicit exploitation of natural resources. In its most recent report , the UN Group of Experts on Congo confirmed that the M23 and the allied Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) controlled the routes from the Congolese mining town of Rubaya to Rwanda, where minerals are mixed with Rwandan production. The UN experts also concluded that “fraudulent extraction, trade and export to Rwanda of Rubaya minerals thus benefited both AFC/M23 and the Rwandan economy.” Red flags ignored Rwanda’s long-time involvement in illegal mining should have been a red flag for the European Commission in its dealing with Kigali. But instead, the commission signed in February 2024 a much criticized Memorandum of Understanding on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains , which drew the ire of the European Parliament . While the deal includes commitments to environmental, social and governance standards, human rights and regional peace and stability, those promises are in stark contrast with the reality on the ground. The February 2024 deal was a major reputational boost for Rwanda that has become a reputational risk for the commission because of Rwanda’s disregard for the basic pledges made in its deal with Brussels. The EU commissioner for international partnerships, Jozef Síkela, should acknowledge that conditions for implementation cannot be met as long as Rwanda supports the abusive M23, by furnishing weapons, materiel and fighters. In June 2023, the EU’s International Partnerships Directorate and Germany’s development agency (GIZ) initiated a multi-million euro project with Rwanda’s mining board, whose head was sanctioned last week. Germany suspended cooperation with Rwanda in view of the conflict — the European Commission should follow suit. These sanctions raise questions over earlier EU decisions to provide two €20m grants to support the Rwandan military’s deployment in Mozambique under the European Peace Facility (EPF). Sanctioned Rwandan officials also include three commanders involved in providing support to the M23. Two of them, Eugene Nkubito and Pascal Muhizi, had recently served in Rwanda’s task force in Mozambique’s embattled Cabo Delgado province in counterinsurgency operations. The current top commander of Rwanda’s forces in Mozambique, major general Emmy Ruvusha , had just recently been transferred from eastern Congo, which should be setting off alarm bells in Brussels. If the EU is serious about safeguards attached to EPF funding to Rwanda’s deployment in Mozambique, then the deployment of Ruvusha and other commanders there should be seen as a categorical red line. The EU’s top diplomat, Kaja Kallas, should pause disbursement of any further EPF funds to Rwanda until safeguards, including genuine vetting of troops deployed, are met, and commanders and troops who served in Congo are excluded from EU-funded operations. Finally, EU institutions should make clear that measures will only be lifted when Rwanda ends its support to the M23. The Congolese army’s creation and support for a coalition of abusive armed groups known as the “ Wazalendo ” has compounded the suffering of civilians further. But Rwanda’s support to the M23 plays such a critical role in the ongoing crisis that the EU should use all opportunities for leverage to press for it to stop. EU institutions should show consistency with recent sanctions, suspend a mineral deal whose provisions are flouted by Rwanda, and ensure that military and security cooperation does not contribute to violations in Congo. The EU should also show readiness to curb Rwanda’s benefits from its presence in eastern Congo and radically review its cooperation with a government that violates rights at home and fuels atrocities abroad. Philippe Dam is EU advocacy director at Human Rights Watch . Philippe Dam is EU advocacy director at | Human Rights Watch | The EU’s top diplomat, Kaja Kallas, should pause disbursement of any further European Peace Facililty funds to Rwanda until safeguards, including genuine vetting of troops deployed, are met, and commanders and troops who served in Congo are excluded from EU-funded operations, write Human Rights Watch. | [
"Africa",
"Opinion"
] | eu-political | 2025-03-27T11:44:32.121Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar210f528c |
Prepare a 72-hour crisis survival kit for citizens, EU tells capitals | EU governments will be expected to develop a 72-hour survival kit for citizens to face new crises, the European Commission said on Wednesday (26 March), as it set out plans for EU wide stockpiling strategy for food and medical supplies. The proposal is part of the Commission’s Preparedness Union Strategy which also calls for more stockpiling of essential supplies and for improved civilian-military cooperation. As well as food and medicines, stockpiling by governments should include critical raw materials so that industrial production or strategic equipment can continue, plus energy equipment. Though Hadja Lahbib, the commissioner for preparedness and crisis management, pointed to Russia’s war against Ukraine as a case where “our European security is directly affected”, she pointed to a series of other hybrid threats such as cyberattacks and “battlefields” that “are being weaponised to threaten our European way of life.” “Today’s threats facing Europe are more complex than ever and they are all inter-connected,” added Lahbib. Although most spheres of crisis management policy are the responsibility of national governments, the EU Commission believes it can play a useful coordinating role. The preparedness strategy is the latest of a series of initiatives aimed at improving the EU’s capacity to respond to crises. As well as creating an EU crisis co-ordination hub to help member states, the commission also wants to beef up the EU’s civil protection mechanism (EUCPM), which was set up in 2001 and allows states to request emergency assistance in case of natural disasters such as floods and wildfires, the Covid-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine. Lahbib said that requests for the EUCPM have increased ten-fold since its creation. The strategy also calls for more cooperation between civilian and military authorities to deal with “complex threats like hybrid warfare, cyberattacks, and potential armed aggression”. Earlier this month, the EU executive unveiled new plans to guarantee critical medicine supplies in a bid to protect the bloc from shortages. The EU’s vulnerability to health emergencies was exposed by the Covid-19 pandemic which prompted the commission to organise joint procurement of vaccines and personal protective equipment. On Tuesday, meanwhile, the commission set out plans to provide €2bn to help finance 47 projects to slash the EU’s dependence on critical raw materials and minerals from outside the bloc. “The Covid pandemic has shown that the added value of acting together in the EU framework is absolutely crucial,” said commission vice president Roxana Minzatu . Minzatu added that the commission’s proposal was aimed at “exiting a reactive responsive mindset and entering a mindset that is about forecasting, anticipating risks, about preparation and, in the end, about crisis management”. The preparedness strategy was one of Ursula von der Leyen commission’s promises for the first 100 days of its second mandate. “This is a once in a generation moment for the security of Europe, strengthening our preparedness is an essential part of this,” said Lahbib. | Benjamin Fox is a seasoned reporter and editor, previously working for fellow Brussels publication Euractiv. His reporting has also been published in the Guardian, the East African, Euractiv, Private Eye and Africa Confidential, among others. He heads up the AU-EU section at EUobserver, based in Nairobi, Kenya. | EU governments will be expected to develop a 72-hour survival kit for citizens to face new crises, the European Commission said on Wednesday — as it set out plans for EU wide stockpiling strategy for food and medical supplies. | [
"EU & the World",
"Health & Society"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-03-26T15:37:24.741Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar06978a57 |
Why it's time for Norway and Iceland to join EU | The United States' potential retreat from its role as Europe’s security guarantor, combined with growing assertiveness toward its allies, poses existential geopolitical challenges for Europe — beyond the immediate question of defending against Russian aggression. Washington’s territorial ambitions in the Arctic, directly challenging the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Canada and Denmark, are a threat in themselves but carry far-reaching, existential implications for all of Europe. Looking at the past three decades in the post-Soviet space, it is clear that non-integrated, neutral states do not function as buffer zones between spheres of influence. To aggressive great powers with imperial mindsets, they appear as easy prey — inviting predatory behaviour. Growing US assertiveness also poses an existential institutional challenge to Nato, even if security and defence cooperation among European members could continue within existing structures. Still, a transatlantic breakdown of Nato would leave not only Canada and Greenland but also Iceland — and, to some extent, Norway, due to Svalbard — vulnerable to political and economic extortion or even military aggression Given China’s and Russia’s increasing assertiveness in the Arctic, such threats could come from multiple actors, with impacts far beyond the North Pole. Losing Nato control — for any reason — over the strategically vital GIUK gap between Greenland, Iceland, and the UK would expose Europe’s Atlantic shipping lanes to naval threats from the north, including Russia’s Northern Fleet, with potentially devastating consequences in any blackmail scenario or conflict. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 triggered an immediate rethinking of Finland’s and Sweden’s long-standing neutral security postures, leading both to seek integration into the transatlantic security architecture and join Nato within two years. A similarly bold and strategic response is now required to address the new geopolitical risks created by the unpredictability and assertiveness of the second Trump administration. One such response could be reconsidering Iceland’s and Norway’s non-EU status and accelerating their accession to the European Union. Even Canada's keen to join EU In March 2025, an Abacus opinion poll found that an astonishing 46 percent of Canadians would support their country’s EU membership — driven by the Trump administration’s trade war threats and talk of annexation. While Canada’s accession might be a step too far for now, the core message is clear: great power assertiveness can trigger smaller, liberal democratic countries committed to the rules based international order to integrate more rapidly, leaving the bully in a weaker geopolitical position. However, Canada should not be the EU’s starting point for strengthening its Arctic footprint. The low-hanging fruit is Iceland and Norway — two countries deeply integrated into the EU’s internal market through the European Economic Area (EEA) and the Schengen Area, yet formally outside the Union. Both have a history of EU candidacy: Norway withdrew after referenda in 1972 and 1994, while Iceland suspended accession talks in 2015 after applying in 2009. Notably, in 2024, Iceland’s governing Social Democratic Alliance pledged to hold a referendum by 2027 on resuming EU negotiations. Legally, both countries are already largely compliant with the acquis communautaire, the EU’s legal order. With sufficient political will, they could join the EU in an expedited procedure within two to three years — a prospect that becomes more realistic if pro-EU forces effectively use strategic communication to align public and elite sentiment, as was done during Finland’s and Sweden’s Nato accession. The nitty-gritty The ratification process of accession treaties has traditionally served as a vehicle for introducing targeted amendments to the EU treaties. A Northern enlargement could offer a similar opportunity. However, instead of reopening divisive debates, such as extending qualified majority voting to sensitive areas like foreign and security policy, which would require proper discussion in a full intergovernmental conference, the process should focus on two carefully-calibrated amendments that would strengthen the EU’s geopolitical posture, particularly in light of the accession of new Nordic members. The first could involve reinforcing the mutual defence clause under Article 42(7) TEU, lowering the threshold for triggering the obligation of aid and assistance from "armed aggression" to include cyber and hybrid attacks. For cases of armed aggression, the treaty language could be aligned more closely with Nato's Article 5, making clear that an armed attack against one or more EU member states shall be considered an attack against all, with the response based on the principle of collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. The second amendment could address the territorial admissibility clause under Article 49 TEU. Expanding the definition of eligible members from "any European state" to "any European state or state with significant historic, cultural, or political ties to Europe" would not only keep the door open for future membership bids from countries such as Canada or a potentially independent Greenland but would also increase the EU’s geopolitical flexibility. Such a change would allow the EU to offer integration pathways to associated countries if the realities of an increasingly turbulent international order require it. Controversies A fast-tracked Nordic enlargement would inevitably be controversial — for Iceland and Norway, the EU, and particularly for other candidate countries like those in the Western Balkans. Yet, this scenario could be shaped as a win-win. Nordic enlargement would help counter the eastward shift of the EU’s centre of gravity, a trend underway since 2004 Iceland and Norway would enter as net contributors, but they already pay for market access via the EEA and Norway grants. The added value now in comparison to previous candidacy rounds would be the EU’s mutual defence clause and its geopolitical weight — critical if the US commitment to the rules-based international order erodes further, weakening or undermining Nato's role. For the EU, Nordic enlargement would help counter scepticism toward further expansion. It would also strengthen the Union’s financial firepower by bringing in two new net contributors. Importantly, it could help reframe the narrative around the EU’s necessary decision-making and policy reforms — not as measures solely required to accommodate a group of net beneficiary countries like the Western Balkans and Ukraine, but as part of a broader, balanced enlargement strategy. Finally, Nordic enlargement would help counter the eastward shift of the EU’s centre of gravity, a trend underway since 2004 and one that would inevitably accelerate with further enlargement toward Ukraine or the Western Balkans. While the prospect of Iceland and Norway overtaking them might feel like a slap in the face for the Western Balkan candidate countries at first glance, it should ultimately serve as both an enabler and an accelerator of their own EU accession. A northern enlargement would inject fresh momentum into the enlargement process, balancing it geographically and financially, and reaffirming the principle of merit-based accession. The expedited entry of the two Nordic countries would be possible precisely because they are already largely in compliance with the acquis communautaire. Framed strategically, this would send a clear message to the political elites of the Western Balkans: deliver on your commitments, and you will be welcomed in. Daniel Hegedüs is regional director for central Europe at the German Marshall Fund of the United States . Daniel Hegedüs is regional director for central Europe at the | German Marshall Fund of the United States | Iceland and Norway are deeply integrated into the EU’s internal market through the European Economic Area and the Schengen zone, yet formally outside the Union. Both have a history of EU candidacy. Both face a hostile Russia and in increasingly hostile US. | [
"EU & the World",
"Nordics",
"Opinion"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-03-26T11:54:48.981Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar4eed4e61 |
Wars, inequality, neoliberalism: the challenges facing the Ukrainian Left | Andrii has arranged to meet me in a bar in Pozniaky, a district of Kyiv on the so-called 'left bank' of the Dnieper, the river that flows through the Ukrainian capital. The right bank is home to the historical and political centre, the most chic and fashionable neighbourhoods, and the seat of government. Andrii is a 30-year-old web developer and a member of Sotsialnyi Rukh (“ Social Movement ”, SR), a leftwing political movement. Before the war, the group, which was not a party, was primarily involved in street activism, focusing on labour and rights. Today, the situation is complicated by war, and by martial law — prohibiting demonstrations, strikes and protests. “The main problem in Ukraine is that we have no social democratic tradition: social democracy in Ukraine was destroyed by the Bolsheviks and the Russians. The left was traditionally linked to the Communist Party and its satellite parties. After Euromaidan , those who wanted no ties with the communist past, nor with Russia, created SR”, Andrii tells me in English, sipping his chai. “The situation is complicated. We are in danger, and there is a limitation on civil rights, which is understandable in times of war,” Andrii said. At the same time, the war “has pushed civil society into action: today we have a large number of civic initiatives. And these movements are in constant dialogue with those in power, and this is what saves us, because without this feedback I think the government simply wouldn’t do the right thing,” he explains. SR, which supports the soldiers on the frontline and the civilian population affected by the war, has, for example, campaigned for the municipality of Kyiv to contribute more to financing the army. “We are well aware that Westerners don’t understand Ukraine, because it is a small, unimportant country and people often think in stereotypes”, but today a greater understanding “can have an impact on lives in Ukraine,” Andrii said. An effort that has to be 'just' The Sotsialnyi Rukh office is in Podil, a central district of Kyiv, on the right bank, where there are numerous restaurants, cafes and bookshops. The space is shared with Pryama Diya (PD, Direct Action), a student union that campaigns for completely free education without discrimination. Vitaliy Dudin, Dionysii Vynohradiv and Vova Hesfer were waiting for me in the courtyard. I already knew Dudin indirectly from reading some of his articles in Commons , a magazine of the Ukrainian left. Dudin is a lawyer specialising in labour law and co-founder of SR. Vynohradiv is a philology student member of SR, and a representative of Pryama Diya. Hesfer is an environmental activist. At the beginning of February he was particularly concerned about the agreement on the exploitation of Ukrainian rare earths, to which the Trump administration is making the continuation of US military aid conditional. Vova is also active in projects to support those who have lost their homes in the Kharkiv region in the north, where the Russian army is advancing, albeit slowly. Today, the question of resistance is central, Dudin tells me. “We have received a lot of help from the United States and other Western countries in the name of supporting democracy and fighting authoritarianism," he said. "Today this aid seems much more conditional on profit and benefit for the West, and this affects the situation in Ukraine. These conditions prevent us from building for the long term, from developing democracy and pluralistic competition in political life. They also prevent us from establishing solid cooperation with other countries, because everything can change. So the only thing we believe in is that the Ukrainian people should stand united and fight.” To date, SR has been able to establish a series of political links with progressive and socialist parties and organisations in Europe, including the Nordic Green Alliance , and the Green Left Alliance of Central and Eastern Europe (CEEGLA). As Dudin tells me, the office that we meet in is funded by the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy with help from Enhedslisten (Red-Green Alliance, Danish eco-socialist party) and the Danish party Alternativet (The Alternative). The initial groundswell of resistance that the country witnessed following the Russian invasion of 2022 is now at risk: not from the idea that the fighting should be abandoned — none of the many people I spoke to in Ukraine raised this possibility — but from the question of the war effort, which must be “just”. What does this mean? “In 2024 a new deduction was introduced on workers’ salaries to finance the war effort. It was 1.5 percent, today it’s five percent”, Dudin explains. “For businesses, everything is almost the same as before. The only segment that has suffered a little are individual entrepreneurs”, independent workers and small-scale self-employed people. 'The reforms that have been carried out, such as the deregulation of labour law, have further weakened workers’ rights, obviously destroying what little confidence they still had in the state' “Workers, farmers, labourers and the working classes are paying a disproportionate price in this conflict. The reforms that have been carried out, such as the deregulation of labour law, have further weakened workers’ rights, obviously destroying what little confidence they still had in the state. Recent laws have reduced social protections and made it easier to fire people, even in times of war. While Ukraine’s existence depends on the resilience and collective effort of its citizens, the government is working to weaken the very foundations of this solidarity.” The speaker is Hanna Perekhoda , historian and member of SR, with whom I spoke before arriving in Kyiv. “The reality is that the Ukrainian government, by maintaining its neoliberal logic, not only undermines the country’s economic sovereignty, but also jeopardises its social cohesion, a crucial condition for the survival of a society at war. The government is at a dead end. It is trying to wage total war against an imperialist power while clinging to the fantasy of a neoliberal economy. Founded on deeply individualistic social imaginaries and deregulated economies, it is simply not suited to defence needs that require united efforts at all levels of society,” argues Perekhoda. “This form of inequality is simply terrible”, adds Vynohradiv in Ukrainian, translated by Dudin: “The elite, the politicians, the big businessmen, can leave the country if they want to, and start a new business. And the rest of the population only has obligations. There is a kind of breach of the social contract”. Today, of course, the pressure on public finances is much greater than it was before the full-scale invasion, Dudin adds: “We have to feed the army. We have to buy weapons. We have to build defence in the south and east. We have to maintain our electricity. We have to rebuild our houses, schools, universities, and hospitals. Where will we get the money? I think this model of, I don’t know, international subsidisation of Ukrainian needs imposed by Zelensky has run its course and is coming to an end”. An anti-authoritarian movement The next day I returned to Pozniaky to meet with Solidarity Collectives (SC, Колективи Солідарності), a group of activists that was formed after the large-scale invasion in 2022 to help some of the soldiers on the front and the civilian population. SC identifies itself as “anti-authoritarian”. Kseniia explains what this means: “Some of us are anarchists; there are militant feminists, progressives, ecologists, leftwingers. Some don’t identify politically, but share progressive ideas in general (LGBT rights, women’s rights, environmentalism, etc.)”. Before the large-scale invasion, “our movement was divided — the typical drama of people on the left, you know?” she tells me with a smile in the local KFC. It’s 9:20 in the morning, and it’s minus eight degrees outside. The only place where you can find a coffee is in the fast food chain. The cashier greets me with a big smile, surprised that I don’t speak Ukrainian. High-rise buildings, mostly built in the nineties, alternate with busy roads. On our second meeting here, I ask about Pozniaky. Kseniia explains that Pozniaky is a working class neighbourhood, whose residents often work on the city’s right bank. Here the rents are lower than in the centre of Kyiv (better served by public transport), where the price of houses has exploded over the last three years, reaching peaks that are reminiscent of the most expensive capitals of western Europe. When the air raid alarm sounds — several times at night, and sometimes during the day — the public transport to the left bank shuts down, forcing those who live there to either sleep in the metro or return home by taxi, at prices that are impossible for most Ukrainian salaries. The minimum wage in Ukraine is 8,000 hryvnia per month, and the average monthly wage is 20,000, which is about €180 and €450 respectively. After the full-scale invasion, part of the Solidarity Collective decided to enlist, while another part of the Collective is dedicated to helping civilians, regularly going to the front lines to support local communities and those fleeing the occupied territories. Another segment of the group is busy learning how to construct drones , programming, flying and delivering them to anti-authoritarian or leftwing soldiers in the various battalions. SC’s commitment to collecting military equipment is an example of the immense work carried out by Ukrainian civil society to support, in a very practical way, the armed forces when the state is unable to meet their needs. There are dozens of foundations and hundreds of initiatives to send money to the various battalions (or to the army in general) or to purchase weapons and equipment, to train soldiers. For example, the Come Back Alive Foundation , one of the best known abroad, has raised over 14 billion hryvnia (about €320m) since 2022. SC considers communication to be central to its activity: “For us it was important to show the perspectives of the left, the activities and the stories of anti-authoritarian militants on the front line”. And this for two reasons: to support the country’s resistance efforts, but also to make their voice and their story heard, because war is a particularly and understandably complex issue for those who are active in leftwing groups: “Many anti-militarists in the past, such as the people who accused others of the militarisation of society here in Ukraine, for example, ended up taking up arms, and we try to explain why”. Historical developments and the current context have created a gap in understanding between Ukrainian leftwing activists and their Western counterparts (though the same could be said for other countries of the former Soviet bloc). As Perekhoda explained, “for many leftwing activists outside of war zones and dictatorial states, these fundamental conditions — physical survival and basic freedom — are taken for granted. This creates a dangerous blind spot, which regimes like Russia exploit with formidable effectiveness. The Ukrainian Left must therefore navigate this environment: committing to the defence of justice and equality, while at the same time participating in the immediate struggle for the physical survival of their society. The challenge is to remain true to one’s values while conducting this dual struggle: resisting an external aggressor and working for a more just and equitable society within Ukraine”. ‘Ukraine isn’t perfect, but it’s the most democratic project that exists in the post-USSR territories. We have rights. We have always fought for these rights. And it was important for us to defend what we have, and to be able to continue to grow this project’ – Kseniia Today, Perekhoda added, “the conflict has obviously disrupted everything, including the very concept of politics. It is now clear that any political life requires at least two fundamental conditions: staying alive and preserving a certain degree of freedom”. I finish my coffee before Kseniia can finish hers, but she doesn’t mind. “Why are we in this situation? Because some authoritarian regime decided that we deserved to be occupied? Because we are ‘fascists’ or whatever other excuse they came up with... The motivations were the same for everyone, along with the deeply personal concern for relatives and friends, for the places where we grew up, and for the rights that we have, which have to be defended. These are the things that make the motivation to fight so great. Because we either die, or worse, or we fight”. “Ukraine isn’t perfect, but it’s the most democratic project that exists in the post-USSR territories. We have rights. We have always fought for these rights. And it was important for us to defend what we have, and to be able to continue to grow this project”, she tells me as she accompanies me to the metro. Is Europe on the horizon? The European Union is seen by my interviewees as the only possible way forward for the country, but not without some 'buts'. “I believe that before the war Ukrainians had a somewhat fairytale idea of Europe, as if everything there was fantastic, without social contradictions. The situation has changed, many are in Europe, and not for tourism. And they see that it is better for many things, but not for others. I also notice that many Western countries are taking a political direction that increasingly resembles what we know here: extreme personalisation and distance from the base, a politics that doesn’t really talk about politics; a politics that has no organisation behind it, but excellent electoral support,” Andrii tells me. But this doesn’t prevent them from seeing a common horizon: “We need the European Union. We need a greater application of the rule of law, Europe has common institutions and common laws. I don’t believe that Europe is the answer to all our questions, just look at Hungary. But I believe there is a common problem and that we should solve it together”. For Vynohradiv it’s the same, and he has no illusions. Of course, “it’s a neoliberal Union. But there is still hope that, through greater integration of the states into one, it will be possible to fight on a broader level for the implementation of some humanistic initiatives for the benefit of all. In any case, it is not up to Putin to decide whether Ukraine wants to join the EU or not. It must be decided solely by the Ukrainians and the Ukrainian people". Dudin concludes: “The EU is a very complex institution. I don’t know if Ukraine will have any kind of impact on the European agenda. But I think our politicians have already destroyed our welfare system, and they won’t stop there, because the corporations are still not satisfied with the level of destruction of our social rights. So maybe joining the EU will save us from the worst-case scenario, and we will have a kind of red line below which we won’t fall in terms of social, economic and human rights. It could be a tool that protects us”. When I leave the SR office in Podil, Dudin and Vova accompany me to my hotel, making sure I’m safe on the ice that covers the snowy pavements of Kyiv. As we walked, Dudin told me something that I had to quickly write down on my phone so as not to forget it, as it tells an important part of the story: “The wide popular support and mass solidarity that emerged during the war have shown that participation in political life is no longer a privilege of the upper classes”. Francesca Barca | is a journalist, editor and translator at | What does it mean to be leftwing and find yourself facing an invasion that you didn’t choose or want, that forces you to revise your principles, while continuing to defend a more just society? A discussion with activists on the Ukrainian Left. | [
"Ukraine"
] | ukraine | 2025-03-26T09:25:27.030Z | https://euobserver.com/ukraine/ar24d7ddd2 |
Trump trade war could trigger financial collapse, economists tell EU | The chaos unleashed by US president Trump’s haphazard foreign policy and flurry of tariff announcements is upending the rules of global trade. Spare a thought for Maroš Šefčovič, the EU’s trade chief who is traveling to Beijing this week for trade negotiations but had to squeeze in a last-minute detour to Washington to avert a trade war (again). After what were described as 'intense' talks on Tuesday, he returned with little to show for it. The real question in Brussels now is: what else might be coming — and how bad could it get? In a paper for the European Parliament’s economy committee published last week four economists sought to answer this question. In it, they sketch out four scenarios — ranging from a low-intensity trade war with tariffs similar to those announced so far; to higher reciprocal tariffs; to a full-blown financial and monetary conflict between rival blocs — a scenario the authors describe as "trade Armageddon." It also outlines a fourth scenario: after a shock period of high tariffs, global governments come together to forge a new economic settlement — one that rebalances trade and includes coordinated action on exchange rates and monetary policy. Thou shalt not ‘sane-wash’ The latter mirrors the preferred outcome of the so-called Mar-a-Lago Accord, a proposal pushed by parts of the Trump administration based on a paper written last year by Stephen Miran, the chair of Trump’s Council of Economic Advisors. It is not clear if Trump has endorsed the vision. But part of it sees the US leveraging the threat of tariffs to bring about the onshoring of US industry and tackling the twin deficits — trade and fiscal — through a reengineering of the dollar’s value and foreign investment flows. We’ll return to the details of the proposal below. 'Nobody had Mexico and Canada getting tariffed ahead of the EU on their bingo card - and yet that is what happened' One of the trickiest parts of analysing Trump’s policies is resisting the urge to over-interpret — or “sane-wash” — decisions and policies that are often arbitrary, constantly shifting, or flat-out incoherent. “One cannot say with certainty that there is a logic to Trump’s trade policies,” the team of four economists write. “Nobody had Mexico and Canada getting tariffed ahead of the EU on their bingo card - and yet that is what happened.” Still, from the chaos of the first few months, a picture begins to emerge: what started in Trump’s first term as an effort to reduce bilateral trade deficits has since evolved into a more radical project — correcting global imbalances in demand and supply, trade, and exchange rate misalignments. This raises the prospect of much higher tariffs than under Trump 1 and could trigger more extreme forms of conflict, forcing the EU and the European Central Bank (ECB) to rethink nearly every aspect of their financial, economic, and monetary defences. From bad to very bad First, the potential impact. A low-intensity trade war would largely stick to measures already in place, such as 25-percent tariffs on steel and aluminium. It also assumes that existing 25-percent tariffs on Mexican and Canadian goods remain, along with 20-percent tariffs on Chinese goods. While this would affect global trade partners, the overall impact on the EU economy would be limited, with GDP falling by just 0.014 percent. A “high” intensity trade war scenario could result from reciprocal tariffs that factor in Value-Added Taxes. The Trump administration claims that VAT, due to its border adjustments, functions like a tariff — and has announced the Fair and Reciprocal Tariff Plan (FRTP), with a deadline set for 2 April. This explanation is “baseless,” according to the economists. But if the US decides to treat VAT as a trade distortion anyway, it could introduce as much as 20 percent in new tariffs on all European goods. This would lead to an estimated $200bn annual drop in EU exports to the US — equivalent to one-third of current EU goods exports to America, or about one percent of EU GDP. Real wages in the EU would drop by 0.25 percent. The GDP impact on the US would be positive, but due to higher cost of imports real wages would decline even more. The overall impact of both low and high intensity scenarios would be significantly worse in both Mexico and Canada, as the above graph shows. In short, reciprocal tariffs would be bad for everyone — including the US. That doesn’t mean they’re off the table; in fact, they’re in line with measures already introduced against Canada and Mexico and “should be taken very seriously,” the economists write. China shock Tariffs however could be the least of our concerns. The US has so far relied on bilateral trade tools, but it may shift toward exchange rate policy on a broader, multilateral scale to address global imbalances — much like the vision laid out in the Mar-a-Lago Accord. Before diving deeper, it’s worth noting that the trade imbalances targeted by the Trump administration (and others before it) are real and have been a source of concern of previous administrations. As the world’s consumer of last resort, the US runs persistent trade deficits with almost all its trade partners — especially with China and the EU. Its role as issuer of the global reserve currency gives US consumers and businesses easy access to credit and steady capital inflows, which help finance those deficits. ECB president Christine Lagarde described the Mar-a-Lago-Accord set of proposals as a “speculative unidentified arrangement” that “lacked substance.” Conversely, the EU and especially China both have export surplus, with the latter trade surplus to an all-time high of just under one trillion dollars in 2024. This brings us to the core of the global imbalance: China’s persistently low domestic consumption. While private consumption makes up nearly 70 percent of GDP in the US and just over 50 percent in the EU, in China it's below 40 percent — and falling. Since the property bubble burst in 2021, China has redirected investment toward manufacturing, leading to massive oversupply in a low-demand economy and threatening domestic industries in Europe and elsewhere with a flood of cheap products. Solving the imbalance requires a coherent policy and careful diplomacy, and the economists note that US and EU interests in seeing China boost domestic demand should, in theory, become “increasingly aligned.” Mar-a-Lago Accord Instead of coherence and diplomacy, there’s the Mar-a-Lago Accord — and Trump. So what to make of it? Speaking in the EU parliament last week, ECB president Christine Lagarde described the Mar-a-Lago-Accord set of proposals as a “speculative unidentified arrangement” that “lacked substance.” The idea is for foreign creditors to swap their US Treasury bonds for ultra-long-term ones — up to 100 years — with little or no interest. That would make it cheaper for Washington to finance its debt and reduce annual bond rollovers, easing pressure on the dollar. The idea is this would increase access to private capital, allowing the US government to step back (or destroy) its national subsidy schemes. The plan assumes no one would agree to this willingly — which is why its success relies on using tariffs and the potential withdrawal of military support through Nato as levers to pressure foreign investors and governments into compliance. But Trump has already slapped tariffs, and his apparent friendliness toward Russia has left Nato allies questioning whether the US would actually honour its security commitments. It weakens his leverage — and undercuts the plan it’s supposedly part of. ‘Armageddon’ So where does this leave us? “The Mar-o-Lago Accord would mine the harbour [for cash], a global-scale financial crisis would ensue,” wrote the chief economist of a German bank in a strategy paper last week. But the economists in the document for the EU parliament warn the risks could go deeper still. If Trump’s policies spiral into a full-blown trade war between rival blocs, a wider financial and monetary conflict could follow — what they call “Armageddon," Trump may leverage the Fed to withhold dollars from allies it perceives as ungrateful. In this scenario, the EU should prepare for a complete collapse of the international multilateral order, with the US potentially walking away from the WTO (already on life support), the IMF, and the World Bank — steps outlined in Project 2025, the conservative blueprint that, while unofficial, has guided other Trump administration actions. This kind of rupture could lead to a scramble for dollar liquidity, which could push the euro into the role of top global reserve currency — but in a world badly shaken by a US pullback. While not considered the most likely scenario by the economists, it’s far from unthinkable. As Reuters reported on Saturday, some European central banking and supervisory officials are beginning to question whether they can still rely on the US Federal Reserve to provide dollar funding during a financial crisis. A complete rethink If the Fed weaponises dollar swap lines, or is no longer willing to be lender of last resort, the ECB could be forced to step in, by extending currency swap lines to a broader range of countries, and acting as lender and market-maker of last resort — not just for banks, but also for clearing houses, asset managers, and pension funds. This would call for a full rethink of how the ECB operates, and “unprecedented coordination between the ECB” and national finance ministers, the economists write. Long story short: the EU treaty doesn’t allow for the ECB to take its cue on its policies from governments. Exchange rate policy is officially set by ministers, but only the ECB can act on it, typically by buying or selling currencies. Even then, it can only move if it doesn’t clash with its inflation mandate. As the ECB itself noted on its website, the euro’s exchange rate “isn’t a policy target,” and interventions are rare and only happened twice in 2000, and again in 2011. But the economists argue that the ECB should “push the limits” of what it can do and “urgently” prepare for an economic Armageddon — which, while still unlikely, is becoming “increasingly probable.” | Wester is a journalist from the Netherlands with a focus on the green economy. He joined EUobserver in September 2021. Previously he was editor-in-chief of Vice, Motherboard, a science-based website, and climate economy journalist for The Correspondent. | Economists warned the European Parliament that Trump’s aggressive trade tariffs could spiral into broader financial and monetary conflict — urging the EU to prepare for a potential ‘trade armageddon.’
| [
"EU & the World",
"Green Economy"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-03-25T17:16:01.361Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar70dd1315 |
From dog racers to PM: US second lady unwelcome in Greenland | Even the dog race the second lady is to see has distanced itself from her, amid a growing backlash against the Trump administration's latest trip to Greenland. "We did not invite them [but] ... they may attend as spectators," the organisers of Greenland's top sled-dog race, Avannaata Qimussersua, told the New York Times ahead of a visit by US second lady Usha Vance there, due on Thursday (27 March). Peter Kofod, a rightwing Danish MP, told press on Monday that Denmark should send the security bill for her trip to Washington. "This is an American who was not invited and who comes with the sole goal of annexing part of Danish territory. It's a charm offensive that ends up being paid for by the Danes," he said. The outgoing Greenlandic prime minister, Múte Egede, has called the US trip a "provocation ... aggression" and urged Danish and other EU leaders to speak out against it. "Every minute counts to ensure that the Americans' dream of annexing our country does not become a reality," he told Greenlandic daily Sermitsiaq on Sunday. The Danish prime minister, Mette Frederiksen, said the same day that this week's trip could not be "seen independently from the [US] public statements" that it was willing to seize Greenland by force or to annex it. They spoke as two US Hercules military transport planes landed in Nuuk on Sunday, where they unloaded four armour-plated limousines in advance of Thursday's arrival. Denmark has also flown over at least 60 policemen to help keep the US VIPs safe, in standard protocol which prompted Kofod's jibe. Mrs Vance is coming to visit with US security advisor Mike Waltz and energy secretary Chris Wright, who will also go to the US' Pituffik military base on the Nordic island. They are coming at a sensitive moment after Greenlandic elections on 11 March prompted ongoing coalition-building talks. The likely new prime minister, who is business friendly and who advocates full independence from Denmark, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, also said on Facebook on Sunday: "I understand if some people feel uneasy [about the US visit]". And he didn't accept Mrs Vance's claim about coming only for the dog-race, adding: "When high-ranking foreigners travel to our country on what are supposedly 'private' visits, it rightly causes concern". Aaja Chemnitz, an MP from Egede's Inuit Ataqatigiit party, described the US trip on Danish TV on Monday as a form "badly timed [election] interference". "Everyone who tries to interfere, but is not part of Greenlandic society, must stay away ," she added. Vivian Motzfeldt, a Greenlandic Green politician, said on Facebook: "If it had happened a year ago, we would have had a very different reaction in our country". But the "[US] president's words" on annexation "change everything", she said. Trump's son, Donald Junior, likewise made an uninvited and unofficial trip to Greenland on 7 January, prompting similar protests. And for some Danish experts, the US actions resembled what Russia did prior to grabbing the Ukrainian territory of Crimea in 2014. "What is happening now in Greenland is reminiscent of the time before the annexation of Crimea. American politicians will come in droves and agitate for Greenland to be American," said Claus Mathiesen, from the Royal Danish Defence College, on X on Monday. Ulrik Pram Gad, an expert form the Danish Institute for International Studies, also told Sermitsiaq on Monday: "The parallel in rhetoric and methods [with Crimea] has also been clear to me since 7 January [the Donald Jr. trip]". "The difference is that it's difficult to imagine that it will end with people shooting at each other in a conflict over Greenland ... that also makes it more difficult to imagine how it will unfold," he said. A European Commission spokeswoman in Brussels on Monday said only that allies should respect EU states' territorial integrity. | Andrew Rettman is EUobserver's foreign editor, writing about foreign and security issues since 2005. He is Polish, but grew up in the UK, and lives in Brussels. He has also written for The Guardian, The Times of London, and Intelligence Online. | Even the dog race the US second lady is to see has distanced itself from her, amid a growing backlash against the Trump administration's latest trip to Greenland. | [
"EU & the World",
"Nordics"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-03-24T17:06:27.995Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar03846564 |
The case for splitting Ukraine's critical minerals three ways: US, Ukraine and EU | To date, the EU and US approaches to striking a deal with Ukraine for access to their critical minerals have been starkly different. The Trump administration started by trying to pressure the beleaguered state into an agreement as payback for US support in the war with Russia. It’s now stalling since a clash between presidents Donald Trump and Volodoymr Zelensky in the White House, even though Kyiv has indicated its willingness to proceed. By contrast, the EU commissioner for industrial strategy, Stéphane Séjourné, aware of the potential risks a bilateral deal between the US and Ukraine could pose to supplies of key materials for the EU’s aerospace and defence industries, has taken a more conciliatory approach , suggesting would never propose a deal that was not "mutually beneficial." The EU is right to counter the bullish, resource-nationalist strategies pursued by the US and China with a more cooperative proposition that could also see each party maximize resource efficiency through circularity, secondary material markets, and industrial innovation. The EU and Ukraine have had a Critical Raw Materials Partnership in place since 2021, but it has not been effectively operationalised, due to the invasion by Russia. A new partnership agreed in a consensual way, without arm-twisting or brinkmanship, could enhance Europe's strategic autonomy and provide the foundations for a stable and reliable long-term relationship between the nations. Deeper integration into European industrial and supply chains would also offer Ukraine better opportunities for sustained economic growth, opening up economic opportunities beyond raw material extraction. Unfortunately, it may be a bit late to be putting this bilateral deal on the table given the details of a US-Ukraine agreement are — according to some sources — close to being finalised. Had Brussels acted earlier, it could have already established a stronger, mutually beneficial framework. Instead, its typically slow, reactive approach to geopolitical developments has left it in a more subordinate position. There is a ‘third-way’: rather than competing for access to Ukraine’s minerals, the US and EU should pursue a tripartite deal. This would enhance supply chain security, accelerate investments in Ukraine, and contribute to geopolitical stability. It would enable the EU and US to pool financial and technological resources while spreading the risks of a long-term investment in a conflict-affected state. A Trump 'win' Trump wants a deal that looks like a win for the US, but the reality is that going in with the EU would yield better results. Without European cooperation, the US faces logistical challenges in extracting and transporting minerals from Ukraine, as well as regulatory misalignment. The EU holds key advantages, such as geographic proximity, established trade and logistic networks, and regulatory frameworks that can facilitate the entry of Ukrainian minerals into European and US markets. Integrating Ukraine into the EU’s energy system in 2027, would also provide a stable energy supply for any processing of raw materials. A joint deal would mean the US wasn’t solely responsible for providing security guarantees to Kyiv, something Trump has been reluctant to commit to, but which would be a likely corollary of investment in the region. Jointly investing in accurate prospecting would reduce investment risks for all parties; and in a three-way deal the EU and US would share the burden of uncertainties and potential setbacks. By working together, the US and the EU could increase resilience, and ensure that Ukraine’s critical raw materials contribute to a secure and diversified supply chain for both sides of the Atlantic. They are both already in the 2022 multinational Minerals Security Partnership ; and companies like TechMet, which have expressed interest in Ukraine’s mineral exploration, already operate across both regions. Makes sense for Ukraine too President Zelensky needs to get the US back on side to have a chance of defending his country against Russian aggression. But the EU is far more invested in Ukraine’s long-term economic development, with a shared vision for ‘post-war’ industrial reconstruction, long-term integration and investments. The European Investment Bank can help mobilise investments for Ukraine’s mining sector; and Europe’s well-established industry networks, such as the European Raw Materials Alliance and the European Battery Alliance , have a key role to play in securing and developing critical raw material supply chains. The main obstacle to a potentially fruitful three-way deal on minerals is the unpredictable and competitive approach of the Trump administration. Navigating this would require pragmatic leadership and a long-term vision on all sides. Any partnership would probably need to be presented in a way that could be labelled ‘pro-American’. The challenges are high, and it’s hard to predict whether the Trump administration will embrace cooperation, despite the obvious long-term benefits. However, it’s worth trying, because a three-way deal could enhance the chances of lasting peace, and enable Ukraine to benefit from its natural resources, rather than remaining a pawn in geopolitical and economic battles between great powers. Dr Patrick Schröder is a senior research fellow at Chatham House , the London-based think-tank. Dr Patrick Schröder is a senior research fellow at | Chatham House | Rather than competing for access to Ukraine’s minerals, the US and EU should pursue a tripartite deal. A joint deal would mean the US wasn’t solely responsible for providing security guarantees to Kyiv, while the EU is far more invested in Ukraine’s long-term economic development. | [
"EU & the World",
"Green Economy",
"Ukraine",
"Opinion"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-03-24T11:15:06.934Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/arf019c50d |
Why defunding NGOs would lock in a European 'Greenwash' Deal | The Strasbourg vote on defunding green NGOs in May will be more than a classic far-right free speech chiller. It certainly leans into the Trump playbook — hijacking public revulsion at the EU’s democratic deficit, and misdirecting it toward the smouldering embers of our checks and balances. But the EPP’s wide-eyed finger-jabbing at €15m of (public) subsidies for NGOs also occludes the annual €1.7bn (private) lobby spend of corporates, which, in another, greener, world would be the real disgrace. Bluntly, the EU Commission's public interest funding here amounts to just 0.001 percent of the financial firepower mobilised by the planet’s richest corporations to defend their planet-baking modus operandi. Helping environmental groups to participate in legislative debate should be a vital counterweight to the business-as-usual which has driven us to the brink of climate chaos (especially in a system which denies elected MEPs the right to propose legislation). But in our market-dominated democratic husk, the ' scandal ' is that anything was paid to offset the corporate arsenal at all. Something rotten in the state of Brussels. The EU has shelled out multiples of billions to polluting companies in clean energy transition subsidies, from green steel to blue hydrogen . En masse, firms have pocketed the cash, dished it out to shareholders , then cancelled or mothballed their green projects and asked for more handouts . This socialisation of risk and privatisation of profit is a feature of our system, not a bug. Subsidies exist to increase capital accumulation , above concerns such as public health or the environment. That is why Airbus is one of the top 10 recipients of green funds, even though 99.4 percent of the 700 commercial aircraft it delivered in 2023 ran on fossil fuels. It is why Europe’s top 25 greenhouse-gas emitters have trousered $87 bn [€80.3bn] from EU-approved green investment funds. It is also why EU citizens still cough up €42bn a year in subsidies for fossil-powered company cars alone. Three polluting carmakers – Stellantis, Toyota and Mercedes received €12bn in EU subsidies to go green yet their share of zero-emission vehicles varies only between two percent to 13 percent. When the commission shells out €600m for electric vehicle battery research and plans pan-EU subsidies , the industry response, naturally, is to demand more money and less regulation to compete with the 'Chinese dragon. ' This too is telling. China’s mass production of affordable clean cars involved an injection of $231bn in state funds since 2009 . Their European counterparts, fresh from Dieselgate , bet against the need for urgent emissions-cutting technology. Rather than cheer a state-funded model that might allow us to rapidly and fairly decarbonise our transport system, the EU instead slapped tariffs of up to 35 percent on Chinese EVs and is now likely to delay the phase-out of Europe’s fossil-powered cars. As the famous New Yorker cartoon of a family huddled in a cave put it: “Yes, the planet got destroyed but for a beautiful moment in time, we created a lot of value for shareholders.” Farm to Fork, REACH, livestock emissions... The pattern has played out time and again . A screeching of industry brakes halted the farm-to-fork strategy, the planned REACH chemicals reform, livestock emissions limits and much more. Few eyebrows were raised last month when it emerged that almost two-thirds of the firms that advised the commission on how to dilute its corporate justice legislation had themselves been accused of human rights abuses and environmental destruction in the last decade. This is how the EU now rolls. Defunding NGOs that monitor industry behaviour will at least ensure less evidence of corporate malfeasance next time around. But most EU citizens want the green transition to be accelerated . Environmental NGOs — understaffed, underpaid and undervalued as they are — are the only actors fighting backs-to-the-wall campaigns, and punching above their weight, to make this happen. A bonfire of their budgets, led by the same politicians that parrot industry talking points about red tape, administrative burden and competitiveness, would only help to cynically railroad the European Greenwash Deal taking shape before our eyes. We may be shocked when the Amazon rainforest is trashed for a motorway to the next climate summit but this is the predictable outcome of a value system that places symbolic headlines, competitive prestige and corporate profitability above enforceable climate action . A politics that affords capital accumulation the same import as a stable climate is doomed to fail when those two objectives conflict. There are plenty of brilliant environmental scientists in Brussels, but they will not win policy debates with industry on their own. We, the public, need other actors on the stage who can help them in this fight because otherwise, the EU will kill its Green Deal simply because that is what its own logic impels it to do. Arthur Neslen writes about the environment for the Guardian, Open Democracy, Equal Times and others. He was formerly the Guardian's European environment correspondent. Arthur Neslen | writes about the environment for the Guardian, Open Democracy, Equal Times and others. He was formerly the | Environmental NGOs — understaffed, underpaid and undervalued — are the only actors fighting back to accelerate the green transition. A bonfire of their budgets, led by the same politicians that parrot industry talking points about red tape, administrative burden and competitiveness, would only help to cynically railroad the Green Deal. | [
"EU Political",
"Green Economy",
"Opinion"
] | eu-political | 2025-03-21T11:02:36.005Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar5f89f3a7 |
A breakdown of how the EU migration crackdown isn't working | In 2024, European leaders took credit for a drop in irregular migration. At an October Brussels summit, EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen declared that partnerships with third countries were working, pointing to a 64 percent decline in Central Mediterranean arrivals. She reinforced the EU’s focus on countering people smuggling, calling it "the trigger" behind irregular migration. Meanwhile, across the Channel, British prime minister Sir Keir Starmer has made "smashing the smuggling gangs" central to his migration strategy. He has also shown interest in European approaches, including Italy’s controversial migration deal with Albania . In March 2025, Frontex reported a 25-percent drop in irregular migration for January-February compared to 2024. While crossings fell sharply in the Eastern Mediterranean and Atlantic, the Central Mediterranean Route saw a 48-percent increase. Frontex claims this demonstrates “the effectiveness of its cooperation with EU member states.” But are the EU’s and UK’s external migration strategies really working? Is the crackdown on smuggling having any real impact? These questions are tackled in our latest research report , Beyond Restrictions: How Migration and Smuggling Adapt to Changing Policies across the Mediterranean, Atlantic, and English Channel, which examines shifting migration and smuggling dynamics since 2023. To assess this, we examined three key areas: arrival numbers, demand for irregular journeys, and the smuggling economy. 1 - Are arrivals really down? Yes — but only on some routes, and likely only for now. While Western and Central Mediterranean crossings dropped between 2023 and 2024, the Central Mediterranean Route (CMR) remains the busiest irregular sea route to mainland Europe. Its history of fluctuations suggests numbers could rebound — just as they did after 2017. Meanwhile, in 2024, other routes were stable or surging: 1. Atlantic crossings to the Canary Islands were up. 2. The Eastern Mediterranean Route saw increased movement. 3. The Western Mediterranean Route remained low but stable. 4. English Channel crossings persisted despite UK and French enforcement efforts. A temporary drop along one route does not mean migration pressure has eased—it simply shifts movement elsewhere, as seen in 2025 trends compared to 2024. 2 - Is demand for irregular journeys declining? No. Demand remains high, and the pressures driving it are intensifying. For many, migration is not a choice but a necessity. Worsening conflicts, persecution, and economic instability continue to push people to leave: In the Sahel, Horn of Africa, Sudan, and across Sub-Saharan Africa, insecurity and economic hardship drive mixed migration. 1. In North Africa, political and economic instability in Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and Algeria fuels migration. 2. In the Middle East, conflicts sustain movement out of Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon. 3. In South Asia, Afghanistan’s dire situation forces many to leave for Turkey and Europe. As transit countries grow more hostile and violence escalates, migration pressure toward Europe is unlikely to slow. EU deterrence policies do little to stop irregular routes. Most migrants embark on journeys with little knowledge of migration policies. Instead, they are driven by safety, economic survival, and family ties. As one migrant put it: "When choosing a destination, asylum policies barely matter. It’s about family, language, and why you left home." 3 - Has smuggling been disrupted? No. Smuggling networks remain agile, constantly adapting to evade counter-smuggling efforts. Crackdowns on key routes like the Central Mediterranean, English Channel, and Atlantic have made smuggling more professional and resourceful. While activity on the Western Mediterranean Route slowed between 2023 and 2024, smugglers haven’t disappeared — they’ve diversified into other crimes and can restart migrant routes when demand rises. Despite enforcement crackdowns, our research shows that smugglers: 1. Shift routes and tactics to evade authorities. 2. Diversify criminal activities to sustain profits. 3. Exploit EU migration deals, leveraging their influence. The smuggling economy is more complex than just criminal gangs. In Libya, coastguards reportedly accepted bribes to allow boats to depart. In Mauritania and Senegal, local fishermen step in to meet demand. In the English Channel, increased enforcement increases reliance on professional smugglers sourcing boats from farther afield. As long as demand exists, smugglers will find a way. Rather than disrupting their business, crackdowns often strengthen it. To appear tough on migration, Europe continues striking deals with transit countries. These agreements, often worth millions, are unlikely to have a lasting impact on irregular migration. Instead, they increase human rights risks, particularly when made with authoritarian regimes, and grant transit countries leverage to use migration as a bargaining tool. Rather than securing sustainable migration governance, these deals give EU counterparts more negotiating power. As maintaining deals grows costlier—both financially and politically—Europe finds itself pursuing new, increasingly questionable agreements. Europe’s migration policies focus on short-term containment instead of addressing why people move. Migration is politically sensitive, and leaders feel pressured to show immediate results. Yet, short-sighted enforcement won’t stop irregular migration — it shifts routes, increases risks, fuels smuggling, and weakens Europe’s negotiating power. To address migration, Europe needs a broader strategy, including: A whole-of-route approach providing assistance, protection, and legal pathways along migration corridors (inspired by Safe Mobility Offices in the Americas). 1. Fast, fair, efficient asylum processing and equitable EU relocation. 2. Scalable, meaningful resettlement programs. 3. Expanded legal labour migration to meet workforce needs. 4. A functioning returns system with dignified reintegration support. These solutions must be implemented together, not sequentially. Waiting to “control” irregular migration before expanding legal pathways is flawed. A comprehensive migration policy must align with EU and UK trade, development, and visa policies — leveraging economic strength to safeguard human rights, rather than issuing blank checks to transit countries. Though politically difficult, only a comprehensive strategy can reduce irregular migration and disrupt smuggling networks. Roberto Forin is the head of Mixed Migration Centre, Europe . Roberto Forin is the head of | Mixed Migration Centre, Europe | Are arrivals really down? Yes — but only on some routes, and likely only for now. Is demand for irregular journeys declining? No. Has smuggling been disrupted? No. | [
"Migration",
"Opinion"
] | migration | 2025-03-20T11:42:37.171Z | https://euobserver.com/migration/ar613bb89a |
The EU's planned '28th regime' is Bolkestein revisited | In 2004, Frits Bolkestein — a Dutch liberal politician and EU commissioner for the internal market — introduced a controversial piece of legislation that would forever carry his name . The “Bolkestein Directive” would allow companies to provide services in other EU countries under the labour conditions of their home country. The image of a Polish plumber coming to work in France for Polish minimum wages alarmed both workers and decent employers. The infamous “country-of-origin” principle would have institutionalised unfair competition. Local companies from higher-wage countries would have been unable to compete with companies based in low-wage countries, offering the exact same service. Instead of competition on quality, innovation, efficiency or client-focus; competition would have been wage-focused. The consequences would be predictable: declining wages, pressure on working conditions, and less scope for collective bargaining. That would have been no less than a full-throated attack on the European social model with collective bargaining and social dialogue at its heart. It is therefore hardly surprising that trade unions quickly dubbed the legislation the 'Frankenstein Directive.' After extensive and successful mobilisations by trade unions, NGOs and citizens — who rallied with over 80,000 people in Brussels today twenty years ago — the principle was reversed: a Polish plumber could still work in France, but only under French wages and working conditions. This ensured fair competition on a level playing field. The Frankenstein Directive was buried for good. Or so we thought. Now, twenty years later, some of its core ideas have resurfaced. The European Commission recently announced that it is working on a so-called “28 regime” , a new legal framework for a separate legal entity for “innovative companies” within the EU. While this may sound technical and complex, in reality, it is quite simple – and very concerning. In its misguided push for EU-wide deregulation, the commission wants to recreate the US’s lower standards, in particular for ‘innovative’ IT start-ups. But it might go further than that: recent statements by the European Commission suggest that ‘innovative’ would encompass almost every companies that want to operate transnationally. The EU’s analysis is that such and other companies struggle with differing tax laws, labour laws and company regulations across member states, which makes it harder for them to operate Europe-wide. That assessment is correct. But the commission’s proposed solution is radical and misguided: it aims to create an entirely new set of rules, independent of any member state — a kind of European corporate, tax and labour law. A “28 regime” as if there was a virtual 28 EU member state. Why would this be so dangerous? Imagine you work for a small chain of clothing stores. You are paid according to, let’s say, Danish wage standards, your company pays Danish taxes and it complies with all Danish regulations. Competing with large international retailers is already tough because they benefit from economies of scale. Now, imagine those big corporations could suddenly opt out of national labour standards and instead pay “European” (read: lower) wages. Unfair competition would intensify, as would the pressure on your employer to downgrade your working conditions. The “28 regime” would enshrine unfair competition, with local businesses and workers paying the price. Just like the Bolkestein Directive, this new plan risks becoming a free pass for companies to bypass national collective bargaining agreements, union rights, and social protections. Worse even, the commission knows this as it has experience with such loopholes: in 2001, it introduced the European Company (Societas Europaea, SE), which has since been abused by German firms to circumvent worker participation and union influence. While companies have such new rights at European level, workers do not: for instance, there is no European right to strike. The EU presents this new plan as a step toward modernisation and innovation, but in reality, it opens the door to further labour market liberalisation without adequate worker protections. The burden will fall on Europe’s workers and small businesses. The European Union was built on a social model that fosters fair competition. The commission’s plans go in the opposite direction. But one thing is certain: should the European Commission go ahead with these plans, it can be sure that the labour movement will respond. Twenty years ago we defeated the Bolkenstein Directive by mobilising hundreds and thousands of working people. We are prepared to do the same again. Oliver Roethig is regional secretary of UNI Europa , the European Service Workers Union. Oliver Roethig is regional secretary of | UNI Europa | The EU's plan for a so-called “28th regime” could make unfair competition the norm at the expense of Europe’s working people. Just like the Bolkestein Directive, it risks becoming a free pass for companies to bypass national collective bargaining agreements, union rights, and social protections. | [
"EU Political",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] | * | 2025-03-19T11:06:34.035Z | https://euobserver.com/*/ar6749e82f |
Macron told you so, again and again – but he's not convincing the French | When Donald Trump took office in January, with a mission to shake up the world order, European leaders seemed somewhat caught off guard — except for the French president Emmanuel Macron. For him, it was as though he had been preparing for this geopolitical chaos from the very beginning, and now his stance has been proven right. Since taking office in 2017, Macron has consistently advocated for the European Union to strengthen its independence — not only from China but, perhaps more crucially, from the United States, particularly in the face of the threat posed by Russia. At that time, Trump was in his first presidency, and one of Macron’s initial actions was to invite his American counterpart to France, welcoming him with a grand display of military pomp. He then extended a similarly lavish reception to Russian president Vladimir Putin at the Palace of Versailles. This ongoing engagement with both leaders has only reinforced Macron’s conviction that Europe must assert its independence, with France at the helm. Macron has also been vocal in his criticism of Nato. “What we are currently experiencing is the brain death of Nato,” he said in a famous 2019 interview with The Economist, adding that Europe was standing on “the edge of a precipice” and needed to start thinking of itself strategically as a geopolitical power. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, he acknowledged the alliance’s worth. “The war [...] brings a clarification, and creates at our borders and on our European soil an unusual threat which gives a strategic clarification to Nato,” he said. Yet, he did not entirely backtrack, adding: “I continue to think that we need to rebuild a new European order of security, and that the war today in Ukraine makes it even more indispensable.” A little over a year ago, when Macron gave a speech at the Sorbonne, just as he had seven years earlier, he reiterated his message: “My message today is simple. Paul Valéry said, at the end of the First World War, that we now know our civilisations are mortal. We must be clear that our Europe today is mortal. It can die. It can die, and that depends entirely on our choices. But these choices must be made now.” Now, a little over a year later, Macron can, more than ever say to his fellow European leaders: ' . You should have listened to me all along.' Footsteps of de Gaulle It must be noted, however, that this stance is not solely Macron’s — it aligns with a very French position, and with former president Charles de Gaulle’s stance in 1966 when France left the military alliance in protest against US dominance. Additionally, France has kept its nuclear arsenal outside of Nato cooperation — a capability specifically developed to avoid dependence on US nuclear weapons. After the United Kingdom's exit from the EU, France remains the only EU country with an independent nuclear arsenal. With an increasingly unpredictable US, Macron is leveraging this as a trump card when advocating for a more independent Europe, positioning France to protect other EU countries with its nuclear umbrella —an initiative he shares with UK prime minister Keir Starmer, the only other European nation also in possession of nuclear weapons. If this argument is convincing to many within the EU, it has not gained widespread support in France. Leaders from the far-right, such as National Rally’s Jordan Bardella, have even called it “treason,” but the criticism spans the entire political spectrum. This is Macron’s problem: while he may be convincing the EU, he is not convincing the French. In early March, the French president delivered a televised speech, calling for unity in the face of Russia, which he described as a “threat to Europe” that “seems to know no borders.” Dmitry Medvedev, the Russian former prime minister, now deputy head of the Russian Security Council, mocked Macron by calling him “Micron” and claiming that he, unlike Russia, is not a threat since he’ll be “gone” by May 2027. And in that, Medvedev has a point. France is a democracy, and Macron is not allowed to run for president a third time. Someone else will take his place. And a not-so-impossible scenario is that just as Europe has switched to relying on France for defence instead of the US — due to the unpredictability of a Trump’s presidency — France could end up being led by far-right leader Marine Le Pen, a politician with ties to a party previously funded by Russian banks . Emma Sofia Dedorson is a Paris-based journalist covering politics, culture and society in France, Spain and Italy. | Emma Sofia Dedorson | 'Europe cannot trust the US for protection. We must be sovereign and stick together, especially in military matters.' Like a broken record, this has been Emmanuel Macron’s message since he took office in 2017. Now, his greatest 'I told you so' moment is here. There’s only one problem: he seems incapable of convincing the French. | [
"EU & the World",
"EU Political"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-03-19T11:03:40.202Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ara4aa7ffc |
The turbo-charging of EU defence — explained | Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shook the EU's approach to defence, prompting a swift reevaluation of the EU’s military landscape. As the European Commission sets out its vision for a single market for defence in its white paper due on Wednesday (19 March), we take a close look at global and European trends — and the industry’s readiness to meet new challenges. Which are the countries spending most on defence in the world? The countries with the highest defence spending in recent years are the United States, China, Russia, India, and Saudi Arabia. European growth is outpaced by Russia's rising military spending, which has more than doubled the levels before its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. How much do Nato members spend on defence? US president Donald Trump has repeatedly criticised allies for not meeting the alliance’s defence spending target of two percent of GDP (agreed upon back in 2014). Even now, Croatia, Portugal, Italy, Canada, Belgium, Luxembourg, Slovenia, and Spain have not hit the target. The defence spending of the 23 EU countries that are Nato members amounted to 1.99 percent of their combined GDP in 2024 and is projected to reach 2.04 percent in 2025. But Trump suggested that Nato members should increase their minimum defence spending to five percent of GDP — an idea backed by EU foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas in January. Macron has proposed raising the EU's defence spending by three to 3.5 percent of GDP. Yet, this would take years to materialise based on current rates. Defence is a tech-driven industry that calls for massive investment in research and innovation. Defence R&D funding in the EU reached €3.9bn in 2022, according to Eurostat. However, according to the Dragi report , next-generation defence systems will require massive R&D investment. Since 2014, the US has prioritised R&D spending above all other military expenditure categories. France, Germany and Sweden are at the top of EU countries investing in R&D for defence. Which European countries are increasing defence budgets the most? Since 2014, countries such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Denmark, North Macedonia, Slovakia, and Sweden have doubled their defence expenditures, while Luxembourg, Latvia, and Lithuania have tripled their spending. Germany, the Netherlands, Estonia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Finland have also nearly doubled their defence budgets. How many soldiers do European countries have? The total number of active military personnel in Europe, including the UK, is estimated to be around 1.5 million. However, its efficiency is undermined by the lack of a common command structure and military systems. By the end of 2024, the number of Russian troops in Ukraine was approximately 700,000. However, it is estimated that Russia has about 1.3 million active military personnel and two million reservists. According to official figures , around 80,000 American military forces are active in Europe. However, the total number fluctuates due to exercises and routine troop rotations, as noted by the Council on Foreign Relations. Meanwhile, experts estimate Europe would need an additional 300,000 servicemen or around 50 brigades to defend itself, without US troops. Is compulsory military service back in Europe? With the Cold War over, many EU countries significantly reduced their military personnel, since conscription was abolished in many countries. For example, France ended it in 1997 and Germany in 2011. However, in response to the growing Russian threat, countries like Latvia and Lithuania have reinstated conscription in recent years. To strengthen European armies, Latvia's president Edgars Rinkēvičs recently said Europe should “absolutely” introduce conscription, an idea backed by Estonia. Several European countries do still have compulsory conscription, ranging from four months in Denmark to 19 months in Norway. Austria, Finland, and Sweden require six to 12 months, while Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania mandate around nine to 11 months. Greece and Cyprus have longer terms of 12–15 and 15 months, respectively. Is Europe moving towards a joint army? No. Some countries, like France, have traditionally supported stronger EU military autonomy, while others, such as Poland and the Baltics, prioritise Nato. But rather than moving toward a single European army, the EU is focusing efforts on closer military cooperation, joint procurement, and faster response forces, as seen in the 2022 Strategic Compass, whose goal was to have a 5,000-strong rapid deployment force by 2025. Military mobility is still today one of the priorities of the EU’s defence strategy since no harmonised rules to move troops or equipment between countries in a situation of emergency. Why and how does the EU plan to boost its arms production? The invasion of Crimea in 2014, followed by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, has reshaped EU security policy, forcing the EU and Nato to rethink defence strategies and increase military spending to boost capabilities. The war in Ukraine and the Trump administration's apparent pivot towards Moscow has also revived discussions on EU strategic autonomy, with France (and now even Germany) pushing for more independence from US-led security structures. Over the past two decades, the EU has come up with different defence initiatives. Key steps to enhance military collaboration include the set up of the European Defence Agency (2004), its annual Capability Development Plan (2008), and PESCO (2017). Regulations for defence transfers and dual-use exports have also strengthened arms control, while Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine accelerated EU defence efforts, leading to the creation of the European Peace Facility (2021), EDIRPA , ASAP (2023), and EDIS (2024). With its ReArm Europe plan , the European Commission aims to mobilise €800bn to boost EU defence spending, support Ukraine, and expand Europe’s industrial base. The plan includes a new instrument of €150bn in new joint EU borrowing, loosening the bloc’s fiscal rules for defence (which could be freed up €650bn over the next four years), using cohesion funds (voluntarily), changing investment rules for EIB and “unlocking private” investment throughout the long-stalled Capital Market Union (CMU). How big is the EU’s defence industry? The EU defence sector has an estimated annual turnover of nearly €84bn, directly supporting over 196,000 high-skilled jobs and indirectly creating more than 315,000 additional jobs, according to the European Commission . But the European defence industry needs more skilled workers as it boosts production and innovation to tackle growing security challenges. European defence companies' market values have soared, with most doubling their share prices since Russia invaded Ukraine. But revenues are still pretty small, showing that their capacity to scale up is held back by the size of national markets and export restrictions. This has prompted a debate about whether there should be a European preference for common EU defence spending. “Such ‘European preference’ is a necessary contribution to reverse the current predominance of non-European suppliers on European defence markets,” argues the industry. But EU countries remain divided. Which weapons systems are seen as a priority for Europe? Europe is investing in multi-layered air and missile defence architectures because as Paweł Ksawery Zalewski, Polish secretary of state for national defence, said last year: “Having an advantage in the air defines the war". For example, the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) , launched in October 2022, seeks to create an all-encompassing defence system that integrates capabilities ranging from short-range to exoatmospheric levels. In addition, drones, missiles, artillery, strategic enablers, military mobility, cyber capabilities, and artificial intelligence have been listed as priority areas. Namely, drones have become a crucial tool in the war in Ukraine , prompting both Kyiv and Moscow to quickly develop their own industry. And today, the main exporters of military drones are China and Turkey. What challenges does the EU face in strengthening its military capabilities? While increased defence investment is welcomed, the industry seeks long-term or multi-year procurement contracts for stability, sustained innovation, and tech development. The ‘built-to-order’ system typical of peacetime, which the EU defence industry is based on, has resulted in long waiting times for advanced defence capabilities. Defence cooperation, including joint ventures and shared procurement, is growing, but it remains limited. There have been specific efforts to boost artillery ammunition production, an area where Ukraine has a high demand. But the EU’s pledge to deliver one million 155-mm-calibre artillery shells between March 2023 and 2024 was impossible to fulfil in time, showing the challenges ahead. The EU Commission estimated in 2022 that the lack of cooperation leads to annual costs ranging from €25bn to €100bn. Another of the key issues for the EU’s defence industry is fragmentation, especially outside the aeronautics and missile sectors. Fragmentation not only triggers duplication and higher production costs but also interoperability problems, limiting its scale and operational effectiveness in the field. As an indication, EU member states have provided ten different types of howitzers to Ukraine, according to the Draghi report. In addition, the EU operates 12 different types of battle tanks, whereas the US manufactures just one (the M1 Abrams). Meanwhile, external dependencies also factor in. Between 2007 and 2016, over 60 percent of Europe's defence procurement budget was spent on non-EU military imports, leading to third-country controls and restrictions on the equipment. A 'European preference' in defence procurement, pushed mainly by France, did not find consensus during informal talks of EU leaders in February – and given the need to scale up quickly, many countries are calling for a system to be as open as possible. Do European countries have nuclear weapons? As of January 2022, France had 290 warheads, with 98 delivery systems, including submarine missiles and air-launched missiles. The UK had 225 warheads, 120 operational, deployed on five submarines, with 105 in storage, according to the Arms Control Association . Meanwhile, it is reported that Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey all host US nuclear weapons. Poland has recently called on Washington to deploy nuclear weapons in the country, admitting that having its own capacity would take decades. Will the EU develop its own nuclear deterrent? Germany’s chancellor-to-be Friedrich Merz is trying to court French president Emmanuel Macron and UK PM Keir Starmer to share nuclear weapons. “We have to be stronger together in nuclear deterrence,” Merz said earlier in March. His remarks come after Macron floated the idea of extending the French “nuclear umbrella” to European countries. However, the debate is still in its early stages. While France's nuclear arsenal of around 290 warheads may be sufficient for national deterrence and some European partners, it is not enough for all of Europe | . | As the European Commission sets out its vision for a single market for defence in its white paper due on Wednesday, we take a close look at global and European trends and the industry’s readiness to meet new challenges. | [
"EU & the World",
"EU Political",
"Ukraine"
] | * | 2025-03-19T06:00:00.000Z | https://euobserver.com/*/ar0fa3f12f |
Belarus forces accused of raping women fleeing to Poland | Testimonies are emerging of sexual violence against women and girls attempting to enter Poland from Belarus, in a wider report on illegal pushbacks of prospective asylum seekers. Published on Tuesday (18 March) by Oxfam and its Polish partner Egala , the 66-page report sheds light into what the campaigners say is a systemic denial of the right to asylum along the countries' shared land border, which spans the Białowieża Forest . "Women and girls face particularly extreme risks, with significant reports of sexual abuse by Belarusian forces, including rape and gang rape," says the report. The clampdown along the shared land border has raised alarms among rights defenders since at least 2021, when Belarus started shuffling people across the border to stoke tensions with Poland. The Polish reaction has since included a heavily fortified 247km land border with a mix of Polish soldiers and border guards, as well as an exclusion zone where journalists and aid workers are banned. Recently, some 280 attempts to cross were made in the span of only two days, according to the Polish Border Guard. "Almost of all of them were thwarted," it said, in a post on X . And while reports of collective illegal pushbacks by Polish guards are not uncommon, the testimonies of rape pose additional questions on whether the forced returns can be justified even under Polish government standards. The document cites Judyta Kuc, head of mission support at Médecins Sans Frontières , as stating that some of their patients reported being raped before being able to cross into Poland. Some are now describing the Belarus side of the border as a "death zone" overseen by increasingly cruel Belarusian uniformed services. “This is the ‘hell’ Poland is sending people back to, and it is sponsored by the EU,” said Sarah Redd, Oxfam Ukraine advocacy lead, in a press statement. At least 87 people have died on both sides of the border from September 2021 to near the end of last year, according to We Are Monitoring , a civil society group. Last year, a Polish border guard was also stabbed to death. Framed as a security threat and part of a hybrid warfare from Russia and Belarus, the issue has seen an increase in violence along the border. In a sign of the escalating abuse, those who are forced back into Belarus are targeted and punished, says the report. This includes being mauled by dogs, waterboarded or electrocuted. At least one person is said to have had his finger cut off as punishment. But the prospect of ending collective pushbacks by Poland, as recommended by the authors of the report, also appears dim. Last month, the Polish government introduced a bill that would allow it to temporarily suspend asylum and later endorsed as a security imperative by the European Commission. "We are witnessing a full-blown rule-of-law crisis at the EU level when it comes to migration and asylum," said Maciej Grześkowiak, a researcher at the Centre for Human Rights at the University of Warsaw, in an EUobserver op-ed. | Nikolaj joined EUobserver in 2012 and covers home affairs. He is originally from Denmark, but spent much of his life in France and in Belgium. He was awarded the King Baudouin Foundation grant for investigative journalism in 2010. | Testimonies are emerging of sexual violence against women and girls attempting to enter Poland from Belarus, in a wider report on illegal pushbacks of prospective asylum seekers. | [
"Migration",
"Health & Society"
] | migration | 2025-03-17T23:01:00.000Z | https://euobserver.com/migration/arf740e957 |
Syrian women must have a seat at the transition table | Syrians have endured 14 years of profound loss but continue to rebuild and seek accountability. Enforced disappearances, torture, and war crimes persist. Over 202,000 civilians have been killed, nearly 100,000 disappeared, and 15,000 died from torture in regime prisons. The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 opened a path for transition, but challenges remain, demanding justice-based accountability. Clashes near Jableh on March 6, 2025, and rising sectarian tensions forced thousands of Alawites to flee to Lebanon, exposing Syria’s fragility. In response, the EU has taken a measured “step-for-step” approach, gradually easing sanctions while monitoring human rights progress. Monday's (17 March) high-level meeting featuring the 27 ministers of foreign affairs and the Brussels Ministerial Conference on Syria will further determine the EU policy decisions and reconstruction funding commitments . Syrian-led civil society organisations, the actors closest to the reality on the ground and crucial for the transitional period, are often put in the margins of such conversations. EU member states must ensure that those responsible for war crimes and human rights violations in Syria are held accountable through robust legal and judicial mechanisms, preventing impunity and reinforcing the principles of international law. There is an urgent need for accountability for crimes committed by not only the Assad regime but also extremist groups such as Isis. However, justice cannot be limited to the courtroom alone. This must be part of a broader transitional justice framework focused on victims and their families. These initiatives, along with reparations and psychological support, must accompany formal legal processes. Justice also needs to be local, there is an urgent need to support community-led initiatives, local truth commissions, and reconciliation efforts alongside international trials. Investing in Syrian civil society (CSOs) and infrastructure today safeguards Europe’s future security and stability. The EU’s support for justice and democracy in Syria is crucial to preventing extremism, state collapse, and mass displacement, challenges that will inevitably affect Europe. Investing in Syrian CSOs today not only upholds human rights but also reinforces regional stability and protects Europe’s long-term security interests. Civil society in Syria needs to be actively involved in the reconstruction of a post-Assad Syria. CSOs are the curial forces who advocate for accountability preserving historical memory and demanding democratic governance. The National Dialogue that took place in Damascus showed the difficulties of politically meaningful incorporation of civil society into political decision-making. And while the event was pitched as an inclusive initiative, not all of Syrian society was represented. The exclusion points to the necessity of a more representative process in which all segments of Syrian society, particularly marginalised communities, should have a place at the table. Syrian women A truly inclusive transition requires a framework in which civil society is not only consulted in but also plays an active role in shaping policy decisions, constitutional reforms and governance structures. Otherwise, Syria will find itself in a cycle of past patterns of political exclusion that severs its population and local entities’ relations with central power. This engagement of civil society must be structured, with mechanisms for continuous dialogue, independent oversight of government actions and formal power to rebuild institutions in accordance with human rights and democratic principles. Syrian women have long been on the front lines of grassroots activism, humanitarian assistance, and community rebuilding. But they are also facing fresh challenges in post-conflict Syria, including the risk of gender-based violence and political marginalisation. The EU must ensure that women have a seat at the table and are key players in the transitional period. Any transitional justice process in the future cannot be limited to addressing gender discrimination in relevant legislation but must address the systemic discrimination against women, legal barriers to the economic and social participation of women, as well as independent mechanisms towards combatting gender-based violence and justice for survivors. The road ahead for Syria is fraught with challenges, but it is also one of opportunity. The EU has the power to shape Syria’s transition in a way that prioritises justice, not just stability. Monia Ben Jemia is president of EuroMed Rights , emeritus professor at the faculty of legal, political and social sciences in Tunis (Carthage University) and feminist activist. She is also the former president of the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women . Rasmus Alenius Boserup is executive director of EuroMed Rights. Previously, he served as executive director of the Danish-Egyptian Dialogue Institute in Cairo . Monia Ben Jemia is president of EuroMed Rights , emeritus professor at the faculty of legal, political and social sciences in Tunis (Carthage University) and feminist activist. She is also the former president of the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women . Rasmus Alenius Boserup is executive director of EuroMed Rights. Previously, he served as executive director of the | Danish-Egyptian Dialogue Institute in Cairo | Monday's high-level meeting of the EU-27 foreign affairs ministers and the Brussels Ministerial Conference on Syria will determine the EU policy and reconstruction funding. Unfortunately, Syrian led-civil society organisations, the actors closest to the reality on the ground, are often put on the margins of such conversations. | [
"EU & the World",
"Opinion"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-03-17T12:48:13.205Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar351b7761 |
Who's up and who's down in Liberties annual EU rule-of-law report | 2024 saw Europe’s political pendulum swing decisively to the right. Populist far-right parties rode a wave of immigration hysteria and economic woes to success in national and EU elections. And even where they didn’t win, mainstream parties mirrored many of their talking points to woo voters. So what does this mean for democracy? In periods of turmoil, our political leaders should be a source of reassurance. We should trust that they will listen to us, and use their powers and public resources in our best interest. Known as ‘the rule of law’, this principle is manifested through the rules and systems of accountability — like independent courts and free media — that keep governments and state officials in check. But the Liberties Rule-of-Law Report , now in its sixth year, has found that Europe’s democratic recession has deepened. Countries regarded as democratic strongholds are sliding towards authoritarian tendencies and the European Union’s minimal use of its rule of law toolbox has barely made a dent. To get a whole picture of the health of European democracies, we divided countries into five groups according to their efforts to improve rule of law issues and implement the recommendations made by the EU Commission's report last year. This gives us a better sense of their democratic trajectory and allows us to catch early warning signals of authoritarianism before they become systemic. The 'goodies' In the first group we had the 'hard workers'. While they may not have the best democratic record, they showed the greatest commitment to strengthening the rule of law. It includes the Czech Republic, whose government improved the justice system and increased cooperation with civil society. Poland is also here but is unique case, having become a laboratory for the difficult task of rule of law restoration. Next we have the 'maintainers'. Their performance is consistent, but no one is reaching their full potential. It includes Ireland and the Netherlands, who generally rank high in democratic rankings, as well as Greece and Malta, who usually perform poorly. Some countries made moderate improvements, such as Ireland, which showed progress in the areas of justice and media freedom, while the Netherlands made no progress whatsoever, and even declined in the area of media freedom. Then there’s the 'sliders'. The 'baddies' This cohort includes traditionally high performers with persistent drops in standards. France is squarely in this category, as it showed no progress whatsoever and declined in most areas. Germany and Sweden also belong here due to their downward trend. This should be considered a warning sign for countries considered stalwarts of EU values who should be leading by example. Several degrees worse we have the dismantlers, who sabotage rule of law institutions through deliberate tactics or severe neglect. This includes Italy, where judicial freedom is compromised and journalists were targeted by public officials. Bulgaria and Slovakia have also earned the dismantler label, having weakened civic space, checks and balances and anti-corruption last year. Right at the bottom, Hungary continues to be an egregious disrupter — far below the EU average, it is in its own separate, lonely category. Its substandard rule-of-law quality deteriorated even further, regressing in almost all areas apart from checks and balances and corruption, where it stagnated. Governments’ disdain of democratic principles is mirrored in the treatment of NGOs and human rights defenders. According to the report, civic space and human rights showed the most combined decline and stagnation, with the Czech Republic the only country that progressed in either area. In most other countries, the relationship between NGOs and governments became increasingly adversarial, stemming from laws designed to undermine their work by depicting them as foreign agents. The rise in verbal and physical attacks, legal harassment and smear campaigns experienced by NGOs and human rights activists — with those working on migration, climate or issues affecting marginalised communities most targeted — often went hand-in-hand with funding restrictions. Many countries reported a starving of funding sources, an issue likely to get worse as a ricochet effect of Donald Trump’s cancellation of USAid funding. Palestine solidarity policing The clampdown on protests reported last year, particularly targeting climate activists and Palestine solidarity protests, continued. Many countries reported increased and disproportionate use of force by the police and changes in law to further restrict the right to protest. The current period of geo-political fragmentation, national discontentment and uncertainty about Europe’s security provides the ideal conditions for authoritarianism to rise. Far-right parties thrive on fear and when people don’t feel safe, respect for democracy and human rights is often the first casualty. Democracy’s guardrails can slow down authoritarians but not indefinitely. Europe needs a united front to weather the shifting international landscape. The EU should lead by example, but instead, it is guilty of similar law-of-law breaches, including politicisation of the judiciary, political interference in the operation of independent authorities, and inefficient prosecution of high-level corruption. The European Commission should take heed of Poland’s struggle to restore democracy and prevent other countries from following the same path through bolder enforcement. Simply put, governments who trash the rule of law should be subjected to infringement procedures — and cut off from EU funds if necessary. The rule of law will anchor us during the turbulent times ahead. It maintains people’s trust in the democratic process and their political leaders, creates the conditions for EU collaboration and guarantees economic stability and the effective exercise of economic freedoms. The EU should reinforce it before it’s too late. Eleanor Brooks is a senior communications officer and Balázs Dénes is executive director at Civil Liberties Union for Europe , a Berlin-based human rights network organisation. Eleanor Brooks is a senior communications officer and Balázs Dénes is executive director at | Civil Liberties Union for Europe | France showed no progress whatsoever and declined in most areas. Germany and Sweden also are on a downward trend, while Italy, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Hungary are wreckers, according to Berlin NGO Civl Liberties Union for Europe. | [
"Rule of Law",
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] | rule-of-law | 2025-03-17T06:00:00.000Z | https://euobserver.com/rule-of-law/arbbfffa9a |
In Syria, and elsewhere, there is no peace without development | On Monday (17 March), leaders from around the world gather in Brussels to discuss how the international community can help address humanitarian needs and support economic recovery and reconstruction in Syria. These are crucial conversations because the people of Syria stand at a historic moment. There has been renewed hope, after decades of brutal rule. But as last week’s events have shown, it’s also a very fragile moment. A brighter future stands at a crossroads. The development and reconstruction of Syria — by Syrians and for all Syrians — rests on a credible and inclusive political transition. Now is the time for bold action. All violence must stop, and accountability must follow. The international community has a duty to support. Syria remains one of the largest humanitarian and displacement crises in the world. Over 16 million people — 7 out of 10 Syrians — require humanitarian assistance. More than half the population lacks a stable source of water, while critical infrastructure has been further affected by the hostilities during 2024. About a quarter of Syrians are living outside the country. They need urgent and practical solutions, both to respond to their current needs, but also to lay the foundation for an inclusive, resilient, and sustainable future, where all communities are integrated, and the rights of vulnerable groups are respected. The importance of this task cannot be overstated. Beyond the immense human suffering, displacement, and the devastation caused by the conflict inside Syria, the impacts of the last decade of war has been far-reaching, having led to tectonic shifts in the political discourse within Europe too. The organisation that I run, United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) — along with the rest of our UN family and our partners — are working to respond to needs in Syria and to adapt our work to the constantly evolving conditions. UNOPS has remained in Syria throughout the last decade, delivering projects amid ongoing conflicts. We have been addressing some of the most critical challenges affecting the Syrian population both in Syria and within the neighbouring countries and communities hosting the Syrian refugees. This work has been wide-ranging. We helped remove chemical weapons in 2014 and since then have been providing operational support to UN partners such as the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). We support humanitarian mine action in Syria, and we are helping rehabilitate educational and health infrastructure, providing renewable energy solutions, and procuring medical equipment and supplies. The future of Syria is in the hands of Syrians. And the international community has a duty to support their efforts at this crucial time. Together with the European Union in Syria, and building on similar work in Myanmar, UNOPS is working to undertake an integrated response across humanitarian, development and peace sectors. Our approach is to enable the local communities and partners to access livelihood opportunities and essential services and to empower those most vulnerable to participate in decision-making processes, so there is more accountability. So we are heavily vested in this week’s "Standing with Syria" conference , which I look forward to attending. But the conversations on Syria also raise broader questions about the transition from humanitarian response, to recovery and reconstruction to longer-term development. UNOPS works on all these three areas, across humanitarian, development and peace and security operations. Over half of our work takes place in fragile, and conflict-affected contexts. From Gaza to Ukraine. From Afghanistan to Haiti. From Yemen to South Sudan and Mozambique, we help our partners respond, recover, and rebuild sustainably and equitably. From clearing mines and debris to procuring critical supplies and restoring infrastructure, we support communities to build back better. By enabling access to essential services - water, sanitation, transport, and education - we address urgent needs while paving the way for long-term development. In the face of the climate crisis, we support our national partners to strengthen resilience and reduce disaster risks. Because of this, we know that it is absolutely essential to bridge the gaps between emergency response, sustainable development, and long-term peace building —the so-called humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus. In other words: how do we respond to immediate needs while supporting the resilience of people affected by poverty and conflict? These are not just rhetorical questions. I have seen their practical implications in our projects in fragile and conflict affected areas. Last month, I visited Gaza for a second time, as part of a Middle East mission that also took me to Syria and Lebanon, among others. In Gaza, the economic, humanitarian, development, peace and security response are so deeply and clearly interconnected. Take one example, from rubble removal. The scale of devastation I saw around me there was overwhelming. An estimated 50 million tons of debris and rubble generated by the conflict will take years to remove. Families returning to the remains of their homes are at high risk from unexploded weapons and contaminated rubble. Early recovery will simply not be possible without effective rubble removal. In Gaza, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon and Ukraine, and many other places, these are efforts that my team stands ready to support. In Ukraine, we have followed a holistic and context-sensitive approach. The situation there is an emergency, so a lot of our work is about responding to urgent needs and addressing vulnerabilities. As we do that, we are also mindful of promoting sustainable economic and social development. Our approach is based on strong dialogue between local communities, businesses, civil society, and international partners, so we can ensure positive and lasting collective outcomes. With support from many partners, we have been powering hospitals, renovating schools, delivering rail repair equipment, refurbishing homes, and helping to reduce the threat of explosive ordnance. In dark times, we have helped to strengthen hope and build resilience that will outlast the war. Our message is clear: investing in the nexus pays. In our deeply interconnected world, crises don’t stay contained — they ripple across borders, economies, and generations. In an age of polycrisis, with a quarter of humanity living in places affected by conflict, our only way forward is by bringing together efforts across humanitarian, development or peace building nature. The time to act with Syrians for a better future for Syria is now. In Syria, and beyond, we must become better at putting people ―their needs, vulnerabilities and aspirations ― at the center of our operations. So that communities can not only survive, but also thrive. Jorge Moreira da Silva is UN under-secretary-general and executive director of the United Nations Office for Project Services . He has over 25 years of experience working on sustainable development, climate change, energy and environment. Previously, he was director of the development cooperation directorate at the OECD and Portugal’s minister for the environment, territorial planning and energy. Jorge Moreira da Silva is UN under-secretary-general and executive director of the | United Nations Office for Project Services | The future of Syria is in the hands of Syrians. And the international community has a duty to support their efforts at this crucial time. UNOPS is working to undertake an integrated response across humanitarian, development and peace sectors. | [
"EU & the World"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-03-17T05:00:00.000Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar14d329e0 |
Let's hit Trump's Tech Bros with that EU Digital Services Tax finally | After all the build-up, the transatlantic trade war has truly begun . US tariffs on steel are reciprocated with EU tariffs on jeans and Harley Davidsons. When announcing the EU tariffs president Ursula von der Leyen was clear that she is open to dialogue with the Americans to deescalate the trade conflict. We have seen in his modus operandi that this is how Donald Trump likes to operate. Bold statements and excessive tariffs to extort trading partners and get a better deal. He has been doing it to Mexico, Canada and Ukraine, and will do so to Europe. However, in exchange for what? This is the reason why the EU and the European Commission have to be prepared for a targeted push of the American administration to weaken the digital rules that protect our citizens online. Big Tech CEOs like Meta´s Zuckerberg have signalled to expect this to happen. Add to that the interference of Elon Musk on the German election and the speech of vice president JD Vance at the Munich Security Conference criticising the actions taken by the EU to counter disinformation. That is why we urge von der Leyen and EU tech sovereignty commissioner Henna Virkkunen to stay firm and defend the European digital acquis from the rising pressure. Together with more than 30 members of the progressive groups in the European Parliament, we sent a letter in support of enforcing the existing rules. DSA and DMA already under review? The announced Digital Package on simplification of recent EU digital rules for later this year is sending a wrong signal to the Americans. We should be extremely cautious when reviewing legislation, such as the Digital Services Act (DSA), and the Digital Markets Act (DMA), that were only adopted in the previous legislative term and are recently coming into force. It is even more astonishing and confusing to announce reviewing the AI Act considering that it is not fully applicable yet. Moreover, the commission has not even completed the first set of investigations in the breach of these new laws. This shows that it is too soon to evaluate their effects. Swift enforcement is needed, still we hear signals that there is pressure to delay the conclusions on the probes into Meta, X and others. It is highly dangerous to reopen the debate on these rules that currently are, and will remain under, immense pressure from Big Tech CEOs and the Trump administration. Not only tech sovereignty is at stake, but also the reputation of the EU as a standard-setter for regulating technology. Virkkunen cancelled Virkkunen was supposed to travel to Washington this week, but the trip was cancelled at the last minute. Maybe this is a good sign showing that the commission is aware that potentially mixing tech diplomacy with trade discussions is not a good idea. In this regard, Europe should realise there is only one thing that Trump and his friends understand. It is force and strength. It is having the right set of cards and playing them out. We should not give away anything of our position, by offering them on a silver platter to water down the rules we democratically created. We should instead put new things on the table, new cards to play. For one, an EU Digital Services Tax , for which the commission proposed a Directive in 2018 and at the time blocked by several member states, can be reintroduced in the new geopolitical context. A targeted levy that will not harm consumers, but aims directly at the excessive profits of tech billionaires supporting Trump. Another option is to introduce an EU-wide ban of very large online platforms that do not abide by the EU digital rules. If Big Tech is willingly ignoring our rules, fines might not be enough of a deterrent. We have seen successful examples of Brazilian courts dealing with X and Musk, by forcing his hand with a ban. We cannot underestimate the disruptive effect and importance of the digital transformation for Europe and our citizens. In our rule of law, the co-legislator carefully constructed a legal framework to make sure that we are clear about what is illegal online. Carelessly deconstructing this framework is creating legal uncertainty and discrediting the values of the EU. Only by taking the offensive, we can defend our rules and prevent them ending up as a bargaining chip in this cynical geopolitical game. Alex Agius Saliba is a Maltese MEP and vice-president of the Socialists & Democrats . Alex Agius Saliba is a Maltese MEP and vice-president of the | Socialists & Democrats | The EU Digital Services Tax (for which the commission proposed a directive in 2018 but at the time was blocked by several member states) can be reintroduced — a targeted levy that will not harm consumers, but aims directly at the excessive profits of tech billionaires supporting Donald Trump, writes the S&D vice president. | [
"EU & the World",
"Digital",
"Opinion"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-03-13T15:07:42.213Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/arc33e939c |
Unpacking EU’s food fight over new gene-edited supercrops | Agrochemical multinationals crave them, small and organic farmers don’t want them, most consumers know zilch about them and governments are fighting over them: genetically modified foods are back on the EU menu. At a standstill for months, the EU's plan to free so-called New Genomic Techniques (NGTs) from strict GMO rules could move forward on Friday (14 March) — delivering on efforts from Europe’s factory farm capitals to override opposition from countries concerned about small and organic farmers. While initially one of the member states slamming the brakes on a deal, Poland, since the start of its EU Council presidency in January, has flipped — much to the dismay of many of its own agri-food players. Pro-NGT countries agree with the European Commission (and big agro-food companies) that lab-tweaked crops can deliver the sustainability that European agriculture so badly needs — as well as help them compete with biotech-friendly nations like the US, Canada or Japan — but critics warn these are the same tall claims as those made for older-generation GMOs, which fuelled intensive farming but failed to deliver for many growers. Those against what they see as a de-facto deregulation also argue the new rules proposed by Brussels will give seed and agrichem multinationals a hassle-free ride on the booming food biotechnology wave at the likely expense of small producers. Countries have been at odds over a host of issues: whether NGT products should be monitored and carry labels for consumers, or only for producers; whether to exempt them from thorough health and environmental safety checks; whether and how to keep them separate from organics; whether to tie laxer rules to sustainability requirements and even on whether the proposal is scientifically sound (no less than seven EU countries and the competent national agencies of France , Germany and Austria warn the law’s scientific basis is inadequate, if not arbitrary). Yet despite attempts by the opposition bloc — Austria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia — to address these issues, the pro-NGT coalition has shut down discussions on all but one topic: plant patents, which many countries fear could fuel food privatisation and monopolies, but which industry sees as its non-negotiable moneymaker . An official within Belgium’s former government, which steered their 2024 Council presidency, said that the pro-NGT camp is “very explicit” that they would refuse negotiations on anything other than patents. 'We have a feeling [that] many things are going through by force; our impression over the whole proposal was that [there was] an intention to push it down our throats without proper work done beforehand', said an EU diplomat Lobbying Warsaw While initially adamant that labelling was “ essential ” for consumer trust and that patents would only benefit big corporations , since the start of its presidency, Warsaw has been bending over backwards to cater to the big players’ NGT cravings — despite opposition voices and studies suggesting NGT awareness among Polish citizens is low. Days into its presidency, Poland dropped most of its concerns and focused on attempting to soften the patent blow, which the commission did not tackle in the law, but on which it is conducting a study due out later this year. In a first proposal, Poland suggested that only non-patented NGTs could benefit from red tape-free market approval; that seed packs should carry patent labels and that countries could restrict patented NGTs in their territories. Businesses were appalled and the proposal flopped. Just weeks later, Warsaw pitched a second deal, binning all previous proposals and saying companies could disclose patent information online, instead of on seed packs, and only voluntarily. Several EU diplomats and Polish stakeholders said Poland’s U-turn came after “unseen” levels of pressure coming at Warsaw from all fronts. In Brussels, industrial farming and biotech hubs like Spain and Belgium led the charge during their presidencies, zeroing in on Poland’s patent concerns after realising that, due to its population, its vote could move the file forward. “They were really hunting for Poland, due to its size, and to the fact that perhaps their position was not as firm,” an EU diplomat said, adding that it all reached a fever pitch during Belgium’s presidency. Three EU diplomats said that, in a last-ditch attempt to get Poland’s agreement, the Belgian presidency took the matter up to the prime ministerial level. The Belgian official confirmed former Belgian premier Alexander De Croo and his Polish counterpart, Donald Tusk, talked NGTs on the sidelines of a trip to Warsaw marking the release of over €100bn in frozen EU funds for Poland. The Belgian official also said Poland’s NGT reservations were “very linked to the attitude of the minister of agriculture [Czesław Siekierski],” who opposed patents. “There was the hope Tusk could overrule him. Which wasn't the case.” Poland’s farm ministry did not reply to requests for comment. Tusk’s press office did not reply to emailed questions about the prime ministerial meeting but said the Polish presidency was being an “honest broker” in the EU Council, adding: “The final support from the member states (including Poland) will be verified after the results of the negotiations with [MEPs]. This is still a long way off.” But as Poland beavers away to begin trilogues with the European Parliament, opposed countries are adamant that their “legitimate concerns” are being ignored. In interviews with EUobserver, diplomats opposed to the law criticised their pro-NGT peers for wanting to rush through a half-baked text seeking to prioritise corporate needs over consumers’ rights, farmers’ livelihoods or the environment. In written comments , some capitals even warn the proposal risks entirely redefining an ‘organic’ or ‘natural’ plant under EU law, in what could spook trade partners. 'If the NGT law will go like the big guys want it to go, there will be only a few suppliers of seeds on the market … So besides losing competition, it is also really about losing control over the food supply chain', said Marek Luty, marketing director at HR Strzelce, a large Polish state-owned seed company “We have a feeling [that] many things are going through by force; our impression over the whole proposal was that [there was] an intention to push it down our throats without proper work done beforehand,” said the EU diplomat. Organic heavyweights like Austria say the bill risks obliterating the organic and GM-free sectors, which would face prohibitive costs to steer clear of unlabelled NGTs — something which the EU’s greenest capitals already see as impossible. "Our land is so small that coexistence [between biotech and organic farming] is not possible (…) we don’t have methods to control it," said a diplomat from Slovenia, where the average farm size is a mere six hectares. “We need more time to discuss, not to hurry and to have a bad regulation … [pro-countries] want to rush, but to rush things with nature is difficult. There is no step back then.” Patent leverage Efforts to give EU farming its high-tech glow-up are ongoing well beyond Brussels. Businesses in Poland are also feeling the heat, as multinationals lead a charm offensive in the country to get farmers and breeders on board. Two Polish seed breeders said executives from multinationals including Corteva and KWS organised an event to “[try] to convince [them]” to join ACLP , one of several licensing platforms set up by industry giants and their lobbies to show off their self-regulation muscles. “The narrative was, 'join us, you will have access to patents … And don't block the patent system in Europe, because you will benefit from it, and we care about you’,” said Marek Luty, marketing director at HR Strzelce, a large Polish state-owned seed company. Convincing seed breeders to join patent platforms like ACLP — through which big companies control who can use their patented NGTs, for how much and under which conditions — could help companies convince “governments (...) that many breeders already accepted the idea” that genes and seeds would become privatised under the patent system, he added. But “patents are always leverage,” Luty said, noting that ACLP executives said companies could always decide to keep a “unique” patented crop to themselves. “If the NGT law will go like the big guys want it to go, there will be only a few suppliers of seeds on the market … So besides losing competition, it is also really about losing control over the food supply chain,” he said. Franziska Achterberg, of the NGO Save Our Seeds , said if Poland’s proposal passes “any breeder or farmer wanting to use a certain variety will still need to do their own research to know whether that variety has one or several patents attached to it.” A smaller Polish seed-breeder working with organics said patents would put them out of business “sooner or later.” While not opposed to NGTs, they said there has been too little debate and far too much coercion. “We feel it’s great business — but it’s a great business for companies and no business for the farmers,” they said, pointing to “plenty” of media articles “stating NGTs are good for farmers [but without] the slightest information about patents.” As word of Warsaw’s change of stance spread last month in Poland, Solidarność , the second-largest farmer union in the country, sent a letter to Poland’s agriculture ministry asking to reject the law and stressing that over 200 EU and Polish food players had written with similar concerns already. Solidarność said the proposal would “increase seed prices for farmers” and warned it was “contrary to the interests of farmers throughout the European Union.” But Poland is intent on moving the bill forward. A spokesperson for the Polish presidency said their latest patent pitch had received “good reactions” from member states and that they would seek to get the green light to begin negotiating with parliament during a meeting on Friday. Gabriela Galindo is a freelance journalist in Brussels reporting on EU policies and corporate accountability, with a particular focus on agri-food and the environment. Jelena Prtorić is a freelance journalist whose work focuses on human rights, the environment, food&water, through an investigative and (often) cross-border lens. She is also the director of the Dataharvest conference and editor for the Arena Climate Network. Gabriela Galindo is a freelance journalist in Brussels reporting on EU policies and corporate accountability, with a particular focus on agri-food and the environment. | Jelena Prtorić | After months of standstill, the EU’s plan to ease restrictions on New Genomic Techniques (NGTs) could move forward on Friday, pushing efforts from factory farm capitals to bypass concerns from countries worried about small and organic farmers. Here's why it’s controversial — and how Poland’s stance has shifted the balance. | [
"Green Economy"
] | green-economy | 2025-03-13T09:45:21.427Z | https://euobserver.com/green-economy/areabaa9a3 |
A radical proposal: put the EU's counter-tariffs on US social media apps | The EU is already retaliating against the US new import tariffs. Any tariff or trade war would be ill-advised and would cause self inflicted pain, with lower risks. So what can be another more productive answer, consistent with the EU Anti-Coercion instrument ? Rather than imposing generic customs that would increase prices of many goods that are both beneficial and useful for Europeans (including in areas where one is interested in maintaining Western production capacities, such as in chips, machinery and chemicals production, battery development or car-making, expecting that Western collaboration will resume in future), we should consider other options. One opportunity would be to strongly reduce the inflow and influence of goods and services known to damage especially people’s health, coming from the US; particularly social media. This spring will see the end of Skype (after two decades), which may be seen as a healthy and beneficial forerunner to social media (allowing us to uphold real relationships globally with minimal costs compared to traditional methods). Why not end the unhealthy social media addiction that has evolved in the past decade or so? Social media quickly shifted to have a negative effect on people’s lives. Social media is strongly negatively related to mental health, to inefficient time use, weakened family relations, depressing comparisons with others, a weakening of democracy and for less tax revenue. Social media benefits from Europeans, yet Europeans are likely suffering in return. While a global issue, Europe is now in a position to end this. Mini-bans Many have already required parental consent (e.g., France), banned social media at younger ages (France, UK), have 40 min max daily use (e.g., China), identity verification (requiring platforms to check — and enforce), ban of certain social media like TikTok, WeChat (India), or introduced night bans (South Korea) — both in the interest of the young and for national security concerns. Taxation could be introduced and should include estimate worth of the youth’s mental health. Europe has a very high share of ad-clicking and social media addicts with high consumption power: more Europeans than North Americans or Asians have a wealth of at least $100,000 [€91,600]. Europeans should seek to recover from a 'FIST' (that is, Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok) which knocked them out years ago and from which we still have not gotten to our feet from. A randomised trial cited shows that blocking smartphone internet access for two weeks improved mental health, attention, and well-being, suggesting constant connectivity undermines quality of life in many ways. Europe, already a leader in effective digital regulation (e.g., GDPR), should as far as possible impose severe regulations and limit access — especially for children and adolescents — to these platforms, tax their revenue models; foster better alternatives with less ads and end addiction based reward systems. While acknowledging US beneficial innovations and useful exports in many other areas, the EU should reject modern exploitative tech, rather than focusing on ending, for example, Tesla’s electric cars, in spite of the animosity to Elon Musk. This shift could redirect time wasted on social media toward productive pursuits, positioning Europe as a pioneer in a healthier digital economy. Europe, but also other world regions like Latin America, South Asia and Oceania, has gone from being a beneficiary of excellent US invention to a victim of useless American digital dominance. The economic opportunity lies in redirecting attention from mindless scrolling to meaningful but politically uncensored engagement, while addressing public health and quality of life. In a way, Europe would thereby (in a positive manner) imitate China’s great firewall, where FIST applications have been shut out, and replaced with carefully-regulated and curated local apps that have very strict policies for youth engagement. European apps would have a chance to develop enlightened versions of FIST applications, which are open source, and provide a public good to the world. Europe has a chance to lead by values, and not pure exploitative commercialism that hypothecates our children’s future. Professor Vegard Skirbekk is affiliated with Oslo and Columbia Universities and a principal investigator at the Norwegian Institute of Public Health. He has written for Foreign Affairs , The Economist , Wired Magazine and the Guardian . Professor Vegard Skirbekk is affiliated with Oslo and Columbia Universities and a principal investigator at the Norwegian Institute of Public Health. He has written for Foreign Affairs , The Economist , Wired Magazine and the | Guardian | Social media is strongly negatively related to mental health, to inefficient time use, weakened family relations, depressing comparisons with others, a weakening of democracy and for less tax revenue. Social media benefits from Europeans, yet Europeans are likely suffering in return. | [
"EU & the World",
"Digital",
"Opinion"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-03-12T16:18:37.564Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar1afb800d |
Harleys and Levis in the firing line as EU retaliates to Trump's trade war | The EU bowed to the inevitable on Wednesday (12 March) by firing a volley of returning fire on US imports after president Donald Trump formally started his much anticipated global trade war. The EU Commission will impose tit-for-tat tariffs on US exports after the Trump administration confirmed 25-percent import tariffs on EU steel and aluminium that will target goods worth $28bn. [€25.7bn] Harley-Davidson motorcycles, Jack Daniels and Levis jeans will be among the iconic US products that get more expensive. The EU executive says that, while disappointed, it has little choice but to respond in kind. On Wednesday morning , commission president Ursula von der Leyen repeated that “tariffs are taxes” and would hurt business and consumers. “In a world of uncertainties, we should not burden our economies,” she said, but defended the EU’s response as “strong and proportionate”. For his part, EU trade commissioner Maros Sefcovic expressed “deep regret” at the US tariffs, adding that EU-US trade relations were ”well balanced”. Though Trump administration’s tariffs will apply globally, China, India and Canada are likely to be the main losers from them, with the EU as collateral damage. Sefcovic said on Wednesday that US officials had made clear that the EU was not the problem during talks with Trump’s top economic officials in Washington last month. But with the US administration pursuing “unjustified and damaging” tariffs, the EU had no choice but to respond in kind, said the trade commissioner. The UK had hoped to be exempted following warm words between Trump and UK prime minister Keir Starmer — who has sought to use London’s post-Brexit status to position himself as a bridge between the US and Europe. Starmer said on Wednesday that he was “disappointed” but has ruled out retaliatory measures for the moment, with officials in London saying that they hope to broker a trade deal with the Trump administration. Few expected the EU to turn the other cheek to US tariffs. Commission trade officials told reporters on Wednesday that their response is about trying “to show strength” while leaving the door open for a negotiated compromise. However, they have not ruled out taking a case to the World Trade Organization, accusing the US of breaking the ‘non-discrimination’ principle that is enshrined in the WTO’s rules and are “going to keep our options open”. Second-time around There is a precedent since Washington and Brussels had a minor trade battle during Trump’s first term. In 2017, the US imposed tariffs on steel and other goods worth $6.3bn, with the commission responding with duties of the same value. On the campaign trail ahead of his victory in last November’s US presidential election, Trump promised an ‘America First’ trade policy that would hit countries with tariffs that Trump believes are treating the US unfairly. “What was $6.3bn back in 2017 is no longer $6.3bn today”, said a commission official on Wednesday, pointing to the UK’s exit from the EU and lower EU goods exports to the US. "We cast the net a little bit wider,” said the official, who added that the EU measures will eventually target goods worth around €22.5bn after consultations with businesses and national governments. The official noted that the EU’s measures could “in principle...go all the way up to €26bn.” The commission is also looking to specifically target US exports from states dominated by Trump’s Republican party in a bid to “try to ensure that there is understanding and pressure within the American system.” Precisely what new products will be targeted by the EU tariffs is not yet clear, though the commission says that some wood products from Georgia, Virginia and Alabama will be targeted. The commission will present a proposal to EU governments later this month following consultations on a 99-page document of products published on Wednesday. A further announcement will be made on 2 April. Timeline The timeline for what comes next is reasonably clear. The EU measures start on 1 April and will fully apply from 13 April. The US tariffs came into force on Wednesday (12 March). Washington has set up a review mechanism in May when its businesses will be able to suggest to the US government to add new products. The early lesson of US tariffs on Canada and Mexico is that Trump sees trade duties as a weapon to force countries to change their policies on migration control and drug trafficking. In the EU’s case, Trump is known to be exercised by the EU’s 10-percent duties on US vehicles which are significantly higher than the US duties on EU cars and, he says, result in too few American cars being driven on Europe’s roads. However, the commission insists that it will not be intimidated. “These tariffs are unfair. They're unproductive, and it's also not very productive to now start negotiating about removing the tariffs,” said the official. “What we are looking for in negotiations is a productive discussion about creating value to what is the largest trade and investment relationship in the world, which is the transatlantic relationship,” said that the official, who noted that the EU has trade agreements with 76 countries around the world, while the US has 20 such trade agreements. Should the tariffs remain in place for a lengthy period there is little question that they will do significant economic damage. Economists believe that the EU’s €800bn ‘ReArm’ project to massively increase defence spending and military capacity following the US’s veiled threats not to protect Nato's eastern border could prompt an industrial boom across the bloc. Others have warned that the US could face a recession of up to three percent over the coming year. Trump has said that the American economy faces a “period of transition”. 'An ally, not an adversary'? However, European Central Bank president Christine Lagarde warned on Wednesday that “maintaining stability in a new era will be a formidable task”. “Trade fragmentation and higher defence spending in a capacity-constrained sector could in principle push up inflation,” said Lagarde. “Yet US tariffs could also lower demand for EU exports and redirect excess capacity from China into Europe, which could push inflation down.” Canadian officials have briefed that they will impose levies worth close to $20bn on US goods, while China has promised to take “all necessary measures” in response. “There's no reason and justification to put tariffs on the European Union,” a commission trade official told reporters on Wednesday. “We're an ally. We're not an adversary.” That may have been true in the past but is, for the moment, no longer. | Benjamin Fox is a seasoned reporter and editor, previously working for fellow Brussels publication Euractiv. His reporting has also been published in the Guardian, the East African, Euractiv, Private Eye and Africa Confidential, among others. He heads up the AU-EU section at EUobserver, based in Nairobi, Kenya. | The EU bowed to the inevitable on Wednesday, by firing a volley of returning fire on US imports after president Donald Trump formally started his much anticipated global trade war. | [
"EU & the World"
] | * | 2025-03-12T15:40:41.757Z | https://euobserver.com/*/ar6821db20 |
Greenland elects pro-business leader, amid Trump offer to 'make you rich' | Voters in Greenland chose the social-liberal and pro-business Demokraatit party in a landslide victory on Tuesday (11 March), in the shadow of US calls to take over its vast territory. Demokraatit won with almost one third (29.9 percent) of the vote, putting 33-year old party leader Jens-Frederik Nielsen in charge of forming a new government, following over 40 years of rule by left-leaning parties. Under his leadership, Greenland is expected to boost its independence from Denmark still further and to diversify its economy away from fishing. The opposition Naleraq party, which favours even faster independence from Denmark, also did well with 24.5 percent of the vote. The two parties together would have a majority in Greenland's 31-member parliament, the Inatsisartut. But Nielsen said he would reach out to all five parties represented in the new assembly before finalising his coalition. Greenland is the world’s largest island, in terms of surface area, and also one of the least-populated countries, with just 40,481 eligible voters in Tuesday's elections. It is a former Danish colony, which is still part of the Danish kingdom, but which also won self-rule since 2009. It is also formally designated as one of the EU's 13 Overseas Countries and Territories, alongside places such as Aruba (the Netherlands) and New Caledonia (France). The turnout (70.9 percent) on Tuesday was five-percent higher than in the previous 2021 election. Splendid weather on the day helped get people out, but US president Donald Trump also played an important role. He first suggested buying Greenland in 2019 — at the time most people thought it was a joke. But he doubled down on his idea in a press conference on 7 January 2025, even adding that he wouldn't rule out using military force to seize it, due to its economic and strategic importance. His son, Donald Trump Jr. landed in Greenland on a promotion tour the same day, despite strong statements from Greenland that it was not for sale. Giggles in Congress And Trump reiterated his interest in acquiring Greenland in his address to the Congress on 4 March - just one week before the Greenlandish vote. "I also have a message tonight for the incredible people of Greenland," he said, about halfway through his 90-minute speech in Washington. Members of Congress started laughing out loud, which was seen in both Nuuk and in Copenhagen as a sign of disrespect. "We strongly support your right to determine your own future, and if you choose, we welcome you into the United States of America," Trump said. "We need Greenland for national security and even international security, and we’re working with everybody involved to try and get it", he added. "We will keep you safe, we will make you rich, and together, we will take Greenland to heights like you have never thought possible before," Trump said "I think we’re going to get it. One way or the other, we’re going to get it", he said, causing more giggles. "It’s a very small population, but a very, very large piece of land. And very, very important for military security," Trump also said. But if Trump was a factor in Greenland's vote, then so was anger toward Denmark from the beginning of the election campaign. Investigative journalists revealed how Inuit women had been forced into birth control in the 1960s and 1970s, using intrauterine devices. The Danish programme was a "genocide", said outgoing Greenlandish prime minister Muté B. Egede. The Danish public broadcaster, DR, added fuel to the fire, when it published, and later retracted, a documentary about Danish profits made from Greenland cryolite mining in the 1980s. Cryolite is a rare mineral used in aluminium smelting, pest control, and dye-making. EU charm offensive For their part, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen and Danish prime minister Mette Frederiksen also visited Nuuk on 15 March last year. Their charm offensive saw von der Leyen open a new EU office and Frederiksen promise €93m in funding for education and social welfare. "From the very first moment, it [Greenland] felt like home, and I think it is because we are so like-minded," von der Leyen said upon her arrival. But as the rift between Trump's administration and the EU keeps widening, the new government in Nuuk will now have important decisions to take. Based on Tuesday’s election result, Greenland is likely to choose a path of more business friendly policies to exploit the country’s natural resources and speed up the process toward full independence from Denmark. Under the status quo, Greenland gets a fixed annual grant of €450m from Denmark (forming 60 percent of the island's budget) and is eligible to take full control of all policy areas, except monetary policies, foreign relations and security. But after 16 years of self-rule, Greenland has only exercised control over three issues — natural resources, worker safety, and its calendar (the decision when to switch from winter to summertime). It can trigger independence talks with Denmark under Article 8 of its 2009 agreement via a majority vote by the Inatsisartut. This would be followed by a referendum in Greenland and a final vote in the Danish parliament. Greenland's security policy is today a matter for Denmark and Nato, under a separate deal with the US in 1951. The 1951 accord says the US, as a Nato ally, would assist Denmark in defending Greenland, and grants America's military and commercial companies widespread access to the island. During World War Two, the US mined Greenland and had more than a dozen military bases there. Today, the US has just one active military facility — the Pituffik Space Base (formerly called the Thule Air Base) — which does surveillance of Russian and Chinese ballistic missiles and satellites. Greenland has the world’s eighth-largest deposits of so-called rare-earth minerals, which are needed in technologies powering the transition away from fossil fuels. But US companies have just five mining licenses there, having shown little interest in its mineral wealth until now. UK companies have 28, Canadian ones have 25, Greenlandish firms 20, and Australian companies 15. | Lisbeth founded EUobserver in 2000 and is responsible to the Board for effective strategic leadership, planning and performance. After graduating from the Danish School of Media and Journalism, she worked as a journalist, analyst, and editor for Danish media. | Voters in Greenland chose the social-liberal and pro-business Demokraatit party in a landslide victory on Tuesday, amid a tug-of-war on its future between the US and EU.
| [
"EU & the World",
"Nordics"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-03-12T11:49:02.595Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/arcf03caf4 |
When is an EU 'dialogue' actually a monologue? | From railway lines to wind turbines, steel has not only forged the foundations of the European Union but remains a critical building block for its future. The industry underpins more than two million jobs and remains crucial for the EU’s economic and geopolitical strength. But it’s also one of the dirtiest sectors: still largely coal-powered, steelmaking is responsible for five percent of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions and costs taxpayers €7bn a year in public health damage. Despite its central role in modern societies, and its enormous climate, social and environmental impact, the sector’s decarbonisation is stalling. Free emissions allowances under the EU carbon market have shielded steelmakers from real climate costs, failing to incentivise cleaner production. Meanwhile, dozens of green steel projects remain stuck in the pipeline, while steelmakers call on the EU for short-term relief on energy prices and more assertive trade defence measures. No surprise, then, that steel has become a top priority for EU policymakers. The sector was granted “strategic” status under the European Commission’s Clean Industrial Deal , a package designed to boost competitiveness and accelerate the green transition. Now, it awaits a tailor-made action plan, set to be unveiled next Wednesday (19 March). Steel is certainly approaching its make-or-break policy moment. One key voice was missing As a sign of steel’s growing momentum, the European Commission this month launched a —a high-level roundtable with industry executives and policymakers. Yet one key voice was missing: civil society. Of the 21 participants, only two were non-industry representatives: a trade union and a think tank. No civic organisations were invited. Some may argue that industrial transformation is too technical for NGOs. But this is absurd. Networks like the European Environmental Bureau and Climate Action Network Europe have contributed technical expertise and science-based solutions to EU industrial fora for decades. We have seen policymaking hijacked by vested interests when polluters dominate the negotiating table — as seen recently with the chemical industry and the 'forever chemicals' scandal The reality is that civil society is being shut out, and this is part of a broader and troubling trend: an industry-led agenda that sidelines environmental and social concerns. Industrial policy is public policy: it demands democratic engagement. NGO participation in these roundtables is essential to ensure that the public interest comes first; especially as the commission opens the floodgates of subsidies for big corporations with weak conditions attached. There are good reasons to be wary of an industrial agenda shaped by some of Europe's biggest polluters. We have seen policymaking hijacked by vested interests when polluters dominate the negotiating table — as seen recently with the chemical industry and the ‘ forever chemicals’ scandal, or when negotiating emissions standards for industrial facilities. There are areas of agreement between NGOs and the steel industry — such as closing loopholes in the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism ( CBAM ) and strengthening green public procurement to support EU-made green steel. But the industry’s delaying tactics are holding back the very transformation it claims to support. Europe’s steel plants are aging, and decisions on their future must be made now. While 33 green steel projects have been announced, most are stuck in limbo, with no final investment decisions made. Take Europe’s largest steelmaker, ArcelorMittal, which has decided to indefinitely delay its planned green hydrogen investments despite securing billions in public aid, leaving thousands of jobs hanging in the balance. Last chance for 'green steel' And all of this is happening at a time when global trade frictions are rife. Coal-based steelmaking is not just an environmental liability; it is an economic one. Electrifying industry facilities with renewables and improving material circularity are essential for resilience in an increasingly volatile and competitive world. The cost of inaction on climate could be catastrophic. Just last month, Germany’s federal intelligence service warned that climate change threatens the very survival of the European Union, exacerbating conflicts and disasters in the next 15 years. Quite simply, this is the EU’s last shot to get the shift to green steel right. That means putting public interest ahead of corporate interests, tightening conditions on public funding, and ensuring robust transformation plans. But can we trust the industrial strategy to deliver these outcomes if it is shaped solely by corporate, profit-driven analyses? Just because it has ‘industry’ in its name doesn’t mean the new EU policy agenda should be dictated by industry executives. For European industry to maintain its competitive edge, it needs fair and ambitious transition — one built on scientific evidence and inclusive governance. Patrick ten Brink is secretary general of the European Environmental Bureau . Chiara Martinelli is director of Climate Action Network . Patrick ten Brink is secretary general of the European Environmental Bureau . Chiara Martinelli is director of | Climate Action Network | As a sign of the importance of 'green steel', the EU Commission this month launched a Strategic Dialogue on the Future of Steel — a high-level roundtable with industry executives and policymakers. Yet one key voice was missing: civil society. No civic organisations were invited. | [
"Green Economy",
"Opinion"
] | investigations | 2025-03-11T12:40:26.325Z | https://euobserver.com/investigations/ar5039e320 |
EU to expand deportation regime as Europe turns against migrants | A new EU-wide deportation regime is set to be unveiled by the European Commission, raising alarm among rights defenders as the bloc continues its political push to crack down on migration. The bill, possibly a regulation, will be presented on Tuesday (11 March) by the Brussels executive and is likely to entail wording that allows member states to bilaterally set up prison-like deportation centres abroad for rejected asylum seekers. Building on the back of a failed 2018 return directive draft , the latest proposal may end up seeing the commission strip away legal barriers so that member states can forcibly send rejected asylum seekers to any foreign country without their consent. "That is the most likely way that this is going to look," said Olivia Sundberg Diez, a policy expert at Amnesty International in Brussels. "What we will see in this proposal is the commission creating the conditions for return hubs or deportation centres to be established at national level through bilateral engagements with third countries," added Diez. No details have been given on what these deportation centres would look like, or where they would be hosted. It is also unclear where these people would go should their origin country still refuse to accept their return. But past similar efforts in Australia, the UK deal with Rwanda , and Italy's centres in Albania , have all failed to deliver on promises while imposing enormous costs on taxpayers as well as suffering among migrants. "Offshoring, or attempting to shift non-citizens to the territory of another country, tends to be futile, expensive, cruel and illegal," said Madeline Gleeson, a senior research fellow at the University of New South Wales, in Sydney. Gleeson said Australia's experiment to offshore asylum and detention onto neighbouring Pacific islands ended in disaster, costing taxpayers over €500m a year. "This is for a policy which, all up over a decade, only encompassed about 3,000 people," she said. UK's deal with Rwanda had been inspired by the Australian model. It too failed. And now Italy's deal with Albania is facing a similar fate. 'Offshoring, or attempting to shift non citizens to the territory of another country, tends to be futile, expensive, cruel and illegal' But the move is part of wider political push on the back of elections in Europe where migration and asylum continue to galvanise the far-right, including in Germany where the anti-immigration Alternative for Germany (AfD) party became the second-largest party in the country in February. Over the weekend, German election winner Friedrich Merz of the centre-right CDU announced he intends to massively expand border controls, significantly increase the number of rejections at the border, and "take all legal measures to reduce irregular migration overall." The commission's return bill on Tuesday is likely to please Merz as it will probably shift the focus away from voluntary returns under the failed 2018 bill towards forced returns, including possible detention of children. It will also likely make it more difficult for rejected asylum applicants to lodge appeals. In a news conference on Sunday, EU commission president Ursula von der Leyen said it would come with a new 'European Return Order' and mutual recognition of return decisions by member states. "Those who are forcibly returned, will be issued with an entry ban. And we will be stricter where there are security risks," she said. Whatever the text, the proposal will still need to go through the often very lengthy process of negotiations between the council, representing member states, and the European Parliament. And how it dovetails into the EU's recent overhaul of its internal asylum and migration rules remains to be seen. “‘Although neutrally phrased as a law on 'returns', the EU is in reality proposing an expanded deportation regime," said Sarah Chander, who heads the Equinox Initiative for Racial Justice , an NGO, in an emailed statement. | Nikolaj joined EUobserver in 2012 and covers home affairs. He is originally from Denmark, but spent much of his life in France and in Belgium. He was awarded the King Baudouin Foundation grant for investigative journalism in 2010. | A new EU-wide deportation regime is set to be unveiled by the European Commission on Tuesday, raising alarm among rights defenders as the bloc continues its political push to crack down on migration. | [
"Migration"
] | migration | 2025-03-10T14:48:58.981Z | https://euobserver.com/migration/ar58219782 |
Five years after Covid-19: has Europe learned? | Five years after the Covid-19 pandemic exposed the weaknesses of Europe’s health and social care systems, have policymakers truly learned from the crisis? While some steps have been taken to improve preparedness, such as improving coordination of disease centres as well as response mechanisms, the most important lesson has been overlooked: Europe’s resilience depends on strong, well-funded public health and care services with qualified staff. Yet instead of strengthening these systems, many governments are prioritising deregulation and competitiveness, risking the same vulnerabilities that left Europe unprepared in the first place. Indeed, the EU’s current trajectory — marked by budget cuts and market-driven policies — risks deepening inequalities, worsening workforce shortages, and leaving Europe unprepared for future health emergencies. The political shift away from public investment ignores the lessons of the pandemic and undermines the fundamental right to healthcare. Without renewed commitments to funding, regulation, and public sector protections, Europe risks repeating past failures and exposing its citizens to preventable harm. The lasting impact of Covid-19 Over two million people in the European region died due to the pandemic, including many health and social care workers . Many continue to suffer from post-Covid conditions such as long Covid or stress-related problems like depression, burnout, and PTSD. Research on the crisis’s impact on healthcare workers and trade unions' responses has documented these ongoing struggles . More than three years after the peak of the pandemic, the WHO declared on 5 May 2023 that Covid-19 no longer qualified as a global emergency. However, its devastating effects persist — continuing to strain healthcare systems and the broader public service sector. Cuts to the public sector, or in some cases chronic underinvestment, combined with privatisation, left health and social services unprepared for the pandemic. For too long before the pandemic, policymakers viewed care as a commodity rather than a fundamental right and a long-term investment in economic and social well-being. Institutions such as the ILO and WHO have consistently emphasised the need for sustained public investment in care services. From applause to action Although the initial applause for health workers led to some policy proposals — such as those outlined in the WHO-Europe Bucharest Declaration and the OECD Health Ministers’ Declaration , as well as EU4Health projects addressing nursing shortages — implementation remains inconsistent. Addressing workforce shortages at both the EU and national levels is now a pressing issue, with the WHO projecting a shortfall of 4.1 million healthcare workers in the EU by 2030. Efforts to address workforce shortages must prioritise retention as well as recruitment. Improving retention starts with better working conditions. While collective bargaining and strikes have led to wage increases, other key aspects of working conditions — such as reducing overtime, improving work-life balance, and strengthening occupational safety and health (OSH) regulations — require urgent attention. The EU has the legal competence to improve OSH legislation, yet the European Commission has yet to present an initiative for a dedicated directive on psychosocial risk factors , as proposed by European trade unions and supported by the European Parliament. This directive could address factors such as excessive workloads and workplace violence, which have both increased since the pandemic. Additionally, EPSU argues that a dedicated OSH directive could help prevent staff shortages in the healthcare sector. The pandemic also highlighted the sector's reliance on overtime, a trend with serious health consequences. Eurofound’s 2022 report on overtime in Europe notes that long working hours increase the risk of physical and mental health issues. The health sector ranks lowest in Europe in terms of flexible working arrangements, with fewer than 20 percent of workers reporting the ability to take time off for personal or family matters. Addressing this issue is especially crucial in a female-dominated sector such as healthcare, where improving flexibility and work-life balance would yield significant benefits. From preparedness to neglect Improving working conditions must go hand-in-hand with increased public service funding, particularly in health and social care. While European governments and the European Commission initially recognised the need for investment, implementation has lagged behind. The political narrative has shifted from making Europe more resilient to future pandemics to introducing austerity measures, including healthcare budget cuts aimed at reducing national deficits. These austerity measures could lead to reduced access to healthcare professionals and hospital services, particularly in rural areas (medical deserts), or even recruitment freezes across the public sector, as seen in Romania . The commission’s recently presented work programme makes it clear that health is no longer a top priority. Instead, it focuses on deregulation and competitiveness, as outlined in the Competitiveness Compass — a policy approach at odds with the urgent need to strengthen healthcare systems. Health and social care should not be treated as competitive industries — Europe should not and cannot "compete" with other regions when it comes to healthcare. In times of pandemics or other health emergencies, international collaboration — from sharing healthcare workers to exchanging patents and medical products — is essential. This is why the WHO has been working on the Pandemic Treaty . Health is not a commodity, and a profit-driven private sector approach will inevitably lead to fragmentation, reduced service quality, and worse outcomes for low-income populations. Protecting healthcare from cuts and politics Rather than deregulation being pushed in the name of ‘competitiveness’, the health and social care sector needs clear guidelines to ensure equal access to quality care, the availability of qualified personnel, and access to essential medicines and medical devices. While bureaucracy can be streamlined through digital solutions, key procedures must be maintained to guarantee high-quality care. Instead of focusing on competition, Europe must work together — both regionally and globally — to ensure universal access to quality healthcare. Care must also be central to European preparedness for future emergencies, including pandemics, climate-related disasters, and conflicts. Yet, the recent Niinistö report , , barely mentions healthcare, underscoring the sector’s continued marginalisation in future planning. Five years after the pandemic began, it is more critical than ever to protect a rights-based approach to healthcare and prevent its politicisation — particularly against far-right misinformation and attacks . From Covid-19 vaccine conspiracy theories to proposals by the US and Argentina to withdraw from the WHO, we are witnessing growing attacks on public health institutions, experts, and trade unions. Universal access to quality healthcare is a fundamental right that only a strong, well-funded public sector can guarantee. To uphold this right and ensure that access to care remains equitable, healthcare systems must be shielded from austerity-driven policies, deregulation, and far-right ideologies. Adam Rogalewski is policy officer for health and social services in the European Federation of Public Service Unions , having worked for the British public-services union Unison , the Swiss general union Unia and the Polish federation of trade unions, OPZZ . Adam Rogalewski is policy officer for health and social services in the European Federation of Public Service Unions , having worked for the British public-services union Unison , the Swiss general union Unia and the Polish federation of trade unions, | OPZZ | While some steps have been taken to improve preparedness, the most important lesson has been overlooked: Europe’s resilience depends on strong, well-funded public health and care services with qualified staff. | [
"Health & Society"
] | health-and-society | 2025-03-10T14:13:56.888Z | https://euobserver.com/health-and-society/ar6ec5f917 |
US tech on the Ukraine battlefield is a problem for Europe | Like a gambler suddenly realizing the house always wins, Europe is waking up to the brutal reality of its dependence on American power. For decades, the continent relied on US security guarantees, never questioning the strings that might come attached. But now, with Trump’s erratic policies and the looming threat of US tech leverage, European leaders find themselves scrambling — both to protect Ukraine and to shield themselves from Washington’s shifting whims. Dutch populist Geert Wilders affirmed his support for Ukraine, calling Trump’s clash with Zelensky “fascinating TV, but not the best way to end the war.” French far-right leader Marine Le Pen condemned the US aid halt as “brutal” and “cruel,” while Britain’s Nigel Farage criticised VP JD Vance for dismissing UK peacekeepers in Ukraine, calling him “wrong, wrong, wrong.” Europe is now awakening to the reality that American support can no longer be taken for granted. Trump's relentless shake-up of domestic and foreign policy has left his opponents scrambling, while his disregard for traditional alliances has forced Europe to act with unprecedented urgency. Ironically, his actions have done more to galvanise European defence efforts than three years of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine as Europe works to generate €800bn of additional defence spending in the coming years. Beyond the erosion of the security umbrella, the US is also proving that its technological monopoly poses yet another threat to European security. Reuters previously reported that US negotiators pressured Kyiv to sign a critical minerals agreement, even suggesting restrictions on Starlink, the SpaceX-owned satellite system, after president Volodomyr Zelensky rejected an initial proposal from the US. Poland and Musk's Starlink The report sparked controversy, prompting Poland to clarify that it funds Ukraine’s Starlink access and will continue to do so. Since Russia’s invasion, Poland has provided 20,000 Starlink units and covered their maintenance costs, despite reports that the US floated cutting access while pushing for a minerals deal. Musk responded to the report on social media, commenting , “This is false" — echoed at the weekend by US secretary of state Marco Rubio, telling Polish foreign minister Radoslaw Sikoski to "say thank you" for Starlink , adding without it "Ukraine would have lost this war long ago and Russians would be on the border with Poland right now." While that may be true, it is also true that Musk didn’t ease concerns by clarifying that the US would never attempt to weaponise US tech against Europe. That possibility remains, especially as the Trump administration aligns more closely with Russian president Vladimir Putin and his position on Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine. On 5 March, Polish deputy prime minister Krzysztof Gawkowski warned that canceling Starlink access for Ukraine would trigger an international crisis with the US. Gawkowski stressed that cutting Poland’s Starlink contracts would severely strain relations, stating : "I cannot imagine a situation where a business agreement between Poland and a US company is suddenly interrupted." Musk’s role in controlling access to Starlink has already sparked controversy before. He previously admitted to refusing to activate Starlink over Crimea, claiming he wanted to avoid complicity in what he called a "major act of war" as Ukrainian sea drones attempted to strike Russian naval assets. Ukraine’s defence minister Rustem Umerov confirmed the country is exploring alternatives to Starlink for frontline communications, though details remain undisclosed. Starlink has acted as the backbone of Ukraine’s frontline communications. At the war’s outset, Russia launched cyberattacks on Viasat to cripple Ukrainian military networks, showing the importance of satellite communications for command and control. However, to reduce dependence, Ukraine has already been integrating alternative satellite systems like Kymeta for its sea drones. Andrii Kovalenko of Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council stated that the front line is now littered with fiberoptic cables, high-speed modems, and satellite services from Swedish and German providers, in the event of Starlink going offline. Serhiy, a drone unit leader from the 23rd Mechanized Brigade, told me that a shutdown would no longer have the same impact as before, due to improved internet retransmitters. Musk’s refusal to activate Starlink for Ukraine’s Black Sea drone operations should have been an early warning for Europe. The continent cannot afford to depend on a system controlled by one individual who has shown a willingness to cut service based on personal whims or political pressure. Adding to the dumpster fire, Musk took to social media to advocate for the US to withdraw from NATO. The gun isn’t only pointed at Ukraine. If Russia were to invade Europe — especially the Baltics — there is no guarantee that figures like Musk wouldn’t restrict Starlink access to aid Moscow. Trump, after all, has already threatened 25 percent tariffs on EU imports, claiming the bloc was designed "to screw" the US. Musk has previously limited access over occupied Crimea and could do so again, justifying it as a move to prevent nuclear escalation. Italy is now reconsidering a €1.5bn deal with Elon Musk’s Starlink for military and government use, citing shifting US commitments to European security, including Ukraine. UK-French Eutelsat Meanwhile, Franco-British satellite operator Eutelsat is emerging as a potential alternative for Europe and Ukraine. Eutelsat's shares have skyrocketed as a result of the rumors. However, it may take years before Eutelsat can match Starlink’s connectivity for both military and civilian use. Meanwhile, Trump attempted to tell Americans to worry less about Putin, and more about migrants so the country doesn't end up like Europe. Once Trump cut off intelligence and military aid to Ukraine , it became clear that his administration is willing to weaponize whatever is necessary to achieve its goals. This is not the America Europe once knew. The only viable path forward is for Europe to reinforce its own defenses while ensuring a strong Ukraine to deter future Russian threats. As the world order fractures, Europe must act faster than ever to secure its future. David Kirichenko is a freelance journalist and an associate research rellow at the Henry Jackson Society , a London-based think tank. David Kirichenko is a freelance journalist and an associate research rellow at the | Henry Jackson Society | Italy is now reconsidering a €1.5bn deal with Elon Musk’s Starlink for military and government use, citing shifting US commitments to European security — while Poland has provided 20,000 Starlink units and covered their maintenance costs. | [
"EU & the World",
"Ukraine",
"Opinion"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-03-10T13:37:04.476Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar587f0496 |
Electric vehicles and climatisation: measuring the impact on driving range | The average energy consumption of an electric vehicle has always been measured without heating the car, which can have a significant impact on driving range – in some cases even halving the range, according to new test methodology developed by Green NCAP. When Green NCAP was launched in 2019 as an assessment programme for vehicle emissions, its main focus was testing the quality of exhaust gasses. Over time, additional parameters were adopted to increase its scope on the sustainability of cars, including the testing of electric vehicles’ (EVs) energy consumption. Every EV, when it is homologated for the European roads, goes through the worldwide-harmonised Light vehicles Test Procedure (WLTP) and is tested for its energy consumption during a standardised driving cycle. The WLTP is developed as a global test cycle designed to represent common driving patterns from different regions across the world. However, as Dr Aleksandar Damyanov from Green NCAP points out, the average energy consumption of EVs can vary widely depending on different factors. “It has become increasingly clear that comparing vehicles’ average energy consumption can be very misleading,” Damyanov explains. “Under what conditions is the vehicle using this amount of energy? How is this vehicle being driven? In what temperatures and on what roads?” Inconsistent energy consumption results in uncertainty regarding an electric vehicle’s driving range, which is a major factor in consumers’ decision making when purchasing an EV. E-mobility Europe , the trade association representing the European electric vehicle ecosystem, speaks of "range anxiety": “Consumers, particularly those transitioning from internal combustion engine vehicles, often experience range anxiety, which makes them hesitant to switch.” The impact of heating When testing vehicles’ energy consumption, the WLTP driving cycle is performed without any form of climatisation. This is of course understandable, as it aims to be representative for many different regions across the world with widely varying climates. The problem is that heating in particular will have a major impact on an EV’s energy consumption — far bigger than what we are used to for combustion engine vehicles. “With EVs we have seen that the main contributor to a vehicle’s energy consumption differing from what has been officially declared, is the impact of climatisation,” Damyanov says. “It’s not wrong that the WLTP-type approval is performed without that climatisation,” he continues, “but it is the task of consumer protection organisations, and of the manufacturers themselves, to inform consumers that the real consumption figure will depend on their needs and their behaviour.” Much more than cooling, it is the heating of an EV in cold temperatures that will have the biggest impact on energy usage. While combustion vehicles can use waste heat from the engine to heat-up the car, EVs need the heat to be delivered by the battery. “What was once essentially ‘free heat’ from the engine, now comes at a significant cost,” Damyanov explains. “We have identified that there is indeed a lack of knowledge when it comes to heating electric vehicles. People are not always aware, and just want to switch from a conventional to an electric car. Suddenly, they can experience a big surprise when in winter, under severe conditions, their driving range can be halved. This is where Green NCAP comes in.” To address this lack of knowledge, Green NCAP has developed their own energy consumption tests. The aim is to hold manufacturers to account and check how the numbers are deviating from what has been declared, but more importantly, to give consumers the ability to compare a wide array of different EVs that have been tested under the same conditions. Ultimately, the goal is to allow European consumers to be more informed, avoiding potential range anxiety. In Damyanov’s words: “When you are informed, you can at least deal with that. You can plan your trip better. You can pre-condition your vehicle.” Cold ambient test Green NCAP first introduced the ‘cold ambient temperature test’ . It is designed to simulate a scenario where a car is parked outside during a harsh winter. The test is performed at -7 centigrade in the laboratory, with the vehicle left to ‘soak’ in these cold weather conditions for a long time before the driving cycle starts, with the heating turned on to 23 degrees Celsius. “You can imagine it’s a cold winter day, your vehicle was left on the street overnight at minus seven – you get to your car, everything is freezing cold, and you need to start your journey,” Damyanov says. The cold ambient test unveils a surprisingly stark difference between an average vehicle’s WLTP result and the energy it consumes during the harsh winter simulation. For the vehicles that were included in Green NCAP’s test so far, the average type approval consumption value was 16.7 kilowatt-hour (kWh) per 100 kilometres. While the cold ambient test averaged a staggering 31 kWh per 100 kilometres for these same EVs. “So this is an increase of 86 percent,” Damyanov points out, “there are vehicles where the driving range is halved, or even worse.” “We also found that the heating performance of electric vehicles can be highly deviating, certain models take a very long time before the required temperature is reached, if it is reached at all.” A new test for 2025 Of course, the cold ambient test depicts a very specific situation, and might not be as representative for everyone looking to find out how much energy their vehicle consumes in winter conditions. “Answering the question of total driving range is difficult, because the cold ambient test results are mostly impacted by the first part of a potentially much longer trip. This is where the vehicle needs to get warm and heat up the cabin. After that, the energy demand will drop as the initial thermal inertia has been taken care of,” Damyanov explains. With this in mind, Green NCAP is expanding its focus on EV cold weather performance in 2025 and will be introducing a new test in the next few months. The new test will be performed in the same cold weather conditions, except this time the vehicle will not be soaked in the minus seven temperatures beforehand. Damyanov describes the situation: “What if my vehicle was not left on the street? What if I had it in my garage? I need to make the same trip, on the same cold winter day, but the difference is that I don’t need to heat up all the components and the cabin when starting my journey.” “The combination of both tests allows us to make a much more consumer friendly estimation of the total driving range of an EV under cold conditions.” Although Green NCAP is very much in the middle of testing, and it is too early to come out with decisive figures, Damyanov is able to reveal that on average the cold ambient test uses approximately 25 percent more energy than the new ‘warm start’ cold ambient test. He illustrates these initial findings using the test results of an unspecified EV: “One of the vehicles we tested for example used 29 kWh per 100 kilometres in the cold start cold ambient test and 22.5 kWh in the warm start cold ambient test.” CLEPA , the European Association of Automotive Suppliers, welcomes Green NCAP’s efforts and emphasises their value: "Cold-weather testing is pivotal for electric vehicles, as it provides consumers with accurate insights into real-world performance. At the same time, it acts as a catalyst for manufacturers, offering crucial data that drives continuous improvements." Solutions for heating When asked whether car manufacturers are working on improving the cost of heating EVs, E-mobility Europe is very clear: “EV manufacturers are fully aware of the impact of climatisation on battery performance and are actively developing solutions to mitigate its effects.” Aside from the wide array of innovative heating technologies, like heat pumps and battery thermal management systems (BTMS), Damyanov highlights the importance of also taking different approaches: “Why should the entire cabin be heated if it’s just the driver occupying it? It’s much more energy efficient to deliver the heat directly to the occupant of the car through seat heating or steering wheel heating for example or through directing the warm airflow only to the people currently in the car.” “To go one step further, some manufacturers even think of integrating heater elements in the seat belt, because this is what touches you directly,” he continues. “We are not at the end of technological development — we see that some manufacturers can indeed improve on heating efficiency, by having better ideas and better engineers.” “As battery technology improves and infrastructure expands, concerns about range will diminish, but for now, maximising efficiency — including through better climatisation — is key to improving consumer confidence,” E-mobility Europe concludes. Looking ahead The objective is clear, Green NCAP will continue to increase its focus on cold weather performance of EVs. “In our protocols for 2025 we are including the new cold ambient test which starts warm, as well as a new insulation test,” Damyanov says. A well-insulated vehicle can of course preserve its heat much better, and will, as a result, be much more energy-efficient. “As combustion engines always delivered heat for free, this is something that has not had much attention in the past,” Damyanov explains. The importance of these projects is nicely summarised by E-mobility Europe: “As Green NCAP assessments highlight the real-world efficiency of different EV models, manufacturers will be incentivised to develop smarter and more efficient climatisation systems, leading to broader consumer acceptance and a faster transition to electric mobility.” Green NCAP has already started testing vehicles for their 2025 protocols and aims to make a first release of test results in the first half of the year. Green NCAP is a green vehicle-assessment programme, hosted and supported by the European New Car Assessment Program (Euro NCAP) in cooperation with European governments. This article was produced in collaboration with EUobserver. Green NCAP is a green vehicle-assessment programme, hosted and supported by the | European New Car Assessment Program | Heating an electric vehicle in cold weather has a significant impact on its energy consumption. To provide consumers with better and more complete information, Green NCAP has developed its own cold temperature tests to measure the impact of climatisation on driving range. | [] | stakeholders | 2025-03-07T10:45:21.006Z | https://euobserver.com/stakeholders/ar7504f730 |
Some depressing home truths on International Womens' Day | The alarming rise in violence against women is a major global emergency. World leaders should recognise and treat it as such. Sexually violent crimes against women , including rape and torture, are proliferating in conflict zones like Ukraine , Gaza , Congo , and Sudan . There is gender apartheid in Afghanistan , and institutional discrimination against women in Iran . Women refugees face rape and detention as they try and enter Fortress Europe. Violence, physical and verbal, against women also happens at home and when women navigate digital spaces. Tackling these and other egregious crimes should be an EU priority. They cannot be tackled by EU Commission roadmaps and strategies alone. EU leaders, including commission president Ursula von der Leyen, must task their representatives to take a strong and determined stand on this global crisis at next week’s UN Commission on the Status of Women . Inside the EU At home in Europe, there must be a more determined effort to enforce the Istanbul Convention , the first legally-binding international instrument on preventing and combating violence against women and girls. EU countries, including Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovakia and the Czech Republic, which are still holding back their ratification should be asked to hurry up and give the green light. The EU Commission itself must either reverse its recent and sudden decision to withdraw an important proposal for an anti-discrimination directive — originally tabled in 2008 but blocked by Germany, the Czech Republic and Italy — or table a new legally binding initiative as quickly as possible. It cannot continue to be business as usual. The fact that violence against women as well as the more general rollback in women’s rights are still not treated as a global emergency speaks volumes about just how little attention leaders — including women in power — are currently paying to issues of equality. Women’s rights were recognized as human rights in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action in 1995. There have been other attempts to fast track gender equality, including through the Sustainable Development Goals . Global movements like #MeToo and #TimesUp helped bring attention to women’s struggle to break free of patriarchal strangleholds. There has been some progress in some parts of the world, in some sectors over the last 30 years. Yet many of the gains are patchy and fragile. Most women reading this column will have their own personal story to tell about encountering 'glass ceilings' of discrimination, bias and prejudice — and also of 'sticky floors' which prevent so many of us from even attempting to climb up the ladder. Too often, however, although sexual violence is increasingly being used as a weapon of war, torture, intimidation and humiliation, it is overlooked and sidelined in global discussions As of October 2024, over 600 million women and girls were affected by war, a 50-percent increase from the prior decade. As a result, warns Antonio Guterres, the United Nations secretary general, “generational gains in women’s rights hang in the balance around the world.” The actual figures are probably higher. Countless women and girls suffer in silence. Many cases of sexual violence go unreported due to fear of retaliation, social stigma, and lack of access to reporting mechanisms. But it is not just in war that women are in danger. The 'hidden crisis' of domestic violence means that one-in-three women globally has experienced physical or sexual violence in her lifetime, often at the hands of an intimate partner. This number alone should be enough to galvanise global action Unprosecuted crimes in the home But once again reports of domestic abuse are often ignored and rape cases go unprosecuted as domestic abuse, sexual violence, and femicide are often still dismissed as private matters rather than systemic injustices requiring government intervention. Digital spaces are new arenas for violence against women. Cyber bullying, online harassment, and digital stalking are growing concerns that disproportionately affect women and girls. Such violence may be “hidden” from public view or online interactions but it erodes democracy and destabilizes societies by fostering fear, silencing voices, and reinforcing systemic inequalities. Societies that tolerate or fail to address gender-based violence ending up normalising oppression and undermining the rule of law. The economic costs of such violence are also staggering. Gender-based violence costs the €366bn annually, with the largest expenses stemming from physical and emotional impacts, criminal justice services and lost economic output. Let’s not kid ourselves: none of this is 'inevitable' or just bad luck. Under the guise of 'family values' — and encouraged by US president Donald Trump’s frontal onslaught on Diversity, Equity and Inclusion initiatives — Europe’s far-right leaders are attacking women’s rights in multiple ways. Italy’s government is promoting so-called 'traditional' family models, Hungary has enacted laws curbing LGBT+ rights, and Poland restricts access to abortions. The dangerous message being sent out is that violence against women is tolerable or even deserved. Going forward, the fight for equality must be collective, unwavering and universal. It cannot be selective and Eurocentric. It must welcome men and include all women, regardless of race, religion, class, ability, or identity and it must be deeply intersectional, thereby recognizing that oppression is multifaceted and justice must leave no one behind. On this International Women’s Day (Saturday, 8 March) we should promise to work harder to create a true “ Union of Equality” and demand that our leaders do so as well. Shada Islam is an EUobserver columnist, and independent EU analyst and commentator who runs her own strategy and advisory company New Horizons Project . She has recently won the European Woman in Media award and the Media Career Award 2023 for her outstanding work and powerful voice on EU affairs and focus on building an inclusive Union of Equality. Shada Islam is an EUobserver columnist, and independent EU analyst and commentator who runs her own strategy and advisory company New Horizons Project . She has recently won the European Woman in Media award and the | Media Career Award 2023 | Most women reading this column will have their own personal story to tell about encountering 'glass ceilings' of discrimination, bias and prejudice — and also of 'sticky floors' which prevent so many of us from even attempting to climb up the ladder. | [
"EU & the World",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-03-07T09:30:52.664Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar5da2ec4b |
Defence industry to EIB: We don’t need money, we need contracts | With the European Investment Bank (EIB), the EU's lending arm, moving closer to funding defence projects, weapon manufacturers argue that what they need is more contracts, not financing. Speaking at the three-day EIB Forum event, the EU Council president António Costa called on the institution to increase its role in defence lending. "It is essential to adapt the EIB’s lending practices to facilitate more loans for the defence sector, making security a new cross-cutting priority in the bank’s public policies," he said on Thursday (6 March). "I hope this can be taken forward as quickly as possible by the board of directors," he added. The bank’s president, Nadia Calviño, said in her speech inaugurating the event that the bank stood ready to “remain responsive and relevant” in “turbulent times” and outlined how the EIB had already supported Ukraine. “We have disbursed more than €2.2bn and agreed to mobilise €1bn in fresh financing” for a variety of projects, including “trolleybuses, trams, restoring hospitals and kindergartens.” These words may have been welcomed by some of the bank’s employees who are less in favour of the EIB’s new defence focus, but they were not necessarily the main course of the event. Instead, the EIB forum showcased how the bank intends to improve prosperity—both in Europe and beyond—while also meeting the EU’s defence needs. The key EIB proposal is that it will no longer impose limits on the amount it spends on defence projects. The current limit is €8bn, and by removing it, defence and security would become a fully-fledged investment goal. And in a letter addressed to the EU's 27 national leaders ahead of the defence summit on Thursday, Calviño positioned the measures as part of a wider push to increase defence spending. “They want defence to become a full priority for the EIB,” said Frank Vanaerschot, director of Counterbalance, an NGO specialised in public banking practices, speaking to EUobserver. “The EIB won’t finance weapons directly, but they will fund projects that are entirely military—for example, military barracks or anti-jamming technology,” he said. “The key message that emerged was that public support is needed to create demand [for military kit]," he also said. "There’s a very aggressive war logic behind all of this." We don’t need your money However, Stefano Pontecorvo, the chairman of Leonardo, one of Europe’s largest weapons manufacturers, argued in a panel hosted by the EIB that “financing wasn’t the issue.” “The EIB recently announced a one-billion-euro funding programme. That’s nice. But we don’t need your money,” he told the audience. What he needed, he said, was demand. And demand, he made clear, came from government, not banks. “Get us the contracts, and reinvigorate the supply chain,” he added, referring to China’s dominant hold over many of the critical materials needed to produce military equipment. “The EIB has everything it needs to fund companies, but funding isn’t the cause of Europe’s [defence woes],” said Frank Thiser, chief financial officer of Quantum Systems, a European drone manufacturer. The problem facing European suppliers, he indicated, is scale and a lack of government demand. While orders for the Eurofighter, the EU’s main fighter jet, number in the hundreds, the F-16 has sold thousands, creating economies of scale that allow for more standardised and cheaper production. “Lack of quantity is at the root of everything,” he said. “I mean, we are lucky – nobody wanted the Ukraine war — but it created a lot of demand [for our drones].” But in general “all those programmes to provide debt or equity funding—they work automatically if there is government demand,” he added, suggesting that the role of the EIB in creating this demand is likely limited. The EIB's defence and investment plans will be discussed at the next board of directors meeting at 21 March. | Wester is a journalist from the Netherlands with a focus on the green economy. He joined EUobserver in September 2021. Previously he was editor-in-chief of Vice, Motherboard, a science-based website, and climate economy journalist for The Correspondent. | The EIB showcased its plans to increase defence financing, but industry leaders at the bank's annual event said: 'That is nice, but we don't need it' | [
"Green Economy"
] | green-economy | 2025-03-06T18:47:16.163Z | https://euobserver.com/green-economy/ara84eddcc |
Why we're blacklisting Morocco's Danish lobbyists | Working for an occupying power, whether directly or indirectly, is not just morally wrong; it contributes to a less stable world. It is also something that should come with political consequences. This is also the case when it takes the form of helping an occupying power’s businesses trying to gain favourable market access for the resources they extract and exploit from occupied lands. As Nordic MEPs, we are well acquainted with the Danish Public Affairs company Rud Pedersen (RP). Perhaps naively, we had hoped this would been having certain standards, and avoiding a scenario as above. It seems we were mistaken. We were honestly both surprised and disgusted, when NGOs alerted us to the fact that Morocco had hired RP to help it with its lobbying efforts over the controversial trade and fisheries agreements with the EU. It is a case that has been covered by the outlet Africa Intelligence , who back in December laid out how the Confédération Générale de Enterprises du Maroc CGEM) has engaged RP to lobby for it in Brussels, as well as the many connections between the CGEM and the Moroccan government. Connections that include how RP, via its London office, hired the daughter of Morocco’s foreign minister to work for it. That the contracting happens through an organisation like CGEM does not absolve the lobbyist of the responsibility of what the ultimate goal is. Especially not when RP itself declares that they are hired to lobby on “trade & agriculture ”. Moroccan occupation, repression and exploitation Issues that will undoubtedly touch upon — or maybe rather try to circumvent — the fact that Morocco constantly tries to have various agreements with the EU include resources from illegally-occupied Western Sahara. This even though neither the EU nor the UN recognises this as legal. This must also be seen in connection with the historical decision from the European Court of Justice on 4 October 2024, upholding the 2021 decision overturning both the controversial fisheries agreement and the 2019 EU-Morocco trade agreements . This came because Morocco insists on selling the rights of the fish of Western Sahara to European business interests, without proper benefit or consideration for the Saharawi population. It should not have to be repeated, but goods from illegally occupied lands cannot, and should not, benefit from a trade agreement with the EU. It is hard to see the work of RP not ending up either trying to circumvent the EU case — or to make yet another agreement, which in the end will also be contradictory to EU law. What is important is to remember that Morocco’s long occupation, repression and exploitation of Western Sahara is flat out illegal , something which is also underlined by then UN still listing it as a non-self governing territory . This is the kind of behaviour and exploitation we, as Left politicians, will always be opposed to. Which is why our message to Rud Pedersen must be so clear: what you are doing, indirectly representing an occupying power via its business interests, is immoral and run counter to the Nordic reputation and standards — and we neither can nor will support it. Therefore, we inform you, that as long as you continue to choose to lobby for the interests of an occupying power like Morocco, whether directly or indirectly, we will refuse to meet with you. Not only on issues relating to Morocco or Western Sahara, but on everything. We will also actively begin encouraging our colleagues, from across the European Parliament, to adopt a similar approach. Occupation and its apologists should not be welcome. While we know that a business is, of course, free to choose its customers, we as politicians are also free to choose what consequences such choices will have, and with whom we will meet. This is a right we will definitely exercise when it comes to your lobbying for a thoroughly unjust cause. We urge you to sever your links, directly as well as indirectly, with the illegal and immoral occupation of Western Sahara and its people. Until you do so, you will remain on our blacklist of those we do not meet. Per Clausen (Denmark), Hanna Gedin (Sweden), Jonas Sjöstedt (Sweden) and Jussi Saramo (Finland) are Left MEPs. Per Clausen (Denmark), Hanna Gedin (Sweden), Jonas Sjöstedt (Sweden) and | Jussi Saramo | As Nordic MEPs, we are well acquainted with the Danish Public Affairs company Rud Pedersen.
Perhaps naively, we had hoped this would been having certain standards. It seems we were mistaken. | [
"EU & the World",
"Nordics",
"Africa",
"Opinion"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-03-06T09:00:00.000Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/arc85d4236 |
Malta's little-known law letting global gambling giants off the hook | The world’s biggest gambling companies are using a little-known Maltese law, that nullifies court verdicts elsewhere in the European Union, to protect themselves from potentially having to pay out millions in legal claims. Under a law known as Bill 55, Maltese courts can “refuse recognition and, or enforcement” of any foreign judgment involving companies registered on the island — namely, the scores of betting companies based there thanks to an already favourable corporate climate. The law effectively shields owners of brands such as Pokerstars , Betsson and Unibet from judgements handed down abroad, of which there are an increasing number. Lawyers told Investigate Europe that Bill 55, described by one as a “sledgehammer”, violates EU law and is preventing thousands of successful claims issued in European courts from being paid out. Crossborder gambling claims are on the rise in the EU, and Malta-based companies are the target of many complaints. “The amount of gambling losses being reclaimed all over Europe probably will, sooner or later, total €1bn,” said German lawyer Benedikt Quarch, whose firm is working on thousands of cases. Given the stakes, pressure is now mounting on the European Commission to challenge the Maltese regulation, in place since 2023. Austria’s highest court, meanwhile, has urged the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to intervene and rule whether the Maltese regulation breaches EU law. Authorities there and in Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands are dealing with a deluge of consumer complaints about illegal gambling, mainly around websites operated by Malta-based firms that national courts have assessed are unlicensed in their countries. There are an estimated 50,000 ongoing claims in Germany and Austria alone, lawyers told Investigate Europe. Law firm G&L Legal in Vienna is itself dealing with over 15,000 cases, many concerning industry heavyweights in Malta. Karim Weber is spearheading the firm’s work in the area. Austria’s Supreme Court has to date found in favour of his clients in hundreds of cases involving Malta-based companies. But Malta’s courts are yet to recognise any of the more than 200 cases the lawyer has asked them to enforce, leaving his clients — and the law firm — out of pocket. Weber has claims totalling €18 million in cases involving only Flutter , the world’s largest online betting company, he said. Austria’s top court ruled in August 2021 that Weber’s client should be paid back all losses they had accrued on the Pokerstars site as its owner, TSG Interactive Gaming Europe, a Flutter subsidiary in Malta, did not have a national licence to operate in the country. All transactions between players and the company were invalid, the court found, as Austrian law deemed Pokerstars was operating illegally. “If the contract is illegal, it is null and void,” Weber said. “It is the same as if you were to sell me two kilos of cocaine today. The contract would be null and void under civil law.” Flutter has disputed such verdicts and denies any wrongdoing. Yet when the civil court in Malta was asked to enforce the ruling, judge Toni Abela, who spent much of his career in politics and was a former deputy leader of Malta’s Labour Party, denied the request in July 2023. The decision came weeks after Bill 55 was ushered through its parliament. The law was described by the government as part of a longstanding policy of “encouraging the establishment of gaming operators”. “It was like a sledgehammer,” Weber recalled. “It was pushed through the Maltese parliament in three weeks with the consent of the opposition.” Weber and Quarch have lobbied the European Commission to intervene. But despite writing a complaint back in 2023, the commission has so far only responded saying it is “assessing” the information. The same answer was given to the German MEP Sabine Verheyen , a rare critic of the sector in Brussels, in April 2024. “I reproach the commission for not acting adequately. I think it is important for the commission to really do justice to its role as guardian of the treaties.” Investigate Europe got a similarly vague response for this article. Inertia in Brussels The apparent inaction reflects a general inertia around gambling in Brussels. There are no European laws governing the sector, in 2017 the commission decided to close a dedicated ‘Gambling Unit’ it had set-up, while a 2021 letter sent by 13 European regulators calling for common policies was quietly dismissed. Austria’s Supreme Court, however, is hoping the ECJ will take action on Bill 55. In October 2024, Austrian judges sent a formal request to the top EU court, claiming that Malta’s failure to recognise its judgements breached EU law. Miguel Poiares Maduro, a former advocate-general at the ECJ, agrees, saying the commission should take legal action against Malta for failing to uphold EU law, with a so-called infringement procedure. “EU law establishes the principle of mutual recognition between member states on judicial decisions,” he said. “It’s not up to the Maltese to define when their courts may not implement a decision from another member state.” Under European law, any citizen can sue a company that was selling illegal services in one country in the courts where the ”harmful event occurred”. Online gambling, provided by companies that don’t have a license, is such an “harmful event”. He finds it hard to explain to clients that despite winning their cases they are unlikely to get their money back. “There are definitely thousands of people affected by Bill 55 because it's a majority of the companies domiciled in Malta which do not pay.” He says there are around 20,000 active claims related to illegal gambling in Germany, while numbers are growing in the Netherlands and Sweden. Across the EU, an estimated 70 percent of web-based betting was illegal by mid-2024, with 6,000 unlicensed providers targeting the region, according to Yield Sec, a marketplace analysis firm. H2 Gambling Capital, another consultancy, reckons the illegal share is more around 20 percent. Methodologies differ, but the scale is alarming. The possible financial implications of Bill 55 are not lost on Malta’s gambling industry, which accounts for around 12 percent of the country’s economic output. “If a material proportion of player claims were successfully enforced either in Malta or any other jurisdiction, it could have a material adverse effect on our business,” wrote Flutter, whose brands also include Sky Betting and Paddy Power, in its latest annual report . Betsson has described its “ vulnerability to customers claims ” while Kindred, which operates Unibet, said Bill 55 is “particularly important considering the increasing number of customer litigations in and subsequent enforcement efforts by Germany, Austria and the Netherlands". The Maltese government and gambling regulator refused to be interviewed for this story. Operators argue that as they are already registered in one member state – Malta – they have the right to operate in all EU states. In response to Investigate Europe, Flutter said Pokestars operates legally from Malta and with the “freedom of services across member states under EU law.” “The court decisions being made under Austrian law are incompatible with these settled EU legal principles, which has been confirmed by the Maltese court in its judgment of 27 February 2025. As such, Pokerstars will continue to vigorously defend these cases in Austria and when brought before Maltese courts,” a spokesperson added. 'The industry does not want to be regulated by Europe, because Europe would be a lot stricter than national governments' - ex-CEO of Paddy Power Some national laws say the opposite: a company must be licensed domestically, and pay taxes, to be able to operate. This partly explains the opposing interpretations of Bill 55. It is amplified by the lack of EU-wide regulations. Stuart Kenny, the founder and former CEO of Paddy Power, regrets not having pushed for more stringent control during his former job. But the industry is quite happy with the status quo, he says. “The industry does not want to be regulated by Europe, because Europe would be a lot stricter than national governments. National governments are as addicted to the tax revenue as the addicts are addicted to online slot machines,” said Kenny from his home in Dublin. “It is utterly preposterous that the EU has got involved in so many other health issues and rightly so but gambling has an opt-out.” The absence of cross-border laws has created a patchwork of national policies across the bloc. Finland has a state monopoly, and bans foreign providers from targeting its citizens. In Greece, the liberalisation of the market resulted in a private monopoly. Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Germany try to authorise and tax licensed companies — and ban those who are not. But it’s not always easy. Between 2021 and 2024, Spanish authorities fined 77 companies for illegal gambling activities – 75 were based abroad. Most in Curaçao, another tax-friendly jurisdiction favoured by the industry. The fines issued to the foreign-based firms totalled €350 million, but none have yet been paid, the government’s transparency portal indicates. Within the EU, states like Malta, along with Cyprus and Estonia, meanwhile, actively try to attract companies through favourable legislation and low taxes. “When we look at casino operators working offshore jurisdictions, place number one is Malta,” Quarch said. “So the illegal online gambling market from my point of view is a very interesting and unfortunate example of how law enforcement in Europe does not function.” Paulo Pena , Harald Schumann , Maxence Peigné are journalists at Investigate Europe . Paulo Pena , Harald Schumann , Maxence Peigné are journalists at | Investigate Europe | Under a law known as Bill 55, Maltese courts can “refuse recognition and, or enforcement” of any foreign judgment involving companies registered on the island — namely, the scores of betting companies based there thanks to an already favourable corporate climate. | [
"Health & Society"
] | health-and-society | 2025-03-06T06:00:00.000Z | https://euobserver.com/health-and-society/arcc32ff89 |
Budapest Pride under threat, as Orbán tests what he can get away with | It was only a matter of time. For years, Viktor Orbán has systematically dismantled Hungary’s democratic institutions, turning the country into an autocratic enclave within the European Union. He has attacked independent media, hollowed out the judiciary, and driven a relentless campaign against LGBTQ+ rights. Now, he has set his sights on Budapest Pride — threatening to ban the Pride march outright. This is not just about one event. It is a calculated political move. Orbán, explicitly relishing a friendlier international climate with the return of Donald Trump, is testing the limits of what he can get away with . He is betting that European institutions, distracted by bigger geopolitical crises, will let this slide. If they do, the consequences will be far-reaching. A Pride ban is not just an attack on Hungary’s LGBTQ+ community — it is a litmus test for European democracy. If an EU member state can strip away fundamental rights with impunity, what does that say about the Union’s credibility? If the right to peaceful assembly is negotiable in Budapest today, where will it be threatened tomorrow? This moment demands more than carefully worded statements of concern. We call on politicians, MEPs, MPs, government leaders, and ministers across Europe to take a stand. Announce that you are coming to Budapest Pride. Book your tickets. Pledge to be there in greater numbers than ever before. If Orbán wants to shut down Pride, then let him try to ban thousands of European leaders, activists, and citizens from marching in the heart of Budapest. For his government, this crackdown is nothing more than a cynical distraction — a tired political playbook that scapegoats LGBTQ+ people to shore up his power. But for countless Hungarians, this is not a game. This is their lives. Lives made miserable, dignity stripped away, futures put on hold. They deserve your support. The Budapest Pride organisers have made their message clear: "We will not let them ban Hungary’s largest recurring human rights demonstration. This year marks the 30th Budapest Pride March, and it has never been more important. Join us on June 28 — let’s march together!" The question now is not whether Orbán will continue down this path. He will. The question is whether Europe will let him. The European Commission and the European Council must act. Article 2 of the EU Treaties is not a suggestion — it is the foundation of the Union. If the EU allows one of its own governments to openly trample fundamental rights, it sends a message to autocrats everywhere: You can dismantle democracy, and Brussels will look the other way. They are breaking the law. Not us. Not you. European citizens, write to your representatives. Ask them a simple question: Will you march with us in Budapest? European institutions, this is your moment to prove that the rights enshrined in EU law still mean something. Members of the Hungarian LGBTQ+ community are European citizens, too. They deserve Europe’s support. Now is the time to show it. Now is the time to show it. See you on the streets of Budapest. #SeeYouAtBudapestPride Katalin Cseh is an MP in the National Assembly of Hungary, and a former MEP with the Renew Europe group. Katalin Cseh is an MP in the National Assembly of Hungary, and a former MEP with the | Renew Europe | Viktor Orbán, explicitly relishing a friendlier international climate with the return of Donald Trump, is testing the limits of what he can get away with, warns Hungarian MP Katalin Cseh. | [
"EU Political",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] | eu-political | 2025-03-05T11:50:51.623Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar0af7d058 |
How a 'Rearmament Bank' for Ukraine would work | Europeans are in shock about the Trump presidency . ‘Is this administration sad, mad, or outright bad?’ they ask themselves amid the ruins of the Atlantic alliance and what some fear even is the impending end of Nato. For optimists, a talentless collection of lackeys and grifters, led by a rough-tongued huckster, will mean more chaos than anything else. Some parts of the US government will simply stop functioning. Other bits will run on autopilot. It is sad, but allies will have to manage as best they can. A more pessimistic take is that eccentricity will triumph. Conspiracy theorists and nutcases really are in charge. As they hunt for the truth about the JFK assassination, the moon landings, and vaccines, madness will reign in Washington. Truth and reason give way to hysteria and myth. It is not just goodbye to transatlanticism, but to the values of the Enlightenment. Even more worrying is the idea that there may be method in the madness. The administration wants to befriend Russia at all costs — and is ready to throw not just Ukrainians, but all Europeans to the wolves in order to do it. The answer may be a mixture of the above, or none. Europeans sometimes forget how tortured and burdensome transatlantic relations have been in the past. Treat what we see as episodes of reality TV and they become more dispiriting than alarming. In any case, instead of fretting about events they cannot control, we should instead be making decisions on things that lie within our power. That is why I along with Belgian, French, Polish and other allies have spent the past few weeks promoting the idea of a Rearmament Bank. This would do for defence what the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) did for the countries emerging from communist captivity after 1991. €10bn seed money It would be publicly-owned, but would borrow money (long-term and cheaply thanks to its excellent credit rating) and lend it out to boost arms production. With a modest amount of paid-in capital — say €10bn — the bank could raise many times that. It would start with a small group of European Nato allies that are most acutely aware of the defence emergency. Later, others could join too, adding more capital and thus more lending firepower. This would not be an EU project, bogged down in Brussels decision-making (and vetos from countries like Hungary). It would be a coalition of the willing, including non-EU Britain, where finance minister Rachel Reeves has already told her civil servants to investigate and develop our proposal. The main backer is Poland, where the government is actively working on a plan to present to the European Council meeting on 6 March . We have also had positive reactions from Nato, the European Commission and from decision-makers in France, Germany and other countries. This project can go ahead quickly. My colleagues, who include veteran bankers and lawyers who helped found the EBRD, have drafted the most important documents. The model is tried and tested. We do not need to invent some elaborate new institution, just to copy a successful old one. Our idea also complements existing efforts. The European Investment Bank, for example, is ideally suited to finance infrastructure, such as the roads, railways, ports and storage facilities needed for military logistics. The European Defence Fund can support innovation. With more flexibility in the Growth and Stability Pact rules, governments can borrow more for defence too. But only our proposed bank taps Europe’s vast private savings pool. We also aim to fix Europe’s parochial procurement system. The Rearmament Bank will insist on high standards of interoperability, and prize speed and agility over elaborate, slow, gold-plated projects. We will stick to sound banking principles: loans must be profitable, not boondoggles. The bank will be profitable, but not profit-maximising. And it will be temporary: once the defence emergency is over, it will stop lending and run down its loan book. A speedy decision on setting up the bank will send powerful signals. It will create momentum in Europe: the bus is moving, so jump on board. It will show that the Brexit wounds are healing. It will show Vladimir Putin that Europe is serious, boosting our deterrence. It may even make an impact in Donald Trump’s White House. Who knows, effective decision-making in Europe might even become a habit. Edward Lucas is a British writer and consultant specialising in European and transatlantic security. | Edward Lucas | Instead of fretting about events in Washington Europeans cannot control, we should instead be making decisions on things that lie within our power. That is why I along with Belgian, French, Polish and other allies have spent the past few weeks promoting the idea of a Rearmament Bank. Here's how it would work. | [
"EU & the World",
"Ukraine",
"Opinion"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-03-04T09:39:17.248Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar9fe95067 |
EU seeks €800bn defence hike after Trump stops Ukraine aid | The European Commission has proposed an €800bn hike in defence spending — the morning after the US stopped military aid to Ukraine. Most of the money (€650bn) is to come from national treasuries, unlocked by letting countries off the hook on EU debt and deficit rules if they boosted defence budgets by a further 1.5 percent of GDP on average over the next four years. In EU jargon, that meant "activating the escape clause in the stability and growth pact", said commission president Ursula von der Leyen in Brussels on Tuesday (4 March). A further €150bn would come from joint EU loans for states to buy "pan-European" materiel, she added, listing items such as "air and missile defence, artillery, drone and anti-drone systems, cyber, and electronic warfare". "We are in an era of rearmament and Europe is ready to act," she said. The €650bn "fiscal space" would cover "long-term" needs for Europe's own security, while the loans meant "member states can massively step up supplies to Ukraine", in a more "urgent" time frame, she added. Other elements of von der Leyen's plan included letting EU countries spend "cohesion funding" on defence, referring to a part of the EU budget which had been historically reserved for helping poorer regions to catch up to the European average. The cohesion budget is worth some €10bn a year and covers Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The European Investment Bank would also become more involved in boosting Europe's private defence industry, von der Leyen said. The commission chief made her brief statement in her Berlaymont HQ in Brussels without taking press questions, despite a radical US announcement on Monday evening that it was halting all military aid to Ukraine, including arms and ammunition that were already in transit to Kyiv via Poland and Romania. US president Donald Trump did it on grounds Ukrainian president Volodomyr Zelensky did not want to sign his ceasefire plan with Russia, which included no security guarantees, demanded US access to Ukraine's mineral wealth, and ceded Ukrainian territory to Russia. Trump's move met with dismay in France, Poland, and Ukraine. France's junior minister for Europe, Benjamin Haddad, told French radio early on Tuesday: "Fundamentally, if you want peace, does a decision to suspend arms to Ukraine reinforce peace or does it make it more distant? It makes it more distant, because it only strengthens the hand of the aggressor on the ground, which is Russia". Polish deputy defence minister Cezary Tomczyk said Trump's decision was "bad news". "It looks like he is pushing us towards capitulation, meaning [accepting] Russia's demands. To stop aid now means to help Putin," also said Oleksandr Merezhko, the head of the foreign affairs committee in Ukraine's parliament. "This is worse than Munich, because at least there they didn’t try to paint Czechoslovakia as the aggressor, but here they try to accuse the victim of aggression — it is extremely dangerous," he added, referring to a British and French deal to let Hitler annex Czechoslovakia in 1938, paving the way to the outbreak of the Second World War one year later. Hungary The pro-Russian government in Hungary stood out in Europe in welcoming Trump's move, however. "The US president and the Hungarian government share the same stance: instead of continuing weapons shipments and the war, a ceasefire and peace talks are needed as soon as possible," a government spokesman said, according to the Reuters news agency. EU leaders will meet in Brussels on Thursday to discuss how to cope with Trump's pro-Russia swerve over the past week, which included the now infamous verbal bullying of Zelensky in the White House last Friday. Proposals under discussion include a French idea to try to agree a one-month "truce" with Russia on air attacks, but not ground warfare, designed to lead to a more lasting "ceasefire", backed by an "assurance force" put together by a coalition of EU and non-EU states, including the UK. They also include confiscation of €210bn of frozen Russian central bank assets in Europe if Russian president Vladimir Putin broke the peace deal in future. But EU leaders will struggle to adopt a common decision on the Ukraine war on Thursday after both Hungary and the pro-Russian administration in Slovakia said they would block any moves that undermined US policy on Kyiv. Hungary is also threatening to veto the rollover of an EU blacklist of some 1,800 Russian individuals when it comes up for renewal on 15 March. "We want the closest possible transatlantic relations", von der Leyen said on Tuesday in a letter to EU leaders ahead of Thursday's meeting. But Europe "needs to be in charge of its own deterrence and defence," she added. "Europe faces a clear and present danger [Russian invasion] on a scale that none of us have seen in our adult lifetime," she said. | Andrew Rettman is EUobserver's foreign editor, writing about foreign and security issues since 2005. He is Polish, but grew up in the UK, and lives in Brussels. He has also written for The Guardian, The Times of London, and Intelligence Online. | The European Commission has proposed an €800bn hike in defence spending — the morning after the US abruptly stopped military aid to Ukraine. | [
"EU & the World",
"Ukraine"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-03-04T09:37:13.992Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar8077820c |
New survey shows Europeans support socially-just public procurement | According to a new survey commissioned by the European Services Union UNI Europa , the majority of Europeans think that public authorities should promote good working conditions and collective bargaining in public procurement contracts. Current EU public procurement rules have resulted in a situation in which most public contracts are given based on price alone, which critics have argued means that public funds are fuelling labour violations and low wages. In response to the results of the survey, Oliver Roethig, regional secretary of UNI Europa said “These findings are an urgent call to action. The EU Commission should listen to European voters: public money should support quality jobs, not companies that undermine fair competition and bust unions.” Public procurement — which is when public authorities purchase goods, services, or work — currently represents around 15 percent of the EU’s GDP. The survey , which consisted of a sample of over 6,000 respondents across six EU countries, asked whether public procurement contracts should prioritise: the lowest price, hiring local companies, or a mix of factors including working conditions, price, quality, and environmental considerations. The majority (65 percent) of respondents said that public authorities should prioritise social and environmental factors over the lowest price. Only around 11 percent supported choosing the cheapest company in public contracts. The social and environmental factors that respondents said were most important included working conditions and wages (46 percent), followed by hiring local workers (40 percent), and support for workers’ rights to join unions and participate in collective bargaining (34 percent). The survey also found that over 80 percent of respondents believe that companies should be excluded from public contracts if they engage in unfair labour practices, such as underpaying employees or blocking unionisation. EU public procurement rules fuelling a 'race to the bottom' Last year, over 1,000 workers demonstrated in Brussels to demand that the European Union change public procurement rules that they said are “fuelling a race to the bottom” in terms of working conditions. The demonstration, consisting of cleaners, security guards, and food service workers, called for reforms to the EU’s public procurement directive, which sets rules on the contracts given by public authorities in the EU. An open letter in support of the demonstration was signed by over 100 economists and said that “The EU Public Procurement Directive’s emphasis on price as the primary award criterion marginalises other critical factors, such as labour rights and fair working conditions, which are essential for sustainable economic growth and good jobs.” A report by the European Court of Auditors published in 2023 found that under current rules, the majority of public contracts are given based on price alone . In several countries, public authorities are giving more than 80 percent of their contracts based solely on the lowest price. In practice, this means that the majority of the €2 trillion of public contracts is rewarding companies for undercutting competitors based on price and worsening conditions for workers. UNI Europa has documented how this has resulted in public funding fuelling labor violations, low wages, and poor services . Via email, a security guard at the commission who requested anonymity said that their conditions were poor and consisted of shifts “up to 12 hours of service, night and weekend shifts.” The security guard also said that “for the moment, contracts are decided largely on price. The company that asks for the least wins the contract, which leads to unhealthy competition.” In another case, the European Parliament’s childcare crèche has been at the centre of a scandal . The contract for childcare services was awarded to People&Baby, a company that has been accused of poor working conditions, high levels of staff turnover, and even alleged child abuse . A representative of the European Public Services Union (EPSU) said that People&Baby employees have described being paid late, being forced to work on holidays, and severe staff shortages that jeopardise the care they can give to the children at their facilities. The company has been described as risking violations and dangerous conditions for children as a result of a “constant preoccupation with saving money.” Another example displays the limits of the EU’s current rules. The government of Malta was sued because it attempted to award a contract to a company with a collective bargaining agreement it had signed with its workers. The lawsuit came from another company with no such agreement, who argued that the government cannot consider collective bargaining as a factor when awarding contracts. Revising EU rules for public procurement In Ursula von der Leyen’s p olitical guidelines for 2024-2029, there is a call to revise the EU’s Public Procurement Directive in the new Commission’s mandate. The guideline states that “a one-percent efficiency gain in public procurement could save €20bn a year”, and emphasises the importance of public procurement in developing innovative goods and securing the supply of vital technologies. Absent in the document is any mention of strengthening social conditionalities or addressing the fact that the overwhelming majority of contracts are given based on cost alone, irrespective of labour conditions. Von der Leyen’s pledge to reform the EU’s public procurement rules appears to call for more cuts to public spending and, rather than addressing the fact that public funds are contributing to labour violations. The document reflects a broader shift away from social and environmental priorities and towards “ competitiveness ” and deregulation that has been observed with the new commission’s mandate. Not all is bad news though. The newly-presented Clean Industrial Deal aims to support workers through "the use of social conditionalities in public funding" to make sure "workers benefit from the support provided to industry, including to promote collective bargaining." This development aligns with the preferences of the respondents in the survey conducted by UNI Europa. UNI Europa argues that the reforms should prioritise collective bargaining, ensure that wages and working conditions are decent for public contracts, and that companies that refuse to negotiate collective agreements should be excluded from these contracts. The security guard working at the European Commission agreed: “Public contracts should set an example, and this is even more true for the commission. As a client, the European commission also has obligations towards the welfare of security guards.” UNI Europa is the voice for the seven million service workers that constitute the backbone of economic and social life in Europe. It is the regional body of UNI Global Union . Headquartered in Brussels, UNI Europa represents 272 national trade unions in 50 countries in over a dozen economic sectors. UNI Europa is the voice for the seven million service workers that constitute the backbone of economic and social life in Europe. It is the regional body of | UNI Global Union | According to a new survey, EU residents want public contracts to prioritise good working conditions and wages over cost alone. | [
"Health & Society"
] | health-and-society | 2025-03-04T06:10:00.000Z | https://euobserver.com/health-and-society/ard48bbde0 |
Trump is a challenge to the EPP — wake up, or move further right? | In just a few weeks, Donald Trump has initiated a supernova of diplomatic destruction, rupturing ties with Europe and shredding the multilateral world order that has been in place since 1945. From withdrawing from the Paris Agreement and the World Health Organisation, to undermining Nato and burning bridges with Europe at the Munich Security Conference, to Friday (28 February) meltdown in the Oval Office with Volodmyr Zelensky, the Trump presidency is reshaping US foreign policy into the image of a lone wolf nation — unshackled, unburdened by cooperation, alone. . This is an existential threat to Europe's freedom and democracy — starting with Ukraine. Trump is pushing a dirty deal with Vladimir Putin to shape the future of Ukraine and Europe, reflecting a nostalgia for the era of the Yalta Conference , where a handful of world leaders carved up the world into 'spheres of influence.' This artificially divided Europe into 'West' and 'East' for 45 years, separated by an Iron Curtain. Trump’s lone-wolf doctrine directly contradicts the fundamental principles on which the European Union was established. The EU is based on the idea that nations and people thrive when they collaborate, promoting a 'together' worldview. European integration emerged from the ashes of war, and it has proven effective. Since 1945, multilateralism has reduced conflict, in stark contrast to the imperialist centuries before. The choice between these two concepts is not just a question of ideology; it is about whether we repeat the mistakes of history, or build a better future. The only way for Europe to survive this attack is to be united and reinforce our European project based on democratic values and solidarity. Now that Trump is ripping up all the rules, there are no multiple choices anymore Trump's assault on the multilateral world order is two-pronged: he attacks multilateral global organisations and tries to destroy the European Union from within. He is using his allies in Europe — Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), and other far-right parties—to reinforce his strategy and weaken the European Union from within. . Where now for EPP? While the Greens, Social Democrats, and most Liberal Democrats still firmly agree on the concept of European cooperation, the position of the Christian Democratic and centrist parties united in the European People's Party (EPP), however, is less clear, and worrying. The firewall between mainstream conservatives and the far right — once firm — is eroding. We have seen a slow but steady drift of the voting pattern of centrist and Christian Democratic parties, united in the European People's Party, towards the far-right European Conservatives and Reformists of Meloni and the Patriots group of Orbán. Since 2022, the Forza Italia, a member of the EPP, has governed with Giorgia Meloni's far-right Fratelli d'Italia [Brothers of Italy]. Meanwhile, in Germany, CDU leader Friedrich Merz attempted to pass asylum legislation with support from the far-right AfD. This move prompted a rare public rebuke from his party colleague Angela Merkel, a steadfast defender of the 'together' vision. But Merz continues. Merz copies Trump's 'woke' wars On the first day after the German elections, he launched an attack on non-governmental organisations and civil society — echoing the aggressive campaign against progressive NGOs started by the European People’s Party (EPP) in the European parliament. The choice is clear, but time is running out. The Christian Democrats' strategy of 'rapprochement' with the far-right is not just a political shift; it is a direct threat to the European project itself. By normalising the extreme right's discourse and undermining European solidarity, the rule of law, and climate action, this strategy risks legitimising the far right. The European People’s Party has long been a pillar of European stability and integration. Inspired by the ideals of Schuman and Adenauer, it has historically championed the 'together' vision. Now that Trump is ripping up all the rules, there are no multiple choices anymore. Now is the time for Christian Democrats, Conservatives, and centrists in the European People's Party to make a decisive break from the anti-Europeans and the anti-democrats. Europe needs leaders who will stand up for its founding values. Europe needs democratic majorities, not alliances with Putin and Trump enablers. History has shown us where a world of competing lone-wolf nations leads: to expansionism and war. Trump's threats towards Canada, Panama, Greenland, and Ukraine raise the alarm. The European People's Party must remember history's lessons and choose between the black hole of the far-right, or the European path of solidarity and democracy. The choice is clear. But time is running out. Vula Tsetsi and Ciarán Cuffe are co-chairs of the European Green Party . Vula Tsetsi and Ciarán Cuffe are co-chairs of the | European Green Party | US president Donald Trump alignment with Russian dictator Vladimir Putin is a watershed moment for all European democrats to resist — especially the conservatives of the European People's Party — write the co-chairs of the European Green Party. | [
"EU & the World",
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-03-03T12:27:11.840Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar7847a2db |
'Our fight won't be a short one', warns Serbian student protestor | The anti-corruption "rebellion" in Serbia will go on despite the regime's spin or violence, one fearless student has said. "It won't be an easy fight, or a short one", said Milica Mudrić, a 22-year-old PR and marketing student at the Faculty of Philosophy, a university in the Serbian city of Novi Sad. Over 200,000 people gathered in the rural town of Niš, in southern Serbia, on Saturday (1 March) to keep pressing for transparency and accountability over the collapse of a railway station roof in Novi Sad on 1 November, which killed 15 people. Some groups of students had walked 130km in freezing weather to be in Niš, backed by gifts of food and shelter by local communities along the way. The protesters stood in a 15-minute silence in memory of victims at 11.52AM (the time of the roof tragedy), bringing central Niš to a halt. It was just the latest in a series of rolling, student-led protests that began four months ago and which include an ongoing blockade of all of Serbia's university campuses. And for Mudrić, one of the students who helped to begin the anti-establishment pushback, Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić’s handling of events so far was missing the point. The roof collapse was "the drop that ran over the glass" for the whole of Serbian society, said Mudrić. "That [roof] canopy collapsing was a direct consequence of the deep-rooted corruption in Serbia — that’s the bottom line and that’s what everyone is aware of," she told EUobserver in an interview. The tragedy was "something we just couldn’t swallow, but they [the Serbian state] wanted us to do exactly that", she said. "People were shocked, hurt, and angry and wanted some answers, as I think everyone has a right to know what happened, whose fault it was, and how would it be handled," she added. "It’s a big movement that just came from people’s desire for answers, ordinary people, who just want this to be a better country one day and for the institutions to work as they should," she said. The movement's logo became the image of a red hand, which you can see "everywhere round here" on walls in Novi Sad, Mudrić said. "It means 'the blood is on your hands' and since then, the red hand has become the symbol of this rebellion, if that’s what I should call it," she said. The government reaction so far has been to charge 13 people with the Novi Sad disaster and for Serbia’s prime minister, Miloš Vučević, to step down in an effort to appease discontent. But that falls far short of the root-and-branch reform of public institutions that people have been calling for as a result. "Our strength comes from our honesty and our transparency," Mudrić said Five demands "We have five requirements [for accountability and reform] and then every university has its own. Some are intertwined, some are similar," Mudrić noted. Vučić has also accused activists of being managed by Western intelligence services to destabilise his Kremlin-friendly administration. "There will be no colour revolution [in Serbia]," Vučić said on Saturday, referring to the wave of non-violent protests which toppled corrupt and authoritarian regimes in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Ukraine, as well as Serbia, some 20 years ago. And protesters, as well as independent journalists who try to cover events, have faced dozens of minor acts of violence by police and by pro-Vučić hardliners, as well as more serious attacks. In one incident in Belgrade on 15 January, a driver hospitalised a 20-year-old student at a rally by ramming her with his car. "He [the driver] hit this girl really hard - she ended up on the roof of his vehicle and then slid down onto the road — and he didn't even stop," said Mudrić. "She had severe trauma and was in emergency care in Belgrade hospital, but she's doing OK now, she's not in a life-threatening condition," Mudrić added. Many other students who speak to media prefer to be identified only by their first names for fear of reprisals, such as interrogations by Serbia’s security services. But Mudrić said she was happy for EUobserver to publish her name and photo because of the level of solidarity among her fellow students and in wider Serbian society. "It took a lot of nerves and bravery to start something," she said, speaking of the first student rallies four months ago. "Some people got really scared by that [the car-ramming incident], but at the end of the day, we have each other and we know if anything happens to any of us we will be there for each other," she added. "Our strength comes from our honesty and our transparency," Mudrić said. And the level of support among the broader Serbian public indicates that she might just be correct about the pull-factor of their simple values. "People are bringing us food, other supplies," she said, speaking of her Novi Sad university campus. "They are there for us for mental health check-ups, doctors' appointments. People are here for us from different professions — attorneys, professors, school-teachers, pensioners, everyone is involved in the story that has started and we are hoping for the best," she added. "I am grateful to anyone who gives support, because in these hard times people should stick together," she added, when asked if she hoped that EU institutions and leaders would voice solidarity with their cause. 'Colour' revolutions And Vučić's talk about colour revolutions was missing the point, because the protesters weren't looking for geopolitical regime change, so much as for basic decency in public life, Mudrić said. "We’ve only reached out to institutions to do their job. The way he [Vučić] is portraying this, as if it was a personal attack against him, or something against him, is just spinning the narrative around," she said. "It is something very new," also said Vesna Pešić, an 84-year-old Serbian ex-politician and academic. "It went like the wind all around Serbia, gathering masses of people, even high school children, who want Serbian institutions to answer who is guilty and what kind of corruption stands behind the railway-roof collapse," she said. Pešić herself took part in the so-called Bulldozer Revolution 25 years ago, which peacefully toppled the late Serbian dictator Slobodan Milošević. She has also continued to speak out against Serbia’s anti-democratic backsliding and corruption in the past two and a half decades, alongside the country’s new generation. And amid Vučić’s widely-documented and growing authoritarianism, Pešić paid tribute to young activists such as Mudrić and her colleagues for showing wider Serbia a more positive political model. "It's a conflict between the state and all of society ... a society represented by decentralised students who blockaded their faculties, sleep there, live together, and decide everything democratically," Pešić also said. Speaking of how students were organising themselves at Novi Sad university, Mudrić said: "It’s literal democracy in real time, voting, listening to each other, speaking with each other, saying what we’re going to do next". And all that meant the blockaded campuses had now become a "scared space" for fundamental European values in Serbia, Pešić said. | Andrew Rettman is EUobserver's foreign editor, writing about foreign and security issues since 2005. He is Polish, but grew up in the UK, and lives in Brussels. He has also written for The Guardian, The Times of London, and Intelligence Online. | Over 200,000 people gathered in the rural town of Niš, in southern Serbia, on Saturday to keep pressing for transparency and accountability over the collapse of a railway station roof in Novi Sad last year, which killed 15 people. | [
"EU & the World",
"Rule of Law"
] | * | 2025-03-03T10:34:16.819Z | https://euobserver.com/*/ard7776182 |
How the EU distorts data to justify green deregulation | Last week, the EU Commission unveiled a plan to cut corporate reporting requirements, claiming it will reduce costs and boost competitiveness. Critics lambasted the changes because they would dramatically shrink the scope of social, environmental, and human rights reporting and due diligence. If the plan goes through, only 20 percent of the companies originally envisioned will be covered. The commission, in various documents and statements, has defended its plans on the basis of cost. In a document released with the Omnibus package, the commission estimates its “rationalisation measures” will cut costs by about €5bn a year—€4.4bn for corporate sustainability disclosure (CSRD) and €320m for due diligence rules on human rights and environmental impacts in supply chains (CSDDD). These figures are rough estimates. Even if they materialise, these savings are likely too small to meaningfully impact corporate balance sheets. According to the commission’s own estimates , due diligence reporting costs (CSDDD) range from €52,200 for large companies to €643,000 for very large companies with a turnover higher than €5bn. As the Dutch NGO SOMO calculated last week, even at the highest estimate (€643,000), annual compliance costs would represent just 0.01 percent of the average CSDDD company’s annual turnover and 0.09 percent of its net profit in 2023 (and 0.13 percent of shareholder payouts). “Complying with [EU due diligence rules] is by no means the factor that would impact EU firms’ competitiveness,” the researchers write. “What is actually harming their competitiveness is their massive payouts to shareholders.” Is there really a trade-off? Despite the limited impact of these savings, the commission continues to frame reporting rules as a competitiveness issue. However, as Andreas Rasche, professor and associate dean at Copenhagen Business School, wrote in a LinkedIn post last week, there is “little evidence that reduced reporting costs actually increase competitiveness.” Compliance costs typically decline over time as auditors, consultants, and businesses adapt. Yet the commission never conducted a comprehensive impact assessment, which “could have clarified things,” Rasche told EUobserver in an email. “Saving costs is important, but it is too shortsighted to ignore the benefits CSRD and CSDDD offer, such as improved risk management, better capital allocation, and stronger human capital management,” Rasche added. “Declaring sustainability reporting a competitive disadvantage may appease populist and revisionist sentiments, but it is not a winning strategy for Europe’s future,” he said. “What is needed now is courage, a firm belief that sustainability and competitiveness go hand in hand,” he said. “But in a process as rushed as the omnibus one, any discussion of potential benefits was lost.” Flawed numbers Calling the process rushed might still be too generous. Beyond shaky cost savings estimates, the push for deregulation also leans on flawed economic claims. Mario Draghi’s report on competitiveness, for example, which forms the blueprint for the omnibus package, estimated that existing trade barriers in the single market cost “10 percent of GDP, according to one estimate.” However, Draghi misinterprets the original source —a 2019 report by Jan in 't Veld, a civil servant at the commission’s economy department—which wasn’t an estimate but a counterfactual illustrating a hypothetical scenario. In 't Veld calculated that without the single market, EU GDP would be 6.8 percent lower, while capital stock would shrink by 10 percent. Draghi not only conflates capital stock with GDP—two fundamentally different measures—but applies it to a different argument. This distortion was further amplified when French diplomats, in a letter to the council lobbying for green deregulation, quoted Draghi as saying Europe loses 10 percent of GDP due to “regulatory complexity.” A highly liberal interpretation, because Draghi referred to trade barriers, not green rules. When asked, French representatives did not provide further explanation to EUobserver. Consequently, what began as a counterfactual about the single market was reshaped—first into Draghi’s argument for fewer trade barriers, then into a justification for rolling back green regulations. While it’s impossible to say whether this specific misinterpretation directly influenced the omnibus package, it shows how the EU’s telephone game distorts studies to fit a narrative—turning green reporting into a competitiveness threat, despite little evidence that deregulation would boost competitiveness. | Wester is a journalist from the Netherlands with a focus on the green economy. He joined EUobserver in September 2021. Previously he was editor-in-chief of Vice, Motherboard, a science-based website, and climate economy journalist for The Correspondent. | The EU’s telephone game distorts studies to fit a narrative—turning green reporting into a competitiveness threat, despite little evidence that deregulation would boost competitiveness. | [
"Green Economy"
] | green-economy | 2025-03-03T05:00:00.000Z | https://euobserver.com/green-economy/ar768ab3e5 |
Poland's ban on asylum — a new low | On 21 February, Polish MPs overwhelmingly voted in favour of a mechanism for the suspension of the right to submit asylum applications. The suspension is to be enacted through executive action by the government in the event of the so-called ‘instrumentalisation of migrants’. The measure is quite clearly at odds with the Polish Constitution, international law, and the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), which by no means allows for such a move—neither now nor under the Migration Pact (which will become applicable next year). The statute is now expected to be approved by the Senate — the upper chamber of parliament — and subsequently signed into law by the president. The passage of this statute, along with the circumstances surrounding it, marks the most recent and most profound step so far in the erosion of the CEAS. The Polish regulation follows a similar Finnish measure and de facto corresponding practices of other member states , not least those bordering Belarus or Russia. What is especially concerning, however, is that while systemic breaches of the CEAS have long been tacitly accepted by the European Commission, recent weeks have seen an unprecedented campaign by both the commission and the European Council to justify a legally indefensible move. This has been done in defiance of the plain language of EU legislation and the rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). We are witnessing a full-blown rule-of-law crisis at the EU level when it comes to migration and asylum. Justifying the legally unjustifiable The newly passed Polish statute is at odds with international law and the CEAS on multiple counts. Most prominently, it violates the right to asylum (Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights) and the principle of non-refoulement. This latter principle, enshrined in Article 78 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), many other legal instruments comprising the CEAS and multiple other sources of international law, prohibits the removal of individuals to territories where they could be subjected to cruel or inhumane treatment. It is widely recognised as absolute, meaning that no circumstances can justify overriding it. In essence, the "suspension of the right to submit asylum applications" allows for the blanket and wholesale denial of rights to a particular cohort of people, purportedly ‘instrumentalised’ by Belarus and Russia. It bears all the hallmarks of collective punishment, effectively assuming that all those ‘instrumentalised’ are a threat and, in principle, must be immediately removed. It represents a striking negation of the focus on the individual, which remains a cornerstone of the very idea of human rights. When accompanied by pushbacks , this measure poses fundamental threats to the lives and dignity of those affected, as events along the EU-Belarus border have already demonstrated . As such, it is overwhelmingly criticised by human rights groups as well as national and international human rights bodies. Despite their clear legal violations, the commission appears to have endorsed the Polish and Finnish statutes, while the European Council "expressed its solidarity with Poland and with member states facing [instrumentalisation of migrants]" just days after the Polish plan to suspend the right to asylum was first introduced. "Exceptional situations require appropriate measures", the European council conclusions of 17 October 2024 stated. More strikingly, in its c ommunication to the parliament and the council issued "to support member states to counter hybrid threats at the eastern EU border", the commission went to considerable lengths to construct a legal argument in favour of the Polish and Finnish regulations. Among many half-truths and legally-unsound arguments, one in particular stands out: the implication that Article 72 TFEU — concerning states’ competence to uphold law and order and internal security — justifies an asylum ban in the event of a "hybrid attack". This might even sound plausible if the ECJ had not explicitly ruled otherwise in arguably the most relevant case to date — concerning Lithuania’s early response to irregular migration from Belarus from 2021 onwards. The law is invoked selectively to fit the political need of the moment. What’s next? Recent developments in asylum law and practice across Europe demonstrate a breakdown of the relevant common legal framework and a direct assault on corresponding international law. Perhaps most importantly, the Migration Pact, after years of negotiations, appears set to effectively become little more than a set of non-binding recommendations, potentially disregarded across the board by member states and unenforceable at the EU level. It is truly astonishing to watch how the EU Commission, the so-called ‘guardian of the treaties’, after investing significant political capital in championing the pact for years, now engages in convoluted legal reasoning to support measures that directly undermine this very legislative package, alongside a set of fundamental rights. We are witnessing the disintegration of the common asylum policy, with broad support for its demise. Maciej Grześkowiak is a researcher at the Centre for Human Rights at the University of Warsaw and the chief coordinator for strategic cooperation at the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights (Polish Ombudsman) . This article reflects solely the author’s own opinions. Maciej Grześkowiak is a researcher at the Centre for Human Rights at the University of Warsaw and the chief coordinator for strategic cooperation at the | Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights (Polish Ombudsman) | On 21 February, Polish MPs overwhelmingly voted in favour of a mechanism for the suspension of the right to submit asylum applications. The measure is quite clearly at odds with the Polish constitution, international law, and the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). We are witnessing a full-blown rule-of-law crisis at the EU level when it comes to migration and asylum. | [
"Migration",
"Rule of Law",
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] | migration | 2025-02-28T09:31:52.142Z | https://euobserver.com/migration/ard2ed88b7 |
EU holds 'very productive' meetings as Trump repeats 25% tariff threat | The European Commission maintains its meetings with US counterparts to stave off tariffs are "very productive", as Donald Trump threatens to slap a 25-percent levy on the EU. The comment by EU commission trade spokesperson Olof Gill on Thursday (27 February) comes less than a day after Trump declared that the EU was created to "screw" the United States. When pressed on how such meetings are productive in the lead up to Trump's latest threats, Gill said the EU was able to put forwards its viewpoints on the benefits of keeping a strong transatlantic relationship. Gill said American companies have been able to invest and generate substantial revenues because of the unified EU market. "This is also one of the key reasons why transatlantic trade amounts to over €1.5 trillion annually, making it the largest bilateral trade and investment relationship in the world," he said, noting that the commission stands ready to protect European consumers and businesses. But with the commission in charge of global trade deals on behalf of member states, the EU-led diplomacy has so far failed to temper Trump's looming trade war, posing questions on how such meetings are "very productive". Trump's 25 percent tariff announcement on Wednesday was instead followed by a slight fall in euro and European bond yields. A pre-announced meeting in Washington between the EU's foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas and US state secretary Marco Rubio, was cancelled yesterday due "scheduling conflicts" . The commission has since declined to say how many meetings it has held with the Trump administration. "I'm not going to comment on meetings between commission representatives and US authorities," said Arianna Podestà, the commission's deputy spokesperson. She also had no information to share on whether European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen has any plans to meet with Trump , noting instead that she had met with vice-president JD Vance in mid-February. The only visible high-level meeting appears to have been last week between Maroš Šefčovič, the EU trade commissioner, and top Trump administration commerce officials. Šefčovič, at the time, said he saw some US willingness to mutually reduce tariffs. The EU has a 10-percent tariff on passenger cars, four times the rate of the US car import tariff of 2.5 percent. | Nikolaj joined EUobserver in 2012 and covers home affairs. He is originally from Denmark, but spent much of his life in France and in Belgium. He was awarded the King Baudouin Foundation grant for investigative journalism in 2010. | The European Commission maintains its meetings with US counterparts to stave off tariffs are "very productive" as Donald Trump threatens to slap a 25 percent levy on the EU. | [
"EU & the World",
"Green Economy"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-02-27T14:33:46.488Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar99a3fa8f |
Why we're suing Elon Musk's X for German election data | The Berlin NGO Democracy Reporting International (DRI) and our legal partner Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte (GFF) is suing Elon Musk's X to provide us with access to the platform's publicly-available data in order to conduct research on online public discourse during the German election campaign . As a result, within just three days, the regional court of Berlin issued an injunction requested by DRI and GFF ordering X to comply with Article 40(12) of the Digital Services Act (DSA), which compels platforms to provide access to publicly available data to researchers "without undue delay". X challenged the decision, and the court accepted one of its arguments, citing a potential bias in the judge who issued the initial injunction due to a previous traineeship at GFF. The court dismissed the bias claims against the other two judges. The case is now returning to the court, which will decide on the preliminary injunction. The ruling will arrive too late for DRI to conduct research on the German electoral discourse on X. Still, the decision will set an important precedent for European digital researchers at a time when US tech giants are pushing back against EU digital regulations . Let’s break down what happened. Article 40(12) of the DSA mandates that major online platforms, such as X, provide access to publicly available data to eligible researchers “without undue delay”. Since last year, all major platforms have rolled out mechanisms to comply with Art. 40(12) of the DSA. This provision sought to formalise what platforms like Meta and Twitter had already been doing voluntarily: offering platform data to researchers through APIs in a timely, straightforward, non-bureaucratic manner. As part of our research agenda, we gained access to TikTok’s Virtual Compute Environment (a secure data room designed for civil society organisations in lieu of its API) and Meta’s Content Library. X, however, was not cooperative. After an eight-month process that we started before the 2024 European Parliament elections — marked by two requests for additional clarification (which we promptly addressed), long stretches of silence, and repeated follow-ups — our request was ultimately rejected. Notably, this rejection came only after we asked for an update following four months of silence. In January we made another attempt to apply for data, this time exclusively with the German parliamentary elections in mind, emphasising the urgency of our application given the election date of 23 February. Despite this, we received no response. Given the ongoing delays, lack of communication and prohibitively high costs of the X Commercial API, we decided to bring the matter to court. Why is getting access to data essential? The DSA was designed on a crucial premise: digital platforms wield immense power, providing the most important fora for political debate. With access to platform data, researchers can understand trends on social media — whether misinformation spreads, how extremist content is amplified, and how algorithms shape user behaviour, many of which have an impact in the real world. Without evidence, debates are theoretical and regulation pointless. Art. 40(12) of the DSA was not a radical new imposition — it merely formalised what was once common practice. Until just a few years ago, most major platforms routinely provided data to researchers, journalists, civil society, and even university students. Twitter used to be among the most beloved platforms for providing easy access to large amounts of its data. This openness fueled extensive research on platform dynamics and their societal impact. The DSA simply ensures that such access is not left to the whims of corporate goodwill but is instead enshrined in a clear, enforceable framework. What this case could mean for data access and DSA enforcement The ruling will carry significant legal implications. It will establish case law on key expressions in Article 40(12) of the DSA — terms that remain undefined but are crucial to its enforcement. Take , for example. Until now, platforms have enjoyed broad discretion in determining how long they can take to respond to data access requests. This ruling may help establish a benchmark for what constitutes a reasonable timeframe. It will also confirm what type of research qualifies as identifying , particularly regarding negative effects on civic discourse and democratic processes—a key eligibility requirement for researchers under Article 40(12). If the current decision is upheld, it could establish jurisdiction for courts in the country where the researcher resides. Ireland — again This would be a crucial precedent: instead of having to file lawsuits in Ireland , where X Corp's European headquarters are located and legal costs are prohibitively high, affected research institutions and individual researchers could sue platforms in their own countries. This would make enforcement more accessible and effective across the EU. The decision may also influence the European Commission’s leverage on enforcement cases, as a judicial authority (in this case, a German Court) will have already established a benchmark for compliance. It may also clarify the position of researchers and civil society by opening a key — though challenging—pathway to accessing platform data, even when companies refuse to cooperate. Last but not least, this case has symbolic value by setting a powerful precedent for how the EU could engage with U.S. tech giants. By affirming the enforceability of the DSA, the court could signal to other jurisdictions in the EU that robust oversight of big tech is achievable. In X’s challenge to the ruling, X argued that our application, practically identical to that sent to Meta and TikTok, did not meet the criteria of researching “ ”. The company also issued a press release through one of its official public policy accounts, framing the case as a threat to freedom of expression. But this has nothing to do with freedom of expression — this is about platform transparency. The final decision will take a few weeks. Of course, meanwhile, the EU Commission itself has asked X to hand over internal documents about its algorithms, as part of an investigation into content moderation. Musk's X has been under investigation since December 2023 under the DSA over how it tackles the spread of illegal content and information manipulation. With the German election done and dusted, in practical terms this means DRI did not have the possibility to examine the platform’s role in this crucial election. This isn’t just a setback for us — it’s a missed opportunity for the public to get further insights on how these platforms shape the information environment. And DRI is far from alone in being denied data access. We remain committed to seeing the judicial process through, hearing X’s arguments, and respecting the final court decision. Daniela Alvarado Rincón is policy officer for digital democracy and Ognjan Denkovski is research coordinator at the Berlin-based Democracy Reporting International NGO, where EUobserver columnist Michael Meyer-Resende is director. Daniela Alvarado Rincón is policy officer for digital democracy and Ognjan Denkovski is research coordinator at the Berlin-based Democracy Reporting International NGO, where EUobserver columnist | Michael Meyer-Resende | As part of our research agenda, we gained access to TikTok’s Virtual Compute Environment (a secure data room designed for civil society organisations in lieu of its API) and Meta’s Content Library. X, however, was not cooperative. | [
"Rule of Law",
"Digital",
"EU Political",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] | rule-of-law | 2025-02-27T13:40:57.618Z | https://euobserver.com/rule-of-law/ar72c796ad |
Von der Leyen's bonfire of regulations is an act of vandalism | Ursula von der Leyen’s commission has just signalled that it is shifting towards a Trump-influenced deregulatory agenda that prioritises market freedoms over public interest. Through Wednesday's (26 February) 'Omnibus' reforms of recently-agreed legal directives and regulations, the commission is dismantling vital safeguards and in so doing will deepen inequality in Europe and beyond and apply convenient myopia to the accelerating climate crisis. In these new turbulent times, ironies abound. It was von der Leyen’s previous commission that championed forward-thinking business regulations — the sustainable finance framework. These agreed EU laws support markets and companies to accelerate growth to deliver our green economies of the future — where new, well-paid jobs, clean tech, cheap and secure energy are created, and human rights are respected. They require companies to report on their efforts and act to reduce environmental harm and uphold workers and communities’ rights — not just in their own operations, but across the global supply chains that produce the food we eat, the clothes we wear and the technology we use. The new commission’s proposals are now for these essential protections to be effectively scrapped, in all but name. Von der Leyen’s commission’s ‘Omnibus simplification package’ is a proposed act of economic vandalism on Europe’s long-term prospects for growth, competitiveness and sustainability. The new commissioners have closed their ears to 140 responsible investors, and responsible business associations representing, together, more than 6,000 businesses, large and small. The commission has selectively listened to old oil and gas companies and backward-looking business associations These leading investors and companies had called for implementation of the new directive, sustained legal certainty, and smart regulation to help responsible business navigate action on climate and inequality. Instead, the commission has selectively listened to old oil and gas companies and backward-looking business associations. As the US administration implements wrong-headed policies to maximise short term returns, promote financial speculation, and narrow economic nationalism, Europe must take a different path. The commission, member states, and parliamentarians must hold their nerve. The opportunity is not just to resist deregulation, but to lead: to direct markets towards long-term value creation and shared economic prosperity. The United Nations and the OECD have set the standards for this approach — one that strengthens the standing of Europe and offers investors and companies the legal certainty and rule of law they need. The commission’s attempt to eviscerate these sustainability laws must not be agreed by the European Parliament and by the member states. Responsible investors, banks and companies will join with citizens’ groups across Europe to insist that all the core aspects of the laws are maintained, including: Firstly, the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) must have teeth (civil liability) otherwise reckless companies will ignore it. Next, the CSDDD as well as the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) must include reporting and protections for workers and communities within brands’ full supply chains. Finally, they must cover a critical mass of companies in order to have a systemic impact and humanise markets. 'Regulation without penalties is no regulation' The new commission proposes to scrap civil liability for companies that abuse workers and communities. For responsible business, that immediately tilts the playing field in favour of irresponsible business, allowing it, with impunity, to keep polluting and retain forced and child labour in their supply chains. As the CSDDD’s original architect, EU commissioner Didier Reynders said, regulation without penalties is no regulation. The new Commission insists that corporations’ human rights and environmental risk assessment focuses on ‘Tier 1’ of supply chains (their immediate suppliers). This contravenes international business standards, ignores all evidence that the most egregious abuses are conveniently buried below brands’ Tier 1, fuels tick-box approaches rather than smart measures; and once again, disadvantages and disincentivises responsible business that continues to identify and expunge the most severe human rights risks, wherever they are in their supply chains. The commission seeks to limit the number of businesses that report to only the very largest, and to drastically reduce reporting requirements. Ask any responsible investor what they need to make high-quality judgements about how to invest sustainably and they will say: up-to-date meaningful reporting from across the large portfolio of companies that they are invested in. That is why so many investors have spoken in support of these sustainability laws. They need this information to make the right investments for our future growth and prosperity. The arguments from irresponsible business and unscrupulous politicians against these laws, such as ‘regulation stymies growth’ are self-serving fallacies. All the evidence is that smart regulation stimulates and rewards innovations — creating profit and enhancing workers’ and communities’ welfare. Today the choice is stark. Is Europe to lead the world in investment and business practice that delivers greater shared prosperity, responsible business, and tackles the climate crisis? Or will it continue with the failed business-as-usual model driving unsustainable inequality and environmental crisis? The second option is the one that has delivered the fear and uncertainty driving the rise of authoritarianism in Europe. To continue with it is folly. Across Europe, efforts must now be re-ignited to hold onto the key achievements of the sustainable finance framework. This is not a bureaucratic battle; this is a fight to humanise our economies and address the ecological crisis engulfing our planet. Mary Robinson is the former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and ex-president of Ireland. Phil Bloomer is chief executive of The Business & Human Rights Resource Centre . Mary Robinson is the former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and ex-president of Ireland. Phil Bloomer is chief executive of | The Business & Human Rights Resource Centre | Ursula von der Leyen’s commission has just signalled that it is shifting towards a Trump-influenced deregulatory agenda that prioritises market freedoms over public interest, writes former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson, and Phil Bloomer. | [
"EU Political",
"Green Economy",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] | eu-political | 2025-02-26T15:22:53.390Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ara0433565 |
EU's green rules rollback criticised for 'missing the point' | Just a few years ago, Europe's green transition seemed unstoppable. But rising inflation and cost-of-living concerns, primarily driven by high gas prices, fuelled a backlash led by business groups and conservatives, who framed green policies as burdensome and too costly. This narrative managed to convince many. By 2023, the EU's Green Deal began to falter, and by 2024, the EU’s main objective shifted to industrial competitiveness The EU Commission is set to unveil its long-awaited omnibus simplification package on Wednesday (26 February), a proposal aimed at easing the regulatory burden for companies while keeping the EU's climate ambitions intact. But critics are concerned that the simplification measures proposed by the commission are little more than a veiled attempt to unwind green reporting requirements hated by corporations. The most significant changes in the commission’s proposal come in the form of drastic reductions to the reach of three pivotal pieces of legislation: the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) and the so-called Taxonomy. Under the new proposal, CSRD would only apply to companies with more than 1,000 employees, rather than 250. If adopted, this change would reduce the number of companies covered by approximately 85 percent. 'It misses the point' The EU’s due diligence rules, which hold large corporations accountable for environmental issues and human rights violations in their supply chains, which critics point out hasn't been implemented yet, would also be watered down in the omnibus proposal. The revised proposal limits reporting requirements to direct suppliers only, a move that lawyers for the green NGO ClientEarth argue ignores “higher-risk actors further down the supply chain.” “This is not playing to the EU’s strength,” said Jurei Yada, from E3G. “Rolling back regulations undermines the very thing the EU should be most confident in—its power to shape global norms through the single market.” Tessa Younger, a sustainability specialist at CCLA, a fund manager for charities and religious organisations, shares similar concerns. “The weakening of due diligence rules makes it harder to push companies to comply with climate rules,” Younger argued. “And investors rely on it to assess risk and identify opportunities.” For her part, Heather Grabbe, senior fellow at Bruegel, a Brussels-based think tank, argued that “what’s odd about this package is that it ignores Draghi’s focus on investment and productivity”. Referring to Mario Draghi’s report on competitiveness, which Commission president Ursula von der Leyen calls the ‘blueprint’ for a second mandate, he calls for more investment and better access to capital markets by finalising the capital market union—none of which are addressed in the omnibus package. By reducing the scope of green reporting standards, the commission “reduces transparency,” Grabbe also said. “Understanding risks is critical for attracting the kinds of investment Draghi is talking about.” “Draghi advocates for gold-plating EU rules by national regulators; for having common standards; and ending paper-based reporting,” she continues. “Not rolling back green reporting requirements. Any steps that reduce the level playing field for investors misses the point.” “We need to ask how [the omnibus package] is going to improve competitiveness,” she said. ‘A patchwork of national laws’ BusinessEurope, the lobby group representing large corporations in Brussels, has been a driving force behind calls to weaken the CSRD and CSDDD regulations. "Over 60 percent of companies cite regulation as a barrier to investment," said its director general Markus J. Beyrer, claim ing that green reporting requirements harmed EU industrial competitiveness. Dutch NGO SOMO put this claim into perspective , calculating that companies lobbying against EU green directives have paid out €2.9 trillion to shareholders over the past decade, while the cost of compliance is just 0.13 percent of their annual shareholder payout. In any case, Enrico Letta, Italy's former prime minister, tasked last year to write the book on simplification ( literally ), recently told EUobserver that reducing the regulatory burden isn’t about cutting the scope of existing rules, but preventing EU-wide rules from being transposed into 27 individual national laws. In his report, Letta identified a major flaw in legislation like CSDR and CSDDD: their status as directives rather than regulations. While EU regulations apply uniformly across member states, directives set broad EU goals while leaving it to individual countries to draft their own laws. "The easiest and most effective step [to achieve simpler rules] is to phase out directives and move exclusively to regulations," Letta told EUobserver. However, the omnibus package ignores this, focusing instead on reducing the scope of the directives as requested by Beyrer and others in the business-lobby. And while excluding SMEs from reporting requirements may relieve smaller entrepreneurs, it also “undermines consistency and comparability,” said Younger. Germany and France have both lobbied “hard” for the commission to weaken EU-wide due diligence legislation. “At the same time, they already have their own versions,” said Grabbe. “So what will this result in? Do we end up with 27 bits of national legislation? That will only make things more complicated.” “We need a unified due diligence law, not this patchwork of national laws,” said Ramsköld. Race to the bottom “We cannot compete by lowering standards,” said Julien Denormandie, France's former agriculture minister and now chief impact officer at Sweep, a sustainability data management platform, in an interview with EUobserver. “The US has lower energy costs, and China has even fewer environmental regulations. Reducing environmental standards will not make Europe more competitive.” Instead, corporate reporting standards and due diligence laws force exporters who want to gain access to the EU single market to adjust to EU rules, thereby creating a level playing field. “It's one of the best tools we have to remain competitive,” Denormandie continued. “If we roll it back, and Europe competes only on price, we lose. That’s a race to the bottom, and it will hurt everyone.” Not final The changes proposed in Wednesday’s omnibus proposal are not final. The package still needs to be negotiated between the commission, the European Parliament, and EU member states. The commission is pushing for a quick resolution. But the reality is that it is going to be difficult to get an inter-institutional agreement—especially with mounting opposition, not just within the commission and parliament, but also from civil society groups and investors. At the same time, the European People’s Party (EPP) is pushing hard for the roll-back of green rules, and is the most dominant political group in Brussels, and has already signalled its willingness to collaborate with the far-right if von der Leyen's usual centre-left coalition comes out against the plans. “I’m very worried,” said Yada. “If the EPP aligns with the ECR to push pieces of the omnibus through, the next few years could be a ‘great bargaining game’ to gut the Green Deal.” | Wester is a journalist from the Netherlands with a focus on the green economy. He joined EUobserver in September 2021. Previously he was editor-in-chief of Vice, Motherboard, a science-based website, and climate economy journalist for The Correspondent. | The EU Commission is set to unveil a proposal to ease the regulatory burden on companies, but critics argue it fails to simplify and instead reverses key Green Deal achievements. | [
"Green Economy"
] | green-economy | 2025-02-26T04:00:00.000Z | https://euobserver.com/green-economy/ar0d5be99c |
Monday is when EU should say 'no' to Israel’s genocide, occupation and apartheid | Across Europe people are demanding an end to the genocide against Palestinians in Gaza. For 16 months people have taken to the streets, activated trade unions, signed letters and petitions, supported fundraisers and built university encampments to demand justice for victims of genocide and war crimes and for the decades of Israel’s brutal occupation and apartheid against Palestinians to finally come to an end. But there is a disconnect between the conversations happening in our homes, workplaces and schools and those happening in the EU’s halls of power. And this rift is at risk of getting wider. On Monday (24 February), EU foreign ministers are hosting Gideon Sa’ar, Israel’s foreign minister , in Brussels for the EU-Israel Association Council. For the first time in the EU’s history, ministers will welcome the representative of a state whose prime minister and former defence minister are subject to International Criminal Court arrest warrants. Under the EU-Israel Association agreement, Israel enjoys certain privileges to the EU market when it comes to trade and economic cooperation, as well as EU funds for research and development, education and culture. The meeting to discuss this privileged partnership is happening while the EU is facing a key moment in its history. Mass deportation from Gaza With the world order being shaken up, respect for international law crumbling and a new US president calling for mass deportation of Palestinians in Gaza, European leaders face a clear choice: will they let themselves and self-proclaimed European values be waltzed over, or will they finally take up the banner of human rights, international law and the rules-based international order? Everything the EU and its member states claim to stand for — be it economic prosperity, common security or respect for human rights — today requires a clear and bold stance. Amidst the chaos on the world stage, there lies an opportunity for EU countries to help lead the way — to reinvent multilateral cooperation based on values that benefit the global common interest. This opportunity should be seized on every front. The situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) and Israel is one of the important issues on which the EU could make a difference. The world has witnessed how Israel has committed and continues to commit genocide against Palestinians in Gaza, doing so in a context of decades of illegal occupation and apartheid. Those gross human rights violations have been extensively documented by Amnesty International and many others. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ordered Israel to take interim measures over a year ago because of the risk of genocide in Gaza. These orders were blatantly ignored. The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants against Israeli prime minister Netanyahu, among others, on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The United Nations General Assembly, following an advisory opinion by the ICJ finding that Israel’s presence in the OPT is unlawful, overwhelmingly demanded an end to Israel illegal occupation of the OPT. The situation is painfully clear and has not been fundamentally changed by the current provisional and fragile ceasefire. In the face of shocking proposals to forcibly deport Palestinians from Gaza and with the staggering and ongoing impunity for the crimes committed, the EU must finally step up — and do what is needed to help end the genocide in Gaza and dismantle Israel’s system of apartheid. EU ministers will sit down with a government of a country that commits genocide, persistently violates international law and subjects Palestinians to apartheid EU member states must immediately halt arms transfers to Israel, ban trade with illegal Israeli settlements and ensure justice and accountability for genocide and other crimes under international law. These actions would help lead the international community away from the yawning abyss of atrocities, impunity and lawlessness. Monday's EU-Israel Association Council is an opportunity to finally change course. EU ministers will sit down with a government of a country that commits genocide, persistently violates international law and subjects Palestinians to apartheid. The association agreement is a good lever to apply pressure, hold Israel accountable and to force change. Indeed, the association agreement itself stipulates in its second article that cooperation must be based on respect for human rights. The EU must demand effective measures by Israel to improve human rights, including respecting the ceasefire in Gaza, ending the blockade of Gaza, ending the occupation of the OPT, and dismantling its system of oppression and domination over Palestinians. That is the message EU leaders should bring to the table at the EU-Israel summit. By doing so, they would show real leadership, the kind that people in Europe are demanding. No more trade with and investments in illegal Israeli settlements. No more arms to Israel. No more support for apartheid. Not in our name. This is not a time for self-proclaimed or self-inflicted European powerlessness or wavering, but one where tools and leverage that allow the EU block to make a real difference must be grasped and confidently wielded. The association agreement with Israel is one such tool to make a difference for the countless victims of human rights violations in Occupied Palestinian Territory and Israel. EU leaders have a historic, legal and moral duty to use it. Wies De Graeve – Frank Johansson – Shoura Hashemi – Esteban Beltrán – Nataša Posel – Stephen Bowen – David Pereira – Ileana Bello – Vibe Klarup – Rado Sloboda – Claudia Pedra – Dagmar Oudshoorn – Julia Duchrow – Carine Thibaut – Anna Johansson – Sylvie Brigot - Anna Błaszczak-Banasiak - Nayden Rashkov - Wies De Graeve – Frank Johansson – Shoura Hashemi – Esteban Beltrán – Nataša Posel – Stephen Bowen – David Pereira – Ileana Bello – Vibe Klarup – Rado Sloboda – Claudia Pedra – Dagmar Oudshoorn – Julia Duchrow – Carine Thibaut – Anna Johansson – Sylvie Brigot - | Anna Błaszczak-Banasiak - | For the first time in the EU’s history, ministers will welcome the representative of a state whose prime minister and former defence minister are subject to International Criminal Court arrest warrants. | [
"EU & the World",
"Opinion"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-02-24T14:28:06.218Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar211d6928 |
80 percent said no — so let’s stop pretending the AfD speaks for ‘The People’ | There are two key takeaways from Sunday’s (23 February) election in Germany: they are the numbers 83.5 and 80. The former is the voter turnout — 83.5 percent — the highest since 1987 . In other words, the highest in the history of a united Germany. The latter — 80 percent — is the total number of Germans who refused to even countenance voting for racist far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), whether they voted CDU/CSU, Green, Left, FPD, or the plethora of niche no-hoper parties that litter a fully-proportional electoral system. That’s four-in-five Germans, on the highest turnout in 38 years, at what should have been a perfect storm for the AfD. The self-proclaimed underdog party had the backing of the richest man in the history of the world, who declared that “Only [the] AfD can save Germany, end of story”. Tesla boss Elon Musk, when not making Nazi salutes , promoted their lies on the biggest political social media on earth. That’s some underdog. The AfD doubled their vote from 10.4 percent in 2021, but the party that started just over a decade ago as an oddball academics’ party objecting to the EU single currency, and morphed into an extremely racist party on the back of Angela Merkel’s decision to let in the over one million refugees from the Syrian civil war in 2015 could not have hoped for a better tailwind than 23 February 2025. On the Friday night eve of voting weekend, a Syrian refugee was arrested for stabbing a man near to death in Berlin’s Holocaust memorial. 11 days ago, an Afghan refugee drove his car into an innocent crowd in Munich. A 37-year-old mother and her two-year-old daughter were killed, and 37 others were injured. On 20 December, another refugee ploughed into a Christmas market in Magdeburg, killing six and injuring 299. He was actually an Islamophobic fanatic, just like the AfD. But to the AfD, he was merely a successful Saudi asylum seeker, so just another brown-skinned not ‘bio-Deutsch’ (ethnically white) German. In June last year, a police officer was stabbed to death while protecting an anti-Islam rally, by an Afghan national. Perfect storm There could not be a more receptive time to be appealing for votes on a white nationalist, anti-Islam, anti-foreigner platform. And, yes, the AfD has made it to 20.8 percent, doubling their 10.4 percent in 2021. But in any society, at any point in time, there is a small but significant hardcore of racist citizens. That’s a democracy, and they have a party to vote for. What even 20 percent does emphatically NOT constitute is some amorphous voice of the real “people” — and it is about time mainstream politicians of the left, centre, and (especially) the centre-right stop pretending this group are somehow the authentic voice of the alienated masses. But as we saw with the rise of Hitler, when you combine a racist scapegoating of an ethnic/religious minority PLUS a massive collapse of the economic condition of the majority, then you have a recipe for fascism — and it is Friedrich Merz ’s job to prevent that now. It’s (probably) nigh-on impossible to completely eradicate racism. But it’s more than possible to increase the material living conditions of the combined working classes and lower middle classes, ie the vast majority of society. Whether the ‘BlackRock’ chancellor , who has never held a ministerial post, was distrusted by his centrist predecessor as CDU leader, Angela Merkel, and apparently owns not one but two private jets, is the man to do this, remains to be seen. But he has already shown — perhaps through fatigue, perhaps through adrenaline — an unexpected honesty on Sunday night’s election coverage, admitting that the US, a country he has worshipped all his life, is no longer a friend or ally of Europe under Donald Trump, and talking of Europe being “independent” from Washington. Germany’s economy — predicated for over a century on a combination of heavy industry and precision engineering, and a million years from being a tech or digital leader — is in the doldrums, with growth stalled and bills rising. But the quality of life, even for the poorest ‘left-behind’ regions in the former communist East, is of a standard their parents, let alone their grandparents, could only have dreamed of. The mainstream parties need to be unafraid of pointing out this elephant in the room. If you’re not happy being (relatively) poor in Germany, fair enough, but you’re not going to be better off anywhere else, so don’t blame it on migrants. Two-time wrecker In other ‘good’ results, the Bundestag has seen the back of the ego-driven trouble-making of would-be kingmaker Christian Lindne r, and his tiny neo-liberal Free Democratic Party (FPD). Lindner was responsible for collapsing a possible coalition with Merkel in 2017, after two full months of negotiations, before it even got started (a coalition his FPD would, in fact, have been perfect for driving through a much-needed 'digitalisation' agenda), and then again collapsing the 2021-2025 ‘traffic-light’ coalition. A two-time wrecker, with an appetite for power without responsibility, not even five percent of Germans wanted him. Similarly, but more interestingly, the Alliance Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) failed to make the five-percent threshold. An ‘economically-left, culture wars-right’ party could still have a future in Germany, or elsewhere, but not when run as a one-woman personality cult. The BSW posters littering the capital merely had a picture of Wagenknecht’s face, with the slogan “Sahra's Coming”. That didn’t work. The Greens, for all the talk of a historically-unpopular coalition, did better than expected, only dropping 3.1 percent on their historic high of 2021. You won't be reading it in other coverage, but Sunday's 11 percent was in fact their second-best result ever. Not bad for coming out of a bruising coalition as the junior partner. The SPD? Well, they clearly needed the more charismatic Boris Pistorius , rather than the cold and aloof Olaf Scholz, but Pistorius’ time may come soon under a ‘Grand Coalition’ of the SPD with Merz’s CDU. Scholz will never be fondly remembered, but in time, his Red/Yellow/Green traffic light coalition might be seen as better than voters gave it credit for. Taking office amid the ongoing Covid pandemic in 2021, the government was soon shaken by Russia’s war of aggression in Europe just five months into its term. Despite internal challenges, particularly from FPD Lindner, the coalition managed to push through serious legislation, including ambitious environmental policies, dual citizenship for the country’s largest minority (Turkish ‘ gastarbeiters ’), and, somewhat under the radar, the legalisation of cannabis. | Matthew is EUobserver's Opinion Editor. He joined EUobserver in June 2018. Previously he worked as a reporter for The Guardian in London, and as editor for AFP in Paris and DPA in Berlin. | There are two takeaways from Sunday's election in Germany — it was the highest turnout in two generations, and four-in-five Germans refused to vote for the racist far-right. | [
"EU Political"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-02-24T13:55:59.637Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar9851557b |
EU envoy in Kyiv warns: Don't repeat ‘about us, without us’ mistake | As the US and Russia discuss ways to end the worst conflict on the European continent since World War II, EU ambassador to Kyiv Katarína Mathernová has cautioned against sidelining Europe and Ukraine from future negotiations. “To make any peace just and sustainable, it cannot happen without Europe,” Mathernová told EUobserver ahead of the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. With the war entering its fourth year, Ukraine and its European allies are increasingly concerned that peace talks — if shaped without their input — may come at the price of a weak deal that will not prevent Russia from attacking Ukraine again in future. Speaking from her office at the EU delegation on Volodymyrska Street in Kyiv, the EU diplomat of Slovak origin argued that Ukraine and Europe must be part of any peace talks, given expectations of providing future security guarantees for the country. “How the war in Ukraine will end will determine European post-war security architecture for the years to come,” Mathernová said. She also stressed the EU’s unprecedented support for Kyiv over the past year, totalling €134bn, including €48.8bn in military assistance, according to figures provided by the EU delegation in Ukraine. But money doesn't automatically transform into military capabilities — and questions arise should the US pull military aid from Ukraine. Last week’s high-level US-Russia discussions in Saudi Arabia notably excluded Ukraine and European representatives, in a sign of what may be the format for future talks. But Mathernová warned that history risks repeating itself. She referred to the 1938 Munich Agreement, where European powers made a deal that ended up failing to stop the war. At the time, Germany, Italy, the UK, and France signed an agreement forcing Czechoslovakia to cede the Sudetenland to Nazi Germany in a failed bid to avoid further conflict. The deal, made without Czechoslovakia, became a symbol of appeasement that emboldened Adolf Hitler. “It was about us, without us,” Mathernová noted, drawing parallels to the current situation. “This historical lesson is one of the reasons why I think that both Ukraine and Europe need to be at the [negotiation] table,” she said, describing an inclusive approach as “prudent” and “smart” to avoid another ‘about us without us’ moment. Societal tensions Alarm bells rang in both Kyiv and Brussels earlier this month when US president Donald Trump broke the diplomatic isolation of Russia by holding a 90-minute phone call with president Vladimir Putin. The call marked a stark departure from the previous US administration and Nato’s long-standing position: “Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine.” But the US position had already been shifting for some time. Ahead of official talks in Saudi Arabia this week, behind-the-scenes meetings between US and Russian officials have also taken place in Switzerland in recent months, according to Reuters . Many details are still unclear, including whether Ukrainians joined those talks. “Discussions and speculation about ceasefires and potential elections brought a lot of the politics back, creating societal tensions” Meanwhile, signs of growing tensions between Washington and Kyiv became noticeable last week when no joint press conference followed talks between Keith Kellogg, Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, and Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky. Kellogg's visit came amid negotiations over a trade deal between Ukraine and the US, with rare-earth minerals at its core — which Zelensky initially rejected. And it also follows a tirade of furious remarks by Trump, testing US-Ukraine relations and transatlantic bonds further. Earlier this week, the US president called Zelesnky a dictator, accusing him of refusing to hold elections. Trump also blamed Ukraine for starting the war, although, in fact, it was Russia that initiated the conflict—not three years ago, but 11 years ago — when its armed forces seized part of Ukrainian territory, the Crimean peninsula. But these diplomatic rifts come after three years of a devastating war that extends far beyond the battlefield, with relentless air attacks and sleepless nights taking a toll on civilians and soldiers alike. “Discussions and speculation about ceasefires and potential elections brought a lot of the politics back, creating societal tensions,” said Mathernová. Ukraine is also struggling with the exhaustion and fatigue typical of a prolonged conflict. And Russia has made “small” but “steady” advances on the front lines over the past year, which is also a factor, the EU envoy noted. “The prospect of EU’s membership is an important element for the country to keep going” Hopes of EU membership Recent statements from both Washington and Moscow downplaying Europe’s involvement in peace talks have raised difficult questions about Europe’s geopolitical influence — at a time when the EU27 struggles to send a united message. Two crisis summits about the future of Ukraine and Europe’s security took place last week in Paris with EU leaders, the Nato chief, the Canadians, and the UK, showing clear divisions about the next steps. When asked about her biggest concern, Mathernová warned of the risk of "collectively letting Ukraine down". The Slovak-born diplomat was officially appointed as the EU envoy to war-torn Ukraine in September 2023. But her ties with the region date back to her time in Brussels, where she served in the European Commission’s department for neighbourhood and enlargement negotiations. After Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine applied for EU membership. Despite Russian-friendly Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán's opposition, EU leaders decided to start accession talks with Ukraine in December 2023. When asked if Ukraine could join the 27-nation bloc in 2030, a date that was raised by former EU council president Charles Michel, Mathernová said that the end of the decade mark was not “unrealistic”. “If there is a just and sustainable peace and they continue with the reforms I think that could happen,” Mathernová said. She noted that Europe today is navigating a very different geopolitical landscape than a decade ago, with Ukraine’s pace of reform accelerating despite the ongoing conflict. “They have written the playbook on how to reform in the times of war,” she said, highlighting the unity Ukraine has demonstrated in its pursuit of EU integration. The EU diplomat also pointed out that once actual peace talks begin, attention will inevitably shift to the EU's membership process, which, despite being bureaucratic and lengthy, remains an essential motivating force for Ukraine. “The prospect of EU membership is an important element for the country to keep going,” she said. “This is what gives them hope, this is what gives them perspective — and it has for the last three years”. | Elena is EUobserver's editor-in-chief. She is from Spain and has studied journalism and new media in Spanish and Belgian universities. Previously she worked on European affairs at VoteWatch Europe and the Spanish news agency EFE. | As the US and Russia discuss ways to end the worst conflict on the European continent since World War II, EU ambassador to Kyiv Katarína Mathernová has cautioned against sidelining Europe and Ukraine from future negotiations. | [
"EU & the World",
"Ukraine"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-02-24T06:00:00.000Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/arcd35b652 |
Use frozen Russian Central Bank assets to pay for peace in Ukraine | With multiple statements this week and last week signaling that the US will no longer prioritise European and Ukrainian security, Europe’s worst nightmare is becoming a reality. There is no doubt that only a democratic, well-fortified, and well-armed Ukraine can guarantee lasting peace for Europe by deterring further Russian aggression. Achieving this will cost a lot. With the US unwilling to continue sharing the burden — and even suggesting that Ukraine should compensate for past aid — Europe must take a hard look at its available resources. Since the immobilization of $300bn [€286bn] in Russian Central Bank assets, Russia has not only continued its genocidal war — inflicting nearly $500 bn in losses on Ukraine — but has also escalated hybrid warfare globally. This includes sabotage, assassination attempts, cyberattacks, and election meddling in Europe, all while forging a coalition of tyrannies determined to dismantle the rules-based world order, with North Korean troops already on the ground. Clearly, freezing Russia’s assets as a countermeasure has failed to deter its aggression, and Moscow’s ambitions extend far beyond Ukraine. Given these new challenges, Europe must overcome its reluctance to make Russia pay for peace. A pragmatic way forward is to consolidate all immobilised assets into a new Brussels-based institution dedicated to Ukraine’s development — minimising risks to the Eurozone while ensuring that Russia bears the cost of its destruction. Low-hanging fruit A significant financial resource remains underutilized: the ungenerated profits from immobilised Russian Central Bank assets. That is a low-hanging fruit. In 2024, the EU introduced a plan to allocate windfall profits from assets immobilized in the Belgium-based securities depository Euroclear to Ukraine. The 2024 profits were mostly used for procuring weapons — including from French and Ukrainian manufacturers — while starting in 2025, they will be directed toward repaying the $50bn ERA loan. Euroclear holds roughly half of all immobilised Russian assets, while the rest generate no returns for Ukraine at all. Moreover, even Euroclear’s assets are not being utilised to their full potential for Ukraine. Since 2022, most of the initial bonds have matured, leaving the securities depository with substantial cash holdings it lacks the mandate or expertise to invest effectively, so it mostly keeps them on bank accounts in different countries. To address this, we propose the creation of a new institution — the Ukraine Development Bank — modelled after Germany’s KfW under the Marshall Plan. This bank would consolidate Russian Central Bank assets from various jurisdictions, using the principal amount to pay compensation to victims and fund Ukraine’s reconstruction in the long term, while in the short term, maximising profits to pay off the ERA loan faster, procure weapons for Ukraine, and support its defence industries. According to the latest financial reports of Euroclear, in 2024, interest arising on cash balances from sanctioned Russian assets before taxation was approximately €6.9bn. By doubling the principal available for investment and shifting to higher-yielding assets, the returns could significantly be boosted. As British investment banker and finance expert Timothy Ash has pointed out , "a portfolio of emerging market assets could generate a 10 percent yield, delivering over $30bn annually for Ukraine." Maximising these profits would ensure stable, systematic procurement of European and American-manufactured weapons for Ukraine — both keeping Ukraine well-armed and helping to persuade Donald Trump to remain engaged in European security and defence while strengthening Europe’s own defence industrial base. As a compromise to address European concerns, the proposed Ukraine Development Bank could be headquartered in Brussels, aligning with Ukraine’s EU integration efforts. This would mitigate risks associated with a potential mass withdrawal of funds from Belgian jurisdiction while also increasing tax revenues for Belgium from the bank’s maximised profits. To ensure transparency and accountability, the bank’s governance structure would include a Board of Directors representing the US, the EU and its member states, the UK, and Ukraine. The CEO — a Ukrainian national — would be selected through an open, transparent, and competitive process overseen by the board. Risk to euro? The strongest opposition to confiscation comes from European finance officials who narrowly focus on perceived risks to the euro. However, neither the initial immobilisation of assets that caused the main market shock nor the decisions on windfall profits and ERA loans have anyhow affected the euro’s attractiveness as a reserve currency. More importantly, the cost of inaction must also be part of the financial discussion. Former US deputy defense secretary Elaine McCusker has estimated that a Russian victory in Ukraine would force the U.S. to increase defence spending by at least $808bn over the next five years. The costs for European countries would be much higher especially if the US decides to withdraw from Europe. During the largest war since WWII, financial officials should not be the ultimate decision-makers on national security matters. Meanwhile, some policymakers have floated the idea of returning the immobilised assets — partially or in full — to Russia as part of a potential peace deal. That would be a disaster. The $300bn exceeds two Russian annual war budgets for 2024. The Kremlin would immediately reinvest these funds into bombs, tanks, and artillery rounds for the next phase of its wars of aggression. Instead, it is far wiser to put this money to work for peace — using its profits to procure German air defences, French and British missiles, and American shells, rather than allowing Russia to funnel an entire amount into drone production in Tatarstan or buying millions more artillery rounds from North Korea. For European leaders, moving forward with confiscation now is not just prudent — it is a strategic necessity. By doing so, they can take on a much greater share of supporting Ukraine without significantly overburdening their own taxpayers. Denying Ukraine the resources it needs for strategic armament, reconstruction, and victim compensation risks depopulation, social resentment, and ultimately, leaving Ukraine vulnerable to further Russian conquest — that would not make Europe safe again. Daria Kaleniuk is executive director of the NGO Anti-Corruption Action Center (ANTAC) , where Olena Halushka also works. Daria Kaleniuk is executive director of the NGO Anti-Corruption Action Center (ANTAC) , where | Olena Halushka | Europe must overcome its reluctance to make Russia pay for peace — a pragmatic way forward is to consolidate all immobilised assets into a new Brussels-based institution dedicated to Ukraine’s development, minimising risks to the Eurozone while ensuring that Russia bears the cost of its destruction. | [
"Ukraine",
"Opinion"
] | ukraine | 2025-02-21T13:08:31.666Z | https://euobserver.com/ukraine/ara8d88a2a |
EU energy deals with north Africa replicate neocolonial harms, says report | Greenpeace has released a new report exposing how European investments, supposedly aimed at supporting the transition to a green economy, are instead deepening inequality and replicating the injustices of the fossil-fuel era in north Africa. The report zeroes in on Egypt and Morocco — two north African nations that remain net importers of fossil fuels, yet export cleaner energy to Europe. This dynamic, the report argues, reveals how European companies, governments, and financial institutions perpetuate unfair relations by prioritising projects designed to extract and export resources. “The Global North is still financing the climate crisis through extractivist investments such as fossil fuels,” said Shereen Talaat, director of MENAFem , a movement of local and regional organisations advocating for equitable development. North Africa, courted by multiple global players, is increasingly leveraging its negotiating power since the energy crisis of 2022. This shift is largely driven by the region's energy exports and strategic location. But Greenpeace argues that oil and gas projects are degrading ecosystems and depleting vital resources like water and arable land across north Africa, threatening biodiversity and long-term sustainability. Even Europe’s push for supposedly 'green' energy projects in the region appears more focused on securing its own energy needs than fostering genuine sustainable development in the Global South. Last year, Egyptian and European companies signed a $40bn [€38bn] investment deal for renewable energy and green hydrogen for export. Meanwhile, energy companies poured billions into Egypt to tap its gas reserves as a replacement for Russian gas. Yet, Egypt itself still relies on fossil fuels and frequently suffers blackouts due to supply shortages. Greenpeace also claims that intensive drilling has led to soil erosion and water contamination while offering little benefit to Egyptians. “The transition to a green economy cannot replicate the injustices of the fossil-fuel era,” said Hanen Keskes, campaign lead at Greenpeace in north Africa and the Middle East. “It must be transformative, inclusive, and centred on the needs of those most affected.” According to the report, achieving a just transition will require overhauling global financial structures — cancelling unfair debt and surcharges on IMF loans, implementing progressive taxation, and ending fossil fuel funding under EU programmes. “Governments must put wellbeing at the top of the agenda,” Keskes concluded. | Wester is a journalist from the Netherlands with a focus on the green economy. He joined EUobserver in September 2021. Previously he was editor-in-chief of Vice, Motherboard, a science-based website, and climate economy journalist for The Correspondent. | EU-led oil and gas projects in north Africa have led to soil erosion and water contamination — while offering little benefit to the local populace, finds Greenpeace in a new report. | [
"Green Economy"
] | green-economy | 2025-02-20T12:27:22.139Z | https://euobserver.com/green-economy/arbb860d02 |
Withdrawing equality directive is disgrace for Europe and capitulation to populism | The withdrawing the Horizontal Anti-Discrimination Directive is a disgrace for Europe, a betrayal of our democratic values, and an insult to the millions of our citizen who face discrimination in their daily life. The European Commission has capitulated to populism. By scrapping the directive , the European Commission has abandoned one of the core principles of the European project: the union of equality. Over the last 15 years, this proposal has become a symbol of hope for millions of our citizens facing discrimination whether it was based on religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation. Its withdrawal is not just a missed opportunity; it is an outright concession to those who oppose progress, diversity, equality and inclusion. Let me be clear: the support for this commission was never unconditional. On the contrary, it was built on the expectation that it would deliver on the key priorities that social democrats have always defended such as protecting minorities, fighting discrimination, and deepening the Union of Equality. The commission does not have the luxury of picking and choosing which fundamental rights to uphold. It has a duty to act, to lead, and to stand firm against reactionary forces. Capitulating to obstruction is not leadership; it is failure. This decision is a test of the commission’s credibility. Trumpism in Brussels If it fails to propose concrete and ambitious alternatives, it risks sending a dangerous message — that European values are negotiable, that fundamental rights can be sacrificed for political convenience. That is unacceptable. We cannot allow the European Union to drift toward the ideology of Trumpism, where social progress is dismantled piece by piece under the pretext of pragmatism. The path forward is clear: the Commission must immediately present a robust alternative to this directive, ensuring that the fight against discrimination remains at the heart of its agenda. It must actively engage with member states to break the deadlock, rather than retreating at the first sign of resistance. It must demonstrate that Europe remains a beacon of justice, inclusion, and diversity—not a continent that caves to fear and political expediency. We must strengthen and expand the Union of Equality—not destroy decades of progress. The Commission still has a choice: to live up to its commitments or to be remembered as the one that turned its back on those who needed it most. For the millions who face discrimination every day, inaction is not an option. Marc Angel is a Luxembourgish MEP with the Socialists & Democrats group. Marc Angel is a Luxembourgish MEP with the | Socialists & Democrats | The withdrawing the Horizontal Anti-Discrimination Directive is a disgrace for Europe, a betrayal of our democratic values, and an insult to the millions of our citizen who face discrimination in their daily life. The European Commission has capitulated to populism. | [
"EU Political",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] | eu-political | 2025-02-20T11:11:45.224Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar5e0315d6 |
Why the new Europol regulation is a Trojan Horse for surveillance | The EU Commission’s proposal for a new Europol Regulation as part of the recast of the ‘Facilitator’s Package’ is a pretext for unchecked expansion of power and resources for Europol, the EU’s policing agency, at the expense of those they claim to protect. The regulation has fallen at the first hurdle — with the Council tearing the proposal to shreds and the European Parliament set to follow suit . The commission is framing these proposals as a humanitarian effort to “curb exploitation” by “ruthless smuggling gangs”, but this disguises a more insidious reality. The reform hinges on the flawed premise that ‘smugglers’ pose the greatest risk to people on the move and that increased police powers and mass data collection will ensure ‘protection’. In truth, this approach fuels harm and discrimination while granting the EU’s agencies like Europol and Frontex unprecedented surveillance capabilities with insufficient oversight. Ursula von der Leyen’s speech and the commission’s documents on the package reference deaths at sea, blaming “smugglers” for the death toll of over 28,000 people since 2014, citing International Organization for Migration (IOM) data. However, the IOM itself highlights “gaps in search-and-rescue capacity and restrictions on the life-saving work of NGOs” as key contributing factors — conveniently ignored in the commission’s interpretation. A recent UN report found that state authorities, including police and border guards, are often the main perpetrators of violence against people on the move, not ‘smugglers’. The EU’s own hostile border and migration policies force people into life-threatening situations. Deaths at sea , and on land , result from a lack of safe, regular pathways into the EU. Instead of addressing these root causes, the commission is doubling down on a failed approach, empowering agencies and criminalising movement and solidarity. This will push people into even more dangerous routes, while authorities committing abuses continue to operate with impunity. Expanding Europol data collection The proposed reform significantly impacts digital and migrants rights by expanding Europol’s data collection on people on the move. New rules would require national law enforcement authorities to share all data related to ‘migrant smuggling’ with Europol. Historically, it has been notoriously difficult to access personal data by Europol, even for activists and human rights defenders from the Global North. The impact on racialised migrant populations will be even more severe. This mass data collection contradicts established data protection standards, raising red flags from the EU’s data protection watchdog. Additionally, we can expect these vast datasets will be analysed by AI algorithms too, which are known to be racist and discriminatory, to ‘produce knowledge’ on migration. Information derived from such models could be used to justify increased policing forces to border regions, leading to more pushbacks, violence and deaths. In the end, who profits from all this? Not people on the move, not those in solidarity with them, but private industries and research institutions receiving EU funding to develop surveillance technologies. Compounding these concerns, the commission sidestepped key democratic safeguards in its proposal. The required impact assessment, meant to evaluate the implications of EU action - notably on fundamental rights, was conspicuously absent. This omission, which UN Special Rapporteur Mary Lawlor called “shocking” , undermines transparency and accountability in policymaking. Europol's history of overreach is well-documented . Reforms in 2016 and 2022 steadily increased its powers, allowing the agency to amass vast amounts of personal data with minimal oversight. The 2023 proposal goes even further, expanding cooperation between Europol and Frontex, the EU border agency infamous for human rights violations . It would allow Europol agents to be seconded into Frontex teams. Currently, Frontex cannot share migrants’ data with Europol en-masse. However, both agencies attempted to circumvent this restriction with the 2015 PeDRA project (‘Processing of Personal Data for Risk Analysis). This effort to conduct mass surveillance of migrants stalled following an investigation and scrutiny from the EU’s Data Protection Supervisor. The new Europol Regulation risks creating a legal framework for enhanced data-sharing between Europol and Frontex, sidestepping previous challenges. Security, Europe! Under the current Polish EU Council presidency, "Security, Europe!" has been touted as a guiding motto, with new EU migration commissioner Magnus Brunner declaring it a “fundamental right” . This focus on security sidelines fundamental rights to asylum, life, and freedom from inhumane treatment. History has shown that restrictive migration policies do not work - people will continue to move. Rather than investing billions into repressive border regimes, offshore detention centres, and surveillance powers, the EU must pursue sustainable and viable alternatives. Civil society, policymakers, and EU citizens must reject these measures and demand a fundamental shift in how migration is approached. Human mobility is not a crime, and scapegoating migrants and their allies for the EU’s systemic failures must end. Hope Barker is an independent researcher with a focus on border surveillance technologies, Caterina Rodelli is EU policy analyst at Access Now , Chloé Berthélémy is senior policy advisor at European Digital Rights , Stefi Richani is advocacy lead for Equinox: Racial Justice Initiative , and Antonella Napolitano is advocacy advisor at the Hermes Center. Hope Barker is an independent researcher with a focus on border surveillance technologies, Caterina Rodelli is EU policy analyst at Access Now , Chloé Berthélémy is senior policy advisor at European Digital Rights , Stefi Richani is advocacy lead for Equinox: Racial Justice Initiative , and | Antonella Napolitano | The EU Commission is framing these proposals as a humanitarian effort to “curb exploitation” by “ruthless smuggling gangs” — but this disguises a more insidious reality. | [
"Migration",
"EU Political",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] | migration | 2025-02-19T11:28:37.606Z | https://euobserver.com/migration/ar62dea65a |
The current state of independent media in Ukraine | Russia is keeping up its disinformation efforts in Ukraine. Empowering our nation's independent media serves as a mighty weapon against these efforts. Yet for Ukraine itself and its authorities, the independence of the media presents the flip side of the coin. A truly-independent media outlet knows no limits on what and who to write about, not to mention cases of corruption or wrongdoings of high-ranking public officials. No wonder, by tackling disinformation, revealing corruption inside Ukraine, and playing an impeccable role in reserving democracy during the war, independent journalists have uncounted enemies to deal with. Therefore, protecting independent journalists and granting them the required freedoms is an important challenge for our nation in these tough times. A year ago, I became the head of the parliamentary committee on freedom of speech. From that point on, my main objective has been to expand opportunities for free media and to strengthen their communication with the parliament. As part of these efforts, in June 2024, together with key Ukrainian civil society players, we introduced draft law No. 11321. In the second week of January 2025, 286 out of 337 lawmakers present that day approved the measure. Following the journalists’ appeals and EU Commission recommendations , the law ensures the openness and transparency of parliamentary committee meetings, most of which have been held behind closed doors since the Covid era. Furthermore, the law provides more opportunities for media outlets to defend their rights and withstand constant attacks on their independence. Predictably, this did not sit well with the Russian propaganda machine. The next day after the law was adopted, Telegram's propaganda channels — known for spreading disinformation — began circulating posts to discredit the law. According to sources in the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, one of the first such posts appeared on a channel with the express purpose of defaming the Ukrainian government. Sadly, these Russia-led themes were also shared by certain domestic news outlets. New statute Russian propagandists' central fallacy was that Ukraine would take action against media outlets that published critical statements about government officials. In reality, news organisations will discover a way to safeguard their interests through a new statute. As thanks to the law, the journalists can save time and money on legal defence by voluntarily deleting comments within three days if they are sued over them. At the same time, if the media considers an appeal to the court about the user’s comment as such that threatens the freedom of speech, it can still defend its position in court, as its is required according to the principle of the rule of law. In summary, the removal of the comments following the appeal to the court is merely an option, not a requirement. This clause was specifically requested by representatives of the media. Moreover, as early as 2015, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) effectively obliged media outlets and bloggers to moderate content under their own materials (Delfi AS v. Estonia). Thus, the possibility of lawsuits over user comments is standard practice in any developed country. At this very moment, the bill is in the signature-request stage with president Volodomy Zelensky. The failure of the draft law No. 10242 last year is an additional indication that the independent media have a support base in the parliament. The law would have imposed substantial obligations on investigative journalists, including the imposition of severe penalties for them and their sources who obtain data from closed government registers. Nevertheless, the draft law was not passed by parliament, largely thanks to the active involvement of Ukrainian media and civil society activists. At present, the proposed law is still pending a second reading, as indicated on the parliament's website. Nevertheless, the initiative has already become toxic for the majority of MPs, as evidenced by the previous attempts. Re-opening access to parliament Re-establishing access for journalists to the Verkhovna Rada [Ukraine's parliament] was another significant step last year. It is of the utmost importance that media continue to report the operations of the country's sole legislative body, even when there are restrictions during martial law. The legislative building currently only allows up to 30 media representatives at a time due to security concerns. While these kinds of measures represent our first steps in moving towards a greater transparency of the parliament’s work, this is an important development, as journalists were previously unable to enter or even visit the parliament building during Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Consequently, after a break of over two years, the media resumed their duties in the Rada. The de-anonymisation of Telegram channel owners, especially those spreading Russian propaganda, is one of the next steps we plan to make the job of professional journalists easier and combating disinformation. A solution that satisfies the requirements of the European Digital Services Act, solves the problems with the country's security, and gets people ready to utilise social media under these new circumstances is now up to the Verkhovna Rada. The adoption of the mentioned initiatives is a significant step forward, but the fight is far from over. Protecting independent journalism and ensuring its growth must remain a national priority, as its strength is integral not only to countering propaganda but also to safeguarding Ukraine’s democratic future amidst the challenges of war. Yaroslav Yurchyshyn is a Ukrainian MP, and head of the parliamentary committee of freedom on speech. | Yaroslav Yurchyshyn | A new law ensures the openness and transparency of parliamentary committee meetings, most of which have been held behind closed doors since the Covid era, writes the head of Ukraine's parliamentary committee on freedom of speech. | [
"EU & the World",
"Ukraine",
"Opinion"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-02-17T12:11:00.728Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/are2db36a3 |
The EU said it believed in the two-state solution — its actions said otherwise | At February's annual EU Ambassadors’ Conference, both the p resident of the EU Commission Ursula von der Leyen and EU foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas made the usual reference to the “two-state solution” as they mentioned the Middle East. Yet the EU has consistently undermined the two-state solution and fuelled the conflict in Israel/occupied Palestinian territory. Instead of acting on recommendations to change course, the EU leadership has possibly even paved the way for another solution: a mass deportation of Palestinians to Egypt and Jordan, flagged by US president Donald Trump as a “clean out” plan , as detailed during his press conference with Israel’s prime minister Netanyahu . 'The EU is a payer, not a player’? Contrary to this line often-heard since the author’s posting in Jerusalem, the EU has played a political role by using its political, commercial and financial levers against its own proclaimed policy objectives, in particular the ‘two-state solution’. It can still change course — but the clock is ticking. The EU fuelled the internal Palestinian division For almost two decades, the EU has fuelled the Palestinian division, both geographically (West Bank/Gaza Strip) and politically (Fatah/Hamas). It notably disregarded the Palestinian clear majority for Hamas in the 2006 legislative elections, considered democratic by an EU Electoral Observation Mission . Undermining a declared pillar of its foreign policy — support for democracy — the EU used its financial leverage to blindly support the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority, increasingly seen as authoritarian under president Mahmoud Abbas and, as confirmed recently, with limited control over the West Bank. Further, beyond the legal requirements regarding a terrorist organisation, the EU opted against diplomacy by a ‘no contact’ policy with Hamas. The EU used the Quartet's conditions as a one-sided diktat rather than responding to openings from Hamas leaders towards the recognition of Israel, such as Khaled Mesh'al to the former US president Jimmy Carter . The EU thus abandoned the Gaza Strip with also little regard to its own consensus on humanitarian aid or even for security: while it claims to support Israel’s security, the EU has maintained an explosive situation leading to the 7 October attacks. This was not for lack of warning: after Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009, recommendations to change course were not followed in Brussels. The EU sided with Israel’s governments against the two-state solution Over the past decades, the EU also sabotaged the two-state solution by offering successive Israeli governments considerable advantages knowing that Netanyahu and others undermined the very viability of a Palestinian state: inter alia, the rejection of the Arab Peace Initiative ; policies supporting Hamas and fuelling the Palestinian divide ; Israeli settlements expansion in violation of international law. The list EU supports is long, and goes beyond the EU-Israel Association Agreement : sectoral cooperation, access to European markets and funding; use of European taxpayers' money to facilitate Israel's occupation by freeing it from its obligations of an ‘occupying power’ under the Geneva Conventions . The EU invested billions in so-called Palestinian ‘state-building’, development and humanitarian aid, reconstruction — all after destruction by Israel’s army. Since October 2023, under von der Leyen, the EU institutions continued their ‘business as usual’ with the Netanyahu government, burying under the rubble the two-state solution and jeopardising the very existence of the Palestinian people — despite clear warnings by the International Court of Justice in the South Africa Israel case . Amidst the rising death toll and destruction in the Gaza Strip, but also in the West Bank, the EU Commission, for instance, greenlighted negotiations with Israel on aviation security ; renewed its agreement to the transfer of personal data to Israel — welcomed by Israeli authorities ; offered additional funding to ‘reinforce EU-Israel bilateral relations’ precisely when Israel further invested in illegal settlements. The EU leadership also flagged that Israel could count on European taxpayers’ money for Gaza's reconstruction, de facto encouraging further destruction. Will Kallas' position on the situation in Ukraine also apply to the Middle East and elsewhere? If aggression pays off somewhere, it serves as an invitation to use it elsewhere. That is our worry", she told the European Parliament during her hearing in November 2024. The EU leadership can continue to selectively apply and therefore undermine international law, or use the EU’s leverage to uphold the EU Treaty obligation of "strict respect (...) for international law " and implement the September 2024 UN General Assembly resolution demanding that Israel’s presence in occupied Palestinian territory, deemed “unlawful” by the International Court of Justice , ends within a year. The EU leadership can continue to blindly follow the US and give in to Netanyahu, a trend in EU policymaking, and be complicit to war crimes and crimes against humanity such as a mass deportation. Or it can rally all EU member states behind a new approach and use its leverage to effectively implement the two-state solution, or other creative and just options — with a vision of dynamics in the wider Middle East. China? The EU could also engage with other players. For instance, China guaranteed an agreement negotiated between Saudi Arabia and Iran , and recently welcomed 14 Palestinian factions, including Fatah and Hamas, to sign the Beijing Declaration on Ending Division and Strengthening Palestinian National Unity . Overall, the EU leadership could finally respond to the appeal by Rachel Goldberg-Polin , the mother of Israeli hostage Hersh. At a press conference in Geneva in December 2023, Rachel shared a poem for a mother in Gaza and the following message: "We are at a crossroads, and when I say we, I don't mean we Jews, Muslims or Christians, Americans, Palestinians, Europeans, Israelis, Ukrainians, Russians. I mean we humans. We can keep dividing the world into the paradigm of them versus us or we can start thinking about those who are willing and those who are not willing." In Rachel’s words: “All over the world, we have got to learn to live together or all over the world we are going to die together.“ Amidst rising tensions globally and within societies, and other existential threats, the time is now for the EU leadership to stop undermining the rule of law, the very foundation of the European project. The time is now for the EU’s leverage to serve the aspirations of all in the Middle East. The clock is ticking. Jérôme Bellion-Jourdan is a senior fellow at the Zurich-based Institute for Global Negotiation . The views expressed in this piece are of the author and not the IGN as whole. He served the European Commission in Cairo and Jerusalem, and as an EU diplomat in Geneva leading in UN negotiations on a range of issues including the Middle East. Bellion-Jourdan holds a PhD in Political Science from Sciences Po Paris. He has argued the above case in a memo and confidential notes sent by the author to the EU leadership since the 7 October attacks. Jérôme Bellion-Jourdan is a senior fellow at the Zurich-based | Institute for Global Negotiation | Over the past decades, the EU also sabotaged the two-state solution by offering successive Israeli governments considerable advantages knowing that Netanyahu and others undermined the very viability of a Palestinian state. | [
"EU & the World",
"Opinion"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-02-13T15:37:54.005Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/arf30887e7 |
What next for the protests in Serbia? | For three months, tens of thousands of citizens, led by students from all over Serbia , have protested throughout the country. They constitute the most serious challenge to the 13-year rule of Aleksandar Vučić. The real question is how these protests can lead to change in Serbia. The protests have clearly defined demands: they seek a legal process against those responsible for the collapse of the canopy at the Novi Sad train station, the release of all documents, the investigation into the attacks against the students, and more funding for universities. While the students did not explicitly demand resignations or new elections, the ruling party and president Vučić have responded with resignations and other measures outside the institutions' functioning. Thus, the president offers solutions reinforcing his extra-constitutional power and a political response, whereas the students demand an institutional response. The four demands raised by Serbian students can be summarised into one fundamental call: they seek accountability from their government and the reinstatement of the rule of law. Over the past 13 years of the Serbian Progressive Party rule, systemic corruption has eroded the rule of law, transforming key institutions into mere tools for those in power. Elections have been marred by irregularities, leaving no realistic opportunity for the opposition to gain power through democratic means. State-run media serve as a mouthpiece for the ruling party, and the police and intelligence services target civil society organisations unlawfully. In this climate, the restoration of a functioning rule of law — one that holds government officials accountable, limits their power and ensures legal checks and balances — is essential not only for democracy but for any semblance of political normalcy. After months of the protests, Vučić wants to give the appearance of fulfilling the demands — at least to his voters — without fulfilling them. As Serbia is at an impasse, the possible scenarios arise. Currently, there is little chance of intense pressure from the outside. While the regime keeps suggesting that Western intelligence agencies support the protests and have been warning of so-called ‘coloured revolutions’, the demonstrators have not received any Western support. The government, on the other hand, did. The US under Trump has supported Vučić, as the messages from Trump’s special envoy, Richard Grenell, indicate. The EU's messages have not been much different. The support is partially grounded in the false yearning for "stability", as EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas recently stated. Enlargement commissioner Marta Kos's letter on the protests avoided taking a clear position. Member states have made lucrative deals with the regime. This includes the sale of French fighter jets to Serbia in 2024 and the lithium mining project by Rio Tinto , which has received strong support from Germany. This does not mean that their support is inevitable. If the protests fail, Serbia will not continue with business as usual, but the regime will become more authoritarian and citizens’ distrust will not disappear. Thus, the stability which motivates EU passivity is completely elusive But the EU is likely to act only if the regime either increases repression or if there are apparent fissures in the regime. Russia and China are staunch supporters of the regime and dislike citizens expressing their opinions anyhow. While the students rightfully demand that the institutions operate according to the constitution, they will not do so without the president’s blessing. Regime collapse? Vučić might fulfil the student protests' demands, but after months of foot-dragging and attacking the protestors, there is little confidence that the regime’s concessions can defuse the protests. Furthermore, even if the demands were met, the structural problem remains. The regime of SNS and Vučić is fundamentally undemocratic and cannot restore the rule of law without threatening itself. Unless Vučić makes a mistake, the system will only collapse if part of the power structure around Vučić shifts loyalties. This will be tricky. The current regime is highly personalised, making maneuvering an elite split difficult. Without external support or apparent allies within the institutions, a political process must emerge that brings a united opposition and a clear path. Despite a short period of cooperation ahead of the 2023 elections, this process has been fragmented. A way forward could draw from the experience in North Macedonia in 2015/6, where an EU-mediated agreement brought in a caretaker government that prepared the country for elections and included representatives from the opposition and the ruling party. However, this path was only possible with outside assistance, which is currently unlikely. Nevertheless, such a political path out of the crisis appears to be the only direction in which the current protests can transform their demands into lasting change. If the protests fail, Serbia will not continue with business as usual, but the regime will become more authoritarian and citizens’ distrust will not disappear. Thus, the stability which motivates EU passivity is completely elusive. Florian Bieber is professor of southeast European history and politics at the Centre for Southeast European Studies at the University of Graz . Marko Kmezić is a lecturer and senior researcher at the same institution, where Claudia Lastro is a PhD researcher and Lura Pollozhani researches social movements and EU enlargement. All are also members of the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG). Florian Bieber is professor of southeast European history and politics at the Centre for Southeast European Studies at the University of Graz . Marko Kmezić is a lecturer and senior researcher at the same institution, where Claudia Lastro is a PhD researcher and Lura Pollozhani researches social movements and EU enlargement. All are also members of the | Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group | The regime of Serbian Progressive Party and president Aleksanda Vučić is fundamentally undemocratic and cannot restore the rule of law without threatening itself. Unless Vučić makes a mistake, the system will only collapse if part of the power structure around Vučić shifts loyalties | [
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] | eu-political | 2025-02-13T11:05:58.390Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-political/arb3d2f254 |
Athens pays $600,000 to Washington lobbyists to be 'Trump-whisperers' | Greece has become the latest European government to hire Washington lobbyists as it seeks to curry favour with president Donald Trump. The contract between the Greek foreign ministry and BGR group , a Republican-focused spin shop with close links to Trump and his officials, is worth $600,000 [€577,000] per year and started on Monday (10 February). BGR has been the big winner on K-Street (the eponymous location of most upmarket Washington lobbying outfits) since Trump’s presidential election win in November. It has taken on the governments of Qatar and Panama, as well as the Yemeni National Resistance in contracts worth around $3.3m in the three weeks since Trump’s inauguration on 20 January. BGR will offer “strategic guidance and counsel with regard to government affairs activity within the US” the contract, filed under the Foreign Agents Registration Ac t, states. “This may include relevant outreach to US government officials, non-government organizations,” it adds. Greece’s main lobbyist will be Fred Turner, a former Democrat Congressional aide, whose support team will include Lester Munson, a former Republican staffer and former senior USAID official in the George W. Bush administration. Greece’s move is the latest in a trend of European governments seeking political influence in Washington. Though a cluster of EU countries have lobbyists in Washington to help promote their tourist industries, the bloc’s governments have rarely hired consultants with a brief to give them access and influence in Congress and the White House. That appears to have changed following Trump’s election. Earlier this week, the president imposed tariffs on steel and aluminium imports that will hit the EU economy, and are likely to be followed by a wider package of import duties. He has also shuttered USAID and ordered a 90-day freeze on US aid programmes, many of which operate in the EU. The European Commission has been in negotiations with DCI group, another Republican lobby firm, while Denmark, facing aggressive demands from the Trump administration to buy Greenland, is also in the market for lobbyists. Meanwhile, Greek prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis has joined the EU’s criticism of Trump’s approach to Greenland, describing it as the latest in a series of “relatively unprecedented announcements announcing geo-strategic changes [and] changes in zones of influence.” He has also spoken of “tectonic upheaval” caused by Trump’s election However, the Mitsotakis government may have reason to expect favourable treatment from the US over the next four years. Trump has appointed Kimberley Guilfoyle, a TV personality, lawyer and former fiancee of his son Don Jr, as the new US ambassador in Athens. | Benjamin Fox is a seasoned reporter and editor, previously working for fellow Brussels publication Euractiv. His reporting has also been published in the Guardian, the East African, Euractiv, Private Eye and Africa Confidential, among others. He heads up the AU-EU section at EUobserver, based in Nairobi, Kenya. | Greece has become the latest European government to hire Washington lobbyists as it seeks to curry favour with the capricious president Donald Trump. | [
"EU & the World"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-02-12T17:33:23.100Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/arbd150faa |
Denmark outsourcing prisoners to Kosovo set pattern for Meloni and Albania | In recent years, EU member states have increasingly turned to 'outsourcing' their societal challenges, from asylum policy to waste management and industrial pollution, not to mention security and defence. This trend, often framed as pragmatic, is in reality a costly and ethically fraught abdication of responsibility. Two recent cases exemplify this, one of them little-reported and one well-documented: Denmark’s agreement to send convicted prisoners to Kosovo and Italy’s outsourcing of asylum processing to Albania. The fact that this tendency to outsourcing is shared by both northern and southern member states point to the urgent need for a cohesive, federal response to Europe’s challenges that are rooted in solidarity and the rule of law. Something rotten in state of Denmark? Denmark’s approach to penal outsourcing, while less internationally reported, is highly concerning. In 2021, Denmark signed a deal to send 300 prisoners — convicted in Denmark and slated for deportation — to Kosovo. The Danish deal with Kosovo is not explicitly focused on offshoring societal issues wholesale but the underlying reason for this is certainly to target a key demographic among the Danish electorate, and to appear to stand for rule of law. However, the very value that these arrangements are supposed to protect, are tarnished by their abuse. For how can Denmark’s legal system credibly monitor and support a system hundreds of kilometers away? How will they ensure that prisoners are afforded the same standards of care and human rights? How can the legal authorities of Denmark comfortably sentence people to deportation, if they cannot justifiable ensure their rights are being safeguarded — after all, the fundamental reason for having a penal system is reform, not merely reprehension. Such outsourcing of justice and the exportation of prisoners is merely a temporary fix to avoid domestic investment in a long-term penal reform. The deal risks isolating prisoners from their families, lawyers, and Danish society, undermining the rehabilitative purpose of incarceration. Rehabilitation itself — proven to reduce recidivism and enhance public safety — may be at risk in an area where legal, cultural, and linguistic barriers may further isolate prisoners. Denmark’s relationship to Rwanda is equally worrisome. A first-mover in suggesting asylum processing sites outside of Europe, other countries, like UK, followed suit — like lemmings over the precipice — never seemingly flinching at the notion of pouring millions of pounds or krona into a migratory Eldorado only the conquistadors might rival in their lust for a dreamed up answer. However, as the implacability of the Danish and British authorities have met harsh reality , we find ourselves again at the crux of the challenge: The protection of our Europe values require solutions that adhere and protect them. In a multipolar world or disintegrating stability, we in Europe must hold firm to our ideals and this means not only tackling migrati and asylum seekers’ needs, but also actively and proactively integrate them into European society. Enter Meloni The Italy-Albania deal, currently under intense scrutiny , exemplifies the worst of this trait. Italian PM Giorgia Meloni has touted the €680m deal as a bold solution to the nation’s migration pressures. Under this bilateral agreement, migrants intercepted en route to Italy are transferred to the centres in Albania if they meet specific criteria: they must originate from countries classified by the government as “safe”, where individuals are presumed to not require international protection, and must not belong to vulnerable groups such as unaccompanied minors, women and individuals with health or age-related vulnerabilities. The agreement primarily targets adult male migrants who are supposedly subjected to an accelerated 28-day asylum procedure. Approved asylum claims result in transfer to Italy, while rejections lead to deportation from Albania to their countries of origin. Reports indicate how these centers face legal uncertainties and are poorly equipped to manage the influx of applicants. Beyond its logistical failings, the plan appears to be a cynical attempt to placate anti-immigration voters rather than a smart solution. By outsourcing the asylum procedure, Meloni shifts the problem out of sight, setting a dangerous unilateral precedent that undermines the EU’s collective ability to address migration challenges effectively. The fact that Italy has felt the need to pursue a bilateral agreement reflects the lack of confidence in first-arrival countries in the New EU Migration Pact and Frontex’s role. The EU’s current exportation of responsibilities has troubling implications. They not only create further occasions for division within the EU, but they also dramatically undermine the continent’s moral leadership, as Italy and Denmark’s strategies exemplify. International asylum law seeks to prohibit practices that could result in inhuman or degrading treatment — a risk inherent in outsourcing justice or migration management to countries with less resources or weaker legal safeguards. But perhaps most concerning, these deals erode the trust in the EU as a unified body committed to shared values. The abdication of responsibility is merely a symptom of the EU’s disfunctional governance, with unanimity voting at its core, that hampers its consensus-building capacity and prevents EU action in principle. When wealthier nations offload their responsibilities, they not only strain their relationships with less affluent neighbours but also send a message that solidarity is secondary to political expediency. This is hardly a successful strategy to bring the Western Balkans into the EU. Shared infrastructure, funding, and oversight would standardise practices and relieve individual member states from shouldering disproportionate burdens. If member states continue to push for bilateral agreements that disperse and run counter to European values, they not only riddle the effectiveness of EU treaties and existing legislation, but also hinder the development of new, federal approaches. The EU’s strength and its global projection should be centred around its ability to lead with values, from pioneering human rights protection to championing democratic governance. Outsourcing societal responsibilities amounts to sweeping the dust under the carpet, and it is a betrayal of its legacy. If the EU is to remain a moral leader it must confront its challenges with transparency, solidarity and a commitment to truly European solutions, which are the only way to forge policies that reflect its ideals. No member state should be left to carry the burdens alone. Federico Durante Mangoni is a former trainee at Volt Europe, Kathrine Richter is co-president of Volt Denmark. Francesca Romana D'Antuono is co-president of Volt Europa . Federico Durante Mangoni is a former trainee at Volt Europe, Kathrine Richter is co-president of Volt Denmark. Francesca Romana D'Antuono is co-president of | Volt Europa | In 2021, Denmark signed a deal to send 300 prisoners — convicted in Denmark and slated for deportation — to Kosovo. Such outsourcing of justice and the exportation of prisoners is merely a temporary fix to avoid domestic investment in a long-term penal reform. | [
"Nordics",
"EU Political",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] | eu-political | 2025-02-12T12:16:42.020Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ara1acfe73 |
Germany needs another Helmut Kohl - instead, it's getting Friedrich Merz | Helmut Kohl became the chancellor of Germany at a time of profound crisis for the Western world. In the early 1980s, the Soviet Union was seeking to extend its superpower status in Afghanistan and deploying modernised SS-20 missiles in eastern Europe that were capable of striking Nato. Germany today faces a similar set of existential geopolitical challenges. Vladimir Putin has launched the first-interstate war in Europe since the Second World War and made frequent threats of nuclear conflict with the West. The return of Russian imperialism on a large-scale in 2022 prompted a radical re-orientation of German foreign policy. Olaf Scholz acknowledged the demise of the peace dividend and the need for Germany to step up on defence and security. But after three years of war, the [Change of an Era] that the German chancellor proclaimed has failed fundamentally to materialise. Scholz has presided over a deterioration in Germany’s relations with its neighbours and key EU partners — France and Poland . A summit of Western leaders on Ukraine took place in Berlin last October without the inclusion of the Polish prime minister, Donald Tusk. The German government also delayed a ban on Russian liquefied natural gas trans-shipments and a proposal to make EU companies responsible for sanctions violations. In contrast, Kohl took an approach that adapted Germany effectively to the difficult geopolitical landscape it confronted. He understood that a credible deterrence towards Soviet aggression was essential, despite the painful memory of Hitler’s assault on Russia in 1941. For Kohl, this could not be possible without Germany’s transformation into a dependable actor in Europe. When he entered the German chancellery in 1982, Kohl faced down the threat of the Soviet Union’s modernised nuclear capabilities. He allowed the deployment of the American Pershing II missiles on West German territory. While many were critical of Kohl’s decision at the time, it played a crucial role in alleviating the tensions of the Cold War. Mikhail Gorbachev later admitted that Nato's steadfastness during the Euromissile crisis contributed significantly to his accommodation of the West under ‘new thinking’ . In parallel, Kohl was determined to prevent Germany from becoming isolated amid the Cold War divisions of Europe. His predecessor, Konrad Adenauer, initiated the Franco-German reconciliation process with Charles de Gaulle. Yet, France was still wary of a resurgence in German power. Kohl made a powerful repudiation of French concerns in striking a strong alliance with Francois Mitterrand. Their partnership formed the basis of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) - the present-day European Union. Eastward enlargement But Kohl also knew that Germany had a historical responsibility to build mutual trust and understanding with Poland. He pioneered the EU’s eastward enlargement, which he believed was critical to the stability and security of the European continent. The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) was a significant milestone as it laid out how the former communist states of central and eastern Europe could be admitted into the EU. Today, Poland stands as a thriving democracy and market economy in the heart of Europe . The statecraft that Kohl exemplified are sorely missing in Europe today. While Germany has sent substantial military aid to Ukraine, it still lacks a comprehensive strategy towards Russia. Instead, Scholz chose to pursue dialogue with Moscow and maintain a prudent approach — to the detriment of European security. Since 2022, Russia has remained intent on reasserting its influence in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. Russia’s aggression is even starting to test Germany’s security. The Kremlin has regularly weaponised irregular migration flows to destabilise the internal affairs of EU member states, such as Poland and Finland. But the suspension of cheap Russian gas imports left Germany particularly vulnerable to the Kremlin’s hybrid warfare. The far-right populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) has exploited Germany’s socio-economic discontent and weakened support for the centre-right and -left. Donald Trump’s return to the White House and Russia’s revisionism mean that Germany will need to make a strategic reset to safeguard European security. Friedrich Merz is expected to become Germany’s next chancellor. If the CDU leader prevails in this month’s federal elections, his job should be to recapture the ‘European spirit’ that defined Kohl’s approach to German leadership. Kohl has often been dismissed as one of Germany’s less inspiring post-war leaders. The CDU tried to oust him after a disappointing set of election results just months before the fall of the Berlin Wall. And his retirement was mired in, and marred by, the scandal of secret donations to the CDU under his watch. But his actions have stood the test of time. Germany reunified and Europe found a way to transcend its differences to create an effective system of peaceful coexistence that many thought impossible. The elections on 23 February are the most consequential for Germany since 1990. Kohl’s momentous time in office helped to create a Europe based on freedom and the rule of law. The task ahead of Germany’s leaders today will be to deter Russia from unraveling that European order. Hugo Blewett-Mundy is a non-resident associate research fellow from the EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy in Prague. Hugo Blewett-Mundy is a non-resident associate research fellow from the | EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy | The elections on 23 February are the most consequential for Germany since 1990. Kohl’s momentous time in office helped to create a Europe based on freedom and the rule of law. The task ahead of Germany’s leaders today will be to deter Russia from unraveling that European order. | [
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] | eu-political | 2025-02-11T14:19:12.245Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar6b35211f |
EU needs to halt rich member states poaching doctors and nurses | The new(ish) EU commissioner for health and animal welfare, Olivér Várhelyi, will undoubtedly face immense and pressing challenges in his new role. Most EU countries are facing identical demographic changes: an ageing population, and an ageing and shrinking health workforce, which is also overworked and undervalued . To say that this does not bode well for access to healthcare for EU citizens would be an understatement. Unattractive working conditions in the healthcare sector make it difficult for countries to recruit and retain their health workers. Dissatisfied health workers turn elsewhere in search of better working conditions, job opportunities or salaries: another city, region — or even another country altogether. The richer countries in northern and western Europe often attract health workers from less affluent countries in southern or eastern Europe. OECD data shows that over the past decade, high-income countries such as Germany, UK, Switzerland and Norway increasingly rely on doctors and nurses trained abroad. Countries like Romania, Slovakia and Hungary, on the other hand, are affected by ‘brain drain’ of their health workers to other countries. Under the radar And some numbers stay under the radar. For example, a conservative estimate suggests that in Germany, there are around 300,000 foreign care workers in the country’s 24-hour live-in care sector, of which many come from east Europe. The geographic imbalance of health workers affects access to healthcare across the EU. It worsens health inequalities in and between regions and countries, specifically harming rural communities. These disparities clash with the EU’s ambition for shared prosperity and cohesion across its member states. And while experts have been sounding the alarm about health workforce shortages for years, it was especially during Covid-19 that countries experienced how health systems can fail due to insufficient health workers. Recruiting foreign health workers, while potentially worsening staff shortages in other countries, is a mere ‘quick fix’ to a chronic problem. EU member states should work towards structural solutions that benefit everyone. Instead of fishing for scarce health workers in the same pond, EU member states should invest in their health workers: ensuring strong health systems that can retain their health workers with attractive working conditions, training and career opportunities. This is where the new commissioner for health can play a pivotal role. To ensure structural solutions, he must spearhead united European action. First, the commissioner should ensure that member states know how to better use existing EU instruments to address their health workforce shortages. This knowledge is currently lacking among member states. For example, certain EU funding sources, like the Recovery and Resilience Funds and European Structural and Investment Funds , can help member states provide better working conditions for their health workforce. 'Medical deserts' Second, the new commissioner should support member states with understanding the full picture. Where are health workers migrating to, and why? Where are the areas with limited availability of health workers, the so-called medical deserts ? Member states could use answers to these questions to inform solution-oriented policies. This requires systematic data collection and monitoring, which is currently lacking. Third, the commissioner should ensure an inclusive approach by inviting more non-state actors, such as health professionals’ associations, in policy discussions about the health workforce crisis. Civic space has been decreasing because of fluctuating interest from member states. But the value of non-state actors is indispensable due to their proximity to local problems and communities. By giving them a voice, in national research and advocacy for example, they can bring essential insights to the table. To effectively address their national health workforce shortages, EU member states should take united action on the above steps, supported by the commissioner. The last thing the EU needs is inward-turning member states that resort to the quick fix of competing for each other’s’ scarce health workers, without reflecting on the consequences of their actions on access to healthcare in other countries. If anyone should know this, it's the new commissioner, given that his home country, Hungary, is disproportionally hit by the out-migration of health workers. The demographic changes happening across Europe — an ageing population plus an ageing and shrinking health workforce — are the ‘perfect storm’ to exacerbate health inequalities in EU countries. But is not too late to turn the tide. The commissioner therefore has a crucial and timely responsibility. He should do everything in the remit of his mandate to lead the way and avert the crisis. For the benefit of all. Mariëlle Bemelmans director of Wemos , a Netherlands-based public health NGO that has led two European partnerships on addressing health worker shortages in Europe. Mariëlle Bemelmans director of | Wemos | The last thing the EU needs is inward-turning member states that resort to the quick fix of competing for each other’s’ scarce health workers, without reflecting on the consequences of their actions on access to healthcare in other countries. | [
"EU Political",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] | eu-political | 2025-02-10T13:44:53.966Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar2c16b5c9 |
Romania's agony | Romania has been much in the news of late, and the news isn’t good. Much of the focus has been on the so-called TikTok controversy , in which the Russian intelligence services allegedly interfered in the recent election to promote its favored candidate. There is substantial evidence that did in fact occur. As a result, the highest court in Romania cancelled the election, and it has been rescheduled for May. Cancelling an election is as extraordinary an act as it is troubling. Russian interference in the election of an EU and Nato member state is just as problematic. Romania is a stalwart member of the Nato alliance with over 10,000 troops planned in Constanta, critical missile defences in Deveselu, and further plans for expansion of Nato troops elsewhere in Romania. I served as US Ambassador to Romania in the Obama Administration and am of Romanian heritage. I have a deep affection for the country and am proud to be part of a group of former US ambassadors to Romania under presidents Clinton, Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden, who I know shares my concern about what is happening there. While I traveled to Romania over two dozen times after leaving my post in 2012, I have only been back once in the last three years. But I do stay in frequent touch with those I trust there. I share the deep concern about foreign interference and strongly support the investigations by the European Commission under the Digital Services Act and by the Romanian government on election law violations. I also believe that the problems are much deeper. Just as we are seeing elsewhere in Europe, deep dissatisfaction with governance has created a toxic atmosphere in which disinformation and propaganda thrives. There was recently a very revealing piece on voter anger in Romania. It paints a picture of despair, brain drain, a 'broken school-to-work pipeline', high inflation, poverty & inequality, regional disparities, corruption and incompetence in health care, low life expectancy, and corruption. Some economic indicators are improving, and of late more Romanians are returning home, but public perception of current governance is quite poor as it is in much of the region. I saw all of this as an ambassador, but a lackluster, disorganised — indeed tribal — political system continues to plague Romania. I saw tremendous progress in my years there, especially on fighting corruption and even building a resilient and innovative tech sector in Bucharest and some of the Transylvanian cities. In fact Bucharest is now one of the 50 richest cities in Europe – 35th in fact. As a result of close collaboration between our current excellent ambassador and the host government, Romania just in the last year gained access to both the Schengen zone and the US visa waiver programme, greatly facilitating regional and international travel, a development that is expected to provide a major boost to the economy. The extreme right, nativists, and Russian trolls will continue to stir the witch's brew in Romania and other member states of the EU Oligarch capture of media Romania also has a small but determined group of anti-corruption and democracy reform NGOs and investigative journalists who work hard to hold elites accountable. But greater investment, especially long-term sustainable equity investment in media is critically needed in Romania, Hungary, and any number of backsliding EU member states. The bottom line is that the EU Commission should complete and release the findings of its investigation of Russian interference before the voters return to the polls in May. So should Romanian authorities report on their investigation of election law violations. The European Commission should make saving local media through support for equity investment for media a centerpiece of its governing agenda, just like we did for electric vehicles. The oligarchic and political capture and collapse of media in Romania and other EU member states is a moral and market failure. Independent media is critical infrastructure for democracy in the EU just as it is in the United States. But most important, the established political parties have to offer solutions to the chronic problems that ordinary Romanians face. I am confident that there are political leaders who have the political & substantive talent to do so. But if they don't, the extreme right, nativists, and Russian trolls will continue to stir the witch's brew in Romania and other member states of the EU. Now is the time for action, in Romania, central and eastern Europe, and in the United States. For what happens in Romania will eventually affect us all. As President Reagan said in his last year in office referring to Europe: “Preservation of a peaceful, free and democratic Europe is essential to the preservation of a peaceful, free and democratic United States.” A politically unstable EU riven by political turmoil fomented by corrupt autocratic member states is a threat to the transatlantic alliance in Nato and the EU — a partnership that has greatly benefited Americans and preserved the peace and stability of the world since the end of World War II. Mark Gitenstein was US ambassador to Romania 2009-12, and US ambassador to the European Union (2012-25). | Mark Gitenstein | The bottom line is that the EU Commission should complete and release the findings of its investigation of Russian interference in Romania's election before the voters return to the polls in May, writes the US former ambassador to Romania and to the EU. | [
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] | eu-political | 2025-02-10T06:00:00.000Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-political/arc2172c27 |
Von der Leyen's second-term U-turns will come back to hurt Europeans | During her first Commission mandate, Ursula von der Leyen defended the EU Green Deal as a “strategy for growth that gives more back than it takes away”. But in a complete and worrying reversal, her second term’s slogan seems to be deregulation, particularly when it comes to legislation setting the bar for environmental and human rights protection. Last November, von der Leyen announced a proposal to review and simplify environmental and human rights laws passed in the previous term, including the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) requiring large companies to prevent and remedy human rights and environmental abuses in their supply chains. The regulatory break is presented by EU and member state leaders as a necessity amid an economic slowdown, assuming that Europe’s competitiveness would be boosted by reducing red tape for businesses. France’s ministry of finance even called for an indefinite delay of some Green Deal laws in the current context. That, however, could not be further from the truth. In his September 2024 report on competitiveness in the EU, Mario Draghi emphasised that “while the EU should aim to move closer to the US example in terms of productivity, growth and innovation, it should do so without the drawbacks of the US social model.” While some actors seize upon the Draghi report to push for a deregulation agenda, this undermines the role of the EU in building what the European Environmental Agency calls “competitive sustainability”. The EU will not benefit from backtracking on its sustainability standards but rather set itself up for failure, to the detriment of its institutional stability as well as human rights and the environment. Extinguishing the trailblazer To begin with, the move is damaging to Brussels’s reputation as a trailblazer in both regulation and human rights — and one with a unique global influence when it comes to corporate accountability. The CSDDD is among the most far-reaching due diligence legislations worldwide. It has inspired many countries to start developing binding norms for businesses that have enjoyed the impunity arising from voluntary standards. A U-turn on the CSDDD and other laws would put in the backseat the EU’s groundbreaking legal work to protect people and the environment. But what the commission underestimates is that a sudden turnaround would also significantly affect businesses for the worse. Indeed, companies and investors rely on predictability to navigate the economy, especially in hard times when leaders abroad engage in a strategy of chaos. Reopening directives that were negotiated for years to achieve consensus and adopted through a democratic process — and only a few months after their approval — undermines the idea that EU laws provide a safe space for businesses to operate in. The EU cannot afford to choose chaos because of pressures from other countries’ leaders when its biggest asset has always been institutional and legal stability. Currently, the commission is running invitation-only consultations where corporate lobbies outweigh civil society organisations and trade unions Moreover, a sudden change in direction penalises those companies that have already invested significant resources and time in compliance ahead of the directive’s adoption. The ones that have committed to respecting workers, communities, and the environment will suddenly find themselves at a disadvantage compared to the 'laggers'. While EU rules are supposed to create a level playing field, the commission’s change of plans creates the opposite situation and focuses only on short-term problems. Responsible investors , companies , and academic experts have denounced the unfairness of such a move and how it would delay an urgently needed transition toward a just economic model that does not rest on exploitation and poverty. Lastly, the way the commission has been handling discussions of the package is damaging the principles of transparency and inclusion enshrined in EU treaties. Currently, the commission is running invitation-only consultations where corporate lobbies outweigh civil society organisations and trade unions. While 31 companies, 13 percent of them representing oil and gas interests, are given a seat to shape requirements on environmental and human rights due diligence, the victims of corporate abuses and those at the frontline of the environmental crises will go unheard. If the burden for small and medium enterprises has been cited as another argument for deregulation, they form only 13 percent of companies invited. This striking over-representation of certain voices and the lack of impact assessments behind the rush for deregulation run counter to the EU’s Better Regulation principles to develop laws in a way that is participatory and rooted in evidence. We fear that the rebuke of previous legislative efforts, especially held under these conditions, will erode the trust of the whole of civil society in the EU’s processes and their democratic legitimacy. The EU has always prided itself on its role as a global leader in both sustainability and human rights. Now more than ever, it is crucial that the Union stand firm on its resolution to protect people and the planet, resisting the pressure to deregulate for the sake of short-term economic gains and pressures from rogue players. Cutting 'red tape' will only worsen competitiveness while harming our potential to transition to a better economy and society – all while compromising the EU’s unity and purpose. Olivier De Schutter is UN special rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights and law professor at UC Louvain . Olivier De Schutter is UN special rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights and law professor at | UC Louvain | In her first term, Ursula von der Leyen defended the EU Green Deal as a “strategy for growth that gives more back than it takes away”. But in a complete and worrying reversal, her second term’s slogan seems to be deregulation, warns UN special rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights Olivier De Schutter. | [
"EU Political",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] | eu-political | 2025-02-07T11:46:46.217Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar310d8372 |
A first look at the EU’s upcoming legislative agenda | The European Commission's 2025 draft work programme has been leaked, offering a first look at the EU’s upcoming legislative agenda. The programme, due to be officially unveiled and presented to MEPs in Strasbourg next week, lists this year’s new proposals, pending files and planned withdrawals. The draft could be subject to potential changes before the final version is adopted. The document lists 46 initiatives, including 24 legislative changes and 22 non-legislative proposals. It also reveals a total of 120 pending files, alongside 31 proposals that will undergo evaluations and fitness checks. The 2025 work programme also foresees the repeal of outdated rules in agriculture, statistics, and transport. But the chapter on the commission's planned withdrawals remains to be completed. The new proposals of the commission prioritise those categorised as competitiveness (10 initiatives), simplification (8 initiatives) and security (6), followed by innovation, preparedness & resilience, and social fairness (each 4). Key simplification proposals include three omnibus packages planned for 2025: the first, focusing on sustainability requirements, is expected to be unveiled on 26 February, followed by two more in the second quarter, on small and medium-sized enterprises and on investment rules. The first omnibus aims to amend the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), and the EU Taxonomy Regulation. But potential simplification risks turning into deregulation. And plans to re-open agreed legislative texts prompted criticism from some companies, researchers, and civil society organisations. Alongside the first omnibus proposal, the Clean Industrial Deal aimed at increasing investment in infrastructure, particularly energy-intensive sectors , is also expected on 26 February. EPP alignment There is a strong alignment between president Ursula von der Leyen's own centre-right European People's Party (EPP) priorities and the commission’s work programme. Under pressure to tighten migration rules — including external return hubs — the EU Commission is set to unveil a new common approach to returns on 11 March. A broader European Migration and Asylum Strategy will follow later in the year (Q4). Likewise, a ‘pact for the Mediterranean’ aimed at cooperating with non-EU countries on migration is set to be unveiled in Q3 this year. Other simplification initiatives include the European Business Wallet (Q4 2025) for digital document management, a chemical regulation REACH revision (Q4 2025) to ease procedures, and a Common Agricultural Policy simplification package (Q2 2025) to reduce paperwork for farmers. Additionally, the revision of the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (Q3 2025) aims to simplify reporting, while the Cybersecurity Act review is scheduled for Q4 2025. Building on the proposal for a defence of democracy package to address foreign interference, the commission is also expected to put forward a European Democracy Shield (non-legislative) in the second quarter. EU budget Discussions on the next EU budget have already started. But the proposal for the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the long-term European budget for 2028–2034, is only expected to be published during the third quarter, likely in July or September. The Single Market Strategy is set to be rolled out in early 2025 — in a bid to respond to Enrico Letta’s report and enhance the EU’s competitiveness. The amendment of the Climate Law to include the 2040 emission reduction target is expected for the second quarter. The Digital Networks Act will be unveiled at the end of the year. The proposal, which focuses on telecoms regulation, will also try to address the €200bn shortfall the EU is facing in network investment. The Critical Medicines Act, aimed to tackle shortages of essential medicines, is expected to be published on 11 March, while the European Biotech Act will be presented towards the end of the year. Meanwhile, an action plan for affordable energy is expected by the end of February, followed by a roadmap to end Russian energy imports by the end of March. The EU still imports about 15 percent of gas (both pipeline gas and liquified natural gas) from Russia. | Notably, some proposals are missing, especially for the transport sector. For the automobile industry, there is no sign of an industrial action plan, which was scheduled for 5 March, nor a proposal on the greening of company fleets, as set in the mission letter of transport commissioner Apostolos Tzitzikostas. | The European Commission's 2025 draft work programme has been leaked, offering a first look at the EU’s upcoming legislative agenda. | [
"EU Political"
] | eu-political | 2025-02-06T14:02:25.373Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ard595388d |
Syria's transition is very uncertain — partly due to Turkey | Ahmed al-Shara , head of an Islamist coalition that overthrew Bashar al-Assad, was recently appointed president of Syria to steward Syria’s transition. The Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), America’s allies fighting Isis, is wary of replacing one dictator with another. Shara talks about pluralism, but he has a sordid background. Before leading Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which 'liberated' Damasus, he was a prominent member of Al-Qaeda and the Nusra front. The US lifted its $10m [€9.7bn] bounty on Shara, but the HTS is categorised as a terror group. Until Shara proves himself, Washington should be wary of normalising relations and lifting sanctions. Syria faces serious challenges after 50 years of rule by Bashar al-Assad’s Ba'ath party. About 11 million people were displaced during Syria’s civil war. Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdogan wants to repatriate them to traditional Kurdish lands in Syria’s northeast, Rojava. The SDC objects to the repatriation of Arabs to Rojava, which could upset the balance of communities in the region. Erdogan is deeply hostile to the SDC, a secular pro-Western group, which led the fight against Isis. The SDC is under constant threat from Turkey, which supports Isis. Turkish troops are massed on the border with Syria. Its drones regularly attack SDC positions. Kurdish leaders have been assassinated by Turkish-backed Islamist proxies. The SDC’s platform of grassroots democracy, women’s empowerment and environmental protection is anathema to Erdogan’s centralised authoritarian rule. It says that the ideology represents a model for decentralised governance that is applicable throughout Syria. Shara and Erdogan are ideologically and politically-aligned. How will Shara manage Syria’s transition? The top priority will be to return refugees to their homes. This starts with the conduct of a census to manage refugee returns. Then Shara envisions a Shura council to draft Syria’s new constitution. He has appointed cohorts from Idlib and parts of northwestern Syria who are religious zealots with little administrative experience. Beginning on 1 March, Shara plans a dialogue with them and community leaders about Syria’s future governance. Shara has grown accustomed to unbridled power. He says the transition could take three years — or longer. A system of transitional justice will be needed to guide the transfer of power from Assad’s Alawite-led military to the new regime. This will be difficult in a country with no experience administering the rule of law. 'No angel' Revenge-taking by Syrians who suffered torture chambers and chemical weapons attacks could disrupt the process of balancing accountability with efforts to rebuild the state, eliminate corruption and cronyism, and end the reign of terror that defined Assad’s rule. Shara is no angel. He became the emir of al-Nusra in 2011; Shara — then known by his nom-de-guerre, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, organised resistance to the US occupation in Iraq. As a member of Al-Qaeda, he participated in the Iraqi insurgency against US forces. He was imprisoned in 2006 at Camp Bucca, which served as a training ground for a whole generation of Islamist terrorists. Five years later, he joined Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of Isis, and became a protégé of Ayman al-Zawahiri who led al Qaeda after Usama bin Laden. Shara consolidated his power in Syria by orchestrating assassinations of rival Islamist factions. HTS gained control over 80 percent of the Idlib governorate. Ghouta, the Damascus suburb that Assad attacked with chemical weapons, became an HTS stronghold. By the end of 2017, Shara found common cause with the Turkish military in Operation Euphrates Shield. This partnership coincided with intensified attacks on the Syrian Democratic Council, America’s ally fighting Isis and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). At least 12,000 SDC members were killed and 25,000 wounded fighting Isis. Kurds killed Syrian Kurdish leaders were also targeted. Hevrin Khalaf, a Kurdish leader and founder of the Future of Syria party, was seized on the M4 motorway and executed in Tal Abyad on 12 October 2019. She was killed by Turkish-backed Ahrar al-Sharqiya fighters aligned with the SNA during Turkey’s cross-border operation “Peace Spring”. Khalaf was shot in the head and four times in her chest. Her breasts were cut off and body mutilated. There is a video of a Turkish-backed soldier standing over her. He kicks the body and says: "This is the corpse of a pig.” Turkey supported Isis attacks on Kobani in 2014. Following Shara’s rise, Turkey’s Islamist proxies renewed attacks in the northeast of Syria, launching an offensive on Mambij east of the Euphrates and then targeting Kobani. Turkish warplanes then attacked SDC positions near the Tishrin Dam in the Ayn al-Arab district. If Turkey succeeds in collapsing the Tishrin Dam, a half million people in the flood plain will be wiped away. Turkey and its proxies are deeply hostile to US interests. The US must remain vigilant. It must not make the mistake it did with Turkey, welcoming an unproven democracy into Nato. Normalisation of relations with Syria should be based on Shara’s actions, not just his words. David L. Phillips is an adjunct professor with Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program . He previously worked with the State Department on Kurdish issues, and is the author of Peacebuilding: A Personal Journey . David L. Phillips is an adjunct professor with Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program . He previously worked with the State Department on Kurdish issues, and is the author of | Peacebuilding: A Personal Journey | The Syrian Democratic Council's platform of grassroots democracy, women’s empowerment and environmental protection is anathema to Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s centralised authoritarian rule. Yet Ahmed al-Shara and Erdogan are ideologically and politically-aligned. So how will Shara manage Syria’s transition? | [
"EU & the World",
"Opinion"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-02-06T12:30:00.108Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar2d200c99 |
How to reform EU overseas aid in the wake of Trump | The sudden interruption of funding by the US government to humanitarian actors has shocked all organisations involved in international solidarity. The Red Cross Movement, UN organisations, and international NGOs are already assessing how the announced restrictions will impact their operations in the field and their staff operating expenses, such as the payment of salaries. Plus the social consequences in the countries and disaster zones these organisations' leaders care for. Without a doubt, an 'every man for himself' reaction will emerge from these three main families of humanitarian actors to protect their action plans and the future of their employees in the headquarters of the different organisations and in the countries where they operate. NGOs are particularly vulnerable as they will be hit by president Donald Trump's announced restrictions in two ways: 1. Via the direct interruption of funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 2. Indirectly by the decrease of sums received, secondarily, from the main UN agencies involved in crisis areas (World Food Program, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF, etc) This shockwave is the extreme consequence of a funding system that focuses on a few member countries of the OECD for the near-total amount allocated by states. The US is, ahead of the EU, the first global sponsor of emergency aid. This sudden tension on the limitations on funding arises as the years 2023-2024 have shown a deterioration of the main indicators of the acting model: for the first time in 10 years, the amounts received for action have decreased, mainly to the detriment of private funds, while government funds were still maintained; but allocated funds reached less than 50 percent of the expected revenue. From 2022 to 2023, the financial need grew by $5bn [€4.8bn]. The crises extending for over five consecutive years now represent 90 percent of global crises and affect 168 million people. Just 10 years ago, only 30 percent of global crises belonged to this 'long-lasting' category. Since then, a splitting effect has occurred: new crises emerging, and a longer durability for those already existing ones. Political priorities This drop in the volume of funds is aggravated by 'political' limitations. All crises do not attract the same attention in the distribution of budgets, resulting in this reality: each state gives what it wants, and more than 80 percent of the allocated sums are 'directed' by donating countries towards crises they deem to have priority. Against a backdrop of overall revenue shortfalls, this has led to flagrant inequalities in the treatment of the populations receiving aid. Two recent major crises highlight the risks of two-speed compassion from donating countries. Or rather the political reasonings motivating their choices. The war in Ukraine has already become fodder for such questions, since it has reoriented large parts of the available funds towards this unprecedented conflict in recent European history, turning them away from many other neglected crises, for example, Haiti, Afghanistan, Sudan, shipwreck victims in the Mediterranean, and others. The second relates to the Gaza Strip. Indeed, if, as can only be hoped for, the violence was to quiet down durably, a vital and massive increase in 'catch-up' humanitarian funding would have to be distributed to mitigate the nutritional and sanitary disaster experienced by the population . The growing concern was already anticipated by observers of this economic model, before the recent decisions of president Trump. The main donating countries are starting to make public the efforts they intend to propose for the reconstruction of this region, and the restoration of its basic services, including medical facilities. If Gaza does indeed become a massive humanitarian priority for all humanitarian aid donors, the situation could become catastrophic for even more neglected areas and populations. This threat of selective financial solidarity adds to the present or expected risks of possible retreat of major donors such as Germany, for varying reasons. In France, the currently negotiated budget announces a stark decrease (of 34 percent) of French Official Development Assistance (ODA). European NGOs are therefore confronted with two simultaneous tasks of vital importance for the future of the civic solidarity they represent: surviving, and contributing to imagine the deep reform of an economic model of which the obsolescence has brutally been brought to light. The EU can be one of its crucial actors: not by simply substituting itself to the US by increasing its contributions, but by first and foremost positioning itself as a voluntary actor for a deep change of the system. There are two logical ways to try resolving the problems described above: largely broadening the number of donating countries, by agreeing to a shared political governance of this new system. It would be a path of revitalised multilateralism. The other option, as recommended by economists such as Thomas Piketty , consists of the contribution of shareholders of large corporations, through fiscal measures. In the European Union alone, these large corporations are expected to receive dividends estimated at €459bn — a sum 10 times greater than the amount needed today to assist more than 300 million people in need of vital humanitarian aid. Pierre Micheletti is a member of the board of directors of SOS Méditerranée-France , a former president of Action Against Hunger and Doctors of the World-France, and author of (Parole, 2020). Pierre Micheletti is a member of the board of directors of SOS Méditerranée-France | , a former president of Action Against Hunger and Doctors of the World-France, and author of | The EU cannot simply substitute itself for missing US overseas aid — it must broaden the number of donating states, and it should copy economist Thomas Piketty's idea of fiscal measures on the €458bn in European corporate dividends, ten times more than enough to help the 300 million people in need of humanitarian aid. | [
"EU & the World",
"Migration",
"Opinion"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-02-05T10:53:09.530Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar78badd92 |
The EU's unwavering support for Rwanda must end now | On 26 January, the M23 rebellion, supported by the Rwandan army, took over the eastern DR Congo city of Goma. This marked a major escalation of the Congolese conflict. The M23 rebellion had (re)started its activities in November 2021; and particularly over the last two years dramatically expanded its territory over eastern Congo. This had stark humanitarian consequences: in the first half of 2024 alone, the group caused over two million people to be displaced . It quickly became clear that M23 was supported by Rwanda: a string of UN reports have proven the direct military support from the Rwandan army for M23: a conservative estimate of last year did put the presence of Rwandan troops at between 3,000 and 4,000. Currently, the rebellion is on its way to Bukavu, another major city in eastern DRC – in what could be a prelude to a de facto annexation by Rwanda and M23. When, in 2012-2013, the M23 took Goma for the first time, the firm international reaction was crucial in ending the conflict. The major donor countries, including the EU and several member states, cut down a significant amount of development aid to the country. Currently, the reality is quite different: while a range of strong political statements have been made – including from the EU and a number of member states – this has not materialised into concrete actions. Germany, UK, and EU silence The only strong reactions so far have come from Belgium (which pushed for the suspension of the EU's minerals deal with Rwanda), Germany (which suspended aid-related exchanges) and the United Kingdom, which has threatened to suspend its bilateral aid to Rwanda. Other countries remain silent. At this point, it’s key for the EU to take decisive action: not doing so risks leading to a conflict further spinning out of control, plunging the region into conflict. Over the past few years, the EU has taken a number of particularly problematic decisions with regard to DR Congo and Rwanda. These have seriously affected its legitimacy in the region — and particularly DR Congo. In 2022 and 2024, the EU, through the European Peace Facility (EPF), has twice provided the Rwandan army with €20m to support its peacekeeping operations in Mozambique. This happened despite strong criticisms on the actual use of this aid, with concerns that it would be used to wage war in DR Congo, rather than for its peacekeeping troops in Mozambique. At the end of 2023, the European Union also announced an investment of €900m in Rwanda through its Global Gateway programme. As these agreements were concluded while Rwanda’s support for M23 had been widely shown, they triggered widespread protests in Congo. During the same period — in February 2024 — a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between the European Union and Rwanda for a strategic partnership in the field of critical minerals . This was enough for the agreement to be interpreted by many as explicit support for the looting of Congolese minerals — and more specifically coltan, needed for high-tech applications — by Rwanda and the European Union. Moreover, three months after the signature of this MoU, the M23 took the Rubaya mine, which, according to some estimates, would produce nearly 20 percent of the world’s coltan. Why did the European Union or its member states sign these agreements while a war supported by Rwanda was raging? Nurturing the ambition to become the 'Singapore of Africa', Rwanda has always managed to gain the support from key members of the international community. It succeeded in achieving impressive developmental results, such as in healthcare. Additionally, the Rwandan army provides a significant portion of peacekeeping troops on the African continent, such as for securing Cabo Delgado in Mozambique. These factors, still coupled with the ongoing guilt-complex for its failure during the 1994 genocide, have led EU member states and high-ranking European officials to offer unwavering support to Rwanda. This explains why the aforementioned agreements were signed: a combination of the popularity of the Rwandan development model with the pursuit of national and European Union interests. France was the driving force behind the €40m granted to the Rwandan army in Mozambique: it was aimed at protecting the French company TotalEnergies, which had been forced to halt a €20bn gas project in Cabo Delgado due to insecurity created by Islamist movements. France One might have hoped that the capture of Goma would be the shock that would push the European Union to change course. However, despite certain member states efforts to sanction Rwanda, they were once again blocked by France: national interests prevailed. Europe seems to remain blind to one of the most significant current violations of international law, highlighting its obvious double standards compared with the situation in Ukraine. Indifference prevails when it comes to the longstanding conflict in eastern DRC, which has been continuing for decades. The current situation could easily lead to a de facto modification of the DRC-Rwandan border, a ‘Crimea-like’ situation, opening up a Pandora’s box of irredentism all over the continent. The grave mistakes made by the Congolese presidency are not an excuse to condone or encourage Rwanda's military operations. The above EU agreements have directly harmed the EU’s legitimacy in central Africa. A first and important step in restoring this legitimacy — and especially to contribute to ending the war — would be a very clear EU stance towards Rwanda, and particularly with regards to the recently concluded agreements: each of these included conditionalities which in the current context have not been met, and therefore should be ended. No action will also further harm Europe’s authority: it is not far-fetched to imagine how, as in west Africa, we may soon end up with rabidly anti-Western governments. Kristof Titeca is a professor at the Institute of Development Policy, University of Antwerp , and a senior associate at the Egmont institute . Erik Kennes is a senior research fellow at the Egmont Institute. Kristof Titeca is a professor at the Institute of Development Policy, University of Antwerp , and a senior associate at the Egmont institute . | Erik Kennes | One might have hoped that the capture of Goma would be the shock that would push the EU to change course. However, despite certain member state efforts to sanction Rwanda, they were once again blocked by France: national interests prevailed. | [
"Africa",
"Opinion"
] | * | 2025-02-04T12:20:44.000Z | https://euobserver.com/*/arce9b9340 |
Meloni's Albania deportation experiment has failed | Last Tuesday (28 January), as Giorgia Meloni’s government resumed its attempts to force people seeking safety and a better life in Europe into prison camps in Albania, electricity broke down in the port of Shengjin. As port staff struggled to get the lights back on, officials realised that among the people they were incarcerating were four children. They had to be taken to Italy — now the third time this has happened. The camps have sat empty since they were opened, home only to stray dogs . This power failure reflects the challenges facing Meloni’s plan. She has staked not only her moral standing but also her credibility on this deal succeeding, yet it continues to be mired in uncertainty and setbacks. On Friday (31 January), the courts ordered that the remaining 43 people taken to Albania were to be returned to Italy. Meloni has claimed that people exercising their legal right to claim asylum, or humanitarians providing aid, are criminals. But it is her attempt to strongarm her way past Italian and international law that has led to this mess. With each transfer to Albania, the government has claimed to only be returning non-vulnerable people to safe places. We know that no one who puts their life at risk in a sea crossing has come from a place of safety, and all face some form of risk. Italian authorities have proven incapable of even conducting a ‘proper’ selection process. Meloni’s government has managed to deport minors and vulnerable people to Albania time and again. Even with the deck stacked in their favour, they exposed the deal for what it truly is — an inhumane and reckless political stunt. And we know that the countries the government designates as “safe” are nothing of the sort, as the EU’s recent partial retreat on its Tunisia-funding has shown. Authorities in the country are selling sub-Saharan migrants as slaves , further fuelling a cycle of violence and exploitation. Some of those shipped to Albania come from Egypt, whose government routinely jails human rights activists and dissidents. Even after the Sisi regime’s security forces were infamously implicated in the death of an Italian student, Italian and EU politicians continued to fund those forces. Let’s also not forget that most of those arriving on Italian shores have fled Libya; where they have been tortured and even sold into slavery from camps supported by Italian and EU funds. These grim deals have fuelled human misery and have only made journeys more dangerous and deadly — which is why the Italian government is now placing all its hope in the Albania deal. Propaganda stunt It’s not just hope but hard cash that Meloni has thrown into the deal, which is set to cost the Italian public over € 800 m, with € 100m squandered already. And other EU countries look set to follow suit . Who gains? Not people incarcerated in camps, not Albanians sold on false promises of regeneration in the camp towns, and not Italians who need affordable homes and secure jobs instead of more wasted resources. Beyond the political gains Meloni’s government hopes to reap from this propaganda stunt, the only economic beneficiaries are the corporate profiteers gouging the state to run camps, and perhaps the police agents being paid to lounge on the beach near empty facilities. All of this has been tried before. The shameful UK’s deal to fly asylum seekers to Rwanda ended in expensive and illegal failure , with not a single person deported. Australia’s offshore detention camps in Nauru — where people were held in brutal and squalid conditions at a cost of half a million Australian dollars per detainee — were found just this month to have violated international law by the UN’s human rights committee. In short, every time these deals have been tried, they have hurt — or even killed — people, broken the law, and redistributed public funds to rich contractors. Meloni’s reliance on Elon Musk to support the deal could not better symbolise how the wealthy and powerful scapegoat people crossing borders to divide us. The longer this deal exists, the more all of our rights are at risk. As someone who was imprisoned by the EU’s most authoritarian government on trumped-up charges , I know all too well the dangers involved in policies that lock people up with no due process. It’s not coincidental that the Meloni government is also seeking to drive through a sweeping attack on our civil liberties that begins with an attempt to ban detained migrants and prisoners from protesting the conditions they are being held in. The political energy and resources being spent on deportations and prisons in Albania should instead be going toward supporting people; both those born here and those seeking a better life here. And the naval ships ferrying people across the Adriatic could instead be used to rescue them, in a year where at least 2,200 more people have drowned on our doorstep. It’s time for Meloni’s government to face reality — this unlawful and, hopefully, unsuccessful plan is embarrassing Italy on the world stage. And as other European countries seek to copy Italy and produce their own return hubs, they should learn from our country’s cruel, expensive, experiment. Ilaria Salis is an Italian MEP for the Green and Left Alliance . Ilaria Salis is an Italian MEP for the | Green and Left Alliance | Last Friday (31 January), Italian courts ordered that remaining 43 people taken to Albania were to be returned to Italy. It’s time for Georgia Meloni’s government to face reality — this unlawful and, hopefully, unsuccessful — plan is embarrassing Italy on the world stage. | [
"Migration",
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] | * | 2025-02-03T10:44:43.617Z | https://euobserver.com/*/ar6aec9598 |
EU leaders' new 'retreat' meeting, and Polish presidency in Gdańsk This WEEK | EU leaders are gathering on Monday (3 February) to discuss European defence and transatlantic relations at the Palais d’Egmont in Brussels in an informal context, deemed a “retreat”. This new format, proposed by EU Council president António Costa, is expected to allow leaders to have more strategic discussions, without the need to agree on the wording that goes into conclusions. Nato chief Mark Rutte is expected to attend for lunch, and UK PM Keir Starmer for dinner. Defence has become a key focus in post-Brexit relations with Starmer, but most EU countries still seek a broader package that extends UK-EU cooperation beyond security. The leaders’ retreat comes three weeks ahead of the third anniversary of Russia’s war in Ukraine. And it also follows new hybrid attacks in the Baltic Sea, prompting Nato to increase its presence in the area. At least 11 undersea cables have been damaged since October 2023, according to AP . “This geopolitical context, which is also marked by the situation in the Middle East, will remain challenging in the foreseeable future,” EU Council president António Costa said in its invitation letter to member states. EU leaders are expected to push for unity on their relationship with Washington — whether on trade, security, defence, or other geopolitical tensions. But with US president Donald Trump back in the White House and calls for Ukraine peace talks growing louder, Brussels is also determined to secure a seat at the negotiating table. “Any decision involving Ukraine must be made with Europe,” an EU senior diplomat said. Talks will also focus on identifying gaps in Europe’s defence capabilities, exploring potential joint projects, and strengthening the continent’s military industry to enhance autonomy and reduce reliance on Washington. But financing is the crux in the EU’s shift to a wartime footing. Last year, the EU Commission noted that an estimated €500bn in additional defence will be needed over the next decade. But there is no agreement on where the money is going to come from. A group of 19 EU member states have asked the European Investment Bank (EIB) to “re-evaluate” its lending policy, which allows investment into dual-use goods, such as drones, but not weapons or defence systems. But the EIB has been hesitant so far, arguing that some investors, like pension funds, avoid investing in defence and that changing its mandate could jeopardise its ratings. Another option under consideration is loosening investment and fiscal rules to boost flows into the defence sector. “And the European Defence Fund can also help, even if we know it's more about border protection than direct investment,” a diplomat said. Although some EU countries are advocating to keep all options on the table when it comes to financing, plans for common debt have been initially rejected. This is currently “irresponsible,” another senior EU diplomat said. According to the Draghi report, “if all EU member states who are Nato members and who have not yet reached the two percent target were to do so in 2024, defence spending would rise by €60bn”. Italy, Belgium, Croatia, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain are still falling short of this target. But diplomats hope to achieve a common understanding on Monday of the need to increase defence spending. EU foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas and Rutte will continue the discussion on Ukraine and defence at a separate meeting on Thursday. Off to Gdańsk On Wednesday, the EU Commission is set to present plans to tackle challenges with e-commerce platforms as the number do purchases online keeps growing. And the European Commission's official visit to Poland for the start of the EU Council presidency will take place on Thursday and Friday in Gdańsk, following a delay due to president Ursula von der Leyen's health. During the visit, the College of Commissioners will meet with the Polish PM Donald Tusk’s government to discuss the priorities for the six-month presidency. Warsaw has made clear that security remains at the top of its agenda. On Monday, there will be the constitutive meeting of the European Parliament’s new special committee on the European Democracy Shield , where MEPs will monitor the EU’s toolbox to counter foreign interference. And Laura Kövesi, the EU's chief prosecutor, and Yannic Hulot, Eurofisc chair, will discuss with MEPs in tax matter subcommittee the role of the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) and Eurofisc tackling VAT fraud in the EU. This will be followed by an exchange of views with the EU climate commissioner Wopke Hoekstra. This week, several commissioners are also expected to meet with the UN high commissioner for refugees, Filippo Grandi. This comes after EU home affairs ministers' discussion failed to shed light on the concept of ‘return hubs’ last week. Meanwhile, the EU's own ambassadors from all around the world will fly into Brussels to discuss EU foreign affairs and security policy. Trump meets Netanyahu In Washington, Trump will receive Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu in the White House on Tuesday. Netanyahu will be the first foreign leader to meet Trump since the inauguration. His visit follows Trump's proposal to “clean out” the Gaza Strip and move Palestinians out to Jordan and Egypt. Meanwhile, the World Health Organization's executive board is meeting in Geneva this week where it is expected to address Trump's decision to withdraw the United States from the organisation. The US is the biggest WHO donor (contributing with $1.2bn in 2022-2023), but it accuses the organisation of mishandling Covid-19. Also on Monday, Greenland's parliament is back in session in Nuuk after its winter break, and it's the first meeting since Trump once again brought up claims to buy — or even forcibly take — the island. | Elena is EUobserver's editor-in-chief. She is from Spain and has studied journalism and new media in Spanish and Belgian universities. Previously she worked on European affairs at VoteWatch Europe and the Spanish news agency EFE. | EU leaders are gathering in a new format 'retreat' on Monday to discuss defence and relations with Washington, while the European Commission's official visit to Gdańsk in Poland for the start of the country's EU presidency is on Thursday and Friday. | [
"Agenda"
] | agenda | 2025-02-03T06:00:00.000Z | https://euobserver.com/agenda/ara22c9e74 |
Is a fair transition possible in a Europe focused on competitiveness, security, and defence? | As the European Union transitions to a new mandate, the shift from the European Green Deal (EGD) to the Clean Industrial Deal raises questions: will social and environmental justice and sustainability once again be sidelined in favour of competitiveness and growth? And will the EU recognise civil society organisations' (CSO) vital role in improving the quality of policymaking and democratic value by representing diverse societies including marginalised groups? Today, the EU is at a crossroads in addressing the environmental crisis. The EU’s political agenda is shifting towards economic competitiveness, defence and security, but civil society has a clear message: a fair transition that neglects social and environmental justice and the well-being of the planet is no transition at all. Our recent policy brief from the Civil Society Forum for Sustainability, which is part of the REAL DEAL project , gathered over 70 civil society organisations to deliberate on emerging issues and provide actionable insights. This collective work, reflected in the policy brief on the Civil Society's strategic role in the 2024-2029 mandate , offers comprehensive recommendations to address global challenges, including the debt crisis, economic and social inequalities, while ensuring that the EGD remains aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the 2030 Agenda. The risks of a narrow focus on competitiveness Shifting the EU’s focus towards industrial competitiveness, growth and defence threatens to prioritise key priorities such as social, environmental and economic equality for the prosperity of all people and the planet. This pivot risks deepening inequalities within Europe and undermining the EU’s credibility as a global advocate for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its promise to “leave no one behind”. The policy brief highlights that the fair transition must address systemic disparities, ensuring that people from marginalised groups are active participants, not afterthoughts, in shaping Europe’s green policies. Advancing gender and social justice The green transition must be rooted in gender equality and social justice. Women and gender-diverse individuals are disproportionately affected by climate impacts yet remain underrepresented in decision-making. The Civil Society Forum policy brief emphasises the need for gender-specific objectives and budgets in all policies. From addressing energy poverty to ensuring equitable access to jobs, the fair and just transition must meet the diverse needs of Europe’s population. The need for deliberative democracy Meaningful and effective participation is essential to a successful transition. Civil society has called for a systematic implementation of Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union, which guarantees transparent and structured dialogue between EU institutions and organised civil society. This is a progressive step to ensure CSOs involvement in design, implementation, monitoring, policymaking and funds in a more inclusive and transparent manner. In addition, this is also to ensure that the rights and needs of everyone, including the communities with vulnerable backgrounds are voiced and reflected through structured and meaningful civil dialogue. Mechanisms for deliberative democracy, as outlined in the policy brief, empower people, particularly those from marginalised communities to actively engage and shape the policies that affect their lives. Key recommendations from civil society The civil society policy brief highlights actionable recommendations to ensure a fair and just transition: Establish innovative, structured, transparent participatory mechanisms for civil society democratic engagement at all levels of policymaking. Foster an economy that ensures the well-being of people within the planet’s ecological limits by prioritising post-growth pathways and a care economy. Implement gender-specific objectives and eco-feminist principles and allocate dedicated funds to address systemic inequalities and specific needs of diverse groups in all policies. Develop targeted programs to address the needs of those most affected by the climate crisis, including migrants, low-income households, and racialised groups. Replace the Stability and Growth Pact with a Wellbeing and Sustainability Pact that centres on social and environmental goals. The path forward The role of civil society in shaping and implementing future EU policies cannot be undermined, as it is one of the cornerstones of EU democratic values. For this, meaningful and effective involvement of CSOs in significant transformations should be ensured. The policy brief offers comprehensive recommendations for achieving a socially and environmentally just transition. It reflects our collective vision for the European Union that prioritises social and environmental justice and the well-being of people and the planet. The time to act is now. Europe’s fair and just transition must be a transition for all, ensuring that no one is left behind, including the planet we live in. A fair and sustainable future for Europe is only possible through continuing efforts on the green and social transition, taking into account the co-benefits of climate action for economic and social prosperity and ensuring citizens and civil society representation to legitimise this process and enable implementation. Hilmi Tekoglu is civic space policy officer at SOLIDAR , the European network of civil society organisations (CSOs) working to advance social justice through a just transition in Europe and worldwide. This piece has contributions from partners of the REAL DEAL consortium. Hilmi Tekoglu is civic space policy officer at SOLIDAR , the European network of civil society organisations (CSOs) working to advance social justice through a just transition in Europe and worldwide. This piece has contributions from partners of the | REAL DEAL | As the EU transitions to a new mandate, the shift from the European Green Deal to the Clean Industrial Deal raises questions: will social and environmental justice and sustainability once again be sidelined in favour of competitiveness and growth? | [
"Green Economy"
] | * | 2025-01-31T11:58:55.365Z | https://euobserver.com/*/ar2d5e3126 |
Why is the EU ignoring Serbia's student protests? | While much of the recent news cycle in the EU has been consumed with the second Trump administration’s 'flooding the zone' with norm-pummeling, disruptive executive orders, popular action for democratic standards and rule of law continues to build throughout Serbia. Yet the policy posture from Brussels remains on autopilot, effectively siding with authoritarian president Aleksandar Vučić against the student-led protesters, continuing happy talk about the enlargement process Along with Ukraine and Georgia (where popular mobilisation against another Moscow-friendly autocratizing regime also continues), Serbia is a democratic frontline. This bottom-up struggle has enormous regional and European significance. In his 12 years of rule, president Vučić has made his regime a trailblazer for modern European rightwing revanchism, the primary driver of regional instability in the Balkans, a hub for Russian and Chinese influence and disruption, and a magnetic pole for modern far-right ethnonationalism and genocidal ideation. Train station collapse lie The ongoing protests were triggered by the collapse of the concrete roof at the entrance of the Novi Sad railway station on 1 November, which killed 15. The government initially tried to deflect public horror by denying that the recent renovation of the station involved work on the collapsed awning, which was rapidly shown to be a lie. Popular outrage soon blossomed into protest, led by university and secondary school students, with traffic stops of 15 minutes – one for each killed – at 11:52, the time of the collapse. Protest leaders have been subjected to arbitrary detentions; the government has characterised the protests as being a call to “civil war” and a “colour revolution” backed from abroad (implying the West). Threats of docking scholarships and other sanctions against students have been made by officials. Violence has been directed at protesters – with two incidents of students hit by cars driven by regime supporters. Each new threat and manufactured conspiracy backfired, building popular support and engagement behind the protests, which on 24 January culminated in a general strike, drawing solidarity throughout Serbia. This Saturday (1 February), a blockade of bridges throughout Serbia is planned. Building tensions These protests are the latest in a series that began in 2016 over the illegal demolition of a Belgrade neighbourhood to make room for the massive Belgrade Waterfront high-rise development. A brutal attack on an opposition candidate in Kruševac generated the statewide “1-in-5 Million” protests against Vučić, beginning in December 2018. Protests against lithium mining in western Serbia, a relatively prosperous agricultural region, halted a Rio Tinto project in 2022. But it was resurrected in July 2024 under the guise of “green transition”, with great fanfare and EU (particularly German) support. This announcement generated massive popular outrage . The connective tissue of all these protests is evident: popular distrust in a government under the firm grip of Vučić and his party, in a state structure which was already highly centralized before he assumed power. Serbia, well before the Novi Sad station disaster, has exhibited the hallmarks of state capture. The posture of the US and EU toward the nonviolent student-led protesters has been effectively the same. The EU Commission enlargement director-general, Gert Jan Koopman, was quoted in regime-aligned as having told Serbian civil society that the EU “will not accept or support a violent change of power in Serbia.” This echoed Vučić’s own public musings and deflection. While participants in the meeting told independent journalists that Koopman's actual statements were far less explosive, the commission failed to respond to queries which would have allowed it to clarify its position. Trump’s envoy for special missions Richard Grenell struck a regime-friendly tone, arguing that the US didn’t support "those who undermine the rule of law or who forcefully take over government buildings," ignoring the fact that the only violent force exerted was by regime backers the demonstrators On Monday (27 January), EU foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas stated that “stability” was the Union’s priority in the Balkans – effectively supporting those who hold power at present. Perversely, this messaging mirrors that of Russia and China. Vučić’s lame efforts to paint the demonstrations and general strike as a “colour revolution” have fallen flat with the Serbian audience, but are echoed in Moscow . Students and Serbians writ large have every right to feel betrayed by those who democratic values but spurn those seeking to see them actually implemented. Protecting Vučić? The West clearly aims to protect its sunk costs in Vučić, despite the nature of his rule — or regional destabilising effects. Benefits include the aforementioned lithium mining deal, “making arms available for Ukraine” through sale to intermediaries, and the sale of Rafale fighter jets . In addition, Trump's son-in-law Jared Kushner is investing in a hotel project on the site of the General Staff building in Belgrade, bombed by Nato in its operation to end Serbia’s war in Kosovo in 1999. But the policy predated these factors, centred on the concept of Serbia as the regional power and an alleged “factor of stability.” Even attacks on neighbours orchestrated from Serbian territory have not shaken the EU’s effective appeasement policy. Popular success in ousting Vučić and pursuing systemic change would send an unmistakable signal to the far-right elsewhere in Europe and North America: Serbia is a cause célèbre for far-right culture warriors , and people have seen the rot this culture has delivered. Bottom-up solidarity behind demands to institutionalise dignity — people power — is what they and those who profit from their divisive narratives fear. Serbia cannot begin to confront its past and build a real future under current management — and it is the main revanchist power in the former Yugoslav space. The regional conflict system, centred on Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, and involving all but one of Serbia’s neighbours (Albania), could not function without a grievance-based irredentist agenda (embodied in [Serbian world]) from Belgrade. The effective collaboration of the 'established democracies,' apart from some principled legislators in the European and national parliaments, is shameful. It is a morbid symptom of the health of democratic antibodies in the European body politic. A systemic infection is indicated. Serbia’s protests for justice, dignity, democracy, accountability, and rule of law deserve support from 'small-D' democrats worldwide. Thus far, the solidarity has been concentrated in the region, including in Sarajevo , Zagreb, and Vukovar . The protests may not be make-or-break for European democracy, but they may well be for Serbia, with wide regional impact. This is the best chance since 2000 for a breakthrough in that direction. To live up to its values, as well as pursue its long-term interests, the EU needs to adopt policies conducive to a truly democratic and representative Serbia, accountable to its citizens and engaged in positive relations with its neighbours. This entails not only a shift in the EU’s messaging, but an independent review of its failing enlargement policy — something which it lacks the will to conduct on its own — and a commitment to heeding the results. History will not forgive Western leaders who support the forces of reaction – or remain on the fence. Kurt Bassuener and Toby Vogel are co-founders and senior associates of Democratization Policy Council , a think-tank based in Berlin. Kurt Bassuener and Toby Vogel are co-founders and senior associates of | Democratization Policy Council | The policy posture from Brussels remains on autopilot, effectively siding with Serbia's authoritarian president Aleksandar Vučić against the student-led protesters, while continuing 'happy talk' about the enlargement process. | [
"EU & the World",
"Opinion"
] | * | 2025-01-31T11:56:28.323Z | https://euobserver.com/*/ar85c1c8a8 |
Europe must become 'true AI continent', says EU tech sovereignty commissioner | The EU must “step up to become a true AI continent,” European tech sovereignty commissioner Henna Virkkunen told MEPs on Wednesday (29 January), as campaigners urged the bloc to stand up against US tech companies. More than 35 European and US organisations have called on EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen to enforce existing flagship EU laws against US Big Tech in a letter also sent out on Wednesday. “Big Tech firms have always used their lobbying and extensive resources to try to avoid EU regulation and protect their ability to exploit users and businesses. We are concerned that from now on they will do so with the backing of the Trump administration,” Margarida Silva, campaigner at the Amsterdam-based NGO SOMO [Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations], one of the signatories, told EUobserver. “Defending our democracy, digital sovereignty, and economy will require strong enforcement of our digital rulebook but also investment alternatives to Big Tech,” she added. The letter comes at a time when US social media companies are requesting protection from the new Donald Trump administration against EU laws, including the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Digital Services Act (DSA). Earlier in January, the CEO of Meta, Mark Zuckerberg, asked Trump to stop the EU from fining US tech companies for breaching antitrust rules. Zuckerberg also unilaterally announced this month he would cease fact-checking on Facebook. Earlier this month, the commission announced it would extend the investigation started against Elon Musk's X in December concerning the platform's algorithm management. The commission also has two legal actions opened against Meta and three on the Chinese platform TikTok. “We are relieved to hear you remain fully committed to the strict application of the DSA and DMA and to enforcing those rules wherever companies do not comply in full,” the campaigners' letter stated. On Monday, tech giants including Facebook, TikTok, and X, were invited by the commission to take part in a stress test to confirm the platforms have adequate security measures ahead of the German election next month, a commission spokesperson announced on last week. This stress test comes after the Berlin-based non-profit think tank, CeMAS revealed last week how Moscow is leading a disinformation campaign on X, increasing pro-Russian far-right narratives prior to the February election. The organisations also asked von der Leyen to strengthen EU tech sector sovereignty. “We call on you to invest in a diverse and decentralised digital sphere that is part of a sovereign digital commons and not owned and governed by proprietary technology corporations,” the letter reads. In her political agenda, von der Leyen already | announced | The EU must “step up to become a true AI continent,” European tech sovereignty commissioner Henna Virkkunen told MEPs on Wednesday — as campaigners urged the bloc to stand up against US Big Tech.
| [
"EU & the World",
"Digital"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-01-29T17:48:41.557Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar7edd2fdf |
Doctors in DR Congo hospital fear Rwanda-backed slaughter, call for EU help | Doctors, nurses, and patients at the Nobel-prize fêted Panzi Foundation in DR Congo (DRC) fear being slaughtered by Rwanda-backed rebels, unless the EU and wider international community act quickly to save them. "We've received a number of threatening messages and we don't know how to clear out the hospital or put these patients out into the wild," Panzi institute spokesman, Crispin Kashale, told EUobserver on Wednesday (29 January) from Bukavu in the South Kivu region in eastern DRC, where a Rwanda-backed rebel group, called M23, seized the nearby city of Goma in the past few days. "In view of what happened in Lemera, where all the patients and staff were killed, we are calling on Belgium, the European Union, and the international community to find mechanisms to protect these patients," he said. Belgium is the former colonial power in DRC and Rwanda, which failed to protect people in the 1994 Rwanda genocide. The Lemera massacre in DRC in 1996 saw rebel militias murder 37 people, according to the UN. The Panzi Foundation was created by Nobel Peace Prize-winning Congolese gynaecologist, Denis Mukwege, to help women who were raped in local conflicts. He is not personally in Bukavu right now, a source told this website. But his hospitals are seen as being particularly at risk of reprisals because Mukwege is an outspoken critic of Rwandan president Paul Kagame, whose agents tried to assassinate him in Brussels in 2015, according to an EUobserver investigation. "People risk being killed because [Panzi staff] were and are harsh criticisers of Rwandan-backed violence in DRC," said a Belgian security source, who asked not to be named. The Belgian foreign ministry said on Wednesday: "The safety of patients and hospital staff must be guaranteed at all times. Any attack would be absolutely unacceptable." "We will continue to coordinate with our partners in the event of a further deterioration of the situation in South Kivu," it added. Mukwege's foundation operates three hospitals in the region - in Bukavu, Mulamba, and Bulenga. The Bukavu hospital has 450 patients and 415 staff, including 50 doctors and 117 nurses, while Mulamba and Bulenga have another 113 patients. The foundation has 442 local employees in total, as well as six international staff from Belgium, Canada, France, and Norway. If the M23 advances toward them, the Panzi institute has prepared to evacuate non-natives with the help of the UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The UN's peacekeeping force, Monusco, has already left the area due to M23's killings of personnel. "For the natives, we have drawn up a contingency plan that will consist of grouping everyone together at some local sites [locations withheld by EUobserver] ... where we have stockpiled food and non-food items in case of a crisis," Kashale said. "The main support would be to secure these places [using international forces]," he added. The patients, who come from all over DRC, including the Katanga, Kasai, Lualaba, Sankuru, Tanganyika, and South Kivu regions, were "already traumatised and find themselves in a situation of re-traumatisation, with the risk of reprisals as long as they cannot be evacuated to their province of origin". History repeating The prospect of trying to protect potential victims from a siege of the Panzi hospital recalls scenes in the Rwanda genocide, where a hotel manager, Paul Rusesabagina, sheltered people in what was later dramatised in the 2004 Hollywood film Hotel Rwanda . And for her part, Rusesabagina's daughter, Carine Kanimba, who is a human-rights activist living in London, echoed the Panzi staff's appeal for help. "Panzi hospital must be protected. The world cannot allow another atrocity to unfold in silence," she told EUobserver on Wednesday. "M23 is absolutely capable of attacking Panzi. They have repeatedly targeted civilians and critical institutions, and Panzi, as a refuge for survivors of war and sexual violence, is a powerful symbol that threatens those who seek to silence justice," she said. "Mukwege's courage has made him and Panzi hospital a target of the Rwandan government, as is anyone who calls out their abuses," she added. For their part, the EU and individual member states, such as France, have curried favour with Kagame in return for access to Rwanda's mineral wealth for European mining firms, as well as Kagame's protection for French energy companies from Islamist insurgents in nearby Mozambique. And the European Commission, on Tuesday, ruled out ending the minerals deal despite the Goma violence. Vanished people But speaking of Goma, Kashale, the Panzi spokesman, told this website: "It is impossible to work in Goma today because of the chaotic security situation. The Panzi Foundation has been running a project there to support the refugee camps of people who fled the armed clashes in Bunagana and Masisi. Today they are doubly victimised, having vanished into thin air". The EU's commissioner for women's rights, Hadja Lahbib, who is also a former Belgian foreign minister, said on Tuesday: "It is paramount to ensure ... protection of civilians" in DRC. But for Kanimba, the EU should be doing much more than issuing statements. "The EU and AU [African Union] must impose strong sanctions specifically against Rwandan officials for their support of M23," she said. "Holding Rwanda accountable and sanctions are crucial to deterring further violence," she added. "This is not just a Congolese crisis: It is an attack on human rights, stability, and justice in Africa," Kanimba said. The Belgian foreign ministry also said: "Belgium has called for a cessation of hostilities, a withdrawal of Rwandan troops [from DRC], and for concrete measures against Rwanda". "All those responsible" for the violence should "be held accountable", it said. Rwanda's embassy in Brussels declined to comment. | Andrew Rettman is EUobserver's foreign editor, writing about foreign and security issues since 2005. He is Polish, but grew up in the UK, and lives in Brussels. He has also written for The Guardian, The Times of London, and Intelligence Online. | Doctors, nurses, and patients at the Nobel-prize fêted Panzi hospitals in the DR Congo fear being slaughtered by Rwanda-backed rebels, unless the EU and wider international community act quickly. | [
"Africa"
] | africa | 2025-01-29T12:19:54.327Z | https://euobserver.com/africa/arfd3cba3d |
NGOs are essential, corporate lobbying is the real problem | Last week, conservative and rightwing MEPs in the European Parliament questioned whether NGOs should receive public funding through EU programmes such as LIFE to engage in EU policy-making. It’s important to note that LIFE , the EU’s funding instrument for the environment and climate action (which encompasses more than operating grants for NGOs), was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council years ago and has been operating ever since. Critics allege, in an increasingly aggressive tone, that NGOs “misuse” these funds to unduly and secretly influence EU decision-making and that this constitutes a “scandal.” Let’s be clear: there is no scandal, no secrecy, here. NGOs are not lobbyists for the European Commission or other EU institutions and this false claim must be rejected in the strongest possible terms. Instead, organisations like the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) are rooted in science, providing evidence-based, expert, non-partisan policy recommendations for nature and the climate. Millions of citizens support this work through memberships, awareness raising, volunteering, and campaigns. WWF’s work programmes are developed with our European offices, free from external influence, be it the European Commission or anyone else. We define our objectives and strategies, and carry out our work independently. The LIFE funding allows us and other NGOs to bridge the gap between national constituencies, citizens and decision-makers, helping bring diverse voices into the policy arena. And contrary to what critics claim: the funding we receive from the European Commission is fully transparent, audited, and publicly accounted for. NGOs like WWF have been registered with the EU Transparency Register for years, ensuring accountability and openness. It is simply absurd to accuse NGOs of doing the commission’s bidding. Our independence is clear and well-documented. WWF has openly opposed the commission on numerous issues, from its decision to include fossil fuels in the EU Taxonomy (over which WWF took it to court!), to the proposed 12-month implementation delay of the crucial anti-deforestation law EUDR , and to its move to downgrade the protection status of the wolf. The real scandal? Corporate lobbying The real scandal lies elsewhere, with private interests, not public ones, dominating EU lobbying. In 2024, the top 50 corporations spent nearly €200m lobbying EU institutions — a staggering 66 percent increase since 2015 - exerting outsized influence on decision-makers, often at the expense of climate action and environmental safeguards, such as key files of the EU Green Deal which have been weakened, delayed or even stopped by powerful corporate lobbying. Compare this to the funding NGOs receive: While the overall LIFE budget amounts to €700m annually — 0.3 percent of the EU budget — only a tiny fraction of this (€15.6m per year) is allocated to support environmental NGOs. Peanuts really, yet vital for the survival of a thriving democracy, where all voices - not just wealthy corporations - can be heard. Ironically, many of the same MEPs attacking NGOs hold lucrative second jobs in the private sector, raising serious questions about conflicts of interest, and many fail to declare meetings with private lobbyists while targeting NGOs. If there’s a risk to EU taxpayers, it’s not from NGOs advocating for a healthier planet — it’s from a political culture that allows private enrichment to influence public policy-making. At a time of growing disinformation and threats to our democracy from powerful forces seeking to establish autocracies, undermining the credibility and mandate of NGOs is not just ridiculous but frankly dangerous. Civil society plays a vital role in holding power to account, ensuring policies are grounded in science, public interest, and democratic values — not greed and short-term economic gain. Without NGO engagement, our democracy would be weakened, leaving the EU vulnerable to (even greater) corporate capture and fake news. If Europe is to remain a beacon of democracy and environmental leadership, policy-makers must reject these misplaced attacks and protect the credibility, mandate and funding of NGOs — not just in Brussels but everywhere - as an essential investment in people, nature, and the future of our planet. There are many threats to our democracy — NGOs are not one of them. Ester Asin is director of the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) European policy office. Ester Asin is director of the | World Wide Fund for Nature | Critics allege, in an increasingly aggressive tone, that NGOs “misuse” these funds to unduly and secretly influence EU decision-making, and that this constituted a “scandal”. Let’s be clear: there is no scandal, no secrecy, here. | [
"EU Political",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] | eu-political | 2025-01-28T11:29:17.988Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar199e94cb |
What is EU doing on AI facial-scraping recognition — and is it enough? | Every day, billions of photos are shared online. These photos can be scraped and end up in facial recognition databases owned by commercial firms, without people’s consent or knowledge . The practice, which allows police and intelligence services to identify individuals of interest by comparing images with biometric facial features held in the databases, is not always regulated. For example, the UK’s data privacy law has been deemed inapplicable to foreign firms offering this service to foreign government agencies . However, the Information Commissioners Office (ICO) plans to appeal this decision despite being denied permission to do so on its first attempt . But EU authorities have taken a hardline stance, by imposing multiple sanctions on Clearview AI, which, according to publicly available information, have not been challenged by the company. Scraping is an automated extraction of information from websites and social media using programmes known as web crawlers. Crawlers harvest, analyse and structure photos, videos, and associated metadata (e.g., links, and data suggesting location and activities). Clearview AI and PrimeEyes Companies like Clearview AI , with over 50 billion photos in its database and PrimeEyes , extensively exploit scraping for their facial recognition services. Generally, scraping information from the web and social media can promote competition by helping businesses track pricing trends and consumer preferences to improve their products and services. Journalists and researchers can leverage scraping for public good, for instance, by gathering data revealing corruption, environmental pollution, and hate speech, while technology companies could use scraped data to train AI models that benefit society. However, scraping also carries significant risks. It raises serious privacy concerns , with people’s biometric data being processed without their consent. Privacy laws require scrapers to demonstrate a lawful basis for processing personal data, such as consent, and comply with rules relating to the rights to access, rectification, erasure, and transparency. Last year, the French Data Protection Authority (CNIL) sanctioned KASPR (a browsers extension) for scraping LinkedIn users’ contact details, in violation of consent and transparency requirements, and restrictions on data retention. But not all authorities successfully enforce privacy laws against scrapers. The inaccuracy of facial recognition also puts anyone whose photos are stored in a facial recognition database at risk. In the US, there have been many documented wrongful arrests of innocent people misidentified by the technology. Last, scraping deepens surveillance, discouraging the free flow of information and sharing of personal data necessary for socio-political and civic engagements. The EU response The EU AI Act bans the untargeted scraping of online photos, videos and CCTV footage to create facial recognition databases. Several EU authorities have imposed prohibitive sanctions against Clearview AI for GDPR violations, including €20m fines in France , Italy , and Greece , each and €30.5m in the Netherlands . In the UK, the ICO’s £7.5m fine was overturned on appeal . The UK privacy rules, like its EU counterpart, apply to foreign entities, except foreign government agencies, if their data processing relates to behavioural monitoring of people in the UK. The ICO concluded that both creating facial recognition profiles and the subsequent use of the database by police to identify people involve behavioural monitoring. However, the appellate body ruled that the creation of profiles alone does not count as behavioural monitoring, as the automated processing of creating facial biometric data, potentially along with other metadata, does not reveal anything about the targeted person’s behaviour. Although the appellate tribunal agreed that the subsequent use of Clearview AI’s facial recognition database could involve behavioural monitoring, it insisted that the ICO lacks jurisdiction over Clearview AI, because the GDPR does not cover activities of foreign government agencies. The French authority interprets behavioural monitoring to include the use of profiling techniques that assess personal aspects such preferences, behaviour, or location, making the creation of the facial recognition database itself profiling and thus behavioural monitoring. EU authorities don’t consider the end users of the database, i.e., government agencies, to be relevant to determining their jurisdictions. This seems reasonable. Foreign surveillance technology firms providing purely commercial services should not bypass the law by posing as government agencies. The GDPR excludes foreign government agencies from its scope, based on the principle that states do not subject foreign governments to their domestic laws . Such a flawed interpretation of the GDPR enables foreign firms to carry out surveillance activities without any accountability mechanisms However, this doctrine is now being exploited by commercial firms, by stretching the definition of foreign government activities to include purely commercial services. Such a flawed interpretation of the GDPR enables foreign firms to carry out surveillance activities without any accountability mechanisms. The UK could extend the upcoming Digital Information and Data Protection Law to foreign firms that conduct scraping in the UK whether or not they conduct behavioural monitoring, making it irrelevant that foreign government agencies are their end users. Nevertheless, this does not seem to be a priority as of now. Business interests On an individual level, adjusting privacy settings on social media and installing anti-crawler extensions could mitigate scraping. Websites and social networks can deploy anti-crawler technologies to tackle scraping. Unfortunately, their efforts in this regard hinges on whether scraping threatens their business interests, with privacy taking a back seat. Scraping requires a careful regulatory response. Banning it disproportionately stifles innovation and business, while leaving it unchecked poses significant risks. Scraping fundamentally conflicts with privacy principles such as consent, transparency, purpose limitation and data minimisation. Personal data is scrapped on a mass scale without our knowledge making it infeasible to obtain individuals’ consents or be transparent. As the technology extracts data automatically potentially usable for multiple purposes, it is also nearly impossible to minimise the data collected or to limit its purpose. Thus, complying with existing data protection laws is considerably challenging, requiring a new approach to regulating scrapping. Prominent privacy scholars, Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hartzog propose allowing scraping only when a clear public benefit can be demonstrated by the scraper, without requiring consent or other legal grounds, suggesting prohibition in all other cases. This may provide a realistic path forward. Dr Asress Adimi Gikay is senior lecturer in AI, disruptive innovation and law at Brunel University of London . He is also a board member of the Centre for AI: Social and Digital Innovation . Dr Asress Adimi Gikay is senior lecturer in AI, disruptive innovation and law at Brunel University of London . He is also a board member of the | Centre for AI: Social and Digital Innovation | Scraping fundamentally conflicts with privacy principles such as consent, transparency, purpose limitation and data minimisation. Personal data is scrapped on a mass scale without our knowledge making it infeasible to obtain individuals’ consents or be transparent. | [
"Digital",
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] | digital | 2025-01-27T10:50:49.156Z | https://euobserver.com/digital/ar4c69411a |
What Europe must do now to end Lukashenko's tyranny | On Sunday (26 January), the dictator of Belarus orchestrated a meticulously planned “special electoral operation,” deploying his security forces and the full weight of the oppressive machinery he has constructed over three decades. This operation was not about governance or representation — it was an assault on the nine million people of our country, whom he perceives as his greatest threat. In 2020, after the regime stole our election victory , hundreds of thousands of Belarusians poured into the streets, demanding justice and democracy. The regime’s response was swift and brutal: violence, repression, and widespread fear. This time, the dictator in Minsk left nothing to chance. Even the faintest glimmer of dissent was extinguished. Without anything resembling a normal voting process, the regime’s electoral charade could hardly be mistaken for democracy. No genuine opponents and no independent observers were allowed. Instead, there was fear—a fear imposed by the baton, the prison cell, and the omnipresent threat of repression. Yet, despite these calculated measures, the dictatorship still showed a lack of confidence in its illusion of legitimacy. The so-called “presidential election” is only designed to prolong his fragile power. He still behaves as if thousands of people are standing near his palace. He understands that Belarusians don’t support him, and his policy is a deadend. He is afraid of repeating 2020, when he was on the brink of collapse, and repeating the fate of Viktor Yanokovych or Bashar al-Assad. The only tools he has left are repression and fear . Every single day, on average, 12 people are detained. For anti-war positions, for supporting Ukraine, for anti-regime comments on Instagram. More than 1,200 political hostages languish behind bars—including my husband, who was arrested after he announced his candidacy for president in 2020. Like many others, he is being held incommunicado, and I don’t even know if he is alive. Lukashenko hoped that so-called elections would help him reset his standing with the world, erase his past crimes, and sidestep accountability. But let me be clear: no sham election can wash the blood from his hands, nor can it erase the betrayal of the Belarusian people in 2020 or the Ukrainian people in 2022. The people of Belarus remember. And the world must remember too. An outpost of the Ukraine war The fate of Belarus is not a remote or isolated matter. It is deeply intertwined with the fate of Europe. Our struggle is a fight for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law — values underpinning the European Union. The fate of Belarus is intertwined with the fate of Ukraine too. Lukashenko made Belarus an outpost for Russia’s war in Ukraine, allowing Russian drones to use Belarusian airspace, and producing munitions for the Russian army. As long as Belarus is under Lukashenko and Putin’s control, there will be a constant threat to the peace and security of the entire region. And it’s in Europe’s interest to drag Belarus out of tyranny and Russian claws. As we speak about possible negotiations on Ukraine, we must not exclude the Belarus issue. Russian troops must leave not only Ukraine but also Belarus, including its nuclear weapons. In such negotiations, Belarus must not become a bargaining chip or consolation prize for Putin. There is no place for Lukashenko in any peace talks or any other international forum. He is an illegitimate ruler, not representing Belarusians, and serving only Russian interests. Today, Belarus needs more than your solidarity; it needs your action. Here is what must be done: The European Union must categorically reject this sham election and Lukashenko’s legitimacy. The European Parliament and 36 OSCE member states made it clear . It’s not an election – let’s call it what it is — a power grab, a farce, a “non-election.” Increase assistance for independent media, human rights defenders, and organizations supporting political prisoners, like our recently created International Humanitarian Fund for victims of repression. Provide scholarships, visas, and cultural exchanges for ordinary Belarusians, demonstrating that Europe is not just a beacon of hope but also a practical ally. Let’s show Belarusians that there is an alternative to the Russian world. And Belarusian democratic forces represent this alternative. Let’s show that Belarus free from Putin and Lukashenko has both a chance and a bright future. We need comprehensive sanctions on all sectors, enterprises, and individuals aiding the war and repression. It's time to close all loopholes that allow Russia to exploit Belarus to evade sanctions. The regime’s crimes must not go unpunished. Support the Lithuanian referral to the ICC. Document human rights violations, build cases for international prosecution, and isolate those complicit in the repression. Justice delayed is justice denied. Let’s give Ukraine everything it needs to win this war and strengthen its position before possible negotiations. The success of Ukraine will be a success for Belarus too, and can spark changes in Belarus. I firmly believe that Belarus can and will be a success story. One day, we will join the proud family of European nations—not as a source of instability, but as a donor of peace and stability in the region. Belarusians are ready for democracy and ready for change. However, as history teaches us, no fight for freedom is ever won alone. It is only through the support of allies — united by shared values and determination — that we can turn this vision into reality. Together, we can build a free and democratic Belarus. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya is Belarus opposition leader | Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya | As long as Belarus is under Lukashenko and Putin’s control, there will be a constant threat to the peace and security of the entire region. It’s in Europe’s interest to drag Belarus out of tyranny and Russian claws, writes Belarus opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya | [
"EU & the World",
"Opinion"
] | * | 2025-01-27T06:00:00.000Z | https://euobserver.com/*/arf9fa581d |
Why Big Agri wants to call new-generation GMOs anything but that | New genomic techniques, new breeding techniques, gene editing, precision breeding — these buzzwords may sound like winning moves in Scrabble, but they are mainly confusing for many of us. And make no mistake, they were designed for that very purpose. In reality, they quite simply refer to a new generation of genetically-modified organisms (GMOs). Calling them 'new GMOs' would have been transparent, but such clarity would likely have sparked widespread public resistance to the European Commission’s legislative proposal to deregulate them. The deliberate use of confusing and blurry concepts discourages informed debate, leaving citizens sidelined and journalists reluctant to dig deeper. In July 2023, the European Commission unveiled its proposal to exclude these new GMOs from the existing EU GMO law. This means no mandatory labelling, no safety checks, and no liability. Since then, EU governments have struggled to agree on a definition for these products, let alone justify the need for such deregulation. Yet, the Polish presidency of the EU is determined to close the file, at all costs. The heart of the push for deregulation lies in one controversial (corporate) premise: that new GMOs are no different from conventional crops. Based on this (false) claim, corporations insist they need no authorisation processes, labelling, safety checks, traceability, or liability — and EU decision makers have been all to eager to take that claim for granted. The truth is, there is no substantive research on how new GMOs interact with other specie s once released into our fields, or their long-term impacts on biodiversity and agriculture practices. Proponents claim deregulation is essential to increase the uptake of new GMOs in Europe. But looking at countries where regulation is already loose, like Canada or the US, the few new GM plants actually grown have been withdrawn from the market due to failures, as seen with Cibus’ genetically modified rapeseed. Far from revolutionising agriculture, new GMOs often serve as little more than marketing tools to attract investors rather than offering sustainable farming solutions. For other two decades, European citizens have overwhelmingly rejected GMOs. In France, 77 percent of respondents to a 2022 poll said they wanted new GMOs to be strictly regulated at European level, the same way classical GMOs are. In Austria, 94 percent agree that products from new GMOs should be labelled as such . Yet the new law sidesteps these demands by excluding new GMOs from labelling requirements. While the law refuses to grant consumers their right to know if their food contains new GMOs, it now introduces a label for patented seeds. So far, EU governments have failed to agree on whether the new law should grant corporations patenting rights. The Polish presidency’s draft attempts to address the patenting conundrum by requiring producers to check and inform buyers that their seeds, food or feed are not covered by patents. The European Commission is then supposed to verify that. In case of doubt, the seed is to be labelled as patented. But the draft leaves critical details unanswered: who in the Commission will handle this, and how? Trying to fix the patent issue through food safety legislation is like patching a sinking ship with duct tape. The real problem lies in the existing patent legislation which is riddled with loopholes, allows the European Patent Office to grant patents beyond the EU, and fosters the power of a handful of big corporations - Bayer, Corteva and Chem China/Syngenta - over the food sector. In 2017, 70 percent of the seed and agrochemical industry was in their hands. More than 1,300 conventionally-bred European varieties are already affected by patents , which are mainly held by these industry giants. Deregulation of new GMOs will only strengthen their monopolies , making it harder for small and medium-sized breeders to access critical genetic resources, undermining their ability to adapt to emerging diseases or extreme weather. Once again, deregulation would benefit a select few at the expense of everyone else — farmers, breeders, consumers, nature. EU policy-makers must halt this legislation and the European Commission must finally assess how patents on GMOs — which often include conventionally-bred and even wild generic material — impact the breeding sector and farmers. Deregulation of new GMOs is not the solution, but a step backward. It’s time to clear the fog: farmers need genuine innovation like ambitious multiple cropping systems, they need support from researchers to reintroduce landscape elements on their fields. These are the pathways to increased farm resilience and better adaptation to the challenges of the climate crisis, destruction of nature, and soil degradation. Mute Schimpf is food campaigner at Friends of the Earth Europe . Mute Schimpf is food campaigner at | Friends of the Earth Europe | Calling the new generation of genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) simply 'new GMOs' would have been transparent — but such clarity would likely have sparked widespread public resistance to the European Commission’s legislative proposal to deregulate them. | [
"EU Political",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] | eu-political | 2025-01-24T13:13:17.070Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar7532f8f9 |
After Gaza, now the EU is silent on the West Bank situation | Since a ceasefire was reached in Gaza , the Israeli army has locked all Palestinian cities in the occupied West Bank while settlers terrorise Palestinians enjoying impunity and protection from the Israeli government. Israeli ministers have announced that they are beginning a major operation and millions of Palestinians fear that the scenes seen in Gaza are going to be repeated. The killing of 10 Palestinians, blocking the access to the Jenin Hospital as well as setting the West Bank into a lockdown has been met with no Western reaction, including from the European Union. After Israel has acted without red lines in Gaza and Lebanon, now western countries are giving them a green light to continue their campaign into the West Bank. The current situation in Palestine is not the entire responsibility of the European Union. But the implications of its lack of action threaten to set irreversible precedents and facts that will affect its ability to promote peace and security whether in the Middle East or elsewhere. Its credibility among Palestinians, Arabs and significant parts of the Global South could not be lower when it comes to accountability and implementation of international law. Politically speaking, the EU and its support for a “rules-based multilateral international order” is nowhere to be seen, while the incoming Trump Administration has appointed an ambassador to the UN who affirms that Israel enjoys “biblical rights” in all the Occupied West Bank and an ambassador to Israel who claims that the Palestinian people doesn’t exist. Will the EU allow for such principles to prevail in the next few months, including prospects of further annexation of Palestinian land? That is why what is going on in the West Bank represents an important test to prove the European willingness, or lack of it, to promote the implementation of international humanitarian law as well as the principles of a political solution. At this stage, European diplomacy should not simply focus on recycled talking points of supporting the “two-state solution”, but supporting concrete policies to end the Israeli occupation of Palestine. While some may argue that the EU requires 'consensus' to implement policy, in reality Brussels has remained absent, virtually silent when it comes to the latest Israeli crimes in the West Bank and avoiding any sort of serious political or legal engagement. Von der Leyen, Kallas, Metsola On the contrary, the Netanyahu government enjoys of privileged relations in Brussels, from Ursula von der Leyen to Kaja Kallas and Roberta Metsola, a trio that has mainly committed to deepening relations with Israel, including a new Association Council, even in light of the genocide committed in Gaza . The current reality in the West Bank may be the worst since decades and it is reflected on the lockdown imposed over all Palestinian cities and the increasing number of Israeli settler attacks. The European Mission to Tel Aviv remains publicly silent about any attacks against Palestinian human rights, even those who are Palestinian citizens of Israel, while in Palestine European diplomats continue to draft reports that are far from making any change of policy in Brussels. While Palestinian officials are required to endorse the two-state solution and asked to change the educational curriculum because of Israeli complaints, Israeli officials are not asked to publicly endorse the two-state solution Many projects funded by the EU have been affected by such policies, and any prospects of boosting Palestinian economy have remained trapped on almost 900 movement restrictions placed in the West Bank. This figure alone should point out the failure of any approach in Palestine that abandons politics and the need to end the Israeli occupation. What is more alarming is the tolerance shown for the systematic and ongoing Israeli violations of international law and UN resolutions. Effectively the EU continues to do business as usual with Israel while it destroys the prospects of any political solution. While Palestinian officials are required to endorse the two-state solution and asked to change the educational curriculum because of Israeli complaints, Israeli officials are not asked to publicly endorse the two-state solution and implement their obligations in order to continue enjoying the benefits of being its main trade partner. Even the Israel-EU Association Council continues to be violated by Israel on its Article 2, without any European response to that matter. In other words, denying Palestinian rights, perpetuating the occupation through an annexation, as established by the ICJ, killing thousands of Palestinians and opposing the two-state solution are not a red-line for the EU in its relations with Israel. Bethlehem has been locked with 89 barriers, Jerusalem and Ramallah isolated from the rest of the West Bank, in Hebron a patient died because his ambulance couldn’t reach the hospital due to an Israeli checkpoint as well as the connection between Palestine and the rest of the world has been affected by the siege over Jericho. While the Israeli government may be perfectly using the first days of the Trump Administration to satisfy its domestic audience after the Gaza ceasefire, the consequences of this operation will continue to affect the prospects of any political process. The issue is not whether the EU will pledge money for the Gaza reconstruction or offer some sort of high-level meeting to the Palestinian Authority as a compensation for enhancing relations with Israel. Rather the issue is whether the EU is willing to play the urgent political role needed to stop the ongoing crimes being committed for decades in Palestine, or if it will continue to contribute to the current status quo, with all its implications and precedents. The EU silence and lack of action over the West Bank attacks, can be taken as the answer to this question. Xavier Abu Eid is a former senior adviser to the Palestine Liberation Organization negotiations affairs department. Xavier Abu Eid is a former senior adviser to the | Palestine Liberation Organization | The current situation in Palestine is not the entire responsibility of the European Union. But the killing of 10 Palestinians, blocking the access to the Jenin Hospital as well as setting the West Bank into a lockdown has been met with no Western reaction, including from the EU. | [
"EU & the World",
"Opinion"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-01-23T11:47:26.030Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar9557bcb5 |
The Council of Europe should support human rights and hold Azerbaijan accountable | When Azerbaijan was accepted into the Council of Europe in 2001 , it was seen as a constructive way to support the country’s progress toward democracy. Like all members, its admission came with certain obligations: uphold the standards of a pluralist democracy, respect the rule of law, and defend human rights. Over the past nearly 25 years, however, the ruling regime of Azerbaijan has consistently failed to honour these commitments. Instead, it has steadily worked to solidify President Ilham Aliyev’s grasp on power, quashing opposition and dissent and restricting civil society. Last January, the Council of Europe recognised these failures when it refused to ratify the credentials of Azerbaijan’s delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). This unprecedented step specifically referred to the deteriorating human rights situation in the country. As PACE convenes for its winter session later this month [January], Azerbaijan will again have an opportunity to present a delegation. However, a look back at the past year shows unambiguously that President Aliyev has failed to address PACE’s concerns and improve the human rights situation in Azerbaijan. In fact, the situation has worsened considerably. Local civil society activists had documented at least 331 political prisoners in the country as of December 2024, including 25 journalists. Those include members of Abzas Media, Toplum TV, and Meydan TV , all independent media outlets reporting on corruption and human rights abuses perpetrated by the Azerbaijani government. If, as expected, the sham trials result in convictions, these journalists will face repercussions long after their potentially lengthy sentences – a media law that took effect in early 2022 allows the government to bar journalists’ accreditation if they have a criminal record, effectively forcing these individuals to lose their livelihoods or leave the country. Human Rights Watch and Freedom Now have documented how the government also uses regulation to obstruct the legitimate work of independent non-governmental organisations (NGOs), making them vulnerable to criminal prosecution. The implications of these policies and practices extend beyond those wrongfully detained, creating a chilling effect on the activities of other journalists and human rights activists who fear similar consequences. In November, Azerbaijan hosted COP29, the prominent, multi-stakeholder UN climate conference. Activists and advocates hoped global participation and attention on Baku would encourage the government to take meaningful steps to address its human rights failures, including by releasing political prisoners. Instead, in the run-up to hosting COP29, the government escalated its crackdown and arrested dozens of civil society representatives who had criticised government policies. Authorities silenced those pointing to Azerbaijan’s own environmental issues, like the well-known human rights defender Anar Mammadli . At the conference, they detained animal rights activist Kamran Mammadli for staging a protest during the proceedings. Security dragged Kamran across the floor in full view of conference attendees and locked him in a restroom for over an hour. The government’s repression was far-reaching – amidst murmurs that President Aliyev would announce a lasting peace deal with Armenia over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, several peace activists were arrested and charged with treason. Among them were Bahruz Samadov, a researcher completing his doctoral studies in Prague. Bahruz is a prolific commentator and contributor to several international publications, including the BBC and RFE/RL, where he spoke out against Azerbaijan’s military operations. Advocates warned of worse to come if the international community did not take firm steps to show President Aliyev that such violations of rights and democratic norms would not be tolerated. Indeed, now that the spotlight has shifted away since COP29, the repression has intensified. Rufat Safarov , head of an NGO that investigates government corruption and human rights abuses, was arrested on December 3, three days before he was set to travel to Washington, D.C., to receive the U.S. State Department’s Human Rights Defenders Award . Courts are now delivering convictions to wrongfully arrested individuals in the earlier crackdown. In early January, a court sentenced human rights activist Bakhtiyar Hajiyev to 10 years in prison on fabricated charges of tax evasion and illegal entrepreneurship. He has been imprisoned since December 2022, and his trial has been repeatedly delayed. Authorities are making new arrests, with six Meydan TV journalists among those targeted. These are only a few examples that show how Azerbaijan has failed to abide by the commitments it made more than two decades ago when it joined the Council of Europe. Neither President Aliyev’s recent rhetoric nor his actions indicate Azerbaijan has met the standards required to rejoin PACE. In fact, they suggest he may be resolved to the isolation they risk bringing about. But the international community must not sit back as Azerbaijan goes the way of neighbouring pariah states Russia and Belarus. States must act in solidarity with the Azerbaijani people who continue to demand their rights and a free democracy. To that end, PACE members must use all the tools they can to hold Azerbaijan accountable. This includes confirming that Azerbaijan’s credentials remain suspended and establishing clear criteria for their restoration. PACE should also condition future funding under a renewed Action Plan on progress towards those criteria. It should also urge the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to launch an Article 52 inquiry into Azerbaijan’s systemic violations of the European Convention on Human Rights, as the then-Secretary General did in December 2015 . These and other steps must be taken as part of a comprehensive response from the Council of Europe that brings Azerbaijan in line with its commitments. The rest of the international community also needs to take bolder action against Azerbaijan's repressive regime. History shows that only decisive measures, like imposing sanctions on human rights abusers and leveraging financial relations, have compelled change. Governments should continue to call for the unconditional release of political prisoners, push for amendments to restrictive NGO laws, and support the courageous, independent voices within Azerbaijan and in exile who are advocating for a free and democratic future. Europe can no longer turn a blind eye to Azerbaijan’s transformation into an autocratic state. It is time to hold Baku accountable for its abysmal human rights record. Andrea J. Prasow is executive director of Freedom Now, a Washington, D.C.-based organisation that protects individuals and communities from government repression and defends human rights through direct legal support, targeted high-leverage advocacy, and capacity-building analysis and assistance. A lawyer and global human rights advocate, Andrea’s expertise includes U.S. national security and foreign policy. Andrea J. Prasow is executive director of | Freedom Now, | Europe can no longer turn a blind eye to Azerbaijan’s transformation into an autocratic state. It is time to hold Baku accountable for its abysmal human rights record. | [
"EU & the World"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-01-23T05:30:00.000Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar27657715 |
Why Ireland is the Achilles Heel of the EU's fightback against Big Tech | The recent controversies surrounding Big Tech moguls Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg — who are defying content moderation norms and accusing the EU of censorship — should come as no surprise to those following the tech industry closely. For over a decade, Big Tech has approached the EU's robust data protection framework as little more than a compliance checkbox , rather than a set of binding legal obligations. A surprising body has been complicit in these Big Tech companies evading EU laws – the notorious Data Protection Commission (DPC) of Ireland. The concentration of Big Tech headquarters in Ireland is no coincidence. While the country’s low corporate tax rate and English-speaking workforce are significant draws, its regulatory leniency has been an equally compelling factor. This leniency extends to the application of critical regulations such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The GDPR, celebrated as a groundbreaking law for data privacy, was designed to deliver on promises of accountability and enforcement. However, the persistent failures of Ireland's watchdog, the DPC, coupled with Brussels' inability to exert sufficient pressure, have transformed it into a weak link in the EU's efforts to hold US tech giants to account. This has understandably emboldened Big Tech companies, with Meta’s Nick Clegg defending the tech giant’s audacious claim that it should not be bound by the EU’s legal framework. As of 2021, the DPC had issued decisions in just four out of 196 cases where it claimed a leading role as the EU regulator The DPC is crucial to the implementation of the GDPR because it acts as the lead supervisory authority for most major US tech companies under the GDPR’s one-stop-shop (OSS) mechanism. The DPC’s laxity — with a lack of robust oversight, delayed investigations and even outright dismissal of complaints — has made it a significant bottleneck for enforcement. This inaction has enabled tech giants to evade meaningful compliance, leaving the rights of millions of individuals in the dust. The numbers confirm as much: as of 2021, the DPC had issued decisions in just four out of 196 cases where it claimed a leading role as the EU regulator. Worse, decisions in Big Tech cases often take years, with several notable rulings taking more than four years to materialise, even when GDPR violations were evident. Too 'amicable' settlements? One of the DPC’s most troubling practices is its reliance on ‘amicable settlements’ to sideline a high number of GDPR complaints . By accepting companies’ assurances that the problem no longer exists, the DPC often withdraws cases unless the complainant explicitly objects. This practice disproportionately disadvantages individuals, many of whom lack the resources or knowledge to challenge such decisions (and when they do so, the DPC oftentimes dismisses their concerns). When the DPC does impose fines — arguably the most impactful tool for ensuring GDPR compliance — it does so reluctantly and under pressure from the European Data Protection Board (EDPB), which coordinates EU/EEA privacy authorities. For instance, the recent fines against Meta were not proactive enforcement actions but responses to sustained demands from EU counterparts urging the DPC to take stronger measures . Even more troubling, when the EDPB instructed the DPC to investigate Meta’s handling of sensitive personal data, the DPC chose not to comply but to sue the EDPB. A ruling in the case of DPC vs EDPB will be announced next Wednesday (29 January). Such defiant actions highlight the DPC’s reluctance to fulfil its enforcement responsibilities, compelling other member states to step in and bypass Ireland altogether. The lack of sustained pressure on the DPC is not accidental. While some actors in Brussels have raised alarm about the DPC, others are complicit in perpetuating this enforcement gap. Their advocacy for deregulation — couched in the language of enhancing competitiveness or fostering innovation — is, in reality, a thinly-veiled call to weaken the application of the GDPR. The failure to enforce data protection laws is not just a regulatory oversight but a direct threat to fundamental rights and societal well-being. At its core, the debate about data protection is about the pervasive impact of Big Tech’s algorithms, which thrive on personal data acquired under dubious circumstances. These algorithms amplify harm, perpetuate inequality, and undermine democracy. By determining who sees what information, whose voices are amplified, and whose are marginalised, these algorithms deepen existing inequalities — economic, racial, and gendered. Moreover, the opacity of these systems erodes public trust, leaving people powerless to understand or challenge the decisions affecting their lives, and subject to endless scrolling that uses their data to keep them hooked. If the EU wishes to maintain its standing as a global leader in data protection and digital governance, it must urgently address the shortcomings of the DPC. With two new commissioners now at the helm (and waiting for a third to be appointed), the DPC has an opportunity to course-correct. However, trust will not be rebuilt overnight. They must demonstrate an unwavering commitment to upholding the GDPR’s principles, not just through more decisions and, with it, more fines but also by addressing systemic issues such as Meta’s business model and its reliance on data harvested without proper consent. It remains to be seen if this leadership will rise to the task. Failure to do so would compromise not only the integrity of data protection but also the broader human rights framework in the digital age. At this critical juncture, the EU must choose whether to cement its regulatory legacy or cede ground to corporate impunity. Itxaso Domínguez de Olazábal is policy advisor at EDRi (European Digital Rights), working as their expert in data protection and privacy, with a particular emphasis on commercial surveillance. Itxaso Domínguez de Olazábal is policy advisor at | EDRi | For over a decade, Big Tech has approached the EU's robust data protection framework as little more than a compliance checkbox, rather than a set of binding legal obligations. A surprising body has been complicit in these Big Tech companies evading EU laws – the notorious Data Protection Commission (DPC) of Ireland. | [
"Digital",
"EU Political",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] | * | 2025-01-22T11:11:44.226Z | https://euobserver.com/*/arfd2322c4 |
France spearheaded successful effort to dilute EU AI regulation | In a matter of days, governments across the EU will have the power to deploy AI-powered technologies that track citizens in public spaces, conduct real-time surveillance to monitor refugees in border zones and use facial recognition tools against people based on their suspected political affiliations or religious beliefs. These are just some of the loopholes and national security exemptions forced through in the European Artificial Intelligence Act , the world’s first set of laws targeting the sector. The law is designed to mitigate the myriad bias and privacy fears surrounding the use of AI technologies and algorithms, with the EU saying the law will create “an AI ecosystem that benefits everyone.” But several controversial parts of the regulation will take effect from , thanks in part to secret lobbying by France and a host of European states. Internal documents obtained from the negotiations by Investigate Europe reveal member states successfully campaigned to dilute measures, giving police and border authorities, among others, greater freedoms to covertly monitor citizens. “In a series of bureaucratic loopholes and omissions, the AI Act falls short of the ambitious, human rights protecting legislation many hoped for,” said Sarah Chander, co-founder of Equinox Initiative for Racial Justice . “In reality, the legislation is a pro-industry instrument designed to fast track Europe’s AI market and promote the digitalisation of public services.” Investigate Europe analysed more than 100 documents from behind-closed-doors meetings of ambassadors from the 27 member states, the so-called Coreper, in the EU Council and spoke to multiple sources present at the negotiations. These meeting minutes and accounts from across the political spectrum detail how France strategically engineered amendments to the regulation . The use of AI in public spaces is broadly prohibited under the act, but changes pushed for by the French president Emmanuel Macron administration and others mean that law enforcement and border officials will have the ability to bypass the ban. Climate demonstrations or political protests, for instance, could now be freely targeted with AI-powered surveillance if police have national security concerns. 'At all costs' When EU ambassadors met on 18 November 2022, France’s representative was unequivocal about the country’s wishes, according to meeting minutes obtained: “The exclusion of security and defence … must be maintained at all costs.” It was a reference to a part of the law proposing that only the military would be allowed to conduct surveillance in public spaces. France wanted an exemption for all authorities if necessary for ‘national security’. Climate demonstrations or political protests, for instance, could now be freely targeted with AI-powered surveillance if police have national security concerns At a later meeting, Italy, Hungary, Romania, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Finland and Bulgaria all expressed support for the French position. "This battle was one of the toughest and we lost it ,” reflected a source in the European Parliament involved in the negotiations, who asked to remain anonymous. In the final text, there are no longer any restrictions on the use of surveillance in public spaces — the need for a national agency approval or declaring the product in a public register — if a state deems it necessary on the grounds of national security . In practice, these exemptions will also cover private companies — or possibly third countries — that provide the AI-powered technology to police and law enforcement agencies. The text stipulates that surveillance is allowed “regardless of the entity carrying out those activities”. “This article [2.3] goes against every constitution, against fundamental rights, against European law,” a jurist from the centre-right EPP group in the European Parliament said, speaking anonymously. “France could for instance ask the Chinese government to use their satellites to make pictures and then sell the data to the French government.” The exemption also goes against rulings from the European Court of Justice in 2020 and 2022, says Plixavra Vogiatzoglou, a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Amsterdam. The judgements found French telecommunications companies had breached EU law by retaining customer data on national security grounds. “The EU court said that private companies involved in national security activities are not exempted, they are still subject to EU law, and the national security exception has to be interpreted very restrictively and the member state has to really justify,” Vogiatzoglou said. France’s private lobbying in EU Council meetings mirrors its public push to exploit the technologies. In May 2023 the country’s constitutional court sanctioned the use of AI-powered video surveillance during the Paris Olympics. The move was the first of its kind in the EU and described as “a serious threat to civic freedoms and democratic principles ” by Amnesty International. Now, such methods could be rolled out across the bloc. Emotional recognition systems The final agreed AI Act, first presented by the European Commission in April 2021 and fought over from the start, has become littered with exceptions. The use of emotional recognition systems — technologies that interpret people’s moods or feelings — is banned from 2 February in workplaces, schools and universities. Companies will be prohibited from tracking customers in-store to analyse buying intentions, for example, and employers can not use the systems to scrutinise if staff are happy or likely to leave. But thanks in part to the lobbying by France and member states, the systems are permitted for all police forces and immigration and border authorities. It is still not clear whether the systems will also be allowed for recruitment personnel, for example, companies to assess applicants for a job. During a meeting on 29 November 2023, Denmark’s ambassador said that any ban “must be proportionate and should only apply if there is a risk of discrimination”. The Netherlands, Portugal and Slovakia took a similar stance in that meeting, with all “generally critical” of widening prohibitions to include law enforcement. And then there are biometric identification systems used to determine race, political opinions, religion or sexual orientation and even if someone is part of a trade union. These are banned under the act, but there is an exception. Police will be free to use the systems and collect image data on any individual or buy data from private companies. France again was a driving force. A document sent on 24 November 2023 by the French government to the Council said it was “very important to preserve the possibility of searching for a person… expressing a religious belief or political opinion, such as the wearing of a badge or accessory, when that person is involved in violent extremism or presents a terrorist risk.” Moreover, facial recognition software can be used in real-time if “strictly necessary” for law enforcement. It can be used by police investigating 16 specified crimes, including a general reference to “environmental crime”. But several states wanted dozens more added to the list. Minutes from the Coreper meeting in late November 2023 reveal France, along with the ambassadors from Italy, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria and Hungary all pushed for the scope to be expanded. Greece, a country at the forefront of migrant arrivals to Europe in recent years, was another in favour. In the same meeting, its ambassador “demanded an explicit exclusion” for prisons and border zones from any ban, lobbying for authorities to have the power to conduct real-time biometric analysis in public spaces on citizens and refugees and asylum seekers . The end of anonymity Biometric systems could now be deployed to surveil millions of faces and cross-check against national databases to identify individuals. Use of the technology in public spaces “means the end of anonymity in those places”, the European Digital Rights Network warned back in 2020. Civil society and NGOs have long sounded the alarm about the harms that could come from the act, which arrives in the wake of the Pegasus spyware scandal and revelations that discriminatory welfare algorithms have been used by various countries around Europe. “Ultimately, we are living in a climate where our governments are pushing for more and more resources, laws and technologies to facilitate the surveillance, control and punishment of everyday people,” Equinox’s Sarah Chander said. “And further away from a future where resources could instead be spent on social provision and protection instead of surveillance technology.” Another loophole carved out concerns predictive policing — the ability of an algorithm to predict who will commit a crime. Spain, which held the presidency of the council as negotiations neared their end in late 2023, already uses predictive policing algorithms. It is the only EU country to admit to doing so, along with the Netherlands. “Predictive policing is … an important tool for the effective work of law enforcement,” the Spanish ambassador said in a Coreper gathering in October 2023. At a meeting a month later, Ireland, Czech Republic and Finland echoed similar views, pleading against a complete ban on predictive policing products. The final text allows the systems to be used, as long as there is human oversight of the technology. When the final trialogue between the council, the parliament and the commission began on 6 December 2023, the Spanish presidency was eager to finalise the text prior to the European elections and the anticipated rise of far-right parties and before Viktor Orbán’s Hungary took on the presidency six months later. Negotiators were locked in a room for a day-and-a-half, an official present at the discussions, who requested anonymity, recalled. “We were exhausted, and only after a night of negotiations did we start talking about the prohibitions at 6 am,” they said. “[In the end] we achieved that every product would be authorised by an independent national authority.” Self-certification? And so the use of so-called ‘high risk’ technologies will be subject to requirements, like a court authorisation, registration in a European database and an impact assessment for the respect of fundamental rights. But even this comes with a caveat. An article was added allowing companies to fill in a self-certification and decide if their product is ‘high risk’ or not, thus potentially freeing them from certain obligations. An internal working document from the European Parliament’s legal service obtained by Investigate Europe questioned the decision. “A high level of subjectivity left to companies, which appears to be in contrast with the general aim of the AI Act, to address the risk of harm posed by high-risk AI systems.” The need to keep corporate interests on the side has concerned member states, notably France which is home to a number of leading companies, including Mistral AI. In a Coreper meeting on 15 November 2023, the French delegation warned that if wider use of the technologies was not permitted, “there was a risk that companies would relocate their business to regions where fundamental rights did not play a role”. The French government did not respond to requests for comment by the time of publication, nor did the governments of Greece, Portugal or Italy. Only time will tell how the AI Act is implemented. Anton Ekker, a Dutch lawyer for digital rights, believes the exemptions will have little impact in practice. “I'm very critical about the use of algorithms by a state. However, the narrative to say that because there are exceptions then things are allowed, it's not correct,” he said. “There are many national, constitutional laws, protecting fundamental rights.” Professor Rosamunde van Brakel, who teaches legal, ethical and social issues of AI, at the Vrije Universiteit Brussels, however, says national accountability mechanisms may not bring much solace to those impacted by the technologies. “In most cases regulation and oversight … only kicks in after the violation has taken place, they do not protect us before,” she said. “Moreover AI applications used in the public sector often affect vulnerable populations who are not empowered to launch a complaint or trust that a complaint will be taken seriously.” Maria Maggiore , Leila Minano and Harald Schumann are journalists from Investigate Europe . Maria Maggiore , Leila Minano and Harald Schumann are journalists from | Investigate Europe | Governments successfully lobby for freedom to surveil citizens in public spaces, target border areas with AI systems and exploit predictive policing algorithms, internal documents obtained by Investigate Europe reveal. | [
"Digital",
"EU Political"
] | digital | 2025-01-22T06:20:00.000Z | https://euobserver.com/digital/ardc3193c4 |
How the EU should stand up to Trump's Tech Bros oligarchy | Former EU competition commissioner Margrethe Vestager used to laugh at how US lawmakers on Capitol Hill sneered at her when she first targeted American tech companies for breaking EU competition rules in the pre-Trump era. As a returning Donald Trump takes aim at EU regulators, promising Apple CEO Tim Cook not to “let them take advantage of our companies,” no laughter is to be heard in the Berlaymont. Worse still, commission president Ursula von der Leyen seems to be considering tearing up the Union’s brand-new digital competition rules as a way of staving off even worse from Trump — from a full-blown trade war to US abandonment of Nato. According to the Financial Times, the European Commission is reconsidering ongoing probes into anti-competitive practices by Meta, Apple and Google. But the EU executive has denied these claims. The investigations were launched under the Digital Markets Act (DMA), a flagship EU legislative initiative seeking to stop large tech companies from abusing their market dominance, which came into force only last year. The EU's new tech and competition commissioners, Henna Virkkunen and Teresa Ribera, have tried to calm jangled nerves has tried to calm jangled nerves by insisting that the investigations are proceeding as planned. But the EU’s collective silence on Big Tech’s increasingly brazen interference in Europe’s sovereign affairs – from Elon Musk’s aggressive promotion of the German far-right on X to Mark Zuckerberg urging Trump to protect Meta from European “censorship ” – speaks volumes. Trump re-enters the White House having promised to impose across-the-board tariffs on EU goods and services unless the bloc ramps up its purchases of American fossil fuels. The US is by far the EU’s largest export market and new trade barriers would damage the bloc's already reeling economy. Dropping, pausing or slow walking investigations of American tech giants under the DMA, competition law or other EU regulations would be one way of currying favor with the incoming Trump administration. But as French liberal MEP Stéphanie Yon-Courtin, one of the European Parliament’s lead negotiators on the DMA, rightly argued in a recent letter to von der Leyen, caving to US political pressure on tech oversight would set a “dangerous precedent” that “undermines the legitimacy of our regulatory framework” and emboldens further attacks on EU rules. Big Tech 'broligarchy' As Big Tech becomes increasingly intertwined with the Trump administration, the last thing the EU should do is water down enforcement in the vain hopes of placating Trump and his tech “broligarchy.” Instead, the EU should be doubling down on its digital rulebook. Musk’s disruptive forays into European politics and Zuckerberg’s craven submission to the MAGA movement (with Google , Amazon and Microsoft not far behind) illustrate the growing political threat posed by Europe’s dependence on US tech giants. Tackling their market dominance is now an urgent matter of national security and sovereignty, not just economics. But it is also good economics. Without creating space for European innovators to thrive by reining in today’s dominant tech monopolies using tools like the DMA, Europe has little chance of building a robust homegrown tech sector able to capitalise on the promise of AI. Failure here means falling further behind in digital, deepening Europe’s economic woes and magnifying its technological dependencies. More fundamentally, the law is the law, and the EU can’t just abandon it when faced with political headwinds. Caving here would almost certainly be viewed by Trump, shrewd negotiator that he is, as a sign of weakness. The threats would only be greater next time, as would the required concessions. Under Joe Biden’s presidency, US antitrust enforcers worked in close harmony with their European counterparts based on a shared understanding of the Big Tech threat. While more could — and should — have been achieved, those days are unfortunately likely behind us. Visionary officials like Federal Trade commissioner Lina Kahn and Department of Justice antitrust chief Jonathan Kanter are on their way out. In comes a cohort of Trump nominees who – while not necessarily friends of Big Tech – may struggle to overcome Silicon Valley’s accelerating influence over the White House. The stage is now set for Europe to take the lead. Sacrificing Europe’s digital sovereignty as an offering to Trump would be a huge gamble, and one unlikely to pay off. The continent would become a digital vassal state, subject to the algorithmic whims of its foreign tech masters. To avoid this dark future, Europe needs to turbocharge its efforts to build a democratic digital economy that puts the public interest, not corporate profits, first. The stakes could not be higher. Max von Thun is director at the Open Markets Institute . Varg Folkman is policy analyst at the European Policy Centre. Max von Thun is director at the Open Markets Institute . Varg Folkman | is policy analyst at the | The EU’s collective silence on Big Tech’s increasingly brazen interference in Europe’s sovereign affairs — from Elon Musk’s aggressive promotion of the German far-right on X to Mark Zuckerberg urging Trump to protect Meta from European “censorship” — speaks volumes. | [
"EU & the World",
"Digital",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-01-21T11:18:26.294Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar1d71180f |
Guess who isn't invited to Europe's Holocaust memorials? | Does the European Commission think that one has to be a Zionist to remember the Holocaust? Apparently so. All of the 11 Jewish groups invited to Tuesday's (21 January) Holocaust remembrance conference in Brussels have lent political support to Israel and many work in close alliance with the Israeli mission to the EU, according to campaigners. Some, like the European Jewish Association, mobilised against the EU’s last foreign affairs chief, Josep Borrell, accusing him of stirring up antisemitism for his criticism of Israel’s war on Gaza. Others, like the Conference of European Rabbis, have slandered the EU as “new antisemites” for labelling products from the occupied Palestinian territories. Two of the invited groups – the American Jewish Congress and B'nai B'rith International – are not even based in Europe. Yet the EU’s apparent “open door” policy does not extend to non- or anti-Zionist Jewish groups. At least one umbrella organisation of 30 Jewish peace groups – European Jews for Palestine (EJP) – say that they were snubbed by the EU’s antisemitism “ tsar ”, Katharina Von Schnurbein, after twice requesting an invitation, following a meeting with her last December. Von Schnurbein did not respond to a press request to explain what smells like a political decision. The same could be said of the red carpet that the Polish EU Council presidency is preparing for Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu at a Holocaust memorial service in Auschwitz on 27 January, in defiance of an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court. Netanyahu is not just an indicted war criminal. He is scarcely able to brush his teeth without misusing , debasing or instrumentalising the Shoah. It is fair to ask what Europe has to learn about Holocaust memory from someone so forgetful that he blames the Palestinians for it . Underlining this question is the way the EU Commission seems to see Zionism – even potentially genocidal Zionism – as a defining characteristic of Jewish legitimacy. This conflation of Judaism with Zionism is – ironically – deeply antisemitic, making racist assumptions about diaspora Jews and holding them accountable for the actions of a foreign state. It’s also untrue. Questionable Poland Many – if not most - Jewish victims of the Holocaust were not Zionists. As Hitler rose to power, the largest Jewish political party in swathes of pre-war eastern Europe was the socialist and anti-Zionist Jewish Labour Bund . On the eve of the Holocaust in 1938, it won 17 out of the 20 Warsaw city council seats taken by Jewish parties. How does the EU Commission’s exclusion of the Bund’s modern-day contemporaries – and its delegitimisation of their beliefs – help us to remember them? Why have the EU Commission and Poland's Tusk now taken it upon themselves to decide which Jews are worth remembering, and which should be honoured? Of course, the majority of diaspora Jews today are Zionists, in some shape or form. This is certainly the case among diaspora community leaders, among whom the priority of supporting Israel rose from 14th place to 5th place in one survey last year. But that’s not the whole story. A survey of British Jews by the International Jewish Policy Institute shortly before the 7 October attack in 2023 found that just 60 percent self-identified as Zionists – a 10 percent fall over the last decade. The IJPR said that this suggested “a growth in uncertainty, discomfort or ambivalence on this issue”. Around 30 percent of British Jews surveyed felt no attachment to Israel, and did not see it as an important part of their Jewish identity. Some 79 percent disapproved of Netanyahu – most of them “strongly” – and 72 percent were pessimistic or very pessimistic about the future of Israeli democracy. Similar results would likely accrue across Europe. So why does the EU Commission judge this Jewish constituency undeserving of recognition or representation? Many of us believe that Netanyahu has tried to hide the abattoir he has created in Gaza over the last 16 months behind a bigger one built by the Nazis 80 years ago. In that context, it is hard not to see Poland’s offer of safe passage to him as an insult to the Holocaust dead, as well as to international law, and a collusion in the use of past Jewish suffering to leverage present day war crimes. Von Schnurbein and Tusk may be looking for transatlantic applause from US president Donald Trump with their skewed guest list, but they won’t find any from the 25 percent of American Jews who, polls indicate , see Israel as an apartheid state and the similar number who believe it is guilty of genocide. The truth is that there is a rich and deep vein of Jewish thought that sees human rights as universal and nationalism as a curse. The real lesson of the Shoah for this quarter is that all civilian life is sacred, and that “never again” must apply to everyone - Jews, Roma, disabled people, Tutsis, Armenians, Cambodians and even, should the International Criminal Court determine it, to Gazans. It's well past time for the EU to put aside their memorial day bromides and face Europe’s ugly legacy of racism and antisemitism, which stains even its attempts to memorialise the phenomenon. Arthur Neslen is the author of two critically-acclaimed books about Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian identities: Occupied Minds - A Journey Through The Israeli Psyche and In Your Eyes A Sandstorm - Ways of Being Palestinian . From 2004 to 2009 he was based in Ramallah and Tel Aviv, where he wrote about the Israel-Palestine conflict for the websites of Al Jazeera, The Guardian, The Economist, Haaretz and Jane's Information Group. He is now based in Brussels, writing about the environment for The Guardian and others. Arthur Neslen is the author of two critically-acclaimed books about Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian identities: Occupied Minds - A Journey Through The Israeli Psyche and | In Your Eyes A Sandstorm - Ways of Being Palestinian | One umbrella organisation of 30 Jewish peace groups – European Jews for Palestine – say they were snubbed by the EU’s antisemitism “tsar”, after twice requesting an invitation to the Holocaust remembrance conference. | [
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] | health-and-society | 2025-01-20T12:14:15.648Z | https://euobserver.com/health-and-society/arec94fabc |
Trump and Davos — a double-whammy start to 2025 | Two events taking place on either side of the Atlantic this week will make it clear for all to see the alarming extent to which our democracy has been captured by corporate interests. In the United States, Donald Trump will return to the Capitol for his inauguration, no doubt feigning a newfound respect for democracy just four years after his supporters stormed the same building but armed with a playbook of far-right policies designed to undermine it. The Project 2025 programme for government drawn up by the Heritage Foundation in collaboration with Trump’s allies and former staff includes plans to scrap democratic checks and balances, attack civil liberties, abuse human rights, repeal climate action and, of course, attempt to weaken workers’ rights. Lurking behind the throne, or most recently awkwardly dancing beside it, is Trump’s billionaire doge, Elon Musk, who has said he disagrees with the principle of trade unions and was praised by the president-elect for sacking striking workers. In the place of a mature and participative democracy of which unions form a central part, politics increasing resembles an episode of The Apprentice, the reality TV show in which Trump and a few trusted advisors decide the fate of workers facing an ever tougher fight for survival. Starting on the same day as Trump’s inauguration on this side of the Atlantic is the Davos summit , where you will find many business leaders who share Trump and Musk’s disdain for the complications of a pluralistic democracy and would prefer to see government ‘streamlined’ and run like a business. Unfortunately, an increasing number of business leaders are abandoning our system of social dialogue in the belief that they alone have the answers to our economic challenges. According to some CEOs who have paid extortionate amounts to whisper in the ears of policymakers over canapes, the answer to all our problems would be to ‘lower regulatory burden’ (cutting safety and environmental standards), a more ‘business friendly environment’ (lower wages and working conditions), and ‘incentives to innovate’ (tax cuts at the expense of public services). Europe could never win a race to the bottom that Trump and Musk’s admirers here are clamouring for and we can already see how this recipe has damaged Europe’s competitiveness. You only need to look at the results of a new survey by the World Economic Forum, which shows employers in Europe say a skills and labour shortage is their biggest barrier to success over the next five years. Employers would do well to consider then evidence showing that downward pressure on wages and working conditions have exacerbated Europe’s labour shortages. The industries finding it hardest to recruit workers paying nine percent less on average than those least affected by the labour shortage, a study by the European Trade Union Institute has found. Musk’s decision to locate his Tesla factory in Sweden is also very telling about the solution to the skills shortage. He says his business model is ‘incompatible’ with collective bargaining but the high-skilled workforce his company depends on is available exactly because collective bargaining results in employers giving workers better opportunities to keep training. 'Lords and peasants' And when it comes to investment, corporations should start by putting more of their profits back into their business rather than siphoning more and more into the pockets of CEOs and shareholders. Gross investment has fallen by nine percent across the EU since 2019, while over the same period profit share has risen by three percent. That has coincided with dividend payments to shareholders growing rapidly. At the same time as working people have been experiencing a cost-of-living crisis, and CEOs in the EU now earn more than 110 times more than the average full-time worker. It’s this manifestly obscene inequality that is the source of the growing anger in our societies. This week’s events demonstrate how increasing corporate power is not only leading to the hollowing out of our economy but is also corroding our society and undermining confidence in democracy. That’s exactly why the likes of Trump and Musk target trade unions and why any efforts to reinforce our ramparts against a slide in authoritarianism must begin in our workplaces. Not only do well functioning collective bargaining systems like that in Sweden greatly reduce the economic inequality on which the false prophets of the far-right prey on, but a recent study of 15,000 workers in ten EU countries shows how there is a strong correlation between better working conditions, such as fair pay, work-life balance and a chance to participate in decisions, and positive attitudes towards democracy and trust in its institutions. That’s why the far-right in the European Parliament fought so hard recently to stop efforts to give a voice to workers in multinational companies and why it’s so important that quality jobs are a priority for the new European Commission. Quality jobs would mean workers are fully-trained in the skills that companies require and that companies offer the pay and conditions which prevent labour shortages.All the evidence shows quality jobs are good for workers, good for companies and also good for our democracy. This is how you prevent the “lords and peasants” society which Elon Musk claims to be against. This should be Europe’s own project 2025. Esther Lynch is general secretary of the European Trade Union Confederation . Esther Lynch is general secretary of the | European Trade Union Confederation | Europe could never win a race to the bottom that Donald Trump and Elon Musk’s admirers here are clamouring for — and we can already see how this recipe has damaged Europe’s competitiveness. | [
"EU Political",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] | eu-political | 2025-01-20T05:30:00.000Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar2bba0bbf |
A victory for the bees? New ruling sheds light on EU pesticide deliberations | When it comes to EU decision-making on which pesticides to authorise or ban, there could be a lot more transparency: for example, why and how the European Commission and member states take decisions on whether protect or not bees and other pollinators. But not only could there be, but there should be much more transparency in this important policy area, according to a landmark ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on Thursday (16 January). The ECJ basically confirmed an earlier ruling from September 2022 on access to information in the area of pesticides decision-making. French NGO Pollinis went to court several years ago to get access to documents from a standing committee of experts from the member states and which is chaired by the European Commission. This committee, with the beautiful acronym Scopaff (Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed), decides on key issues relating to pesticides. This committee plays a central role in European pesticide policies, but is completely opaque: the condensed minutes do not give details of negotiations, and the votes of the member states and their positions are kept secret. But this 'black box' should, according to the ECJ, become more transparent from now on — provided the EU Commission is still in favour of the rule of law. In 2022 the commission had appealed against an initial General Court ruling favouring transparency, and is now legally proven wrong. According to the ECJ, the commission had no grounds to deny the NGOs' requests for access to documents, which would reveal the positions of member states on pesticide issues, as such a request did not risk undermining the decision-making process. Back to the bees It all started with the bees. In 2013 the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) published the so-called Bee Guidance Document, basically providing new protocols for scientifically assessing the risks of pesticides on bees. Various reports showed that bee populations were in decline , just like many other insects. But, until this day this Bee Guidance has never been officially approved by the member states. There was a fierce pushback by the pesticide industry because the EU wanted to ban specific neonicotinoids, which are proven to be harmful for bees. The EFSA's Bee Guidance Document was at some point even watered down by the commission and some member states through the Scopaff experts — a scandal that was denounced back in 2019, because it was the latest example of undue influence by agrochemical lobbyists influencing national and European authorities. This is helped by the very opacity of the decision-making process on how the EU protects bees and other pollinators. The opacity of SCoPAFF allows member states to avoid accountability to their citizens and makes the committee a strategic target for industrial lobby influence and through its decisions, contributes to the collapse of pollinators and biodiversity. In May 2019 the European Ombudsman slammed the European Commission for "maladministration" for withholding information on the position of national governments on the Bee Guidance Document. Back in 2019 the then leading EU election candidate for the Belgian Greens and now minister in the federal government, Petra de Sutter said: “It is absolutely not acceptable for governments and lobbyists to exert their influence independently of established procedures for political decisions, under the pretext that they are purely technical decisions. In the end, it is both citizens and the environment who pay the price." The most recent - and worrying - example of this is the weakening of the EFSA Bee Guidance Document. That document is a European standard way of examining how harmful certain pesticides are to pollinators such as bees. The industry’s trick is a classic: providing an impact analysis which claimed that the adoption of the Bee guidance would bring EU agricultural production to a halt The Bee Guidance was the basis for the EU banning three neonicotinoids in 2018, and thus threatened to hurt business even more. Hence the lobby campaign to weaken it. De Sutter criticized the fact that “some member states and the European Commission want to weaken” the Bee Guidance. And that moreover, “it is not known which member states play which role”. After obtaining 78 documents following the first ECJ ruling and relying on other files and emails, POLLINIS showed the industry's privileged access to the SCoPAFF, as well as the collusion of several member states with the agrochemical industry. Documents for example showed that the industry has access to all the SCoPAFF members, while this is not the case for all the other stakeholders — let alone ordinary citizens. Also the pesticide industry was able to win the SCoPAFF members' support in order to block the official adoption of the 2013 EFSA Bee Guidance. The industry’s trick is a classic: providing an impact analysis which claimed that the adoption of the Bee guidance would bring EU agricultural production to a halt. It was exactly the same kind of impact assessment as lobby-instrument which the industry used to block the recent pesticide reduction law (SUR). Hence the juridical steps by Pollinis. Thanks to the ECJ ruling the commission will no longer be able to refuse access to documents concerning member states' deliberations on pesticide regulation in Europe, without valid justification. Concluding a long administrative and legal battle, the ECJ decision reaffirms the principle of the widest possible public right of access to documents. This important verdict will help limit the secrecy surrounding SCoPAFF, increase its accountability, and curb the influence of industry on European policies. This is truly a black box being opened. The European Commission will no longer be able to unjustifiably deny access to documents concerning deliberations on pesticide regulation. Transparency is an essential prerequisite for democracy; it should strengthen decision-makers’ accountability to European citizens and put an end to the collusion of far too many of them with agrochemical interests. Barbara Berardi is director of research and advocacy at POLLINIS . Hans van Scharen is researcher at Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO), the NGO monitoring corporate lobbying of Brussels. Barbara Berardi is director of research and advocacy at POLLINIS . Hans van Scharen is researcher at | Corporate Europe Observatory | Thursday's ECJ ruling is truly a black box being opened. The European Commission will no longer be able to unjustifiably deny access to documents concerning deliberations on pesticide regulation. | [
"EU Political",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] | eu-political | 2025-01-17T10:24:52.397Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar8c210b18 |
A step-by-step programme for tackling Ukraine's corruption in 2025 | While defending its territory against Russian aggression, Ukraine is aiming for another strategic goal: transforming its institutions to meet EU standards. 2025 will witness an unprecedented push to overhaul crucial rule-of-law institutions, from the customs service to the Supreme Court, marking Ukraine's most ambitious reform agenda since gaining EU candidate status. Beyond improving the country's rule of law, these reforms should help to fill up Ukraine’s budget, much of which is allocated to support Ukraine’s armed forces in the face of Russia’s war. Ukraine's reform agenda gained unprecedented momentum in 2024, prompted by the dual forces of EU accession requirements and domestic demand for change. Though international financial support plays a crucial role–particularly through an EU–led assistance programme — Ukrainian society remains the key architect and advocate of these transformations. Recent polls show that 63 percent of Ukrainians support international partners' involvement in anti-corruption reforms, reflecting a genuine societal commitment to fast EU accession. First and foremost, in 2025, Ukraine will work on reforming its Economic Security Bureau (ESBU). This agency deals with crimes that hinder the Ukrainian state's economic interests. The bureau’s detectives investigate falsifying financial documents, evading taxes, or even illegal gambling. For several years, the institution was heavily politicised and even used to pressure businesses for political and financial gains. February to summer After over six months of discussions and compromise-searching ping-pong, in June 2024, Ukraine’s parliament kicked off the bureau’s reboot. Its new head will be selected through an open, transparent competition and should take office by the end of February 2025. The next task is to fill up staff vacancies and launch transparent, merit-based attestation for current employees. These will ensure the agency, which has up to 4,000 officers, receives new, fresh blood to carry out its functions. As the ESBU is eying up what brings in state revenues, the shared feeling for this reform is that it should help Ukraine’s budget drain less and reclaim the parts lost due to counterfeiting or unpaid taxes. The same logic applies to another gargantuan reform — a reboot of the customs service. For years, customs offices have been known as one of Ukraine's major ‘cash cows’. As the service cannot boast of corruption-free officers, its work would resemble a colander more than a pot — with many loopholes and ways to allow for tax evasion. In the summer of 2025, Ukraine’s soon-to-be rebuilt customs service will have its new chief, who, using the Economic Security Bureau's blueprint, will initiate the process of re-evaluating personnel. By strengthening the independence of the customs service director and eliminating the authorities' political leverage to appoint and dismiss them, the customs operation in Ukraine should get a second wind of transparency and efficiency. Customs is undeniably one of the ideological cornerstones of the European Union. For Ukraine, making its customs systems operate on a new level with transparent rules and procedures is a prerequisite for synchronising with the EU. The reforms of the Economic Security Bureau and the customs service are complex and will take a long time to implement. To completely change the setup of the customs service, Ukraine will need to adopt new laws to guarantee the institution's independence and compliance with EU standards and best practices. Once aligned, a more effective modus operandi of the two institutions will kill two birds with one stone. First, it will help Ukraine prepare itself for EU accession and tackle financial violations and crimes. Second, the Ukrainian state budget will receive more critical revenues to feed Ukraine’s defence against Russia’s war. As for now, the entire income raised from Ukrainian taxes is used to cover defence-related needs (military salaries, etc). In some other countries, two grand renewals would be enough for years — but not in Ukraine. Here, several significant reforms are being implemented while we fight the war. The judiciary 2025 will be a life-changing year for Ukraine's judiciary, launching its most ambitious renewal since regaining independence. The cornerstone of this transformation is hiring around 2,000 new judges — a move that will reinvigorate Ukraine's courts with professionals selected through strict, EU-standard procedures. A key element of this judicial renewal is the establishment of the High Court for Public Law Disputes. This specialised court will strengthen administrative justice by reviewing decisions of national-level public agencies, including crucial oversight of decrees of state agencies and civil service appointments. This court will use the successful blueprint of the High Anti-Corruption Court as a guiding model. The latter was started from scratch in 2019 to ensure high standards in tackling high-level corruption. Six renowned international experts selected judges for this court. Again, the same model is needed to recruit professionals with high integrity and no political links. While establishing new institutions is crucial, reforming existing ones is equally important. The Supreme Court, as Ukraine's highest court of general jurisdiction, represents the most challenging aspect of judicial transformation. The urgency of this reform became evident after recent scandals, including the charging of the court's head with accepting a €2.5m bribe. Two elements are key to a successful reboot. First, we must improve procedures for appointing new judges — to fill around 50 vacant positions (out of 200). A transparent selection process with public and international experts on the selection board will ensure the appointees are free from political influence. Also, the remaining sitting judges, who comprise more than three-quarters of the Court, should undergo integrity checks. Such screening will help eliminate corruption risks and increase Ukrainians’ trust in a fair judiciary. Ukraine's reform journey, launched during the 2013 Maidan revolution, has dramatically accelerated despite Russia's full-scale invasion. The results speak for themselves: a new anti-corruption infrastructure that has successfully prosecuted high-level officials, fulfilment of all seven EU pre-candidacy requirements, and unprecedented transparency in public spending. Olha Kovalska is international advocacy expert at the Anti-Corruption Action Centre in Kyiv, where Tetiana Shevchuk is legal counsel. Olha Kovalska is international advocacy expert at the Anti-Corruption Action Centre in Kyiv, where | Tetiana Shevchuk | The urgency of these reforms became evident after recent scandals, including the charging of the Supreme Court's head with accepting a €2.5m bribe. | [
"Ukraine",
"Opinion"
] | ukraine | 2025-01-16T10:50:11.863Z | https://euobserver.com/ukraine/arc47c95a8 |
EU can sanction Russians without warning, court says | The EU can sanction Russian firms or oligarchs without any prior warning, judges have said, after a legal challenge that threatened to wreck the bloc's €25bn asset-seizure programme. A Russian telecommunications firm, MegaFon, had claimed the EU Council should have warned it prior to its listing in February 2023, so that it could exercise its "right to be heard" to explain its case first. But judges in the EU's General Court in Luxembourg said on Wednesday (15 January) that adopting such an approach would let Russian targets move their financial assets out of EU jurisdictions ahead of any final decision, making a mockery of asset-freeze measures. "Such a derogation from the fundamental right to be heard during a procedure preceding the adoption of restrictive measures is justified by the need to ensure the effectiveness of the measures freezing funds," the verdict said. "In order not to compromise its effectiveness, such a measure must, by its very nature, be able to benefit from a surprise effect and apply immediately," it added. In a small irony, MegaFon did not have its assets seized by the EU. It was placed on an EU grey-list, called "Annex IV" in Brussels jargon, which forbids European companies from selling it dual-use technology, which could help the Russian military to wage war on Ukraine. But the EU has also imposed asset-freezes (and visa-bans) on more than 2,300 other Russian individuals and firms on a separate blacklist. And the "surprise effect" has seen EU jurisdictions freeze €24.9bn of private-sector Russian assets in a programme which a MegaFon-case precedent could have put at risk. General Court verdicts can be appealed at the European Court of Justice, its highest judicial body. But MegaFon’s Italian lawyer, Massimo Moretto, didn’t answer when asked by EUobserver on Wednesday if an appeal would go ahead. Meanwhile, MegaFon had also argued that the EU Council had not given enough reasons for its grey-listing and that its punishment was a form of "disproportionate and intolerable interference" by the EU. But judges disagreed, saying the EU Council had shown MegaFon provided roaming services in the Russian-occupied regions of Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk in Ukraine, as well as installing infrastructure in the Russian-occupied Kharkiv region. The EU Council had also shown MegaFon had close contractual relations with Russian armed forces, Wednesday's verdict said. The grey-listing satisfied "an objective of fundamental public interest for the international community", the EU court said. The MegaFon case is one of over 110 Russian legal challenges to the EU sanctions regime, including one by Alisher Usmanov, a blacklisted Russian billionaire who co-owns the grey-listed phone company. But in the past three years, just nine Russian individuals have managed to get off the blacklist following court victories or lobbying campaigns. | Andrew Rettman is EUobserver's foreign editor, writing about foreign and security issues since 2005. He is Polish, but grew up in the UK, and lives in Brussels. He has also written for The Guardian, The Times of London, and Intelligence Online. | The EU can sanction Russian firms or oligarchs without any prior warning, judges have said, after a legal challenge that threatened to wreck the bloc's €25bn asset-seizure programme. | [
"EU & the World",
"Ukraine"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-01-15T17:56:09.898Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar40d18d86 |
The European Parliament crèche scandal | A childcare centre at the heart of the European Parliament should be a symbol of care, stability, and excellence — values that the institution claims to uphold. Instead, the parliament’s Wayenberg crèche has become a prime example of how privatised childcare can fail children, parents, and workers alike. The latest scandal surrounding its management by People&baby, a French childcare company, exposed a disturbing reality staff pushed to breaking point, chaotic working conditions, and a revolving door of providers undermining continuity of care. Beyond the immediate scandal lies a deeper question: can the care of children, one of society’s most vulnerable groups, ever align with the profit-driven motives of privatisation? For years, the parliament’s Wayenberg crèche has been plagued by instability, first under Esedra and then under People&baby. Staff at the Wayenberg daycare have consistently reported inadequate resources, unsustainable workloads, and high turnover. Unions such as EPSU, SETCA, and CNE have long called for action, highlighting how these challenges directly impact the quality of care provided to children. The crisis reached a breaking point last year when management failures became untenable, leading People&baby to terminate its contract prematurely. Workers described a chaotic environment where their ability to care for children was severely compromised by the company’s failures. Despite this, the tendering system resulted in another problematic decision: a company set up by previous (similarly criticised) provider Esedra beat out a People&baby shell company, all while the parliament refused to engage with trade unions. This cycle of “out of the frying pan, into the fire” is unsustainable. This isn’t just a Eurobubble problem. It reflects a troubling trend across Europe where profit-driven childcare companies prioritise cost-cutting over quality. By outsourcing daycare services every few years, the parliament has sacrificed continuity and stability — both essential for children’s development — for the sake of financial efficiency. People&baby exemplify the pitfalls of privatised childcare. As detailed in investigative journalist Victor Castanet’s , the company prioritise profits by cutting costs — employing fewer, less qualified staff and exploiting public subsidies while compromising on care standards. This business model — particularly prominent in France — has led to overcrowded facilities, overwhelmed caregivers, and preventable incidents. In 2022, an overburdened worker at a People&baby-run daycare in Lyon made a fatal mistake, resulting in the death of an 11-month-old child. This profit-driven approach has been mirrored in other countries . In the UK, private equity-backed providers have driven up costs for parents while delivering inconsistent care. Even in Sweden, where the welfare model sets high expectations, privatised childcare has struggled to meet the same standards. These examples underscore a grim reality: privatisation may reduce costs on paper, but it often sacrifices the quality and equity families rely on. Not just a Brussels Bubble issue The parliament’s daycare debacle isn’t just an internal matter — it’s emblematic of broader issues affecting childcare across the continent. In countries where childcare is treated as a public good, outcomes for children and families are significantly better . Publicly managed systems provide greater stability, accountability, and equity, ensuring that care is guided by community needs rather than corporate profits. If Europe’s flagship institution can’t lead by example, how can it advocate for progressive policies across member states? By outsourcing a key service to private companies with checkered records, the Parliament risks eroding its credibility as a champion of social justice. MEPs are well aware of the Wayenberg scandal. In 2020 – when Esedra was the operator - the Parliament passed a resolution emphasising the need for transparency in the tendering process and the need to prioritise children’s well-being and staff working conditions. Most recently, a French MEP proposed excluding People&baby and its branches from future procurement, calling for direct employment of daycare staff — a model already used by the European Commission. The childcare crisis in the parliament reflects a larger problem facing families all over Europe. Childcare isn’t just a service; it is a foundation for social and economic equality. Accessible, high-quality childcare allows parents, particularly women, to participate fully in the workforce. It gives children a safe, stimulating environment that supports their development. When childcare is privatised, these goals are undermined. Profit-driven providers cut corners, leading to high staff turnover, inadequate training, and compromised care standards. Workers, often underpaid and overworked, bear the brunt of these policies, while children and families suffer the consequences. The Parliament has an opportunity to lead by example, taking bold steps to reform – steps that can be replicated on every level: Publicly managed childcare services deliver better outcomes. The Parliament should transition to a public or non-profit model, ensuring stability, accountability, and quality. Where outsourcing continues, the Parliament must implement stricter criteria for contractors. Transparency, fair labour practices, and enforceable quality standards must be non-negotiable. High-quality care begins with well-supported caregivers. Competitive salaries, ongoing training, and reduced workloads are essential to attract and retain skilled professionals. Parents, unions, and MEPs have repeatedly raised concerns about the current system. Engaging is critical to building a model that meets the needs of all stakeholders. A question of values At its heart, this issue is about values. Does the parliament, a European soapbox and reflection of our ideals, prioritise the well-being of its youngest citizens and the dignity of its workers? Or will it continue to treat childcare as a commodity, subject to the whims of the market? By embracing a public, high-quality childcare model, the parliament can send a powerful message: when it comes to care, people must always come before profits. Pablo Sánchez Centellas is the policy officer for European Public Services Union . Pablo Sánchez Centellas is the policy officer for | European Public Services Union | The problems with the European Parliament's crèche reflect a troubling trend across Europe where profit-driven childcare companies prioritise cost-cutting over quality. By outsourcing daycare services every few years, the parliament has sacrificed continuity and stability — both essential for children’s development — for the sake of financial efficiency. | [
"EU Political",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] | eu-political | 2025-01-14T12:44:19.668Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar6cf0df7a |
With Georgian Dream in power, what next for EU monitoring mission? | Since the war in 2008, the EU Monitoring Mission ( EUMM ) has been the only remaining civilian monitoring mission in Georgia and is a key stabilising force in the region — and the EU just prolonged the mission for another two years in December 2024. However, the disputed parliamentary elections and the government's increasingly authoritarian and anti-European stance could pose new challenges for the mission. As in the countries of the Sahel, there may be fundamental questions about how a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission should work with a government that is increasingly hostile towards the EU. The Georgian Dream government could even revoke the mission's invitation if relations with the EU further deteriorate. But the EUMM's de-escalation tools, such as the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) and the hotline between Georgia, its regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Russia, remain vital — for both the Georgian government and the EU. The EUMM was established in 2008 to act as a civilian observer mission in the intra-Georgian conflict between the core country and the breakaway territories and Russia. Its task is to monitor the implementation of the EU-brokered six-point agreement that ended the August 2008 war. As a result of the conflict, Georgia lost control over the last areas still controlled by Tbilisi in the regions that had been breakaway since the early 1990s. Since then, the administrative borders (ABL) to both regions have been controlled by border troops under the control of the Russian domestic intelligence service FSB. Since October 2008, some 200 EU observers have been on the ground to monitor the ceasefire and stabilize the post-war situation. 24/7 hotline The mission relies on two key mechanisms: a 24/7 hotline linking Georgian, Abkhazian, South Ossetian and Russian security actors and allowing for immediate communication of all conflict-related incidents. There are also IPRMs (Indident Prevention and Response Mechanisms) in Ergneti and Gali. The former involves Georgian, Russian and South Ossetian de facto authorities and is co-moderated by the EUMM and the OSCE. Meanwhile, the IPRM on Abkhazia, which included Georgian, Russian and Abkhazian representatives, has been suspended by Abkhazia for more than six years. The parliamentary elections on 26 October, 2024 were the first elections since Georgia was granted EU accession candidate status in December 2023. The election campaign was characterized by strong polarization between the government and the pro-European opposition as well as president Salome Zurabishvili. The Georgian Dream party, which has been in power since 2012, pursues an authoritarian course and staged the elections as a decision between “peace and war”. There were numerous irregularities on election day . National and international observers, including the OSCE observation mission, pointed to overcrowding at polling stations, intimidation of voters and local election observers, violations of the secret ballot and several incidents of physical altercations outside polling stations. At the occasion of the publishing of the final report of the OSCE’s election observation mission on 20 December 2024, the head of the EOM stated that there have been many issues identified that “negatively impacted the integrity of these elections and eroded public trust in the process”. Already on 28 November, the EU Parliament decided by a large majority not to recognize the parliamentary elections and to call for internationally supervised new elections. On 16 December, the EU announced individual sanctions against Georgian officials in response. Abkhazia and South Ossetia — two frozen conflicts heating up So far, these events have had no visible impact on relations between Georgia and its breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Although two further rounds of Geneva international discussions have recently been held between Tbilisi, Moscow and the de facto governments in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, these have merely revolved around the already known deadlocked positions of all parties. South Ossetia is consistently pursuing a policy of self-isolation vis-à-vis Georgia and the international community. At the same time, Russia is strengthening its strategy of expanding its influence in the region. Since 2008, at least 30 military bases have reportedly been established by Russian border guards and security forces, and arrests and violence at the ABL and discrimination against ethnic Georgians continue. Abkhazia has long relied heavily on Russian financial aid but following massive protests against an investment deal with Russia and the subsequent ousting of the Abkhazian president, Russia has withdrawn its support. This has affected the salaries of the Abkhazian people, as well as increasing the cost of electricity. In response to the growing crisis, the EU is now considering ways to ensure energy security in the region through Georgia, which could also work as a confidence-building measure for Georgia and Abkhazia. Even if the mission's mandate is not directly related to domestic issues, the extension until the end of 2026 and the continued work of the EUMM will also make an important contribution to the stabilisation of Georgia. Although the Georgian Dream party is seen as EU-sceptic, it is not pro-Russia. Thus, a withdrawal of the EUMM cannot be in its interest. However, such a development, i.e. the withdrawal of the Georgian invitation for the mission, cannot be ruled out if the escalation between the Georgian government and the EU continues. A closing of EUMM would have unforeseeable consequences for the stability of the region and could — without the de-escalation instruments of the EUMM still available — lead to serious incidents on the administrative border with the two breakaway regions. The continued presence of the EUMM in Georgia is also of strategic interest to the EU, inter alia for monitoring Russian activities in these regions and in the Black Sea. The EU should therefore protect the EUMM as much as possible from the current disputes with the Georgian Dream. Leena Harmuth & Tobias Pietz are members of the policy team at the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) in Berlin. Leena Harmuth & Tobias Pietz are members of the policy team at the | Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) | The EU just prolonged its monitoring mission in Georgia in December, for another two years. However, the disputed parliamentary elections and the Georgian Dream government's increasingly authoritarian and anti-European stance could pose new challenges for the mission. | [
"EU & the World",
"Opinion"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-01-13T11:47:00.869Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/arf6e1e21b |
Defence, Nato Baltic Sea summit, Iran in focus This WEEK | The Brussels bubble is back in full swing after the Christmas and New Year season, with defence and security high on this week’s agenda. EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen is still recovering from pneumonia at home in Germany. And if she isn’t back by Wednesday, European Commission executive vice president Teresa Ribera will be chairing the commissioners' weekly meeting. The Competitiveness Compass, which is expected to guide the new commission's work over the next five years, is due to be unveiled this week but could still be on hold due to von der Leyen’s illness. The defence ministers of France, the UK, Italy, Germany and Ukraine are expected to meet in Warsaw on Monday (13 January) to further discuss Ukraine’s military needs. This follows last week’s Ukraine Defense Contact Group in Germany, the last Ramstein format meeting before US president-elect Donald Trump's inauguration. “We need to do everything possible to make sure that Ukraine has what it needs, in terms of training and equipment, to prevail in this fight,” Nato chief Mark Rutte said last week. In his first official visit to the European Parliament, Rutte will address members of the committee of foreign affairs, the defence subcommittee and the parliament’s Nato delegation on Monday. On Tuesday (14 January), Finland will host a summit with Nato countries bordering the Baltic Sea to address security threats in the region — after an incident on Christmas Eve resulted in an electricity cable and four telecom cables linking Finland and Estonia being damaged, weeks after a similar cable-cut mystery hit the region. The meeting, hosted by the resident of Finland and Estonia’s PM, will also include the participation of leaders from Denmark, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden, and European Commission vice-president Henna Virkkunen. Nato said last month that it will increase its military presence in the Baltic Sea to protect critical infrastructures, as recent incidents are seen by experts as part of a hybrid war between Russia and the West. The Kremlin has denied involvement in damaging the cables. “The sea domain is currently the most contested because it’s also strategically important,” a commander of the Estonian military told AP in December. Nuclear talks Iran will hold nuclear talks with France, the UK and Germany on Monday and Tuesday (13 and 14 January) in the Swiss city of Geneva — amid concerns over the country's nuclear programme and its compliance with international obligations. The meeting comes after French president Emmanuel Macron said last week Tehran's uranium enrichment drive was "nearing a point of no return” and hinted at possible sanctions if no progress is made. Earlier in December, the UN nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said Iran is speeding up uranium enrichment to 60 percent, nearing weapons-grade levels. For his part, Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian is set to visit Moscow on Friday (17 January) in a sign of Tehran's close cooperation with Russia. Meanwhile, ahead of the annual meeting taking place in Davos next week, the World Economic Forum will launch its annual Global Risks report on Wednesday (15 January). Enlargement, trade, migration In Brussels, MEPs in the parliament’s foreign affairs committee will also have an exchange of views with the new EU commissioner for enlargement Marta Kos on Tuesday. Talks will focus on the 2024 Enlargement Package adopted by the EU Commission last October. EU trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič will discuss with MEPs in the trade committee on Thursday the controversial EU-Mercosur agreement which was wrapped up in early December — despite opposition from several EU countries led by France. On the same day, MEPs in the budget committee will discuss financial assistance to Egypt and Jordan. As part of a €7.4bn aid and investment package agreed with the Egyptian government last year, the EU is expected to provide Egypt with up to €5bn in medium-to long-term loans until 2027. Likewise, the EU is set to provide a €500m loan to Jordan between last year and 2027. The subcommittee working on tax matters will host a debate about the impact of taxation on gender equality on Monday, while the fate of the Capital Market Union (CMU) will be discussed by the economic committee on Thursday. Also on Thursday, Hadja Lahbib, the new EU commissioner for preparedness, crisis management and equality will meet with Palestinian PM and foreign affairs minister Mohamad Mustafa — amid talks for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. | Elena is EUobserver's editor-in-chief. She is from Spain and has studied journalism and new media in Spanish and Belgian universities. Previously she worked on European affairs at VoteWatch Europe and the Spanish news agency EFE. | The Brussels bubble is back in full swing after the Christmas season, with defence and security in the Baltic, Iran and Gaza, high on this week’s agenda. | [
"Agenda"
] | agenda | 2025-01-13T07:47:32.915Z | https://euobserver.com/agenda/arce38847a |
Egypt’s new asylum law: aided by EU support, fuelled by repression | The EU’s reliance on Egypt as a 'migration buffer' has translated into significant financial and logistical support aimed at controlling migration routes. In March 2024, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen and Egyptian president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi signed a Joint Declaration on the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership, emphasising cooperation on migration, security, and economic stability. Von der Leyen described Egypt as a “key partner,” stating: “The EU and Egypt will continue to cooperate in order to support Egypt’s efforts in hosting refugees, and both sides are committed to the protection of the rights of migrants and refugees.” As part of this partnership, the EU announced a €7.4bn aid package in 2024, which included €5bn in concessional loans, €1.8bn in investments, and €600m in grants. An additional €1bn was disbursed later in the year under the Macro-Financial Assistance programme. These funds complemented the IMF’s expanded loan program to Egypt, which increased from $3bn [€2.9bn] to $8bn during the same period, according to reports from the EU and IMF. Altogether, Egypt received approximately €10.2bn in aid and loans. Critics argue these funds, ostensibly aimed at addressing economic challenges, empower an authoritarian regime, emboldening its repressive policies against refugees and dissenters alike, according to a report by Deutsche Welle. Egypt’s asylum bill: a repressive framework Egypt’s new asylum bill, introduced as an attempt to regulate refugee status, has drawn significant criticism for its vague language and restrictive provisions. Terms like “national security” and “public order” remain undefined, allowing for broad interpretations that justify arbitrary measures against refugees. Major General Ahmed Al-Awadi, chairman of the Defence and National Security Committee in the Egyptian Parliament, defended the bill, stating that it “aligns with Egypt’s international obligations” and ensures refugees’ rights without imposing additional fees. The government claims the law creates a comprehensive legal framework for refugees while balancing national security concerns. However, rights organisations, including Amnesty International, have criticised the law for transferring responsibilities from the UNHCR to national authorities without adequate safeguards. They warn that the bill risks undermining refugee protections, especially given its link to Egypt’s draconian anti-terror law. The anti-terror law, infamous for its broad definitions, has been used to detain tens of thousands of peaceful dissenters and journalists — including the author of this article — under prolonged pretrial detention or unfair trials. Refugees, previously seeking protection in Egypt , now risk falling under this same oppressive framework. Anti-migrant hate campaigns Domestically, Egypt has witnessed a surge in anti-migrant hate campaigns. Between 10-23 November, 2024, over 86,000 anti-refugee posts circulated on social media, reaching more than 13 million users, according to Deutsche Welle . These campaigns, often fueled by nationalist rhetoric, blame refugees for economic hardships and frame them as threats to sovereignty. The EU’s focus on funding border control and security measures inadvertently empowers such narratives. By supporting regimes like Egypt, the EU emboldens practices that foster violence and marginalisation against migrants. This dynamic has also spread over to the broader region. Migrants stranded in Tunisia and Libya face similar repression as governments adopt Egypt’s securitized migration control model, exacerbating risks for those fleeing persecution. The rise of far-right parties across Europe has reshaped migration policy, prioritising externalised border management at the expense of human rights. Egypt’s role as a gatekeeper for Europe’s borders aligns with this agenda, as EU funding strengthens the regime’s grip while downplaying accountability for abuses. Moreover, the normalisation of anti-migrant rhetoric within Europe has encouraged similar practices in Egypt. Online hate campaigns and xenophobic discourses in Egypt echo the far-right’s framing of migrants as economic burdens and cultural threats. This cyclical relationship creates a double bind for refugees, who face repression in transit countries like Egypt and hostility in Europe if they manage to escape. The EU’s partnership with Egypt on migration reflects a dangerous trade-off, where human rights are sacrificed for political expediency. Refugees, already vulnerable to violence and exploitation, now face the compounded threat of draconian laws and rising hate speech, fueled by European security policies. If the EU is to maintain its credibility as a global defender of human rights, it must condition its funding on tangible improvements in refugee protections and insist on transparency and accountability in its collaborations. As critics warn, cooperation without oversight risks perpetuating repression in Egypt and undermining the EU’s global standing. Shimaa Samy is an independent Egyptian journalist, and executive director of the Seif Law Foundation for Legal and Research Studies. She is also the project manager for a specialised initiative on migrant and minority women in Egypt. | Shimaa Samy | Egypt’s new asylum bill, introduced as an attempt to regulate refugee status, has drawn significant criticism for its vague language and restrictive provisions. Terms like “national security” and “public order” remain undefined, allowing for broad interpretations that justify arbitrary measures against refugees. | [
"EU & the World",
"Migration",
"Opinion"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-01-13T06:00:00.000Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar788ee6c9 |
What does the new EU-Japan defence partnership actually mean? | Japan has become the first country in the Indo-Pacific to strike a security and defence partnership with the European Union. In one of his final acts as the EU’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell concluded what he described as the “historical and very timely” agreement last November with Japan’s foreign minister, Takeshi Iwaya. The landmark deal reached in Tokyo coincides with the new strategic partnership agreement between Japan and the EU that took effect on 1 January 2025. The latest developments in EU-Japan relations are somewhat surprising for the northeast Asian country, which has attached a deep level of importance to its postwar alliance with the US. But they reflect Japan’s desire to become a major power in its own right within a new world of geopolitical competition. Japan has been preparing itself to play an active role in global affairs in recent years after more than half a century of isolation and pacifism. The late Shinzo Abe — the country’s longest-serving prime minister — implemented consequential institutional reforms that included the creation of Japan’s first-ever National Security Council in 2013. These changes enabled Abe’s successors to consolidate Japan as a strong and independent actor capable of standing up for democracy and the rule of law in the world. Since 1945, Japan has sought to maintain peaceful foreign relations. The country pursued engagement with Russia notwithstanding the annexation of Crimea in 2014 in light of the long-standing dispute over the Kuril Islands off the northeast Japanese coast. But Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 prompted Japan to change its foreign policy. Fumio Kishida - who served as Japan’s prime minister from 2021 to 2024 — reacted with boldness to the all-out Russian assault. Ukraine U-turn In December 2022, Kishida updated his country’s National Security Strategy to recognise Russia as a threat to "the very foundations of the rules that shape the international order." In an unprecedented move for postwar Japan, Kishida approved the provision of lethal weapons to victims of aggression. This included the Patriot surface-to-air missiles that have been instrumental to the Ukrainian counter-offensive. Japan’s support for Ukraine is backed up with a reorientation of its postwar military posture. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution that renounced war as a sovereign right had left Japan heavily dependent on the US for its security. Kishida made a dramatic change to this constraint on Japan’s power by authorising its counter-strike capability. This is supplemented with a long-term plan to increase defence spending. Japan is on course to become the third-largest military spender globally in 2027, following the US and China. In an unprecedented move for postwar Japan, Kishida approved the provision of lethal weapons to victims of aggression But Russia’s war against Ukraine alone does not account for Japan’s new-found assertiveness in foreign policy. Rather, it has been a primary goal of the Japanese leadership to defend the rules-based international order that has allowed their country to prosper after the devastation of the Second World War. The security of Europe and of the Indo-Pacific are becoming increasingly interlinked as Russia and North Korea start to collaborate with one other . The deployment of North Korean soldiers in Russia indicates that a shared long-term interest exists between Moscow and Pyongyang to challenge US primacy in international affairs. In response, Japan looks to its alliances as a critical mechanism with which it can advance its core national interests. Kishida has devoted particular attention to Japan’s security cooperation with the US in order to maintain the global balance of power. Last spring, his government reached an agreement with the Biden administration to improve bilaterally the respective Japanese and American command and control architectures. This strengthens the US-Japan alliance by allowing for greater interoperability between their armed forces and enhancing Japanese defence capabilities. Japan’s multilateralism extends beyond its ties with Washington. When it returned to the international community in 1956 as a new member of the United Nations, Japan reaffirmed its belief in the principles of free and open cooperation and peaceful coexistence. Kishida applied these fundamental values to Japan’s G7 presidency in 2023. The Japanese premier placed a strong emphasis on building coalitions with the world’s emerging power centres in support of Ukraine. Japan’s relations with South Korea had been deteriorating over historical grievances, which undermined regional stability. But Kishida’s inclusive approach to diplomacy secured a historic rapprochement between Tokyo and Seoul. Japan has also built strong relations with key global players outside of its immediate neighbourhood. While responding differently to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Japan and India have worked together to keep the Indo-Pacific a free and open region. Kishida and his Indian counterpart, Narendra Modi, reaffirmed their countries’ " special strategic and global partnership " in a summit held in New Delhi in March 2022. Japan’s investment in sustaining the post-1945 order is a timely strategic asset for the EU. The process of European integration faces a revisionist threat from Russia with the implicit backing of China and an uncertain US presence in Europe. In this new geopolitical landscape, further engagement with Japan’s growing importance on the world stage will be vital. Hugo Blewett-Mundy is a non-resident associate research fellow from the EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy in Prague. Hugo Blewett-Mundy is a non-resident associate research fellow from the | EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy | Japan has become the first country in the Indo-Pacific to strike a security and defence partnership with the European Union. Japan is now on course to become the third-largest military spender globally in 2027, following the US and China. What does that entail? | [
"EU & the World",
"Opinion"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-01-10T10:02:35.598Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ardb6a9f8c |
Europe's response to Syria has been disappointing — to say the least | On New Year's Day, Tamara, a well-known Syrian activist, posted a picture of her in Damascus with the caption, "Finally back home". It has then been almost a month since the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. For most Syrians and people who follow Syria closely, the thought occurs to them at least once every day that surely it is unlikely how the country has completely changed in a few days after 13 years of war. It remains hard to believe. I see countless reports like Tamara's passing from Damascus. Syrians with tears in their eyes. Even after a month, optimism remains the prevailing feeling. That is not to say it lacks realism. Activists watch the doings of new leader Ahmed al-Sharaa with suspicion. Every misstep or wrong appointment is harshly criticised. Others, on the other hand, call for patience. Some particularly highlight the former al-Qaeda leader's efforts to protect minorities, while others give little credence to the new policies of his militia HTS. There is also a noticeable difference between the many Syrians who have fled the country in the past for political reasons and those who have remained there out of necessity. The latter are mostly happy that they are finally free and can talk about whatever they want, without fear of being arrested and tortured. The returned refugees want above all to be sure that Syria will be a democratic country for all Syrians. It is a classic divide between those who have been exiled and those who have stayed. It is a classic divide between those who have been exiled and those who have stayed However, the main question is how long will the state of grace last for al-Sharaa and his HTS? Every revolution, from the French to the Sudanese revolution, is followed by a kind of honeymoon. Everyone is mostly happy and feels a great bond with each other. It is a period when hardships and shortcomings are forgotten. In Damascus today, for instance, there are no complaints that there is only electricity for a few hours a day and that HTS has failed to drastically change this for the time being. Similarly, hunger in the country is still tolerated with patience. But there comes a time when annoyance grows, and people demand improvement. If this does not materialise, the legitimacy of al-Sharaa and HTS will quickly diminish, and the likelihood of new conflicts grows. The European Union should know this. Our continent has seen many revolutions and democratic transitions. After the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, the situation was no different. For two decades, every government of central and eastern Europe was mercilessly punished in the ballot box for not living up to the ideal image and high expectations. We would also have learned from democratic transitions in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East that without support from the international community, fledgling democracies often revert to chaos and dictatorship. This is precisely why Europe's response since the fall of Assad on 8 December 2024 has been disappointing. In an initial reaction on 9 December, several European countries announced that the asylum procedure for Syrians would be stopped. At the same time, sanctions against Syria were not suspended and HTS was not removed from the list of terrorist organisations. Isn't that strange? If the country is believed to be run by terrorists, why stop procedures for those fleeing terrorism? In the end, the EU decided to send the foreign ministers of the two largest member states, Germany and France, to Syria to talk to the new leader. The European message from both ministers could have been better, to say the least. They indicated that European policy towards Syria, for instance on sanctions, will only change if there are guarantees on the protection of religious minorities, women and Kurds, and if there is no conservative Islamist rule. The question then becomes when exactly will Europe find that those guarantees are met? In a few months or a few years, and on the basis of what report? A Syrian cynically asked me why Germany does not want to support Islamist governance in Syria but trades with Saudi Arabia, or worse is silent about a genocide in Gaza? In short, what are these 'European values' now? The sanctions were introduced against Bashar al-Assad because he killed his people, not because Syria was not a Scandinavian-style social democracy. The US has already understood this and (partially) removed the sanctions. Why can't Europe manage this? Libya 2.0? Europe made exactly the same mistake in Libya, waiting far too long to engage. As a result, militias and political groups were supported each time by other countries. This was the recipe that led to the civil war that started in 2013 and is still ongoing. France and Italy do not go unpunished in this, by the way. We also saw in Sudan how international restraint contributed to the flare-up of a new conflict. Hasn't the time come to learn lessons from these catastrophes? Nevertheless, the European Union has an important lever in its hands. In 2012, at the initiative of France, it established the "Friends of Syria" group. In December that year, no fewer than 114 countries' representatives attended the meeting in Marrakech. The best thing the European Union could do now would be to reconvene those "Friends of Syria" and together devise and fund a reconstruction plan for Syria. The advantage of that approach is that it is joint and therefore does not favour any groups or militias. It will also make Syria a liveable country again faster than otherwise. After all, if one wants Syrian refugees to return, the offer of a house or flat will certainly help. Today, on the other hand, the country is in havoc. Even if the signals from Syria today are positive, the situation remains very fragile. We can choose to wait and see if everything goes according to so-called 'European values'. And if things go wrong, we can shake our heads, shrug and say that things could never have worked out with those former jihadists anyway. Another option now is to participate in the political and material construction of the country and guarantee ourselves that all groups are included in this process. That is no guarantee that it will succeed. But after all the misery of recent years, isn't it worth trying? Koert Debeuf is professor of Middle East at the Vrije Universiteit Brussels (VUB), and chair of the board of EUobserver. Koert Debeuf is professor of Middle East at the | Vrije Universiteit Brussels | Europe's response since the fall of Assad on 8 December 2024 has been disappointing. In an initial reaction, several European countries announced that the asylum procedure for Syrians would be stopped. At the same time, sanctions against Syria were not suspended and HTS was not removed from the list of terrorist organisations. | [
"EU & the World",
"Africa",
"Opinion"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-01-09T09:59:28.388Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar96867a51 |
EU fined €400 for breaching own privacy laws with Facebook 'log in' | The EU general court in Luxembourg on Wednesday (8 January) ordered the European Commission to pay €400 in damages to a private citizen for breaching its own data protection laws. The complainant, a German citizen, filed the case after visiting the Conference on the Future of Europe website in March 2022 via Facebook — claiming the commission had violated his right to data protection. The individual had used the "Sign in with Facebook" option on the EU Login page to register for the conference and argued that his personal data — including his IP address, browser details, and device information — was sent to recipients in the US without his consent. Specifically, he had registered for a 'GoGreen' event through the EU Login service and chose the option to log in via Facebook. The court, which handles cases against EU institutions, determined that transferring the user's IP address to Meta platforms in this way indeed violated EU data protection laws and that there was “a sufficient link between the commission’s violation and the moral harm suffered.” The EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is one of the strictest data privacy laws globally, with Meta previously facing hefty fines for data breaches. This time, however, it was the commission itself at fault. The citizen sought €400 in compensation, plus €800 for the ‘moral harm’ caused by the commission’s failure to respond to a request for information. The court dismissed the claim for compensation over the failure to respond. However, the court did agree that the transfer of the user’s IP address to Meta Platforms was in breach of EU law. The commission had not demonstrated the existence of appropriate safeguards, a requirement under EU law, as the “Sign in with Facebook” link was governed solely by Facebook’s terms of service. Therefore the court concluded that the commission had indeed violated EU law and that the complainant had suffered moral harm due to “uncertainty” about the handling of his personal data. | Wester is a journalist from the Netherlands with a focus on the green economy. He joined EUobserver in September 2021. Previously he was editor-in-chief of Vice, Motherboard, a science-based website, and climate economy journalist for The Correspondent. | The complainant, a German citizen, filed the case after visiting the ‘Conference on the Future of Europe’ website in March 2022 via Facebook, claiming the commission had violated his right to data protection by sending data to the US. | [
"Digital",
"EU Political"
] | digital | 2025-01-08T16:29:34.205Z | https://euobserver.com/digital/arbf1bedc3 |
TikTok's interference is coming for French and German elections next | As the war in Ukraine has been unfolding on the battlefield, the Black Sea region has been assaulted with much cheaper instruments of destabilisation from Russia. Information and voter manipulation in key elections is an effective way to control a country’s geopolitical and economic policies. Throughout this fall, three countries in the Black Sea region faced important electoral scrutiny: Georgia’s parliamentary elections , Moldova’s presidential elections and EU referendum and Romania’s presidential and parliamentary elections . All were heavily targeted by destabilising interferences from Russia. Malign information manipulation by foreign powers follows a generic recipe of three key elements nowadays. Firstly, it requires a large network of peers who trust and rely on each other, both online and offline. Whether it is the traditional clientelistic pyramids or the weaponisation of 'echo chambers', there has been a long-term investment from abroad into building such closely-tied groups. Secondly, it requires a long-term feed of generic information (e.g. health, wellness, fitness, beauty, fashion, culture and religion) on social media channels (e.g. TikTok, Instagram, Telegram, Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp groups). Micro-influencers are usually preferred to bigger names as bots build up their audiences and are easier to manipulate or cheaper to buy. Years in advance These have been set up months and years in advance of key elections in the Black Sea Region and elsewhere. Finally, the last piece of the puzzle is the amplification campaign. Like a 'flame' a couple of weeks or even days before election day, coordinated messages of support for a given political candidate (with a pro-Russian or pro-Chinese political agenda) are shared widely across the previously established online networks. This is done under the supervision of public relations companies , that often seem to work on promoting the national brand abroad, when in fact engage in-depth in political campaigns by buying advertising, designing the messaging and coordinating its distribution via social media networks. In addition to the online networks, dense grassroots clientelistic networks are also developed making the mobilisation tactics even more efficient. Each of the three stages of foreign information manipulation and interference requires substantial financial resources that are not usually paid directly by foreign governments. Funding for information manipulation campaigns often comes from organised criminal activities: video chat and gambling networks managed by Romanian-based pro-Russian criminal networks, or outward financial crime network s coordinated by the Israeli-born pro-Russian Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor. Recent estimates place Ilan Shor’s financial investment in electoral mobilisation in Moldova at approximately $56.4m [€54.7m] since mid-2022. Similarly, the personal wealth of Georgia’s Bidzina Ivanishvili is so large that he is single-handedly financing the propaganda machine behind his incumbent party Georgian Dream . China is similarly funding its information manipulation operations with online scams involving video chat and cryptocurrencies run by Chinese criminal networks in the Philippines. Malign interferences work only to the extent to which there are domestic structural vulnerabilities. Democracy is perceived to be failing everywhere. Politicians are no longer able or willing to respond to popular wants and needs. Citizens often want different things from the ones they need, and presenting a rational political offer might not respond well enough to emotional triggers linked to fear of war, poverty, or respect. Across the democracies in the Black Sea region, we can find similar domestic vulnerabilities: elite vanity and citizen’s fears. The pro-European politicians are increasingly less able to understand and mobilize large segments of the population. In Romania, Moldova or Georgia, there is roughly an equal split amongst the electorate, between pro-Western, undecided and the nationalist or fearing Russia’s retaliation if turning towards the West. Less 'pro-Russia', more 'anti-West' We often make the mistake of calling out the latter group as pro-Russian, when in fact, given the historical occupation of Romania, Moldova and Georgia by Russia, it is hard to find many overtly pro-Russian people in these countries. The anti-Western or undecided segments are made up of people unable to connect to a Western cultural and political trajectory. Pro-Western political elites, in contrast, have a categorical disdain for those who are not convinced of their superiority and do little to engage with these audiences, spending most of their time in Brussels or Washington DC. Should they spend more time in the regions, the mobilisation in favour of the pro-Western agenda might be larger. Political elites’ vanity is also represented by the high fragmentation of the pro-Western candidates. As much as president Salome Zourabishvilli tried to rally the pro-Western political forces behind her Georgian Charter of the country’s path to Euro-Atlantic integration . She fell short of a unified opposition bloc for the parliamentary elections this fall. Maya Sandu’s political party PAS, is unlikely to be able to hold on to a majority in Moldova next year, without a coalition partner, while Romania’s pro-Western parties continue to be split despite the rise of the extreme-right bloc in parliament and presidential elections. Pro-Western political parties in the Black Sea region seem increasingly ill-equipped to engage in this narrative competition with outdated pointers of public communication and poor delivery. Most pro-Western politicians in Romania, Moldova or Georgia have been using opinion polls as a key barometer of what they should say, while pro-Russian campaigns dive much deeper into sentiment analysis sub-segmentation. We know from the behavioural literature that information treatments are much less effective than monetary and social norms ones. In the Moldovan elections, telling people that the European Union is good was not a strong mobilising strategy. In contrast, financial incentives of just $100 or social norms that ascribe grassroots, neighbourhood-level clientelistic networks worked very well. Russia is ironically weaponising popular fears against it to enhance support for political elites that would follow a pro-Russian agenda. Romanians, Moldovans and Georgians fear war with Russia and there is very little explanation from mainstream political parties on how this can be avoided. As historically occupied territories by neighbouring empires — current day Russia, Hungary or Turkey — countries in the Black Sea region also have a strong emotional stance about foreign ownership of their land and natural resources or repression of religious liberties. While there is no rational link to European policies, malign narratives overlap the European integration process with these very deeply embedded emotional triggers. When a country develops a new weapon technology it does not do so with only one adversary in mind. The similarities between Chinese information manipulation campaigns in the Philippines and the Russian information manipulation campaigns in the Black Sea region are striking. It is not just the Chinese TikTok platform and the Russian Telegram that were heavily used in these interference operations, but direct coordination from actors within Russia. It is unlikely that the malign interference techniques, deployed in the Black Sea region, as in the Philippines, are likely to go away any time soon. As we see the fine-tuning of destabilizing techniques supported by Russia and China, it should be no surprise that they will be deployed in the upcoming German or French elections in 2025. Clara Volintiru is regional director for the Black Sea at the German Marshall Fund of the United States . Clara Volintiru is regional director for the Black Sea at the | German Marshall Fund of the United States | The similarities between Chinese TikTok manipulation campaigns in the Philippines and the Russian information manipulation campaigns in the Black Sea region are striking. As we see the fine-tuning of destabilising techniques, it should be no surprise that they will be deployed in the upcoming German or French elections. | [
"EU & the World",
"Opinion"
] | * | 2025-01-08T13:53:29.404Z | https://euobserver.com/*/ar313087ce |
The mirage of EU techno-solutionism to the climate crisis | A co-founder of OpenAI, also a leading AI scientist, recently shared his vision for the future — a planet covered with data centres and solar panels to fuel energy-intensive AI systems. If this vision leaves you uninspired and listless, you’re not alone. As leaders of civil society organisations working on the intersections of technology and environmental justice, who have seen the rise and rise of energy-intensive technologies like AI, we feel the same way. Unfortunately, the European decision-makers do not seem to agree with us all. The recently-voted in European Commission seeks to pursue an approach to ‘clean growth’ that serves industry’s interests over our rights and the fight against the climate crisis. The focus of this ‘just and competitive’ ‘green transition’ would be on economic growth and industrial policy, by means of digitalisation. All of this, despite ample evidence that tech-driven solutions will not fix the environmental and climate crises, unless they also support just systems and shifts to lifestyles with less environmental impacts. Moreover, across the climate justice and digital rights movements, we’ve both witnessed the harmful consequences of this narrow ‘tech-solutionist’ approach. Technology, as shaped by today’s market-driven priorities, carries immense hidden environmental and social costs. The tech sector is one of the fastest-growing contributors to waste and energy consumption. In 2021, it was responsible for two-to-three percent of global carbon emissions — on par with aviation. For instance, Microsoft’s emissions of the poisonous carbon monoxide gas have surged by nearly 30 percent since 2020, largely due to the expansion of its data centres. Similarly, Google’s greenhouse gas emissions in 2023 were almost 50 percent higher than in 2019. The rise of generative AI is especially concerning, as it heavily relies on electricity. It’s expected to send energy use, carbon emissions and water usage through the roof. A study finds that a simple ChatGPT exchange requires about one litre of water. The exponential resource demand for AI means that any efficiency improvement thanks to this tech will not be enough to outweigh its huge energy footprint. The tech industry is also, in part, responsible for the EU’s ‘crusade’ to siphon off critical materials from resource-rich countries. Most of our digital devices, services, platforms and infrastructure depend on resource extraction and labour exploitation – often from Global Majority countries. Misleading techno-solutionism Why, then, in the face of ample evidence to the contrary, are EU decision-makers fixated on technology as the solution to the climate crisis? This is because of the false assumption that the digital and green transitions are ‘twins’ and always mutually reinforcing. It creates a misleading and harmful narrative that such initiatives would solve the climate crisis and provide new economic opportunities. Our experience shows that this narrative is well-rooted in Brussels – fuelled by Big Tech lobbying and market-driven logic. For example, the nascent EU industrial policy is mainly based on techno-solutionist assumptions, and what researcher Seda Gürses calls a ‘superficial understanding of digital infrastructures’. The world’s largest economies, including the EU, aim to "win" the green transition by boosting their companies' competitive edge, dominating green technology, and growing their economies. In the end, Europe's industrial policy may end up ‘cementing the infrastructural power of tech companies’ and the way they have transformed our ‘production environment’ — often at the expense of a fair and just transition for all. Addressing climate change at the scale required may be impossible without cutting-edge technology. However, we need technology and digital infrastructure free from the logic of never-ending growth underlying the tech industry’s economic model. States and corporations’ techno-solutionist promises only further the climate crisis, and amplify colonial dynamics of labour and resource extraction. These practices undermine the rights of global majority countries and marginalised communities, who bear the brunt of these crises. What we need instead is a reflective change about the circumstances in which technologies are designed, produced and deployed, and by/for whom. We need to question the profound grip that giant tech companies have on our economies, institutions and lives. Moreover, digitalisation must be decoupled from growth by centring economic and resource justice. For this, we need to ask the question — what would community-based, alternative tech look like, which serves people, democracy and the planet? ‘Digitalisation’ should be a means to more well-being, more equity and a healthier natural world. Efficiency gains need to be part of a sufficiency strategy for goods, services and information flows – which is about preserving energy, resources and the safety of all people. Concretely, we hope to see the EU make the ‘right to repair’ a reality, to actively decrease the demand and address the emission, energy and resource use of the technology sector. The EU must build on the small progress that the current legislation provides in terms of reporting requirements on their environmental and social impacts. More importantly, Europe must heed the voices of non-profit organisations calling for a focus on material and energy sufficiency. This includes supporting community-driven, socially just, and sustainable technologies . Claire Fernandez is the executive director of European Digital Rights (EDRi). Katharina Wiese is the policy manager for economic transition and gender equality at the European Environment Bureau (EEB). Claire Fernandez is the executive director of European Digital Rights (EDRi). Katharina Wiese is the policy manager for economic transition and gender equality at the | European Environment Bureau | Narrow 'tech-solutionism', and a planet covered with data centres and solar panels, will not solve the climate crisis. Google’s greenhouse gas emissions in 2023 were almost 50 percent higher than in 2019. And Microsoft’s emissions have also surged since 2020, largely due to the expansion of its data centres. | [
"Digital",
"Green Economy",
"Opinion"
] | digital | 2025-01-07T15:32:01.126Z | https://euobserver.com/digital/ar125f5e3f |
What 2025 holds for EU and Balkans | Following years of political neglect, slow domestic reforms, and global events taking the spotlight, the Balkans have long been ignored by the EU. But with discussions on enlargement becoming more commonplace, alongside a number of reform efforts finally bearing fruit, 2025 presents Brussels with a golden opportunity to push ahead with further integrating the Balkans into the European political family. In fact, Brussels already has a headstart within this re-energised integration process, with the recent decision by the EU Council for Justice and Home Affairs to finally vote to remove land borders between Bulgaria, Romania, and the Schengen area. Having met all technical requirements for Schengen since 2011, the accession of the two Balkan states has been stalled by claims of a lack of effort in tackling organised crime, and most importantly, the worry that loosening border restrictions would further increase migration flows from Turkey to the bloc. The elimination of borders, which began with removing sea and air borders in March last year, shall also bring about extensive economic opportunities for tourists, locals, and businesses, whilst also further securing the bloc’s external frontier. By completing the process of integrating Bulgaria and Romania into the border-free area , Brussels will finally show that the bloc does not discriminate against newer member states, ending claims of a ‘two-tier’ union. Furthermore, preparations for Bulgaria’s long-awaited entry into the eurozone should finally be completed throughout 2025, with their currency switchover being prepared for 1 January 2026. The adoption should not only ensure a stronger, more integrated economic union as a whole, but shall also bring about extensive economic opportunities to one of the bloc’s poorest states, reducing red tape for businesses and consumers alike, whilst bringing economic stability to a nation racked by a political crisis entering its fourth year. However, the final switchover should not be rushed, with both Bulgaria and fellow eurozone members ensuring that the public and businesses alike are thoroughly prepared for the changeover, providing timely information on key dates, exchange rates, and providing dual pricing on goods during the switch, similar to Croatia’s adoption procedure in 2023 . Bulgaria’s adoption of the single currency could also further convince fellow non-euro states, such as Romania, to consider making greater preparations for any switchover in the coming years. By providing a target date alongside preparing the final legal documentation for accession, Brussels can highlight its renewed commitment to enlargement Next in line… Beyond current member states, Brussels can look to recognise and reward the progress made by Montenegro over recent years by setting a firm date on its accession into the bloc. With Podgorica’s ambitious goal of accession by 2028, both the EU and Montenegro will have to move quickly in order to make this enlargement target a reality, but it is certainly possible. Having closed three negotiating chapters in December 2024 (the first chapters closed in seven years), and with a further seven chapters estimated to be closed throughout 2025, Brussels can show that enlargement still remains a tangible goal for the Balkans. As the Adriatic nation continues its ambitious reform efforts, Brussels should not miss the chance to adequately prepare both itself and its future member state for accession to the bloc. Furthermore, by providing a target date alongside preparing the final legal documentation for accession, Brussels can highlight its renewed commitment to enlargement occurring within the current commission mandate. Through providing the necessary support and incentive to Montenegro’s accession efforts throughout 2025, fellow candidate countries across the Balkans will get the opportunity to see accession to the bloc as a realistic possibility, with the right political willpower from all sides. Brussels can further capitalise on any broader enlargement successes by pushing newer candidate countries to pursue even more intensive reform efforts. Albania, which recently started the negotiating process after its application was decoupled from neighbouring North Macedonia, has made strong reform efforts in recent years. In order to meet prime minister Edi Rama’s highly ambitious accession target of 2030, Brussels and Tirana must intensify and sustain ongoing reform efforts across the country, especially in tackling organised crime and enhancing environmental protections. The EU could also finally get negotiations with North Macedonia underway after decades of waiting. This effort would squarely focus on finding a reasonable solution to their constitutional dispute with Bulgaria that eases Sofia’s concerns on minority rights , whilst rewarding Skopje for its patience and ongoing reforms. Although both candidate countries have faced numerous challenges in their accession procedures, 2025 offers a fresh start for all sides to show their full commitment to getting the two countries ‘EU-ready’, focusing on sustaining reform efforts and actively preparing for the opening of new chapters throughout the year. Like all issues related to EU enlargement, especially those within the Balkans, nothing is certain. But with the right reform, incentive, and political will, 2025 represents a golden opportunity for the EU to continue properly integrating current members, whilst fully preparing future nations for membership of the bloc, showing that the Union has finally ‘returned’ to the Balkans. Cameron MacBride is a project development officer with the European Centre for Minority Issues Kosovo (ECMI Kosovo). His primary focus is on contemporary politics in the Western Balkans and the ongoing EU integration of the region. Cameron MacBride is a project development officer with the | European Centre for Minority Issues Kosovo | With sufficient political will, 2025 can mark the year the European Union truly ‘returns’ to the Balkans, focusing on integrating current members, preparing candidates for accession, and continuing to facilitate ambitious reform across the region. | [
"EU & the World",
"Opinion"
] | eu-and-the-world | 2025-01-06T11:41:54.663Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/are3af59f0 |
FEMM: Advancing women’s rights and enforcing EU law to expand gender balance | As gender equality continues to face a growing backlash, particularly from far-right groups which now have a far greater number of MEPs in the 2024-2029 parliament, the EU must continue to tackle the democratic deficit when it comes to women’s rights, the chair committee on women's rights and gender equality Lina Gálvez Muñoz (S&D, Spain) told EUobserver. “The far-right places anti-feminism, anti-gender politics, and opposition to LGTBQ+ rights at the core of its agenda, [and] they now hold a larger presence and influence in the European Parliament. [But] failing to prioritise gender equality is a mistake we simply cannot afford,” the social democrat said. Gálvez Muñoz added that more work needs to be done when it comes to sexual and reproductive health rights in the EU — which is still “a deeply sensitive topic” in many countries. “As with gender equality, these rights are heavily attacked by the far-right,” she said, referring to abortion rights and the opportunity for women to choose their preferred methods of family planning and contraception. “More equal societies will bring stronger democracies,” she also said, arguing that gender mainstreaming must be integrated into all policies, programmes, and funding mechanisms to achieve true gender equality . “We are still far from this goal”. In 2020, the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) projected that it would take over 60 years to achieve full gender equality across the EU — highlighting the slow pace of progress, despite decades of legal advances and policy initiatives aimed at closing the gender gap. The EU pay transparency directive, which aims to ensure equal pay for equal work, is to be implemented by EU member states in mid-2026. But with the ongoing green and digital transitions reshaping the labour market, Gálvez Muñoz argues that ensuring women aren’t left behind is also now a top concern. “Evaluating these transitions and implementing targeted measures will be essential to closing the gender gap and ensuring that all available talent is on board,” she said. In addition, Gálvez Muñoz argued that this next legislative term will focus it will be crucial to ensure the proper enforcement of EU laws on combating violence against women, where there are still pending tasks: guaranteeing that non-consensual sex is recognised as rape across the EU and making sure gender-based violence is classified as an offence across all EU member states. The plan to classify all non-consensual sex as rape across the EU became tremendously controversial last year when member states rejected the proposal, claiming that the European Commission had overstepped its mandate. This decision not only reflected deep divisions among EU countries (since some, such as Belgium or Spain, already have national laws in place covering this issue) but also raised serious questions about the commitment of certain countries to effectively address sexual violence. Meanwhile, advancing gender budgeting, gender-sensitive policy, and gender equality in terms of political representation will also be some of the priorities for Gálvez Muñoz’s committee. “We need more disaggregated and gender-sensitive data to enable effective gender mainstreaming across all policy areas,” the 55-year-old Spanish politician said, adding this requires strengthening EIGE and establishing a gender-equality taskforce in all EU institutions’ departments. In late summer, the likely composition of the new commission raised eyebrows, since there was initially a male-dominated list of commissioner-designates. This prompted EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, the first woman to hold the post, to push several countries to change their nominations. “While the new commission has achieved near parity, the previous von der Leyen Commission had more women in key positions. Although efforts have been made to compensate for this by appointing women to powerful roles, the trend reflects a broader democratic deficit that we must not tolerate,” said Gálvez Muñoz — while pointing out that the current 2024-29 parliament itself has a slightly lower proportion of women than the previous one. . | Elena is EUobserver's editor-in-chief. She is from Spain and has studied journalism and new media in Spanish and Belgian universities. Previously she worked on European affairs at VoteWatch Europe and the Spanish news agency EFE. | Despite progress in embedding women's rights into law, much work remains for the EU Parliament’s women's rights committee. Top priorities include enforcing existing rules and ensuring non-consensual sex is recognised as rape across the EU. | [
"Who's who in the EU Parliament committees?",
"EU Political",
"Health & Society"
] | eu-political | 2025-01-06T06:03:00.000Z | https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar4b01cb97 |
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