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Germany's Schengen abdication — a structural policy failure not a quick fix
|
Germany’s latest move to reinstate border controls is more than just a temporary fix; it is a sign of deeper cracks within the country’s migration policy. Since the Ventimiglia crisis in 2011, internal border controls in the Schengen zone have been an increasingly common tool to address migration pressures. Germany, as the most frequently-impacted member state, has often resorted to EU safeguard clauses to manage the flow of people. However, what sets this latest decision apart is not the act itself but its magnitude in the absence of an immediate border crisis. This time, it reveals a more structural issue within Germany’s approach to integration and migration. If left unaddressed, this policy shift could put the entire European project at risk. Border control reinstatements have become a familiar pattern in the Schengen zone over the last decade. The Ventimiglia crisis of April 2011 marked the beginning of a series of temporary border control reinstatements within the EU, with Germany often at the forefront. This approach became most visible during the 2015 refugee crisis, when Germany, facing exceptional migration pressure, utilised safeguard clauses within EU law to reintroduce checks at its borders. Since then, sporadic controls have persisted, as seen in Germany’s recent actions to curb irregular migration on its borders with Switzerland and Poland. Germany has often leaned on EU safeguard clauses to control the movement of people, illustrating the weight put on the country by migration management in the EU framework. In recent years, border checks between Germany and its neighbouring countries, like Austria, Poland, and Switzerland, have been frequently reinstated to manage the influx of asylum seekers. These moves are legal under the Schengen Border Code, which permits temporary border controls in the event of a serious threat to public order or internal security. Yet, Germany’s new reliance on these clauses indicates a deeper issue. While these controls were initially justified by immediate crises, they now appear to be an increasingly entrenched element of Germany’s approach to migration, raising concerns about the long-term future of open borders within the Schengen zone. With the present border control announcement, the question arises: Is Germany truly dealing with an imminent security threat, or is this a sign of its failure to develop a coherent and effective integration strategy? Is Germany truly dealing with an imminent security threat, or is this a sign of its failure to develop a coherent and effective integration strategy? Unlike previous instances, the current reinstatement of border controls does not result from exceptional pressure, such as the 2015 refugee crisis. Instead, it signals structural issues within Germany’s integration policies. Over the past decade, Germany has implemented expensive integration programmes aimed at enhancing immigrants’ employability. These programmes, while well-intentioned, have led to long processing delays and left many immigrants in a state of limbo. A vivid example of this alienation is portrayed in the 2022 movie “The Swimmers” by Sally El-Hosaini , highlighting the exhausting wait times and idleness forced upon asylum seekers. These expansive integration programmes stem partly from recent German labour market reforms, including the introduction of a national minimum wage in January 2015. These reforms made it harder to integrate low-skilled newcomers, resulting in both a financial burden for taxpayers and increased public resentment. As cases of violence involving immigrants become more mediatised, Germany’s move to close its borders appears more a reaction to internal policy failures than an immediate security crisis. Germany’s recent border control decision signifies a worrying shift towards an insulated approach that could undermine the European project. Historically, Germany has championed open borders, driving Schengen's establishment in the 1980s and 1990s. Its current stance, however, could suggest a retreat from this legacy, endangering the core principles of European integration. If Germany – Europe’s economic powerhouse and Schengen’s key architect – begins to normalise border checks, other EU states will follow suit, threatening the zone’s survival. Labour market reforms While this inward turn is a direct outcome of internal German policies, the ripple effect of these internal decisions reaches beyond Germany’s borders, potentially disrupting the European single market and straining intra-EU relationships. Europe now risks fragmentation, with each country pursuing its own version of control, eroding the foundation of free movement. Germany’s move to restore border controls is less a response to an immediate crisis than a symptom of deeper policy failures. The root cause lies in Germany’s labour market reforms, which have inadvertently hampered the inclusion of newcomers and led to expansive new programmes to integrate the latter. An effective response would require Germany to once again liberalise its labour market, as it successfully did in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Those reforms absorbed post-reunification unemployment and restored Germany’s economic clout, enabling it to hold Europe together in the ensuing decades. German policymakers must recognise that a more insulated approach threatens not only national interests but also the broader European project. Reinvigorating labour market flexibility could alleviate migration pressures, making restrictive border controls unnecessary. The future of European integration hinges on Germany’s ability to embrace policies that reflect its historical commitment to openness. Now is the time for Germany to return to policies that strengthen both its own economy and the entire continent. Dr Emmanuel Comte is senior research fellow, at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), and author of . Dr Emmanuel Comte is senior research fellow, at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy
|
(ELIAMEP), and author of
|
What sets German chancellor Olaf Scholz's latest decision apart is not the act itself — but its magnitude in the absence of an immediate border crisis. This time, it reveals a more structural issue within Germany’s approach to integration and migration. If left unaddressed, this policy shift could put the entire European project at risk.
|
[
"Migration",
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] |
migration
|
2024-09-16T09:59:15.548Z
|
https://euobserver.com/migration/ar9466b27b
|
Orban's Patriots for Europe — worst name ever
|
The name Patriots for Europe will easily go down in the history of the EU as the greatest misnomer ever. The name suggests an unlimited love for their home country Europe but its manifesto emphasises the national sovereignty of the nation-states on the continent. Moreover, the launch of the Patriots for Europe by Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán and two allies on the 30 June this year is the epitome of a false start. The new party was formed the elections for the European Parliament had been conducted in the member states at the start of that month. The sole aim of the foundation of the ‘Patriots’ was to strengthen the position of the populists parties from the separate member states in the European Parliament. Its purpose was not "to contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of the citizens of the Union" as article 10 (4) of the Lisbon Treaty has it, but to qualify for European subsidies. The ambiguous attitude of the ‘Patriots’ is highlighted by their linguistic laxity. As they claim to be the champions of the nations of Europe, the translation of their manifesto should have been an obvious priority. Actually, they could have been expected to outperform the EU’s commitment to multilingualism by ensuring the simultaneous translation of the manifesto in the vernacular languages of the constituent parties. The neutral observer could hardly be more disappointed. While two of the ‘Patriots’ member parties are Dutch-speaking, not one iota of the manifesto has been translated into the language of the Low Countries. In good populist’s tradition, the PfE manifesto identifies an enemy. While it acknowledges that the process of European integration may have been initiated for noble reasons, it posits that ‘institutions’ have taken control and are planning to transform the EU into ‘a European central state’. As their aim to subjugate the proud nations of Europe to an emerging empire, now is the time for to peoples of Europe to reclaim sovereignty and to take back control over their own destiny. Brussels’ cash machine For this goal to be achieved, they should a) replace democracy with diplomacy and b) stop the EU from meddling into the internal affairs of its member states. While the two arguments are obviously correlated, the latter reveals Orbán’s real reasons for launching the ‘Patriots’ after the 2024 elections for the European Parliament. He is not driven by noble motives such as respect for the principles of international law but by more down to earth considerations. He simply wants to tap his money from the Brussels cash machine. The Hungarian prime minister is pissed off by the EU decision to withhold money from the Recovery and Resilience Fund as long as his government does not respect the values of the EU. As his argument that the EU is not entitled to oversee the way in which his country is spending the subsidies received from Brussels because that would amount to unwarranted intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, has been rejected by the EU Court of Justice, he tries to get his money by changing the laws of the Union. In order to attain their prosaic goals the self-styled Patriots have to turn the current EU into a caricature. In reality, the European Union is neither a dictatorship nor an Empire or a Fourth Reich. The EU has been founded by democratic countries on the European continent with the aim to prevent the renewed outbreak of war between them and to attain common economic and political objectives. Guided by their constitutional principles of respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, they wanted their organisation to function democratically too. Although it was said to impossible by political theorists, they succeeded in overcoming the democratic deficit of the early stages of integration. In a prolonged period of trial and error, they created a new model of democracy. On the basis of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, the EU can be described as a democratic union of democratic states. An undemocratic organisation of illiberal states By portraying the EU deliberately as a ‘European central state’, the manifesto entitles and encourages its member parties and their voters to destroy the union from within. Unlike the Brexiteers who wanted the UK to leave the EU in line with article 50 TEU, the ‘Patriots’ aim to dismantle the EU and to abolish the European Parliament and the EU Court of Justice altogether. Just like Orbán prefers to describe himself as the leader of an ‘illiberal democracy’, the manifesto wants to reduce the current European democracy to an ‘undemocratic organisation of illiberal states’. The upcoming legislature will have to prove whether the EU and its political parties are capable of beating off the attack from within. As a resilient democracy, it is obliged to defend itself in the interest of its citizens and its member states. Jaap Hoeksma is a philosopher of law, author of The European Union: a democratic union of democratic states and the recently-published The Democratisation of the European Union. Jaap Hoeksma is a philosopher of law, author of The European Union: a democratic union of democratic states
|
and the recently-published
|
The name Patriots for Europe will easily go down in the history of the EU as the greatest misnomer ever. The name suggests an unlimited love for their home country Europe but its manifesto emphasises the national sovereignty of the nation-states on the continent.
|
[
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-political
|
2024-09-16T05:00:00.000Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar699a7338
|
Fairtrade: the unbearable compliance costs of EU deforestation law for small-scale farmers
|
Fairtrade International (the Bonn-based global organisation, co-owned by more than 2 million farmers and workers, to promote fairer prices, and a worldwide-recognised label of sustainability) is deeply concerned that many small-scale cocoa and coffee producer organisations will be cut off from trade with the European Union market because of the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) that will start to apply on 30 December 2024. This is not because these producers farm on deforested land but is due to the ambiguities in the regulation. The producers need clear definitions of key terms, a thorough explanation of the rules on the traceability requirements and data governance across supply chains, and specifications of the criteria that will be used to verify compliance from the European Commission, and they need it now, not later. Small-scale farmers are also facing big challenges when it comes to collecting, managing, and submitting the regulation’s required data. And while they can and want to scale up and add the data management systems and capacity, they need financial support to do so. Fairtrade strongly believes in the objectives of the EUDR to tackle deforestation and forest degradation by prohibiting products linked to deforestation on the EU market, and it does support a shared responsibility across supply chains when it comes to meeting these goals. We have been working hard over the last two years so that farmers and cooperatives will be ready for the regulation and able to provide their trade partners with the information they need. For example, we updated our standards for cocoa and coffee to include geolocation mapping, deforestation monitoring, risk assessments, mitigation plans, and support for producers to mitigate deforestation risks. Meanwhile, the audits carried out by our independent certifier FLOCERT will translate to an additional layer of verification on these issues. The producers need clear definitions of key terms, a thorough explanation of the rules on the traceability requirements and data governance across supply chains, and specifications of the criteria that will be used to verify compliance from the European Commission, and they need it now, not later There are about 845,000 Fairtrade coffee farmers in 624 producer organisations, and 471,000 cocoa farmers in 407 producer organisations for a total of 1.3 million farmers in more than 1,000 small producer organisations. Based on 2022 data - for coffee, there are 30 countries, and for cocoa, 19 countries, with Fairtrade producer organisations. Plus, to help cooperatives and their deforestation risks, we partnered with nature tech firm Satelligence. Satellite geo-mapping The Fairtrade certified producer organisations provide geolocation data for each of their members’ farm plots. The platform verifies the data and then detects any deforestation activity within members’ boundaries, and whether or not farms are located in protected areas. It also flags deforestation near the farm, an important piece of information that contributes to risk assessments. Finally, the system generates reports that cooperatives can use themselves and provide to their customers or potential customers. According to a new study about deforestation by KIT - Royal Tropical Institute, Chain Collaborative, and Expressing Origin, Fairtrade farmers are in a better position when it comes to protecting forests and complying with the EUDR. The study also found that Fairtrade cooperatives and farmers were using their extra resources, such as the Fairtrade Premium, an additional sum of money that goes into a communal fund for workers and farmers to use to improve their social, economic, or environmental conditions, to invest in some of the EUDR requirements such as the required geolocations data collection. However, Fairtrade believes that small-scale farmers should not have bear the compliance costs linked to laws imposed by the EU. This is simply unfair as long as the terms of trade remain unchanged. Throughout the years Fairtrade has been working to tackle deforestation from its root causes, such as poverty. Fairtrade prices support better incomes for farmers thanks to its minimum prices, and we have so far set living income reference prices in two countries for cocoa and seven countries for coffee, which companies can choose to pay to make progress toward farmers being able to farm sustainably and support a decent standard of living. Fairtrade programmes contribute to be key enablers of forest protection by smallholder farmers, such as climate adaptation and agroforestry systems. The European Commission’s intervention in the form of updated information and financial support is necessary today or the EUDR will disproportionately affect small-scale farmers by hindering their participation in EU market. This, however, is just the beginning because much more is needed to reverse forest degradation, protect forests, and build on the livelihoods of smallholder producers and their landscapes. Juan Pablo Solis is senior advisor for climate at Fairtrade International . Juan Pablo Solis is senior advisor for climate at
|
Fairtrade International
|
Fairtrade International is deeply concerned that many small-scale cocoa and coffee producer organisations will be cut off from trade with the European Union market because of the EU Deforestation Regulation that will start to apply on 30 December 2024.
|
[
"EU & the World",
"Africa",
"Green Economy",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2024-09-13T09:36:57.882Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar19f5a8cf
|
Where the EU's efforts to regulate AI fall short
|
In recent years, efforts to regulate AI have surged. However, the technology’s complexity compounded by self-interested actors making wild claims about its potential to do harm, make it challenging to craft measured regulations. In a 2023 open letter , academics and business owners including Bill Gates warned that AI poses an existential threat without explaining how . Some of the signatories concerned about lack of regulation stand to benefit from the status quo. Google Brain ’s Co-Founder, Andrew Ng, argued that the letter's true motive was to weaken Open Source AI through heavy-handed regulations to the advantage of big-tech. Amid the global race to regulate AI , world's first comprehensive AI regulation — the EU AI Act — aims to set a global regulatory standard . But I believe it falls short. Three forms of AI regulation In the global regulatory landscape, three ways of regulating AI can be identified — comprehensive, sectoral, and AI system-focused regulations. A comprehensive regulation seeks to establish common regulatory standards for AI across all industries. In contrast, sectoral regulation allows adopting regulatory standards for particular domains (e.g., banking). Sectoral regulation ideally requires a central authority that coordinates consistent standard-setting and enforcement (so-called coordinated sectoralism ). The UK’s 2023 pro-innovation AI white paper outlined this although the proposed UK AI Bill inadequately translates it into a regulatory framework . In the US and Australia , AI is currently regulated primarily through consumer protection, privacy, and other domain-specific laws that are not particularly designed for AI. Over the past few years, AI technology-focused regulations have been proposed or enacted. These include China's proposed generative AI regulation and California’s BOT Act regulating chatbots. The UK government's recent announcement that the country's upcoming AI legislation will target companies developing ‘the most powerful AI systems’ is another example of technology-specific regulatory choice. These diverse approaches offer competing and complementary options for regulating AI. Rushed compromises Whilst comprehensive regulation seeks to prevent fragmented standards and provide legal certainty , it can ironically lead to fragmentation. For instance, the EU AI Act mandates the disclosure in relation to AI-generated content to consumers engaging with deep fakes. However, deep fakes pose profound challenges including misleading voters and allowing the misuse of people’s images and voices (eg, in non-consensual pornography ). They call for a more robust regulatory response beyond mere disclosures. Kai Zenner, an EU Parliament aide involved in drafting the AI Act acknowledged that the act was rushed with emphasis on quick compromises , leaving critical gaps, and necessitating additional fragmented regulations. On the opposite end, focusing only on 'the most powerful AI systems' could be dangerous. AI technologies have caused significant real-world harm. Facial recognition technology has been used by the police to wrongfully arrest individuals or lockout Uber drivers of their accounts due to technical flaws, impacting their livelihoods. It does not take the most powerful AI systems to cause considerable societal harm. A well-designed sectoral approach seems to be more effective in the evolving AI landscape because it allows the adoption and enforcement of regulations suitable for sectoral needs and contexts. The EU AI Act bans AI systems deemed to pose unacceptable risks to society whilst imposing stringent standards for high-risk AI systems such as those used to evaluate job applications, student admissions and eligibility for loans. Those presenting low risks face minimal transparency and accountability obligations. This risk-based approach tailors regulatory requirements to the level of risk posed by the specific AI systems. In theory, it is sensible; but due to its specific design, it could lead to over-regulation or under-regulation. Delivery robots — but where? The EU AI Act classifies autonomous delivery robot s as high-risk, whether used in controlled warehouse premises or urban public spaces. While their use in public spaces can cause harm, they pose little to no risk when used in controlled environments. The list of high-risk AI systems under the EU AI Act ignores this important context of use and overregulates developers and deployers of such robotics. Conversely, AI systems that pose a significant risk of harm, such as migration prediction and money laundering detection tools fall through the cracks, although they could discriminate against people based on factors such as race and religion. Since they are not classified as high-risk, developers and deployers are not required to follow the strict safety standards meant for high-risk AI. The EU Commission's power to revise the list of high-risk AI systems is ineffective due to the potential lack of political commitment and slow approval processes for delegated acts through which revisions can be adopted. Whilst risk-based regulation is useful, it should be grounded in a principle . The AI Act could have been designed to treat "AI use cases that are likely to adversely affect public interest" as high-risk. By lacking an adaptable underlying principle, the AI Act’s current approach potentially hinders innovation and creates loopholes. Erosion of the 'Brussels Effect' The EU has shaped global regulatory standards through the ‘ Brussels Effect ', where foreign businesses and states embrace EU law out of legal and commercial necessities. The power of the Brussels Effect lies partly in the quality of legal standards in the EU . However, the EU AI Act’s flaws combined with the contentious nature of AI regulation, suggest that the Brussels Effect may give way to more negotiated global standards. Dr Asress Adimi Gikay is senior lecturer in AI, disruptive innovation & law at Brunel University, London , and a board member of the Centre for AI: Social and Digital Innovation . Dr Asress Adimi Gikay is senior lecturer in AI, disruptive innovation & law at Brunel University, London , and a board member of the
|
Centre for AI: Social and Digital Innovation
|
The technology’s complexity — compounded by self-interested actors making wild claims about its potential to do harm — make it challenging to craft measured regulations.
|
[
"Digital",
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] |
digital
|
2024-09-12T11:56:06.510Z
|
https://euobserver.com/digital/are9af2ae9
|
Why Chinese electric vehicle plants in EU could be a good thing
|
Last month the European Commission announced it will impose additional taxes on electric vehicles produced in China. These are levies ranging from nine percent (Tesla) to as much as 36.3 percent (SAIC and other producers that do not cooperate in the commission’s investigation). For the time being, attention is — understandably — focused on possible Chinese countermeasures that could possibly lead to a trade war. Yet this development also offers an opportunity. As production costs in China rise, intercontinental transport becomes more expensive and import duties are imposed, the difference between producing there and here becomes smaller and smaller. We already see this happening in practice. Chinese car manufacturer Chery wants to build electric passenger cars in Spain together with the Spanish Ebro-EV Motors. To this end, a Nissan factory in Barcelona that was closed in 2021 will be reopened, creating work for thousands of employees. Previously it was announced that China's largest manufacturer of electric vehicles, BYD, will starting production in Hungary . Also Xpeng is considering a European plant for its EV’s. And telecom equipment manufacturer Huawei is going to build a factory near Paris. There are rivals outside EU too. Turkey and Morocco BYD also announced last month that it wants to invest €900m in a factory in Turkey that will produce 150,000 EVs and hybrid passenger cars annually. And Chinese battery maker Gotion High Tech is investing €2.45bn in a giga factory in Morocco to serve the European carmakers market. When China steadily developed into an economic superpower from 1979 onwards thanks to its open door policy, we considered this as just fine. China cheaply assembled everything we needed for our homes and offices, from toys, furniture to electronics. We did not mind that this led to job losses. In any case, the disappearance of entire production sectors has not led to mass unemployment in the West. Our workforce started doing other things, which often yielded even more. This cut both ways: 300 million Chinese escaped poverty, while our prosperity and purchasing power increased due to the flow of cheap products from the Far East. Then Chinese companies came here to make acquisitions. They were looking for returns, but also technological knowledge. The realisation slowly grew that China would not settle for a place as the 'Factory of the World', but that it wants to develop and produce high-quality technological products. Critics point out that Chinese state aid and dumping as a result of overcapacity can destroy entire sectors in the West. Sectors on which we want to build our sustainable future, such as solar cells, wind turbines, batteries and EV’s. Jobs, taxes, working conditions, environment The new competition with China is therefore about our economic revenue model for the future and jobs. And now they want to invest in production capacity here. In a way its encouraging that Chinese companies want to move part of their production to the European Union. If they want to produce here, they not only create employment, but also have to comply with European rules in the areas of pay, working conditions, the environment and taxes. We are not going to have a more level playing field than this. The levies on 'Made in China' therefore make it possible to compete more fairly not only on price, but on all relevant aspects of the production process. We should not leave this to countries close to the EU. We must embrace it ourselves. If we want to make optimal use of Chinese capital and knowledge and prevent only countries on the edges of the Union are benefiting, member states should work together instead of competing each other. Let's establish which regions urgently need economic strengthening and where youth unemployment is high. What we should certainly not do is use the same instruments that we accuse the Chinese government of: offering cheap land, subsidies and tax benefits. Only by working together can governments set requirements in the areas of the environment, employment and labour rights and have companies contribute to education and work experience placements. Fred Sengers is a Dutch public speaker and researcher on modern China . Fred Sengers is a Dutch public speaker and
|
researcher on modern China
|
As the EU imposes more import duties on products made in China, it becomes more attractive for Chinese companies to open production facilities here. Europe should welcome them. Finally a level playing field when China's multinationals have to comply with European rules and pay taxes here.
|
[
"EU & the World",
"Green Economy",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2024-09-11T11:37:29.752Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/arc88d71a8
|
Will the centre-right enable the far-right in Austria at September's election?
|
For almost two years, opinion polls have given a lead to the Austrian far-right Freedom Party for the 29 September national elections. With only weeks left until election day, the mainstream parties are in the meantime sounding the alarm to convince voters of the threats a potential far-right chancellorship and government poses to the country’s democracy, trying to dissuade them from voting for the far-right. However, while all eyes are on the far-right, the centre-right Austrian People's Party (ÖVP)’s key role in this election is often neglected. Plummeting in the polls after their ‘wunderkind’, Sebastian Kurz , left politics in 2021, the People’s Party failed to regain the level of popularity they enjoyed during the Kurz years. And yet, while unlikely to come in first in this autumn’s national elections, they will hold the most powerful position in Austria in the aftermath of the election: forming a coalition without them is practically impossible. As such, whether a far-right coalition government emerge largely depends on them. Yet, the ÖVP has demonstrated its negligence of the danger the far-right poses to democracy before. Setting aside the 1983-1987 minority coalition between the Social Democrats and the Freedom Party before its ‘Haiderisation’, the ÖVP has been the main partner to the far-right, elevating it to power several times over the last two and a half decades. In 2000, the ÖVP, although coming in third place in the 1999 elections, set a precedent by forming a coalition with the second-placed far right which led to short-lived sanctions by the EU-14 . In 2017, a strengthened and ‘new’ ÖVP under Kurz led the party into a renewed coalition with the far-right party — this time though with no international repercussions as far-right politics has become mainstreamed. After undermining liberal democracy, and several national scandals posing threats to the country’s rule of law and security, such as the raid of the Austrian intelligence services , ordered by back-then FPÖ interior minister Herbert Kickl, the ÖVP-FPÖ government gained international notoriety following the revelations of the ‘ Ibiza scandal ’ in 2019, ultimately breaking apart the coalition. Early elections resulted in an unprecedented ÖVP-Greens coalition that would hold for the next five years. Not ruled out This autumn, the possibility of the ÖVP once again aiding the far-right to power looms large. While a far-right victory would allow the FPÖ to hold coalition talks and appoint the chancellor, their only viable option for a needed coalition partner remains the ÖVP, the lone party that has not categorically ruled out a coalition with the FPÖ, only a cabinet including hardliner and FPÖ-leader Kickl. However, the ÖVP’s pledges should be taken with a grain of salt: first, reminiscent of the year 2000, when the ÖVP entered a governing coalition with the FPÖ under the premise that Haider would be left out, the exclusion of Kickl does not mean the far-right would be any more ‘moderate’ or uninfluenced by him. Secondly, not only does the ÖVP already govern with the FPÖ on the regional level in several states, but they do so with people considered as extreme as Kickl, such as with Udo Landbauer in Lower Austria. The pretext of not wanting to govern with an FPÖ that includes Herbert Kickl is hypocritical at best and naive at worst Thus, the pretext of not wanting to govern with an FPÖ that includes Kickl is hypocritical at best and naive at worst as it neglects the fact that the entire party represents the same anti-liberal democratic values as the party’s leader does. A coalition excluding the far-right is possible but challenging. It would require the ÖVP to join forces with the SPÖ and another party, likely the liberal NEOS, to secure a parliamentary majority. However, the stability and success of such a three-way coalition are uncertain, especially given Austria’s limited experience with such government formations. Consequently, the ÖVP will find itself in the most powerful position in the aftermath of the 29 September election: with a far-right party that cannot come to power without it on one side, and mainstream parties that cannot prevent the far-right from governing without it on the other, the ÖVP holds the key to power and thus a bargaining chip. Like in the past, it will coalition with the ones offering the most appealing offer in terms of power, ideological congruence and opportunity to implement its ‘vision’ for Austria. As such, a relaunch of an ÖVP-FPÖ coalition currently seems like the most likely option — especially as ÖVP senior figures are already calling for a government with the far right, given their “good cooperation” at the regional level. In that event, the People’s Party, having itself shifted to the right over the years, would once again not only help the far-right to power but be complicit in the undermining of Austrian liberal democracy, the erosion of norms and attacks against the rule of law – as they have in the past. As such, the choice they make might determine the direction and future of Austrian democracy. Gabriela Greilinger is a doctoral student and researcher at the University of Georgia, USA , in far-right politics, democracy, and political behaviour in Europe, with a focus on Austria and Hungary. Gabriela Greilinger is a doctoral student and researcher at the
|
University of Georgia, USA
|
While all eyes are on the far-right, the centre-right Austrian People's Party (ÖVP)’s key role in September's election is often neglected. While unlikely to come in first, they will hold the most powerful position in the aftermath: forming a coalition without them is practically impossible. As such, whether a far-right coalition government emerge largely depends on them.
|
[
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-political
|
2024-09-10T10:27:34.739Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ara2339dd7
|
The case for a first-ever EU just transition commissioner
|
The 'mission letters' for the new college of commissioners Ursula von der Leyen sends out on Wednesday (11 September) will tell us a lot about whether the promise of just transition translates into tangible action. Building a society that enables people to thrive while also protecting the planet is possible. To get there, the costs and benefits of the green transition must be shared fairly. The wealthiest and the biggest polluters must pay their fair share, while workers should be protected and accompanied throughout the process. As stated by EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen last July when seeking the confidence of a majority in the newly elected European Parliament, “ ”. This vision was also embraced in the strategic agenda adopted by the EU governments, where they committed to upholding the social dimension of the Union. But lofty words like “leaving no one behind” are not enough. For the just transition to be real, we need a critical shift: climate, economic, industrial and financial policies must be designed to reduce, and never exacerbate, socio-economic inequality. 'Leaving no one behind' The mission letters will be a key indicator of how serious the commission will be about the just transition. There are a number of ways forward that von der Leyen can take. Firstly, a new European Commissioner focused on the just transition and climate action, with a clear mandate to ensure alignment of climate and social policies. Inequalities and poverty already exist in Europe, and we must ensure that climate and social policies go hand in hand to prevent the further exacerbation of social exclusion. The mission letter for the just transition and climate should include a plan for a Just Transition Directive that ensures workers in carbon-intensive sectors, such as fossil fuels or automotive, are accompanied towards new good jobs. Secondly, there has to be a commitment to ambitious 2040 climate targets to protect the most vulnerable from climate impacts and extreme weather. The Social Climate Fund, and future financial frameworks, should ensure EU funds support people in the transition, including that vulnerable groups are not disproportionately burdened by climate policies. Lastly, public services need an uplift to guarantee that energy-efficient housing, low-carbon public transport and other sustainable options are affordable and accessible to all. This is what “leaving no one behind” would look like in real life. Von der Leyen has pledged to “ This is a fundamental commitment, as without adequate financial resources, the green and just transition will remain wishful thinking. However, a piece of the puzzle is missing as nowhere in the strategic agenda is a reference to redistributive taxation . Wealth inequality translates into huge carbon inequality, and those with the most wealth are responsible for the lion’s share of emissions. Progressive taxation — on extreme wealth and the fossil fuel industry’s excess profits — is a prerequisite to achieving the EU climate goals. Reducing income and wealth inequality through progressive taxes is the simple way to curb excessive consumption by the wealthiest and their luxury emissions whilst generating public revenues to invest in the green and just transition. The ‘cost of living crisis’ makes it much more difficult for people to engage in the deep changes required by the green transformation, while the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a wealthy minority is allowing them to disproportionately affect law-making to protect their profits instead of tackling the climate and environmental crisis. Therefore, taxing wealth would reduce not only economic but also political inequalities. Last but not least, despite the adoption of Next Generation EU (NGEU) when the Covid-19 pandemic started, large investment gaps remain for delivering on climate and other EU Green Deal targets as well as on the much-needed social investments to meet the Porto social targets. These gaps notably entail crucial public infrastructure that cannot be financed through private capital and is needed for the private sector’s transition to a decarbonised, less material-intensive economic model. We need new taxation options to close the green spending gap and meet Europe’s international climate finance commitments. An ambitious EU climate and social agenda is incompatible with budget cuts. When Next Generation EU ends in 2026, the EU will need new sources of income. The EU fiscal rules already limit member states’ ability to invest at the national level. The solution lies in new taxation options — ensuring that those who pollute the most, and can afford to contribute more, do their fair share. Let’s see if the mission letters will live up to the promises made on just transition. There is no time to waste in leaving no one behind. Isabelle Brachet is fiscal reform policy coordinator at the umbrella NGO Climate Action Network (CAN) Europe . Laura de Bonfils is secretary-general at Social Platform , the leading organisation working on EU social rights. Isabelle Brachet is fiscal reform policy coordinator at the umbrella NGO Climate Action Network (CAN) Europe . Laura de Bonfils is secretary-general at
|
Social Platform
|
Transitioning to a greener Europe should be a win-win for everyone — but without the protection of social rights, many people stand to lose out. As Ursula von der Leyen prepares to unveil the mission letters for her new commissioners, one key question looms: will the new EU Commission deliver on its promise to support people through the massive changes ahead?
|
[
"EU Political",
"Green Economy"
] |
*
|
2024-09-09T10:57:25.642Z
|
https://euobserver.com/*/arad2bc36c
|
Why 'protecting kids' is a politician's cop-out for more chat surveillance
|
In the realm of political discourse, few arguments are as emotionally charged — or as manipulatively wielded — as the call to "protect our children." At face value, it's an unassailable proposition; who would argue against the safety and well-being of society's most vulnerable members? But the reality is far more sinister. When politicians invoke the need to shield children from the dangers of the internet, they often do so as a pretext for introducing sweeping, authoritarian measures that curtail privacy, erode civil liberties, and fundamentally reshape the relationship between the state and the individual. One of the most glaring examples of this is the push for mandatory age verification for accessing adult content online. The rhetoric is always the same: we must ensure that children are not exposed to harmful material. However, the implementation of age verification schemes often involves intrusive measures that require individuals to provide personal information — such as government-issued ID or biometric data — before they can access certain websites. In practice, this means that private companies or government agencies are collecting vast amounts of sensitive information about individuals' online habits. The risks are manifold. Data breaches are an ever-present threat, and even the most secure systems are not immune. Moreover, the aggregation of such data creates a surveillance apparatus that can easily be repurposed for more nefarious ends. In practice, this means that private companies or government agencies are collecting vast amounts of sensitive information about individuals' online habits These laws not only pose serious privacy concerns but are also becoming increasingly fashionable among lawmakers who wish to appear tough on social issues without considering the broader implications for the privacy rights of citizens. The very people these laws are supposed to protect — minors — are often the ones who find ways to circumvent the restrictions, while adults are left navigating a digital landscape that feels more like a panopticon than a place of freedom. It’s also worth mentioning that preventing kids from accessing certain content should be the task of a parent, not of the state. What such legislations do is excusing parents from their job and forcing society to cope with parents’ lack of interest in their children’s lives. Trojan horse for authoritarianism If age verification schemes are a Trojan horse for authoritarianism, the European Union’s proposed " chat control " initiative is a full-frontal assault on digital privacy. Under the guise of combating child abuse, the EU is considering a plan that would require tech companies to scan all private messages for potentially illegal content. The implications of this are chilling. Imagine a world where every text you send is monitored by an algorithm designed to detect suspicious activity. Proponents argue that such measures are necessary to root out criminal behavior, but the reality is that these systems are prone to error and can easily be abused. Innocent conversations could be flagged, leading to unwarranted investigations and the potential criminalisation of ordinary citizens. Worse still, the very existence of such a system normalises the idea that surveillance is a necessary and acceptable part of modern life. In order to allegedly prevent child abuse, privacy will be abolished — and, don’t forget, child abuse happens offline, but legislators find it easy to just criminalise the end of the line while washing their hands of reality and creating a tool to censor and control. The idea that the state — or even private corporations — could have access to the intimate details of our lives is antithetical to the principles of democracy and human rights and a step toward a dystopian future. It’s a direct attack on the presumption of innocence, replacing it with a culture of suspicion and control. The fundamental problem with these initiatives is that they present a false dichotomy: that we must choose between protecting our children and preserving our freedoms. This is a dangerous and misleading narrative. It suggests that the only way to ensure the safety of minors is through increasingly draconian measures that strip away the very rights and liberties that define a free society. But there are alternative approaches. Education, for instance, is a powerful tool that can equip young people with the knowledge and critical thinking skills they need to navigate the internet safely. Parental controls, privacy settings, and responsible content moderation are all effective ways to manage online risks without resorting to authoritarian tactics. Moreover, we must recognize that the internet is a reflection of society at large. The dangers that exist online — whether they be exposure to inappropriate content, cyberbullying, or exploitation — are not unique to the digital world. They are societal problems that require societal solutions. By focusing solely on restricting access and increasing surveillance, we are ignoring the root causes of these issues and, in the process, creating new problems that are far more insidious. Every time politicians propose measures to "protect our children," we must scrutinise their true motives and the potential consequences of their actions. In many cases, these proposals are not about safety at all, but about control — control over information, control over individuals, and control over society. We must resist the temptation to accept these measures at face value. Instead, we should demand solutions that respect both the safety of our children and the privacy and freedoms of all citizens. Raphael Tsavkko Garcia is a freelance journalist and editor, with a PhD in human rights, in Antwerp, published by Al Jazeera, The Washington Post, Wired, MIT Tech Review, among other news outlets.
|
Raphael Tsavkko Garcia
|
The European Union’s proposed "chat control" initiative is a full-frontal assault on digital privacy. Under the guise of combating child abuse, the EU is considering a plan that would require tech companies to scan all private messages for potentially illegal content
|
[
"Digital",
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] |
digital
|
2024-09-06T09:23:03.782Z
|
https://euobserver.com/digital/ar50be8e42
|
Why did the EU quietly approve a Big Agri mega-merger this summer?
|
Now that the post EU-election dust has whirled down, politicians are returning back to Brussels from a well-earned holiday, it might be a good moment to highlight a mega business merger in the agricultural sector. While most people were on their summer holidays, the merger between two Big Agri giants, Bunge and Viterra, received a green light from the European Commission, an important step in what is always a carefully-planned process towards global approval. First of all, this not just nerdy competition stuff. This is about one of the single most important topics that dominate EU-politics: farmers’ protests, food prices, inflation and even migration. Because after all, the fate of European farmers defined the course of the EU politics: EU elections, the positioning of Ursula von der Leyen’s European People's Party (EPP) against anything sustainable and green , and subsequently also the not so soft killing of large chunks of the EU Green Deal by that same EPP . On 13 June 2023, Bunge announced that it wants to buy up Viterra: Canada’s largest grain company with headquarters in the Netherlands. Currently, Bunge is already the world’s fifth-largest grain trading company and one of those handful of global food corporations that most people do not know by name, but only through its consequences. It is difficult to overstate the power of the so-called 'ABCCD's - ADM, Bunge, COFCO, Cargill, and Louis Dreyfuss: they control 70 to 90 percent of the global grain trade. As it is enshrined in EU Regulation 139/2004 , are not supposed to reduce competition in the single market. Mega-mergers, just like international free trade agreements, have shown to have profound and long-lasting impacts on farmers and their livelihoods. Recently, the European Commission published a report wherein it admits how much market concentration has increased during the last 25 years. This deal is unprecedented in size within the global agriculture sector and will result in further accelerated concentration in markets where economic power is already very concentrated. But somehow rightwing politicians choose to attack environmental legislation (Farm to Fork) or engage in cultural wars on lab-meat. In Canada, the alarm was set off. The risks to farmers were noted in the assessment of the Competition Bureau Canada which stated: “The proposed transaction is likely to result in a substantial lessening of competition in certain relevant markets, such as decreased prices paid to farmers and reduced choice through the elimination of rivalry between Bunge and Viterra”. A first in-depth study of this merger’s impacts on Canadian farmers by several economists concluded that it would reduce farmers’ incomes by $770m [€694m] per year. The European Coordination Via Campesina (ECVC), an umbrella organisation representing small and medium-scale European farmers, notes that "the increased market dominance will enable to eliminate smaller competitors that are currently operating in the EU marketplace, reducing choices at all levels of the value chain". Sellers inflation in food prices? Food commodity traders like Bunge have the power, as evidence from IPES Food shows, to influence prices of global food stuffs. Researchers Isabella Weber and Merle Schulken explained this as "sellers inflation" in a recently published study With in-house intelligence on global agricultural markets that exceeds that of states, the ABCCD cartel plays a crucial role in the financialisation of food markets. As a result, the ABCCD are known to benefit from crises and volatility. In 2022, roughly one-in-ten people went to bed hungry and the absolute number of people with hunger increased by 40 million. According to the UN, the main drivers for this increase were conflict, the related disruption of global food supply chains and food price shocks. In the same period, the profits of the ABCCD cartel notified the most profitable year in the agricultural commodity traders’ history: 2021 net profits rose between 75 per cent and 260 per cent for all five agricultural commodity traders. Merger review, as boring as it sounds, is a matter of public interest and should not be left to bureaucrats. A report of competition experts concluded that Bunge/Viterra deserved further investigation. Otherwise, ever increasing market concentration in the food sector will further hamper democratic involvement of EU. It questions European societies’ capacity to be sovereign in food systems. This 'sovereignty' is a favourite (though hollow) rhetoric of rightwing politicians. In January 2024, the European Parliament already expressed its concern over concentration in the food supply chain. After the holidays, it is now time for something stronger: a more comprehensive view on merger control and maybe a break up ? Hans van Scharen of Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) , which monitors corporate lobbying in Brussels, and Irene Keizer of SOMO , the Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations, in Amsterdam. Hans van Scharen of Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) , which monitors corporate lobbying in Brussels, and Irene Keizer of
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SOMO
|
The world’s fifth-largest grain-trading company intends to buy — with EU approval — Canada’s largest grain company, headquartered in the Netherlands. The result is likely to be a cartel of food-price inflation.
|
[
"Green Economy",
"Opinion"
] |
green-economy
|
2024-09-05T10:31:21.252Z
|
https://euobserver.com/green-economy/ar421c0515
|
Collating carbon data shows there is a pay-off to emissions cuts
|
As the EU’s institutions return from summer recess, urgency is building to strengthen the bloc’s ability to transform into a sustainable economy that can continue to compete globally. Mario Draghi’s report on the issue is also expected in the coming months. Considering the EU’s ambitious Green Deal, this is often painted as a trade off between environmental ambition and action versus economic competitiveness, when, in reality, the two are not mutually exclusive. If anything, they go hand-in-hand and there is evidence that proves it. Take emissions reductions for example: European companies that disclosed through the CDP (formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project) emissions cuts of three percent across scopes 1 and 2, from 2022-2023, actually increased their revenue by more than three percent during the same period, on average. This is based on an analysis of environmental data from businesses representing almost 90 percent of European market capitalisation, disclosed through CDP - the non-profit that runs the world’s environmental disclosure system for companies, cities, states and regions. These companies’ environmental action did not impede their ability to grow —ˆ in fact, green transformation of key European industries like steel and electric utilities will be critical to the region’s ability to compete economically in the future. The robust and consistent environmental data that informs the investment needed is ensured through the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) and its European Sustainability Reporting Standards (ESRS). Their timely implementation is critical for companies and financiers to effectively navigate and drive the sustainability transition. Ultimately, keeping this pace is key to achieving the objectives of the EU Green Deal to transform the bloc into a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy. The ambition set out in the EU Green Deal, including comprehensive and consistent sustainability reporting through the CSRD, is not hampering companies’ revenue growth — it is creating opportunities for them to better compete. In fact, European companies identified €3.47 trillion in climate-related opportunities that come at a significantly lower cost of €620bn. These opportunities are in areas including the development of low emission goods and services as well as access to new markets. Comprehensive and consistent data Those investments needed to realise these opportunities, just like any other commercial investment, can only be made with comprehensive and consistent data on the issue at hand; sustainability data being fundamental here. The CSRD and ESRS are crucial to create the obligation to gather, prepare and publish this information so companies and financial institutions can effectively navigate and drive the opportunities within the sustainability transition. Companies themselves report that the opportunities to be gained from these investments at scale vastly outweigh the costs involved. For example, Vattenfall disclosed opportunities of more than €650m from green hydrogen renewable energy initiatives from a cost of €147m. This development is linked with a major industry collective intended to help power green steel production, an area of much-needed expansion to support the EU’s transition to a sustainable economy. Any delay in upholding the ambition of the EU’s green policy agenda, and the standards that are essential to it (such as the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, EU Deforestation Regulation and Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation), would undermine Europe's future economic competitiveness, as well as its ability to achieve its climate and environmental objectives. We could also see leading companies outpacing the evolving legal framework, leaving the smaller organizations being guided by the delayed roll-out of the standards and struggling to keep up with the real economy. The data clearly shows that decisions on implementing regulation do not need to be a choice between environmental ambition and business growth. Rather, they power each other. The green transformation of key European industries like steel and electric utilities will be critical to our region’s ability to compete economically in the future amid global demand for more sustainable products and value chains. 'Green' steel Take steel for example, which also represents about five percent of the EU’s CO2 emissions - nine-in-10 companies now offer low-carbon products. Still, they are set to be behind demand for green steel by 31 percent over the next 10 years - according to CDP and Oliver Wyman analysis . Alongside boosting their own levels of expenditure, these companies need capital to grow their existing initiatives to the required scale. Comprehensive environmental data, ensured through robust regulation, is fundamental to guiding these investments and to transforming Europe’s economy into one that is both more sustainable and more competitive. While many companies need the support of financial institutions to bring these projects to commercial scale, the finance sector needs proof such initiatives can operate sustainably at this level. This is becoming an urgent issue, with one-third of Europe’s companies now reporting access to capital as a key concern in decarbonization efforts, according to CDP analysis with Oliver Wyman. Corporate environmental data, which CDP has been collecting for more than 20 years, is essential for providing financial markets with the information they need to make investment decisions that support of green initiatives. Many major European businesses are already well prepared to comply with EU reporting rules on climate through their CDP disclosure. Looking at Europe’s listed companies, 60 percent of them already report the majority of datapoints aligned with IFRS S2 through CDP, which is part of the global baseline ISSB standards and overlaps significantly with ESRS climate standards. They are also taking the next step beyond just complying, as this data is shared with their financial institutions and customers to enable opportunities for better access to capital and stronger value chains. This means that data doesn't just collect dust in annual reports but is seen and used by the wider ecosystem. Major manufacturers are already accessing financing with the support of this information. Take for example German steel giant Thyssenkrupp. The company is investing €3bn until 2027 in one of the largest industrial decarbonisation efforts of any business worldwide. They received a CDP 'A' score for the eighth year in a row in 2023, which has helped the organization secure public funding for its decarbonization initiatives. Rather than hampering business success, sustainability reporting will be fundamental in helping guide investments to power Europe’s economic competitiveness. Pietro Bertazzi is director of policy & external affairs at the CDP (formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project ) — a not-for-profit charity that runs the global disclosure system for investors, companies, cities, states and regions to manage their environmental impacts. Pietro Bertazzi is director of policy & external affairs at the CDP (formerly the
|
Carbon Disclosure Project
|
Mario Draghi's competitiveness report, and the EU Green Deal, are often painted as a trade off between environmental ambition and economic competitiveness, when, in reality, the two are not mutually exclusive. If anything, they go hand-in-hand — and there is data that proves it
|
[
"Green Economy",
"Opinion"
] |
green-economy
|
2024-09-04T10:34:33.189Z
|
https://euobserver.com/green-economy/ar21ba5cb6
|
Why EU leaders should get off Musk's X
|
When men go to pee in a public toilet they spend a minute gazing at the wall in front of them, in what many advertisers have seized upon as an opportunity to display posters of their products above the stinking urinals. But in terms of framing, you'd better ask yourself: Is this really what I want my brand to be associated with? You might well think twice if you were selling ice cream or toothpaste, so what if your poster was Ursula von der Leyen's face selling EU values? Because that's the kind of environment in which the European Commission president, other top EU officials, and national EU leaders are posting their images and comments every day when they use X to communicate with press and the EU public. Even the toilet analogy is too kind. There was already lots of toxic crap on X before the summer of 2024. Racist, antisemitic, and homophobic content had "surged", according to a study in January by US academics . X had more Russian propaganda than any other big social media, an EU report warned in 2023. Porn was 13 percent of X in late 2022, according to internal documents seen by Reuters. But this summer, with the failed assassination of Donald Trump in the US and the UK race riots, X's CEO Elon Musk turbocharged his platform into an overflowing sewer of bigotry, nihilism, and greed. As I tried to follow the UK riots from Brussels using X, time and again I saw von der Leyen's carefully coiffed Christian-Democrat torso issuing some polite EU statement, while sandwiched on my laptop screen between video-clips getting off on anti-migrant violence, pro-Russian bots, and OnlyFans links. Musk's algorithms pushed pro-riot content so hard down users' throats it prompted a UK government rebuke and talk of legal sanctions. Tommy Robinson, a leading British racist, got over 430 million views for his X posts, for instance. Andrew Tate, Britain's top misogynist, got 15 million views for one X post inciting rioters. And the biggest turd in the cesspit - Musk's own avatar - also kept appearing next to von der Leyen and other EU leaders on my screen, as the US tech baron ranted about "civil war" in the UK, peddled pro-Trump conspiracy theories, or told EU commissioner Thierry Breton to "literally fuck your own face ". Musk's summer coincided with France's arrest of a Russian tech CEO , Pavel Durov, in August on suspicion he condoned the sale of child pornography and drugs on his Telegram platform. The European Commission also started legal proceedings against X in July over misleading and illegal content, in a process that could see Musk fined hundreds of millions of euros. But aside from the grand issues of how to regulate social media without stymieing free speech or privacy, EU leaders could do something a lot simpler and closer to home for the sake of public mental health - just switch to any other less sleazy platform instead. You could do it tomorrow with one email to your tech staff and for all the stupid material on Instagram, for example, at least your face won't keep flashing up next to jubilant pogroms and naked tits on your constituents' screens. Von der Leyen has 1.5 million X followers, French president Emmanuel Macron has 9.8 million, while Spanish prime minister Pedro Sánchez and Polish prime minister Donald Tusk have 1.9 million each. EU leaders could also do something a lot simpler and closer to home for the sake of public mental health - just switch to any other less sleazy platform instead But please don't worry, not all journalists or the general public are that dumb yet, most of us will find you and follow you anyway because politics is genuinely important. And we will thank you for giving us one more reason to get off X ourselves, because so long as you use it as your main outlet for news updates you are dragging us along with you. My analogy about ads in a public toilet was meant to show the importance of semiotics in political PR - it matters where you speak, not just what you say. It also holds good for those who worry that if normal leaders and media abandoned toxic platforms, then extremism would grow in its own exclusive online world. It's just good public hygiene to bury our sewage pipes, instead of letting people empty their buckets out of the window onto our heads. But if you prefer to hold your nose and stay on X, consider also that you are not only damaging your own brand, but causing financial and political harm in real life. Financial hurt, because if you help make people reliant on X for news, then greater use of Musk's platform makes people like him, Robinson, and Tate ever richer via X's monetisation schemes for viral content. Political injury, because to the extent that von der Leyen, Macron, or Sánchez possess real importance, they aggrandise Musk, Tate, and Robinson by continuously appearing alongside them in X's hyper-curated online space. And so if you should worry that urinals below your face might put people off, then the situation is actually worse than that. Your presence on X is also helping to pay for the muck to flow and the toilet owner is using you to sell it to the world.
|
Andrew Rettman is EUobserver's foreign editor, writing about foreign and security issues since 2005. He is Polish, but grew up in the UK, and lives in Brussels. He has also written for The Guardian, The Times of London, and Intelligence Online.
|
Leaders should ask themselves - is X really what I want my brand to be associated with?
|
[
"EU & the World",
"Digital"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2024-09-03T16:05:54.577Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar1eb43d53
|
MEPs must fight back - and vote - to protect EU aid budget this month
|
As the new European Parliament gears up for another term, MEPs face one of their most important tasks: voting on the EU’s aid budget for 2025. We, presidents and European directors of 13humanitarian NGOs, urge MEPs to reflect the opinion of their constituents and defend aid to the most vulnerable. While many topics spark division within Europe, Europeans are united in one thing: the belief that the EU has a responsibility to show global solidarity via European aid. Yet, heads of state and politicians are increasingly seeking drastic cuts to official development aid and scaling back on humanitarian aid pledges. Despite these pressures, EU politicians must remember the clear voice of citizens when they are given the choice to cut or increase Europe’s aid budget this month. Over nine-in-10 Europeans think it is important that the EU funds humanitarian aid globally. In some EU countries almost everyone agrees, with Portugal, Greece, Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia and Ireland boasting 97-percent approval rates for European aid. Denmark, Latvia, Sweden and Finland had over 10-percent increases in the number of people who believe European aid is very important since the question was posed to them in 2020. Such a strong consensus should be a gift to policymakers. It is clear. Citizens want to continue seeing the EU use taxpayer money to support people facing critical level-crises. The consensus reflects the urgent reality: in 2019 when the last group of MEPs took their seats 131 million people needed humanitarian assistance. Today, that number is at 308 million due to conflicts, climate emergencies and economic factors. Yet budgets are tight and need to be used wisely. Salami-slicing the budget by €2bn As NGOs, we — and the communities and organisations we partner with — have seen the number of complex protracted crises soar in recent years. Avoiding costly ongoing humanitarian responses to those protracted crises requires investment in addressing root causes and long-term solutions. Cutting long-term development spending to contexts like Myanmar, Mali and Burkina Faso now is not a wise way to save money. Providing aid today is more effective than having to address spiralling humanitarian needs tomorrow. Withdrawing a lifeline to millions of people will have a direct and outsized impact with the fallout being far more costly if these fragile contexts descend into deeper or protracted crises. Ensuring this continued investment and commitment to development funding requires a U-turn in the EU and member state approaches, as earlier this year, EU leaders announced nearly €2bn in cuts and redeployments to existing programmes for health, education, human rights, peace-building and other development priorities to enable investment in migration control. Cutting long-term development spending to contexts like Myanmar, Mali and Burkina Faso now is not a wise way to save money In addition to taking the difficult choices to maintain long-term investment, politicians and donors need to prioritise putting into action nexus commitments by linking humanitarian, development and peacebuilding activities. A proactive approach to flexible funding will ensure that communities and organisations responding to development challenges and humanitarian crises can flexibly manage funds and deliver on their commitments. To avoid a perpetual humanitarian cycle, Europe cannot give up on supporting investment across the SDGs and peacebuilding. The EU reserves are empty after years of responding to Covid domestically and internationally, the Ukraine war and multiple global crises, European citizens want these reserves to be rebuilt. As the preparations for and negotiations of the next EU’s long-term budget (MFF) start up in the next months European leaders will have the opportunity to clearly demonstrate the political commitment of the EU towards people in need globally. MEPs can and should hold them to account. When Europeans are asked about how they feel when it comes to Europe as a global leader in humanitarian aid more than eight-in-10 feel pride, satisfaction and enthusiasm . In times of division, policymakers would do well to associate themselves with policies that inspire pride and enthusiasm rather than be viewed as responsible for ending European leadership on one of its most popular policies. A policy disconnect is fast approaching. Europeans are committed to give aid while European policymakers are committed to reducing it. MEPs have a unique opportunity to bridge this divide and represent their citizens by proposing and voting for an increased humanitarian and development aid budget. Cutting aid budgets when millions rely on them and when European’s believe in them would be reckless policymaking. Céline Mias: Europe director, Danish Refugee Council Edouard Rodier: Europe director, Norwegian Refugee Council Evelien Van Roemburg: Head of Oxfam’s EU office Imogen Sudbery: Executive director, International Rescue Committee Belgium Jeroen Uytterschaut: Executive director & EU representative World Vision Julieta González: Director and EU representative CARE International Aïcha Koraïchi: President Action Contre La Faim France Maria Groenewald: Director VOICE Floris Faber: Europe Director Act Alliance Maria Nyman: Secretary General Caritas Europa Hassan El Sayed: Partnerships Director Solidarités International Willy Bergogné: Europe Director & EU Representative Save the Children Ilan Cohn: Europe Director HIAS Europe Céline Mias: Europe director, Danish Refugee Council Edouard Rodier: Europe director, Norwegian Refugee Council Evelien Van Roemburg: Head of Oxfam’s EU office Imogen Sudbery: Executive director, International Rescue Committee Belgium Jeroen Uytterschaut: Executive director & EU representative World Vision Julieta González: Director and EU representative CARE International Aïcha Koraïchi: President Action Contre La Faim France Maria Groenewald: Director VOICE Floris Faber: Europe Director Act Alliance Maria Nyman: Secretary General Caritas Europa Hassan El Sayed: Partnerships Director Solidarités International
|
Willy Bergogné: Europe Director & EU Representative Save the Children
|
As the new European Parliament gears up for another term, MEPs face one of their most important tasks: voting on the EU’s aid budget for 2025. Yet, heads of state and politicians are increasingly seeking drastic cuts to official development aid and scaling back on humanitarian aid pledges, write the directors of 13 international humanitarian NGOs.
|
[
"EU & the World",
"Africa"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2024-09-03T09:39:38.626Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ard7c0d656
|
The AfD victory in Thuringia echoes the Nazi win there in 1930
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Sunday night (1 September) was a huge success for the relatively young hard-right populist party, the Alternative for Germany (AfD). For the first time since 1945, a German far-right party has won regional elections at a state-level. In the state of Thuringia, it received almost 33 percent of the vote, leaving the centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) way behind with 23 percent. In Saxony, it received 30.6 percent, just fractionally behind the CDU winners at 31.9 percent. For some observers, the rise of the Alternative for Germany is specific to the country's former communist East. Since German reunification in 1990, the party that has won the most elections in Thuringia is Die Linke (The Left), which is often seen as a far-left populist protest party. The Left has its roots in the former East German ruling party, the Socialist Unity Party (SED) and became increasingly successful after 2004, following the electoral success of the CDU throughout the 1990s. But this time, the Linke lost 18 percent of the votes, leaving it behind on the fourth place even behind its split-off BSW (Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance), a new party established by a former prominent former Linke-member with strong far-right leanings in regard to immigration. BSW went from nowhere to receiving almost 16 percent of the vote. But there is more to be said regarding the electoral success of the AfD than the demise of the leftists, especially for Thuringia. This victory has historical significance. It was in the Thuringian state election of 1930 that the Nazi Party had its first success. It became the second-largest party in the regional elections gaining 11 out of 53 seats, which allowed them to form a coalition government and appoint the first minister of the interior and education. This served as a first testing ground for many of their policies, before they came to power at the national level three years later. Enter Björn Höcke, fascist And indeed, Thuringia’s AfD is infamous for its regional leader, Björn Höcke, who is widely seen as one of Europe's most radical far-right ideologues. The German government’s domestic secret service, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, categorised his faction of the AfD to be a suspect right-wing extremist organisation, which puts it under the secret service’s surveillance. In contrast to the AfD’s tactical policy to portray itself as a shield against antisemitism, Höcke is widely seen as being a racist and fascist. A court ruling decided that describing Höcke as fascist was not slanderous. Due to his antisemitic positions, several high ranking leaders attempted to expel Höcke from the AfD, but failed. His success will probably benefit Höcke and his radical wing even more. While theoretically, the AfD could form a coalition with either the CDU, or with the newly-founded BSW, no party publicly agrees to form a government with the AfD. Fascists win youth vote But this de facto cordon sanitaire might help the AfD in the long run to increase its electoral success, especially given the circumstances that it won most of the young votes between 18 and 25. But the other problem is the lack of an alternative. Together, the Left, BSW, and the centre-left SPD don’t have enough seats to form a coalition. And it is questionable whether the Christian Democrats would be willing to join foreces with a post-communist party like the Left and BSW, since the CDU has ruled out any coalition with the Left in the past. Arithmetically, a coalition between the AfD and BSW would be possible, but is quite unlikely. The victory of the AfD in Thuringia raises many questions, but is certainly a turning point in for Germany’s political landscape. Decisions to be made by many stakeholders might determine important new pathways for Germany’s political future. Farid Hafez is a senior researcher with Georgetown University ’s The Bridge Initiative , which tracks political Islamophobia, in Washington D.C. Farid Hafez is a senior researcher with Georgetown University ’s
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The Bridge Initiative
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The AfD's victory has historical significance — it was in the Thuringian state election of 1930 that the Nazi Party had its first success, becoming the second-largest party in the regional elections gaining 11 out of 53 seats, which allowed them to form a coalition government and appoint the first minister of the interior and education. This served as a first testing ground for many of their policies, before they came to power at the national level three years later.
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[
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-political
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2024-09-02T10:30:21.527Z
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https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar90812415
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Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan: accounting for the missing is the first step
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Conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan, and elsewhere, together with a global slide from democratic to authoritarian rule, have produced a spike in the number of missing and disappeared persons. This is a trend that has been compounded by some of the consequences of climate change, including mass migration. As we mark the International Day of the Disappeared on Friday (30 August), it is important to highlight the fact that accounting for the missing is an essential component of efforts to protect and restore the system of international law that protects all of us. Governments have mandatory obligations to investigate disappearances. It doesn’t matter if the missing person is a paid-up traveler with a ticket and a visa or an irregular migrant with neither; it doesn’t matter if the person is a citizen of the country where they have disappeared; it doesn’t matter what religion or colour or gender they may be. The right to truth and justice is universal. The good news is that this basic principle can be upheld in practice. There are tried-and-tested strategies through which very large numbers of missing persons can be accounted for. Effective measures can be taken to document cases, to locate and identify victims, to return living victims, including children, to their families and to return the remains of deceased victims to their loved ones so that they can be buried with dignity. Data collection and management systems have been developed that cross borders if necessary, bringing relevant agencies together to apply the latest genetic science. The International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) pioneered a multidisciplinary approach in the former Yugoslavia, where it has helped the authorities to account for more than three quarters of the 40,000 people who went missing in the conflicts of the 1990s. This approach supported the process of post-war justice that has been a lynchpin of conflict resolution in the Western Balkans and elsewhere. Evidence gathered by ICMP and its partners during the exhumation of mass graves in Bosnia and Herzegovina was presented as evidence at the trials of individuals subsequently convicted of war crimes. Ukraine In the case of Ukraine, the connection between accounting for the missing and restoring the rule of law has been recognised . The European Union and the governments of Canada, Germany, Norway, the United States, and the Netherlands, are supporting ICMP’s programme to help the Ukrainian authorities develop a systematic DNA-led process to locate and identify those who have gone missing as a result of the Russian invasion – and a central plank of this effort is to ensure that evidence will be documented in such a way that it can be presented in court. In June this year, ICMP gathered Ukrainian and international officials, technical experts and civil society representatives at its headquarters in The Hague to examine steps that can be taken to repatriate children who were forcibly taken from Ukraine and put up for adoption by Russian families. This is a war crime for which Russian president Vladimir Putin and the Russian commissioner for children’s rights, Maria Lvova-Belova have already been indicted by the International Criminal Court. It will require a concerted legal effort on the part of the Ukrainian authorities and the international mechanisms designed to maintain the rule of law to ensure that the rights of these children and their families are restored, and the perpetrators are brought to justice. It will also require the application of advanced DNA technology and a program of psychosocial support. As we mark the International Day of the Disappeared it is important to remember that the issue of missing persons — from conflict, from natural disasters, from migration and other causes — affects all of us, and that practical steps can and should be taken, even amid the chaos and danger of conflict, to gather evidence that will establish the fate of the missing and bring those responsible for their disappearance to justice. Accounting for the missing and gathering evidence for future war crimes trials are an essential element in restoring the rule of law and laying the foundations for long-term peace. Kathryne Bomberger is the director-general of the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), a treaty-based intergovernmental organisation with headquarters in The Hague. Its mandate is to secure the cooperation of governments and other authorities in locating persons missing as a result of conflicts, human rights abuses, disasters, organised violence and other causes and to assist them in doing so. Kathryne Bomberger is the director-general of the
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International Commission on Missing Persons
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From Ukraine, to Gaza and Sudan, accounting for the missing and gathering evidence for future war crimes trials are an essential element in restoring the rule of law and laying the foundations for long-term peace, writes the director-general of the International Commission on Missing Persons.
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[
"EU & the World",
"Africa",
"Ukraine",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2024-08-30T07:45:36.459Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar02fecaeb
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EU among top spenders on ineffective ‘climate solutions’
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EU countries rank high among wealthy countries that spend billions of public money on so-called 'climate solutions' that "consistently fail, overspend, or underperform," new analysis by research and advocacy group Oil Change International (OCI) suggests . The report focuses on Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and fossil hydrogen. CCS involves capturing emissions at the source, a technology heavily promoted by gas and oil companies as a way to continue burning fossil fuels. However, according to the report's authors, despite many decades of research and global public subsidies worth $30bn [€27bn] in the past 40 years, the technology has "failed to make a dent in carbon emissions." First, the money: since the first test projects came online in 1984, 80 percent have failed due to technical issues, cost overruns, and a lack of financial return. Of the projects that have received government funding — almost all of which were awarded after 2008 — 45 percent were spent on projects that are no longer operational today. The US tops the list with $12bn in CCS and hydrogen subsidies. Norway comes in at $6bn, Canada at $3.8bn, the EU itself spent $3.6bn, and the Netherlands at $2.6bn, according to the research. Together, these four make up 95 percent of all carbon capture and hydrogen subsidies. Now, the second question is: how effective is the technology in the first place? Here the data compiled by OCI is perhaps even more damning. The annual capacity of global carbon capture projects today is 51 million metric tons. This is slightly over 0.1 percent of annual global emissions. More problematic is that after many decades of research, the technology still doesn't come close to working as advertised. While the industry claims carbon capture can capture 95 percent of emissions, the US-based Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis ( IEEFA ) found that real-world performance is much lower. No plant has captured more than 80 percent. In some cases, the figure is much lower, dropping to just 10 percent with the carbon sequestration technology used at one plant. Another recent example is Shell's Quest project in Alberta, Canada. This project captures CO2 from producing hydrogen used to refine tar sands oil, which is a very energy-intensive and polluting process. For this it has received over $600m. But results have been disappointing, with only 68-percent of emissions captured. Despite this, Greenpeace recently revealed that the oil and gas giant earned an additional €130m on the project through a carbon credit deal with the Albertan government. The subsidies will "prolong fossil-fuel extraction and enhance the industry's profits" and, in the years to come, "divert away research and investment" from proven alternatives, such as batteries, wind and solar, OCI argues. Yet oil majors such as Shell and Exxon say more investment is needed to develop CCS, and governments seem to have listened. OCI tracks between $114bn and $237bn in available public new funds announced since 2020, most of which will come from the US, Canada, and European countries. "We need real climate action, not fossil fuel bailouts" said OCI on social media.
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Wester is a journalist from the Netherlands with a focus on the green economy. He joined EUobserver in September 2021. Previously he was editor-in-chief of Vice, Motherboard, a science-based website, and climate economy journalist for The Correspondent.
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EU countries rank high among the wealthy countries that spend billions of public money on so-called 'climate solutions' that "consistently fail, overspend, or underperform", according to a new analysis. Prime among them is carbon capture and storage.
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[
"Green Economy"
] |
green-economy
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2024-08-30T07:15:35.666Z
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https://euobserver.com/green-economy/arfe1ac3fa
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Europe's Indentitarian Movement — old fascism in new clothes
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On Wednesday (28 August), German broadcaster RTL screened coverage obtained through investigative documentation into one of Europe’s growing and popular rightwing extremist movements, the Identitarian movement. The Identitarian movement has become the main representative of what has been called the 'New Right'. The term New Right was originally coined in France to describe a reaction against the leftwing student protests of the 1960s, and has now evolved into a rightwing movement that aims to connect far-right extremism with democratic legitimacy. Most political parties from France’s National Rally to the Alternative for Germany and the Freedom Party of Austria can be seen as part of the New Right, an attempt to sell old fascist parties in new clothes, to pretend a break with the Nazi ideology and the embrace of democratic values. While those parties have become successful players in the parliamentary arena — with some of them even participating in local and national governments — the Identitarian Movement has become the main operator on the street, far away from official statements made in the public. For them, immigration from Africa to Europe is a “great migration, the exodus, and the 'Great Replacement.' They have been pushing for years, becoming more palatable and even recognised, so that far-right political parties could pick up their supporters, once the first wave of scandals is over and rightwing positions have become normalized. But to believe that these fascist tendencies are done is a wishful thinking. Sometimes, they lurk behind well-versed statements and come to the forefront. While it helps the Identitarian movement not to operate as a public body anymore but rather as a loose social movement, its most famous spokesperson, the Austrian Martin Sellner, had to go through legal proceedings after having received funds from the perpetrator of the New Zealand Christchurch attack on two mosques that killed 51 Muslims. And now it's happened again happened — with the investigative piece broadcast by RTL Germany, where the genocidal ideas of the far-right are being exposed. The group of journalists from Germany traveled throughout Germany and Austria, where it met with activists from the Identitarian movement including some with official positions in political parties such as the Alternative for Germany. In private conversations, they would be much more open than in the general public. Holocaust-denial and neo-Nazi symbols The RTL broadcast undercover footage from a party in Vienna where individuals made extreme and hateful statements, including Holocaust denial, glorification of genocide, and references to neo-Nazi symbols. One visitor made remarks about the Holocaust, stating: “It wasn't six million Jews. At most, 175,000 Jews were gassed. I think it's great that it happened, to be honest.” The participant continued: “Germany needs a Srebrenica 2.0,” meaning a genocide of Muslims, adding “1995 was Srebrenica, the genocide of Muslims. That was very cool.” During the war in ex-Yugoslavia in 1995, about 8,000 Muslim men and boys were killed in a massacre in Srebrenica. The International Court of Justice classified the massacre as genocide in 2007, and the UN introduced an official remembrance day for the genocide only this year. Another participant at the party commented on the number of victims: “8888 victims, supposedly. It would be cool if there were that many.” The number 88 is a known far-right code, referring to the eighth letter of the alphabet, H, which serves as an abbreviation for the Hitler salute of “Heil Hitler.” Old fascism in new clothes What could be witnessed during these undercover gatherings is a confirmation of the worst scenario of how to view the Identitarian movement: old fascism in new clothes. But why is this even relevant? Martin Sellner, the unofficial spokesperson of the Identitarian movement, is not only leading the far-right on the streets. He is also well connected with those of the far-right seeking power. Another investigat ion in the autumn of 2023 showed that Sellner was the main speaker of a closed meeting discussing what he called “remigration,” the deportation of people of coluor with German citizenship through legal means. Make their lives unbearable by putting pressure of assimilation was his main idea. The former head of Germany’s intelligence service was supposed to work out the details. The revelations of that meeting led to millions of Germans pouring out onto the streets to protest the far-right. Meanwhile, befriended parties like the Freedom Party of Austria have openly called for a European Commissioner for Remigration , which is just one example of what becomes palatable following a first shock. Party leaders of the New Right, such as Herbert Kickl, whose FPÖ is currently leading in the polls after having won the elections for the European Parliament in Austria, is openly calling the Identitarian movement an “interesting project to be supported,” comparing it to Greenpeace, but “right.” Farid Hafez is a senior researcher with Georgetown University ’s The Bridge Initiative , which tracks political Islamophobia, in Washington D.C. Farid Hafez is a senior researcher with Georgetown University ’s
|
The Bridge Initiative
|
A group of journalists traveled throughout Germany and Austria, where it met with activists from the Identitarian movement, including some with official positions in political parties such as the Alternative for Germany. In private conversations, they would be much more open than in public.
|
[
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-political
|
2024-08-29T07:04:05.376Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar824d9c24
|
The silent nightmare of Balkan depopulation
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There is a silent nightmare taking place in the Balkans, with large-scale emigration plus by a low birth rate. Serbia and Albania have lost over half a million people since 2014, Bosnia and Herzegovina is expected to lose half of its manpower by 2050 (more than during the 1990 wars), and Croatia losing more than one million citizens since 1990. EU membership brings many benefits, ranging from democratisation, the rule of law, the protection of minorities and the freedom of speech. One thing the low-income countries currently in, or aiming to join, the EU had not anticipated was large-scale migration. The Balkans has been the epicentre of relentless wars and ethnic cleansing — but there is nothing of greater threat than a continually-shrinking population, fuelled by low birth rates, massive emigration and an increasingly unattractive market for foreign investment. The reasons for leaving? The Balkans has always been a source of emigration, and that is not new, with many at different times fleeing wars, poverty, or simply in pursuit of better opportunities. In the 1960s and 1970s, Yugoslav leaders even authorised men to migrate to Germany and Austria as 'Gastarbeiter' [foreign workers]. Mass emigration followed quickly upon the collapse of communism in Albania. For relatively small countries lacking natural resources, migration was often viewed as the best option to relieve the burden of overpopulation. What has made the current situation a time-bomb is a vastly lower birth rate and absence of a policy by the government to tackle the issue. The region has never caught up with a real market economy. Most of the politicians have geared up their economy to enrich themselves or their friends' circle, leaving limited and few chances for the people. Whilst corruption and nepotism has been a prevailing factor in awarding government jobs, low salaries in many privately-run enterprises was a crucial element in making them unattractive to local or foreign immigrants. Because of the small size of these countries, they are unable to draw sufficient foreign investments or large companies that can offer a well-paid salary. Despite the fact all the national governments recognise the problem, they have hardly taken any action. Aside from some restraints on healthcare worker s, other professions are hard to restrain — and even for healthcare it's only a postponement . To complicate the situation, virtually everybody can easily travel from the Balkan countries to richer countries such as Austria, Italy, Germany or the Benelux countries. Equipped with fairly good language knowledge, finding a job and relocating to another country offering better pay or greater opportunities is easy. On the other hand, the Balkans countries are not able to bring enough foreign labour to compensate for those who left, in contrast for example to Poland, which attracted 1.3-1.5 million Ukrainians (before the 2022 war started) as workers in different sectors. The mass emigration of young, well-educated people deprives the home country of labour, in addition to the problem of the ageing population and sufficient funds to maintain the pension system. IT, tourism, healthcare Virtually every sector suffers from emigration, but in particular, these three: since almost every job is related to technology, many of the companies in the region cannot find IT experts . The salaries offered by Croatian companies are far below what the German companies can offer, apart from social and health security. Tourism was the second sector to suffer from the mass exodus. Although only at their busiest for three to four months of the year, but crucial for the economic growth of almost all countries in the region, many supermarkets , hotels , restaurants and bars have difficulties finding the necessary staff . Until recently, it wasn't difficult for hotels located near the coast to recruit Albanians from the smaller towns to work for three to four months or to employ teenagers or students during their summer holidays. In the tourism sector, however, they are now moving to better countries. The primary destination is Croatia , where the tourist season is longer and the salary is higher. The third sector is healthcare, while some steps have been taken to curb emigration, but these will most probably only postpone the problem but not solve it. By 2023, it was reported than 3,500 doctors and nurse s had left Albania for Germany. This is a nightmare for Albania. An ageing population, which logically requires more medical care compared to younger people, a large-scale emigration of doctors and fewer young people studying medicine, will inevitably increase the hospital waiting lists. While Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia lost population after joining the EU, Moldova, Albania and North Macedonia have already lost population before joining the EU. Can the governments tackle the problem with higher pay, improved healthcare or better services? Why are young people migrating? Can the government do anything to stop them? Those are some of the most difficult questions to answer. People migrate for a variety of reasons, and pay is certainly one of them, plus the much higher standard of living in western Europe. Most people leave to settle in a non-corrupt society with improved health and welfare, a rule-based society, without nepotism or corruption . As young people tend to travel more extensively and have the skills required, they often see more opportunities for both themselves and their families in a democratic society. This migration therefore relates a lot to financial and monetary aspects, but also to the hope of a better and more secure future. For the regional governments, the path forward is to switch from a combination of a stabilitocracy and authoritarian policies to a democratically-organised society. Dr Rigels Lenja is a journalist, columnist and historian specialising in east and southeast European Modern History. His research has focused on dictatorship, modern warfare, democracy and modern religion in the Balkan countries.
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Dr Rigels Lenja
|
There is a silent nightmare taking place in the Balkans, with large-scale emigration plus by a low birth rate. Serbia and Albania have lost over half a million people since 2014, Bosnia and Herzegovina is expected to lose half of its manpower by 2050 (more than during the 1990 wars), and Croatia losing more than one million citizens since 1990.
|
[
"EU Political",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-political
|
2024-08-20T06:37:24.827Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar8e14dd8e
|
Time for the EU to push back on religious freedoms in Pakistan
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Last week (14 August) 2024, marked the 77th anniversary of Pakistan’s independence following the termination of the British Raj. Politician and founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, demanded a homeland for Muslims, which was ultimately achieved with Pakistan’s formation. While Pakistan celebrates its independence, it's crucial to reflect on the rights and freedoms of all its citizens. Unfortunately, the reality for many minorities in Pakistan is far from celebratory. Over the years, reports from various international human rights organizations have highlighted systematic discrimination and persecution faced by religious and ethnic minority communities, including Sindhis, Baloch, Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, Ahmadiyya Muslims, and others. Many of the human rights violations that occur in Pakistan stem from a strong religious intolerance within the population. Pakistan, with 97 percent of its citizens being Muslim, has declared Islam to be the official state religion. Religious minorities in Pakistan face harsh religious laws and discrimination. Blasphemy still on the books Most notably, its blasphemy law states that any derogatory remarks about the prophet Muhammed will be punished with death or imprisonment for life. Since Pakistan’s independence, at least 1,500 people have been officially accused of blasphemy. Even though none have been sentenced to death, over 90 of these civilians were extrajudicially killed after their accusation. Many others were imprisoned without a trial. The blasphemy law has also created a situation of lawlessness around blasphemy allegations as they have often been used to settle personal vendettas. This has led to many arbitrary detentions, such as those of Shagufta Kausar and Shafqat Emmanuel, a Christian-Pakistani couple who were accused of sending blasphemous text messages in 2014, despite both being illiterate. Additionally, blasphemy allegations have turned into violence against religious minorities. In August 2023, following a blasphemy allegation, a mob attacked a Christian neighbourhood in the town of Jaranwala, where several houses and churches were burnt down as a result. More recently, Nazir Gill Masih, a Christian shoe factory owner, died in a mob attack against his home on 25 May 2024. The religious discrimination in Pakistan permeates many aspects of life. Christians, typically situated in the lowest socio-economic strata, often find themselves relegated to menial sanitation roles. Particularly vulnerable are girls from religious minority backgrounds, who frequently encounter early barriers to education due to discriminatory practices. They suffer disproportionately from malnutrition, have lower school attendance rates, and struggle with higher illiteracy levels compared to their Muslim counterparts. These girls also endure relentless pressure to convert to Islam, exposing them to the risks of forced conversions and premature marriages — phenomena increasingly prevalent in recent years. Despite Pakistan's constitutional commitment to safeguarding minority rights, ethnic groups like the Baloch and Sindh face systemic oppression from state and military apparatuses, due to their regional interests and aspirations for autonomy. The government's heavy-handed response to dissent further exacerbates the situation, resulting in enforced disappearances. In 2023 alone, over 500 ethnic Baloch individuals vanished under suspicious circumstances, a trend also found in Sindh. Pakistan's government routinely suppresses and eliminates ethnic minorities and dissenters without due process, thereby violating both human rights principles and the nation's own constitutional mandates. GSP+ preference Currently, Pakistan has privileged access to the EU market with the Generalized Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+), dependent upon its adherence to international conventions, including those concerning minority rights. As a beneficiary, Pakistan's compliance with these standards is supposedly crucial for maintaining its trade benefits. And yet, the rights of the Sindhi, Baloch, Christians, and other minorities are continuously violated with little to no consequences. Time and time again, human rights activists and defenders from the communities, as well as members of the international community, have called for attention and accountability in Pakistan. It is time the EU takes action and demands Pakistan's adherence to these conditions as the EU has the authority to suspend or withdraw GSP+ privileges in case of serious violations. By leveraging its trade relationship, the EU can incentivise reforms and improvements in the treatment of minority communities, aligning with its values of human rights and contributing to Pakistan's inclusive development. Global Human Rights Defence calls on the EU and the international community to stress Pakistan’s commitment to upholding the principles of equality, justice, and pluralism upon which the country was founded. Though its founder Muhammad Jinnah established the country as a homeland for Muslims, he also believed in the freedom of minorities, as he stated in his 1947 speech: "You may belong to any religion or caste or creed — that has nothing to do with the business of the state ... We are starting with this fundamental principle: that we are all citizens, and equal citizens of one state." Let us remind Pakistan of its founding aspiration to create a country where every citizen, regardless of their religious or ethnic identity, can live with dignity, freedom, and respect. Jessica Schwarz and Abe Moedt of Global Human Rights Defence . Jessica Schwarz and Abe Moedt of
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Global Human Rights Defence
|
As Pakistan celebrates 77 years of independence, is time the EU takes action and demands Pakistan's adherence to human rights conditions — as the EU has the authority to suspend or withdraw Islamabad's favourable trading privileges in case of serious violations.
|
[
"EU & the World",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2024-08-19T06:21:01.780Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar1804e718
|
EU's carbon border tax will hurt developing country SMEs
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The EU prides itself in its progressive values, including its commitment to sustainable development. However, its incoming deforestation regulation and carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) disproportionately burden developing countries–and within them, smaller and medium sized companies (SMEs) in particular. As part of the European Green Deal, CBAM — a tariff on carbon-intensive imports — will fully take effect in 2026. Ideally, the mechanism will help to drive corporate investment into decarbonisation in the EU’s trade partners. But financial incentives to boost corporate investment, or for developing countries to mitigate and adapt to climate change, remain limited. Companies on the receiving end therefore face challenges in complying with the rules. Indian steel Indian steel producers are some of the most at risk companies to the CBAM. India is a significant exporter of steel to the EU and Indian steel production is largely reliant on coal — a carbon-intensive fuel source. Within India, large industrial conglomerates are much better placed to deal with the EU’s green regulations. Tata Steel, a subsidiary of the Tata Group and one of the biggest players in the steel sector, already has production facilities in Europe and has described the CBAM as “an opportunity”. That large industrial companies are taking steps to green their heavy carbon emitting activities in order to remain competitive is a positive development — but the opportunity to do so is not equally accessible to all. Tata Steel (whose total revenue amounted to $28bn [€25.5bn] in the 2023 fiscal year) has the resources to invest in and comply with CBAM regulations, while smaller and medium sized companies (SMEs) — particularly in developing countries — will have a much harder time and are unlikely to view CBAM in opportunistic terms. Bigger companies are able to take advantage of economies of scale when it comes to regulation and financing that smaller companies are not afforded. According to a UN study, 79 percent of SMEs surveyed in South-East Asia acknowledged the need to acquire new technical skills to effectively deal with climate change and leverage existing climate mitigation opportunities. Failure to comply with compliance requirements could in turn result in the exclusion of SMEs from global supply chains and trade. Deforestation Similarly, the EU’s incoming deforestation regulation is likely to hinder access to the EU market for small-holder farmers producing commodities including cocoa, coffee, and palm oil from countries like Indonesia, Ethiopia and Vietnam. The EU recognises the importance of protecting its own SMEs — the re-elected EU Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, has highlighted helping European SMEs scale up and fully leverage the EU single market as part of the next commission's agenda. Indeed, SMEs help to boost competition in what can otherwise be industries dominated by a few large players. They are also more likely to have localised operations and to invest in local communities compared to larger corporations. The impact of CBAM and the deforestation regulation on smallholder farmers and SMEs in developing countries adds fire to perceptions that these are unilateral measures imposed by Western countries —instead of being part of a globally negotiated solution to a critical issue. Criticism of the regulations has built up — even from the US–the country whose companies are probably best placed to deal with the new rules. In June Gina Raimondo and Thomas Vilsack, the US secretaries of commerce and agriculture, and trade envoy Katherine Tai called on the EU to delay the deforestation legislation, which was set to come into effect in December 2024, over fears that it will hurt American producers. If American producers are afraid, then consider how SMEs or smallholder farmers in Indonesia are faring. The new commission should give some greater consideration to how its climate regulations and development policies might be combined to take into account the unique challenges and vulnerabilities faced by developing countries. Frances Li is a Europe analyst at the Economist Intelligence Unit . Frances Li is a Europe analyst at the
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Economist Intelligence Unit
|
The impact of the carbon border levy and the deforestation regulation on smallholder farmers and SMEs in developing countries adds fire to perceptions that these are unilateral measures imposed by Western countries — instead of being part of a globally-negotiated solution to a critical issue
|
[
"EU & the World",
"Africa",
"Green Economy",
"Opinion"
] |
*
|
2024-08-16T06:32:25.152Z
|
https://euobserver.com/*/ar6d69cded
|
Bulgaria's eurozone accession problems mount
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Despite receiving a commendation from eurozone leaders for its progress back in March, Bulgaria's political stalemate has further delayed its eurozone entry — now only expected in 2026 due to ongoing instability and inability of Bulgaria to meet the required criteria. While the entry was originally targeted in January 2024, Bulgaria's high inflation led to a postponement to 2025 to allow time for economic stabilisation. However, the political crisis has intensified, as the country heads toward its seventh election in three years, following the failure of three different political parties, including the populist There Is Such a People party to form a stable government. The political crisis is compounded by other significant challenges. Bulgaria, currently the European Union's poorest nation based on GDP per capita , remains one of the lowest-ranked EU nations in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), reflecting persistent corruption issues. Additionally, Bulgaria struggles with institutional weaknesses and low innovation, as evidenced by its performance on the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI). Senegal, Ghana, Jordan...Bulgaria Moreover, low scores on the Rule of Law Index highlights ongoing concerns about judicial independence and law enforcement effectiveness. In terms of the rule of law, Bulgaria ranks similarly to countries like Senegal, Ghana, and Jordan. These challenges highlight Bulgaria's significant and ongoing difficulties in fully aligning with EU standards. Given that former prime minister Boyko Borissov and sanctioned media mogul Delyan Peevski remain influential figures, it's unsurprising that Bulgaria finds itself in this situation, raising questions about the country's democratic development. Despite deep frustration and anger over corruption, which sparked massive anti-mafia protests in 2020 , reformers in Bulgaria face significant challenges. Both the GERB (the Borissov party dominating Bulgarian political landscape for the last 15 years) and the DPS (the Turkish minority party in which Peevski has recently tried to extend its influence) parties maintain strong support through clientelism networks, regional strongholds, and the influence of local officials, where many feel their livelihoods are tied to party loyalty. This entrenched system complicates efforts to bring meaningful change, as these parties can reliably mobilise their voting bases. A traditional counter-power, the Bulgarian press is largely controlled by Peevski, an individual listed under the Magnitsky Act due to his controversial role in Bulgarian politics, including running bribery schemes and exerting control over key Bulgarian institutions and sectors. The UK's sanctions against him under the Global Anti-Corruption Regulations 2021 echo these concerns. The roles held by these individual and organisations and the sanctions adopted against them, and in turn Bulgaria, highlight the urgent need for transparency and accountability within the country. Moreover, they emphasise the international community's commitment to combating corruption, reinforcing the importance of reforming Bulgaria's political and economic systems to meet eurozone standards. These ongoing issues have significantly delayed the essential reforms needed for Bulgaria's eurozone integration, pushing the potential entry date to 2026 at the earliest. Experts from Scope Ratings have pointed out that the primary reasons for this delay are the country's persistent high inflation, which despite efforts to reduce it remains above the top three performing EU countries, and ongoing political instability, resulting from the confrontation between forces pushing for modernity and higher standards and the old guard incarnated by Borrissov and Peevski fighting for the corrupt status quo. Russian disinfo Russian disinformation has also played a role in Bulgaria's delayed eurozone entry. Various analysts have noted that misinformation campaigns, particularly those funded by Russian interests, have been used to create doubt and scepticism about the benefits of adopting the euro. These campaigns have negatively influenced public opinion, making it more challenging for the government to secure the necessary support for the transition to the eurozone, further complicating Bulgaria's path toward meeting the criteria for membership. The disinformation campaigns typically focus on exaggerating the potential risks of adopting the euro, such as fears of price increases or loss of economic sovereignty, which can delay political and public support needed for the transition. As Bulgaria faces yet another snap election, the ongoing uncertainty continues to cast doubt on the nation's future within the European monetary union. The deadlock not only threatens Bulgaria's Eurozone timeline but also its broader economic goals. Without decisive action, the window for adopting the euro in the planned timeframe could close, potentially pushing the country’s entry back by several years. This situation reflects a broader challenge facing Bulgaria — a nation striving to align with EU standards while grappling with deep-seated political divisions that continue to impede progress. Blaga Thavard is a lawyer at Pappas & Associates in Brussels and a member of the Sofia Bar Association.
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Blaga Thavard
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The timeline for Bulgaria’s journey toward eurozone membership has already slipped from January 2024 to sometime in 2026, with obstacles including the country's own political fragility — the nation is grappling with elections for seventh time in three years, a revolving door of governments, high inflation and targeted disinformation campaigns.
|
[
"Rule of Law",
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] |
rule-of-law
|
2024-08-13T06:03:06.515Z
|
https://euobserver.com/rule-of-law/are1757c31
|
Time for an EU commissioner for animal welfare
|
The coming weeks are crucial to ensuring that the EU Commission’s plans and priorities for the next five years respond to the hopes and expectations of Europeans in many policy areas, including that of animal welfare — which is very popular among citizens but too often neglected by their institutions. Eurobarometer and other surveys consistently show that animal welfare is very important to a majority of EU citizens, who want to see improvements in the way animals are treated. The new EU Commission that is taking shape in this period should no longer allow a lack of resources or clarity to affect the enforcement of – and necessary improvements to – existing legislation, as well as the promotion of higher welfare standards among our trading partners. Things are getting worse. Why? 25 years ago, the EU banned conventional battery cages for laying hens. This happened at the end of a decade in which important pieces of legislation were approved, greatly improving the treatment of billions of animals by phasing out some farming systems and practices that were inherently incompatible with animal welfare. It was a period in which the EU institutions were listening to their citizens and to sound science, rather than allowing progress to be hindered by niche private sectorial interests. Since then, progress has slowed down – and often halted altogether. Increasingly, we have seen it replaced by ambitious statements that have rarely been followed by significant action. This is both because inadequate resources have been directed towards animal welfare and because there has been a lack of clear institutional responsibility, which has also resulted in poor transparency and accountability. As a result, billions of animals have continued to endure easily avoidable suffering. In recent months, the previous commission even postponed the delivery of the long-overdue revision of the animal welfare legislation, including the ban on cages. This has not only impacted countless animals but has also meant that the demands of EU citizens for improvements in the way animals are treated have been blatantly ignored. Europeans want an EU commissioner for animal welfare An Ipsos survey of June 2024 confirmed that 70 percent of Europeans want an EU commissioner for animal welfare . This survey was commissioned in the light of the key demand of the #EUforAnimals campaign, promoted by the Belgian animal welfare organisation GAIA , which aims to provide a concrete response to the low ambition on animal welfare currently being shown by the EU institutions. Over 309,000 citizens, 208 MEPs in the 2019-24 term of the parliament, and around 100 MEPs in the 2024-29 term have already joined the #EUforAnimals campaign , asking for this responsibility to be made explicit in the name of the relevant Directorate-General and the job title of the competent EU Commissioner. In the present context, the Commissioner’s responsibility would become for “Health, Food Safety What do MEPs think? In 2022, the European Parliament’s recommendation based on the final report of the Enquiry Committee on live animal transport (ANIT) stated "that a clearer and more explicit responsibility for animal welfare in the EU institutions would be of great importance to improve the enforcement of existing legislation on animal welfare, the identification of relevant gaps, and the elaboration of proposals needed to provide effective responses when necessary”. It also called for the “responsibility for animal welfare to be made explicit in the title of the relevant EU Commissioner and the name of the relevant Commission Directorate-General in order to reflect the significance of this issue for European citizens and ensure that enough political attention is accorded to it”. Animal welfare will not be adequately protected in the EU unless it is managed in a different way from the past. Now is the time to deliver this much-needed change. Currently, Animal Welfare is only mentioned in the name of a single unit of DG SANTE, under Directorate G: “Crisis Preparedness in Food, Animals and Plants”. The absurdity of this situation is evident. This is why we are deeply concerned that, in the first announcements made by President-elect Ursula von der Leyen regarding changes that she wants to implement in the new EU Commission, she did not include the transformation of DG SANTE into a DG for “Health, Food Safety ”. Ursula von der Leyen can make history on animal welfare Of course, this change is still possible, and we hope that Ms von der Leyen will want to move on from the current situation in which, as European citizens, we continually hear our institutions say that animal welfare matters but then do not see those statements transformed into concrete action. This situation is no longer justifiable – if it ever was. EU commission president von der Leyen has in front of her a call from more than 60 national and international organisations that are behind the #EUforAnimals campaign, as well as over 300,000 citizens, hundreds of MEPs and, according to the Ipsos survey, 70% of Europeans. They should not be ignored. It is imperative that animal welfare be given a higher profile in the new Commission, by proposing that the responsibility of the SANTE commissioner should become for “Health, Food Safety and Animal Welfare”. This would demonstrate a real commitment to improving animal welfare in the EU and worldwide. It would also show Europeans citizens that their institutions care for animals as much as they do. Adolfo Sansolini has successfully led campaigns at the national and international level and coordinated international coalitions. Presently, among other commitments, he is the coordinator of the #EUforAnimals campaign on behalf of the Belgian animal welfare organisation GAIA . Adolfo Sansolini has successfully led campaigns at the national and international level and coordinated international coalitions. Presently, among other commitments, he is the coordinator of the #EUforAnimals campaign on behalf of the Belgian animal welfare organisation
|
GAIA
|
Animal welfare will not be adequately protected in the EU unless it is managed in a different way from the past. Now is the time to deliver a much needed change: an EU commissioner for animal welfare.
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[
"Health & Society"
] |
health-and-society
|
2024-08-08T05:49:15.158Z
|
https://euobserver.com/health-and-society/ar2cab72be
|
Gift away: Supporting members can now gift EUobserver articles
|
Last week, we quietly released a new feature for EUobserver 's supporting members: gift articles. It works just like gift articles from the New York Times, Financial Times and The Atlantic. If you're a supporting (ie, paying) member of EUobserver, you can click the little gift icon at the top an article. This copies over a unique URL to your clipboard, which you can then share with your colleagues, friends, kids, partners or enemies, so they can read an article that's normally behind the paywall. Every supporting member gets to share up to 10 links per month, which can be read up to ten times each. These are just the initial parameters, we might still tweak them based on usage and member feedback (tell us what you think!). With this new feature, we hope to deliver a way for our members to introduce EUobserver content to more readers who might not yet know about us. Gift articles are just the first in a number of new features we'll be adding to the website in the coming months. For September, we've planned to release a dedicated page that will allow members and non-members to search our archives using search terms and filters to narrow down results. Also, we're working on a revamp of our daily newsletter to provide more context and highlight the articles you definitely should not miss. For fans of brevity: we won't be going to a Playbook-style newsletter, just a slightly updated look and feel that gives a little more of an idea of what we think is important and what to keep an extra eye on. If you have any ideas for features or improvements to our new-ish website, please email me at [email protected] to tell me – we value your input. Hope you're having a lovely summer. Alejandro Tauber is the publisher of EUobserver.
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Alejandro Tauber
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A (for us) new way of sharing our journalism with people who might not yet know about EUobserver — try it out.
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[
"Inside EUobserver"
] |
inside-euobserver
|
2024-08-06T08:35:46.926Z
|
https://euobserver.com/inside-euobserver/arb9123375
|
Poland's rightwing PiS was economically redistributive. Is that a lesson for the left?
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The last 15 years or so have seen a rise in support for far-right political forces across the Western world. Since June alone, elections for the European Parliament, the French National Assembly and the House of Commons in the UK revealed big gains for the Right. Many are deeply apprehensive about this trend due to the experiences from the 20th century. This, however, poses the question what, if anything, can be done to try to deal with this issue? Politically, the response across the Western world has been to adopt ever tightening anti-immigration measures. Arguably this has shifted politics in the West rightwards, normalising rhetoric and measures even by mainstream parties and actors, which in the past would have been deemed unacceptable. This has been accompanied by the establishment of a dominant view that values and identity are the key factors behind this surge of support for the far-right. Crucially, this has happened in an environment in which the Left, understood as the force that articulates political disagreements as seen through the prism of class struggle, thus emphasising the primacy of economic factors, has been at a historic low. In other words, despite the momentous crisis of capitalism triggered by the 2008 financial crash and its fall-out, this has not resulted in a renewed political challenge to the fundamental principles of the Western economic system. For left-leaning commentators and analysts, the rise of the far-right is ultimately a result of the absence of another political avenue for the expression of many people’s rightful frustrations with their stagnating and even deteriorating living standards. So, following this line of thought, a crucial way in which the rise of the far-right can be halted is by the implementation of measures which will redistribute wealth, so that the ordinary citizens’ standard of living can be improved, and inequality reduced. Syriza, Corbyn ... and the PiS? Examples of politically significant forces that could have had that effect in recent years include the election of Syriza in Greece at the end of 2014 or Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership of the UK Labour party. Ultimately, so far at least, such efforts from the left have been unsuccessful. This is why the Polish experience under the rightwing Law & Justice party (PiS) between 2015 and 2023 is all the more intriguing. More specifically, a key reason for PiS’ repeat electoral success is that it delivered on many of its social spending pledges, which meant that the party gained the trust of voters on socio-economic matters. One of its most popular programmes was the ‘500 plus’ that provided child subsidy; a programme that was extended during PiS’ second term in office. Contrary to the criticisms the PiS got for its socio-economic programmes as a strain on public finances, after its first term in office, economic growth was strong, unemployment was low, and due to increased tax revenues, there was in fact a reduction in the budget deficit. Crucially, despite PiS remaining the biggest political force after the 2023 elections, Poland is now led by a mainstream coalition, headed by Donald Tusk. A key reason for this outcome was that this time round an important coalition was mobilised against some of PiS’ other policies (i.e. anti-abortion, erosion of the rule of law). Nevertheless, some analysts have speculated that the PiS’ electoral performance may have ironically also been hampered by the success of its redistributive policies. More specifically, these policies could have created a small aspiring middle class less supportive of redistribution by pulling voters in some regional areas out of the PiS’ target socio-economic group . Arguably, this exposes the weaknesses in the dominant view that identity and values are behind the rise of support for the far-right, while suggesting that addressing economic hardship may be an important leverage in the struggle against the rise of the far-right. Perhaps the Polish experience isn’t so surprising if one takes into account research on the far-right supporters, which suggests that in distinction to its core supporters, who are motivated by cultural considerations, the numerically more significant support for the far-right comes from peripheral voters, whose key consideration is economic . Crucially, although the Polish experience by no means suggests that the far-right has become an insignificant political force, it arguably provides evidence that addressing the voters’ economic concerns could help reduce the support for the far-right at the ballot box. Valentina Kostadinova is a lecturer in politics at the department of economics and international studies at the University of Buckingham in England. Valentina Kostadinova is a lecturer in politics at the department of economics and international studies at the
|
University of Buckingham
|
For the Left, a crucial way in which the rise of the far-right can be halted is by the implementation of measures which will redistribute wealth, so that the ordinary citizens’ standard of living can be improved, and inequality reduced. Yet Poland's rightwing Law & Justice party already tried that.
|
[
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-political
|
2024-08-05T06:00:11.312Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar0a707e50
|
Lukashenko opens window of opportunity for Western influence
|
In recent weeks the Belarusian regime has been indicating that it does not feel comfortable in the situation in which it has found itself. Aleksandr Lukashenko, who on July 20 celebrated the 30th anniversary in power, reshuffled his team and appointed the new head of the presidential administration, the new minister of foreign affairs and the new ambassador to Russia. 19 political prisoners were released. The flow of migrants on the Belarusian-Polish border has decreased. Whereas the Belarusian ministry of foreign affairs signalled its readiness to start a dialogue with Poland, Lukashenko himself urged to find ways to restore cooperation with the EU. To the surprise and dissatisfaction of Moscow, Minsk introduced visa-free travel for citizens of 35 countries, including members of Nato and EU. Most importantly, Lukashenko withdrew additional troops from the border with Ukraine deployed there only weeks ago. Although most of these measures look externally oriented, the primary reason for taking them might well be domestic. Quite plausibly, we are witnessing preparations for a snap presidential election, which, according to the law, can be held any moment before 20 July 2025. The timing simply cannot be better for that. First, the geopolitical context is favourable. Relations with Russia are stable and predictable. What the Kremlin needs is Belarus’s territory, airspace and infrastructure, but not the troops, which are minuscule in the scale of Russia’s war against Ukraine. In turn, the West is currently approaching Belarus just as an extension of Russia. Western policymakers have neither a strategic vision for Belarus as an independent entity, nor interest in the country’s affairs. It took the EU nearly a year to design and adopt the latest package of sanctions against Belarus, but their focal point seems to be border restrictions, which affect ordinary Belarusians more than the regime. Second, Lukashenko has enlarged his domestic manoeuvring space. Massive repressions are not the only factor to be taken into consideration. While repressions did help to thwart domestic opposition and regain control, they could not restore the domestic legitimacy of the regime. To reach this goal, Lukashenko successfully instrumentalised and manipulated the societal fear to be directly involved into the war in Ukraine. The propaganda machinery constructed and spread the narrative of Belarus’s non-participation in the war being the regime’s achievement, simultaneously portraying the West as an aggressor. Third, the Belarusian opposition is not ready for the elections. Instead of re-establishing channels of communication with the people inside Belarus and explaining why their problems stem directly from Lukashenko’s assistance to Russia in its aggression against Ukraine, democratic forces abroad have been spending time and energy on internal power struggle and preserving their status in the West. The “travel diplomacy” of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the leader of the Belarusian opposition, and her multiple top-level meetings, however, did not help the émigré community to deal with bureaucratic problems they face daily, such as the renewal of passports or residence permits. Moreover, both the above-mentioned latest round of Western sanctions against Belarus and the unilateral release of the political prisoners further dent the credibility of the Belarusian opposition, which has made these issues the cornerstone of their agenda but in reality, can do little on both accounts. On a separate note, the regime in Minsk cannot take it for granted that its economic resources will remain the same a year from now and that the situation will not worsen considerably as a result of sanctions or Russia’s reluctance to maintain the current level of subsidies. This is another important reason to hold the elections ahead of schedule. Implicitly, Lukashenko’s campaign has already started. His recent demonstrations of the “peace-loving position” aim to anchor him as the only actor who can prevent the war’s coming to Belarus. Re-composition of the power vertical is intended to guarantee a problem-free election success. The new head of the presidential administration Dmitry Krutoy has already begun touring the country on Lukashenko’s assignment. The forthcoming presidential election in Belarus may be the final opportunity for the opposition and its partners in the West to reconnect with Belarusian society. Due to their anti-war position, Belarusian people are a natural ally of the West. Many of them demonstrated in 2020 that they care about Belarus’s future as a democracy. Yet, they now increasingly feel abandoned and having no choice but to go with what they consider to be a known evil. The West should not only be reminding the Belarusians of the dangers of Lukashenko’s course but show them an alternative. Belarusians should know what kind of an offer would be awaiting their country in case it starts economic and political reforms. The failure to do so will mean a continuation of the dictatorial rule in Belarus for now and a risk of internal destabilisation or annexation by Russia in the not-so-distant future.
|
Arkady Moshes serves as the director of Russia, the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood and Eurasia Research Programme, and Ryhor Nizhnikau is a senior researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA).
|
For the West, the forthcoming presidential election might be the last opportunity to engage with the Belarusian society.
|
[
"Opinion"
] |
opinion
|
2024-07-30T07:21:17.974Z
|
https://euobserver.com/opinion/arfa85b69c
|
US trade deficit: are the EU and China to blame? (No)
|
If Donald Trump manages to win the November US elections, one of his priorities appears to be to put an end to decades of trade deficit, for which he not only intends to target China with increased tariffs but also the EU. As he put it in his Bloomberg interview, ‘the European Union sounds so lovely. We love Scotland and Germany. We love all these places. But once you get past that, they treat us violently. But I was changing all of that and that culture. Return me to the White House and I’ll finish the job’. And he is also straightforward that Trumpnomics will mean tax cuts, more oil, less regulation, higher tariffs and fewer foreign financial commitments. But let’s begin with the concept. What is a trade deficit? The trade balance is the most relevant part of the current account balance and measures the exports and imports of goods and services of a country. A trade deficit means that the value of imports of a country exceeds that of exports, i.e. a country consumes more than it produces. For decades, the US trade balance was in equilibrium, but towards the end of the past century, deficits started to increase, reaching a record level of $945bn [€873bn] in 2022, which significantly decreased to $784bn in 2023. In nominal terms, the US trade deficit is the largest in the world. But there is a huge difference between goods and services: whereas the US balance of goods records a deficit (1.06 trillion in 2023), the balance of services is in surplus ($279bn in 2023). Therefore, the imbalance lies with goods. Country-wise, the largest US trade deficit is vis-à-vis China , hence the rhetoric emerged on the US side: in 2022, the US trade deficit with China accounted for more than $367bn, before moving to $287bn in 2023. The decrease in the US trade deficit with China in 2023 came together with a record trade deficit with Mexico ($152bn in 2023), testifying for the ‘nearshoring’ strategy of the US. US trade shortfalls also reached annual records with Germany ($83bn), South Korea ($51BN), Taiwan ($48BN), Italy ($44bn) and India ($43.6bn). The current account balance of a country is broadly equal to the financial account with an opposite sign. And the financial account of a country basically comprises foreign direct and portfolio investment. This means that the current account deficit of the US (owing to its balance of goods deficit) gives place to a financial account surplus, that is, to foreign direct and portfolio investment to their economy. It is no coincidence that for more than a decade, the US has been the top destination for inward foreign direct investment. This makes perfect sense since investments are needed to compensate for the additional consumption and investment of the public and private sectors. While it is true that China’s economic model is based on state-subsidised over-production, presumably with the intention to flood international markets with their artificially price-competitive products, it is not least true that the US trade deficit is mostly explained by its economic fundamentals. Indeed, economic theory shows that the current account balance of a country equals the differential between private savings and investments plus the differential between public income and public expenditure. The US has high levels of public deficit (i.e. a negative differential between public income and public expenditure), which according to the Congressional Budget Office , will remain above six percent of GDP by 2034. And Trump’s plans to cut taxes would only increase this figure. So if Trump aims to reduce the US trade deficit as well as to cut taxes, the only possible adjustment can come from the private sector, which would see its savings massively increase and investment decrease, with the subsequent impact on economic activity. There is an intrinsic contradiction in Trumpnomics: tariffs are a tax on imported products or services. So even if he cuts taxes, any tariff elevation will lead to the opposite effect, spurring inflation and damaging households’ purchasing power and companies’ performance. And this is under the assumption there would be no retaliatory measures from other jurisdictions, which could only worsen the situation of US households and companies and even the US sovereign or the dollar a world currency. In a nutshell, the US trade deficit is far from being the fault of the EU or China. It is the result of economic fundamentals and the rest of the world funding the US’s spending and investment activities, both private and public. While it is good to detect and counter any anticompetitive trade practices, one should be careful with the policies implemented, which could not only be detrimental to the EU and China but also to the US. It is also legitimate to want a shift in the productive model of an economy, but neither the initiation of a trade war nor expansionary fiscal and monetary policies seem the best recipe for the purpose. The US should not lose sight that China is, after Japan, the second largest foreign holder of its public debt, which is already above 100 percent of GDP and is expected to keep on increasing in the coming years. If a possible new Trump administration wants to set the record straight on trade policies, they’d better focus on reforming the World Trade Organization. Judith Arnal is a Spanish economist with the Real Instituto Elcano think-tank and the Centre for European Policy Studies . Judith Arnal is a Spanish economist with the Real Instituto Elcano think-tank and the
|
Centre for European Policy Studies
|
If a possible new Trump administration wants to set the record straight on trade policies, they’d better focus on reforming the World Trade Organization than on a trade war or expansionary fiscal and monetary policies.
|
[
"EU & the World",
"Green Economy"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2024-07-30T06:59:36.323Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar591fde06
|
Lonely in Venice
|
To say that Gustav von Aschenbach had a good summer in Venice would be a lie. The weather was hot and oppressive. He repeatedly wanted to leave, but could not. A pandemic was spreading, but the authorities were trying to cover it up. He discovered his forbidden love for a boy staying in the same hotel. And then he died. No, Thomas Mann's Death in Venice is not the prototype of a light holiday read. But is it worth opening one of the most celebrated novellas of the last century? It can be exhausting to wade through Mann's dense prose, which uses every possible excuse to leave the plot for reflections on philosophy or art, and to follow the story of the elderly professor (a thinly disguised Mann, like so many of his protagonists) who cannot take his eyes off the Polish boy Tadzio. If you found that last sentence to be a little convoluted, perhaps don’t open the Death in Venice (I recommend simpler Mann reading at the end). Also, the core of the story, an obsessive, forbidden love, may speak less to people in Europe today. Gay love no longer has the aura of social scandal that it did in 1912 (although love with a minor does). More relevant, I think, is another leitmotif of the novel: Loneliness. Von Aschenbach is very lonely. All the time. He talks to himself. He sits alone at breakfast. He sits alone on the beach. He eats by himself. He reads books and newspapers. He daydreams and dreams at night about Tadzio. His only conversations are brief exchanges with hotel receptionists, postmen, shipping agents. They are all about logistics. Last year Gallup reported that almost one in four people worldwide feel lonely or fairly lonely. And this is more about Tadzio than von Aschenbach - young people seem to be the most affected. One suspects that the measures to combat Covid have something to do with this. The World Health Organization warns of the health risks of loneliness and social isolation. One should of course not reduce loneliness to a problem. It can also be exhilarating, as Mann writes in the novella: “The observations and encounters of a solitary, taciturn man are vaguer and at the same times more intense than those of a sociable man; his thoughts are deeper, odder and never without a touch of sadness. Images and perceptions that could be dismissed with a glance, a laugh, an exchange of opinions, occupy him unduly, become more intense in the silence, become significant, become an experience, an adventure, an emotion. Solitude produces originality, bold and astonishing beauty, poetry. But solitude also produces perverseness, the disproportionate, the absurd and the forbidden.” That’s the message I want to share with you this holiday season. Don't be afraid to be on your own, to travel solo, to look at the world in silence. It’s often what we need to figure out where we stand. But we shouldn’t ignore the other side and also use the holidays to connect and reconnect. How do you find the right balance between the two? I’m not sure. Everyone must find out for themselves. And if you want to be alone and read books, I conclude with some tips on Thomas Mann. Reading Death in Venice is no pleasure because its style mirrors its substance. Its tone is as obsessive as von Aschenbach is obsessive. Instead, I recommend the (much longer) Magic Mountain. It has many connections to the Venice novella, but here people talk to each other. They discuss political philosophies in great detail. We live in a time where liberalism and human rights are under attack from many sides. These attacks are often cheap and merely hide the self-interests of authoritarian politicians. But not always. Read The Magic Mountain to gain a deeper understanding of extremist political ideologies (and you get a love story, an astonishing chapter on getting lost in a snowstorm and a lot of irony on top). If you like it short, I recommend Mario and the Magician. This novella is about the ascent of Italian fascism and the fascination with authoritarian leaders. Yes, that’s topical as well. Or, if you like it lighter: Disorder and Early Sorrow, a lovely novella with a fine description of a child’s emotions, set in the context of the chaos engulfing the household of a respectable professor in Germany’s hyper-inflation of 1923. I end with the most obvious Thomas Mann tip. The novel earned him the Nobel Prize for literature. He finished at the age of twenty-five. The renowned publisher Samuel Fischer refused the manuscript. Too long, too long-wound, he complained. Could Mann reduce it by half? The largely unpublished Mann replied that the 1,100 pages were worth it. He would not delete a sentence. Fischer relented and the rest is history. The Buddenbrooks is the most accessible of Mann’s novels. Philosophical thoughts are baked into the story line, rather than presented as long diversions. The book has colour and life and Mann’s characteristic irony is at full display. It is an excellent read and it will not make you feel lonely. Michael Meyer-Resende is the executive director of
|
Democracy Reporting International
|
Death in Venice is not the prototype of a light holiday read. But is it worth opening one of the most celebrated novellas of the last century?
|
[
"Opinion"
] |
opinion
|
2024-07-29T07:22:30.944Z
|
https://euobserver.com/opinion/arc8e2a7c2
|
How a Slovak priest, Russian bikers, and a Polish lobbyist fuelled anti-LGBTI hate
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Ahead of the snap parliamentary elections in September 2023, the topic of LGBTI rights was heavily utilised in Slovakia as a political tool. The current prime minister Robert Fico mocked opponent Michal Šimečka, head of the liberal party, by questioning whether he would "identify as a boy, a girl, or a helicopter" in a social media campaign . Recently in July 2024, Fico referred to LGBTI rights in a speech , stating: "These harmful and nonsensical progressive and liberal ideologies [referring to the right to same-sex marriage] are spreading like cancer." According to opinion polls conducted by the Slovak think-tank Globsec in 2020 , 2023 and 2024 , only about a “third” of Slovak respondents agreed that LGBTI rights, such as the right to marriage, should be guaranteed. This figure consistently polls far below the rest of the Visegrad Four countries. Actors spreading anti-LGBTI and anti-gender disinfo narratives Among the actors spreading anti-LGBTI and anti-gender disinformation narratives is Catholic priest Marián Kuffa. In an interview published on 23 September 2023, one week before the parliamentary elections, Kuffa stated: "gender ideology is a genocide of our [Slovak] nation" and "gender and civil unions are a scheme to decrease population." The interview was shared over 5,500 times and garnered 250,000 views on Facebook. Kuffa urged voters to reject liberal parties, even condemning the Christian Democratic Party (KDH) for potentially allowing liberals into the government. In Poland, similar attempts to dehumanise the LGBTI community were made by Kaja Godek, a pro-life activist and founder of (Life and Family Foundation). In August 2023, two months before the parliamentary elections, the foundation's official Facebook page commented that the LGBTI pride march in Częstochowa city "insulted, profaned, and promoted perversions." Their website further claimed: "We showed children sexually abused by paederasts." Recently, in June, Godek stated on social media: "LGBTI people need psychiatric help." Political Links Kuffa, known for his homophobic rhetoric , has family ties to Slovakian politics. His brother Stefan Kuffa and nephew Filip Kuffa , who were MPs in 2020 for the far-right ĽSNS party, contested for the right-wing and pro-Russian Slovak National Party (SNS) in 2023 and were appointed as state secretaries at the environment ministry. Kuffa’s comments are an example of hateful disinformation, according to Roman Samotny, an activist and founder of Tepláreň, an LGBTI bar in Bratislava, outside of which two people were killed in October 2022. “By employing sophisticated manipulation tactics, Kuffa claims if LGBTI individuals are given equal rights, the nation or humanity will die because of it,” Samotny said. “Considering Kuffa’s close political ties with the far-right, this is quite an alarming statement that may influence voters to think of LGBTI as enemies of society," he said. Similarly, Godek has strong political ties with Konfederacja, a far-right political party in Poland. In 2019, she was placed at the top of Konfederacja's candidate list for the European Parliament elections, aligning the party with anti-LGBTI sentiments. Godek is known for her advocacy for the anti-LGBTI agenda, including stating a disinformation narrative that: (which means "gays want to adopt children because they want to molest and rape them") in May 2019. “These disinformation narratives paint a distorted picture of LGBTI describing them as outsiders manipulating local events,” said Monika Tichy, founder of Lambda Polska, a group supporting trans and queer across Poland. Tichy added: “Godek, who is known for her political influence, accused queer activists of wanting to give dreadful gays and lesbians access to children so that they can abuse and rape them. These accusations are absolute lies." Narratives similar to Russian propaganda In September 2023, false claims about gender ideology and same-sex civil unions leading to population genocide emerged in Slovakia, mirroring earlier events in Russia. In Russia, State Duma senator Irina Filatova declared in May 2023: "Gender ideology should be recognized as extremism! There are only two sexes, and you are what you were born as!". Later that year, Russia's narrative of "gender ideology" unified the population against perceived Western threats. This narrative was adopted by Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church, who stated in 2024: "Gender ideology destroys the traditional institution of the family." In 2023, false narratives about sex education by LGBTI individuals with an attempt to adopt children and molest them emerged in Poland. Earlier in the same year, in Russia, the pro-government media outlet Tsargrad released a video claiming sex education lessons are being imposed and conducted by transgender individuals. Also, the narrative suggesting gay couples seek to adopt children for predatory purposes surfaced in Russia in 2020 in a campaign video , which was later banned by YouTube on the grounds of violating its policies regarding hate speech. Kremlin operatives Kuffa was interviewed by Matúš Alexa, founder of the pro-Russian motorcycle group, (Brother for Brother). Formally a civic association with an online shop selling merchandise with the letter “Z” and Russian slogans, the group promotes the idea of traditional family on its social media where it also shares content from the Russian embassy and other Russian sources en masse. Alexa often posts photos with the Russian ambassador and travels to Russia to attend cultural events , participate in the meetings with officials such as SVR’s head Sergey Narishkin , or observe elections in the occupied Crimea. Apart from Kuffa, Alexa also promoted other SNS members, such as Rudolf Huliak or Ivan Ševčík , on the motorcycle group channels two days before the elections where they made remarks about how liberals intended to “change sex in small children”. “Given that Brat za Brata has been linked to information operations run by the Russian embassy, it is a purposeful effort by a Russian influence agent in Slovakia,” said Victor Breiner, independent hybrid threats analyst. Breiner added: “Part of Russia's strategy in the EU is to cultivate a right-wing radical electorate which will then vote for parties that represent Russia's foreign policy interests. For this purpose, sexual minority rights are a welcome social phenomenon they can exploit to polarise society.” In Poland, Konfederacja has proven ties with Russia. Grzegorz Braun, one of the founders of Konfederacja, travelled to Russia in 2018 at the invitation and expense of a Kremlin-linked foundation. Braun also met a Russian journalist Leonid Swiridow, who was expelled from Poland in 2015 at the request of Polish Security Services. State-sponsored extremism According to public funds contracts , Kuffa receives funding from the Slovak state and the Presov region to run a charity centre called the Institute of Christ the Great in Žákovce, eastern Slovakia. Over the past 12 months, the institute has received over 1.3 million Euros through state contracts to run its dedicated social care centre, women’s shelter, senior home, and homeless shelter. Godek’s Foundation appeals for donations via quick contributions on its website but does not publish any financial information. The recent EU parliamentary elections held in June 2024 witnessed a rise in anti-LGBTI statements across Europe, according to a report by the advocacy group ILGA-Europe. Katrin Hugendubel, advocacy director of the group, said: “It is important to call out the actors spreading these disinformation narratives and reveal their playbook acts because these narratives feed into the anti-LGBTI sentiment. We need collective action to stop the spread of these lies.” Ronald Rodrigues is a freelance journalist based in Central Europe covering human rights violations, discrimination towards minorities, migration, and LGBTQIA+ rights with stories published in the BBC Future , The Copenhagen Post , Ms. Magazine , Foyer UK , and The Free Press Journal . Varvara Proj is a Russian journalist focusing on LGBTQIA+ rights, feminism, and dismantling Russian propaganda with works published for Feminist Anti-War Resistance , Sphere Queer , LGBT propaganda , and LGBT propaganda.media . Robert Barca is a digital investigative journalist from Slovakia focusing on fact-checking, digital verification, and OSINT at Agence France-Presse (AFP) Fact Check
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Anti-LGBTI disinformation narratives in Europe show similarities and connections to Russian propaganda
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[
"Investigations",
"Health & Society"
] |
investigations
|
2024-07-26T07:15:30.636Z
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https://euobserver.com/investigations/arcd805ac8
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How the ultra-right used homophobic disinfo in Czech and Hungarian elections
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When Zuzana Huszár, 29, returned home one evening in June 2024, after a long day of work at a queer safe space in Prague, Czech Republic, she found her partner agitated. Her partner, Tereza Misha, told her that she had been “shamed” on the streets and received “hateful comments” on her way back from work due to her queer appearance. Misha, 27, is one among the many from the LGBTI community who have experienced hate-motivated violence, including verbal, physical, and sexual attacks, which has increased from 11 percent in 2019 to 14 percent in 2023, according to the report published by the EU fundamental rights agency earlier this year. “This growing phenomenon of anti-LGBT hate speech in Europe is a result of disinformation narratives against LGBT+ spread by conservative actors and exploited for political gains by the far-right,” said Katrin Hugendubel, advocacy director of ILGA-Europe, an LGBTI advocacy group. Disinformation is defined as false or misleading content that is spread with an intention to deceive or secure economic or political gain and which may cause public harm, according to the European Commission Guidance . “It is an orchestrated attempt where local conservative groups work in unison with partners in neighbouring countries supported by funding or foreign influence to spread anti-LGBT disinformation,” Hugendubel said. A three-month multilateral investigation in the Visegrad four (V4) countries of Central Europe — Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland — revealed ultraconservative actors, linked to governments, far-right political parties and secretly funded NGOs, are spreading anti-LGBTI disinformation narratives to influence elections and, these narratives are similar to Russian propaganda. Aligned to official propaganda In the Czech Republic, a disinformation statement (Homosexual marriage will start the trade-in children) was issued by Jana Jochová, chairperson of the conservative organisation (AliPro) or Alliance for Family, on a public broadcaster on 13 September 2021 — 24 days before the parliamentary elections held on 8 and 9 October, 2021. According to a report by the Central European Digital Media Observatory (CEDMO), approximately 20 percent of Czechs believed the false narrative linking same-sex marriage to child trafficking. About 10 days before the elections, AliPro ran a post on their official Facebook page stating that “by redefining marriage (between a man and a woman), we are saying first and foremost the roles of mum and dad are not important.” These disinfo narratives were pushed right before the elections to start a discussion on “marriage equality”, confirmed Filip Milde, an activist from Jsme fér (We are Fair), an LGBTI group in the Czech Republic. Milde pointed out that AliPro has been using these disinfo narratives as a mobilisation tool to delay the legalisation of same-sex marriage by spreading lies about the LGBTI community. “These lies can often lead to a sentiment of hatred towards LGBT people, couples and families with children," he said. With efforts continuing to date, in 2024, AliPro has prepared campaigns to influence members of the parliament to prevent the approval of marriage or partnership for same-sex couples. A recent vote for the legalisation of same-sex marriage did not receive a full majority in the Czech parliament in February 2024. Political Links AliPro is associated with two political parties that are part of the ruling coalition in the Czech Republic. For example, the chairperson Jana Jochová is an assistant to MP Václav Kral of the current ruling right-wing political party Občanská demokratická party (ODS), while the vice-chairman of the AliPro Jan Gregor works at the ministry of justice. Further, in 2022, the ministry of labour and social affairs stated that it had been cooperating with the Alliance for Family since March 2022. AliPro was part of the working group on the Concept of Family Policy of the Ministry that is responsible for family policy initiatives. When asked about current cooperation, a spokeswoman said that the ministry is no longer cooperating with the Alliance for the Family. In addition to organising various events attended by politicians, its structures are intertwined with the Czech government, said Alex Alvarova, a Political Communication Expert from the Czech Republic. “The fact that members of the conservative AliPro are directly connected to the current ruling political party and have a foot inside the Ministry of Justice indicates the potential scope of their influence on policy decisions regarding the LGBTI community," said Alvarova. A similar pattern is seen in Hungary with the far-right governing coalition of Fidesz and the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP) led by prime minister Viktor Orbán and his adjacent or Centre for Fundamental Rights (CFFR), which claims to be a civil society organisation, but which is spreading the same anti-LGBTI misinformation as the government. The predominant disinformation narrative present in Hungarian Facebook posts from 2021 includes posts suggesting a correlation between sex education about LGBT+ matters and “paedophilia”. These posts often refer to sex education in schools as “rainbow propaganda.” Recently, 29 advertisements with content drawing a correlation between ‘LGBT+ individuals and paedophiles’ blaming the opposition for not voting for the anti-trans and anti-gay, so-called child protection law were launched by Megafon, the pro-government media centre. These ads were released in the four days following the resignation of the former president of Hungary in February 2024. At least 10,525,000 HUF (€26,766) were spent on these ads which are still running and the amount is constantly increasing, the Budapest-based think-tank, Political Capital reported. Russian-Inspired Anti-LGBTI disinformation In September 2021, false claims about same-sex marriage leading to child trafficking emerged in the Czech Republic, resembling earlier events in Russia. A year ago in Russia, the ‘Reproductive Specialists’ case came to light in July 2020, where doctors were accused of trafficking children born to surrogate mothers. By 2021, the head of Rosyurconsulting, a company which arranged surrogacy programmes, claimed non-heterosexual individuals were part of this investigation, aiming to support new laws and stir negative public opinion. This led to the LGBTI community in Russia becoming a strategic target for state propaganda where the state-controlled channel NTV significantly increased its broadcast of videos purporting the trafficking of babies to same-sex couples in Belgium. In the same year, the popular Russian newspaper Argumenty echoed this sentiment , claiming homosexuals were involved in child trafficking in the US. In February 2023 in Hungary, some narratives falsely linked sex education for children with LGBTI propaganda and paedophilia thereby destroying traditional family values. Four months ago, in October 2022 in Russia, ultraconservative and US-sanctioned Russian oligarch Konstantin Malofeev claimed paedophilia was connected to “non-traditional values” while discussing a law banning gay propaganda. Two years prior, in 2020, the Russian Orthodox Church warned sexual education should not "turn into the corruption of children, leading to various diseases and the promotion of non-traditional orientation". This false narrative continued in 2023, equating transgender identity with paedophilia. “Hungary has been using Russia’s playbook to spread LGBTI misinformation,” said Remy Bonny, executive director of the Brussels-based NGO, Forbidden Colours. “The Hungarian government often uses the child protection narrative claiming LGBTI people are trying to influence and convert children (to trans, queer …) through sexual propaganda," he said. Bonny recalled the so-called ‘gayrope’ misinformation narrative that Russya-1 has introduced. “Orbán has been using this trope as well, claiming LGBTI groups from Brussels are spreading harmful propaganda and blaming the EU for trying to dismantle traditional family values,” he added. Connections to Russia Both AliPro and CFFR, joined forces with other European conservative movements in Poland and Slovakia to form the Alliance for the Common Good (ACG) in 2021. ACG, which claims to be a European network of non-governmental organisations, aims to unite pro-life groups against the spread of LGBTI and gender ideology. In September 2021, AliPro invited representatives of Them Before Us, a US-based organisation that promotes marriage between a man and woman only, to the Czech Republic. The anti-LGBTI organisation Them Before Us and the Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF), another US-based organisation, are listed as partners of Promise to America’s Children, a coalition of non-profit organisations working for the wellbeing of American families. According to revelations by a Central European investigative outlet VSquare, ADF was listed as a partner on the website of the Polish ultraconservative organisation Ordo Iuris which forms the ACG. ADF International, the European arm of ADF, was one of the coordinators of Agenda Europe, a network of more than 400 ultra-conservatives that included members from the World Congress of Families (WCF), according to a report by openDemocracy. The ADF increased its European spending from $2.6m (€2.4m) in 2018 to $5.7m (€5.2m) in its most recent tax filing (mid-2022- mid-2023). The Human Rights Campaign (HRC) Foundation exposed the WCF’s sponsorship by Russian oligarchs Konstantin Malofeev and Vladimir Yakunin, a close advisor to Russian president Vladimir Putin. The Russian Federation accounted for $188.2m (€173.8m) in anti-gender funding from 2009 to 2018 in Europe, from organisations associated with Yakunin and Malofeev, as per a report by the European Parliamentary Forum (EPF) for Sexual and Reproductive Rights. Another finding shows that Czech members Kateřina Ucháčová and her husband Radim Ucháč , who were part of the Committee for the Protection of Parental Rights (VORP) which later became AliPro, were invited to Moscow in 2014 to attend the ‘Large Families and the Future of Humanity Forum’. The event was sponsored by Yakunin’s St. Andrew the First-Called Foundation, according to leaked documents by Shaltai-Boltai, a Russian hacking group. Secret funding In terms of funding, the Czech AliPro claims to operate primarily on donations from individuals and legal entities, as per documents in the commercial register. According to recent financial statements, in 2023 , the Alliance for Family spent 3.5 million Czech Koruna (CZK) (€138,839) out of the 4.8m CZK income including 4.7m CZK (€186,406) received in donations. Their donations more than tripled from 1.2m CZK (€50,050) in 2019 to 4.7m CZK (€ 186,406) in 2023, the names of donors are not disclosed. One of the donors of the association is Czech billionaire Marek Španěl, owner of the media website Parlamentní Listy and majority owner of Echo Media, which publishes the weekly Echo and the internet daily Echo24. Španěl told us: “I used to send financial contributions to the Alliance for Family. I sent the first hundreds of thousands of Czech Koruna about two years ago. I do not remember the total amount.” On the other hand, the CFFR receives funding from the Hungarian government, according to a response to a FOIA request submitted by independent news outlets Telex and 24. Hu in 2022. In the same year, the Center received around 9bn HUF (€22.98m) in unknown donations, according to an investigative journalism outlet Atlatszo. Further, taxpayers' money was transferred to these institutions for example, 170m HUF (€434,190) was allotted for renovation in 2023 . In the second part of this investigation, we will reveal the collaboration of ultraconservative actors with the far-right, and foreign influence in the remaining two V4 countries of Poland and Slovakia. Ronald Rodrigues is a freelance journalist based in Central Europe covering human rights violations, discrimination towards minorities, migration, and LGBTQIA+ rights with stories published in the BBC Future , The Copenhagen Post , Ms. Magazine , Foyer UK , and The Free Press Journal . Varvara Proj is a Russian journalist focusing on LGBTQIA+ rights, feminism, and dismantling Russian propaganda with works published for Feminist Anti-War Resistance , Sphere Queer , LGBT propaganda , and LGBT propaganda.media . Flora Garamvolgyi is a reporter from Hungary contributing to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) , The Guardian , and The Observer from the United States and has been working as a foreign correspondent with a focus on the links between the US far-right and Europe. Zdislava Pokorná is an investigative journalist from the Czech Republic working with the first Czech digital newspaper Deník N focusing on corruption, ultraconservative movements, money laundering, and domestic investigations. Robert Barca is a digital investigative journalist from Slovakia focusing on fact-checking, digital verification, and OSINT at
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Agence France-Presse (AFP) Fact Check
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Anti-LGBTI disinformation narratives in Europe show similarities and connections to Russian propaganda
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[
"Investigations",
"Health & Society"
] |
investigations
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2024-07-25T06:37:47.719Z
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https://euobserver.com/investigations/arc113bb65
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Putin's takeover of Georgia risks tragic EU defeat
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The appointment of Estonian former prime minister Kaja Kallas as the EU's new high representative for foreign affairs and security policy (HRVP) is undoubtedly a rock-solid demonstration that countering Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine is a top priority for the EU. In Georgia, another key Eastern Partnership country that was the first victim of Russian aggression in 2008, Kallas will have to deal with surging Russian influence and the transformation of Georgia into a Russian vassal against the will of its people. A Russian political victory in Georgia, which now seems closer than most people thought possible, would be a major blow to EU interests and a tragedy for the Georgian people, who have repeatedly and resolutely expressed their pro-European aspirations. The new HRVP will have to focus personally not only on how to prevent this disaster, but also on restoring strong political control over the European External Action Service (EEAS) bureaucracy, which has often acted as a key enabler of Russian influence in Georgia. The stakes could not be higher: while Georgia's transformation into a Russian satellite would be a disaster in itself, failure to help the Georgian people reverse this slide into oblivion will also render futile EU efforts to engage Western-leaning Armenia. There is no doubt that the “foreign influence” law recently adopted by the ruling Georgian Dream party in Georgia, a copy-paste of draconian Russian legislation that president Vladimir Putin's regime has used to dismantle civil society in Russia, is a victory for the Kremlin. Russia's leaders, including Putin himself, have vocally supported the law and Georgian Dream in the face of Western criticism. However, the institution that Kallas will be commanding, the EEAS, despite Georgian Dream crossing one red line after another, pushed for business as usual with Georgian Dream's puppet master, oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, and his cronies for as long as possible, thus enabling Georgia’s democratic backsliding and drift towards Russia. No one in Western capitals, and especially in Brussels, is under the illusion that unless significant costs are imposed on Ivanishvili and his crew, much worse is in store not only for Georgia but also for EU interests. Virtually all Georgian civil society organisations that have refused to register with the Kremlin-style registry face imminent closure. In his 29 April anti-Western manifesto, Ivanishvili himself announced a large-scale crackdown that is sure to include mass prosecutions, arrests, and possibly violence. Georgian election-monitoring organisations would almost certainly be dismantled, making international monitoring of the upcoming October elections of limited relevance, while the election itself will be under threat. Georgia's Belarusisation, with its eventual transformation into a Kremlin vassal, will go one step further. Indeed, Ivanishvili's regime has been using tactics from the Kremlin playbook for some time, including the use of groups of thugs (mainly wrestlers), often mixed in with the police, to attack and severely beat dissenters, including near their homes and in front of their children. How could this disaster have happened? Wasn't Georgia supposed to be at the forefront of the Eastern Partnership? Many of us have been warning for years about Georgia's drift into the Kremlin's orbit, closely linked to democratic backsliding. But such concerns have often been downplayed by bureaucrats at various levels: The 2013 report by the EU's special adviser on constitutional and legal reform, Thomas Hammarberg, neglected and even denied the development of selective justice under the Georgian Dream government, and was extremely damaging at a time when more could have been done. Too many have looked the other way, while eager to declare “success” for their own work. In a 2016 meeting with a visiting group of MEPs, the then European Union ambassador to Georgia, Janos Herman, downplayed their concerns about Ivanishvili's pro-Russian leanings, defended his record and intentions, and asked them not to call Ivanishvili an oligarch. Instead, he said, they should call him an “enlightened patriotic tycoon”. He also defended a controversial law that Georgian Dream had used to hijack Georgia's then-independent and highly respected Constitutional Court. Sadly, this is one, but certainly not the only, example of how ignorance has enabled Georgia's gradual slide into disaster. Our goal now, and that of the Georgian people, must be to prevent this and to avoid the final catastrophe of Georgia's imminent and full slide into Russia's orbit. We are confident that Kallas also wants to stop this, but for that to happen, the legitimate leverage of the West, and the EU in particular, must be used immediately, and strong political scrutiny at the highest level must return to the Georgian file in Brussels. Failure to impose costs on those who have spearheaded the drive to bring Georgia into the Kremlin's clutches is not pragmatism but impunity, which encourages further abuse. While the US has imposed travel restrictions on these individuals and their family members, the EU not following suit is a green light for the hotheads in Georgian Dream. It is true that Hungary will try to block similar sanctions, but as the Russian sanctions ordeal showed, the EU can avoid being held hostage by Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán, while the Commission has quite a few executive tools at its disposal. The stakes are simply too high, and as numerous previous cases have shown, doing nothing is a terrible policy.
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The Georgian people have shown their determination, their non-violent discipline, their commitment to European ideals and their resistance to the tyrannical influence of the Kremlin.
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In Georgia, another key Eastern Partnership country that was the first victim of Russian aggression in 2008, new EU foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas will have to deal with surging Russian influence and the transformation of Georgia into a Russian vassal against the will of its people.
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[
"EU & the World",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-and-the-world
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2024-07-25T05:37:25.739Z
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https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ard5236aa9
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Fish-feed industry wreaking havoc in West Africa
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Salmon is marketed to consumers as the ‘chicken of the sea’ – sold as low-carbon, easy to cook and sustainable. Sales of farmed fish are booming in Europe – the aquaculture sector is now the fastest-growing food sector in the world and is often credited with providing respite for our overfished oceans. But there’s a catch. The pellets that are fed to popular fish such as salmon and seabass rely on a vital ingredient: fishmeal and fish oil, which is mostly made from small nutritious fish harvested from oceans around the world. Civil society groups have long raised the alarm about the harms caused by this industry in West Africa, where 38 fishmeal factories are strung along the coastlines of Mauritania, Senegal, and The Gambia. In the last decade, the fishmeal industry has grown here exponentially, harvesting pelagic fish – like mackerels, sardinellas and sardines – by the tonne. In step, it has brought a host of negative impacts: food insecurity has risen, thousands of women fish workers are jobless, and stocks of target fish species are crashing. None of this chimes well with sustainability-conscious European consumers. Yet major EU and US companies continue to source from the region, because demand for fishmeal and oil outstrips supply, and West African exports are high quality, made from whole fresh fish. The Dutch-owned aquafeed producers Skretting, Danish feed company Biomar, and US feed-manufacturer Cargill, are among those who continue to source from Mauritania, which is the seventh biggest fish oil importer to the EU. These three powerful market players are all taking part in voluntary sustainability schemes in the region with other global buyers in the fishmeal and fish oil industry that have been set up in response to a growing outcry at industry harms in West Africa from artisanal fisher organisations , NGOs and the UN’s FAO . The industry-led schemes are the focus of a new investigation by DeSmog, which has analysed and mapped the overlapping membership of the three initiatives: the certification programme MarinTrust, an industry roundtable for marine ingredients and a Fisheries Improvement Project in Mauritania. We found that the voluntary schemes were no guarantee of sustainability – riven by conflicts of interest, lacking local representation and failing to protect fish stocks. But despite this, they were referenced frequently by corporations as evidence of their sustainability credentials. Take the certification programme MarinTrust, which sponsors an “improver” scheme in Mauritania. Our analysis showed that high-level employees from aquafeed giants Cargill and Biomar, and fishmeal traders like Pelagia, are on key committees with oversight of standard-setting for their industry. As one commentator put it to DeSmog, it’s like the ‘fox guarding the hen house’. MarinTrust itself was set up by the marine ingredients organisation IFFO, a fishmeal trade association, which controls the certification programme’s board. Overall, the industry made up 83 percent of its trustees, far higher than equivalent bodies the Aquaculture Stewardship Council (33 percent) and Marine Stewardship Council (11 percent). By contrast, the study revealed the total absence of representatives from West African civil society, women fishworkers, and small-scale fishers, despite these communities bearing the brunt of fishmeal industry impacts. The aquafeed giants Cargill, Skretting, and BioMar involved in the three initiatives are the world’s biggest salmon-feed suppliers. They are anxious to get hold of more certified ingredients: all have plans to expand aquafeed production, and have ambitious, short-term targets for increasing the proportion of fishmeal and oil in their feed that is certified as ‘responsibly sourced’. Dyhia Belhabib, fisheries programme manager at the non-profit EcoTrust Canada described the industry’s extensive ties to MarinTrust as a “massive conflict of interest”. Our analysis also showed that the Global Roundtable on Marine Ingredients suffers from the same problem, lacking any West African representation and home instead to 14 powerful corporations, lobby groups and certifiers. The imbalance in favour of industry was a far cry from the transparency and public participation that should be part of any response to the challenges faced in the region, according to Andre Standing, senior adviser at the Coalition for Fair Fisheries Arrangements (CFFA), a platform of European and African-based organisations. “That’s the opposite of a roundtable where people from West Africa are not invited,” he added. DeSmog also looked at Mauritania's Fisheries Improvement Project (FIP), which was set up by Olvea, a major French exporter of fish oil from the country. Local organisations report better transparency, which is welcomed. But five years after the FIP was set up in 2017, the fishery is still not certified, stocks of the industry’s target fish are overexploited and at risk of collapse. But major EU, Norwegian and US fish-feed companies continue to source marine ingredients from there. The sole NGO supporting the FIP stresses that the project has “no claim to sustainability”. Yet the major aquafeed companies talk up their participation in all three of these initiatives in their reports, and at conferences, as evidence of their commitment to responsible practises – and their sourcing policies all allow them to source from FIPs. Greenpeace Africa told DeSmog that to date none of these three initiatives had improved the situation on the ground. Women fish-workers in Senegal told us their income is down, they can’t pay school fees, and their fish processing sites stand empty. Meanwhile, families on low incomes can no longer afford to feed fish to their children, who have lost from their diets the complete nutritional package of iron, calcium vitamin A and Omega-3 fatty acids, essential in their first 1,000 days of life for healthy brain development and growth. Instead, the schemes give European consumers a false sense of safety. The danger is that all these initiatives only serve to legitimise the overfishing of critical fish stocks, and are simply, in the words of one campaigner: “100 percent greenwashing.” All organisations and individuals mentioned in DeSmog’s investigation were contacted for comment. A set of responses from MarinTrust, Roundtable, and IFFO can be viewed here. DeSmog’s investigation can be read in full here . Hazel Healy is DeSmog's . She is also a freelance writer and broadcaster specializing in stories about food justice, climate, and migration.
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Hazel Healy is DeSmog's
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An in-depth report by DeSmog reveals that flagship initiatives to ensure “responsible sourcing” for the global aquafeed industry are being undermined by systemic conflicts of interest, endangering efforts to safeguard critical fish stocks in West Africa.
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[
"Green Economy",
"Opinion"
] |
green-economy
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2024-07-23T08:30:53.582Z
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https://euobserver.com/green-economy/ar42058c24
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Labour challenges on doorstep of new EU parliament
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The rising cost of living, the protests that Europe has seen in the last years, and the results of the European elections, show the need to invest in the social dimension of the European project, and to improve the everyday lives of ordinary Europeans. The EU parliament's employment and social affairs committee (EMPL) will be at the core of this work. After having constituted ourselves as a committee, one of the first high-profile issues on the agenda of the EMPL committee is the approval of one or more of the future EU commissioners. We are still awaiting a full organigram and portfolio overview of the next European Commission. However, that does not mean that all is quiet from the EMPL front. It is clear that several important policies are waiting at the doorstep of both the committee and the next European Commission. These are some of the many challenges the EU is facing which I hope to see addressed by the EMPL committee. Every year public procurement in the EU accounts for 14 percent of our combined GDP - or roughly two trillion euros. Yet sadly, the majority of public tenders are still focusing only on the lowest price. This means that we end up seeing the public sector, in reality, funding abuse and underpayment of workers - as well as lining the pockets of companies hiding in tax havens. This has to stop. We must change the EU’s outdated rules. The past term identified, investigated and raised the issue. To me, it is clear that during the current term, we will have to solve it. Another big issue is how the at times endless sub-contracting chains end up leading to workers being without the protection they need, and as scientists have shown , to abuse and horrible conditions. We already see clear A and B teams of workers in terms of their rights, and that should not be so. It is clear that the EU’s current policies are not up to the task, and we will need to change that. The sooner, the better. From hiring and firing to actual management of workers and output analysis, the use of AI in the workplace is an issue we will need to deal much more with. The same goes for the situation of the EU’s many platform workers — a number the European Commission assesses will soon hit the staggering figure of 40 million . A growing number of people have their working lives increasingly dictated by algorithms, all too often without sufficient human oversight or intervention. The use of AI and Algorithmic Management must be based on the 'human in control' principle and should help support and reinforce working conditions and never be used to replace dialogue and consultation in the workplace. The European model of social dialogue and collective bargaining is a key pillar of the EU and if nurtured and cared for, it will continue to ensure that companies and workers alike will prosper. Social dialogue – especially collective bargaining - is the democratisation of the world of work. We need a progressive outcome on the revision of the European Works Councils Directive and the commitments from Val Duchess and La Hulpe must be delivered, especially the Pact for European social dialogue, including the capacity building and institutional and financial support to negotiating and implementing social partner agreements. In spite of the knowledge of how harmful they can be, there are still around 1400 chemicals in the workplace without any meaningful EU-level restrictions and limit values. At the current speed, it is estimated that it will take another 70 years until we have regulated them all. We have to ensure that workers in the EU do not get sick and die from workplace exposure to harmful chemicals and substances. We must speed up and allocate more resources to the legislative process of setting binding limit values. Lastly, we must recognise the immense inequalities our societies are facing. While some have real access to proper lives, education and modern health services, for many in Europe, this is only theoretical. This understandably creates anger and frustration — because the fact of the matter is that Europe and its countries can more than afford to provide for all its citizens. That it doesn’t happen is because of political choices, not a lack of resources. This also means that ensuring a fairer social distribution and creating European societies where none of its inhabitants need to fear for the future is the best tool we have in the fight against the far-right. It is a tool that I truly hope Europe will dare to use.
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Li Andersson, member of the European Parliament for Finland and candidate to chair the employment committee in the European Parliament.
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Some of the policies that are waiting at the doorstep of both the next parliament's employment committee and the programme of the next European Commission are public procurement, abuse of workers, use of AI in the workplace, social dialogue and exposure to harmful chemicals.
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[
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] |
health-and-society
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2024-07-22T09:16:05.845Z
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https://euobserver.com/health-and-society/ar106a92a4
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Dutch to stay out of widening EU boycott of Hungary
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The Netherlands isn't joining a boycott of Hungary's EU presidency, as its new government sits on the fence on rule-of-law. Dutch prime minister Dirk Schoof said on Thursday (18 July) that his justice minister, David van Weel, will attend an informal meeting in Budapest on Monday. "If it is in the Netherlands’ interest to go, then we will go unless the minister is on holiday,” Schoof told Dutch broadcaster NOS in the margins of a European summit in the UK. The boycott so far includes the European Commission and at least eight member states: Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Sweden. "The government wants to clearly distance itself from the Hungarian presidency's handling of Ukraine in the first weeks of the presidency," Danish foreign minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen said on Thursday in a written reply to national MPs. It comes after Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán met Russian president Vladimir Putin in Moscow on 5 July, as if Orbán was representing the EU on a Ukraine peace mission, even though he had no mandate to do so. The last Budapest meeting, of energy ministers on Tuesday, saw just six EU countries send senior people, suggesting the boycott was already wider in practice than the eight EU capitals who subscribed to it publicly. Informal energy meetings can see a low turnout also for non-political reasons — Greece and Luxembourg sent junior people, for instance, even though they had earlier told EUobserver they were against boycotting Orbán for now. But the justice and home affairs ministers' meeting next week will be a better test of who's in and who's out, as it is a more high-profile event. The next Budapest fixture, also next week, brings together health ministers, but is again quite low-key - the Dutch minister, Fleur Agema, for instance, has said she won't make it as she's on holiday, even though the Dutch are staying out of the anti-Hungarian protest. The biggest test will come in August when EU foreign and defence ministers are due to go to Orbán's capital. Meanwhile, the fact Hungary is chairing justice talks on Monday is ironic, given that Orbán is under an EU sanctions procedure from 2018 for abusing the rule of law at home, on top of the criticism of his EU presidency violations. The Dutch minister, van Weel, said he'd meet with civil society leaders while he was in Budapest, in a fig-leaf statement about his trip. The Netherlands was in the past broadly aligned with northern and Nordic EU countries in taking a strong line on the rule of law. But Schoof is leading a government coalition which, for the first time, contains the far-right PVV party of Geert Wilders, who is friends with Orbán and who may have tilted the balance in a new direction. Over 60 MEPs and some EU capitals have called for Hungary's presidency to be taken away and given to Belgium and Spain or to Poland, which is to take over the EU presidency in January anyway. According to EU Council lawyers there is no legal way to do this without first having an EU-26 consensus that Hungary had breached EU values under Article 2 of the treaty, which could trigger further consequences for Budapest. But Orbán's ally, Slovakia's populist prime minister Robert Fico, would likely veto this, while the Netherlands might also go against the move, in part due to the new Wilders factor. This left boycotts as the only practical form of redress for Hungary's critics, an EU diplomat said. If the situation were to deteriorate, EU capitals could also boycott formal Hungarian EU presidency meetings being held in the EU Council in Brussels. They'd be legally obliged to send at least their ambassadors, but these wouldn't be eligible to cast a vote or make a statement. And that meant the most extreme scenario could see top-level EU politics being conducted in a chamber with 24 silent people, while Dutch, Slovak, and Hungarian ministers talked to each other.
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Andrew Rettman is EUobserver's foreign editor, writing about foreign and security issues since 2005. He is Polish, but grew up in the UK, and lives in Brussels. He has also written for The Guardian, The Times of London, and Intelligence Online.
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The Netherlands isn't joining a boycott of Hungary's EU presidency, as its new government sits on the fence on rule-of-law.
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[
"EU & the World",
"Rule of Law"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2024-07-19T09:24:27.846Z
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https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar1a14e2b6
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The Olympics should be for all women, including Muslim women
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It’s a Saturday and I just completed another park run in South London. I lie down on the warm grass and stretch. Around me, there are people of all backgrounds, racial identities, ages and abilities. This is our space, where we come every weekend and chat after racing each other to the finish line. I feel elated, energised, alive. Running has given me so much: an outlet in times of stress, a refuge from trauma, a way to challenge myself and most of all, a lot of fun. It helped me find my people and be a part of a community when I moved to London. To think that all this could be taken away from me is unbearable. In the last few months, my runs have become faster. I have been channelling the feelings of rage and injustice into them and dedicating them to the sportswomen in France who I have been speaking with as part of my work with Amnesty International. Footballers, basketball players, volleyball players, gym lovers and swimmers — all prevented from doing what they love because they are Muslim and wear hijabs and other forms of religious clothing. Yes, you read that right — this is what is happening in France, the country that wants you to think it champions women’s rights. The country that proclaims its devotion to “égalité” will in just a few days host the 2024 summer Olympic and Paralympic Games. Last September, France’s minister for sport Amelie Oudea-Castera announced that no female athlete representing the country will be allowed to compete in the Games if she wears religious headgear. This country, marred by gendered Islamophobia for decades , would rather risk losing medals, discriminate against and exclude incredibly talented sportswomen from its national teams than allow them to be their full selves. But it’s not only during the Olympics that France does not want to see visibly Muslim women. Even at amateur levels and in regional competitions, several sports federations have banned sports hijabs. So, after training for years, excelling in their sport, coaching young girls and considering sports as a professional career, young Muslim women athletes are told to remove their hijabs or give up on their dreams. 'It's a form of violence' It’s “really frustrating, really humiliating,” says Hélène Bâ, a co-founder of the Basket Pour Toutes collective that campaigns to overturn such bans. Instances of referees asking teenage girls to remove parts of their clothing to participate are not uncommon. “It’s gender-based violence because … the referees are, the majority of them are men,” Hélène tells me. “And so, it’s men asking me to take off my clothes. Whether it’s covering the head, whether it’s your T-shirt, whether it’s your dress, this is violence. … It’s a mix of a lot of discrimination and a lot of violence.” This gender-based violence is also a manifestation of Islamophobia, perpetuating systemic racism and discrimination against Muslim women, and reflecting the continuing consequences of France’s history and legacy of colonialism, with profound impacts, particularly on racialised women. Volleyball player Assma describes her experience of being prevented from competing. “When I wanted to register for a women's competition,” she says, “my coach told me it wouldn't be possible. So I asked her why. And she tells me right away: ‘Because you're wearing something on your head’ … At that moment, I didn't feel very well and straight away, I knew that it was going to be a problem.” In France, a rule banning religious clothing from competitions has been in place in football since 2006. A collective of hijab-wearing football players called the Hijabeuses challenged it before French courts, and now also at the European Court of Human Rights. They recently organized “alternative Olympic Games” — truly inclusive of all — near Paris. One of its co-founders, Founé Diawara, stressed to Amnesty International: “Our fight is not political or religious but centred on our human right to participate in sports. Many women are excluded from football fields in France every weekend solely because they wear a veil.” Sports hijabs that meet the safety requirements are authorised by international sports federations such as FIFA, FIBA and FIVB. Moreover, France is the only country in Europe with bans on religious headwear in sports such as women’s football, basketball and volleyball. No other country in the region, at the level of national laws or individual sports regulations, has enshrined bans on religious headwear such as those worn by some Muslim sportswomen and girls. Discrimination against Muslim women and girls in sport The bans are discriminatory and violate the human rights of Muslim women and girls who wear religious headwear and who play sports, including their right to equality, freedom of expression, association, religion, health, bodily autonomy, and physical and psychological integrity, among others. The right to participate in sport itself is a human right under the full spectrum of human rights, for example, the right to take part in cultural life, the right to health, including mental health, the right to participate in public life and take decisions about one’s own body and private life. All of these rights must be respected and protected for everyone without discrimination. Hijab bans in sports, and beyond, are a feminist issue and a matter of racial and gender justice as well as a human rights concern. Religion is often a racialised category. Muslim people in Europe are racialized in categories encompassing perceived race, ethnicity and/or nationality, irrespective of their religious practice and actual religion. The wearing of headscarves and other types of religious clothing by Muslim women has long been instrumentalised and negatively stereotyped in our region, particularly in France, to demonise them and homogenise the diverse significance such clothing represents to those who wear it or would wish to do so. No woman should be coerced into decisions about her clothing or face the impossible choice between career and faith, identity and autonomy. If the discriminatory bans at amateur and professional levels are not eliminated, even fewer Muslim women athletes — who already face systemic barriers in accessing sports in France — will ever reach the Olympics and Paralympics. This is why ahead of, and during, the forthcoming Paris Olympics and Paralympics, Amnesty International is calling for an end to these violations of women and girl athletes’ human rights. We call on everyone who understands the transformational power of sport to use their voice against these racist, discriminatory and harmful bans on sports hijab. Please use your voice and show solidarity with Muslim women athletes in France. Anna Błuś is Amnesty International’s Researcher on Gender Justice in Europe.
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Anna Błuś
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France is the only country in Europe with bans on religious headwear in sports such as women’s football, basketball and volleyball. This is why ahead of, and during, the forthcoming Paris Olympics and Paralympics, Amnesty International is calling for an end to these violations of women and girl athletes’ human rights.
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[
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] |
health-and-society
|
2024-07-19T07:00:18.386Z
|
https://euobserver.com/health-and-society/ar1325c645
|
Open letter to MEPs: an urgent response in defence to an isolationist America
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You will never have as much power as you will have on Thursday (18 July) at 1 PM, when you vote on the Commission presidency in a secret ballot. The fate of the EU will be in your hands. Essential in our view, is that in your vote you take into account the position of the new European Commission, especially the re-election of commission president Ursula von der Leyen and the new high representative for common foreign and security policy, Kaja Kallas, on the necessity of a European Defence Union. This is of the highest priority. Moreover, the security of Europe depends on it. The recent events in the United States — the disastrous debate performance of president Biden, the attempt on Trump's life , and the nomination of a virulently isolationist vice president to the Republican ticket — significantly increase the likelihood of US disengagement from Europe. The increasingly likely Trump victory would almost certainly lead to the evaporation of US support for Ukraine by early 2025. All this means that the European Union faces a stark reality: the transatlantic alliance that has underpinned its security for decades is fraying. The US, long the cornerstone of European security, is increasingly turning inward. The recent political turmoil in the US underscores this shift. The Biden campaign's faltering performance and the rise of isolationist sentiment, epitomised by the new vice president, signal a retreat from global engagement. This retrenchment leaves Europe vulnerable, particularly in the face of the ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine. Sadly, the EU has repeatedly shown that without US backing, it is unable to protect Ukraine or defend itself effectively. The war in Ukraine has laid bare the EU's defence deficiencies. Despite numerous sanctions and diplomatic efforts, the EU has struggled to mount a coherent and effective military response. The reliance on US military aid has been stark. Without American support, Ukraine's ability to withstand Russian advances would be severely compromised. This dependency highlights a critical vulnerability: Europe's defence architecture is fundamentally flawed, overly reliant on an ally whose commitment is no longer assured. Yet, we have no choice as it is not sure anymore that we can count on the US against an increasingly belligerent Russia. Therefore Europe needs a European Defence Union. The EU must take its security into its own hands. The European Defence Union would provide a framework for a unified and robust European military capability, enabling the EU to respond swiftly and effectively to threats. It would enhance strategic autonomy, reduce reliance on external powers, and send a strong message of resolve to potential aggressors. The notion of a European Defence Union is not new. In 1950, as Europe lay in ruins and the Cold War loomed, and after influential proposals from Winston Churchill and Dean Acheson, French Prime Minister René Pleven proposed the European Defence Community (EDC). The objective - fully backed by the American authorities, especially the US Senate - was to find a politically viable way to rearm Germany under European control. The EDC aimed to create a pan-European defence force, integrating the military capacities of its member states. The EDC would have had a shared budget, centralized weapons procurement, and centralized governance. The force would have had 42 divisions from France, the German Federal Republic, Italy and the Benelux. Although the Treaty of Paris containing this plan was signed in May 1952, the French National Assembly rejected its ratification in 1954 and the plan was abandoned. And yet, after contemplating our current faltering efforts, It is staggering to think that, five years after a savage war that tore Europe apart, European politicians came so close to integrating Europe’s armies. The reactivation of the European Defence Union would involve the same three key elements: a common defence budget, a common army, and a central command structure. EU member states would commit to increased defence spending and resource pooling, to eradicate duplication and multiplication of weapon systems, modernising military infrastructure, enhancing cyber defences, and developing advanced technologies. The EDU should not be an alternative to Nato but rather the European pillar of it as was already the idea in 1954. The US, even under a potential Trump presidency, would see strengthening European defence capabilities as bolstering the transatlantic alliance, providing a more balanced partnership and reducing the burden on the US. It will also signal to other global powers that Europe is prepared and capable of defending its interests independently. The path will not be easy. It will require significant investments in defence, overcoming historical hesitations, and building consensus among diverse national interests. However, the benefits far outweigh the challenges. A unified European defence force would not only bolster security but also strengthen the EU's geopolitical standing, making it a truly independent actor on the world stage. The time for the European Defence Union has come. The recent events in the United States have highlighted the precariousness of relying on an increasingly unpredictable ally. Europe must take its security into its own hands. The re-establishment of the EDU offers a viable path forward, ensuring that the EU can protect its citizens, uphold its values, and defend its sovereignty. As MEPs, your role at this juncture is pivotal. On Thursday, you hold the power to shape the future of European defence. This is a rare opportunity to push for the re-establishment of the European Defence Union as the commission's and EU foreign affairs chief's highest priority. In the coming security landscape, the establishment of the EDU is not just a strategic necessity; it is a moral imperative to ensure the safety and stability of Europe for generations to come.
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Luis Garicano and Guy Verhofstadt are former liberal MEPs from the Renew Europe group
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In the emerging security landscape, the establishment of the European Defence Union is not just a strategic necessity; it is a moral imperative to ensure the safety and stability of Europe for generations to come.
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[
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-political
|
2024-07-17T12:11:20.844Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar7e94e394
|
Podcast: The Trump shot heard around the world
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A would-be assassin’s bullet didn’t have to kill Donald Trump to fundamentally change the course of the 2024 presidential election in the United States. The incident itself is just the most recent and highest profile example of an apparent increased willingness to resort to political violence. The European Union already felt that in the weeks before its parliamentary elections, as several candidates were the victims of verbal or physical assault. Let’s not forget Slovakia’s prime minister Robert Fico, who survived five bullets earlier this year. So there is talk all around about “lowering the temperature.” Surely that is on the mind of the European Commission, as it looks for ways to sideline the Viktor Orbán show as Hungary presides over the EU Council. Of course, the commission’s leader, Ursula von der Leyen, has to survive a parliamentary vote first. She’ll probably get the votes, but how many and from whom is the big question. To try to answer that and other dicey dilemmas, Euroscopic brings on EUobserver managing editor Elena Sanchez as well as European insider and fellow substacker, Augustin Bourleaud . William Glucroft is a writer and journalist based in Berlin. Explorer of the Teutonic Imaginary who's covering Germany with wit, style, and insight worth reading. Martin Gak is a broadcaster and writer , a native of Argentina fascinated by the idea of Europe, its values and its cheese. William Glucroft is a writer and journalist based in Berlin. Explorer of the Teutonic Imaginary who's covering Germany with wit, style, and insight worth reading. Martin Gak is a broadcaster and
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writer
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A bullet grazed the ear of Donald Trump and, with it, ricocheted off European politics. Meanwhile, the UK wants to cosy up to its old fling, the EU, almost as much as Orbán wants to with Russia.
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[
"Euroscopic"
] |
euroscopic
|
2024-07-17T11:45:54.399Z
|
https://euobserver.com/euroscopic/arc48e4bb7
|
MEPs worth keeping an eye on in the next term
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This week, the new European Parliament will convene for the first time in its constitutive session. As MEPs decide on how to divide the Parliament’s influential positions, like committee chairs, vice-presidents and quaestors, and hold the much-anticipated vote on Ursula von der Leyen’s European Commission presidency, the first contours of the coming terms of political balance will become apparent. From the 720 MEPs descending upon Strasbourg, the EUobserver has highlighted seven lawmakers worthy of keeping an eye on - giving a glimpse of what to expect from the coming years. Fidias Panayiotou - N/I Panayiotou, commonly known as “Fidias” by his 2.6 million followers on Youtube, already made it into our previous list of remarkable new MEPs . A Cypriot influencer, Fidias was one of the election’s big surprises, riding his way into parliament on a wave of young voters, despite lacking experience or even any apparent interest in politics. Before his election campaign, the self-described “professional mistake maker” was mostly known for forcing Elon Musk to hug him and free-riding on trains Why he’s worth keeping an eye on Notwithstanding his apparent lack of affinity with politics, Fidias seems to have fully committed to combining his Mr-Beast style videos with his new job as Parliamentarian. Claiming to be the “most democratic politician” in the parliament, Fidias let his followers decide on which parliamentary group to join (they voted for Non-Inscrit). It remains to be seen if he manages to keep up this radical form of “TikTok-politics”, but he already announced that followers could vote on whether he should support von der Leyen as well. Roberto Vannacci - Patriots Also already featured on the EUobserver’s list of remarkable new MEPs, the former major-general and decorated war veteran gained notoriety in Italy after writing a book-long polemic against LGBTQ+ people, minorities, feminism, and migrants, earning him a leading spot on the list of Matteo Salvini’s Lega del Nord. Why he’s worth keeping an eye on Vannacci, whose political priorities include securing a “right to hate”, is not likely to increase the quality of European political discourse. Nonetheless, he could still be worth paying attention to, as an indicator of early divisions within the newly formed Patriots of Europe group. During the group's constitutive meeting, Vannacci was voted to be one of the group’s vice-presidents. But according to reports in the French press , newly chosen Patriot president Jordan Bardella, MEP for National Rally, regretted the nomination, expressing his opposition to Vannacci’s incendiary homophobia. Brando Benifei - S&D Benifei, an Italian Social Democrat, was joint winner of the MEP of the mandate awards, which were presented in March. Benifei won the award together with Romanian liberal MEP Dragoş Tudorache, for their role as lead negotiators for the EU’s landmark AI act. Why he’s worth keeping an eye on Benifei made the significance of AI legislation in safeguarding consumers, workers and democratic rights against big tech companies a crucial part of his campaign. With AI and digital technology likely to remain a central issue on the EU’s legislative agenda, Benifei will be an important voice to watch. Dóra Dávid and Aura Salla - EPP Dóra Dávid is an incoming Hungarian MEP for Peter Magyar’s TISZA party, which joined the European People’s Party (EPP). Aura Salla is also a new EPP lawmaker for the Finnish National Coalition Party. But beyond their common Christian democrat affiliation, they share another allegiance as well, both having worked as lobbyists for Meta, the Facebook parent company. Salla was in fact lead lobbyist for the social media company, as Meta head of EU affairs. Why they’re worth keeping an eye on Salla has tried to pitch her experience as an asset, arguing that it was useful for the Parliament to have an MEP that truly understood the inner workings of large social media companies like Facebook. But with the EU increasingly clamping down against big tech companies under the Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA), the strong representation of Facebook lobbyists in the Parliament’s most influential group has caused concern among transparency campaigners and NGO’s. Giovanni Crosetto - ECR Giovanni Crosetto is a novice MEP for Brothers of Italy (FdI), the party of Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni. In apparent keeping with his party’s motto “God, Family, Country”, Crosetto is the nephew of Guido Crosetto, one of the founders of Brothers of Italy and currently Italian minister of defence. Why he’s worth keeping an eye on Apart from his familial connections with the Italian government, Crosetto seemingly represents a slightly more moderate wing of Brothers of Italy, resolutely condemning images of FdI supporters doing fascist salutes in January. On issues like ecology, however, he squarely fits the Brothers of Italy profile, calling for the “unfeasible Green Deal” to be dismantled. Daniel Freund - Greens Daniel Freund is a German MEP returning for a second mandate with the European Greens. Freund, who previously worked for anti-corruption NGO Transparency International, has been one of the parliament’s most prominent defenders of the rule of law in the past term. Repeatedly taking Hungary and Poland to task over their democratic backsliding, Freund has also been an important driver for the establishment of the parliament’s new ethics body. Why he’s worth keeping an eye on As the far-right remains ascendant in a number of member states, the defence of the rule of law in Europe will remain a key issue of concern for the next parliament. Freund is likely to continue his push for increased budgetary sanctions for rule of law breaches. Moreover, Freund has also been among the most vocal critics of the Hungarian presidency of the council, calling it “a serious risk to European democracy”. Piet Ruig is a Brussels-based journalist who previously worked for the Dutch public broadcaster VPRO.
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Piet Ruig
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As MEPs gather on Tuesday (16 july) in Strasbourg for the constitutive session of the next European Parliament, the first contours of the new political dynamics will become apparent. Out of the 720 members, the EUobserver has picked out seven lawmakers worthy to keep an eye on in the next term
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[
"EU Political"
] |
eu-political
|
2024-07-16T06:00:00.000Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar737a6007
|
Orban's make-believe 'I'm the EU president' act is a gamble on a Trump win
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Viktor Orbán's alleged "peace diplomacy" campaign, which unfolded during the first 12 days of Hungary's EU presidency, has shocked and surprised Budapest's EU and Nato partners. Not only were the snap visits to Putin, Xi Jinping and Donald Trump not coordinated with allies, but most importantly, Orbán's travel plans to Moscow were actively kept secret from them and Ukraine. Orbán not only parroted Russian and Chinese talking points, violated the principle of not negotiating about Ukraine without Ukraine, but generally tried to wreak havoc on EU foreign policy and position himself in the power quadrant of Putin, Xi Jinping, Trump and Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Mostly revealed and reported by the international media, on his way from Moscow to Beijing Orbán also attended the informal summit of the Organization of Turkic States in Azerbaijan, where representatives of the unrecognised Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus were also present. This also raises some questions about Orbán's commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus and how far he is willing to go with symbolic gestures to Erdogan and Turkey. Around the Nato summit in Washington , Orbán's only full-fledged bilateral took place again, with Erdogan. While the intensity of the Hungarian diplomatic offensive is truly astonishing, its substance — cozying up to authoritarian strongmen around the globe — seems more familiar. Same, but different this time However, there are at least two qualitatively new features of the unfolding events of the Hungarian EU presidency that may fundamentally influence its endgame. While the setup seems very familiar — Hungary versus the EU — the structure and dynamics of this conflict are fundamentally different from anything we have seen in the past 14 years of Hungary's autocratisation saga. This time, the Hungarian government is not confronting the European Parliament or the Commission, but rather all the other member states. At the 10 July 10 Coreper II meeting, where the member states confronted Hungary with their disapproval, 25 EU members took the floor and spoke out against the foreign policy moves of the Orbán regime. The only country that did not participate in the debate was Slovakia, but the government of Robert Fico did not actively protect Orbán either. In a thinly-veiled way, Fico even actively distanced himself from Orbán when he announced the next day that his Smer party was out of the question to join Orbán and Le Pen's new Patriots for Europe parliamentary grouping. The fact that Hungary's conflict this time is actually with all the other member states and not with the supranational EU institutions was further emphasized by the opinion of the Council's legal service, which argued that Orbán's trip to Moscow was a clear violation of the principle of sincere cooperation and the EU treaties. Among the legal services of the main EU institutions, the Council's legal service is actually the most conservative one, which usually interprets EU law according to the political interest of the sovereignty of the member states. The fact that this time even they consider Hungary to be in violation of EU law speaks for itself. While experts and the media have repeatedly criticized the slowness and timidity of the EU's reactions, the opposite is actually the case. All the main EU leaders reacted to the Moscow and Azerbaijan trips within 24 hours, the Council discussed the events in COREPER II format within four working days (!) after the Putin-Orbán meeting, and member states started spontaneously boycotting various formats of the Hungarian presidency almost immediately. This is an extraordinarily fast pace of events. Especially if we consider that the member states are already thinking about further, more formal sanctions, including cutting the rotating presidency. Of course, these are being kept as measures of last resort, but it shows that EU members are ready to escalate if Budapest continues on its course. Miscalculation or gamble? There is also something new not only in the shape of the political battle lines, but also in the strategy pursued by the Hungarian leader. Over the past 14 years, Orbán, like a true semi-autocrat, has always played the long game. This time he is not. Expanding his political autonomy and room for maneuver is obviously the strategic foreign policy goal behind the campaign, but judging by its intensity and the reactions it has provoked, it seems to be backfiring. There are two logical explanations for the Hungarian diplomatic offensive, which appears to have been planned in detail well in advance. Either it represents a serious miscalculation on the part of the Hungarian regime as to how far — and how fast — it can go, or it is designed to achieve its goals in a short period of time, until 5 November. But even if one of the main goals of the diplomatic offensive is to place Orbán in the middle of the above-mentioned power quadrant of Putin, Xi Jinping, Trump and Erdogan, which apparently is the new geopolitical coordinate system after November according to Orbán, a striking characteristic of the strategy is that it hardly allows for a plan B and thus represents a very risky gamble for the Hungarian leader. Obviously, he is putting all his eggs in one basket, the return of Trump, the alternative being a humiliated, ridiculed, weakened and sanctioned Hungary if his bet doesn't pay off. Whether Orbán has miscalculated or is making a spectacular gamble will have to be seen in the coming weeks. If he backtracks and de-escalates, the show of the last ten days could be a product of miscalculation. If he continues trolling and provoking, it is by design and may only intensify between now and 5 November. If this happens, the member states must be prepared to end the Hungarian presidency before the elections in Georgia , Moldova and the United States in the fall, in order to avoid a fundamental perception crisis of the EU's foreign policy. Daniel Hegedüs is senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS). Daniel Hegedüs is senior fellow at the
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German Marshall Fund of the United States
|
There are at least two qualitatively new features of the unfolding events of the Hungarian EU presidency that may fundamentally influence its endgame. This time, the Hungarian government is not confronting the European Parliament or the Commission, but rather all the other member states, writes Daniel Hegedus of the German Marshall Fund.
|
[
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-political
|
2024-07-15T05:00:00.000Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-political/araa27331d
|
My son's torturer will be representing Syria at the Paris Olympics
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The Olympics is such a celebration of young people, of big dreams realised and collective joy. It reminds me of the energy that my youngest son Ayham had when he was growing up. He wanted to learn everything about politics since he was a young teenager, questioning freedom of speech in Syria under Assad’s rule. I learnt so much from him. When the Syrian revolution started, he met many like-minded young people at university. He was part of peaceful protests to call for freedom and democracy. It meant something to be part of the student community at Damascus University and he made firm friends instantly. His life was ended and dreams of a free Syria squashed when fellow students stormed his lecture hall and dragged him to a room of his university’s medical faculty, torturing him in ways it is too painful to recount. He endured hours of violence at the hands of the National Union of Syrian Students (NUSS), who in coordination with Syria’s state intelligence services, became the regime’s de facto oppressors on campus. They tortured him so badly that he later died of internal bleeding in a government detention cell. Now, more than 10 years on, Omar Aroub, the man who was a senior member of the NUSS leadership at the time, overseeing crimes of the worst kind, is getting ready for the Olympics. He is now Syria’s vice president of the General Sports Federation, as well as the chairman of the Syrian Paralympic Committee. He was awarded these titles through the blood of our children. It’s hard for me to believe that such a criminal is roaming free around the world while thousands of people remain detained or disappeared in Syria. Aroub was instrumental in the crimes committed by the nation-wide student union which spread fear and turned students against fellow students at the start of the revolution. He recruited students to suppress protests, providing them with weapons and instructing them to torture, detain or throw students out of dormitory windows. A recent report by investigators gives heartbreaking details of all the NUSS crimes committed in direct coordination with the wider state security apparatus at the same university where my son was killed. My son was missing for months before I learned that he died days after his detention My son was missing for months before I learned that he died days after his detention. Until I knew the truth I visited different detention centers most days searching for him. But when I met Ayham’s friend who survived detention alongside him, he told me about the last days of my son’s life. We talked about the big ambitious dreams my son had for his future and for the future of Syria. He was a young man with Olympic-size hopes that inspired me to hope for something different — and that’s what I try to do to this day. His hopes were taken from him and I will forever grieve the beautiful boy they took from me. I am even denied the truth about where he was buried. I will always call for justice for the crimes he and so many others endured. Justice does not just mean standing trial, although this is of course vital for any kind of accountability. Justice should also mean war criminals are not given podiums where they can flaunt their impunity.The International Olympic Committee knows the crimes Aroub committed and yet he is still allowed to be part of Syria’s delegation. His presence on the team says to every one of his victims that war crimes are not just tolerated, they are awarded. It also sends a dangerous message to every head of state deliberating their relationship with the Syrian regime. Safe for return? Some EU states might use Aroub’s Olympic PR stunt as a cover for their anti-refugee policies. It is fuel for their argument that parts of Syria are safe for refugees to return to. The reality could not be further from the truth. There are signs that the Czech Republic is planning a fact-finding mission to Syria on behalf of the European Union to build a case for deporting those who have sought safety in Europe. But if their mission is truly fact finding, they will find evidence of ongoing human right abuses at the hands of the regime. If Ayham was with me today he would be working day and night to demand an end to human rights abuses. He would be saying that people like Aroub belong behind bars and not at international events. Alongside other families and survivors, we have been calling for accountability for a long time. Today we demand that Aroub be banned from the Paris games. Together we can show him that he will be held accountable for his crimes. Mariam al-Hallak is an activist and former educator now based in Berlin. She's a founder of the Caesar Families Association . Al-Hallak one of many Syrians who learnt of their loved ones' deaths in the Assad regime's detention centres through the so-called ' Caesar photos ' — leaked images of thousands of detainees tortured to death in custody. Mariam al-Hallak is an activist and former educator now based in Berlin. She's a founder of the Caesar Families Association . Al-Hallak one of many Syrians who learnt of their loved ones' deaths in the Assad regime's detention centres through the so-called '
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Caesar photos
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The International Olympic Committee knows the crimes Omar Aroub committed and yet he is still allowed to be part of Syria’s delegation.
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[
"EU & the World",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2024-07-12T09:14:19.091Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar8672ae76
|
Nato's two-percent of GDP target is a blank cheque to the arms industry
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In his opening address at the 75th anniversary celebratory summit in Washington, Nato secretary general Jens Stoltenberg described it as the most "successful alliance in history ," claiming recently that its main purpose was not to fight wars but to prevent them. The people of war-torn nations like Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, who have suffered decades of instability because of Nato-led wars, might disagree. It was not the cost of war that topped the summit agenda however, but rather how to maximise profit from it. As Nato expands so does military spending Nato was founded in 1949 when its 12 initial members pledged to collectively defend each other in the event of an attack. Though its rival alliance, the Warsaw Pact, was dissolved at the end of the Cold War, Nato continued to expand, particularly eastward, and today it has 32 permanent members and maintains partnerships with the African Union and states in the Indo-Pacific region. As Nato grows, so too does its military budget, which according to SIPRI hit a record high of $1.341 trillion [€1.2 trillion], accounting for 55 percent of global military expenditure in 2023. Nato spending is governed by its defence investment guideline - a political agreement and not a legal obligation, which stipulates that members must commit two percent of their GDP to "help ensure the Alliance’s continued military readiness". Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Nato has called on all members to increase spending to meet this two-percent target — even though the Alliance's budget and its military capability are already vastly superior to that of any potential aggressor or rival. In advance of the 2024 summit an exuberant Stoltenberg, sitting alongside US president Joe Biden, announced that a record 23 of Nato 32 members had hit the two-percent target, which he clarified is no longer "the ceiling, but the floor". Aligning a state’s military budget with a percentage of its GDP says precisely nothing about that state’s military capability. It is an entirely arbitrary figure established by a purely economic criterion. For example, landlocked Luxembourg with a population of just over 672,000 could invest two percent of its GDP in submarines, though it would have no use for them, and the Nato target would have been met. Though the two-percent rule is devoid of any rationale or logic beyond boosting militarism and fuelling war, non-Nato members are now also beginning to apply this standard, establishing an unofficial global norm for military spending. Making a killing At least one-fifth (20 percent) of the ‘two-percent floor’ must be invested in major equipment and associated R&D. In other words, hundreds of billions of taxpayer money should be directly invested in highly lucrative private arms companies to produce weapons of war. According to Nato 2024 spending report , all but two members (Belgium and Canada) fell short of the 20 percent target, with Albania, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg and Poland spending over 40 percent of their military budgets on equipment and R&D. Applying the ‘20 percent of two percent’ rule to SIPRI's 2023 figure of $1.341 trillion would see arms companies cashing into the tune of $268bn, though considering that at least five Nato members are already spending over twice this amount on equipment and R&D, this sum is likely much higher. By comparison, the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations has an annual budget of a mere $ 6 bn to oversee its global operations indicating that states have relegated peace-keeping, diplomacy and multilateralism to the dustbin and are hellbent on pursuing a hawkish war agenda instead. Still not content with current spending levels however, Stoltenberg announced that Nato would be rolling out a new defence industrial pledge during this summit with a "better outlook for the arms industry" meaning more spending on bigger contracts for longer-term investments. In short — more war. He lauded Nato's trans-Atlantic F-35 collaboration as a Nato success story though he failed to mention that these fighter jets are being used by Israel in its genocidal war on Gaza, where UN experts have repeatedly called on states to impose an arms embargo. Nato is a war alliance Between banter about baseball, US secretary of state Anthony Blinken said at the summit that Nato is stronger, larger, more fit for purpose, and ready to deal with the challenges of our time. One of the greatest challenges however is global warming, which is worsened by war with 5.5 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions being produced by the military. New research from the Transnational Institute, Stop Wapenhandel and others found that Nato's overall military spending last year produced an estimated 233 million metric tonnes of CO2, more than Colombia or Qatar’s entire annual greenhouse gas emissions. Nato is a war alliance. Far from promoting peace and stability as it claims, it is the single most destructive alliance in history having participated in several wars over previous decades resulting in millions of deaths and driving unprecedented levels of forced displacement and devastation. If world leaders were truly interested in addressing the challenges of our time then dissolving Nato should be number one on their list of priorities. Niamh Ni Bhriain is war and pacification programme coordinator at the Transnational Institute , founded in 1974 as a international research and advocacy institute committed to building a just, democratic and sustainable planet. Niamh Ni Bhriain is war and pacification programme coordinator at the
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Transnational Institute
|
Aligning a state’s military budget with a percentage of its GDP says precisely nothing about that state’s military capability. It is an entirely arbitrary figure established by a purely economic criterion.
|
[
"EU & the World",
"Ukraine",
"Opinion"
] |
*
|
2024-07-11T10:43:08.353Z
|
https://euobserver.com/*/ar0395ffcd
|
The EU and China are destined for a protracted trade war
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The EU began imposing tariffs of up to 37.6 percent on Chinese electric vehicles (EVs) last Friday (5 July), affecting $11.5bn [€10.6bn] of Chinese EV exports. In response, China threatened retaliation, starting with pork, particularly affecting Spain. It's likely China will expand its retaliation list to include European big engine cars , dairy products, wine and cognac. The EU-China trade war appears imminent. While the trade war seems imminent, an all-out conflict in the near future is unlikely. To Chinese policymakers, the EU represents an intermediate zone in countering US hegemony. The US is China’s principal rival in foreign policy, classified under Marxist dialectics as the major contradiction, while the EU is seen as the minor one. China is likely to avoid a full-scale retaliation similar to its 2018 response to the US due to deflationary pressures on its economy and its reliance on the EU market. The EU is China’s largest export market and crucial for Chinese outbound investments due to its legal environment, large consumer base and high-tech industries, making it highly attractive to Chinese entrepreneurs. Chinese policymakers are attempting to defuse tensions by sending high-ranking officials for environment and climate dialogues in the EU, seeking diplomatic solutions. Therefore, the next four to six months may provide a window for normal EU-China trade relations China may refrain from extensive retaliations, preferring peaceful resolutions through lobbying and dialogue. The outcome of the US presidential election will significantly influence China’s stance, with a potential Trump 2.0 administration likely reigniting US-China trade tensions. Furthermore, the rise of extreme rightwing movements in France and elsewhere in Europe makes Chinese policymakers cautious about exacerbating nationalism and protectionism. The rise of extreme rightwing movements in France and elsewhere in Europe makes Chinese policymakers cautious about exacerbating nationalism and protectionism However, this period of cautious observation will likely be short-lived. EU-China trade tensions are expected to intensify into a prolonged conflict starting from early 2025. Two systemic factors contribute to this escalation and prolongation. Firstly, EU-China economic competition is structural; China no longer dominates only low-end production but competes globally with high-end manufactured goods of strategic importance such as EVs, batteries, telecom equipment, fast rail systems, airplanes, and wind turbines. The EU has implemented legal measures to counter China’s subsidized advantages. Reciprocity in openness is also seen as lacking from China’s side, prompting the EU to act against what it perceives as unfair practices. Secondly, geopolitical factors are now influencing EU-China relations. A geopolitical rivalry has emerged between the “ Geopolitical European Union ” and an assertive, authoritarian China. While Chinese policymakers traditionally denied conflicts of geopolitical interest with the EU, this perception shifted after 2019, particularly with the transformation of the European Commission under Ursula von der Leyen, who secured a second tenure for 2024-2029 . China’s “17+1” initiative, initially seen as encroaching on the EU’s central and eastern European interests, has strained relations. Events like the China-Lithuania diplomatic row and Russia-Ukraine conflict further strained relations, leading to a reduced “17+1” to “14+1” format . China’s strategic partnership with Russia has altered perceptions in the EU, viewing China more as a systemic rival and less as a partner. This shift prompts the “Geopolitical Europe” to resist China’s economic and political influence, particularly its statist model. Long-term economic conflict These systemic factors will likely lead EU-China relations into a long-term economic conflict. Beijing will find it increasingly unacceptable as its new quality productive forces are constrained and hundreds of billions in exports to Europe are affected. Beijing may strategically target EU sectors for retaliation, escalating multiple trade conflicts. With the EU’s exports to China valued at €224bn, not counting services and investments, China has substantial leverage. With the EU’s exports to China valued at €224bn, not counting services and investments, China has substantial leverage A protracted EU-China trade war would have profound implications. Firstly, it could disrupt the atmosphere within the multilateral trading system, notably affecting the WTO, where both the EU and China play crucial roles. Secondly, the EU risks losing a historically ardent supporter of European integration. This would significantly impact the EU, especially with the rise of far-right movements within Europe, if China opts to work with individual member states rather than EU institutions—a strategy similar to past instances involving Donald Trump . There are already clear indications of this approach, such as the episode when Emmanuel Macron accompanied Ursula von der Leyen on a state visit to China, during which she received “a cold shoulder” . Thirdly, a prolonged trade conflict could reshape global supply chains, potentially leading to a partial economic decoupling between the world’s second (China) and third (EU) largest economies. An enduring trade war would also affect China’s domestic politics and foreign policy, closing off avenues for engagement with the liberal world and potentially leading to closer alignment with Russia amid tensions in East Asia (Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait). This could result in the formation of two military blocs in East Asia: China-Russia-North Korea vs. US-Japan-South Korea . In summary, a protracted trade war would severely disrupt peace in East Asia and have global repercussions. In the coming years, the EU, based on its values, will most probably contend with challenges including a revanchist Russia, a populist resurgence under Trump 2.0, the rise of far-right movements, and a prolonged economic conflict with China — an authoritarian giant commanding the world’s second-largest consumer market. The fate of global trade largely rests in the hands of EU and Chinese decision-makers, but time is running out as they seem destined for a prolonged trade war. Zhang Xiaotong is professor at the department of political science and international relations at KIMEP Univiersity, Almaty, Kazakhstan, and director of the China and Central Asia Studies Center, and editor-in-chief of the journal Economic Diplomacy . He is the author of the recent book Linkage Power Europe: The EU’s Trade Negotiations with China (1975-2019) . Zhang Xiaotong is professor at the department of political science and international relations at KIMEP Univiersity, Almaty, Kazakhstan, and director of the China and Central Asia Studies Center, and editor-in-chief of the journal Economic Diplomacy . He is the author of the recent book Linkage Power Europe: The EU’s Trade Negotiations with China (1975-2019)
|
.
|
The EU began imposing massive tariffs on Chinese electrical vehicles last Friday — it's likely China will expand its retaliation list to include European big engine cars, dairy products, wine and cognac. The EU-China trade war appears imminent.
|
[
"EU & the World",
"Green Economy",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2024-07-10T10:50:38.328Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/aredfedbb0
|
Report highlights hiring practices as hurdle to disabled European job-seekers
|
Employees with disabilities continue to face serious obstacles to labour market inclusion, according to a new report by the European Disabilities Forum (EDF) published on Wednesday (10 July). The report details how, despite existing legal frameworks on reasonable accommodation measures, these are not effectively put into practice to truly help Europeans with disabilities, as access issues and hostile workplace cultures remain. Main issues include a lack of “awareness, provision of assistive technology, reasonable accommodation and development of digital skills” the report authors write, calling on public authorities in the EU to step up their game. “Employers need more information and support, or persons with disabilities will remain excluded,” said Maureen Piggot, EDF executive committee member, adding that more policies were needed to “allow workers with disabilities to be employed and, more than that, to be valued”. The findings come as employment levels of people with disabilities continue to be significantly lower than the rest of the population, with only 51 percent of people with disabilities in employment compared to 75 percent of those without, according to previous research by the EDF. But the report highlights that inadequate hiring practices have contributed to this gap remaining pervasive, with only one-in-four employers in the EU participating in programmes that make recruitment more accessible. Among EU member states, Spain is the only positive outlier, with 82 percent of employers interviewed using accessible hiring programmes. Spain also has a comparatively small employment gap, coming in at 14 percent, with only Portugal, Denmark and Luxembourg scoring better. But accessibility issues continue after the recruitment process as well, the report's authors write, with 81 percent of employers interviewed for the service saying that they did not have any programmes in place for the acquisition of assistive technology, with 75 percent not even sure whether their employees used such technological aids. Generally, a lack of awareness and understanding was a pervasive problem obstructing the professional inclusion of people with disabilities, the report highlighted. This applied to public support programmes for reasonable access as well, with only a quarter of employers aware of such programmes. In order to address the issues, the report called on both employers and public authorities to increase both funding and awareness for accessible technology. Noting that the 100 million Europeans with disabilities “represent the largest minority in Europe,” failure to effectively include them “would result in a societal and economic cost our continent simply cannot afford,” the authors argued. Piet Ruig is a Brussels-based journalist who previously worked for the Dutch public broadcaster VPRO.
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Piet Ruig
|
Europeans with disabilities continue to face pervasive problems in workplace and labour market accessibility, according to a new report by the European Disability Forum. Obstacles highlighted include a lack of accessible hiring practices and insufficient provision of assistive technology.
|
[
"Health & Society"
] |
health-and-society
|
2024-07-10T06:00:00.000Z
|
https://euobserver.com/health-and-society/ard19d45ea
|
Memo to Nato: hoping for Ukraine victory but denying supplies won't work
|
As Nato meets in Washington on Tuesday (9 July) for a three-day summit, with Ukraine one of the topics at the top of the agenda , officials have already started preparing — and according to the Wall Street Journal, Nato will establish a greater presence in Ukraine. The organisation will “station a senior civilian official in Kyiv,” where this individual will regularly work with Ukrainian officials. Nato will also establish a programme to manage current and future military assistance to Ukraine. The effort will be based in Germany. The new initiative, however, will not be referred to as a “mission” as Nato member Germany stated it wants to “avoid the implication that it and Nato were at war with Russia.” Aside from this programme, Nato secretary general Jens Stoltenberg has also requested Nato members to pledge “ a minimum of €40bn ($43.37bn) annually to fund [defence] aid to Ukraine .” The objective is to establish a long-term plan for future aid to Ukraine. These two efforts signal that Nato is fully committed to helping Ukraine, and that the organisation will continue to do what it takes to help this Eastern European state in its time of need. Aside from sending various forms of assistance, several Nato members have also stated they will send military instructors to Ukraine. 'Military trainers'? According to French president Emmanuel Macron, several Nato member countries have agreed to send military trainers . France, Poland, and the Baltic states have also stated that they are prepared to send troops to help Ukraine. These countries have argued that the West is too worried about aggravating Russia, and that the West instead should do everything it can to help Ukraine. Several countries, such as the United Kingdom and Germany, quickly dismissed France’s proposal. They argued that sending troops to Ukraine would further aggravate Russia, and that it would lead to a larger conflict. These concerns, however, ignore the larger picture. Russia’s war has already escalated. As Western organisations and institutions consume themselves with Russia’s behavior, the Russian Federation continues to escalate its war. For example, the Russians recently sprung an attack on Kharkiv province, an event that forced thousands of Ukrainians to flee their homes. Ahead of the Nato summit, the Russians also launched a missile strike on Ukrainian civilians in Dnipro and Kyiv . When the Russian invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, several Western media outlets were sceptical of Ukraine’s success. “Ukraine probably cannot hold off Russia forever,” one international headline read at the time . Given this mentality, several countries were hesitant to provide defence assistance to Ukraine. Despite these pessimistic views, Ukraine defended itself from the Russian onslaught. By April 2022, the Ukrainians successfully defended their capital. They also forced the Russians out of northern and central Ukraine. Then, by 2023, Ukraine reclaimed more than half of the Russian-occupied territory in southern and eastern Ukraine. In addition, the Ukrainians destroyed two-thirds of Russia’s pre-invasion tank force, and they destroyed one-third of Russia’s entire Black Sea Fleet. Despite these successes, several Western countries have continued to enforce their self-imposed restrictions on defense aid to Ukraine. These barriers, in addition to recently delayed European and American aid, allowed the Russians to fortify their positions in southern and eastern Ukraine. North Korea and Iran supplies The Russians also purchased defense equipment and hardware from the North Koreans and Iranians. This allowed them to bolster their defense forces. It also allowed the Russians to conduct multiple airstrikes on civilian targets across Ukraine. These bombardments have killed many Ukrainians, and it has led to the destruction of several Ukrainian cities and villages. Delayed Western response during Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, and stalled assistance to Ukraine in late 2023 and early 2024 are partially to blame for Russia’s continued war. These hold-ups allowed Russia to regroup its forces, and claim and occupy additional territory in southern and eastern Ukraine. It is important to note that many countries around the world continue to stand with Ukraine. They are also concerned that Russia’s war will continue without a foreseeable end. But there is still hesitancy to supply Ukraine with the weaponry it needs to defeat Russia and end the war. Hoping for a Ukrainian victory while delaying future assistance and imposing barriers to aid cannot coexist. Members of the international community must realize that such a strategy will not result in a short conflict. Instead, if they continue to behave in this manner, then they must prepare themselves for a prolonged war. Therefore, if world leaders genuinely want to do whatever it takes to help Ukraine win the war, then they should lift the restrictions on defence assistance to Ukraine so that this country can achieve victory. Otherwise, their hesitation and fear of escalation will only lead to the additional loss of Ukrainian life. It will also increase the probability of sending advisors and soldiers from Nato member countries to Ukraine, and this could lead to the additional loss of life. Dragging Nato into Russia’s war will only lead to a deadlier outcome, and no one will want this. Mark Temnycky is an accredited freelance journalist covering Eurasian affairs and a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Mark Temnycky is an accredited freelance journalist covering Eurasian affairs and a
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non-resident fellow
|
Delayed Western response during Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, and stalled assistance to Ukraine in late 2023 and early 2024 are partially to blame for Russia’s continued war
|
[
"Ukraine",
"Opinion"
] |
ukraine
|
2024-07-09T10:56:48.094Z
|
https://euobserver.com/ukraine/ar1303c12d
|
The EU must not support intensive fish farming — it's not sustainable
|
The Hungarian presidency of the Council of the European Union, which will run between 1 July and 31 December 2024, has announced in its programme that it will pay particular attention to the development of “sustainable and competitive aquaculture”, arguing that “it is the animal protein production sector with the smallest environmental footprint.” Beyond a supposedly low carbon footprint, aquaculture is also presented as an alternative to mitigate declining wild fish catches. However, under the term “aquaculture” we find various production models – some of which are more environmentally benign when conducted at appropriate scale, such as the cultivation of mussels, clams, and oysters, and some of which come with significant damaging impacts. Many European consumers who want to eat fish from sustainable sources believe farmed salmon, trout and seabass are sustainable choices. But the intensive farming of carnivorous fin fish is neither socially nor environmentally sustainable. The environmental impacts of this industrial production model include an increase in harmful algal blooms , a negative impact on sea grass meadows due to the accumulation of organic matter around farms, mass fish die-offs , the use of the harmful substances such as carcinogenic formaldehyde or antibiotics, and water pollution , creating dead zones on the sea bed underneath the farms. Adding to this, carnivorous farmed fish such as salmon and seabass require high volumes of fishmeal and fish oil from wild-caught fish in their feed. In Europe, industrial aquaculture of carnivorous fish at sea is damaging the environment and displacing traditional activities such as coastal small-scale fisheries. On the island of Poros, Greece, for example, the plan is to increase the area dedicated to open net pen carnivorous fish farms by 28 times. Yet, underwater video depicts that marine ecosystem near the current small-scale pens is completely dead from the waste and pollution of the farms, and local professional fishermen attest to a loss of wild fish since the influx of fish farms. Beyond Europe, the production of fishmeal and fish oil necessary to feed carnivorous farmed fish is depleting wild fish stocks. This is the case in West Africa where the overfishing of small pelagics such as sardines and mackerel for industrial fish farms in Europe is undermining food security and the livelihoods of small-scale fishers and women fish-processors. Fish is taken away from people in low-income countries to feed the farmed fish which will be consumed in wealthy nations. The UN special rapporteur on the right to food acknowledged this in his report to the Human Rights Council in early 2024: “Many farmed fish are carnivorous species that require feed products harvested from wild fish stock, thereby creating another source of pressure on wild fish stocks and disrupting ecosystems. Moreover, global feed companies are exacerbating food insecurity in some communities. For example, over half a million tons of pelagic fish that could feed over 33 million people in the region are instead extracted from the ocean along the coast of West Africa and converted to fishmeal and fish oil, primarily in order to feed farmed fish and livestock, mostly in Asia and Europe.” The current EU strategy for aquaculture does not respond to the social and environmental challenges posed by this sector and fails to clearly define what “sustainable” aquaculture is. In fact, in a special report on aquaculture , the European Court of Auditors (ECA) found that the European Union has been pouring funds into the development of aquaculture with little proof that this has contributed to the sector’s “environmental and social sustainability or its competitiveness.” The ECA report further highlights that “there are currently no indicators available to monitor the environmental sustainability of EU aquaculture.” Under the agriculture and fisheries agenda, Hungary has reaffirmed its wish to support farmers, and fish farmers, through a “farmer-friendly European food system.” Rather they should support low impact small-scale fishers as primary food producers. Under the Hungarian presidency, the EU should discontinue support for industrial aquaculture of carnivorous species and instead promote more sustainable small-scale aquaculture options that can co-exist instead of negatively affecting small-scale fisheries in Europe and beyond. If Europe wants to be a model in sustainable ocean governance, it must place small-scale, low-impact fisheries and aquaculture at the heart of its food policy. The Coalition for Fair Fisheries Arrangements is a platform of European and African organisations that raises awareness about the impacts of the EU-Africa fisheries agreements on artisanal fishing communities. The
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Coalition for Fair Fisheries Arrangements
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The Hungarian EU presidency has announced its main priority when it comes to fisheries is to support aquaculture. The EU should focus instead on responding to the social and environmental challenges posed by this sector and on promoting sustainable small-scale aquaculture options.
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[] |
*
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2024-07-08T13:40:04.687Z
|
https://euobserver.com/*/ar52d6319c
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Confiscating Russian assets would not break international law — it would safeguard it
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Seizing all $300bn [€277bn] of Russia’s frozen state assets and transferring them to Ukraine is disregarded as nearly impossible by the EU. Consequently, we have ended up with a disappointing compromise. At the recent G7 summit in Italy, leaders agreed to provide Ukraine with a $50bn loan backed by the interest earned from the frozen assets. It is better than nothing, but pales in comparison to the assets’ game-changing scale. While the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and others are pushing for the full seizure of Russia’s frozen assets to support Ukraine, some European officials worry about setting a controversial legal precedent. It is not just that Russia could sue us for a perceived violation of international law, they claim. If we alter the law to confiscate the assets, other countries could launch counter restrictive or retrospective legal actions which could undermine the EU as a defender of the rule of law. Other European officials highlight potential economic retaliation — particularly from China and Saudi Arabia — as the main reason to refrain from confiscating Russia’s frozen assets. Whether in the form of direct retaliation against large EU member states such as France and Germany, or by withdrawing state assets from European banks, some European officials fear that retaliatory steps could undermine the euro as a reserve currency and threaten Europe’s economic stability. Saudi Arabia and China bluffing? But while Xi Jinping has professed a “no-limits” friendship with Vladimir Putin, an economic confrontation with Europe would be a significant gamble for Beijing. For those who have not professed support for Russia’s illegal war, Saudi Arabia among them, retaliation would represent a major escalation. Let us be clear: confiscating frozen Russian state assets to support Ukraine would safeguard international law — not break it. And in not confiscating the frozen assets, Europe is rendering perceived economic interests more important than the international law it claims to protect. Russia has blatantly violated international law every single day since the beginning of Putin’s illegal war. This clear violation was recognized by the UN General Assembly on 14 November 2022, and by the International Court of Justice on 31 January 2024 in its binding preliminary ruling that Russia must bear all legal consequences of its wrongful acts — including paying reparations for the damage caused by the war. In a detailed report by the European Parliamentary Research Service, "confiscation based on third-party countermeasures with a conditional element" and "confiscation based on the enforcement of international judgments against Russia" are deemed consistent with international law. Even if a country does not currently have existing legal mechanisms to confiscate frozen Russian assets, new measures can certainly be legislated. Canada did so in 2022, and the United States followed suit earlier this year. Behind closed doors, some European officials argue that the West can leverage the frozen assets to entice Putin to end the war, under the assumption that they would be unfrozen once the war is over. But the West must remember that Putin has been willing to suffer huge economic losses and put Russia’s entire economy on a war footing just to continue the invasion. Money has no influence over Putin’s decision-making. On the contrary, it is Europe that seemingly bends to economic threats. Even once the war ends, Putin’s regime is highly unlikely to voluntarily compensate Ukraine as international law commands. Confiscation of Russia’s frozen assets is the only measure that would even begin to approach the costs of Ukraine’s eventual reconstruction. It will be either Russia or Western taxpayers that will foot most of the bill. The arguments against confiscating the Russian state assets are based more on fear than reality. Steps by Western governments to seize frozen Russian assets would be made on solid legal, logical, and moral grounds — and governments can adopt new legal precautions against counterclaims where necessary. Western leaders must demonstrate that international law is not just symbolic, but a set of rules under which those who break them are held responsible — regardless of economic interests. Ukraine’s allies must finally demonstrate to Putin — and other potential aggressors — that the free world is ready to use all measures possible to bring Russia to justice and defend the rule of law. Olena Sotnyk is a lawyer, senior representative for Rasmussen Global political consultancy in Ukraine, advisor to the deputy prime minister of Ukraine, and a former MP in Ukraine from 2014-2019. She has a background in international law, human rights, and security studies. Celine la Cour is a project manager at Rasmussen Global based in Brussels. She formerly worked for the Danish government and the EEAS and has an educational background in international relations and conflict resolution. Olena Sotnyk is a lawyer, senior representative for Rasmussen Global political consultancy in Ukraine, advisor to the deputy prime minister of Ukraine, and a former MP in Ukraine from 2014-2019. She has a background in international law, human rights, and security studies.
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Celine la Cour
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European officials highlight potential economic retaliation — particularly from China and Saudi Arabia — as the main reason to refrain from confiscating Russia’s frozen assets. Whether in the form of direct retaliation against large EU member states such as France and Germany, or by withdrawing state assets from European banks, they fear that retaliatory steps could undermine the euro as a reserve currency and threaten Europe’s economic stability.
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[
"EU & the World",
"Ukraine",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2024-07-08T11:24:21.270Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar07c9897d
|
Podcast: Orbán in command
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The schizophrenic politics of the European Union continue. On one hand, you have the far-right winning big in France’s first round of parliamentary elections and the eurosceptic Viktor Orbán taking over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union (not to be confused with the European Council, which of course no one would ever do). On the other hand, you’ve got a trio of solid centrist and pro-EU personalities (Ursula von der Leyen, Antonio Costa and Kaja Kallas) set to lead the bloc in Brussels — and possibly without having to pander to the far-right (or whatever Giorgia Meloni’s ECR says it is) for their votes. All said, there are ample arguments to be made for both that the sky is falling in and that everything will be OK. EUobserver’s Andrew Rettman returns to talk foremost about Hungary’s presidency and Pascal LeTendre-Hanns shares insights into French politics right now
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.
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A run through the beginning of the controversial Hungary’s EU Council presidency and what is at stake in French politics right now.
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[
"EU & the World",
"EU Political"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2024-07-08T09:29:56.849Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar439da76b
|
Beyond the missiles — a call for a €1bn European Cultural Deal for Ukraine
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While the world focuses on military tactics in Ukraine, a quieter war rages for the soul of the nation. Children cry for food and their parents, missiles rain down, yet in conference rooms, journalists, security experts and foreign policy analysts discuss "Europe at War" comfortably from their distance. Amidst all the talk a critical front is being ignored: the cultural front. The war at our doorsteps is not only a brutal invasion on an independent European country, but an assault on international laws and on peoples’ culture, heritage, and identity. It is the systematic pursuit of Russian colonialism and denial of an independent Ukrainian culture and existence. Putin’s war is a drain on the people, culture, and economy of Ukraine. It has driven millions into poverty and is devasting on all fronts. Still, Ukrainians are showing extraordinary resilience and determination fighting the aggressor, and defending the fundamental values of freedom, democracy and human dignity which are essentially cultural. Ukraine is fighting for its existence as it is fighting for its European destination. We need to do all it takes, not only to support Ukraine, but to make it win the war and cultural battle. The European Union’s decision to grant Ukraine an EU membership perspective in June 2022 and to open accession negotiations in December 2023 evidences European leaders’ recognition of Ukraine as a pivotal partner now, and in the future. After the war, Ukraine will have a key role supporting the EU in its efforts to promote peace, stability, and democracy in the region. None of these ambitions can be achieved without culture. A 'European Cultural Deal' for Ukraine? Aware of the deep cultural dimension of the conflict, the initiators of the Cultural Deal for Europe campaign – European Cultural Foundation , Culture Action Europe , Europa Nostra – supported by hundreds of arts, culture, and civil society actors, including important philanthropies like TBA21 Thyssen-Bornemisza Art Contemporary and Museums for Ukraine, have come together calling for a European Cultural Deal for Ukraine. . The European Cultural Deal for Ukraine proposes a strategic, longterm vision for Ukraine, firmly attached to European values and with a solid European sentiment towards its people. Ukraine’s heroic fight, strength and resilience also show through its cultural resistance. Theatres, operas, museums, galleries, libraries, and art spaces continue to operate whenever possible providing support and hope. Culture is essential for Ukraine today as for its future tomorrow. In this spirit, the European Cultural Deal for Ukraine campaigns for culture and cultural heritage to be part of the EU’s and Ukraine’s Recovery Plans and Actions, specifically for two percent of the Ukraine Facility (2024-2027) worth up to €50bn to be allocated to culture. The collective appeal advocates for: Consolidating knowledge and regularly updating needs assessments of the Ukrainian cultural sector Ensuring culture is included in international and national support packages for Ukraine Developing capacity building and mutual learning opportunities to support the reform of Ukraine’s legal cultural infrastructure and cultural policy Promoting Ukrainian culture in Europe, and investing in a culture of solidarity Reinforcing Ukrainian participation in European cultural networks and projects Involving Ukraine in EU actions related to culture, cultural heritage and the creative industries Supporting Ukrainian cultural stakeholders in their own advocacy, in and outside Ukraine Making the EU emergency response for cultural recovery a reality. There is still no sight of an EU emergency mechanism for culture While the European Cultural Deal campaign, working together with the European institutions on the one hand, and pushed by Ukrainian cultural actors on the other, succeeded to have culture in both the EU’s and Ukraine’s Recovery Plans, there is still no sight of an EU emergency mechanism for culture – as called for by the European Parliament in its resolution on cultural solidarity with Ukraine (in October 2022). Setting up such a European cultural solidarity and recovery mechanism could be a powerful first initiative of the new Culture Committee of the European Parliament and the incoming European Commissioner for Culture. The European Cultural Deal for Ukraine recognises the value of arts and culture as forces of resistance, expressions of resilience, and essentials to the reconstruction of Ukraine – emotionally, mentally, and physically. We must invest in culture and its capacity to heal, unite communities, and imagine a way forward. This counts as much for Ukraine as it does for Europe. Ukraine boasts a wealth of cultural traditions, languages, and ethnicities, reflecting its complex history and diverse population. By celebrating and preserving this cultural tapestry, the deal aims to strengthen Ukraine’s European belonging and identity while fostering greater appreciation for its cultural contributions and heritage within the EU and beyond. Initiatives strengthening a culture of solidarity — such as the Culture of Solidarity Fund (Ukraine edition launched the day after Russia’s brutal assault) — and creating cultural bonds between Ukraine and other European countries play a crucial role in supporting Ukraine’s arts and cultural ecosystem, preserving its cultural richness for future generations, and preparing for Ukraine’s EU membership. Crucially, the success of the European Cultural Deal for Ukraine will depend on strong political commitment, adequate funding and meaningful engagement from all stakeholders. The EU, national governments, cultural institutions, civil society organisations and the private sector must work together in a spirit of cooperation and solidarity. New forms of public-private partnerships need to be engineered, and current cumbersome and outdated administrative and financial rules be revisited, upgraded and some possibly scrapped. We want the EU to assume leadership—also in cultural terms. We want to see a European Commission president championing culture and a European Parliament united for Ukraine's cause in Europe. Ukraine’s future is in Europe, but there is no future without culture. Isabelle Schwarz is head of public policy at the European Cultural Foundation Isabelle Schwarz
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is head of public policy at the
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A quieter war rages for the soul of the Ukrainian nation. Amidst all the military hardware talk a critical frontline is being ignored: the cultural front.
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[
"EU & the World",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2024-07-05T11:10:44.897Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar129eb7bc
|
Do European Jews endorse the IHRA definition of anti-semitism?
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In 2016, the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) adopted a “working definition of anti-semitism”. Since then, the definition has attracted endorsement by a wide range of governmental, professional and civic organisations as a means of identifying antisemitic attitudes and behaviours. In particular, the European Commission sees the definition as “the benchmark” for defining anti-semitism and as “the basis for [its] work on tackling anti-semitism.” Further, the commission argues that Jewish endorsement of the IHRA definition is an important condition for demonstrating its validity. The IHRA definition comprises a generic statement on the nature of anti-semitism, augmented by a set of 11 “contemporary examples”. Seven of them are linked in some way to Israel (e.g. applying double standards to Israel, drawing comparisons between Israeli policy and that of the Nazis) and four examples are unrelated to Israel (e.g. alleging that Jews control the media, finance, etc.). Despite the broad range of support for the IHRA definition, a significant number of scholars, lawyers and civil society organisations have questioned the value and legitimacy of the definition. The grounds for these objections are diverse and include arguments that some of the examples conflate anti-semitism with harsh, but non-racist, criticism of Israel, and that some examples lack clarity and focus. In justifying its support for the definition, the commission relies heavily on the findings of a major survey of Jewish perceptions of anti-semitism conducted by the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) in 2018. Specifically, the commission claims that this survey shows that the IHRA examples of anti-semitism reflect what the vast majority of European Jews regard as antisemitic. The commission also claims that the survey demonstrates that European Jews encounter antisemitic incidents related to Israel more often than any other form of anti-semitism. About a year ago, the Brussels-based European Middle East Project (EuMEP) commissioned me to conduct an independent assessment, to examine whether the 2018 FRA survey does indeed provide empirical support for each of these claims. My findings are published on Thursday (4 July) in the report Does the IHRA working definition of anti-semitism reflect the views of most European Jews? . In a nutshell, they show that the 2018 FRA survey, whilst broadly robust in its methodology and analysis, does not bear out the central elements of the commission’s claims. This is to say that the survey disproves the claim that European Jews endorse the IHRA examples of anti-semitism. Nor that it disproves the commission’s second claim about the predominance of Israel-related anti-semitism. Rather, my analysis shows that the survey did not incorporate all of the questions that would have been needed to test these claims in their entirety, nor was it designed to do so. The EU Commission appears to have drawn the wrong conclusions from the data The claims therefore remain untested. In citing the survey as the evidence base for these assertions, the commission appears to have drawn the wrong conclusions from the data. More specifically, the survey data show that, at best, three of the 11 IHRA examples of anti-semitism are endorsed by the majority of European Jews. In the remaining eight cases, including all of the more controversial Israel-related examples, the survey did not include questions that could reasonably assess agreement with those examples. Hence, it could not provide evidence for Jewish endorsement of the majority of the IHRA examples of anti-semitism (nor the lack of it). Similarly, with regard to the commission’s claim about the predominance of Israel-related manifestations of anti-semitism, the survey provided no direct evidence on the prevalence of different categories of anti-semitism. It did assess the perceived frequency of a few very specific examples of anti-semitism, but the data do not provide any statistically credible evidence that Israel-related anti-semitism is the dominant form. Of course, in the aftermath of 7 October, given the alarming rise in Israel-related anti-semitism across Europe, it would be perverse to question the claim that this is currently the main vehicle for the expression of Jew-hatred. As my report notes, the prevalence of Israel-related anti-semitism has a history of dramatic fluctuation driven by spikes in the intensity of the Israel-Palestinian conflict through time. Nonetheless, in the absence of such acute triggers, the ‘natural’ balance between various manifestations of anti-semitism remains an important and open question. And, despite the commission’s assertion, this question has not been resolved by the 2018 FRA survey. These conclusions are also relevant to the more recent FRA survey of experiences of anti-semitism conducted in 2023, the results of which are due to be published on 11 July. Unlike the 2018 survey, the questionnaire items in 2023 do mirror many of the examples of anti-semitism attached to the IHRA definition (eight out of 11). Thus, this survey could have been used to assess Jewish endorsement of the more controversial IHRA examples. However, the respondents were not actually asked to assess whether the examples were antisemitic – only to report whether they had experienced those (presumed) manifestations of anti-semitism. Hence, like the 2018 FRA survey, the 2023 survey will also be silent on the question of whether the majority of European Jews endorses the contested IHRA examples – though for a different reason. These issues should be considered in the context of the wider debate about whether the victims of anti-semitism (or any other form of racism) should serve as the main arbiters of what constitutes unacceptable speech for them. But if the commission is indeed committed both to the necessity for Jewish endorsement of its preferred measure of anti-semitism and to the importance of evidence-based policy-making, it cannot rely on the 2018 survey findings. It will need to obtain fresh evidence that is relevant to the question of whether the IHRA definition reflects the views of most European Jews. Professor Stephen H. Miller OBE is emeritus professor of social research at City, University of London. He has published widely in the fields of research methodology and Jewish social research and has particular expertise in the nature of Jewish identity and the social attitudes of British Jews.
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Professor Stephen H. Miller OBE
|
The objections to the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance definition of anti-semitism are that some of the examples conflate anti-semitism with harsh, but non-racist, criticism of Israel.
|
[
"EU & the World",
"EU Political",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2024-07-04T09:40:25.815Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ara3188a41
|
Already scandal-hit, new far-right Dutch government assumes office
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The new Dutch government was formally sworn in on Tuesday (2 July). Despite promises by outgoing prime minister Mark Rutte’s that the incoming coalition would continue the same line as far as the EU was concerned, the look of the new cabinet suggests differently. Ahead of last week's EU summit, Rutte and Dutch officials promised that the new government, led by non-affiliated former civil servant Dick Schoof , would have similar positions to the outgoing government on foreign policy and EU files, despite far-right firebrand Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV) being the largest coalition partner. However, even the date of the swearing-in itself indicated a changing of the wind. According to Dutch media reports, the handover was originally planned for Monday 1 July, coinciding with Ketikoti, the holiday marking the end of slavery in the Netherlands. To prevent the bad optics of far-right ministers assuming office on the same day, the outgoing government, the Amsterdam mayor and even the Dutch king himself intervened to change the date, Dutch public broadcaster NOS reported . Moreover, the composition of Schoof’s cabinet promises a hard break with EU policies of the past. Perhaps most controversially, Wilders nominated far-right hardliner Marjolein Faber as asylum minister, whose assignments will include the near-impossible task of negotiating an opt-out of the recently concluded EU migration pact . 'Great Replacement', security threat, corruption The nomination of Faber, who previously declared her support for the racist 'Great Replacement' conspiracy theory, threatened to throw the government into a crisis even before even assuming office. By retracting her statements, Faber ended up securing her appointment. But she is the latest in a string of controversial nominations by Wilders. His previous candidate for asylum minister and deputy prime minister Gidi Markuszower was marked as a potential security threat by the Dutch intelligence services. Before that, Ronald Plasterk, Wilder’s first candidate for prime minister, and Gom van Strien , PVV senator and proposed ‘coalition scout’, both withdrew following corruption allegations. Beyond the specific issues with PVV appointees, Elizabeth Kuiper, associate director at the European Policy Center (EPC), expressed more general concern about the new cabinet. “It’s a team that lacks experience in all sorts of fields,” she told the EUobserver, adding that this was particularly pressing for Schoof due to his lack of political affiliation. “He will have limited contacts with European parties,” she said — noting the importance of the network facilitated by political families in Brussels. Another new minister likely to face an uphill battle in Brussels will be Femke Wiersma, incoming minister for agriculture. Member of the populist Farmer’s Citizen’s Movement (BBB), Wiersma will have to fight for the litany of exemptions demanded by the coalition agreement on EU rules on nitrogen, fertiliser and nature restoration, exemptions the Dutch are very unlikely to get. Though few will be surprised that the liberal VVD appointed fiscal hawk Eelco Heinen to lead the finance ministry, Kuiper argued that on EU budget discussions too, a change of tack could be observed. “There’s continuity in the sense that the Netherlands has a 'frugal' reputation, but always from a constructive spirit,” she said. “The current coalition agreement is not constructive.” Moreover, this radicalised Dutch parsimony could touch upon the EU’s policies on economic security and competitiveness as well, Kuiper argued. Noting the importance of a company like Dutch chip-maker ASML for the global race for digital innovation, she worried about decreased investment. “If you invest less in research and development, won’t you further contribute to Europe lagging behind?” Hungary ties The one policy area where continuity does seem likely is defence, with incoming minister Ruben Brekelmans and state secretary Gijs Tuinman vocal on continued support for Ukraine. “It’s important that the Netherlands will continue to play a role as catalyst [on support for Ukraine]” Brekelmans said during the hearing preceding his appointment. However, even on security policy, some eyebrows have been raised, with several cabinet-members having close ties to Hungary - where prime minister Viktor Orbán has been a key Putin ally inside the EU. Minister of economic affairs Dirk Beljaarts has a Hungarian mother, and has been honorary consul for Hungary for nine years. Beljaarts renounced his Hungarian passport to become minister. State secretary for digitalisation Zsolt Szabó, is a child of Hungarian refugees, has been active promoting Hungarian Dutch business networks. Both were nominated by Wilders, who has a Hungarian wife and is widely considered to be a friend and ally of Orbán. Piet Ruig is a Brussels-based journalist who previously worked for the Dutch public broadcaster VPRO.
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Piet Ruig
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The new Dutch government was officially sworn-in on Tuesday. The handover comes as outgoing prime minister, Mark Rutte, tried to allay apprehensions of the coalition involving the far-right PVV, promising continuity with his own policies. But the composition of the cabinet already indicates otherwise.
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[
"EU Political"
] |
eu-political
|
2024-07-03T08:37:45.914Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar45a258b3
|
Orban's new Patriots for Europe group is targeting the council, not the parliament
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On Sunday (30 June), 24 hours ahead of the official start of Hungary's rotating EU presidency, Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) chairman Herbert Kickl, former Czech prime minister and ANO leader Andrej Babiš and Hungary's prime minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party announced the official creation of a new nationalist and sovereign-tist political group on the European stage, the Patriots for Europe (Patriots). According to the trio's plans, the adoption of a joint manifesto and the announcement of further members will soon follow. While the announced formation in its current form falls far short of the required threshold of 23 MEPs from at least seven European Union member states, the dismissive attitude of early commentators towards the group and its perceived influence is not necessarily justified. While the first impression may be that the Patriots for Europe are a collection of central European naysayers and populists, there is a logic and sophistication to the group's design. The group's membership clearly cuts across classic ideological and partisan divides, bringing together founding and prospective members with very different previous European party affiliations: FPÖ comes from the radical right Identity and Democracy (ID) group, which it shared with Marine Le Pen's National Rally and Matteo Salvini's League, ANO from the liberal Renew, while Orbán's Fidesz comes from the ranks of unaffiliated parties after leaving the EPP in 2021. However, these parties have one crucial thing in common. They are either in power, or polling to win their respective future national elections (which are due soon, in the case of Austria this autumn, and in the Czech Republic in 2025.) The group is not optimised to influence EU politics in the European Parliament, and for good reason. Orbán, the most likely mastermind behind the initiative, has understood that radical right parties not only have divergent interests on the European stage, but that their influence in the parliament can also be significantly limited by the political centre. This is especially true when the main goal of the key figureheads of the radical right, such as Georgia Meloni or Le Pen, is actually cooperation with and integration into the centre. Seat at the table Orbán understood that there are different ways to maximise the influence of a group, and that a political group can be optimised to exert influence not in the parliament, but actually through the Council. And it does not need the 'big fishes' for that purpose, but only those, however small they are, who are most likely to sit at the Council table after their next national elections. This logic can certainly be extended to other parties in the wider central European region: Robert Fico's governing Smer in Slovakia, whose membership has just been suspended by the Socialists & Democrats (S&D) group, or Janez Janša's SDS in Slovenia (currently a member of the European People's Party), a likely candidate to lead the next Slovenian government in two years' time, and, last but not least, the elephant in the room, Poland's Law and Justice party (PiS). If the Patriots succeed in uniting these important central European parties, they will have a critical mass and gravitational force that would make it no longer difficult to meet the official thresholds for European political groups. While these parties may certainly disagree on several issues, this won't necessarily prevent them from working together. The Patriots group is designed to pool populist opposition to certain low-hanging fruits of European politics, such as immigration, the greening of Europe's agricultural sector, or the proposed ban on internal combustion engines, and exploit that oppositional politics for the domestic political purposes of its members. The group can also provide a valuable resource to its members by enabling them to re-emerge as influential veto players on the European stage, as they did in the heyday of the Visegrad Group between 2015 and 2017. While the Patriots will be far from a blocking minority in the council at the beginning, they will be a considerable force to reckon with, and their size and influence could certainly grow as a consequence of the upcoming Austrian and Czech national elections. Soon the number of PfE prime ministers may exceed even the combined number of ECR and ID colleagues in the European Council. Will the establishment of the Patriots lead to growing tensions with the ECR and ID groups and their leading figures such as Meloni and Le Pen? Not necessarily. For PM Orbán, who will certainly be seen as the symbolic leader and mastermind of the group for the time being, such a political success on the European stage will only allow him to speak again more-or-less on an eye-level with Meloni and Le Pen. As his influence grows with the group formation, Orbán will certainly feel both emboldened and protected to take more risks and use the opportunities offered by the Hungarian presidency to troll the European Union and reap the political benefits of certain conflicts. Whether the Patriots will succeed in establishing a new political group remains to be seen in the coming weeks. But one can certainly see a kind of ominous political innovation here: a political group tailored to represent fundamental opposition to mainstream EU policy and to maximise influence not in the European Parliament but through the Council of the EU. Daniel Hegedüs is a senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund think tank Daniel Hegedüs is a senior fellow at the
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German Marshall Fund
|
Viktor Orban's newly-announced central European "Patriots for Europe" group, with Austria's FPÖ and the Czech Republic's ANO, may further fragment the radical right in the European Parliament. However, with an eye on expected national election results and likely prospective members, in the future this group – rather than the ECR or ID – could be the real pool of nationalist, sovereignt-ist parties in government.
|
[
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] |
*
|
2024-07-01T16:12:28.277Z
|
https://euobserver.com/*/ar7e524613
|
How QAnon pushed climate-denialism into European mainstream
|
At a protest in Oxford, UK, early last year, a round of speakers warned of the city council's plans to restrict traffic as part of a 'globalist agenda' to strip away freedoms and control the population by stopping them from leaving their neighbourhoods. In the crowd, people denounced vaccines while others rallied against digital currencies and, others still, the United Nations. The protest followed proposals modelled after the '15-minute city', a benign concept introduced in 2016 by the Franco-Colombian urbanist Carlos Moreno and that has spread across European cities in an effort to reduce pollution and ensure essential services are within walking distance for local residents. And video of the protest have been shared online, in large part, thanks to the livestream recorded by Children Health Defense , an international anti-vax organisation that has chapters in Europe. A leaflet of the event, shared on social media, shows logos of organisations that protested against Covid measures in the past. Online, climate-change deniers and anti-vaxxers seem to converge towards far-right conspiracy groups, according to the results of an investigation by the nonprofit investigative newsroom Lighthouse Reports and EUobserver, and may engender these types of seemingly catch-all protests. Links to the livestream of the Oxford protest have been re-shared in QAnon Telegram channels more than 23,000 times, amassing almost 560,000 views in the months following the event. A video excerpt featuring a 12-year old girl who was on stage at the anti-15 minute Oxford protest was first shared by Children’s Health Defense and kept being re-posted by other Telegram channels even months after the event. At the moment the post has nearly 250,000 views. QAnon takes its name from Q, an anonymous poster that left cryptic messages on online boards and whom followers believe to be a US government political insider. QAnon sees Trump as the saviour in the fight against the 'Deep State', a supposed satanic elite that controls the world. Each new global event is interpreted and spun in light of Q‘s messages, also called Qdrops. Children’s Health Defense is presided over by Robert Kennedy Jr, an anti-vaxxer and now a third-party candidate in the upcoming US presidential election. He is the nephew of former US president John F. Kennedy. US tax records show Children's Health Defense had received some $23.5m [€21.85m] in contributions, grants and other revenue in 2022. This money is spent on events and legal services and it also includes a $510,000 a year salary for Robert Kennedy Jr. and $180,000 for CHD's president Mary Holland. The convergence of disparate groups with different agendas such as the anti-vax Children’s Health Defense, climate-change deniers, and QAnon groups is one of the trends that is making the far-right conspiracy movement seemingly unstoppable. A previous investigation by Lighthouse showed how QAnon viral theories took root in Europe. This time, Lighthouse Reports spent months trying to understand the recipe for how social media manipulation enables theories to morph and spread like wildfire, outliving any individual theory. Lighthouse analysed more than 100 million posts on channels associated with QAnon on the social media platform Telegram, shared between September 2020 to June 2023, to understand how climate denialism theories drag people into a dystopian vision of the world. These posts are part of a database set up by Lighthouse Reports and Bellingcat to explore the explosion of QAnon conspiracy myths in Europe across more than 2,000 Telegram channels in nine countries. Timing, network, vocab The first three ingredients of this recipe borrow some of the marketing industry strategies: timing, networks, and vocabulary. However, in this case the aim is to spread political views not sell products. As people’s rage and frustration, fed by conspiracy theories related to Covid and Ukraine, died down, Telegram users following QAnon channels were primed for a new target: climate denialism. According to Lighthouse analysis, until late 2022 climate mentions were quite limited in the database compared to other topics. The Oxford event took place on 18 February 2023 and posts on climate-related issues warning about a “climate lockdown” or against “15-minute cities” had been spreading since March 2022. They only gained wider popularity around November of the same year when the support by a few key channels in the QAnon world prompted a surge in traffic and attention. According to Lighthouse analysis, to really hook audiences and ignite protests, the theory had to tap into the original primal fears that allowed otherwise rational people to fall prey to QAnon conspiracy theories in the first place. Since the Covid lockdown already generated anger, the climate conspiracy took advantage of that anger, leveraging the same vocabulary, and using it as a fuel to accelerate the spread of theories related to the climate crisis. That’s how a controversy over innocuous 15-minute cities has since morphed into an identity of resistance over other perceived injustices and how anti-vax rhetoric moved closer to climate conspiracies. Primal fears One of the protest speakers at the Oxford event was Jonathan Tilt, former leader of the libertarian Freedom Alliance Party who ran in the mayoral election of West Yorkshire in May 2024. "Covid fraud was the first part of that war, they tried to introduce lockdowns, it didn't really work, there was a lot of pushback," he said, in a telephone interview in March. For Tilt, the introduction of vaccine passports was a failed attempt to roll out what he describes as a dystopian digital matrix. "Climate change, climate alarmism and gross restrictions on travel are another attempt to do it. It’s a more sort of devious and slow cooker method than the stuff that we had in 2020," he said. Oxfordshire County Council denies that its 15-minute city proposal would confine people, and say traffic filters simply aim to reduce traffic and make it easier to get around the city. A trial, set for launch in autumn, is expected to improve bus services and make walking and cycling easier and safer, said a spokesperson. Tilt dismissed such plans and said climate change is a different route for the dystopian digital matrix in “a clear attempt at zoning and stopping” people. These theories are increasingly amplified by alternative news sites and social media spouting QAnon narratives. Feeding in new conspiracy theories has been part of QAnon‘s DNA from the start. For example, due in part to social media recommendation systems, QAnon became an amalgam of individuals from many other types of groups: anti-vaccine activists, 9-11 truthers, flat-earthers, Pizzagaters . These people “found some specific facet of the theory appealing” explains Renée DiResta, formerly research manager at the Stanford Internet Observatory and expert on the spread of disinformation and malign narratives across social networks. “They brought their own interpretations of events into the conversation and this led to something of an 'omni-conspiracy',” adds DiResta. When queried, Tilt said he has connections to some people in Children's Health Defense Europe (CHD Europe), a Brussels-based offshoot of its larger US version. CHD has also featured interviews with MEPs, including Germany's Alternative for Germany (AfD) MEP Christine Anderson , who described Covid-19 as a means to prepare society for complete domination. AfD is a far-right party that has been classified by German domestic security services as a potentially extremist party. Recently a German high court confirmed this designation stating that AfD pursues goals “against democracy”. "The next thing we will see is the establishment of so-called 15-minute cities," Anderson told Children's Health Defense TV. “It has nothing to do with this [convenience]. Nothing whatsoever. It's about control," she said. Anderson’s vocabulary is likely not a coincidence. To identify the rhetorical strategies of climate-denialist conspiracy myths, Lighthouse extracted the most frequently occurring nouns and used a statistical technique to group large volumes of Telegram posts according to their topic similarity, and found that vocabulary plays an important role in integrating new theories with familiar ones. For example, Covid and allusions to being controlled are important words used to redirect outrage towards new theories, with some differences between countries. In German posts, Covid terms were frequently mentioned both for the 15 minute cities theories and for climate lockdowns throughout the lifecycle of the narratives, while in English the connection between Covid and the 15 minute city conspiracy is made much later. Anderson herself sat on the European Parliament's special committee on the Covid-19 pandemic. A source close to the committee said the far-right rarely attended the committee meetings when issues dealing with social rights, research, and fundamental rights were discussed. "But if we had a hearing on the pharmaceutical industry, or if we had a hearing with the commissioner, they were always there just to ask or just to give one message. And it was always a conspiracy theory," said the source. Yet messages linking Covid and climate change espoused by Tilt and Anderson resonate. Among the people who find these theories appealing is Ruth O'Rafferty of the Scottish Vaccine Injury group, a self-described support group on Facebook. O'Rafferty says she had an adverse reaction to AstraZeneca vaccine and was unable to get public treatment. "And I'm not against vaccines, but these were new technology and they were rushed through and given emergency licence," she said, in an interview in late March. And while her group doesn't link the vaccine to wider climate issues, O'Rafferty is receptive. "It is beyond the scope of the group. However, I can understand it. Did we feel coerced? Yes, we were coerced," she said. "It's like they're taking away people's free choice," she said. That sense of coercion and the stripping of freedoms due to Covid converges with the climate denial views, even if the connection is not immediately made. According to Lighthouse’s analysis of climate-related posts, the idea of convenience is twisted into the concept of a prison: 15-minute cities are there to keep people in certain areas of the city, to lock them up, despite all evidence to the contrary. “Conspiracy theories often rely on distrust and fear, and an underlying set of circumstances in the offline world,” says DiResta. Children Health Defense's role in the conspiracy arena When a theory is first introduced, it is competing against dozens of other theories for attention in an already crowded digital space. Alternative news websites, Telegram influencers, established media, and also organizations such as Children’s Health Defense, need people’s engagement. The recipe for virality depends on these groups feeding off each other’s audiences and benefiting from the groundwork laid by others. Children’s Health Defense is also an example of how the recipe can be applied in different contexts: from spreading theories on social media to lobbying activities in the EU Parliament. According to the Lighthouse dataset, alternative news websites provide the raw materials for new conspiracy theories. CHD runs its own alternative news outlet called Defender, that frequently publishes content railing against vaccines, 5G wireless networks, and World Health Organization power-grab fears. The Center for Countering Digital Hate , a British not-for-profit, has listed Children's Health Defense as one of the top 12 influencers in spreading English-speaking anti-vax disinformation on X [Twitter] and Facebook. And its European version is also active on social media, with accounts on X, Telegram, Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube. Ad Fontes Media , a media watchdog based out of Colorado, says the platform regularly publishes misleading articles. "Children's Health Defense publishes an unacceptable amount of misleading information concerning vaccines," said Vanessa Otero, the founder of Ad Fontes Media, in an email. "And often does so in a fashion that is associated most strongly with a hyper-partisan or most extreme political bias to the right," she said. While the website of CHD European chapter gets a limited number of visitors, the main US CHD website, house of the Defender, had 2.2 million views between February and April this year, according to Similarweb, a US software company specialising in web traffic. Lighthouse analysis shows that posts about climate conspiracy containing links to the Defender were re-shared nearly 1,700 times. One of the Defender’s articles highlights how the World Economic Forum is supporting the 15-minute city concept. CHD’s lobbying in Europe Online, conspiracy theories can be spread by pseudo-anonymous Telegram channels with huge followings, but when they enter the field of policymaking and lobbying, credible and recognised figures take centre-stage. Set up as an ASBL (non-profit organisation) in Belgium in August 2020 by Belgian activist Senta Depuydt, CHD Europe has helped disseminate such views in the hopes of drumming up public outrage and support for its cause. Depuydt says she had convinced Robert Kennedy Jr to open a European branch of Children's Health Defense, following a hearing at the European Parliament on Monsanto where the two had met. "I told him there was a global coup d'etat under way ... and I contacted him and told them there is a need for resistance, an international resistance, and that is how I opened a European branch of his organisation," she said, in an interview last December. Depuydt resigned as chair in 2022 for personal reasons, she said, and has since promoted his candidacy for US president. Around the same time, CHD Europe nominated four new board members including Catherine Austin Fitts, an American investment banker and a former member of the George Bush senior's administration, and Renate Holzeisen, an Italian lawyer who since 2023 sits in the regional council of Trentino-Alto Adige, an autonomous region in the north of Italy , and is also a member of the South Tyrolean state parliament. CHD Europe has been lobbying MEPs in the European Parliament, organising conferences at the Châtelain Brussels Hotel, holding press briefings at the Brussels Press Club, as well as being party to two failed legal challenges over Covid at the European Court of Justice. Children’s Health Defense and its European chapter echoed their main arguments in an email and letter to MEPs in September 2021. Signed on the behalf of Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. and Senta Depuydt, the four-page letter railed against Covid travel restrictions and the so-called Green Pass to allow vaccinated people to travel more freely. “The citizens of Europe and the world are watching you — our liberty and security are in your hands. Do not let us down!” said the letter, amid warnings such restrictions would likely become a permanent feature. At the Brussels Press Club in early 2022 further extremist views were on stage. Parallels were drawn between Covid and the Holocaust, amid claims humanity is under siege by global heirs of the Nazis. CHD Europe was presented by Mary Holland, CHD Europe board member Catherine Austin Fitts, and Vera Sharav, who sits on the advisory board of CHD Europe. "The unvaccinated are being vilified as the Jews were in the 1930s and the 1940s. What's the difference? Just the fact that the vaccinated are obedient," said Sharav, in comments that went unchallenged. When approached, CHD's president Mary Holland declined to comment on its European branch. "CHD Europe is in transition right now, and we don't have any comment," she said via email. CHD Europe's seat is currently listed at the same address of the Brussels-based Malherbe law firm, which we reached out to for this story. Malherbe also declined to comment and it wouldn't acknowledge that it represents CHD Europe despite being publicly listed as such in the Belgian register. "I can tell you the organisation is currently closing its Brussels-based European chapter," said Depuydt, in an email. But Holzeisen, who sits on the CHD Europe's board, said the chapter is going through a re-organisation to better connect with the local audiences. "Absolutely not," she said, when asked if CHD was leaving Europe, in a telephone interview in April. "It is an issue of reorganisation," she said and one that aims to become more independent from its US counterpart. "The United States is very different from Europe. In Europe, the countries are from a cultural point of view, also from a language point of view, very different," she said. A previous analysis by Lighthouse suggests that many locally-driven conspiracy theories need to engage global audiences to garner traction. The spillover For her part, Holzeisen is criticising a global pandemic treaty by the World Health Organisation, which she claims is part of a larger climate change strategy instigated by the European Union. According to Lighthouse analysis, the connection to global organizations such as the World Economic Forum (WEF) or WHO is a strategy also used by QAnon channels. By delocalizing a conspiracy theory, it makes it more appealing to a wider global audience. While previously a local event like the outrage over a new transport system in Oxford was of no interest to anyone outside the affected zone and may eventually run out of steam, now by integrating it into established QAnon narratives, people in Germany or Italy feel threatened by similar projects. Once the first three ingredients of the recipe for virality have set the conspiracy in motion, the spillover into the mainstream is bound to happen thanks to two additional ingredients: local scandals are connected to the wider world of conspiracy lore, setting the stage for the theory to go from local to global and external sources, such as established media, pick them up and thus lend them a veneer of credibility. One of the cornerstone values that underpin QAnon is the opposition to supposedly secret machinations perpetrated by the world elites. It doesn’t make much difference if the enemy is the World Economic Forum or the local mayor of the city that wants to introduce a new law. Posts about the climate lockdown and 15-minute cities often refer to plans imposed by those in power and that shouldn’t be taken at face value: they are usually part of larger schemes to reduce citizens’ freedom. In this way local events can be considered parts of an international scheme, allowing a conspiracy to germinate in different countries. With a war weighing on the global economy and a barrage of reporting on the climate crisis, climate change denialism may have offered a way to feel in control. DiResta explained that theories often appeal most to people who are struggling. “The theory may offer an easy answer, or a scapegoat,” explains DiResta. Similar arguments were repeated by Robert Kennedy Jr in an interview by UK Column News on 1 May 2023: “Climate issues and pollution issues are being exploited by the WEF and Bill Gates and all of these mega-billionaires the same way that Covid was exploited — to use it as an excuse to clamp down [sic] top-down totalitarian controls on society.” It is a view shared by a number of far-right MEPs, including Romania’s Cristian Terhes who earlier this year told the European Parliament in a debate on climate change that the world is witnessing “the imposition of a utopian, criminal ideology, which requires us to totally destroy our way of life in the name of madness: zero-carbon emissions.” Terhes is also an anti-vaxxer and is behind the International Covid Summit, whose opening anthem calls on parents to shield their children from perceived tyrannies. “We’ll be free until the day we die” are among the anthem’s lyrics. And in a recent event by the rightwing European Conservatives and Reformists Group, Dutch MEP Rob Roos says the climate crisis is a fake crisis created on purpose by the EU and that controlling CO2 emissions is basically equal to controlling people's lives. Anderson’s and Kennedy’s interviews and Roos’s and Terhes’ statements lend false credibility to the conspiracy. And when established media and journalists pick up these conspiracy theories, they give them an air of legitimacy and access to a more mainstream audience. In August 2022 Claus Strunz, then editor-in-chief of the German mass-market tabloid newspaper Bild, criticided a new energy-saving policy by the Germany's Green minister for economic affairs and climate action, Robert Habeck, during a TV interview: “We experienced with Corona what we are seeing with climate now”. Habeck “is not planning anything other than the climate lockdown”, Strunz alleged. The video uploaded on YouTube was viewed more than 660,000 times, accompanied by the hashtag #klimalockdown, and people in the comment section cheered Strunz — since anyone else who claimed something like this in recent months had been considered a conspiracy theorist. QAnon channels widely shared the video. "Bild is of course still a propaganda tool [...] but these statements by the editor-in-chief contain a lot of truth", reads a post published by a Telegram channel in Lighthouse database. This vicious feedback loop demonstrates the success of the recipe for virality: an elected representative or a journalist presents the absurdity as reality, legitimising a theory that was spread in the first place by alt-news media and Telegram. In addition, using a shared vocabulary to frame these theories produces a clear convergence among heterogeneous conspiracy groups that were originally focused in spreading disinformation on unrelated topics, such as vaccines. This generates reach, clicks and attention. And spreads fear. The recipe for virality provides an entry point in the wider world of conspiracy theories to all those people that are concerned about Covid vaccines, lockdowns, and 15-minute cities and explains why organizations like CHD can pivot easily from anti-Covid narrative into climate denial conspiracies. And governments' responses to the climate crisis continued to generate new conspiracies. In early 2024 a wave of farmers' protests swept through Europe's major capitals. While the EU is seeking to adopt its Green Deal to make the continent climate-neutral by 2050, farmers protested in front of the European Parliament in Brussels and set a subway entrance on fire. In Germany tractors partially blocked roads and city centres. At the beginning of May 2024 while farmers marched in Warsaw in Poland, a banner reportedly read "Let Brussels eat worms, we prefer pork chops and potatoes," a reference to an old conspiracy theory that the WEF and governments will force people to eat insects. This theory is now resurfacing after being widely shared in Telegram posts tracked in the Lighthouse database in previous months. The vocabulary follows the same recipe for vitality: it paints a picture of a plan run by world elites and exploits anxieties about losing freedom. Riccardo Coluccini and Justin Casimir Braun are reporters at Lighthouse Reports . Eva Constantaras is an editor at Lighthouse Reports. Nikolaj Nielsen is a staff reporter at EUobserver. Riccardo Coluccini and Justin Casimir Braun are reporters at Lighthouse Reports . Eva Constantaras is an editor at Lighthouse Reports.
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Nikolaj Nielsen
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Climate-change deniers and anti-vaxxers are converging online in far-right conspiracy groups, according to an investigation by the nonprofit investigative newsroom Lighthouse Reports and EUobserver, taking in everything from 15-minute cities to net zero.
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[
"Investigations",
"EU Political",
"Health & Society"
] |
search
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2024-07-01T13:48:50.764Z
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https://euobserver.com/search/Olena%20Tregub
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Podcast: After the vote is before the vote
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The UK and France head into snap elections. A Hezbollah threat against EU-member Cyprus reminds Brussels that the walls of the "garden" may not be as high as one might like. Plus, Rutte goes NATO. News doldrums, silly season, . There are many names for the summertime off-season, when there isn’t much to report except the sunburns of politicians as they run off to the beach with everyone else. This summer, however, is shaping up to be anything but slow. The long days are sure to be filled with horse-trading and hand-wringing of all kinds. Both the United Kingdom and France hold snap elections around the same time in early July. Neither result is likely to be very pretty. Meanwhile, Hungary will be rotating in to run the Council of the EU, while the EU itself figures out what its next parliament and commission are going to look like. Amid all that, outgoing Dutch prime minister, Mark Rutte, will be stepping into NATO’s top civilian post (leaving behind a country that is more extreme right than ever). Oh, and if Israel declares war on Hezbollah, Hezbollah may declare war on Cyprus — an EU member. Probably not, but just the idea of that is enough to underscore how big the gap is between talk of European defense and actually defending Europe, without the U.S. stepping in. Which depending how things go after the summer, it might not. Award-winning European correspondent, Caroline de Gruyter , and New School prof, Claire Potter , lend their expert hands to help us cover all these issues. William Glucroft is a writer and journalist based in Berlin. Explorer of the Teutonic Imaginary who's covering Germany with wit, style, and insight worth reading. Martin Gak is a broadcaster and writer , a native of Argentina fascinated by the idea of Europe, its values and its cheese. William Glucroft is a writer and journalist based in Berlin. Explorer of the Teutonic Imaginary who's covering Germany with wit, style, and insight worth reading. Martin Gak is a broadcaster and
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writer
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The UK and France head into snap elections. A Hezbollah threat against EU-member Cyprus reminds Brussels that the walls of the "garden" may not be as high as one might like. Plus, Rutte goes NATO.
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[
"Euroscopic",
"EU Elections"
] |
eu-elections
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2024-06-28T12:43:18.986Z
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https://euobserver.com/eu-elections/ar1e68819f
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EU Migration ‘schizophrenia’: Need workers, close borders?
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Europe’s economy needs one million foreign workers each year, said Ylva Johansson , the European Commissioner for Home Affairs, in January. This is due to the demographic change in Europe, which is resulting in a decline in the working age population. So-called EU Talent Partnerships are presented as a solution to this challenge. Announced in June 2021 , the aim is to attract non-EU citizens into the European workforce and fill gaps in the labour market. The Commission considers Talent Partnerships a “triple win” – beneficial for the EU’s economy, the non-EU partner countries that often face high unemployment rates and for the workers themselves. A patchwork of small-scale projects Initial plans foresaw the establishment of the first partnerships by the end of 2022, but concrete agreements have yet to be reached. So far, the EU has funded various pilot projects, which were grouped under the Talent Partnership umbrella . They vary in design but often include training initiatives in non-EU partner countries and assistance to workers in the relocation process. “It is difficult to say when a Talent Partnership begins and what it actually means,” notes Bernd Parusel, senior researcher at the Swedish Institute for European Policy studies, adding that agreements are strewn across different international and bilateral agreements. Despite millions in funding for the pilots, they have led to only a small number of recruitments by European companies. For instance, the MATCH project , matching Senegalese and Nigerian employees with employers in four EU countries, resulted in only eight people being recruited. Another pilot, the THAMM project , is managed by multiple organisations without a unified evaluation. In Germany, the Agency for Development Cooperation (GIZ) supported over 400 people in finding work or apprenticeships. But determining the impact beyond the project duration is challenging since participants were only followed between three to six months, while apprenticeships typically last multiple years. “These are interesting pilot projects, but they are not enough to meet the huge needs we already witness in some sectors,” says Jean-Louis De Brouwer, Director of the European Affairs Programme at the Egmont Institute, who doubts that the projects are scalable to the extent required. Talent Partnerships as a ‘friendly gadget’ in migration negotiations “There is kind of a schizophrenia between the toxic debate on migration in many countries and the acknowledgement that they need workers,” says De Brouwer. Commissioner Johansson promotes the Talent Partnerships as an aspect of negotiations on migration with partner countries and emphasises their role in negotiating readmission agreements. This focus is also reflected in the selection of partner countries. Asked about the current status of Talent Partnership negotiations, the European Commission Spokesperson for home affairs, Anitta Hipper, states that partnerships with Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Pakistan and Bangladesh are prioritised and roundtable exchanges are planned for the first half of 2024. Through the partnerships, third countries should be engaged “on migration management, in particular by helping to reduce irregular migration and incentivising partners to cooperate on return and readmission,” Hipper writes. Partnerships with Nigeria and Senegal depend “on an improved cooperation on the full range of migration issues”. An internal EU document from February 2024 reads: “It is considered that the timing to launch a talent partnership [with Senegal] is not ripe, considering the overall level of cooperation, including on readmission”. For Nigeria, a “readmission agreement is the first step towards a comprehensive partnership, of which the Talent Partnership would be a component.” Partner countries criticise this conditionality. Amongst them, Naela Gabr, Chairperson of the National Coordinating Committee for Combating and Preventing Illegal Migration and Trafficking in Persons in Egypt, emphasises Egypt’s situation as a transit country and its efforts to combat “illegal” migration: “We prevent a tsunami of migration to Europe”. In her opinion, labour mobility projects can be a win for everybody but they require consistent support and funding. At the same time, “cash for migrant control” deals worth millions between the EU and Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and most recently Lebanon have drawn criticism from civil society organisations for lacking human rights safeguards and funding inhumane detentions and forced returns . Parusel comments: “The EU is prepared to go to great lengths to control irregular migration, even to the point of making dubious deals with third countries. There is this outsourcing dimension: Money is given to other countries so that they can take over migration control for us”. In this context, Marie Walter-Franke, researcher at the German Expert Council on Integration and Migration (SVR), regards Talent Partnerships as “little more than a friendly gadget” in negotiations otherwise focused on returns and migration control. She has observed that partner countries “don’t take the EU seriously”, as requests for cooperation on migration control and returns are not met with concrete offers from the European side, which would give substance to the Talent Partnerships. This could be simpler admission procedures, such as point-based systems already used in Canada and other countries, and visa options for jobs of all skill levels. Many bureaucratic hurdles remain The fact that legal competences on visa regulations and the recognition of qualifications are shared between the EU and member states contributes to the difficulties employers and non-EU workers face. The Commission has recognised this issue and called on member states to better implement existing EU legislation. It has also proposed a revision of EU legislation setting the framework for the legal residence of non-EU workers in the EU. The recent adoption of the revised Single Permit Directive is one way the EU seeks to simplify the application process for non-EU workers, ensuring quicker decisions, and enabling them to change their employer and maintain their residency during periods of unemployment. Improvements regarding long-term residency were also proposed by the Commission but put on hold in March , as Parliament and Council could not reach an agreement. In addition to residence permits, the recognition of qualifications can pose another hurdle. Non-EU citizens working in the EU are nearly twice as likely as EU nationals in their home countries to work in jobs below their qualification level. To address this, the Commission has proposed to simplify procedures to recognise foreign qualifications in November. “It’s not just about the number of people moved” Organisations overseeing the pilot projects, such as the Migration Partnership Facility (MPF) , under the International Centre for Migration Policy Development, stress the importance of testing new methods to gain experience and establish cooperation on migration. Diana Stefanescu, Project Specialist for Labour Mobility at the MPF at the time of the interview, highlights: "These are very early stage projects. It’s not just about the number of people moved." A cost-value analysis conducted by Digital Explorers , a partnership between Lithuania and Nigeria under the MPF, projected that the financial benefits would exceed the €1.3mn in EU funding. This took into account that the number of people staying in Europe would gradually decrease after the completion of the project. Stefanescu adds: “The pilot projects are the first step to opening a door to much more cooperation and impact, and I think potential for this is strong but more funding is needed.” The Commission states that the scale of pilot projects has increased over time and that it “stands ready to continue supporting scaled up initiatives. This depends also on the commitment of Member States, which remain competent to establish volumes of admission to their territories.” EU focuses its spending on border control The EU has invested around €82.2mn in Talent Partnership projects to date. Funding has mainly come from the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), the Neighbourhood Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) and the EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), which has been criticised by NGOs for diverting development aid to stop “irregular” migration. According to Commissioner Johansson, the EU saw 300,000 “irregular arrivals” in 2023 compared to 3.5 million people arriving through “regular channels”. Yet EU funding focuses largely on curbing migration and increasing returns. While the volume for the AMIF increased by 29%, from €6.7bn to €8.7bn (2018 prices) compared to the last EU budget, funding largely aimed at border protection has more than doubled. The EU’s Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex, alone is set to receive an unprecedented €5.6bn between 2021 and 2027. Europe’s economy needs foreign workers As labour shortages continue to rise, there is a growing interest of companies to recruit from abroad. Stefanescu from the MPF is optimistic that companies will step up their investment, which is necessary to make the recruitment of foreign workers sustainable. Yet in spite of the private sector’s interest, some projects could not be launched due to the lack of political support. “Some governments are worried about the political impact”. “Providing safe and legal pathways is a priority,” the Commission promised at the launch of the Talent Partnerships. Whether the EU can fulfil this promise largely depends on the political will of member states to implement policies that make it attractive for people to work in Europe. This not only includes simplifying admission procedures and aligning them with the demands of the labour market. It also requires improving working conditions and addressing discrimination of non-EU citizens, who are more likely to work in shortage occupations and more frequently exposed to discrimination . “It takes courage to pursue a policy that is not based on this fear that too many people or not the right kind of people might come,” says Walter-Franke.
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A failure to address labour and skills shortages will negatively impact the European economy, especially as the demographic change and the green and digital transition continue to put a strain on the labour market. Using Talent Partnerships as a bargaining chip to enforce migration control makes them miss out on their potential.
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With the need for one million foreign workers annually, the EU introduced Talent Partnerships to bring in non-EU citizens to fill gaps in the labour market. Pilot projects only led to a small number of recruitments so far, with partner countries required to cooperate on border protection and returns.
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[
"EU & the World",
"Migration",
"Investigations"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2024-06-28T11:35:38.005Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/are40a8fca
|
Hungary’s democratic Rubik’s Cube
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It is perhaps fitting that Hungary has chosen the Rubik’s Cube as the logo for its upcoming EU presidency. It may signal “the essence of Hungarian genius” – as Hungarian EU affairs minister János Bóka claims - but it also represents a complicated dynamic where each piece of the puzzle is interconnected and solving one part creates problems elsewhere. This is how Viktor Orbán’s government has been able to tighten its grip on state institutions and take control of the media; through a centralised internal mechanism able to impose an ever-evolving set of laws and precedents designed to intimidate, deter and silence opponents at home while obfuscating critics abroad. Take Hungary’s new Sovereignty Law. Unlike similar legislation recently introduced in Georgia that drew condemnation from the international community and a stinging rebuke from Brussels, it failed to provoke a similar outcry but has nevertheless deeply impacted civil society in the run-up to the recent European Parliament elections and a further targeted crackdown this week. The Protection of National Sovereignty Act established a new Sovereignty Protection Office (SPO) and amended the Hungarian Criminal Code, prescribing a prison sentence for organisations and individuals using foreign funding – overtly or “in disguise to circumvent the prohibition” - for political campaign purposes. Fiercely opposed by civil society organisations , citizens and independent media outlets inside Hungary, the law has drawn criticism from the Council of Europe commissioner for human rights, the UN special rapporteur on freedom of expression and the special rapporteur on human rights defenders, and the Venice Commission. But this has not stopped it from having a chilling effect on the exercise of a wide range of fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association, and right to access to information, which has led to a distortion of public discourse and democratic life. The Sovereignty Law has had the greatest impact on organisations working directly on or around elections. It has enforced a culture of fear within civil society and the media, diverted already limited resources and attention, stifled cooperation and imposed a level of self-censorship. This matters because the country already falls well short of the requirements for free and transparent elections that should be standard within the EU – as Hungary’s most prominent Hungarian election-related organisations including 20k, Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (HCLU), Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Mérték Media Monitor, Political Capital and Unhack Democracy have already concluded . The joint report into the EU parliament and local elections found the dominance of the ruling party in public advertising, media, and social media was striking. From the beginning of 2024 until election day, Fidesz and two government-organised nongovernmental organisations ([GO]NGOs), Megafon and Civil Solidarity Forum (CÖF), spent fours times as much on Facebook and Google (HUF 2.1bn / €5.3m) compared with opposition parties and their associated media combined. In connection with the local elections, the involvement of local public authorities in the campaign and the use of municipal resources for campaign purposes were widespread. This came on top of gerrymandering that occurred with the redrawing of electoral maps in late 2023, in multiple cases raising suspicions of illegality or political motivation. On election day itself, polling station commission members surveyed by Unhack Democracy reported the organised transport of voters, 'electoral tourism' and vote buying. The National Election Office has announced mayoral elections in six municipalities will be re-run due to law violations and the Supreme Court has ruled a new election needs to be held in one precinct because of vote buying. Abuses, in particular, voter interference during mobile voting in nursing homes and at polling stations among young people, remain systemic. This mirrors a pattern of voting irregularities observed across multiple elections dating back to the 2018 parliamentary vote, when Unhack Democracy put Viktor Orbán’s super-majority into question . The failings of Hungarian democracy have been well documented, but require reexamination at a time when its diplomats look to shape the EU’s agenda to - as the tagline for its rotating presidency claims - “Make Europe Great Again” . The EU must do more to counter democratic rollback within its borders. It can improve the accountability and transparency of elections by mandating citizen observation, which is currently not allowed in Hungary as well as other member states. It can also improve the effectiveness of pro-democracy civil society by adopting a “common market” for non-profit associations. As MEP Sergey Lagodinsky said in March, democracy does not end at country borders . This new directive will significantly improve access and funding for nonprofits operating cross-border and go some way to countering draconian domestic “foreign agent” legislation increasingly seen across Europe. The impact of the Sovereignty Law - and the collective experience of civil society organisations working on recent elections - demonstrates the importance of fostering a supportive civic ecosystem in Hungary and across the region, properly supported with long-term sustainable funding, and not afraid to take risks to defend the democratic process. There is no single solution or magic bullet to countering democratic rollback. Like a Rubik’s Cube, the solution lies in seeing each moving piece as part of an interconnected puzzle. Only then will all the sides align. Elliott Goat and Zsofia Banuta are co-directors of Unhack Democracy , an election watchdog and civic innovation non-profit based in Europe Elliott Goat and Zsofia Banuta are co-directors of
|
Unhack Democracy
|
Recent elections reveal the chilling effect of the new 'Sovereignty Law' on civil society and media, just as Hungary prepares to take over EU Council presidency
|
[
"Rule of Law",
"Opinion"
] |
rule-of-law
|
2024-06-28T08:51:03.270Z
|
https://euobserver.com/rule-of-law/ar10731f16
|
Right of reply: Who is ADF International in reality?
|
Should Europeans be free to express their opinions? We think so. In fact, we stand up in courts around the world – from Finland to Nigeria – defending those being unjustly criminalised for doing just that. Recently, an author in this magazine wrote an opinion piece expressing a negative opinion about us. That would be ok, except a lot of what he wrote wasn’t true. The article was titled “ ” — but nobody came to ask us the answer. To set the record straight, ADF International stands for every individual’s right to live in accordance with their beliefs in Europe and beyond. We advocate to end the persecution of Christians and other religious minorities around the world. We defend families and individuals in court, and champion fundamental freedoms at the national and international level. Working alongside our network of over 4,000 lawyers around the world, our Brussels-based team brings important human rights cases to light in the EU. Take Yahaya Sharif Aminu , a Sufi musician in Nigeria, who was convicted and sentenced to death in 2020 despite not having legal representation, after sharing audio messages on WhatsApp deemed blasphemous towards the prophet Mohammed. He remains in prison awaiting a retrial. ADF International is supporting his defence at the Supreme Court of Nigeria, but justice is moving slowly. Our team is on the ground in Brussels to bring the EU’s attention to critical cases such as this one, leveraging the institution’s ability to be a beacon of human rights for the world – for example, via an urgent resolution condemning blasphemy laws. Or, take Päivi Räsänen : ADF International is supporting the legal defence of the long-serving parliamentarian and grandmother of 12. She’s facing criminal trial at the Finnish Supreme Court on charges of “hate speech” — for posting a Bible verse tweet in 2019. You might not agree with Päivi’s peaceful expression of her Christian beliefs about marriage, but a free and democratic Europe requires people of all faiths and none to be able to participate in public discourse without fear of criminal punishment. With our presence at the international institutions, we are able to raise her story at the EU as a much-needed warning as Europe debates various iterations of censorship across the continent. Financial supporters of ADF International come from Europe and across the globe – reflecting true international backing for our work. ADF International’s teams are staffed locally. In Brussels that means Europeans who believe in European values – upholding human rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the right to life. ADF International is committed to the defence of human rights, to the benefit of everyone. Any allegations of being a “hate group” are nothing but lies stemming from the false and debunked claims of the US-based Southern Poverty Law Centre (SPLC). The SPLC has been widely discredited by investigative journalists, charity watchdogs, and commentators as activist, partisan, and unreliable. It has created a biased and ideologically-driven “hate group” list as part of a “highly profitable scam”, as one former SPLC employee described it. Countless mainstream media outlets have exposed SPLC’s biased agenda and misconduct. In fact, the SPLC has been sued multiple times for unjustly spreading false information about groups in order to discredit those with whom they disagree. So, who is ADF International? Here’s the truth: ADF International is among the largest and most effective legal advocacy organisations in the world dedicated to protecting religious freedom and free speech rights, in Europe, and across the world.
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Adina Portaru is a senior legal counsel for ADF International in Brussels.
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Adina Portaru, a senior legal counsel for Alliance Defending Freedom International in Brussels, responds to EUobserver's opinion piece describing who ADF International is and why they are lobbying Brussels.
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[
"EU Political"
] |
eu-political
|
2024-06-26T13:09:59.781Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-political/arf89cfa2b
|
EU’s female 'dream team' must put values over power
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The stars appear aligned for the appointment of three women to lead the EU’s most consequential institutions. Some will see this as a moment to celebrate the creation of a female-led European “dream team” or even a “feminist” Europe. For others, the jury is still out. A quick recap: Unless she fails to get a majority of votes at the European Parliament, the centre-right European Peoples Party’s (EPP) Ursula von der Leyen will stay on as president of the European Commission. Roberta Metsola, also from the EPP, will lead the European Parliament and liberal Renew Europe’s Kaja Kallas, the sitting prime minister of Estonia, will become the next EU foreign and security policy chief. Christine Lagarde will remain as the head of the European Central Bank until 2027 and Nadia Calviño was recently named president of the European Investment Bank. Around them is a powerful and colourful cohort of other female superstars. Stage (far) right, stands Georgia Meloni, Italy’s prime minister, who is seen as a “good European” by her EU friends but is known at home for staying true to the Mussolini-era slogan of “God, homeland, family”. Even further to the right is Marine Le Pen, the leader of France’s National Rally party, whose toxic anti-Islam and anti-immigration diatribes have already infected the French body politic and whose protégé - Jordan Bardella - may soon become French prime minister, sitting side by side with president Emmanuel Macron. On the centre-left — if the German coalition survives — stands Annalena Baerbock, German foreign minister, leader of the Greens and architect of a quixotically selective “feminist foreign policy”. The European Parliament will continue to host a number of influential female deputies, including Tineke Strik of the European Greens, Valerie Hayer of Renew Europe and Spanish MEP Iratxe Garcia, head of the Socialists & Democrats (S&D) group. Taking her place in the EU assembly for the first time is human rights activist, lawyer, and refugee advocate Rima Hassan who is of Palestinian heritage and represents leftwing . Put them all together and the EU institutions seem well on the way to answering European feminists’ prayers for more women in more influential jobs. But be careful what you wish for. Representation is important and there is strength in numbers. Yet just as some brown and black European politicians are no different from their male, pale, and stale colleagues, so too women leaders can often be the spitting image of men. It is the quality of leadership that matters. As Europe enters even more turbulent waters, we need leaders who combine power with values and a decent moral compass. The EU can only inspire respect, both at home and abroad if its leaders align with standards of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Europe’s “dream team” will have to do better on several fronts. For her part, von der Leyen discovered her inner feminist vocally and publicly after a ' sofagate ' moment in Ankara three years ago. Since then, she has won praise for her handling of the Covid crisis (bar a few disappearing messages with pharmaceutical company Pfizer) and for steering EU policy on Ukraine. But she will also be remembered for her staunchly pro-Israel stance, even as the country is widely being denounced for its destruction, dislocation, starvation, and “plausible genocide” in Gaza, following the 7 October Hamas terror attack. Remarkably, as a politician who emphasises motherhood — a trait apparently shared by other conservative and far-right politicians —von der Leyen has not flinched at report s that nearly 21,000 children are missing in Gaza because they are either trapped beneath rubble, buried in unmarked graves, or detained by Israeli forces. Along with her friend Meloni, the EU Commission chief has signed some of the most egregious cash-for-migration control deals with neighbouring strongmen, thereby further reinforcing 'Fortress Europe' and disregarding international human rights and refugee conventions. When it comes to women’s reproductive rights, outgoing EU Parliament president Metsola’s track record remains dicey while Meloni has recently campaigned successfully to ensure there was no mention of "abortion" in a recent G7 statement. And as far as press freedom is concerned, the Italian prime minister, who is hailed as “constructive” and pro-European in Brussels, is criticised at home for her “ suffocating control” over media. Kallas is an outspoken Kremlin critic , who is leading the drive to ramp up European support for Kyiv's war effort, but like so many other European female leaders has yet to voice any serious criticism of Israel’s assault on Gaza. Still, it is important to remain hopeful. United Nations deputy secretary general Amina Mohammed points out that it is not easy to be different when society’s definition of power is based on the traits of men such as “flexing muscle and testosterone”. As such, she says, it is unfair to judge women on an individual basis while they are still within the confines of a patriarchal system. Others argue that gender-based discrimination makes women leaders want to present themselves as “iron ladies” rather than peacemakers, and to eschew — not pursue — peace. Still, Europe can lead by example. At a time when women’s rights are on the retreat to an extent that imperilled Afghan women are excluded from a crucial meeting on their country’s future, European women leaders have the numbers and the power to prove that women’s leadership does not mean more of the same. Von der Leyen and others may not be able to immediately dismantle long-entrenched patriarchal structures. But they can prove that they are not inward-looking “white feminists” who care little about the rest of the world, except through sporadic moments of performative solidarity. In a world where women leaders are few and far between, Europe’s “dream team” has the privilege of proving that female power can be value-based and different from the male version. By doing so, they will elevate Europe’s role and standing, not diminish it. Shada Islam is an EUobserver columnist, and independent EU analyst and commentator who runs her own strategy and advisory company New Horizons Project . She has recently won the European Woman in Media award and the Media Career Award 2023 for her outstanding work and powerful voice on EU affairs and focus on building an inclusive Union of Equality. Shada Islam is an EUobserver columnist, and independent EU analyst and commentator who runs her own strategy and advisory company New Horizons Project . She has recently won the European Woman in Media award and the
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Media Career Award 2023
|
Some will see the EU-top job appointments as a moment to celebrate the creation of a female-led European “dream team” or even a “feminist” Europe. For others, the jury's out.
|
[
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-political
|
2024-06-26T13:08:13.508Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar3ef1d4d4
|
What could five more years of von der Leyen mean for Europe?
|
As the chief of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen has become one of Europe's most influential women — a powerful position that she has been fighting to keep. But what could five more years of von der Leyen mean for the EU? Top negotiators have agreed on a second term for the German conservative, according to EU diplomats. There is no talk of a challenger and everything seems to indicate that she will secure enough support from EU leaders — although she still faces the task of securing the support of at least 361 out of 720 MEPs. For many, her name represents stability and the ability to navigate any new challenges that may arise, as she showed during the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, critics see von der Leyen as a symbol of weakness and technocracy. Geopolitical or Politicised? Von der Leyen’s self-proclaimed "geopolitical commission" in 2019, which shifted her mandate to focus more on external relations, going beyond her role as head of the commission, raised concerns about impartiality. But her foreign policy focus is expected to continue, driven by the current geopolitical situation. "It will continue, if not increase. The world in 2019 was different from now, and in 2024, this geopolitical focus seems more important than ever," said Sophia Russack, a researcher at the think tank CEPS. Russack also said that it is not the geopolitical role of the institution that erodes the commission's neutrality, but rather the politicisation of the commission itself. Following her handling of the Gaza war, widely seen as von der Leyen’s biggest controversy, she was accused of having an overly pro-Israeli stance, prompting criticism from EU foreign affairs chief Josep Borrell, EU Council president Charles Michel , and even EU civil servants . "Von der Leyen’s trip [to Israel after the war broke out], with such a completely pro-Israeli position, without representing anyone but herself in a matter of international politics, has carried a high geopolitical cost for Europe,” Borrell told Spanish newspaper El Pais earlier this year. Despite her record in Gaza, her unconditional support to president Volodymyr Zelensky in the Ukraine war and her push for a stronger defence and security industry in Europe has been praised by experts as a step in the right direction. "Having an experienced hand at the helm of the commission who has proven her worth in pushing the EU security and defence union forward would be no bad thing," Jamie Shea, a former senior Nato official, previously told EUobserver. The EU’s unconditional support for Ukraine is expected to continue during the next mandate, especially if Estonian prime minister Kaja Kallas is approved as the next EU foreign affairs chief. ‘Growth problem’ Defence policy will become the next commission’s main priority, but the push for economic security will keep gaining momentum over the EU’s next mandate, not to mention a reduction in green requirements and bureaucracy in the name of competitiveness. Europe lacks the economic basis to fund the climate transition or Europe’s defence needs. “We do have a growth problem,” Guntram Wolff, an economist from the think tank Bruegel told EUobserver. “Three years after Covid-19, we are seeing that the US is rebounding more strongly than Europe,” he added, mentioning AI and space as sectors where the 27-nation bloc was lagging. The main pending tasks for the next commission include strengthening the EU's single market, improving access to capital, developing an effective industrial policy, and promoting research and innovation. In this context, one of the main questions is how to make the decade-old project of the Capital Markets Union a reality, bypassing vested interests at the national level. Trade is also part of the geo-economics equation. Although Wolff doesn’t predict many bilateral agreements during the next term, the finalisation of the EU-Mercosur agreement and deals with Indonesia and India are seen as opportunities to secure influence in the Global South. On the climate front, von der Leyen will face a very challenging environment – with discussion on the 2040 targets, the role that agriculture plays in the transition and the phase-out of fossil fuel vehicles due to dominate talks “This will be a make or break moment for the Green Deal,” said Georg Zachmann from the think tank Bruegel, arguing that the introduction of a carbon price for transport and heating fuels (ETS2) will be key for the success of the Green Deal. ‘Europe that delivers’ Von der Leyen aspires to lead a "Europe that delivers” as she has said repeatedly during her campaign. But her commission has been criticised for not enforcing EU law during this last mandate and for quickly giving in to pressure from either EU member states, lobbyists, or farmers. "Ursula von der Leyen is an accountant of what the heads of state and government tell her. I am not blaming her, she cannot do anything to regain authority," Romano Prodi, former president of the European Commission told La Stampa. When it comes to applying and enforcing EU law, her commission has favoured so-called dialogue over infringement procedures — an approach that has drawn criticism from MEPs and experts, who argue that it is an "opaque political process" that may not ensure member states come into legal compliance. In recent months, she also faced criticism for dropping the Article 7 procedure against Poland, with Visegrad Insight fellow Krzysztof Izdebski arguing that her decision could be perceived as "mainly political”. The decision, based on an action plan which does not ensure implementation, has already been used by Hungary to accuse Brussels of double standards. But this is not the first time the alleged ‘politicisation’ of the commission has become an issue. Her time as head of the EU Commission has also seen incidents such as the PieperGate or Pfizer-text-message scandal that have marred her reputation. The Belgian courts and the European prosecutors are currently investigating the missing text messages between von der Leyen and Pfizer CEO Albert Bourla regarding a deal for 1.8 billion Covid-19 vaccine doses, but the outcome will unlikely impact her next term. And the EU Parliament decided in March to sue von der Leyen's Commission for unlocking €10bn for Hungary. MEPs argued that the decision, made just before an EU summit and following threats by Hungary's prime minister Viktor Orbán to block a €50bn fund for Ukraine, was politically motivated, but the commission is convinced that it will be able to defend its position in court. ‘Democratic crisis’ The European election results, which made possible a majority coalition between the centre-right EPP group, the Socialists and Democrats (S&D), and the liberal Renew Europe, have helped ease concerns about the far-right's rise in the bloc, but the centre today is not the centre of 2019. And the question is whether mainstream parties can maintain control or give in to the populist wave — especially after von der Leyen left the door open to a possible collaboration between the EPP and the rightwing European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group during the campaign. “It is a real sign of democratic crisis that the so-called centre of politics is now more comfortable considering alliances with the far right than the left,” Aurelien Mondon, a politics professor at the University of Bath in the UK, told EUobserver. For her part, EU ombudsman Emily O’Reilly recently said the centre held because the EPP and others “shifted their own dial further to the right” especially on the climate crisis and on migration. “Winning is not just a question of power … but also a question of who is winning the argument, which narrative dominates. In these terms, it is much harder to remain optimistic that the ‘pro-EU centre-ground’ is holding,” O’Reilly also said. During the 2019-2024 mandate, certain legislative proposals such as, for example, the controversial Nature Restoration Law saw the realignment of the EPP with the ECR and even the far-right Identity and Democracy (ID group), raising doubts about future green EU legislation.
|
Elena is EUobserver's editor-in-chief. She is from Spain and has studied journalism and new media in Spanish and Belgian universities. Previously she worked on European affairs at VoteWatch Europe and the Spanish news agency EFE.
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As the chief of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen has become one of Europe's most influential women — a powerful position that she has been fighting to keep. But what could five more years of von der Leyen mean for the EU?
|
[
"EU Political"
] |
eu-political
|
2024-06-25T15:31:12.673Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-political/arb5ac9760
|
Russia bans EUobserver and dozens of EU media
|
Russia has banned 81 EU-based media, including EUobserver, saying they "systematically disseminate false information about the progress of a special military operation [Russia's invasion of Ukraine]". The Russian foreign ministry announced the move on Tuesday (25 June) in retaliation against EU sanctions on Russian propaganda outlets. Russia's online ban covered national broadcasters and news agencies in Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden, but not Germany or Poland. It hit several of Europe's best-known newspapers, including Berlingske in Denmark, France's Le Monde and Liberation, Germany's FAZ, Der Spiegel, and Die Zeit, the Irish Times, La Repubblica in Italy, NRC in the Netherlands, and Spain's El Pais. EUobserver was banned as one of four EU-focused media, including also Agence Europe and Politico in Brussels, and the Prague-based RFE/RL. Other EU-focused media, such as Euractiv and Euronews, were not mentioned by Moscow. The Russian ministry also spared all media in pro-Russian Hungary, except one independent outlet called 444.hu. The ministry called the ban a “mirrored and proportionate” reaction to EU sanctions on Russian media. “If restrictions on Russian media are lifted, the Russian side will also reconsider its decision in relation to the mentioned media operators,” Russia said. For its part, the EU banned four Russian propaganda conduits on Monday — Voice of Europe, RIA Novosti, Izvestia, and Rossiyskaya Gazeta. Voice of Europe was a Prague-based outlet said to have bribed MEPs to act for Russia in a recent sting by Belgian, Czech, and Polish intelligence. This is still the subject of an ongoing investigation. The EU has also blocked Russian outlets Katehon, Pervyi Kanal, REN TV, Rossiya 1, Rossiya 24, Spas TV, Sputnik, Russia Today , Tsargrad TV, and several of their subsidiaries in previous rounds of sanctions. And it has blacklisted over 100 Russian individuals on grounds they were spreading propaganda, such as RT editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan and TV anchorman Vladimir Soloviev. The bans on both sides are less than watertight — EUobserver still had Russian readers following Tuesday's declaration. Russia Today and Sputnik are also widely accessible in the EU, even without using a VPN, according to RFE/RL. Russia ranked near the bottom of the world — 162nd place out of 180 — for press freedom, according to the Paris-based group Reporters Without Borders (RSF). RSF's website is also blocked in Russia. Commenting on the Russian media ban, EU values commissioner Věra Jourová said on X: "It's a nonsense retaliation." "No, propaganda outlets funded by Russia to spread disinformation as part of Russia's military doctrine are not the same as independent media. Democracies know that," she said.
|
Andrew Rettman is EUobserver's foreign editor, writing about foreign and security issues since 2005. He is Polish, but grew up in the UK, and lives in Brussels. He has also written for The Guardian, The Times of London, and Intelligence Online.
|
Russia has banned 81 EU-based media, including EUobserver, saying they "systematically disseminate false information about the progress of a special military operation [Russia's invasion of Ukraine]".
|
[
"EU & the World",
"Rule of Law"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2024-06-25T14:14:22.907Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar5b99bec6
|
EU needs to help Moldova fight Russian disinfo attacks
|
As 2024 unfolds, Moldova finds itself at a decisive juncture. With pivotal presidential elections, a crucial EU referendum , and parliamentary contests looming by mid-2025, the destiny of the nation hangs in the balance. Despite the popularity of Moldova's president Maia Sandu and her administration, the country is under siege from a barrage of crises and escalating hybrid assaults targeting its political integrity. The stakes transcend Moldova's borders, casting a long shadow over the European Union, Ukraine, and democratic allies, such as the US, UK, and Canada. Amid Russia's relentless onslaught and collusion with local oligarchs, urgent action is imperative. Europe and its allies must fortify their strategic communications and deliver resolute support. Against the backdrop of the Ukraine conflict, Moldova's stability teeters on the edge, demanding a swift and substantial response. Russia, in collaboration with fugitive Moldovan oligarchs, orchestrates elaborate disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining Moldova's democratic advancements. These efforts encompass energy coercion, the promotion of separatism, the propagation of corruption, and the inundation of social media platforms, such as Facebook, Telegram, and TikTok with falsehoods. A recent deepfake video circulating on TikTok, falsely depicting president Sandu endorsing candidates supported by the fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, garnered nearly 1m views, vividly illustrating the magnitude and detrimental impact of these tactics. The depths of Russian interference in Moldova are staggering. Moldovan intelligence reveals a chilling reality: In 2023 alone, over $55m [€51.2m] was funnelled into destabilising the country. This financial juggernaut allows Russian propaganda to drown out the voices of democracy, employing sophisticated tactics to sow fear and spread misinformation among Moldovan citizens. A particularly alarming incident serves as a stark reminder of the magnitude of this threat. On 24 April 2024, Moldovan authorities intercepted pro-Russian political activists returning from a congress in Moscow, carrying a staggering sum exceeding $1m. This brazen attempt to subvert Moldova's stability and democratic ideals underscores the sheer scale of resources being mobilised to undermine the nation's sovereignty and democratic progress. Battling fake news In light of these challenges, Moldova has embarked on a determined path to combat disinformation. The Parliament has taken decisive action by prohibiting several Russian state-owned TV channels and initiating the establishment of a Center for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation. Furthermore, with the backing of the EU , a National Cybersecurity Agency is being established. Yet, while these initiatives represent significant strides, they are long-term solutions. Moldova urgently requires immediate assistance to effectively confront the persistent onslaught of disinformation campaigns. Europe's communication strategies must evolve to confront Russia's multifaceted threats. A comprehensive update is essential to ensure agility and impact, particularly on platforms like Telegram and TikTok, where Russian narratives gain traction. Additional funding channels and streamlined processes are vital to empowering local civil society and communication centres, redirecting resources to targeted social media campaigns. This includes reallocating resources from traditional promotional materials to targeted social media advertising, engaging influencers, and delivering tailored messages to diverse demographic groups, including regions, such as Gagauzia and Balti. Creating a coordinated, multinational funding mechanism could harmonise support efforts across the EU, the US, the UK, and other democratic partners. Simplifying application procedures with a standardised template, similar to the EU CV Europass, would empower NGOs and activists to focus on strengthening democracy instead of navigating complex funding applications. The upcoming elections in Moldova carry immense significance. Their outcome will profoundly influence the nation's democratic path and its ties with the EU . For Europe and its allies, backing Moldova transcends regional interests; it represents a pivotal battleground in the global fight for democratic principles against authoritarian encroachment. As Moldova stands at this critical juncture, it is imperative for the democratic West to bolster its support, employing innovative and resolute measures to uphold democracy and advance European ideals. The moment calls for decisive action. The fate of Europe and the preservation of democracy in the region hinge upon it.
|
Carolina Bogatiuc is a policy fellow on EU Affairs at the Institute for Policy and Strategic Initiatives (IPIS), former chief of staff to the former Moldovan minister of foreign affairs and European integration, Nicu Popescu.
|
With national elections and an EU referendum looming by mid-2025, Moldova's future hangs in the balance, amid attacks by Russia-linked disinformation.
|
[
"EU Political",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-political
|
2024-06-24T11:39:09.350Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-political/arddf59232
|
Fist-fight in Italy's parliament, Macron lights a fuse in EU
|
Yes, the “centre” of European politics “held.” But oh dear are things fragile. Neither the German nor French political establishment enjoys much legitimacy these days, and only the far-right seems to have come up with an “alternative” to them. Hey, say what you want, but at least it’s an ethos . While there are still plenty of socialists and centre-left folks loafing about the halls of European power, it’s anyone’s guess what the EU looks like when its two biggest members are flirting with neo-fascist takeovers or ungovernable coalitions — if not nationally, at least regionally. In third-largest Italy, the populist right already has things well in hand. EUobserver’s Valentina Saini returns to Euroscopic to discuss what’s up in Italy and the government’s push towards the fancy-sounding idea of “differentiated autonomy.” Giorgia Meloni may find herself in the awkward position of trying to boost her European credentials while placating the eurosceptic ones that got her into power in the first place. Oops. But who needs illiberals to dismantle “European values” from within when liberals are happy to do it themselves? EUobserver columnist Shada Islam joins us to discuss the role that Israel’s destruction of Gaza is playing in splitting the EU — and if Arab and Muslim voters here can form the kind of potent constituency that their counterparts in the United States have been able to do. William Glucroft is a writer and journalist based in Berlin. Explorer of the Teutonic Imaginary who's covering Germany with wit, style, and insight worth reading. Martin Gak is a broadcaster and writer , a native of Argentina fascinated by the idea of Europe, its values and its cheese. William Glucroft is a writer and journalist based in Berlin. Explorer of the Teutonic Imaginary who's covering Germany with wit, style, and insight worth reading. Martin Gak is a broadcaster and
|
writer
|
This week's Euroscopic gets into European power battles, Giorgia Meloni's push towards the fancy-sounding idea of “differentiated autonomy” and the role that Israel’s destruction of Gaza is playing in splitting the EU.
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[
"Euroscopic"
] |
euroscopic
|
2024-06-21T12:55:56.195Z
|
https://euobserver.com/euroscopic/arf3402996
|
Euronews, Orbán, Fico — media freedom is in peril across the EU
|
On 11 April, the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) passed its final vote before becoming law in the EU. The same day, it came to light that the 2022 sale of Euronews had in fact placed it under the control of investors closely allied with Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán, and the purchase was primarily financed by a Hungarian state capital fund. Two weeks after this revelation, the Fico government approved a law bringing Slovakia’s public service media under political control, in direct contradiction with the EMFA. Finally, at the end of April, the latest edition of the annual Liberties Media Freedom Report was published, confirming the dangerous state of media freedom throughout the EU and warning that the EMFA is far from a panacea. The findings of the report, which tracks developments in media freedom in 19 EU member states, make clear why the EU felt it needed to act. Attacks on journalists were widespread last year, from France and Germany to Croatia and Greece. Harassment and vexatious lawsuits known as SLAPPs (strategic lawsuits of public participation) remain commonplace. Some governments refuse critical journalists access to public events or buildings. Public service media face funding cuts and influence from politicians; in Hungary, they are part of the government’s propaganda machine. Media ownership concentration is heavy, but transparency about exactly who those owners are remains low. The Euronews story shows us how the ownership of even large, EU-level news companies can remain shrouded in secrecy. Roughly two years removed from its sale, we are only just beginning to understand who’s ultimately in charge there. Media ownership transparency is a first step towards accountability and makes it possible for people to understand who controls the news sources they rely on. Hidden influence on media outlets also creates a less pluralistic media landscape, preventing people from having access to a plurality of voices, forming their opinions, and making informed decisions at the polls. EU institutions have taken note of the bloc’s declining media freedom and pluralism, and there has been new legislation aiming to reverse the slide. Most prominent, of course, is the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA). The EMFA sets out minimum standards that, while important, leave much still to be done by member states and national and EU-level authorities. 'National security' loophole It bans the use of Pegasus , Predator and other spyware against journalists — but creates a national security loophole that is ripe for abuse. It requires some media ownership information to be published at the national level, such as names and addresses, including their beneficial owners, direct or indirect but does not create a centralised EU-level database of media owners and their affiliation to politicians, leaving it to national regulators to determine how and how much data is made transparent. It requires fair and transparent allocation of state advertising expenditures but with limited safeguards, leaving it to member states to require more transparency and determine a stricter legal framework for the transparent, non-discriminatory allocation of state advertising. Clearly, the EMFA is not enough to fully protect media freedom and pluralism, even when combined with the Anti-SLAPP directive and other extremely important legislation, which again sets only minimum standards for protecting journalists. The Fico government’s decision to gut the independence of public service media so soon after passage of the EMFA makes clear the need for close and continuous monitoring. Restoring and protecting media freedom across the EU requires strong cooperation between the EU and member states. The European Board of Media Services, a new and independent body made up of national media authorities, assisted by the EU Commission, will be tasked with ensuring the consistent application of the EMFA. It will fall on national and EU regulatory bodies to enforce the EMFA and the Digital Services Act, which regulates the online environment to create an accessible, transparent and safe space to access information and express opinions. Member state governments must make sure those regulatory bodies remain independent, and pass new laws with further safeguards where EU law falls short. Civil society, self-regulatory bodies and journalists’ associations must play an active role in monitoring the implementation and laws and policies and how they work in practice. The Treaty of the EU sets out an obligation for the EU institutions to “maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society,” and elaborating a well-functioning dialogue with civil society should be on the agenda of the next commission. The events of just the last months make clear that EU legislation will not be enough to resuscitate media freedom in the EU, especially in member states where the government views a free press as its adversary. With this information, EU and national officials will have a clear understanding of how best to work together to secure a truly free and pluralistic media landscape in Europe. Jonathan Day is advocacy officer at the Berlin-based NGO Liberties (The Civil Liberties Union for Europe) , a watchdog that safeguards the human rights of everyone in the EU, where Eva Simon is senior advocacy officer and tech and rights lead. Jonathan Day is advocacy officer at the Berlin-based NGO Liberties (The Civil Liberties Union for Europe) , a watchdog that safeguards the human rights of everyone in the EU, where
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Eva Simon
|
The sale of Euronews to investors linked to Viktor Orbán and Robert Fico's move to bring Slovakia's public media under public control offer a clear warning that new legislative action from Brussels will not be enough on its own to reshape Europe’s media landscape.
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[
"EU Political",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-political
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2024-06-21T10:16:02.583Z
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https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar751a340d
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How to deal with a problem like Serbia's Vučić and his rampant nationalism?
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In the wake of Aleksandar Vucic's defiant display at the UN , draped in the Serbian flag and delivering a nationalist salute, the Balkans once again finds itself at a critical juncture. This act, laden with historical connotations and nationalistic fervor, serves as a stark reminder that Serbia's leadership under Vucic remains entrenched in a divisive past, rather than embracing a pro-Western, European future. The European Union and the US, however, have yet to forge a unified approach towards Serbia, let alone the broader Balkan region. This disjointed policy framework is emblematic of broader challenges within EU foreign policy, exemplified recently by its fractured response to the Israel-Palestine conflict. Similarly, in the Balkans, a cohesive strategy towards Serbia is imperative, built on a foundation of balanced deterrence and diplomatic engagement for regional stability and prosperity. Following Russia's aggression in Ukraine, Serbia, despite its EU candidate status, refrained from joining EU sanctions against Moscow. Member states pursued individual relations with Belgrade, driven by perceived national interests. For instance, Hungary – taking over the EU Council presidency on 1 July – maintains robust ties with Serbia and the Republika Srpska, leveraging veto threats within the EU against actions targeting figures like Vucic and Dodik. France, despite being a staunch EU ally, recently deepened military cooperation with Serbia , showcasing the complexities of member states pursuing independent bilateral agreements. Similarly, US policy in the Balkans, which focused on integrating Serbia into the Euro-Atlantic sphere to counter Russian and Chinese influence, has struggled. Despite these efforts, Serbia continues to deepen its ties with both Moscow and Beijing. Friends in Beijing Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit underscored this trend, resulting in numerous economic agreements, including a controversial extradition pact that runs counter to European human rights norms. Serbia's role as a conduit for Chinese influence, amid broader US-China tensions, undermines Western efforts to maintain strategic cohesion in the region. Internally, Serbia under Vucic has seen democratic backsliding, erosion of media freedoms, and questionable electoral practices, as highlighted by European observers . The failure to uphold democratic standards not only complicates Serbia's accession path but also perpetuates regional instability and hampers efforts towards Euro-Atlantic integration. In confronting these challenges, a recalibration of Western policy towards Serbia is imperative. A unified approach, blending robust deterrence with targeted diplomatic engagement, must prioritise engagement with diverse segments of Serbian society beyond the ruling elite. The notion that Vucic alone can steer Serbia towards Western values and interests must be dispelled The notion that Vucic alone can steer Serbia towards Western values and interests must be dispelled, replaced by a pragmatic engagement strategy that fosters democratic norms and pluralistic governance. Moreover, regional dynamics necessitate a merit-based approach towards all Balkan states, moving beyond a disproportionate focus on Serbia. The region, scarred by the legacy of 1990s conflicts, requires leadership committed to reconciliation and stability. Serbia's persistent interference in neighboring states , from Republika Srpska to Kosovo, underscores the urgency of fostering inclusive leadership that transcends historical grievances. Drawing parallels from European history, leaders like Willy Brandt and Konrad Adenauer exemplify the transformative power of conciliatory leadership in post-war Germany. Their commitment to reconciliation, epitomized by gestures like Brandt's kneeling in Warsaw and Adenauer's collaboration with de Gaulle, laid the groundwork for European unity and prosperity. In contrast, Vucic's leadership evokes memories of a bygone era under Milosevic, marked by nationalist posturing and regional dominance. Moving forward, Western policy must not succumb to illusions of Vucic's transformative potential. Instead, it should leverage diplomatic tools and conditional engagement to promote democratic governance and respect for rule of law within Serbia. Concurrently, fostering partnerships with civil society and non-governmental actors can empower pluralism and democratic resilience. The EU and US must forge a unified Balkan policy that transcends historical divisions and confronts contemporary challenges with resolve and coherence. By recalibrating their approach towards Serbia and the broader region, prioritizing democratic norms and inclusive governance, Western powers can foster a stable, prosperous Balkans integrated into the Euro-Atlantic community. Anything less risks perpetuating instability and undermining decades of investment in regional peace and reconciliation. Engjellushe Morina is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). Engjellushe Morina is a senior policy fellow at the
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European Council on Foreign Relations
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Following Aleksandar Vučić's flag-waving disrespect at the United Nations Srebenica genocide resolution, the notion that Vucic alone can steer Serbia towards Western values and interests must be dispelled.
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[
"EU & the World",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2024-06-20T10:39:21.780Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar7ce2ba26
|
France and Italy face EU debt showdown as deficits exceed limits
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The EU Commission is preparing debt procedures for France and six other countries for their breach of EU spending rules. “We have assessed the fiscal situation in member states, we have come to the conclusion that deficit criteria are not met in some countries, including in France,” said trade commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis on Wednesday (19 June). On 1 January, after years of negotiations, EU member states agreed to re-impose the bloc’s fiscal rules. As a consequence all countries with deficits higher than three percent of GDP and debt ratios above 60 percent of GDP, will need to reduce debt according to the so-called excessive deficit procedure (EDP). France is the largest economy to be in breach of the rules, followed by Italy, Poland, Belgium, Hungary, Slovakia, plus Malta also ran higher-than-allowed deficits. The commission based its decision to warn these countries based on 2023 deficit figures, but also took into account expected budgets for 2024 and the following years. Spain and the Czech Republic for example also exceeded three percent in 2023 but expected to dip below the limit this year. Estonia has similarly breached the limit, and is expected to remain above the benchmark. But with a debt ratio of only 20 percent it is far below the limit of 60 percent set by the so-called stability pact. Less strict, still impactful Even though the new rules are less strict than previous fiscal rules, which were suspended when the Covid-19 pandemic hit, they still bite. Therefore, negotiations between member states and the commission may turn nasty before the year is over, especially if populist parties win the parliamentary election in France, which is headed for snap elections on 30 June. Both the far-right Rassemblement National (National Rally) and the leftwing Popular Front have announced spending packages that would lead to a confrontation with the commission later this year, as it would increase deficits further in the short run. Member states are expected to publish their mid-term debt reduction pathways this summer, and discuss it with the commission, which will then approve definitive debt-plans for these countries this autumn. The Brussels-based think-tank Bruegel previously estimated that France would need to cut €15.7bn this year, or around 0.5 percent of GDP, based on the minimum reduction benchmark included in the fiscal rules. But it is up to member states to decide where cuts can be made. This would however come on top of already announced budget cuts worth about €20bn. Many have warned that re-imposing spending cuts, especially at this scale, would be a gift to the far-right, who were the main beneficiaries of the loss of trust associated with cuts to social welfare, healthcare and other social services, as many researchers have found. But EU economy commissioner Paolo Gentiloni on Wednesday said that ”the theory is not entirely proved in my view” and pointed out that the high expenditure of the last few years have not been able to stem the far right advance. Will the commission impose fines? Countries that refuse to comply can be fined. The new Stability Pact empowers the commission to issue sanctions of 0.1 percent of GDP per year on countries that do not implement suggested budget cuts. This would amount to €2.6bn for France, and €1.9bn for Italy. “But it is way too early to talk about any possible enforcement steps,” said Dombrovskis when asked about a possible debt-showdown with France. In reality the excessive deficit procedure has never led to a fine. France especially has been in an excessive deficit procedure for the majority of the time since the introduction of the euro currency over two decades ago. But every French government has relied on its power and central role in the EU establishment to scare away any commission official brave enough to impose the rules. This time is different? This time it might be different, as commission officials are under pressure to enforce the new fiscal rules all member states have just agreed on. “Whether a country respects the treaty for deficit and debt or not should not be based on the size of the country, I think that is obvious,” said Dombrovskis when asked if he would shy back from imposing sanctions on offending member states “The fact that country’s can set their own debt reduction pathways, goes hand in hand with stronger enforcement,” he added.
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Wester is a journalist from the Netherlands with a focus on the green economy. He joined EUobserver in September 2021. Previously he was editor-in-chief of Vice, Motherboard, a science-based website, and climate economy journalist for The Correspondent.
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The EU Commission is preparing debt procedures for France and six other countries for their breach of EU spending rules — preparing the way for a hard fiscal fight later this year.
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[
"Green Economy"
] |
green-economy
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2024-06-19T12:23:32.725Z
|
https://euobserver.com/green-economy/ar11845cb6
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The EU is pushing Cambodia further into the orbit of China
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In 2020, when the EU ended Cambodia’s preferential treatment under the ‘Everything but Arms’ trade arrangement, it cited “serious and systematic concerns related to human rights” and the need for ongoing monitoring of restrictions the governing regime was imposing on freedom of expression and political rights. Three years later, despite troubling reports concerning the political environment in Cambodia, including the barring of opposition parties and an upswing in state-backed intimidation and arrest of dissenting citizens, the EU opted against sending a team of observers to monitor the country’s elections. A Soviet-style pseudo-act of democracy ensued. The country’s ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) secured a further term, and, in the weeks thereafter, a dynastic handover of power between Hun Sen and his son, Hun Manet, was formalised. The muted response to these developments by lawmakers in the EU, the UK and the US effectively gave a three-decade-long regime, characterised by its systematic assault on civil liberties, the freedom to act as it pleases. "We will continue to work with Cambodia's new government and will not prejudge how it may or may not perform in the coming months," a European Commission spokesperson said when pressed on how the EU would respond to Manet’s accession. Why does this matter to Europeans? Most obviously, the current EU position runs counter to the institution's founding, treaty-enshrined commitment to promoting democracy and human rights around the world. It is also, in failing to keep the Cambodian regime in check, and subject to at least some level of accountability, pushing the country further into the orbit of China - a relationship that Cambodia’s young premier recently described as “inseparable”. The significance of a deepening of relations between Phnom Penh and Beijing cannot be understated. There is growing evidence to suggest that Cambodia is enabling China to establish a naval base at Ream, where Chinese-owned companies have been engaged to modernise the existing port. Vessels of the People’s Liberation Army appear to be permanently docked in the area, despite denials by the Cambodian government, and the two countries have recently conducted a series of substantial “ Golden Dragon ” joint military exercises. Later this year, Chinese companies are due to start work on the Funan Techo canal, a 180-km, $1.7bn [€1.58bn] project, which will connect Cambodia’s capital to the Gulf of Thailand. 'Dual-use' and bypassing Vietnam Upon completion, this project could divert traffic from the Mekong River and cut out the need for passage through Vietnam. Independent analysis of the project concluded that the canal is intended for “dual use”. In addition to facilitating trade, the authors found the canal is designed such that it could facilitate the passage of military vessels through Cambodia, towards the Vietnamese border. In addition to these major infrastructure partnerships, Cambodia is also increasingly playing an important diplomatic, almost proxy-like role for China at major international forums, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This has raised questions about Cambodia’s position on key regional issues, including China’s claim to the South China Sea, which contains valuable untapped mineral deposits, as well as a thriving fishing ground. This passage is also coveted by the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, and others, which have more established territorial claims. This makes Cambodia, and other countries benefiting from China’s “Belt and Road” initiative, critical to any future powerplay in the region, in so much that Beijing’s creeping influence is not just impacting governmental but also wider public opinion. Indeed, this year, for the first time, a poll found that a majority of Southeast Asians would choose China over the US in the event of a hypothetical war between the countries. For the West, these findings should serve as a call to action, and show that mere support for democracy in these parts is not a sufficient bulwark to China’s ambitions. To the EU’s credit, it has set out a €300bn ‘Global Gateway’ package to help its digital, energy and transport sectors “ de-risk ” their relationship with China and avoid a repeat of the dependency challenges presented by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But the reality is that action to date, in Europe, has centred primarily on shoring up domestic interests and emboldening bad actors - including Cambodia’s Manet - rather than tackling thornier, geopolitical challenges. But this could change. The president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, this month secured backing from EU leaders for stinging new trade tariffs on China. Italy’s surging rightwing prime minister, Italy’s Giorgia Meloni, has withdrawn her country from the Belt and Road initiative, after public opinion became unfavourable towards on-going involvement. Even the far-right National Rally, which looks set to win the upcoming parliamentary elections in France, has struck some opposition to China’s growing influence, even if they remain silent to Beijing’s human rights abuses. The prospect for a real shift in policy within the EU, though, comes from the newly-enlarged centre-right voting bloc in the European Parliament - the European People’s Party (EPP) - which recently stated that growing tensions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait should serve as a “wake-up call for Europe”. It has called upon the bloc to do more to foster cooperation with a “Union of Democracies” in the region. This would make for a good starting point, and speak to the EU’s self-proclaimed role as a guardian of global democracy. But additional pressure must also be brought to bear on China’s growing network of allies, including Cambodia, where CCP-styled mechanisms for the control of public discourse, the roll-out of mass surveillance, and violent assaults on civil liberties are taking root. It is true that the EU has a delicate line to tread with its engagements in South East Asia. However, it must also recognise that it has a role to play in protecting the fragile roots of democracy that exist in this region. The all-carrot, no-stick approach, particularly towards the Manet regime - which has historically attempted to gain backdoor access to EU citizenship and offshore its ill-gotten assets to the bloc - is harming both the people of Cambodia and Europe’s own values and standing on the world stage. Holding the likes of Manet to account, and insisting on his regime safeguarding social, civil and human rights should be part and parcel of the bloc’s China strategy. The consequences of sitting timidly, and failing to push back at the multi-layered system of Chinese creep could spell trouble not just for democracies, like Cambodia, but regional and wider international stability. Mu Sochua is a former Cambodian politician and Nobel Peace Prize nominee now living in exile in the US, and president of the Khmer Movement for Democracy . Mu Sochua is a former Cambodian politician and Nobel Peace Prize nominee now living in exile in the US, and president of the
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Khmer Movement for Democracy
|
The significance of a deepening of relations between Phnom Penh and Beijing cannot be understated.
There is growing evidence to suggest that Cambodia is enabling China to establish a naval base at Ream, where Chinese-owned companies have been engaged to modernise the existing port.
|
[
"EU & the World",
"Opinion"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2024-06-19T10:59:16.555Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar2722e442
|
While military aid soars, humanitarian help for Ukraine plummets
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If you were to be dropped into one of the major cities of Ukraine in the centre or west of the country – such as Lviv or Kyiv – on an ordinary Tuesday morning, you would think that everything is normal. In these energetic and picturesque European cities, parents walk their children to school, cafes spill over with students and the aroma of specialty coffee and the crisp energy of spring fills the air. Until all at once, the sound of an air raid alarm pierces the air and the illusion of normalcy is broken. While this is normal life for Ukrainians, it seems that for the rest of the world, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has started to fade into the background. The stories of missiles striking schools and hospitals and residents sheltering in metro stations are fading into our collective subconscious. Despite renewed international support and military aid for the Ukrainian state, funds allocated to the humanitarian sector are alarmingly decreasing. Donors, including Germany, the UK and the EU, have already announced dramatic budget cuts to humanitarian aid for Ukraine. This is in spite of the fact that 14.6 million people – about 40 per cent of the Ukrainian population living in Ukraine – will need humanitarian assistance in 2024, according to the UN’s Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan. In particular, the European Commission (ECHO) released at the beginning of the year the funding for each region in what is called the Humanitarian Implementation Plan - for 2024 the budget for Ukraine and region is €88.5m compared to 2023 budget of €335.4m. For humanitarian organisations based in Ukraine, like Caritas , the reality and brutality of the war is always at the forefront of their minds. So too is the fear of being forgotten by the rest of the world. As two nationally-based organisations providing humanitarian assistance in Ukraine, Caritas Ukraine and Caritas-Spes Ukraine are rooted in the local community and were providing social services long before the start of Russia’s invasion into the country in 2014. On my recent visit to Ukraine, I was struck by my own misconceptions about the gravity of the humanitarian crisis continuing to unfold in Ukraine. Calm cities mask countless displaced Beneath the calm exterior in western cities like Lviv and Kyiv are countless stories of internally displaced people who have sought shelter in these cities – stories of displacement, loss and fear for the lives of their families and friends near the frontlines. During my visit to a shelter for internally displaced people in Lviv Oblast, one mother from Sloviansk, a city in Donetsk Oblast, shared with me how much she misses her hometown, known for its hot springs that are said to have healing properties. Now, she told me: “I live day by day. I don’t have any dreams for the future.” Another woman, tears in her eyes, told me how she longs to return home to Kharkiv. Ukraine’s second largest city, Kharkiv faces nearly constant bombardment, with residents having only about four hours of electricity a day. “I try to call my mother (in Kharkiv) often, but sometimes she isn’t able to respond to my calls because the electricity or phone connection isn’t working.” After the recent Russian attacks on the Ukrainian energy infrastructure, several European countries (including Germany and Sweden) have sent immediate material aid to Ukraine through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. This demonstrates concrete attention to the country's current emergencies, and perhaps can divert the attention on the serious ongoing funding cuts; considering that according to the UN only 26 percent of the needed funds for 2024 have been provided as of early June 2024. Markiyan Stefanyshyn of Caritas-Spes' Ukraine office in Lviv, recounted his many visits to the frontlines with trucks full of food aid. “There is still a huge need for humanitarian assistance in many, many cities near the front line,” he insists. Money is worthless because there is nothing left to buy “I’ve been to these cities – in some places, money is worthless because there is nothing left to buy. Some cities are completely destroyed and people who have left will have no home to return to.” For nationally-based humanitarian organisations that existed in Ukraine prior to the full-scale invasion and will continue their work long after the war ends, international support and solidarity are crucial to sustain their ongoing work. While the world may be returning to business as usual, people continue to face staggering physical and psychological needs as the war rages on. One Caritas staff told of several children who had sheltered for an extended period of time under occupation and intense bombardment and who stopped speaking due to the prolonged trauma they had faced. Tetiana Stawnychy, president of Caritas Ukraine, said: “When we think of humanitarian assistance, we can’t only think of material assistance, although this is urgently needed. People are facing real trauma, and this requires long-term psycho-social assistance.” She is convinced that this long-term work is dependent on the continued solidarity and support of donors and partners. “Localisation isn’t just about the work of local and national organisations delivering services — it’s also about the intermediaries and donors that build a bridge to provide this solidarity and support. We all have an important role to play.” During my visit to Ukraine, I met warehouse workers who volunteer their time to Caritas-Spes Ukraine to load trucks for delivery to the frontlines. Many staff members of Caritas Ukraine are internally displaced themselves – some of whom have moved to the west of the country with their beneficiaries, including people with disabilities, who they continue to serve. Their dedication stands in stark contrast to the growing fatigue of the international community to continue to fund the humanitarian response in Ukraine. Abriel Schieffelers is humanitarian advocacy officer for Caritas Europa Abriel Schieffelers
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is humanitarian advocacy officer for
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Donors, including Germany, the UK and the EU, have already announced dramatic budget cuts to humanitarian aid for Ukraine.
|
[
"Ukraine",
"Opinion"
] |
ukraine
|
2024-06-18T10:32:02.273Z
|
https://euobserver.com/ukraine/arbe75531d
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Big Pharma influence hangs over Europe’s medicines regulator
|
At the end of 2019, two pharmaceutical consultants checked into an Amsterdam hotel. It is one of hundreds of options in the city. It is also where experts from the European Medicines Agency (EMA) are staying for their monthly meeting. Many are their former colleagues. Senior figures from the agency’s Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP), its most influential body, were gathering at its headquarters in the Dutch capital. They were there to discuss applications from pharmaceutical firms wanting to market their drugs in Europe. It is these experts, plucked from their day jobs at national agencies or health authorities, that the EMA relies on to assess the merits of drugs that could be used by millions. Discussions are highly confidential. Guido Rasi, the EMA’s director until 2020, says drones were even once sent to spy on proceedings by unknown actors. The consultants, Tomas Salmonson, a Swede, and Briton Robert Hemmings, previously had a seat at the table. For years they were part of the EMA’s inner circle, in the CHMP and on expert panels. Now, through their joint enterprise Consilium Salmonson & Hemmings, they advise Big Pharma on how to get the coveted authorisations they once approved. After setting up Consilium, according to Rasi, the pair would corner experts in the corridors of the hotels. Their presence at hotels did raise eyebrows but the pair deny any wrongdoing. Salmonson said they “repeatedly tried to avoid” staying at the same venue, but it was not always possible. “We tried to avoid meeting CHMP members by, for example, having breakfast after the meeting started.” But it was not “100 percent successful as on occasions we have accidentally met CHMP members in the lobby.” However, there are bigger questions that exist for the regulator. Tomas Salmonson was chairman of the CHMP for six years until September 2018. Three months later he launched his consultancy firm (Consilium Sweden AB). His friend Robert Hemmings, who was a CHMP member for 11 years, incorporated at the same time, Consilium Hemmings (UK) Ltd. “Our best work has been in partnership,” reads the website of their new venture, Consilium Salmonson & Hemmings. Significantly, as they were not EMA employees, but instead were hired by their national agencies, neither were covered by the EU’s conflict of interest framework. “EMA's committee members... are not employed by EMA and therefore the EU staff regulations do not apply to them,” an EMA spokesperson said. And transparency campaigners argue that this is a "significant loophole". “It is incredible that no rules are in place to prevent revolving door cases involving scientific experts,” says Shari Hinds, policy officer at Transparency International. “We urge the EMA to implement effective and comprehensive rules to prevent such cases in the future.” Financial ties with industry Investigate Europe has found that the regulator is beset by several conflicts of interest with concerns over professional and financial ties to industry. It is also facing growing criticism for fast-tracking drugs that could pose serious risks to patients. When it formed in 1995 only 20 percent of funding came from industry , with the rest from the European Union. This year, more than 90 per cent is forecast to come from industry fees and charges relating to medicine approvals. “The financing of the agency and the level of fees is agreed by EU lawmakers and codified in EU legislation... Applicants pay for a procedure, but not for the outcome of a procedure,” an EMA spokesperson said. “Using the analogy of a driving test, one needs to pay to take a driving test but there is no guarantee of passing the test.” In 2022, industry fees accounted for almost 86 percent of the regulator’s €417m in revenues its latest accounts show. Investigate Europe can reveal how just 21 companies provided half of these fees received for drug authorisations. Novartis gave almost €20m, followed by Pfizer, AstraZeneca, Jannsen, Roche and GlaxoSmithKline, all of them paying more than €10m, data from freedom of information requests reveals. The regulator’s close ties to industry are widely known, says Yannis Natsis, who was on its board for two and a half years, representing healthcare providers. “The EMA has a long tradition of working closely with the companies that they are supposed to regulate.” Part of the reason is because authorisation processes have skyrocketed. The regulator has greenlit an average of 85 new drugs a year in the past decade, compared to a yearly average of 49 in the previous 15 years. Its 21 biggest funders were beneficiaries of half of them. This readiness to authorise is a worry for Beate Wieseler from IQWIG (Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care), Germany’s agency for assessing drug safety and efficiency. “The EMA is approving new drugs more quickly, and with less clinical data available,” she says. “It’s becoming more difficult for us to assess their real added benefit compared to existing drugs.” There are three ways to get a drug quickly approved by the EMA and 198 drugs have benefited from these accelerated authorisations since 2004 (out of more than 1,400 approvals in total). The most used is a procedure called conditional marketing authorisation (CMA), that was given to 91 drugs during the period. A CMA helps patients who have limited options and time to access new drugs, the regulator says. It involves only two of the three test phases typically required. In exchange, companies agree to additional clinical trials at a later date. Two-thirds of drugs approved via CMA belong to the 21 firms that paid most fees to the EMA. There is no indication that the payments influenced decisions. Investigate Europe has found that 51 CMAs were recommended by EMA in the last five years – more than half of those granted since the special procedure was introduced in 2006. To date, only nine drugs with a CMA are not on the market anymore. “It's scandalous,” says Pierre Chirac, director of La Revue Prescrire, a French medical journal who told us that not having enough evidence about the benefit puts patients at “unnecessary risk”. One of them is Ocaliva, a treatment for primary biliary cirrhosis, an autoimmune liver disease. It was approved under a CMA in 2016. Four years later, US firm Intercept Pharmaceuticals finally submitted the promised test for its drug. The results found that not only did Ocaliva not work , it also caused serious side effects, and sometimes death. The EMA began a review in October 2023 . A month later, the regulator renewed Ocaliva’s conditional marketing authorisation. In a press release in June this year , Intercept – which sold the European rights to the drug in 2022 to Advanz Pharma – said “improvement in survival or disease-related symptoms has not been established” with Ocaliva. The EMA is currently reviewing the latest data, assessing the overall benefit-risk balance of Ocaliva with a view to making a recommendation on whether the medicine's marketing authorisation in the EU should be amended. Meanwhile, Ocaliva continues to circulate throughout the EU. Guido Rasi, EMA’s former director, who now teaches at a university in Rome and advises the Italian health ministry, defends fast-track procedures. “Conditional marketing authorisation is the way forward," he says, as long as robust tests are done at a later date. But researchers at King’s College London found that in half of all cases between 2013 and December 2018, the required tests had not been provided more than seven years after conditional authorisation. “For 30 years we've been told that post-marketing studies will fill in the gaps,” says Dr Courtney Davis, a medical sociologist at the university. “But this is not the case. We don't get this evidence.” There are tools to “robustly support the development and authorisation of medicines” the EMA said. “Medicines under CMA are constantly being monitored. Their benefit/risk balance is reviewed on an annual basis.” The regulator added that Covid-19 vaccines “might shed some light on the use of this procedure in the last few years”. In fact, these only account for seven out of the 51 recommended between 2019 and 2023. Translarna, a drug for Duchenne muscular dystrophy developed by PTC Therapeutics International, received conditional approval in 2014 . When renewing its CMA in 2023, the regulator’s expert advisory group decided that Translarna should be removed from the market . PTC Therapeutics told Investigate Europe that the EMA "has raised no safety concerns with Translarna," adding that all reports of death "are typically assessed by reporting expert physicians and have been evaluated by PTC and determined to be not related to Translarna." The EMA rejected the renewal of the market authorisation for Translarna because "its effectiveness had not been confirmed". The European Commission has the final say on approvals and withdrawals. In May this year, it rejected EMA's recommendation to remove Translarna. In response to Investigate Europe, a Commission official said they had raised concerns about the “composition” of the advisory group and questioned whether it met the “principle of objective impartiality”. The Commission asked the EMA to review its decision. The agency did so and, for the second time, recommended to reject the market authorisation. PTC plans to request a re-examination of this resolution. Even once a drug is proven to be dangerous or ineffective, obtaining a withdrawal can prove difficult. Researchers at Leiden University found several cancer drugs withdrawn by the FDA, the EMA’s parallel in the US, were still available in some European countries. “Your country pays for years for a drug that ultimately proves ineffective, and even when it's withdrawn you have to keep paying because patients have to finish their treatment,” says the university’s Sahar Barjesteh van Waalwijk van Doorn-Khosrovani. Pradaxa case Nathalie Dallard is painfully aware of the dangers, her 80-year-old mother was given Pradaxa while in a hospital. She later suffered a fatal haemorrhage. The memory of nurses emptying basins of blood and the panic among staff is still vivid 12 years on, as are the words of one doctor present: “I'm going to file a pharmacovigilance report on this new anticoagulant we've given her.” It turned out her mother was not alone. According to health professional reports submitted on the Eudravigilance database , 374 deaths across Europe and the US are suspected to be linked to Pradaxa. The drug is designed to prevent blood clots and strokes. The German firm Boehringer Ingelheim received an initial authorisation for Pradaxa in 2008, via a double-blind test, primarily for use in preventing Venous thromboembolism (VTE). Significantly, the authorisation for stroke prevention, which was received later and is what was given to Nathalie Dallard’s mother, went through an open-label trial. In order to support its use of this type of trial for this second use, the firm sought scientific advice from the EMA. Expert opinion can be provided by the EMA — at an extra cost to companies — to help advance applications. One expert selected was a French cardiologist who, after giving a positive opinion on downgrading the tests, became a consultant at Boehringer. Another was the late Eric Abadie. Investigate Europe has learnt that Boehringer wrote to the regulator requesting Abadie be on the three-person panel. He was selected from the thousands of EMA experts. Abadie left before the process was complete to become head of the influential CHMP. Notably, Pradaxa received its authorisation without having an antidote to combat side effects that include uncontrollable bleeding. The antidote arrived in 2015, too late for Nathalie's mother and others. Boehringer has since reached a $650m [€606m] settlement with affected patients and families in the US. An EMA spokesperson said: “EMA has a robust system for ensuring the independence of its work.” Boehringer Ingelheim said it was “common practice” to suggest experts to the EMA, but added: “Meanwhile practice has changed, and companies no longer make such recommendations.” The firm said Pradaxa had important health benefits and added: “Given the severe impact of stroke events, regulators underline that the benefits of stroke prevention treatment outweigh the risk of adverse effects from bleeding.” “They used scientific advice to obtain a weakening of the procedures,” argues Anne Chailleu, vice-president of Formindep, a non-profit which has spent years campaigning for victims. “These decisions are tainted by conflicts of interest.” Tomas Salmonson, the Swedish doctor who checked into the Amsterdam hotel, was chairman of the CHMP for six years until September 2018. The partnership he set up with his friend, Robert Hemmings (11 years a CHMP member) - Consilium Salmonson & Hemmings - has one main goal: to help pharmaceutical clients obtain EMA marketing authorisation. Business has been brisk. Salmonson's Swedish business amassed net income of more than €4.4m since it started, analysis of corporate accounts reveals. Hemmings' company declared retained earnings of €1.8m, as of March 2023. Guido Rasi, EMA director at the time of the hotel meetings, said he raised concerns: “When I heard that Salmonson and Hemmings were contacting the experts, I walked into the meeting, asked for a postponement and gave a clear signal that I was prepared to do anything to stop them, including referring the matter to Olaf [the EU anti-fraud office].” Salmonson is also on the board of Pharmetheus, a Swedish consultancy, which pursues approvals for big pharma clients. In 2021 he joined the scientific advisory board of Winhealth, a Chinese company whose “partners” include the likes of Roche, Pfizer and Daiichi Sankyo. Salmonson said he has not done any work with Winhealth for a long time. Salmonson and Hemmings both denied any conflict of interest in their work. Salmonson admitted he had “worked for companies that CHMP formed opinions (positive and negative) when I was the Chair”, since leaving the regulator. He added that all CHMP decisions were taken by the wider group. Hemmings said that he delivers “high-quality drug development programmes that can lead to high-quality dossiers being presented to regulatory authorities.” The EMA said that its experts are “subject to the rules in place at the organisation that employs them.” Sweden’s Medical Products Agency, where Salmonson was employed at the time, admits there is a regulatory problem. “In Sweden, there is a lack of regulations on so-called transition restrictions in connection with an employee ending his employment with an authority and moving to, for example, the private sector.” The British Medicines and Healthcare Regulatory Agency (MHRA) did not respond to the question of whether Hemmings had complied with the rules related to the cooling period after leaving the agency: "We are in the pre-election period in the UK and cannot comment on enquiries that do not relate to interests in the public health.” The conspiracy theory Recently, a small hope of transparency came from the European Court of Justice. On 14 March, the EMA was condemned for conflicts of interest in a case against a French laboratory. D & A Pharma had discovered that two experts working on its marketing authorisation dossier for Hopveus, a drug against alcohol dependency, were employed by a rival. The experts had been called in as part of an “ad hoc” committee, a rare arrangement used when there is no dedicated committee on the subject. Except, as the court noted, a psychiatry committee did exist. At the same time, Spanish firm Pharma Mar, was waging a similar legal battle. The independent company, which had submitted an authorisation application for a drug to treat multiple myeloma, challenged the decision to reject it on the grounds that an expert used by the EMA worked for a competitor. “EMA has a very strict policy in place on handling competing interests of scientific committee members and experts,” the regulator said. Hareth Nahi, who was added as an “additional expert” to the Scientific Advisory Group for Oncology, is in fact the co-owner of the patent for Cell Protect, a drug against multiple myeloma. He declined to comment for this article. Pharma Mar won their first case in 2020, but then three EU countries – Germany, Estonia and the Netherlands – appealed the verdict. They won. The court has now asked for a review, and a new decision is expected soon. “It's hard not to fall into the conspiracy theory, when you see that now the big laboratories are protected by countries”, says a source inside Pharma Mar, who asked to remain anonymous. “It's a battle of David against Goliath.” Leïla Miñano, Maria Maggiore, Manuel Rico, Catrien Spijkerman are reporters for Investigative Europe . Leïla Miñano, Maria Maggiore, Manuel Rico, Catrien Spijkerman are reporters for
|
Investigative Europe
|
Investigate Europe has found that the European Medicines Agency is beset by several conflicts of interest concerns over professional and financial ties to industry. It is also facing growing criticism for fast-tracking drugs that could pose serious risks to patients.
|
[
"Investigations",
"Health & Society"
] |
investigations
|
2024-06-17T15:13:53.960Z
|
https://euobserver.com/investigations/ar6d0b9023
|
The 'renovictions' problem - fighting the greenlash in eco-housing
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A rise in the so-called 'greenlash' - opposition from people and communities negatively impacted by climate policies - is slowing political progress, especially in the buildings sector, which accounts for 40 percent of European emissions, and where greening our homes, workplaces and public buildings is critical to reach net zero. The EU has made important progress by launching the renovation wave and passing the European Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD), which mandates that member states must reduce average primary energy use in residential buildings by 20-22 percent by 2035. But the shortage of affordable housing means that building retrofits may inadvertently increase financial burdens on renters and homeowners, fuelling a “greenlash” that is feeding into Europe’s already divisive politics. Housing was high on the agenda for Dutch voters in the recent election, which saw a quarter of the seats going to a far-right party that campaigned explicitly on perceived links between the acute housing crisis and migration. In Germany, a proposed phaseout of gas boiler sales was met with an enormous political backlash. Reactions to perceived inequality in green initiatives have led governments to backtrack on or water-down plans. But while this may be a short-term political fix, the consequences of inaction in the long-term will only further entrench inequality when it comes to safe, secure, and energy efficient homes and workplaces. To turn the tide on greenlash, the new EU parliament must root future climate initiatives in human rights. Ensuring communities aren’t left behind is the only way to widen support for, and ultimately accelerate, decarbonisation initiatives. Athens, Copenhagen, Lisbon and Prague The Institute for Human Rights and Business has published a report examining the dynamics of equality and social justice in green housing policy in eight cities worldwide, including four in the EU - Athens, Copenhagen, Lisbon and Prague. Our findings, the results of a two-year global study, show that some decarbonisation efforts and green investments have exacerbated inequalities in the housing market in cities around the world. In all four EU cities in our study, we found examples where efforts to increase energy efficient renovations led to higher rents and evictions, (known as 'renovictions'). For example, in Athens, the government-led Exoikonomo energy efficient renovation subsidy programme has largely benefited wealthier households who can afford to invest in upgrades. Similarly, in Prague, many landlords have benefitted from the EU-funded New Green Savings programme. With rent protections only in place for a year, retrofitting costs have often been passed on to occupants, and many faced eviction due to rent increases they couldn’t afford. While Copenhagen has slashed its carbon emissions by 42 percent since 2005, progress has pushed some communities out of their neighbourhoods. Greener buildings are often pricier, and climate-friendly developments can drive up land prices and cost of living - a trend labelled “green gentrification”. Addressing such adverse impacts, notably on already vulnerable individuals and communities, requires efforts that pair green policies with well considered rights-based strategies and mechanisms to help distribute benefits equitably. Thankfully, our study found examples that are having a positive impact on both people and planet. In 2023, Portugal created a new housing ministry and scrapped the golden visa scheme launched in the wake of the global financial crisis for foreigners spending over €350,000 on renovating property, or €500,000 on buying it. The scheme exacerbated rising housing costs, with the city becoming the third-most expensive place to rent in Europe, particularly impacting low and middle-income households. In its place, Portugal launched its new housing plan, Mais Habitação, backed by €2.7bn in investment from the EU Recovery and Resilience Plan. The programme aims to increase supply to tackle the housing crisis by simplifying licencing rules, combating property speculation, increasing publicly owned housing and protecting families through rent caps. In Copenhagen, an innovative low-carbon real estate company called Home.Earth treats tenants as shareholders, with their returns on investment effectively slashing rents by 20 percent compared to market rates. The company is developing a hub of 158 inclusive homes and commercial space, which will generate just 6 kilograms of CO2 equivalents per square metre per year - well below the mandated 12, with tenants protected by a no eviction policy. Meanwhile, in the Czech Republic, the Prague Development Company has been established, with a mission to build up to 8,000 public affordable housing apartments by 2030. The company has been given 70 hectares of public land to build energy efficient, cost effective rental units for single parent families, key workers and independent seniors. It’s essential EU member states take steps to embed human rights obligations and the principles of a just transition into their implementation of the EPBD, including prioritising funding for lower-income, vulnerable and marginalised groups, safeguarding against green gentrification and renovictions, and up-skilling construction workers in retrofit training programmes. Governments should also ensure that real estate and construction companies aren’t let off the hook from reporting the human rights impacts of their business operations under the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive ratified last month. Safe and secure housing is a human right, but it can’t be fulfilled without tackling climate change. However, decarbonisation initiatives that are not grounded in human rights risk exacerbating issues of affordability, gentrification, and energy poverty. This risks driving polarisation, instability, and insecurity, and will set back climate progress with dangerous consequences for citizens, governments and businesses. To accelerate meaningful climate action, we must ensure initiatives address the needs of marginalised communities - embedding fairness in planning, construction and retrofitting while simultaneously tackling the housing crisis and reducing emissions in our cities and towns. Respecting people’s fundamental rights is the only way we can create the fair and sustainable societies we need for people and planet to flourish. Giulio Ferrini , is Head of Built Environment at the Institute for Human Rights and Business , and one of the authors of the IHRB report. Giulio Ferrini , is Head of Built Environment at the Institute for Human Rights and Business
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, and one of the authors of the
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The shortage of affordable housing in the EU means that building eco retrofits may inadvertently increase financial burdens on renters and homeowners, fuelling a 'greenlash' that is feeding into Europe’s already divisive politics.
|
[
"Green Economy",
"Health & Society",
"Opinion"
] |
green-economy
|
2024-06-17T12:27:15.732Z
|
https://euobserver.com/green-economy/ar2951ca4e
|
Wolf in sheep's clothing? The two faces of the Russian Orthodox Church
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The Russian Orthodox Church looks tamer inside the EU than it does in Russia — but the Kremlin’s weaponisation of religion has made it a security concern. Surrounded by gaily-painted icons and frocked in an ornate red-and-gold vestment, archpriest Pavel Nedossekine praised the virtues of St John the Russian, an 18th century martyr, in his homily at the Holy Trinity church in Brussels city centre on Sunday 9 June. He also invited people on a pilgrimage to St John’s relics in Greece. But even though he spoke in times of acute geopolitical tension and on the morning of EU and Belgian elections, Nedossekine didn’t mention the Ukraine war or politics. He spoke to about 120 worshippers, who almost filled the small nave, where women veiled their hair and stood on a separate side of church to men, according to custom. People wore modest clothes and there was an inclusive atmosphere, with children playing at the rear of the church, and with members of the congregation chatting in Chechen, French, a Roma dialect, and Ukrainian, as well as Russian. At one point, a woman silently offered EUobserver’s reporter two phosphora (holy bread) wrapped in tissue paper and a prayer candle. And “there was nothing about the service I found disturbing," said Olga F., a refugee from the Ukrainian town of Irpin, who now lives in Belgium, and who attended the Russian liturgy. "He [Nedossekine] didn’t mention the war, unless he did it so quietly I didn’t hear him. My ears pricked up when I heard him say ‘soldiers’, but he was only speaking about soldiers from the story of St John,” she said. “For me, personally, it felt a little bit like stepping back into the 19th century, but it was just a fairly ordinary Russian service,” she added. After mass, Nedossekine declined to speak to EUobserver on how the Ukraine war had affected the Russian diaspora in Belgium, saying he needed permission from the church hierarchy. But he added: "You know, there has been a Russian presence here in Belgium for over 100 years. It includes many different kinds of people and different opinions". Holy Trinity is one of 18 Russian churches , chapels, and monasteries in Belgium, served by some 25 priests and led by archbishop Simon in Brussels. The church has a diplomatic mission to the EU institutions, also in Brussels, led by archimandrite Philip. And the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (but of the Moscow Patriarchate), a Russia-allied Ukrainian splinter-church, has been holding new pop-up masses in the Belgian town of Leuven since at least April, EUobserver has learned. Aside from liturgies, sacraments, and pilgrimages, the Russian church plays a wider role in community life in Belgium, by doing fundraising, Sunday schools, and children’s plays - with photos in the corridor at Holy Trinity in Brussels showing a recent production, which was strikingly entitled 'The Death of the Spy Gadyukin', after a 1960s film. The church also takes part in events with the Co-ordination Council of Russian Compatriots in Belgium (a branch of the Russian foreign ministry) and with Russian House Brussels (a limb of Russia’s embassy to Belgium). Some 10,000 Russians first fled to Belgium in the 1920s Russian Civil War. And the diaspora has grown in recent decades: Over 20,000 Russians also took Belgian nationality since 1992, including some 2,000 since Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine in 2022, according to Belgian figures. A further 11,125 Russian citizens lived in Belgium today, many of them in Brussels in the Uccle and Ixelles districts, and in Antwerp. "We don't have information on how many people 'identified' as Russian”, or how many were dual nationals, Belgium’s statistics office said. But a survey inside Russia in June last year showed how widely Russian identity was bound up with its church: Just 12 percent of Russians regularly went to mass, Russian pollster Levada said , but 72 percent identified as "orthodox" and 83 percent had been baptised. Millions of ethnic Russians also lived in Germany and hundreds of thousands more in Estonia, Italy, Latvia, and Spain. The Russian church had some 350 Parishes in Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, and Spain put together. 'Complicit in war crimes' Back in Belgium, archbishop Simon and archimandrite Philip also declined to speak to EUobserver, but if they had agreed, they might have had to justify an uglier side of their institution. Like Nedossekine, many Russian priests in the EU prefer to stay quiet on politics. "In western Europe, the [Russian] clergy is trying to remain silent about the war, since not only many parishioners, but also many priests, judging by my conversations ... take an anti-war position”, said Nikolay Mitrokhin, a sociologist of religion at the University of Bremen in Germany. But inside Russia, the church is an ardent supporter of Russian president Vladimir Putin's brutality, causing mistrust abroad. Russian patriarch Kirill personally consecrated the Holy Trinity church in Brussels in a ceremony in 2003. He also ordered all his priests on 1 March 2022 to insert prayers for victory by " Holy Rus " [Holy Russia] against Ukraine into liturgies and defrocked ones who disobeyed. A Russian church synod called for a " holy war " against Western “Satanism” in a declaration on 27 March this year. The Council of Europe in Strasbourg said on 17 April the Russian church was “complicit in war crimes ” in Ukraine. The EU has blacklisted the church's Russian broadcaster, Spas TV , which "calls the occupied territories of Ukraine, Russian" and associates "the West and Ukraine with godlessness and the devil", according to the EU Council. One of its former top bishops, Leonid Gorbachov, used to post videos of Russian fighters abusing Ukrainian POWs on his Telegram social-media channel. And Kirill himself narrowly evaded an EU visa-ban and asset-freeze in 2022, only due to a veto by Hungary's Putin-friendly prime minister Viktor Orbán. The EU foreign service said no one had met archimandrite Philip, Kirill's envoy in Brussels, since "at least" 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine. It also showed how low the church's reputation had sunk. "The role of churches should be to foster peace, non-violence, mutual understanding, and reconciliation. The Russian Orthodox Church is led by patriarch Kirill, who keeps collaborating with the Kremlin regime in the oppression of the Russian people ... and supports Russia’s aggression against Ukraine with pro-Kremlin propaganda," an EU foreign service spokesman said. For its part, Latvia took steps to separate its orthodox church from Russia already in 2022, amid concern priests were spreading subversive propaganda. “The bill enshrines in law a full independence of the [Latvian] church and its autocephalous status, dissociating it from the influence of the aggressor state – the Russian Federation," its legislation said. The Estonian parliament, the Riigikogu, in a resolution on 6 May, also described the Russian church as "a direct threat to the public and constitutional order". Despite their concern, Mitrokhin, from Bremen, said: "The Russian Orthodox Church has very limited influence on the Russian-speaking diaspora, and politically - almost zero". But not all Russian priests in the EU were as meek as Nedossekine was last Sunday in Brussels, according to Kristina Stoeckl, a sociologist at LUISS Guido Carli University in Rome. "There are with no doubt many parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church outside of Russia that fully follow the line of their leadership [Kirill]", she told EUobserver. "Anecdotally, I can tell you that Russian friends who fled Russia [to Europe] after the outbreak of the war have felt unwelcome in the Russian parishes in the cities where they arrived to, because many parishioners are 'patriotic' and support the war and they look upon victims and critics of Putin and the regime with suspicion," she said. Speaking from Austria, which is home to over 30,000 ethnic Russians, Liliia Sablina, a Russia researcher at the Central European University in Vienna, also said: “The primary problem is that many Russian-speakers hold EU passports, but feel themselves as members of the ‘Russian World’.” “Such people can de-democratise European countries from within, for instance, via giving their votes to far-right parties which are facilitated by Russia", she said. 'Tried-and-tested' cover for spies Propaganda aside, the Russian church also has a history of collaboration with Russian spy services, prompting hard security concerns. Kirill himself was a spy in Geneva in the 1970s for the Soviet-era KGB intelligence service, according to Swiss media, citing declassified archives. Latvia's autocephaly law flagged "national security interests". The Estonian foreign intelligence service, EFIS, warned in a report in 2023 that Russian spies were using the Russian church as "a tried-and-tested cover in foreign countries". “Maintaining the position of the Russian Orthodox Church [ROC] in foreign countries is crucial to the long-term interests of the Russian special services, which is why the leaders of the ROC branches have been given the liberty to pretend to be a loyal local religious organisation,” it added. Estonia expelled its most senior Russian priest, metropolitan Eugene, on 18 February after an "individual threat assessment" by its domestic intelligence service, Kapo. "The church is one of the few remaining levers for Russian influence operations that are not yet directly affected by international sanctions," Kapo said . Sweden (home to over 20,000 ethnic Russians) also stopped state funding for Russian churches on 31 May, after the Swedish homeland security service, Säpo, warned that Russia was using "the religious community as a platform for intelligence gathering and other security-threatening activities". And Western leaders ought to impose "tighter restrictions on Russian intelligence personnel across the alliance", said Nato secretary general Jens Stoltenberg in Brussels on 14 June, following a string of Russian-linked, low-level sabotage attacks in the Czech Republic, Germany, Lithuania, Poland, and the UK. For its part, Belgium expelled some 60 Russian spies working under diplomatic cover since 2022, its homeland intelligence service, the VSSE, told EUobserver. It declined to say if it saw the Russian church as a threat, the way Latvia, Estonia, and Sweden did. Belgium's justice ministry also declined to answer when asked what were legal red lines against potential hate speech or radicalisation in orthodox or other church services. But for all Nedossekine's quietism at Holy Trinity in the EU capital, Putin's hybrid tactics were seeing his church and the Russian diaspora in wider Europe put under greater scrutiny, Western security sources indicated. Over 64,400 Ukrainians now also lived in Belgium, most of them refugees, and some of those who have campaigned against Putin, such as Olga F., told EUobserver that they feared being put under Russian surveillance, even in the EU and Nato HQs' symbolic host nation. “I don't know what they're capable of,” also said Marta Barandiy, a Belgian of Ukrainian origin, who ran (unsuccessfully) in the European Parliament elections, after what she believed were " Russian forces " burgled her office in the EU district in Brussels on 13 May. A Western intelligence contact told EUobserver that Russian spies used civilians from its diaspora to do their dirty work because it created "plausible deniability", so that "they [Russian authorities] can say 'it's nothing to do with us', even if the perpetrators are caught". Speaking about the threat of religious propaganda, a second Western intelligence source said: "Sometimes, it doesn't matter if you're a Russian 'patriot' or not."
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"Russian services have become increasingly ruthless since the [Ukraine] war - they wouldn't think twice about blackmailing a decent person living in Belgium to work for them, by threatening their relatives in Russia if they didn't comply," he said.
|
The Russian Orthodox Church looks tamer inside the EU than it does in Russia — but the Kremlin’s weaponisation of religion has made it a security concern.
|
[
"EU & the World",
"Ukraine"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2024-06-17T09:49:55.929Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/arfc186c44
|
Left surged in Finland: its leader, Li Andersson, explains why
|
Finland's Left Alliance party leader Li Andersson won more votes than any other Finnish candidate running in the European elections. Ever. In an election that saw a far-right surge in France and Germany, the 37-year old former education minister is part of a larger left-leaning victory spanning Denmark, Sweden, and Finland. "We emerged as the kind of number one political alternative for a lot of voters," she told EUobserver on Thursday (13 June) in Brussels. Her party placed second in Finland, with over 17 percent of the vote, after the ruling liberal-conservative National Coalition Party. The Left Alliance is now sending three MEPs to the European Parliament with Andersson alone obtaining some 240,000 votes. How did she do it? Andersson said they connected with voters on issues dealing with inequality, climate change, rule of law, democracy, and human rights. But she also attributes the performance to the far-right, who once in power, had demonstrably failed to improve the lives of people. "Finland is one of the few countries in Europe where we have already seen and experienced what it means when the far right and the traditional right cooperates," she said. She cited the right-wing nationalist Finns Party as an example. The Finns Party obtained under eight percent of the votes, or around half compared to the 2019 elections. It was also part of the coalition government but failed to deliver on campaign promises, said Andersson. Instead, they attacked labour unions and workers' rights, cut social security for low wage earners, hiked VAT, and slashed financing for climate and the environment, she said. Labour and environment issues aside, Andersson said the Left Alliance also supported Ukraine's right to defend itself, as well as arms exports to Ukraine. And she backed asylum and migration policies that respected international human rights law. The Left has 39 MEPs - could more join? Andersson is now among the some 39 MEPs that make up The Left in the European Parliament. "We really want to have an active role in decision making within the parliament," she said. Although currently the smallest group, she said The Left wanted to collaborate with the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) the Greens, and possibly others, to push forward issues dealing with labour rights and the green transition. It is not immediately clear to what extent the Left will fold in additional MEPs. But Andersson said there were no negotiations with possible outliers, such as Italy's Five Star Movement, which has eight MEPs. And she ruled out Germany's Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW). "My party and the Nordic Green Left, we are not willing to sit in the same group as the Wagenknecht," she said. "For us it's more important to have a well functioning Left group than just the biggest size as possible," she added. Created in the aftermath of a defections from the Die Linke last October, BSW is sending six MEPs to the European Parliament. Wagenknecht has since called for a new ‘left conservative’ group. Its European Parliament manifesto seeks a ceasefire and negotiations with Russia over Ukraine. On migration, they want asylum to be processed at the EU's external borders and in other countries.
|
Nikolaj joined EUobserver in 2012 and covers home affairs. He is originally from Denmark, but spent much of his life in France and in Belgium. He was awarded the King Baudouin Foundation grant for investigative journalism in 2010.
|
Finland's Left Alliance party leader Li Andersson won more votes than any other Finnish candidate running in the European elections. Now she is at the European Parliament hoping to counter the far-right, while championing labour rights and climate.
|
[
"Nordics",
"EU Elections"
] |
nordics
|
2024-06-14T11:32:34.055Z
|
https://euobserver.com/nordics/ar06b6ecc0
|
My brother died on the Pylos shipwreck: one year on I've started a petition for justice
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My name is Oday Al Talab. I had two brothers, Mohammed and Riyadh, but Riyadh died in the Pylos shipwreck. In my city in Syria, Daraa, I worked as a journalist. Snipers of the regime shot me twice because of my media activity in Syria, where I was documenting violations against civilians. Due to my health and continuous targeting by the regime, I left Syria I consider our situation one of displacement. We were displaced in Daraa because they [the Syrian authorities] bombarded our homes and neighborhoods. My brothers left Syria because of this. They also reached the age of compulsory military service and did not want to join the regime’s army. The choices for young people in Syria are death, migration or displacement. Searching for my brothers When I first heard about the shipwreck, I had no information about whether this was the ship that my brothers were on, but I knew there was a high possibility it was. I immediately arranged my journey to Kalamata, Greece, where they had brought the survivors and the drowned. I went to the hospital, then to the coast guard. They didn't give any further details about the incident. The suffering continued as I went between the coast guard, the police and the hospital, then back to the coast guard. They eventually shared a list with the names of 104 survivors of different nationalities. I searched for my brothers' names. I found Mohammed. I asked about my other brother, Riyadh. They said they did not have any information about him. They told me: “We will take you to see your brother, but you're not allowed to ask him about your other brother or ask him certain questions. You are not allowed to cry. You will see him for one minute or less.” When they took me to see him, there was an iron fence separating us. “Where is Riyadh?” Mohammed immediately asked me. I asked him the same question. He could not control himself, he started crying. His face was bruised from what he had endured. The police took him inside, back to a warehouse not suitable for animals, let alone human beings. They wouldn’t let me console my brother. Many people from Daraa were on the ship that sank. Many Syrian families contacted me to find out about the fate of their children who were on board. I started helping them by asking information about their family members. From the list of survivors, we singled out the Syrian names and their families were contacted. They were reassured that their children were alive. For those whose names we couldn’t find, their situation was the same as my missing brother. Uncooperative authorities The Greek authorities treated us very badly. They said there were 82 bodies, but they wouldn’t give us any more information even though we are the relatives of those who died. To identify bodies, I gave a DNA sample in Kalamata, along with details about my lost brother, including his height and weight, age, a picture of him, distinctive marks, everything. The next day I went to Athens to search the hospitals, to ask about the bodies, to find information about the fate of my lost brother. I was told that the 104 survivors were transferred to a camp near Athens. I went and asked to see my brother Mohammed again. There were many families and relatives of the victims and survivors there too. The authorities told us that the waiting time was long. I asked the camp manager if they could allow all the family members from Daraa to enter the camp together, to be given one hour to see the Syrian survivors. The request was accepted. We had procured some supplies for the survivors, at our own expense: mobiles with internet connection, clothes, food, personal care items. We saw some Syrian survivors still wearing the same clothes they wore when the boat sank. A young man was covering his body with a blanket because he didn't have any clothes. Accepting loss On our fourth day in Greece, I asked the coast guard if anyone had been rescued, other than the 104 survivors. They said “no”. At that point, anyone still missing was dead. This is being logical; this is being honest. We lost hope of finding the missing. Based on the information we had, we announced the death of my younger brother Riyadh. A week after returning to the UK I received an email from the Greek authorities telling me that my brother Riyadh’s body had been identified and to contact them for funeral arrangements. Even when I told the Greek authorities I wanted Riyadh to be buried in Greece, they repeatedly told me to contact the Syrian embassy. I refused to do so. Being from an opposition family, we do not recognise the Syrian regime, and we do not deal with it. I was finally told that the burial could take place in Greece, but there is no Islamic cemetery in Athens. The Greek authorities told me they would not cover the costs of an Islamic burial. I had to take care of the burial myself. When they released Riyadh’s body, I travelled back to Greece and reached out to a Muslim funeral service company. We collected my brother’s body from a mortuary fridge in Athens and we buried Riyadh in a Muslim cemetery eight hours away from Athens. If the Greek authorities have the bodies and data of those who died, how is it possible that not all the bodies have been returned to their families after one year? This is wrong. We want justice. We want those responsible to be held accountable. I started the Justice for the Boat Victims initiative, an online campaign in support of victims and families of the shipwreck. The campaign assisted families of the missing with the search for their relatives. We made calls to NGOs and media outlets, posted photos and information. We created a WhatsApp group for the families of the victims so they could communicate, and we advised them on how to communicate with the Red Cross and Red Crescent and how to conduct DNA tests. We helped survivors connect with lawyers. Based on witness testimony, the Greek authorities were involved in the sinking of the boat. We want justice and accountability. Over 500 of the people drowned remain at sea. They are not numbers. They had dreams, they had families, and they had rights. They had a right to live.
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Oday Al Talab is a Syrian refugee living in the UK.
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Oday is a Syrian who now lives in the UK. His brothers Mohammed and Riyadh fled Syria to Europe. They ended up on the Adriana, an overcrowded trawler that left Libya with an estimated 750 people from Syria, Pakistan and Egypt onboard, before sinking off the coast of Pylos, Greece, a year ago today (14 June 2023). Oday’s brother Mohammed survived, but Riyadh died.
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[
"Migration"
] |
migration
|
2024-06-14T09:29:04.830Z
|
https://euobserver.com/migration/arcc6a6261
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Accounting for the missing in Ukraine is first step to peace
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The “ Peace Formula Philosophy ” that Ukraine has proposed for discussion at the international conference in Switzerland this weekend (15 and 16 June) includes provisions on the release of prisoners and deportees, and accountability for “serious crimes under international law” through “appropriate, fair and independent investigations and prosecutions.” Accounting for victims of incommunicado detention or enforced disappearance and bringing perpetrators to justice are indispensable in upholding the rule of law and forging a truthful historical narrative that will not be manipulated or exploited for political advantage. Since 2014, the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) has helped Ukraine to build a system that can reliably account for large numbers of missing persons. The authorities have committed themselves – in the middle of a war – to a strategy that is predicated on delivering truth and justice to victims. In addition to captured and missing military personnel, the authorities are compiling a comprehensive record of civilians who have disappeared in occupied territory, including children deported to Russia. The numbers range from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands. Faced with this volume of missing persons it is not sufficient to rely on peacetime provisions that are customarily vested in the criminal justice system. However, a range of strategies have been developed over the last 25 years. In a DNA-led process, genetic reference samples are taken from hundreds of thousands of relatives, and DNA extracted from these samples is compared with DNA taken from unidentified human remains or from living people – children, for example – who are unable to identify themselves. Yugoslav case-study ICMP pioneered this approach in the former Yugoslavia, where it helped the authorities identify more than three-quarters of the 40,000 people missing from the conflicts of the 1990s, including more than 7,000 of the 8,000 victims of the 1995 Srebrenica Genocide. The painstaking, science-based process of identifying thousands of victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina and documenting evidence in a disciplined juridical process made it possible to establish an irrefutable historical record and deliver a measure of justice to victims through domestic and international courts. ICMP has already piloted a joint programme with Ukraine’s ministry of internal affairs to collect samples from families in Ukraine and in countries where large numbers of Ukrainians have sought refuge. ICMP is also helping to train Ukrainian forensic experts in the protocols required to process large numbers of unidentified remains to a standard where the evidence that has been collected can be presented in court. Settlements that have ended conflicts in other parts of the world have included legislative and institutional provisions to account for the missing. Colombia’s 2016 peace accords, for example, established a Search Unit for Missing Persons (UBPD) and tasked ICMP with supporting the work of the UBPD. Missing children In Kyiv at the end of May, ICMP brought together relevant Ukrainian government institutions and civil society representatives to examine the institutional and legislative provisions that will be required to sustain an effective missing persons process over the long term. A roundtable of Ukrainian and international forensic experts organised by ICMP in Warsaw from 11-13 June built on this discussion, and the process will continue at ICMP headquarters in The Hague next Wednesday (19 June), where roundtable participants will look specifically at the issue of how to locate and identify Ukrainian children who have been deported to Russia. Until now, this dialogue has engaged Ukrainian stakeholders. Yet the families of Russian military personnel missing in Ukraine are also demanding to know the fate of their loved ones. The Russian authorities have an obligation to account for the missing and an interest in cooperating with the Ukrainian side in order to do this. The Ukrainian authorities have rightly placed this issue at the centre of efforts to restore peace. Lasting peace must be based on truth and justice – and these will only be secured if systematic steps are taken to account for those who have gone missing as a result of the conflict. Kathryne Bomberger is director general of the International Committee on Missing Persons , a treaty-based intergovernmental organization with headquarters in The Hague. ICMP’s mandate is to secure the cooperation of governments and other authorities in locating persons missing as a result of conflicts, human rights abuses, disasters, organized violence and other causes and to assist them in doing so. ICMP’s Ukraine programme is supported by the European Union and the governments of Canada, Germany, Norway, and the US. Kathryne Bomberger is director general of the
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International Committee on Missing Persons
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Ahead of this weekend's Swiss conference on peace in Ukraine, the director general of The Hague-based International Committee on Missing Persons explains the importance of DNA-tracing the remains of those lost or missing or abducted in the war — including children and the remains of Russian soldiers.
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[
"Ukraine"
] |
*
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2024-06-13T11:34:07.848Z
|
https://euobserver.com/*/ar8fe33a52
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Medicine dealers: Europe’s secret drug negotiations
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Patients suffering from cancer or other serious diseases rarely realise that their fate can depend on secret price deals struck between state officials and pharma executives, according to research by Investigative Europe. “The negotiation is totally secret. Everything moves around in sealed envelopes, changing hands with signatures,” one negotiator from a mid-sized EU country reveals. “We don't even put it in our electronic systems because we don't want the contractor who maintains our systems to have access.” States think they make big savings from these secret deals, but in reality, they are pitted against each other, unaware of what others really pay. Despite the discounts, governments are often charged extortionate fees for life-saving medicines – or they are unable to access them altogether, an eight-month investigation by Investigate Europe and its partners has found. Patients are suffering needlessly because companies pick and choose where it is more profitable to launch their drugs. “We have a first, second and third class of European citizen when it comes to access — that’s a scandal,” says Clemens Auer, who was director general of Austria’s health ministry until 2018. Drugmakers demand higher prices each year, often with discounts already priced in, says Joerg Indermitte from Switzerland's Federal Office of Public Health “The last example I have is 50,000 francs [€51,800] per month for a new oncology drug. We never had such a high price. Although only 10-20 patients are treated with this new drug, it is extremely expensive.” Investigative Europe reporters spoke to dozens of officials involved with confidential pricing who described an “absurd” system that forces them to negotiate medicine prices blindfolded. “Price secrecy is considered a core value of the industry,” says Wim van Harten, a Dutch oncologist who has spent years looking for the true costs of cancer therapies in Europe. Rich nations generally pay less than those in central and eastern Europe for certain drugs, the investigation finds. It reveals an alarming gulf in access across the bloc to many innovative medicines, while drug firms rack up vast profits from healthcare systems. The official price of a drug — its ‘list’ price — can easily be found online or on the back of medicine packs. But these prices are often artificial, and it is in the industry’s interests for them to be high. The reason is simple: dozens of countries set their prices by looking at what other states publicly say they pay – be it cancer treatments with list prices in six figures or rare single-dose drugs marketed in their millions. High list prices are the industry’s gateway to bumper profits. In reality, a parallel system exists. The parallel system The European Medicines Agency approves certain categories of drugs for use across Europe. Companies then choose whether they want to market a drug in a country or not. The official price is set by each country separately and then individual negotiations begin to agree on any secret discounts. Pharmaceutical firms effectively get billions in what experts call ‘interest-free loans’ as most states at first pay them the higher official drug price. Then, over time, companies discretely return the difference between the official price and the real, negotiated price. In Belgium alone, these returns amounted to €1.5bn in 2023. In bigger markets, the rebates are larger, and the amounts of public money temporarily loaned to industry are even higher. Industry is “adamant on keeping the results of these negotiations secret,” says lawyer and public health advocate Ellen ‘t Hoen. “Having all couched in secrecy gives them an enormous power to play a divide-and-rule game.” Countries strike secret deals hoping to contain the rising costs of new drugs – but innovative drug prices are rising everywhere. In the Netherlands, the part of the national hospital budget spent on these drugs has risen from 0.6 percent to 10 percent in the past 15 years, Dutch oncologist van Harten says. Norwegian authorities say they had to rebuild their database to give room for more zeroes in million-figure prices. The company Novartis broke the record with Zolgensma, a treatment for spinal muscular atrophy, which they set at 27m NOK [€2.3m] — an "absolutely unethical” price, says Anja Schiel from Norway’s Medical Products Agency. Ultimately, a confidential rebate was agreed upon in 2021. Investigate Europe analysis indicates that countries across Europe are paying wildly different prices for 'miracle’ cystic fibrosis drugs. Vertex Pharmaceuticals, the US biotech firm with a monopoly on the treatments, can ask for more than €200,000 per patient per year for its breakthrough Kaftrio/Kalydeco treatment – more than 40 times the estimated production cost, according to UK researchers. The firm disputes this, saying that prices are not determined by production costs, but by the investment made in their development, the risk undertaken, and their value to the community. The medicines have been lauded for helping patients with the rare disease that progressively clogs the lungs and can lead to early death. Yet Vertex, which had sales of almost $10bn in 2023, appears to be charging poorer nations higher prices than some of their richer neighbours. Analysis of corporate records and budget and health data from national authorities provides for the first time a glimpse into the disparity in what countries pay for these life-saving medicines. Patchy prices across Europe In western Europe, Investigate Europe compared Vertex's local revenues to the official number of patients taking the company's drugs in 2022. The average, excluding VAT, was estimated to be around €71,000 in France, €81,000 in Italy, €87,000 in Spain and €88,000 in the Netherlands. In comparison, the average expenditure per patient in some central and eastern European countries appears higher. In the Czech Republic, the estimated yearly cost in 2022 was €140,000, according to data from VZP, the country's largest public insurer. "This is the real cost paid for this kind of treatment," VZP said, though it is not clear if any tax is factored in. Lithuanian authorities have spent years trying to negotiate with Vertex amid mounting pressure from the media and patient groups. The government said in April that it was ready to pay as much as €8.4m to provide Kaftrio and Kalydeco for up to 48 patients. This could equate to €175,000 per person. “The inverse correlation between numbers of patients and prices likely reflects differences in negotiation powers,” says Valérie Paris, economist at the OECD who has worked extensively on pharmaceutical pricing. "It seems to me that you have made all possible efforts to get net prices but only the company selling the product or national authorities could really confirm these data.” Monika Luty, 27, was forced to leave Poland in 2020 because the drug was not reimbursed there. She posted a video online , begging Vertex to give her Kaftrio. "I felt a huge disappointment," she says. "Living in the EU, being Polish, I was discriminated against because I was not German or of another nationality where treatment was available. There should be no discrimination in the EU." Her friends helped her crowdfund over €200,000 and her dad sold his car so she could buy the drugs from Germany. Seeing how effective they were, she crossed the border for good. "I paid zero, so I was crying because it was so easy," she remembers. "To get the drugs in Germany, all I needed was insurance, a job and to live there." Poland later struck a reimbursement deal with Vertex and Investigate Europe estimates that the price per patient in 2023 was €109,000 before VAT. Far cheaper than the Vertex list price, but still more expensive than elsewhere in Europe. “The price of our medicines is based on their innovation and the value they bring to the CF community, caregivers and healthcare systems," a Vertex spokesperson said. "The reimbursed prices quoted in your inquiry are inaccurate." The company declined to comment on individual countries or to specify the inaccuracies. It added that over the past decade more than 70 per cent of its operating budget was spent on research and development. Despite its huge revenues, Vertex is not part of Europe’s main industry body. When asked about confidential pricing, the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations did not directly answer whether richer countries are paying more than poorer ones. “There is a broad consensus that prices need to reflect the ability of a country to pay for medicines. Efpia and its members propose a system for Europe where countries who can afford to pay less for medicines, pay less,” says Nathalie Moll, its director general. Strategic threats A typical strategy to maintain the secrecy status quo is the threat to boycott markets. “I have done hundreds of these negotiations,” says Francis Arickx, head of pharmaceutical policy at the Belgian National Institute for Health and Disability Insurance. “The threat that the company is not going to sit at the negotiating table, we hear it all the time and we hear it everywhere.” KCE, a state-funded institute in Belgium, tried in 2016 to examine the secret discount deals signed by national authorities. They wanted to present results without divulging any protected data about specific deals. Yet after pressure from the Belgian Pharmaceutical Association, a watered-down study was released, excluding any analysis of those deals. The study did however reveal that the association had threatened to sue prior to publication. When a big Swiss drugmaker pushed for a higher price in Austria, Clemens Auer alleges that a representative reminded him of the investments they had made there, implying that those were at risk if a favourable deal was not agreed. “It's always the same stupid, very primitive game,” he says. Denmark and Germany, two countries that allow companies to initially set official prices freely, are usually the first entry points in Europe. In practice, Denmark places some ‘voluntary’ price limits, while Germany reviews each medicine one year after introduction and can then ask for price changes. Meanwhile, the initial high prices are used as a reference by others, while setting their own official prices. What happens next in the two countries is shrouded in secrecy. Danish hospitals procure the most expensive medicines with confidential discounts, but these deals do not appear on Euripid, the European pricing database, Danish officials say. Germany is even more opaque. It vetoed a World Health Organisation resolution on price transparency and it is not even part of Euripid. “We always ask the companies ‘tell us, please, the real price in Germany’. They say they don’t know,” says one European negotiator, who requested anonymity. “I just can’t believe [there are no confidential discounts] because they have a really powerful market, they could get the best prices in Europe. Maybe it’s possible but I really can’t believe it.” The rest of Europe is starting from a step behind. A pharmacist working for a Hungarian subsidiary of a multinational drugmaker puts it bluntly: "For a company like Novartis or Pfizer, the Hungarian market is a rounding error.” Worst situation in Hungary, Malta and Cyprus Investigate Europe found that Hungary is among several states locked out of access to critical medicines. German research institute IQWiG compiled a list of 32 medicines for Investigate Europe and its German partners NDR, WDR and Süddeutsche Zeitung. These drugs, according to the scientists, have a "significant" or "considerable" additional benefit to existing therapies. They included treatments for conditions including breast cancer, leukaemia and cystic fibrosis. Data collected from across Europe reveals that in six EU countries one-in-four of these important medicines is missing. Without purchasing agreements between countries and companies, which are the basis for reimbursement, health authorities have to resort to other costly methods to obtain a drug, or miss out on access altogether. The situation is particularly dramatic in Hungary, where 25 out of 32 medicines are not available, and in Malta and Cyprus, where 19 and 15 medicines respectively are not generally reimbursed. Patients in Cyprus and Hungary can get some drugs by applying for individual access – but often at extortionate costs to the state. In the Baltic states and Romania, a high number of important medicines are also unavailable. Even when medicines are made available to smaller states, prices can be excessive. Giorgos Pamboridis, Cyprus’s former health minister, occasionally discovered that their prices were “double, triple or even five times those paid by other countries”. He is appalled that the EU allows industry to treat its members so differently. “NDAs [non-disclosure agreements] are tools for the abuse of dominant position that industry has vis-a-vis its clients, the states. Without the slightest consideration, the EU is giving up on its sole advantage, its size.” Siloed negotiations amplify inequality, says a former Irish health official: "The 27 member states negotiating for themselves is astonishingly inefficient and leads to inequality for European citizens.” When 10 countries including Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain joined forces and signed the Valletta Declaration to cooperate on medicines procurement in 2017, industry showed zero interest, several participants told Investigate Europe. Further north, the Beneluxa collaboration – Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – has negotiated prices for a few high-cost drugs, mostly with small firms. Two negotiators involved said bigger companies are reluctant to join. “The small companies say, ‘yes, with one negotiation I can access more markets, so I agree’, while the big companies seem to be boycotting this kind of initiative,” says Paolo Pertile, an economics professor at the University of Verona. Covid-19 case The one-time major companies negotiated EU-wide was for Covid vaccines. It showed that if pressured, industry can conceivably agree to not play one country against the other. But prices again were secret. “If the EU had used its joined forces to not agree to confidentiality clauses, this could have been a game changer,” says Sabine Vogler, head of pharmacoeconomics at Austria’s national public health institute. Pharmaceutical companies are able to “blackmail governments”, says Luca Li Bassi, former head of the Italian Medicines Agency, who has campaigned for greater price disclosures. “If transparency is demanded, the pharmaceutical companies threaten not to give the drug.” Meanwhile, the suspicion that every time there is a confidentiality agreement, someone else is being ripped off, was proven right when the price of the AstraZeneca Covid vaccine was leaked. In South Africa it was double that of the EU. “Any member states’ collaboration... should guarantee the confidentiality of pricing and reimbursement agreements,” Efpia’s Moll says. “Industry participation in any member states’ collaboration on pricing, reimbursement and access-related issues should be voluntary.” The idea that industry is the only real winner of this secrecy is widespread among negotiators like Francis Arickx, who says Belgium tried and failed to limit confidential clauses. “The opposite actually is happening; we see a very clear industry push to maintain contracts until generics or biosimilars arrive.” EU health commissioner Stella Kyriakides is aware of the myriad issues. "Where you live shouldn't determine whether you live or die," she said when presenting a new set of laws last year. But the EU’s planned ‘pharma package’ legislation has been met with resistance. It includes no measures to tackle secrecy or confidential prices. Even an attempt to reduce market exclusivity of pharmaceutical firms was clipped by industry and member-state lobbying. “Medicine prices are an area of national competence and linked to national health budgets,” a European Commission spokesperson told Investigate Europe. “However, as acknowledged in the Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe, greater transparency around price information could help member states take better pricing and reimbursement decisions.” The spokesperson said that the commission supports the work of Euripid, the European pricing database. Yet when contacted, Euripid refused to provide any data on the rising number of confidential agreements between states and pharmaceutical companies. Now the veil of secrecy could become even thicker. A new law for “Medical Research” is under discussion in the German Parliament. If it passes, every time authorities order a price cut because a drug does not perform as promised, the rest of the world will not know. The artificially high ‘official’ prices are all they will see. Industry will be thrilled if it happens, says Josef Hecken, head of the national committee for approving new drugs. “Medicines that get steep discounts here will be sold elsewhere as gold,” he says. “Champagnes will pop in many corporate offices.” Eurydice Bersi, Lorenzo Buzzoni, and Maxence Peigné are investigative journalists for Investigative Europe Ingeborg Eliassen, Harald Schumann, Nico Schmidt, Attila Kalman also contributed to this piece.
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Eurydice Bersi, Lorenzo Buzzoni, and Maxence Peigné are investigative journalists for Investigative Europe
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Patients suffering from cancer or other serious diseases rarely realise that their fate can depend on secret price deals struck between state officials and pharma executives, Investigative Europe can reveal.
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[
"Health & Society"
] |
health-and-society
|
2024-06-13T11:02:10.145Z
|
https://euobserver.com/health-and-society/ardb8697b8
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Meloni tries to gag G7 on ‘safe and legal abortion’
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Italy's objections to the promotion of sexual rights have forced the G7 to shelve plans to include “safe and legal abortions” in a draft communique, which can still be subjected to changes, EUobserver has learned. The 13-15 June meeting of the G7 leaders in Italy is addressing the issue of how to use windfall profits generated by Russian frozen assets seized by the West since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. However, numerous other issues were also on the summit agenda, including a commitment to promoting abortion rights internationally, which is being opposed by far-right Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni whose country is holding the G7 presidency. "It’s not acceptable. A G7 presidency should be an honest broker and represent and fight for protecting the interests and safety of all citizens, and not just those with certain political views," an EU diplomat told EUobserver. Before the EU elections, which saw a domestic triumph for Meloni, a statement issued by G7 leaders last month reiterated the group’s devotion to “achieving comprehensive SRHR [Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights] for all, including by addressing access to safe and legal abortion and post-abortion care”. Earlier in April, G7 foreign ministers also committed to promoting sexual and reproductive health and rights — but without mentioning abortion . This time around, Meloni was pushing back on efforts led by the US, Japan, France, and Germany to include “safe and legal abortions” in the text, according to a source close to the negotiations. But the text is still being negotiated and it is still unclear whether this wording is seen as a red line for Meloni. Tensions in Italy over abortion rights have increased under Meloni, who has been accused of taking the country back to medieval times. "From the beginning of her government, she tried to weaken women's rights,” Tina Marinari, a campaigner from Amnesty International in Italy, told EUobserver. When asked why Meloni would now oppose wording she green-lighted in May, Marinari said that Meloni has used everything, including women's rights, during the electoral campaign to “get votes” not only in Italy but also in Europe. Despite her promise not to interfere with the right to abortion during the first 90 days of pregnancy, which was established in 1978, there has been a recent setback to abortion rights in Italy after Meloni's party passed measures allowing anti-abortion activists to enter abortion clinics. Women in Italy may also be forced to listen to the unborn baby's heartbeat before an abortion, and there have been reports of women being offered 1,000€ for carrying on with their pregnancy, Amnesty International said. Additionally, Meloni’s party is considering putting forward a proposal to give full rights to the foetus, which would automatically hinder the right to abortion. “In Italy, we have law 194 that should guarantee the free access to surgical and pharmacological abortion but the reality is a little bit different because of a consequence of many constraints and limitations on the ground,” Marinari said. Data from the Italian ministry of health shows that access to abortion remains difficult and patchy across the country, with a high number of medical personnel refusing to perform abortions, especially in southern regions, such as Sicily and Abruzzo. A new European citizen initiative “My Voice, My Choice” calling for EU financial support to ensure safe and free access to abortion across all member states has already collected over half a million signatures. But even if the campaign gets the 1m needed votes in at least seven member states, success can't be taken for granted. "Every person is entitled to have their own opinion on abortions. But it is not up to anyone to determine the body, health and life of others,” said Kristina Lunz, co-founder of the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy .
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Elena is EUobserver's editor-in-chief. She is from Spain and has studied journalism and new media in Spanish and Belgian universities. Previously she worked on European affairs at VoteWatch Europe and the Spanish news agency EFE.
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Italy's objections to the promotion of sexual rights have forced the G7 to shelve plans to include “safe and legal abortions” in a draft communique, EUobserver has learned.
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[
"EU Political",
"Health & Society"
] |
eu-political
|
2024-06-12T11:39:22.932Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar8d2c0166
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EU's leaked strategic agenda makes zero mention of health
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The leaked EU Strategic Agenda 2024-2029 draft does not include a mention of health once, and climate change as mere lip service, even though climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss are estimated to be responsible for almost 20 percent of deaths in the European region according to the World Health Organization (WHO) and add to a huge burden of acute and chronic disease. One wonders what makes this agenda ‘strategic’, if it fails to incorporate the value of prevention before the damage is done. The impact of climate change and pollution to health is likely to affect everyone over the course of a lifespan, with some being more vulnerable than others, such as children, pregnant women, the elderly and those already suffering from illness. The socio-economic differences between EU countries and people also mean some are hit harder than others. The environmental health sector is indignant about the rollback of ambition to address climate change and pollution. We urge the EU to include and prioritise both climate and environmental action for healthier people and a healthier planet. Silent on forever chemicals Pollution, from a cocktail of substances, impacts all our health, whether the pollutants are airborne, in products, or in food and water. Negative health impacts such as cancer, infertility, impaired immune-, hormonal and reproductive systems can result even from low levels of exposure to harmful chemicals. Shockingly over 70 percent of chemicals produced in Europe are hazardous to health. It has been estimated that exposure to such chemicals contributed to over 260,000 deaths in the WHO European Region in 2019, and this is likely an underestimation due to a lack of available data. The European Human Biomonitoring programme concluded in 2022 that the European population is exposed to alarmingly high levels of hazardous chemicals, in particular children, after testing 18 of the most harmful chemical groups in people across 28 European countries. Exposure to chemicals, including pesticides, is linked to birth defects and negative cognitive and physical development of children. A recent scientific study found that exposure to chemical mixtures such as PFAS and phthalates during pregnancy can lead to negative impacts on neurodevelopment, such as cognitive abilities and fine motor function of children. According to the European Environmental Agency exposure to air pollution and carcinogenic chemicals, and other pollutants may contribute to over 10 percent of cancer cases in Europe. This means that if pollution is not addressed, the EU’s flagship Beating Cancer Plan will be just a broken promise The draft EU Strategic Agenda is clearly focusing on competitiveness and defence, and yet paradoxically it does not consider the significant economic and societal costs stemming from pollution. This includes €52-84bn annually (EEA countries) for exposure to PFAS , with cleaning costs of water purification of PFAS a whopping €238bn — as well as over €163bn per year in health costs from endocrine disrupting chemicals. These are just some of the many chemicals that are not regulated properly wreaking havoc on our health — and as they increase in our environment and bodies so will the costs. The European Union needs to stick to the Green Deal Commitment, Zero Pollution Action Plan and Chemicals Strategy for Sustainability. We need an updated and robust REACH regulation as a priority for the next EU Commission in the first 100 days of its mandate, an EU-wide PFAS restriction and a commitment to diminish the use of harmful pesticides if we are serious about disease prevention and healthier, longer lives. If politicians ignore health, the results will be dire; unbearable health costs, higher mortality rates, negative impact on reproduction, pollution that cannot be cleared, diminishing fertile land and freshwater reserves. Healthy populations and ecosystems are vital for achieving competitiveness and security. Health concerns everyone, irrespective of political alignment. The final EU Strategic Agenda needs to address the heavy toll climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution are taking on health. Génon K. Jensen is executive director of the Health and Environment Alliance (HEAL) , a leading European organisation on addressing environmental determinants of health, with over 80 national & sub-national member organisations. Génon K. Jensen is executive director of the
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Health and Environment Alliance (HEAL)
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The leaked EU Strategic Agenda 2024-2029 draft does not include a mention of health once, and climate change as mere lip service, even though climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss are estimated to be responsible for almost 20 percent of deaths across Europe
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[
"Health & Society"
] |
health-and-society
|
2024-06-12T10:50:39.832Z
|
https://euobserver.com/health-and-society/ar6c97bea9
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EU leaders plotting top jobs dinner next week — but without von der Leyen
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Following the European election results, attention has rapidly focussed on the infamous riddle of the EU top jobs appointments, with much political manoeuvring already in play behind the scenes. The first official discussion on top jobs will only take place during an informal dinner next Monday (17 June) — when EU leaders will try to find options for the next presidents of the European Council, Parliament and Commission as well as the next EU foreign affairs chief. No decision is expected to come out of this meeting, although Ursula von der Leyen, who is seeking re-election as EU Commission president for the next five years, might have dreamed of an early affirmation from EU heads of state and government. But the European Council, which is in charge of organising the informal dinner, has not invited von der Leyen — prompting the commission to demand a place at the table. "We understand that this is an informal dinner of the members of the European Council of which the president of the Commission is a member and therefore we expect her to be there," a commission spokesperson told reporters on Tuesday. When it comes to discussing or deciding on top positions, the candidates traditionally step out of the room. This happened in the past with Charles Michel before being appointed EU Council chief or José Manuel Barroso before he was nominated EU Commission president. One reason von der Leyen wants to be part of this meeting is the discussion of the strategic agenda. However, this topic is expected to be fully explored only during the regular European Council meeting later in June. EU ambassadors on Wednesday (12 June) requested to divide the meeting into two parts: one on the results of the European election, to which both EU Parliament president Roberta Metsola and EU Commission president von der Leyen could take part; followed by an exchange of views on top jobs without candidates. And most EU leaders have also backed Michel’s move, an EU diplomat told EUobserver. “A large majority of leaders have a strong preference that they have a behind the closed-doors debate,” the diplomat said, arguing that this always enables a more honest discussion. But there is another group of countries that are neutral about whether von der Leyen should be part of the discussion or not, and a "very small group" of leaders who would rather have her in the room, the EU diplomat also said, adding if she is invited, she might have to deal with some leaders asking her to step aside or suggesting other Spitzenkandidates to also be allowed to present themselves and their plans. Following the last 2019 European elections, none of the two main Spitzenkandidaten, the European Peoples Party’s (EPP) Manfred Weber and the Socialists' Frans Timmermans, were eventually appointed. Instead, EU leaders brought in von der Leyen from Angela Merkel's defence ministry in Berlin as a last-minute surprise 'dark horse', using their treaty powers. Figuring out who gets the top jobs is tough because EU leaders want to keep everyone happy — balancing different political groups, big and small countries, gender, and north and south. And this time around, eastern countries, led by Poland, are also expected to demand a top spot . Von der Leyen is and remains the frontrunner for the EU Commission, after the EPP won the European elections . And only the name of Mario Draghi, an Italian technocrat and former ECB chief, has come out as a potential rival. But an internal document seen by EUobserver, which sums up discussions between the EU council chief and EU leaders about the next strategic agenda has slammed von der Leyen's self-proclaimed "geopolitical commission" and "the politicisation" of rule of law conditionality, casting doubts about her re-election. Frederiksen, Costa, Kallas, Wilmes, Sikorski... For her reappointment, first, she would need a qualified majority of the 27 EU leaders, and then later support from at least 361 MEPs in the European Parliament. Also in the mix of the top job as the runners for the presidency of the EU Council are Mette Frederiksen (the centre-left Danish prime minister) and António Costa (former socialist Portuguese prime minister). And the EPP has shown a preference for Costa, who was embroiled in a corruption scandal last year causing his resignation, and since Frederiksen is also a woman from a Northern country — this would put von der Lean’s position at risk. "It is possible the presidency of the European Council will go to a socialist candidate,” Portugal prime minister Luis Montenegro said on Monday. "If Antonio Costa is a candidate for this position...the Portuguese government will not only support (him) but will do everything to ensure his candidacy is successful”. Meanwhile, Estonian prime minister Kaja Kallas has emerged as one of the top candidates for the next EU foreign affairs chief. But other names include Sophie Wilmès (Belgian foreign affairs minister) or Radek Sikorski (the Polish foreign affairs minister) Informal conversations on the top jobs are likely to arise during this week’s G7 meeting in Italy and the Ukraine Peace Conference in Switzerland — just days before the official EU leaders' dinner next Monday.
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Elena is EUobserver's editor-in-chief. She is from Spain and has studied journalism and new media in Spanish and Belgian universities. Previously she worked on European affairs at VoteWatch Europe and the Spanish news agency EFE.
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The first official discussion on top jobs will take place during an informal dinner next Monday, but Ursula von der Leyen, who is seeking reelection, has not been invited — prompting the commission the demand her place at the table.
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[
"EU Political",
"EU Elections"
] |
eu-political
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2024-06-11T16:17:35.771Z
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https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ara3a1dce1
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Newly-sensible, centrist Poland has chance to lead Paris-Berlin-Warsaw triangle
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Radoslaw Sikorski has bold ambitions for Poland and its role in Europe. The Polish foreign minister told the Sejm that Warsaw should “facilitate and contribute” to the European Union’s transformation as “a geopolitical entity” capable of defending its interests. Sikorski’s stated view that his country belongs at the centre of EU decision-making might have seemed unrealistic a few years ago. Poland’s Law and Justice government (2015-23) clashed openly with EU institutions over the rule of law and damaged diplomatic relations with Germany. But the result of the European Parliament elections does position Poland as the prime actor to inform the EU’s strategic direction beyond 2024. The strong performance of far-right parties in France and Germany stands in stark contrast to how the central European state voted. Poland’s incumbent pro-European government defeated its nationalist-conservative opposition for the first time in a decade. The electoral success of the centre in Poland means that Warsaw can expect to enjoy considerable influence in the new Commission. Donald Tusk, the Polish prime minister, framed the vote as a “fight to prevent war from coming to Poland and to the EU” This perspective was also expressed by the European People’s Party (EPP), which retained its position as the largest group in the European Parliament. Ursula von der Leyen, the EPP lead candidate, vowed to create “a bastion against the extremes” shortly after the projected results were released. European defence and security is the EU policy area where Poland could have a leading role in the months and years ahead. Since taking office last December, Tusk has reset Poland’s relations with its most important EU partners, France and Germany, under the Weimar Triangle . This was a vital step to take towards enhancing the EU’s capability to act as one voice in response to a resurgent Russia. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is calling into question the traditional Franco-German motor of European integration. Paris and Berlin stymied France’s semi-presidential system and Germany’s federal parliamentary system has hindered bilateral security cooperation between the EU’s two major powers at a time of immense crisis. Emmanuel Macron’s refusal to rule out sending Western forces to Ukraine was met with a swift rebuke from Olaf Scholz out of Germany’s fear of escalation. But Poland’s positive intervention with the Weimar Triangle’s revival means that it is well-placed to help iron out French and German differences over Ukraine and build trust. The foreign ministers of Poland, France, and Germany signed a Political Declaration earlier in the year, which committed their countries to intensify coordination and strengthen ties at all levels. Sikorski underscored the importance of leveraging the trilateral format to “a much greater extent than ever” in his address to the Polish parliament. Poland is also taking the initiative to facilitate the EU’s institutional adaptation to the geopolitical reality of interstate war. The country’s experience of Soviet occupation means it is one of the few EU member states that truly understands the importance of maintaining a credible deterrence against Russia. Poland spends more on defence than any other of its European counterparts (four percent of GDP). The strong example that Poland sets on defence expenditure has already started to gain traction at an EU level. In March, von der Leyen outlined a European defence industrial strategy , which is designed to incentivise arms production and consolidate a resilient defence sector. But the prospect of the European Commission president’s re-election paves the way for the EU to go even further and establish an EU defence commissioner . Sikorski has welcomed the new post, stating that it would oversee the bloc’s unified command and manage its defence budget. It is often said that an eastward shift has been taking place within Europe since Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The eastern EU member states, who were dismissed as alarmist about Russia, were proven right in their long-standing warnings of the Kremlin’s real intentions. But the influence of Poland in the EU was severely undermined under the populist Law and Justice party. The European Parliament elections, however, cements a fundamental change in the EU’s balance of power. The victory of Tusk’s Civic Platform has reinforced the political salience of Poland’s unequivocal approach towards Russia and support for Ukraine. Jean Monnet, one of the founding fathers of the European project, said that Europe “will be forged in crisis.” In today’s new era of great-power confrontation, it is Poland that is primed to help strengthen the continent’s cohesion and integration. Hugo Blewett-Mundy is a non-resident associate research fellow from the EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy in Prague. Hugo Blewett-Mundy is a non-resident associate research fellow from the
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EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy
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As France and Germany shift to the hard-right, the centre is holding in Poland
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[
"EU Political"
] |
eu-political
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2024-06-11T11:39:09.710Z
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https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ara08babc4
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Amid far-right noise, pro-European centre holds – albeit weakened
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Despite concerns about the surge of the far-right in Europe, the pro-European parties have managed to hold a majority in the next European Parliament — making EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen’s own re-election more likely. The European People’s Party (EPP) came top in the four-day European elections, winning 185 of the 720 seats in the European Parliament — an increase of nine MEPs, compared to 2019. The Socialists and Democrats (S&D) came second, losing a few seats but securing 137 MEPs in the next hemicycle. Big gains took place in France, paired with modest improvements in Italy and Romania. Losses took place in Poland and Germany, while they maintained their support in socialist-led Spain. Despite massive losses in countries like France, where president Emmanuel Macron responded to the results on Sunday night by calling for snap parliamentary elections, the liberals of Renew Europe are still the third-biggest political force. However, they saw their number of MEPs drop from 102 to 80. As a result, the mainstream centrist-democratic majority is projected to have 402 MEPs, representing almost 56 percent of the seats. Von der Leyen, seeking a second term at the helm of the European Commission, would need 361 votes to get the parliament’s green light. Both the S&D and the Greens immediately presented themselves as reliable partners for this potential pro-democratic coalition. But whereas von der Leyen announced her intention to “build a platform” with socialists and liberals, she notably did not respond to the invitation by the Greens. Notably, the Greens suffered the biggest losses of the night, with especially the French and German delegations taking strong hits. Better results in Nordic and Baltic countries were insufficient to compensate for their losses — prompting them to pitch themselves as a potential partner in the pro-democratic coalition. “Any coalition we’ll be part of will be based on pro-democracy and pro-Europe. And that's very clear. That's without Identity and Democracy (ID) and European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR),” Green lead candidate Bas Eickhout told EUobserver. While far-right and national conservatives were expected to get big wins, they only saw their number of seats slightly increasing. ECR saw an increase in the number of MEPs from 69 to 73 while far-right Identity and Democracy (ID) won nine seats. Nonetheless, the particularly strong result for France’s National Rally was hailed by its leader Jordan Bardella, as an “unprecedented defeat for the powers-that-be”, that would mark “the first day of the post-Macron era”. “I cannot act as if nothing had happened,” Macron said, as he announced that he was dissolving the French National Assembly and calling for elections on 30 June and 7 July. Notably, those parties which currently fall under ‘non-attached’ or ‘others’ will play a key role in reshuffling parties and shaping the next legislative term. These include Viktor Orbán's Fidesz (which win 10 MEPs), Alternative for Germany (15 seats), Italy’s Five Star Movement (with nine MEPs) and Sarah Wagenknecht’s new party, which split from Die Linke in Germany (six MEPs). "EU politics appears not only more fragmented, but also less intelligible than ever before," said Alberto Alemanno, professor of EU Law at HEC Paris and College of Europe, on X, reacting to the election results. Turnout relatively low Overall, turnout in the Thursday-Sunday elections decreased slightly compared to 2019, estimated to be 48.8 percent by Europe Elects, 0.3 percent lower than last time. Gains in Germany, the Netherlands and Romania appear to have been offset by falls in participation in Spain, Poland and Italy.
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Luxembourg, which has compulsory voting, topped the list with 82 percent, followed by Malta at 72 percent and Germany at 66, with Belgium, which has compulsory voting as well, still to publish figures.
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Despite fears of a far-right take-over, Europe's political centre holds after the EU elections, amid gains by the centre-right and stability for the socialist centre-left. But major losses for the liberal Renew and the Greens, paired with a sharp rise for the far-right in France, indicate Europe is still turning right.
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[
"EU Elections"
] |
eu-elections
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2024-06-10T00:19:25.644Z
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https://euobserver.com/eu-elections/ar1883aa39
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Surprise win for Flemish Nationalists in Belgian domestic election, far-right second
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The Flemish Nationalist NVA, a member of the rightwing European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), narrowly beat the far-right Flemish Interest in the Belgian national and regional elections taking place on Sunday (June 9), simultaneously with the European elections. NVA leader and mayor of Antwerp Bart de Wever declared victory around 8pm on Sunday, with around 80 percent of the vote counted. “More than ever, Flanders has chosen for more autonomy,” de Wever said during his victory speech, alluding to his goal of reforming Belgium’s federal constitution. Results indicated NVA won around 17 percent of the national vote, beating Flemish Interest, a member of the hard-right Identity and Democracy (ID), into second place with 15 percent. The far-left PVDA/PTB rose to third place, with just under 10 percent, narrowly ahead of the French-speaking centre-right Reformist Movement (MR). Belgium’s traditional centre-left powerhouse, the French-speaking Socialists (PS), suffered a disappointing result, dropping to seven percent. The Dutch-speaking liberals (Open VLD), outgoing prime minister Alexander de Croo’s party, took a beating as well, with an emotional De Croo calling it "an exceptionally tough night". On Monday (June 10), De Croo submitted his resignation as prime minister to the Belgian King, though he is expected to remain in place as the head of a caretaker government until a new coalition has been formed. In keeping with the rest of Europe, however, the Greens suffered the biggest losses of the night, with French-speaking Ecolo losing more than half of its seats. De Wever’s win came as a surprise for commentators, as the rival Flemish Interest had been topping polls for weeks. “The centre-right voter has been convinced by Bart de Wever,” concluded Laura Jacobs, a political scientist from the University of Antwerp, noting how socio-economic concerns and the sustainability of Belgium’s budget were central to the NVA campaign. Flanders first Still, the results show how the Dutch-speaking region of Flanders has been at the forefront of the far-right wave that is sweeping Europe, with the two hard-right parties winning a combined 47 percent of the vote in the elections for the regional Flemish Parliament. Nonetheless, the two Flemish Nationalist parties’ failure to reach a combined outright majority in the Flemish Parliament will be reassuring to many, after fears over a far-right nationalist coalition dominated the campaign, even sparking speculation over the future of Belgium as a whole. Instead, NVA will likely attempt to form a Flemish government with the Flemish Christian Democrats (CD&V) and the Flemish Social Democrats of Vooruit, predicted Jacobs. But at the national level, forging a coalition will remain complicated. “The puzzle is slightly less hard than expected,” Jacobs said, but the strong performance of both the hard-left PVDA/PTB and the far-right means finding a majority will require complicated political arithmetic. Though an NVA-led centre-right coalition involving French and Dutch christian democrats and liberals seems most likely, such a coalition would only command the slimmest of majorities in parliament. Moreover, it seems unlikely that De Croo’s Open VLD will be persuaded to govern after suffering such serious losses. Instead, a severing of ties between French and Dutch-speaking “sister-parties” could be necessary, said Jacobs, noting that Flemish Vooruit might be persuaded to govern without the French PS. But even in that scenario, de Wever will face difficulties in achieving the fundamental constitutional reforms he campaigned on — promising less financial transfers from Flanders to the rest of Belgium. “He needs a two-thirds majority in both parliaments to do that,” Jacobs noted, adding that local elections in October could make coalition talks even more complicated. Piet Ruig is a Brussels-based journalist who previously worked for the Dutch public broadcaster VPRO.
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Piet Ruig
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The Flemish Nationalist NVA defied polls by winning the Belgian national elections, beating the far-right Flemish Interest, who came second. Though a centre-right coalition led by NVA leader Bart de Wever seems most likely, any coalition will involve highly-challenging parliamentary arithmetic.
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[
"EU Political"
] |
eu-political
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2024-06-09T22:35:13.009Z
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https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ara6d73e0b
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European elections 2024: Live results
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More than 360 million Europeans were eligible to vote in this ongoing EU elections — a four-day democratic marathon across the 27 EU member states whose outcome will determine the influence of political forces in Europe over the next five years. While European elections often see a low turnout (with the highest-recorded at just 51 percent in 2019), this time they have received increased focus , especially due to the major challenges the EU has faced since that last vote — mainly the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine.) Unlike previous EU elections, but mirroring national outcomes, the 2024 elections have the potential to shift the traditional power balance from progressive forces to those on the right — and either increase fragmentation of party groupings within the next European Parliament, or see some sort of consolidation of national conservatives plus populist far-right forces. While we are still awaiting final results from EU member states (namely Italy, where the last voting polls close at 23:00), follow our below: And that's a wrap Thanks for joining us, and read our final wrap up here. EU politics 'less intelligible' than ever before (0:38) "EU politics appears not only more fragmented, but also less intelligible than ever before," said Alberto Alemanno, professor of EU Law at HEC Paris and College of Europe, on X. The post-election period, he said, will be shaped and driven by both internal matters (such as the snap French elections and the formation of the Dutch government) and external ones (such as the war in Ukraine, and the upcoming US presidential elections, among others). EU political groups will start reshuffling to divide EU money and top jobs. And unaffiliated MEPs may play a role in shaping the new political cycle, Alemanno also said. Socialists and Greens pitch a democratic majority, Renew absent (0:27) The Socialists & Democrats lead candidate Nicolas Schmit said they are open to collaborating with the European People’s Party (EPP). “It is clear that for us. We are open to strong cooperation with all democratic forces in this parliament,” he said, after congratulating the EPP and the EPP lead candidate Ursula von der Leyen for winning the elections. “We are open to all democratic forces, as we are closed to all those who want to dismantle Europe,” he also said. “I'm confident that we are able together to find a way how we can govern Europe in a difficult time,” he also said. While acknowledging losses and gains in different countries across Europe, the Greens also called for a "stable majority" and pledged to act responsibly to deliver for Europeans. Green lead candidate Bas Eickhout said that the elections clearly show that the lead candidate for the EPP has won the election and this should be reflected in the outcome of the council taking place later this month. "We are disappointed about the results, which are mainly because of losses in Germany and France," he said, pointing to Green wins elsewhere. "We are clearly not happy with the total number of seats," Eickhout said, adding that he was happy with the broader representation of greens throughout Europe. The Dutch politician also argued that the "challenges facing Europe were too big to play political games", arguing for the need for a "stable majority" and pitching the Greens as a coalition partner. "The Greens are ready to deliver. We are ready to take that responsibility," Eickhout also said, while calling for the "continuation of the Green Deal as a part of a green industrial strategy. "I think the biggest mistake we would do is now to abandon the Green Deal." Notably, Renew liberal Valérie Hayer was absent from the EP gathering of lead candidates late Sunday night. Five more years of Ursula? (00:21) The first lead candidate to speak on Sunday night was incumbent commission president Ursula von der Leyen, from the European People's Party (EPP). "Today is a good day for the EPP," von der Leyen said, celebrating their election win and arguing that the result had two messages. "First, there remains a majority in the centre for a strong Europe," von der Leyen noted, but she added that it was "also true that the extremes on left and the right have gained support." She also echoed Weber's comment on building on a "platform" with social democrats and liberals, in what she called a "proven and constructive relationship". When questioned on possibly including the Greens in this platform, von der Leyen said that other partners would be a later consideration: "First things first." On her bid for the commission presidency, she said she was "confident" of securing a second mandate. The Greens are projected to be sidelined in the European Parliament amid a thrashing in Germany and France. Climate change more difficult to sell (00:10) Leapfrogged by both the far-right Identity and Democracy Group as well as European Conservatives and Reformists Groups, the Greens have seen their numbers drop from 71 MEPs to 53. It is a stunning defeat on the back of a 2019 election win that saw the narrative to tackle climate change take root. But Belgian Philippe Lamberts, who co-helmed the Greens since 2014, told EUobserver that the calculus on climate had changed. “The popular mobilisation for climate at least in northern and Western Europe was not apparent this time,” he said. He also said the wider public has also evolved since 2019, making efforts to curb climate change a more difficult sell. “Of course, the loss of seats is always a blow, also for us, but at the same time, we do see gains in other countries as well,” Bas Eikhout, a Dutch Green MEP, told reporters in Brussels. 'Respect the outcome of elections': EPP's Manfred Weber (23:18) Manfred Weber, leader of the European People's Party (EPP), was triumphant. "We won the elections," Weber said, adding that among the "democratic centre parties" the EPP was the only one to win seats. Praising Ursula von der Leyen for being a "convincing lead-candidate", Weber called on the other parties to support her candidacy for the commission presidency. "Those who speak about saving democracy should respect the outcome of elections," Weber said, calling on German chancellor Olaf Scholz and French president Emmanuel Macron to endorse von der Leyen as commission president. Weber invited Europe's social democrats and liberals to join the EPP's "pro-European and pro-democratic alliance," but would not immediately include the Greens, saying that "the starting point is the platform of social democrats and liberals." Weber also said that "all those who want to destroy our Europe are our enemies," and vowing that the EPP would not allow them "any kind of influence at the EU level," but refused to specify who these enemies were, amid speculation over possible collaboration between the EPP and the rightwing ECR. Responding to the possibility of Hungarian MEP candidate Peter Magyar's Respect and Freedom joining the EPP, Weber noted that many others wanted to join the party as well. "That's great news for us, we are attractive," Weber concluded, adding that "the door is open for all those who respect our goals." Socialist call for a 'pro-European democratic coalition' (22:42) Portuguese MEP Pedro Marques, the vice-chair of the Socialists and Democrats (S&D), called for a pro-democratic coalition for the next mandate. “We can build the pro-European democratic majority, a pro-rule of law majority, and that's what we'll be fighting for in the weeks and months to come,” he said. While congratulating the European People’s Party (EPP) and its lead candidate Ursula von der Leyen, Marques urged the EPP to avoid collaborating with European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR). “If we need to extend this position, it should be in the direction of the progressive groups of the pro-European groups, and certainly not the direction of the far-right,” he said. If needed, the Greens should be called to the negotiating table, he said. The EPP, S&D and liberal Renew Europe should have around 398 seats, according to exit polls. This would represent 55.2 percent of total votes, down from 59.1 percent share in 2019. Bringing the Greens into this pro-democratic coalition would increase the numbers to 451 seats, representing 62.6 percent of total votes. Wether this coalition could hold throughout the next five-year mandate is unlikely. On certain legislative proposals such as, for example, the controversial Nature Restoration Law, the S&D and Renew joined forces with the Greens and The Left to pass legislation. But this vote also saw the re-alignment of EPP with national conservatives ECR and far-right Identity and Democracy (ID), raising doubts about future green EU legislation. Greens urge expansion of Green Deal, despite 'disappointing results' (22:37) Outgoing Green co-leader Philippe Lamberts was disappointed by election results that have seen the climate-fighting party witness losses. “Tonight’s result is certainly not a victory for the Greens,” he said. But Lamberts maintained that the future of the planet needs an expanded Green Deal. He also called on the conservatives, the social democrats and liberals not to embrace “various flavours of the far-right.” “Despite all the disappointing results tonight, we the Greens, the European Free Alliance stand ready to take up our responsibilities,” he said. Far-right parties underperforming in the Nordics (22:36) Left-leaning parties including the Greens are making gains in Denmark and Sweden, amid losses elsewhere in the European Union. A remarkable outcome in Denmark has seen the Greens (Socialistisk Folkeparti) take poll position with 18.4 percent, followed by the socialists and liberal conservatives, according to exit polls. "I can’t even describe how proud I am,” said Pia Olsen Dyhr, who chairs the party. Her party had earlier released a statement calling for an alternative response to both welfare and the climate. “We are willing to deliver that in the European Parliament,” it said. Other results are coming in from Sweden, where the greens are now polling as the third largest with 15.7 percent, up 4.2 percent when compared to 2019. Meanwhile, their nationalist and far-right counterparts Sweden Democrats dipped to 13.9 percent, down 1.4 percent from 2019. Cas Mudde, a Dutch politics professor, on X said that far-right parties seem to be underperforming in the Nordic countries. Weber urges parties to support von der Leyen (22:20) Manfred Weber, leader of the European People's Party, has called on democratic parties in the European Parliament to respect the election result. "The EPP lead candidate Ursula von der Leyen must now be supported by them as Commission president for the next five years," he said on X. ECR silent on Fidesz, eyes collaboration with the centre-right EPP (22:17) Assita Kanko, also a Belgian MEP, spoke on behalf of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR). “When the true aspirations of citizens are ignored, when nobody wants to acknowledge them, that gives more space to extreme movements,” Kanko said, emphasising the importance of "centre-right policy" on questions of defence, security and migration. Pitching a possible collaboration with the European People's Party, Kanko expressed the hope that they "will be part of a majority in this parliament." "We worked very well in the past five years, including with [EPP commission president] Von der Leyen" Kanko continued, adding that there was "nothing to prevent us from working with the EPP." Kanko wouldn't comment on whether the ECR would welcome Viktor Orbán's Fidesz to boost the group's numbers. “In my view, the first priority is not to become the biggest, but is to see how we can work as we are now, taking the election results into account,” she said. The Left reacts to exit polls (22:06) Marc Botenga, a Belgian MEP for the Left, welcomed the advances made by the Left in several countries but expressed his concern about the gains of the far-right as well. Blaming the policies of "traditional parties," Botenga argued that people's frustration over deteriorating public services and infrastructure drove them to the far-right, lamenting the "politics that have created a social disaster everywhere in Europe.” Poland's PiS loses support, as EPP's Tusk secures slight majority (21:54) The party of Polish prime minister and former European Council president Donald Tusk’s Civic Coalition has secured about 38 percent support, according to exit polls. Tusk’s Civic Coalition is expected to have 19 MEPs in the next European Parliament — the same number secured by the Law and Justice (PiS) party — a party known for dismantling the rule of law in the country during its past administration. PiS, one of the largest parties in the rightwing European Conservatives and Reformists, has seen its support drop from 45 percent in 2019 to 34 percent in 2024, losing a projected seven seats. Meanwhile, the liberal Third Way are expected to get three seats and the socialist party two MEPs. Newcomers from Poland include six projected MEPs from the far-right Confederation [ ] which still has to join a political family for the next mandate. Macron drops bombshell — snap parliamentary elections later this month (21:53) French president Emmanuel Macron dropped a bombshell in response to his party's painful defeat in the European elections, dissolving France's National Parliament and calling snap parliamentary elections. "France needs a clear majority in serenity and harmony," Macron said, adding that the French had to "write history, not be driven it." The first round will take place on 30 June, followed by a second on 7 July. Big gains for far-right Vox in Spain, but EPP remains favoured option for Spaniards (21:28) Mirroring results from the most-recent Spanish national elections held last summer, the leading opposition party, the centre-right People's Party, has won Spain's European elections, securing 22 of the 61 seats allocated to the country, according to first exit polls. Far-right Vox (a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists) has seen a sharp increase in support, climbing from six to 10 percent — more than doubling the number of MEPs, from three in 2019 to seven in the next legislative term. The socialist party of prime minister Pedro Sánchez has seen a slight drop in support, from 33 to 30 percent, but it will maintain its 20 MEPs. Sánchez's allies, which sit in the Green group, have increased the number of MEPs from two to four. But the biggest loser of this election is Ciudadanos, the liberal party that started in Catalonia in 2016 and disappeared in 2023. The liberal party saw their support drop from 12 percent in 2019 to one percent, and as a result, it will also disappear from the European Parliament. Catalan pro-independence parties, divided into the Greens and the Left, have secured three MEPs. And two MEPs are expected to come from the ‘Se Acabó la Fiesta’ [The Party's Over] party, whose leader, a far-right agitator, has become famous through social networks such as Telegram, Instagram, and YouTube. Far-right triumphs in France (21:02) French far-right leader Jordan Bardella has called for a new orientation of the European Union, following a historic win by Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN), which is projected to win 30 of France’s 81 seats —up 12 from its result in 2019. “The French have tonight demanded to take back charge of the politics of migration, the return of state authority to each square metre of territory,” said the 28-year-old Jordan Bardella, president of the National Rally. French president Emmanuel Macron’s Renaissance coalition came in second with 15.2 percent, followed by the socialists at 14.3 percent. French president Emmanuel Macron’s liberal Renew coalition came in at less than half of that number with 14 seats, a humiliating loss of nine seats. Macron’s coalition was nearly overtaken by the Social Democrats led by Raphael Glucksmann, rising from seven to 13 MEPs. The hard-left “France Unbowed” of The Left leader Manon Aubry slightly improved its performance, winning eight seats, compared to seven in 2019. And centre-right Republicans lost two of their eight previous seats. Meanwhile, Eric Zemmour’s Reconquest Party (a member of Identity and Democracy) will exacerbate worries over France's far-right turn, newly-entering parliament with five seats. Once again, some of the heaviest losses are suffered by the Greens, losing more than half their seats as they dropped from 12 to five MEPs. The latest election gain in France comes with far-right gains in Germany and in Austria. Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) obtained some 16.2 percent, behind CDU/CSU that came out on top with 30 percent, according to exit polls. AfD’s leadership have described it as a “super outcome”. Their win comes despite Nazi-related scandals over its leading candidate Maximilian Krah. “All in all people are fed up with the fact that they are faced with so much bureaucracy from Brussels,” Alice Weidel, AfD’s co-leader told broadcaster ARD. Similar gains are being made by the far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPO), whose first leader in 1956 was a former Nazi and SS officer. The FPO is now in top position in Austria with 27 percent support, according to exit polls, followed by Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP). The latest estimates suggest the far-right Identity and Democracy group could have 62 MEPs, up from the current 49. First full hemicycle projection (based on national preliminary results) (20:35) The European People’s Party (EPP) is projected to win this election, securing 181 MEPs, up from 176 in 2019, according to the first full hemicycle projection based on national preliminary results. The Socialists and Democrats (S&D) are set to lose four seats, reducing their number of MEPs from 139 to 135. Due to a so-called 'greenlash' led by farmers’ protests against Europe’s environmental agenda, the Greens are poised to suffer one of the biggest hits, losing 18 seats from their current 71. Similarly, liberal Renew Europe is facing significant losses, with their number of MEPs dropping from 102 to 82. Support for the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) has slightly grown, with projections indicating that they would win two more MEPs, totalling 71 in the next European Parliament and becoming the fourth largest group. Meanwhile, the far-right Identity and Democracy (ID) has made sharp gains, increasing their number of seats from 49 to 62. Please note that these are only preliminary results and that political groups are expected to reshuffle. "Europeans are also still voting, so this is really just a first projection," warned European Parliament president Roberta Metsola (EPP). Parties like Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán's Fidesz are currently in the group of Non-attached Members, but they are expected to join a political family to increase their influence in legislative processes. Croatia results (20:31) In Croatia, the Croatian Democratic Union, of current prime minister Andrej Plenković is projected to come first, winning half of Croatia’s total of 12 seats, adding two to their previous four MEPs. Croatia’s Social Democratic coalition comes in second with four seats — gaining one, compared to 2019. Green member “We can!” and the far-right Homeland Movement (a member of Plenković’s government coalition) will both enter the European Parliament for the first time, with one seat. Green Spitzenkandidat Bas Eickhout speaks (20:24) Reacting to the German result, Green lead candidate Bas Eickhout attempted to qualify his party’s losses, arguing it was “more of a vote against the Ampfel [traffic-light] coalition [of socialists, liberals and greens in Berlin]” rather than a rebuke of the Green Deal. Emphasising gains made in the Baltic states, Eickhout argued that Greens “had a record high result in 2019”, which they knew “we would never be capable of repeating”. The Green chief dismissed the suggestion that their group would try to recruit new members to boost their numbers. “We are not suddenly changing our tactics now, with more, or less, seats,” Eickhout said, adding that “contents goes first.” Eickhout also suggested that to effectively counter the far-right, Greens and Social Democrats had to collaborate more, following the Dutch example. “Progressives need to sit down to think, OK, what is our alternative and how credible can we make that alternative?,” he said. But he refused to confirm his support for the re-election bid of Ursula von der Leyen, lead candidate for the commission presidency of the European People’s Party (EPP). “That's too early to tell.’, Eickhout said. “Any coalition we’ll be part of will be based on pro-democracy and pro-Europe. And that's very clearly without ID and ECR.” World largest newsroom for one night (20:23) About 1,000 journalists from 90 countries are expected in the European Parliament to cover election night, turning the hemicycle into the largest newsroom in the world for one night. The first projection of the full hemicycle, based on national preliminary results, will be published soon. After the preliminary results came out from Germany, all eyes are now on France, where far-right Marine Le Pen's party, National Rally (a member of Identity and Democracy), is leading the polls. EUobserver’s coverage is free during the EP elections week EUobserver is a non-profit news organisation reporting on EU. We are independent, meaning we don’t have a billionaire owner, a corporation backing us or moneymen in Dubai paying our salary. You do. Your contributions have helped us uncover scandals , report on issues that matter (but don’t please advertisers) like labour policy and migration and hold power to account . If you value our coverage, consider signing up for a supporting membership (starting from €1/month) or to our newsletter for three free articles per month. Help keep our independent reporting independent. NVA projected to come top in Belgian national election (19:45) The Flemish nationalist party NVA (a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists — ECR), is expected to come top in Sunday's simultaneous Belgian national election, securing about 23 percent of support in the Belgian Chamber of Representatives — a seven-percent increase from the previous election in 2019, according to preliminary estimates. The far-right Vlaams Belang (from Identity and Democracy) has also made significant gains in Belgium's northern region of Flanders, with their support increasing sharply over the years (from three percent in 2014 to around 12 percent in 2019 and 18 percent in 2024). The current mayor of Antwerp, Bart de Wever (NVA), who hopes to become the next Belgian prime minister, previously ruled out any coalition with Vlaams Belang. He aims to lead a potential centre-right coalition with the Christian Democrats and the support of the liberals, which could be formed by September. However, only 65 percent of the votes have been counted so far in Belgium — where voting is mandatory. EPP's Weber slams German red/green/yellow coalition after first exit polls (19:13) After the first exit polls were published in Germany, European People’s Party leader Manfred Weber celebrated the victory of his centre-right CDU/CSU which are expected to get 30 MEPs in the next European Parliament. He also said that the so-called “traffic light” coalition in Berlin, with (yellow) Free Democrats (FDP) and Greens, under a (red) Social Democrat (SPD) chancellor Olaf Scholz, no longer reaches people. “We stand for stability and are the bulwark against rightwing extremists like the [Alternative for Germany] AfD,” he said on X. Far-right ID given room named after German green eco-feminist (19:00) The far-right Identity and Democracy (ID) has been placed in a European Parliament room named after Petra Kelly, the late German green eco-feminist activist. Kelly co-founded the Green party in Germany in 1979, which in this election has taken a thrashing, following its peak 2019 performance, against gains by the far-right Alternative for Germany, according to the latest exit polls. Kelly, who died in 1992 at 44 years-old, focused much of her work on peace and non-violence, ecology, feminism and human rights. Such efforts often run counter to the political goals of the ID group, which has railed against the European Commission’s green transition. Incidentally, ID is also sharing the same floor with the Left, which has been placed in a room named after Manolis Glezos, a Greek leftwing politician. Greek PM Mitsotakis’s support confirmed (18:58) Greek prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis's party New Democracy (European People’s Party) maintains solid support, securing eight of the 21 seats allocated for Greece, according to the latest national estimates. New Democracy had six seats in the outgoing parliament. “In the next five years very important decisions will be made in Europe,” Mitsotakis said on X on Sunday. The main leading opposition Syriza will maintain four MEPs, while the socialist party Pasok has seen an increase in support, getting three MEPs, a gain of one on the previous mandate. Greek Solution, a member of the European Reformists and Conservatives, also won an extra seat on top of its previous one, with Greece's communist party remaining stable at two seats as well. Greek newcomers to the parliament are far-right Niki and left-populist Course of Freedom, each winning one seat. Renew and the Greens will have no more Greek MEPs. Far-right in Austria doubles its support (18:53) Austria's far-right Freedom Party (FPO), part of the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, has gained about 27 percent of the vote, becoming the winner in Austria of the European Parliament elections, according to first national estimates. The FPO has doubled its number of MEPs from three to a projected six — of the 20 seats the country holds. Chancellor Karl Nehammer's party, the Austrian People's Party (European People’s Party), is projected to have five MEPs, losing two seats compared to the 2019-2024 term. The Social Democratic Party of Austria is set to maintain its five MEPs from the last European elections. After a pre-election scandal involving 23-year-old Austrian Green EU lead candidate Lena Schilling, who has been accused of spreading hurtful rumours, the Green Party is projected to get two MEPs, down from three in the last mandate, after securing only about 10 percent of the votes. NEOS, which is part of the liberal Renew Europe, saw a slight increase in support, climbing from eight to 12 percent. It is expected to secure two seats, gaining one more MEP. Meanwhile, the biggest loser of the elections seems to be the party of Walter Baier, S (lead candidate) of the European Left for the European election, which got only three percent of the votes — and no representation in the next European Parliament. AfD makes five-percent gain in Germany (18:30) The first projection has arrived for Germany, the European Parliament’s largest delegation with 96 seats. Despite allegations against the party's leading candidate, Maximilian Krah, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) made sharp gains, climbing from 11 to 16 percent, and securing 19 MEPs — in a far-right surge that has started to take shape across Europe. The far-right Identity & Democracy group in the European Parliament expelled AFD after the pre-election scandals. But Germany’s overall winner is commission president Ursula von der Leyen’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU), with the powerhouse of the European People’s Party slightly increasing its lead and securing 30 MEPs. The other winner of the night is newcomer Sarah Wagenknecht, who's eponymous Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) gained six percent of the vote, after splitting from her former party, the hard-left Die Linke (which got only three percent). Meanwhile, the German Greens are the big losers, dropping to 12 percent from their record 21 percent in 2019, a result that does not bode well for their performance in the rest of Europe, considering their long-standing strength in Germany. Green lead candidate Bas Eickhout was forthright, calling the result “very disappointing” in a post on X. The results suggest a strong dissatisfaction with the current three-way Red/Green/Yellow coalition in Berlin, with chancellor Olaf Scholz’s Social Democrats (SPD) receiving its worst result in recent history, with 14 percent of the vote and 14 projected MEPs. The liberal Free Democratic Party comes out mostly unscathed, retaining its five percent, identical to the 2019 result. Pan-European Volt tripled its result from less than one to three percent. Accessibility issues (17:32) Voters with disabilities have faced barriers to exercising their democratic rights in several European countries, according to testimonies collected by the European Disability Forum. In Ireland, small tables in voting tables hampered people with physical disabilities in grappling with the large ballot, and some polling stations lacked signage for accessible entrances as well. In Belgium, a deaf person’s request to have a sign interpreter while helping to process votes at a polling station was turned down. Portugal saw issues with voting secrecy, as people with motor disabilities or visual impairments had to ask others to mark their ballots for them. Still, in many other countries facilities for the disabled seem to have functioned smoothly, with no accessibility issues reported from Italy. It is estimated that there are 100 million persons with disabilities living in the EU. Campaign violence (17:15) Though today there have been no reports of major incidents so far, the days leading up to the vote have been marked by violence in several European countries. Especially in Germany, politicians have been under attack, with reports of members of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) attacked in the southwestern city of Karlsruhe on Saturday. On Thursday, a local candidate for the AfD was stabbed in Mannheim, following assaults on Green and Social Democrat politicians in May. But attacks occurred elsewhere as well. On Friday, a man assaulted Danish prime minister Mette Frederiksen, who came away mostly unscathed, but cancelled election events afterwards. However, the most high-profile attack was last month’s assassination attempt on Slovak prime minister Robert Fico, who reportedly is recovering well despite being shot multiple times. The unprecedented violence is a marker of the highly agitated political atmosphere across the EU, with the expected right-wing surge making the current elections more tense than ever. Ambience outside the European Parliament (17:10) As journalists get ready for election night, citizens enjoy sunny Brussels. Disinformation concerns (16:22) Europe has yet to experience any large-scale disinformation campaign, says the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO). The EDMO has, however, detected various narratives enticing people not to vote in the days leading up to the vote. The latest includes social media posts in Germany making bogus claims that the EU wants to impose a “Ukraine Solidarity Tax” of 80 euros per month starting August 2024. An EU official told reporters last week that such campaigns have increased in complexity and sophistication. “We do see more, a little bit across the board, but I have to be also very clear in quantitative terms, we do not see an explosion of disinformation of information,” he said. Latest from Pollwatch (16:01) Dive into the latest insights from our collaborative Pollwatch project , offering updates on evolving political landscapes — alongside potential shifts in upcoming party dynamics. Turnout figures (15:30) As the first results come trickling in, turnout is shaping up to be high across Europe, possibly improving upon 2019. Apart from the high turnout in the Netherlands, the first results in Czechia and Latvia suggest an improvement over 2019, with preliminary data from France registering a slight uptick as well. But in Hungary especially, turnout is shaping up to be impressive: at 1 pm 33 percent of voters showed, a whopping ten percent higher than in 2019. It remains to be seen who stands to benefit from the stronger participation, however. Whereas results from the Netherlands indicate that pro-European voters had contributed to the higher turnout, it could also stem from more successful mobilisation by the far-right, whose voters historically show up less during European elections. 26 million new voters (12:34) Many teenagers aged 16 will on Sunday have voted for the first time in Belgium and Germany, (which both lowered their voting age in the last couple of years), as well as Austria, and Malta, where it was already permitted. In Greece, they can do so from the age of 17. It is estimated that a million young voters, aged 16 and 17, will vote for the first time in 2024. As a result, it is estimated that there will be around 26 million eligible first-time voters for these European elections. What happens after election night? (12:30) EU member states' authorities will communicate to the European Parliament the names of the elected MEPs in the coming days. Meanwhile, political groups will rush to rearrange themselves — to split funds and the possible top jobs. By 15 July, political groups will notify the EU parliament president, Roberta Metsola, of their names, their political declaration and their composition. The new mandate of the European Parliament, in its joint homes of Brussels and Strasbourg, will officially start on 16 July. Insights from the Netherlands, Ireland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Latvia (Sunday 12:15) As we warm up for the election night, citizens in the Netherlands (6 June), Ireland (both on Friday 7 June), the Czech Republic (7-8 June), Slovakia (8 June) and Latvia (8 June) have already voted. The exit polls in on Thursday night showed that high voter turnout in the Dutch elections was crucial in affecting the outcome, which was more favourable for the pro-EU camp than expected. Though Geert Wilders’ far-right Party for Freedom (PVV) is projected to win seven seats, the Green-socialist coalition party remained on top with eight seats. Though conducted no exit polls, simultaneous local elections suggest the liberal Fianna Fáil and the centre-right Christian democrats of Fine Gael performed well, while Greens are projected to slump, winning none of Ireland's 15 seats. In , where the vote took place in the aftermath of the assassination attempt on prime minister Robert Fico, polls stayed open for longer than planned, after a polling station temporarily closed over a white powder scare. According to unofficial results released on Sunday morning, the liberal Progressive Slovakia narrowly beat Fico's Smer. In the and , no exit polls were organised. We will have to wait for the first estimates and provisional results later today to know more. But the opposition Czech ANO party, led by former prime minister Andrej Babis , is leading the polls with a populist stance critical of Brussels. The ruling coalition of prime minister Petr Fiala, known as Together, was polling closely behind the ANO party. The Pirate Party and STAN, part of Fiala's government, are also expected to win seats in the European Parliament. According to Latvian media, and based on unofficial estimates, the National Alliance (from the European Conservatives and Reformists) and New Unity (European People's Party) are projected to get two seats each. Meanwhile, For Latvia's Development (Renew), the United List (European Conservatives and Reformists), Latvia In First Place (a relatively new right-wing populist party without a specific European affiliation), Harmony (Socialists and Democrats) and the Progressives (Greens) are expected to gain one seat each.
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The outgoing European Parliament (11:30)
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EUobserver's live coverage of the European Parliament election results. Dive into the latest updates and share your thoughts in the comments section to join the conversation.
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[
"EU Elections"
] |
eu-elections
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2024-06-09T10:54:29.732Z
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https://euobserver.com/eu-elections/ar098d1384
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Greece issues arrest warrant for Norwegian helping refugees
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Human rights defender Tommy Olsen, from Norway, is facing up to 20 years in prison after Greece issued a national warrant for his arrest last month. "We have just seen the files, and there isn't one single piece of evidence against me," he told EUobserver on Thursday (6 June). Olsen runs the Aegean Boat Report, a Norwegian non-governmental organisation (NGO) set up in 2018 to monitor and share data on people seeking refuge on the Greek islands. But he is facing an uncertain future as Greek authorities step up the pressure to have him arrested. "I am in danger of being closed down basically," he said, of fears his funding will dry up. Although the Greek case against him is several hundred pages long, his name is only mentioned twice. "It's kind of ridiculous," he says. One is a text message exchange with refugees who had arrived on the Greek island of Kos. This includes Olsen informing authorities of their location, their names, and their desire to apply for asylum. The second is a Greek coast guard officer who claimed Olsen was cooperating with smugglers, he says. Mary Lawlor, the United Nations special rapporteur for human rights defenders, described the case against Olsen as disturbing. "He is being targeted in what appears to be an arbitrary investigation criminalising his work in defence of the rights of migrants," she said, on X. The case goes back to July 2021 when eight asylum seekers arrived on Kos. Greek human rights defender Panagiotis Dimitras alerted authorities of their arrival. Olsen did the same, leading both men to being indicted. Around the same time, the BBC had ran a story on illegal pushbacks in Greece, a charge denied by country’s migration and asylum minister, Notis Mitarachi. Mitarachi had already by then accused Aegean Boat Report of facilitating "illegal migratory flows" in what civil society organisation describe as a politically motivated smear campaign. Human Rights Watch says information against Dimitras and Olsen had also been leaked to the media, including Greece’s largest national newspaper, Kathimerini. By his count, Olsen said there has been around 100 articles on him in the Greek press over the last four years. "The strange part is, never has any Greek journalists, these news outlets, contacted me for comment," he said. Despite the public smearing, a judge dismissed the case due to a lack of evidence. But now the same case has returned, this time by a new Greek investigator in Kos. The prosecution office in Kos now claim their evidence is sound. And last year, they charged Olsen and Dimitras with migrant smuggling and being members of a criminal organisation. They then demanded Olsen come to Greece. Olsen refused amid fears his presumption of innocence had been violated. International Arrest Warrant? On 14 May, a national warrant for Olsen's arrest was issued. But things could get worse. Olsen's Greek lawyer, Zacharias Kesses, says a procedure for an international arrest is also in the works. Once official, Olsen will likely be arrested by the Norwegian police. He will then have to plead his case in court. Should the Norwegian judge rule in his favour, Olsen would still face the threat of arrest elsewhere. "So if he goes to Brussels, he's going to be arrested and there's going to be the same procedure in Belgium," says Kesses. Kesses has represented other human rights defenders and humanitarian aid workers in Greece in the past. This includes activists Sarah Mardini, a Syrian competitive swimmer who saved drowning refugees, and Sean Binder, a German national. "No court [in Greece] has convicted any humanitarian," says Kesses. "But there are many humanitarians who suffered from pretrial detention or remained in a legal limbo for four or five years," he says. Kesses says such tactics aim to prevent civil society from monitoring and documenting illegal pushbacks in Greece. And pre-trail detention in Greece can last 18 months. For his part, Olsen says the latest move against him is politically motivated. "They have unlimited resources to do whatever they want. We don't have vast resources," he says. An international arrest warrant could also mean no funding. "I can't see anyone taking the ball if I quit, and that's kind of a problem for me, because to give them the satisfaction of me quitting, that's really tough," he says.
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Nikolaj joined EUobserver in 2012 and covers home affairs. He is originally from Denmark, but spent much of his life in France and in Belgium. He was awarded the King Baudouin Foundation grant for investigative journalism in 2010.
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Aegean Boat Report NGO chief Tommy Olsen is facing up to 20 years in prison after Greece issued a national warrant for his arrest last month.
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[
"Migration"
] |
migration
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2024-06-07T14:33:56.808Z
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https://euobserver.com/migration/arc4387302
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Meloni prepares for G7 Africa test
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The preparations for next week’s G7 summit in southern Italy have been overshadowed by the European elections. Even so, the summit in Apulia, which starts on 13 June, will be a major diplomatic test for the EU, and particularly Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni. Leaders are expected to discuss a plan to use windfall profits generated by Russian assets seized by the West since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Around $300bn [€277bn] of Russian assets are in the hands of Euroclear, a securities depository based in Brussels, which are generating annual profits of around €3bn per year. Under the G7 plan, which EU finance ministers are expected to debate after the summit, profits from the frozen assets could service the interest and capital of a loan to Ukraine by the international community. Following a remote Eurogroup meeting on 5 June, Irish finance minister and eurogroup chair Paschal Donohue, said “the discussion among ministers showed appreciation for the constructive engagement with G7 partners in this regard and full support for it to continue.” US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has said the loan could be worth $50bn, although the terms and size of the loan are still being debated. However, much of the rest of the three day gathering is set to focus on Africa. Meloni, who holds the G7 presidency this year, has invited an unprecedented five African heads of state, as well as African Union commission chair Moussa Faki Mahamat. The Africa focus is not a surprise. Since unveiling her ‘Mattei plan’, which aims to support African governments on energy, health and education policy, at a summit in January attended by more than two dozen African leaders and European Union officials, the Meloni government has briefed that it wants to make African development a central theme of its G7 presidency. Italy has a tradition of relatively close relations with Mediterranean countries such as Tunisia, Libya, partly Algeria and Egypt as well, but less so with sub-Saharan Africa. The new 'Mattei' plan Within the context of Meloni’s new ‘Mattei’ plan – named after Enrico Mattei, the former chairman of Italian oil and gas giant ENI - we can expect some offers to Africa, including proposals to support clean energy and food security in Africa. A so-called ‘Food Systems Initiative’, that could be unveiled in Apulia, aims to provide technical support to African nations to help them integrate food provision in their climate plans. Italian officials are also pushing for the G7 to agree a plan to develop new financial instruments with the African Development Bank to help bolster growth on the continent. Diversifying energy supply and migration control are two key priorities for Meloni’s nationalist government, which explains the presence of leaders from Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia. Italy is also concerned about the effects on employment from AI on Africa leading to higher migration. The first Mattei Plan operations include a contribution of €75m to finance Eni's biofuels supply chain in Kenya. More likely to be contentious are debates on a new debt restructuring programme for poor countries. Kenya’s president William Ruto who, together with South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa, the latter at his first international gathering since the African National Congress lost its parliamentary majority last week for the first time since the end of apartheid, has been leading the campaign for leaders to commit to ambitious financing and debt restructuring. Ahead of the summit, Ruto has urged G7 leaders to "demonstrate solidarity with Africa" by committing to support debt-restructuring and cancellation, as well as make provisions for greater concessional and longer-term development financing. That means, among others, agreeing to reallocate the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights to the African Development Bank, and committing funds to the International Development Association, he says. Earlier this week, US president Joe Biden’s press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre told reporters that leaders “will also redouble commitments to support developing countries seeking to make investments in their future and to help strengthen food security and health financing.” The IMF, meanwhile, has approved the use of SDRs – the fund’s reserve currency – worth up to $20bn for the acquisition of hybrid capital instruments by development banks. G7 leaders are also likely to use the summit to make new financial commitments to the International Development Association, the arm of the World Bank which provides soft loans to developing countries, and which is meant to be replenished every three years, including in 2024. On debt, however, there is likely to be little movement. The communiqué following a G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’ meeting between 23-25 May contained no new commitments on debt treatment, despite a group of countries, including Sri Lanka, Ghana and Zambia having completed – or are close to completing – multi-billion euro debt relief deals with creditors.
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Benjamin Fox is a seasoned reporter and editor, previously working for fellow Brussels publication Euractiv. His reporting has also been published in the Guardian, the East African, Euractiv, Private Eye and Africa Confidential, among others. He heads up the AU-EU section at EUobserver, based in Nairobi, Kenya.
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Overshadowed by the EU elections, next week’s G7 summit in southern Italy will be a major diplomatic test for the EU, and particularly Italian premier Giorgia Meloni.
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[
"EU & the World",
"Africa"
] |
*
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2024-06-07T13:45:54.397Z
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https://euobserver.com/*/ar6ef1a54f
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Dutch 'Green-Left' victory shows high turnout matters in far-right fight
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The Dutch left-green merger party led by former EU commissioner Frans Timmermans won the Dutch European Parliament elections, narrowly defeating far-right leader Geert Wilders for the top spot, gaining eight seats compared to Wilders’ seven, according to the definitive exit poll. Earlier this week, Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV) was projected to beat all opposition, coming in with nine MEps. So it's no wonder Thursday's initial outcome was hailed by other leftwing leaders in Europe as a major victory. “The message to Europe and to the far-right is loud and clear! We are ready to build a new course to protect our progressive values,” said Iraxte García Pérez , president of the Socialists and Democrats (S&D). But with the Netherlands not being the largest of countries — filling only 31 seats in an EU Parliament of 720— the question of significance immediately came up on social media. Dutch political science professor Tom van der Meer, for example, criticised the media's “eternal fascination” with “who was the biggest.” Cas Mudde, a Dutch politics professor at the University of Georgia, quickly pointed out that while significant, its importance may lie in its effect on the national political dynamic. “It will make it harder for the incoming coalition to argue that the Netherlands is eurosceptic,” he said on X. Whether Timmermans' GroenLinks-PvdA, as the party is called in full, will indeed become the largest Dutch party in the European elections will only definitively become clear on Sunday evening. So far, the polling – which has a margin of error of one seat – suggests that the gap between the parties is significant, with the green-left gaining 21.6 percent of the votes, while the PVV received 17.7 percent. “It’s a marvellous result,” said Wilders on Thursday evening. While the question of who was biggest may be mostly symbolic, the exit polls did show that high voter turnout in the Dutch elections was crucial in determining the outcome. Although Wilders won seven seats, a major victory, his party significantly underperformed compared to the Dutch elections back in November, when the PVV won 23.5 percent of the vote. According to these same figures, the three new governing coalition partners in The Hague, which also include the NSC and the Farmers Party, have also lost a significant voter share, from 56 percent last year to 38 percent today. This has led some to wonder whether Wilders’ victory was actually a shellacking in disguise – if not for the PVV directly, then at least for his potential cabinet. Looking more closely at the percentages, the newly formed NSC party, led by Pieter Omtzigt, has especially suffered. They got 12.9 percent of the votes in the November elections, but now they’re down to just 3.8 percent. This fall in support was expected as the party, largely consisting of political newcomers, has struggled to maintain cohesion. But it is also seen as a sign of the distaste within the party and among NSC members about governing with Wilders, whose Islamophobic rants are well documented and even led to a conviction for ‘group insult’ by the Dutch Supreme Court in 2021. However, a better explanation for Wilders's failure to beat the Green Left seems to be more mundane and related to voter turnout. Compared to last year, 56 percent of erstwhile PVV voters stayed home for these elections, compared to 22 percent for the Green Left. This is remarkable because overall, the Dutch voter turnout on Wednesday was the highest since 1989 (although compared to national elections still some 30 per cent lower). According to the Ipsos pollster, the top reasons for those not turning out to vote were, "no interest in EU politics", "no trust in EU politics" and "generally uninterested in politics." It turns out that mobilising the anti-EU vote is harder during EU elections. The question remains whether Wednesday’s results constitute a far-right victory. It is clear that the fear of a far-right avalanche has not materialised. While the PVV did gain seven seats, the extreme right FvD lost all four, meaning that the anti-EU right gained three seats overall. This may not be enough to justify the 'far-right surge' label that many media outlets have used. Before the week is over another seven seats will be distributed among the parties according to share. This means that some parties, like the FvD, whose leader Thierry Baudet has recently found success selling boxed meals on TikTok, may yet gain a seat. It could also mean very small differences may lead to significant changes in the final outcome come Sunday. According to calculations made by another Dutch poller, the difference between the Green-Left and PVV could increase to three seats if the latter receives just 0.15 percent less than exit polls suggest.
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Wester is a journalist from the Netherlands with a focus on the green economy. He joined EUobserver in September 2021. Previously he was editor-in-chief of Vice, Motherboard, a science-based website, and climate economy journalist for The Correspondent.
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The exit polls show that high voter turnout in the Dutch elections was crucial in determining the outcome, which turned out more favourable for the pro-EU camp than expected.
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[
"EU Elections"
] |
eu-elections
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2024-06-07T13:10:06.761Z
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https://euobserver.com/eu-elections/arb2769f3b
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2000-2024: A short history of Europe's far-right...so far
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The 4 February 2000 might as well be remembered as the day Europe had to fight again for its democratic values. And it failed. On that day, in Austria, the center-right ÖVP, a member of the European People’s Party (EPP), announced a coalition with the radical-right FPÖ. The reaction was broad and strong. In the streets of Vienna several demonstrations took place. The German government called it an “historic mistake” and the Portuguese presidency of the European Union said that “racist and xenophobic behaviors” were taking power in Austria. All EU states suspended their normal bilateral relations with Austria, reducing them to the minimum possible, while the European institutions showed unease with the fact that they had to treat Austria with equality while it had ministers who were the successors of Nazism. The president of Austria felt forced to have the new chancellor and its deputy sign a declaration that they vow to respect human rights, the principles of a pluralist democracy and the rule of law. Israel withdrew its ambassador from Vienna and announced unprecedented diplomatic sanctions, warning that in the birthplace of Hitler deniers of the Holocaust had taken power. By September 2000, all EU states had lifted their sanctions. The Austrian far-right won their fight for normalisation, and all European Union states recognized it as legitimate government. The government of alliance of the democratic and authoritarian right would last until 2007. Enter Silvio 'Bunga Bunga' Berlusconi This wasn’t the first time, as in 1994 Silvio Berlusconi had made a coalition with what is now Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia, then under Gianfranco Fini. And even earlier, in the first decade of the new West German government, the far-right parties German Party (BP) and All-German Bloc/League of Expellees and Deprived of Rights (GB/BHE) had ministers under Konrad Adenauer’s government. But while those examples were easily ignored as small partners in governments strongly led by the center-right, the Austrian example was a clear 50:50 partnership that was difficult to ignore. Yet, after the normalisation of the Austrian participation of the far-right in national government, it became acceptable all over Europe. Across the whole continent there are now more countries the centre-right has either brought the far-right into power or where it radicalized itself to become the far-right, than countries where the is still standing. One year after Austria, also Denmark normalized its far-right with a liberal-conservative government counting on the parliamentary support of the far-right Danish People's Party. And the year after was the time for a coalition of liberals, conservatives and the far-right in the Netherlands. Then Poland, Hungary, Greece, Latvia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Slovakia, Estonia, Slovenia, Croatia. We reach 2024 with most EU states having had the far-right involved in power than those that have not In each of these countries the center-right had to decide between the most basic democratic values, or the shortest way to power. And in each case they chose the shortest way to power. By accepting the far-right as a partner, they not only normalized those parties, and in many cases made them one of their strongest electoral opponents, but also normalised their policies. The differences between mainstream politics and the far-right stopped being a question of different systems but of quantitative differences within the same system. Under Manfred Weber and Ursula von der Leyen this strategic choice has been brought to the European level. The first part was to adopt many of the ideologic flags of the far-right. From migration to climate action, the EPP changed their own stance in order to copy the far-right . Then it made a clear division between what it considers and . Half of Europe’s radical-right parties are now normalized, with parties like Fratelli d’Italia in Italy, Fidesz in Hungary and the ODS in Czechia running their respective countries in coalition with the EPP, while the other half is either behind an imposed cordon sanitaire – like France’s Rassemblement National – or happily behind such a wall – like Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland. Finally the big problem is that not much will change after the European Elections. There will be no majority in the Council or the Parliament that passes through an alliance of the EPP and the parties to its right. What will happen is what always happened before, a grand coalition of EPP, Socialists and Liberals. With one difference: the playing field has been rigged. The policies and tactics of the far-right have been normalized, the EPP has moved to the right and with it brought all other parties. The next commission will have far-right commissioners from Italy, Hungary and the Netherlands and Von der Leyen will have no issues giving them relevant portfolios. The transformation of the nascent European democracy into an authoritarian project might have started in Austria in the year 2000, but 24 years later has never been stronger. Filipe Henriques is a Brussels-based political scientist & analyst focused on European politics.
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Filipe Henriques
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The 4 February 2000 might as well be remembered as the day Europe had to fight again for its democratic values. And it failed. The next commission will have far-right commissioners from Italy, Hungary and the Netherlands and Ursula von der Leyen will have no issues giving them relevant portfolios
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[
"EU Political",
"EU Elections"
] |
eu-political
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2024-06-07T11:49:48.529Z
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https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar7fa302bc
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Macron’s tactics against the far-right failed
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On Thursday evening (6 June), French president Emmanuel Macron organised an interview on French public television to address the threats to Europe. He talked about Ukraine and Russia, about Palestine and Israel – but most of all he pleaded with French voters not to vote for the far right in the upcoming election. Because that, he said, would be a dangerous choice. Far-right top candidate Jordan Bardella (National Rally) is reaching 33 percent of voting intentions in polls, while Macron’s governing coalition has fallen to 16 percent. The interviewers tried to get an answer to whether or not he would listen to the voters' “critique”. He called that political fiction. Then they asked him if it was really his role, as a president, to meddle in the European elections. “To address the Europeans at the moment we live, it is essential for the path for the life of our country and the path for our nation,” he said. As Macron crossed The Louvre’s courtyard in May 2017, the European hymn was blasted on the speakers. For the first time as president, he thanked them for their confidence. Well aware that not every one had voted for him – many not even as a second option – he particularly addressed the fact that National Rally's leader Marine Le Pen and the far right had obtained an historic electoral success. “I will do everything the coming five years so that there will no longer be any reason to vote for the extremes”, the fresh French president said back then. He pointed out that it would be a difficult task to achieve, but he believed that he would eventually reconcile the French. According to what the president said to French daily newspaper Le Figaro back in 2016, the rise of the far right was what once drove him into politics. The 2002 presidential elections saw the National Front (today’s National rally) founder Jean-Marie Le Pen reach the second round. That caused such an outrage and sense of indignation in Macron, he told Le Figaro, that it made him engage politically. Nevertheless, after his first full five-year mandate, Macron once again ran against the far-right candidate Le Pen . She had now advanced to be a stronger opponent. In addition, another, and even more radical far-right party – Reconquête – had emerged in France while the traditional right-wing party, The Republicans, in their turn, had adopted far more rightwing policies as well as officially endorsing “the Great Replacement” theory — an originally antisemitic conspiracy theory, based on the idea that ethnic Europeans were being demographically replaced by non-Western foreigners. The far right had not been curbed – it was rising. The first Macron-Le Pen battle was won by Macron with 66-34 percent, and the second with 60-40. Le Pen wasn't close to winning the second time either – but Macron was not nearly as triumphant the second time. Then, in the following parliamentary elections, his party lost its majority. Most of his voters had cast their ballots her rather than him. “En même temps” – At the same time Macron had done exactly as promised. He had created a pragmatic, European way forward that should have given “all Citizens something to be pleased about”, as he told Le Parisien. He had made gender equality his “main cause” and fostered a “Citizens Convention for the Climate”, giving 150 randomly selected citizens time and resources, together with experts and research, to reach a green path ahead for France – two decisions made to please the green left. At the same time, he had tried to give the French right-wing what they wanted – like a minister of the interior from the Republicans: hardliner Gérald Darmanin who made himself a name by banning allegedly extremist associations – covering everything from violent extreme right groups, and Islamic juridic rights associations, to climate activists. Darmanin stood in the front line when police violently put down anti-government protests led by the Yellow Vests movement, resulting in 82 seriously wounded protesters – 17 who lost an eye and four who lost a hand. However, neither the green left nor the feminists were content with what they “got” from the president. Gender equality as the great cause for both his terms was welcomed – but “there is no additional funding,” according to the feminist organisation . And more than half of the proposals from the Citizens Assembly for the Climate were dropped while the remaining were watered down. At the same time, Macron's power practice has sometimes bordered on authoritarianism. The controversial pensions reform was forced through parliament without a vote – a reform symbolically pushed through by the only female prime minister of Macron’s, and the second ever in France: the “woman from the left”, socialist Élisabeth Borne. She was France’s prime minister for 20 months before being replaced by the current “mini-Macron” Gabriel Attal . “It’s like they said, ok so now we’ve had a woman as prime minister for 20 months, that’s good, that’s done. Now let's go back to normal. The next will be a man,” Borne said months later. The tactic has sometimes leaned so much to the right that the French left believe his stance really is “right and far right – at the same time”. Like his bill to combat Islamic radicalism, initially pitched as a way to combat “separatism”, and eventually also the very controversial bill on migration, labelled by Le Pen as “a victory” – but too soft. Macron took pride in this ability to see beyond ideological apriorism and see all sides of the issues. He was neither left nor right – he was both. Or neither. Voters will judge on Sunday. Emma Sofia Dedorson is a Paris-based journalist covering politics, culture and society in France, Spain and Italy.
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Emma Sofia Dedorson
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French president Emmanuel Macron had two main goals for his presidency: to curb the rise of the far right, and to make Europe independent from the US and from China – with France as its leader. Now he is losing Europe to the far right.
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[
"EU Elections"
] |
eu-elections
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2024-06-06T21:47:45.732Z
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https://euobserver.com/eu-elections/ar00181ab3
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Pollwatch: Final EUobserver update before Sunday's big results night
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The European People's Party (EPP), Socialists & Democrats (S&D) and liberal Renew Europe are expected to maintain a majority (with 397 projected MEPs), even though all groups would see losses, according to our final pre-election polling collaborative project Pollwatch. With a so-called 'greenlash' led by farmers’ protests against Europe’s environmental agenda, the Greens are poised to suffer the biggest hit, losing 22 seats from their current 71 — but liberal Renew Europe is facing similar losses. Meanwhile, the nationalist-rightwing European Conservatives & Reformists (ECR) and unaffiliated MEPs rising sharply — the latter mostly driven by far-right Alternative for Germany’s (AfD) suspension from the extreme-right Identity and Democracy (ID). For weeks, there has been much speculation about the composition of the next political groups, with some suggesting the possibility of further fragmentation, potentially resulting in a total of nine groups instead of the current seven. Progressive forces are increasingly concerned that the German EPP EU Commission president candidate, Ursula von der Leyen, appears to be cosying up to Italian prime minister Georgia Meloni, especially considering that one of the largest groups within Meloni's ECR family is Poland’s Law & Justice (PiS) — a party known for dismantling the rule of law in the country over its past administration. But voting stability plays a crucial role in coalition building, and according to EU Matrix data, ECR holds the second-to-last position in this regard. It is only after the election results are somehow digested that political parties will begin behind-the-scenes negotiations to decide which political group to join — leading to potential shifts in the balance of power. The EPP, which was once home to Hungarian prime minster Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz, is expected to welcome some five MEPs from former Fidesz's official Péter Magyar's newcomer TISZA party. Meanwhile, far-right French leader Marine Le Pen, whose political party National Rally sits in ID, has invited Meloni to join forces and create a new, potentially larger, EU far-right group — an old dream of many, including Orbán, which never previously turned into reality given their differences and nationalistic focus. “Far-right leaders are making a lot of noise, but will they be a defining force in the European Parliament? No, the EU elections won't give the EU away to the far-right - but there's a risk for normalisation,” according to Alberto Alemanno, professor of EU Law at HEC Paris and College of Europe. In this context, it remains to be seen whether Orbán’s Fidesz party — which is projected to have some 12 MEPs — will end up in ECR or ID. Orbán has been a long-standing ally of the leader of Poland’s PiS, Mateusz Morawiecki, and both have expressed willingness to collaborate with Le Pen. On the left side, Germany’s new left-conservative party led by Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW), expected to secure seven seats, has announced plans to establish a new parliamentary group. This alliance could potentially include Slovakia’s Smer and Hlas, projected to secure four and two MEPs respectively. Both parties were suspended from S&D last year over their pro-Russian stance. Moreover, around 15 projected MEPs from Italy’s Five Star Movement (M5S) may align with the Greens, bolstering their influence. However, reports indicate that disagreements have emerged over military assistance to Ukraine, an issue the party opposes. Meanwhile, attention will also be on the Renew Europe vote next week when the group’s members will decide whether the Dutch liberal party VVD should be kicked out over its coalition government in the Netherlands. While European elections often see a low turnout, with the highest recorded at just 51 percent in 2019, this time they have received increased attention, especially due to the challenges the EU has faced in recent years, mainly the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. Unlike previous ballots, and mirroring national outcomes, the 2024 elections have the potential to shift the traditional power balance from progressive forces to those on the right — and either increase fragmentation or the consolidation of national conservatives and populist forces. Historically, the EPP and the S&D have held over 50 percent of the votes. However, they had to team up with the liberal Renew Europe to make a working coalition, often dubbed a "democratic coalition,” which had its own ups and downs. But on certain legislative proposals such as, for example, the controversial Nature Restoration Law, S&D and Renew joined forces with the Greens and The Left to pass legislation. But this vote also saw the alignment of EPP with national conservatives European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and far-right Identity and Democracy (ID), raising doubts about future green legislation. More detailed information about the projected number of MEPs per country compared to 2019 EU elections here:
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Elena is EUobserver's editor-in-chief. She is from Spain and has studied journalism and new media in Spanish and Belgian universities. Previously she worked on European affairs at VoteWatch Europe and the Spanish news agency EFE.
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With a so-called 'greenlash', led by farmers’ protests against Europe’s environmental agenda, the Greens are poised to suffer the biggest hit, losing 22 seats from their current 71 — but liberal Renew Europe is facing similar losses.
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[
"EU Elections"
] |
*
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2024-06-06T16:24:23.681Z
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https://euobserver.com/*/areaba2f2f
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Lamy: EU should work with African states to make carbon tax work
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“The purpose of CBAM [the carbon border adjustment mechanism] is not to make money but to make sure that others raise the price of carbon,” says Pascal Lamy. Both a former EU trade commissioner and a former director general of the World Trade Organisation, few are more qualified to assess the raft of new taxes and laws aimed at cutting carbon emissions via trade, than Lamy. Chief among them is the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), a tax on imports of a group of products including steel, cement, iron and aluminium, that has been widely welcomed in Brussels but has prompted a backlash from countries that face being hit by the new tax. "The EU needs to work with countries and offer them technical support,” Lamy tells EUobserver. Lamy points to Mozambique , one of the African countries set to be hardest hit by CBAM, and how the EU could mitigate the effects on its economy. “Mozambique exports a lot of aluminium, but its energy comes from the South African grid. The best case is to plug it into the grid in Mozambique, then the exports would become green. And the EU needs to invest to help Mozambique pay for this.” The African Climate Foundation has estimated that the levy, which became law last year, could result in a four-percent drop in Africa's exports to Europe, despite the fact that the continent only accounts for four percent of greenhouse gas emissions. South Africa is still threatening to challenge the CBAM at the World Trade Organisation, though EU trade commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis said last week that Brussels was in talks with a group of countries to assuage their concerns about the levy – under which payments will only start in 2026. “CBAM is what it is. It will be more problematic if African and other countries don’t increase their own carbon prices. The day when CBAM is extended to other goods, African exports will have a premium,” says Lamy. “I was against CBAM 10 or 20 years ago, but I’ve changed my mind,” he says. However, he plays down the notion that the EU has dictated the terms of CBAM – though he is more critical of the EU’s new anti-deforestation law - to its African partners, though he concedes that “this is a perception, and perceptions matter.” He is also confident that the levy is WTO compatible and does not discriminate against countries, “though I am quite convinced that there will be a dispute at some point.” “We are in a testing period. This process started four years ago and the fact that it is not in force with payments is ample evidence that there has been and is plenty of time.” He points out that some countries are already looking at ways to mitigate the effects of CBAM. India seems to be close to imposing an export tax on brown steel so that it will get the money and the EU will not. Something to offer In the meantime, Lamy argues that, when it comes to EU-African relations, Europe’s preoccupation with securing access to the critical raw materials needed to manufacture batteries for electric cars and propel the EU’s green transition, means that “the game is more balanced than it used to be.” “Those countries that have something to offer to the EU have a competitive advantage,” he adds. There is also growing momentum for international leaders to agree on a suite of new environmental levies to pay for the costs of climate change. Governments are close to agreeing the terms of reference for a new UN tax convention , while France, Kenya and Barbados are co-chairing their own tax task force with a mandate to look at green taxes. France wants the UN Convention to focus on green taxes, urging it to "work on a standard and global transactional carbon price", along with global levies on air transport, and a tax on heavy fuel used in international shipping transport. However, that has prompted concern that these new bodies will duplicate each other’s work and that they may only be able to reach agreement on taxes that are voluntary. “In the case of a shipping tax, it’s all fine if everyone does it....and I can see some reluctance from some countries,” says Lamy. “My own view is that most of what we need for the transition will have to come from pricing nature-based services...this is the big pot of money,” says Lamy, who co-chairs the Africa-Europe Strategy Group on Ocean Governance. “Issue number one is a regulatory framework and taxonomy, and the right place to oversee that is the G20,” he says. He welcomes the proposals by Barbadian prime minister Mia Mottley on reform of international finance, and French president Emmanuel Macron’s “but the main issue remains to finance the ecological transition...in giving a value to nature-based solutions.” Pointing to recent agreements with the likes of Barbados and the Galapagos Islands offering debt alleviation in exchange for protecting coral reefs, he says “this is the way to go. Nature’s contribution to decarbonisation should be priced.” “For the moment, there is nothing like a big, deep, liquid carbon market on this planet – and we need it.”
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Benjamin Fox is a seasoned reporter and editor, previously working for fellow Brussels publication Euractiv. His reporting has also been published in the Guardian, the East African, Euractiv, Private Eye and Africa Confidential, among others. He heads up the AU-EU section at EUobserver, based in Nairobi, Kenya.
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The EU needs to work with countries and offer them technical support to adapt to the bloc's new carbon border tax, says former EU trade commissioner and ex-WTO chief, Pascal Lamy.
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[
"EU & the World",
"Africa"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2024-06-06T15:31:22.402Z
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https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar6fb8a9e6
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Coming clean? EU cleaning industry exploitation exposed
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As morning dawned over Munich, German customs authorities embarked on a covert mission to investigate suspected illegal migrant labour at a local hotel. Asked what their purpose is, they answer they are aiming to uncover companies that exploit undocumented migrants as employees. “At night, in the darkness and especially in hotels this provides perfect conditions for deception,” one of the customs officers says. Upon arrival, his team finds irregularities in the Georgian and Turkmenian cleaners’ paperwork, including forged residence permits. The raid uncovered outsourcing of cleaning services to a company that originally recruited migrants from outside the EU, sending them as posted workers into the Union with the help of sub-companies, prompting legal action. Similar patterns have been detected in other cities where this hotel chain operates, with cleaners often working discreetly during guest off-hours. After searching apartments and conducting interviews, the German authorities withhold the passports and usually give cleaners 48 hours to leave the country, all while investigating further the illegal recruitment that brought these people here. This is not an isolated case in the EU these days. The EU’s undocumented cleaners Eurostat reports around 3.5 million documented cleaners in the EU, though their work often goes unnoticed. But additionally, there are undocumented cleaners, mainly non-EU migrants, whose contributions are significant but not captured in official statistics due to their status. Their stories and challenges remain hidden, underscoring the deep-seated complexities and disparities within the cleaning sector, which official data fails to fully capture. This investigation into the recruitment of non-EU migrant cleaners in Europe reveals the exploitation of individuals from Ukraine, Russia, Moldova, and Georgia in wealthier EU nations like Sweden and Germany. This scheme, where Poland is used as a gateway to EU countries and highlighted by the recent raid in Munich, involves subcontracted contracts, forged work permits, and false promises, enabling recruiters and employers to profit from non-EU migrants seeking jobs, through advertising on Facebook and Telegram groups, while prosecutors are often one step behind. This investigation also found a pattern of undocumented cleaners from outside of the EU receiving forged documents from recruiters to pose as EU citizens while working. Moldovans and Georgians pose as Bulgarian or Romanian, while people from Turkey will receive forged documents from Cyprus. Seeking employment in Europe People from all corners of the globe are drawn to opportunities in Europe, including the cleaning industry. In Belgium, cleaners often hail from as far away as the Philippines to Africa — particularly Congo. In Sweden, Thomas Ahlstrand, a retired prosecutor and delegate at the Council Of Europe Group of Experts on Actions against Trafficking (GRETA), observes that within the cleaning sector in Sweden, women predominantly from eastern Europe are common. In the UK, English-speaking Africans and individuals from the West Indies are prominent. In France, many cleaners come from French-speaking African countries, leveraging historical colonial ties and shared languages. “It’s easier for a person from Sierra Leone to find her way in Great Britain. And it’s easier for a person from Senegal to find her way in France”, Ahlstrand says. Wherever they come from, or end up, these people have one thing in common. They tend to be exploited by their employers. Swedish police coordinator Helena Lantz, who specialises in labour crimes, notes that these migrants are often assigned dangerous cleaning duties, while Swedish cleaning industry expert Gesa Markusson highlights a discriminatory pay scale, in which undocumented workers earn less than their Swedish counterparts. A pattern: long shifts and no breaks A Ukrainian, who for risk of repercussions will be named "Alexander" in this article, arrived in Gothenburg, Sweden, as a war refugee intending to stay with his daughter and her Swedish husband. However, feeling like a burden he sought work and ended up in the cleaning industry as an undocumented worker. At a Gothenburg-based cleaning company, Alexander experienced exploitation. He found himself in an unjust environment, where the company’s director manipulated his situation, taking advantage of his need for employment. Alexander was subjected to long working hours from early morning until late afternoon, including unpaid Sunday shifts. “The Swedes had lots of breaks, ' fika ' and tea breaks,” Alexander tells EUobserver. “We worked like slaves”. Moreover, the director changed Alexander’s contract abruptly, seemingly to replace him after a year of service, using a loophole in employment terms. He was even coerced into providing free transportation services without compensation, Alexander claims. Asked about such practice, the company stated it complied with legislation “as well as collective agreements with all employees”, but did not further comment when confronted with the specific allegations. Instead, a company representative alleged an aim of “damaging our company’s reputation” and even suggested former employees would be criminals, without giving further proof or details. Victim of exploitation In 2022, a scandal in Sweden revealed how Ukrainians and other non-EU migrants were being criminally exploited by the cleaning industry after being recruited by Polish agencies. In the 900-page internal Swedish police investigation containing witness testimonies, screenshots and invoices, a Russian woman, who in this article will be called "Sasha", testifies that she sought work abroad due to low wages in Russia which made it hard for her to support her child and disabled mother. Through friends and Facebook ads, she connected with a Polish recruiter in Lublin who offered her a job in Sweden. Despite signing a contract in Polish, which she couldn’t read, she was assured of its legality because they informed her that she had an “A1” document. On their website ZUS, the Polish Social Insurance Institution, explains that the A1 certificate enables an employee, contractor or business owner to be covered by the Polish social security system and send workers abroad to other EU countries. Regardless of the duration of work abroad, the employee needs to have an A1 or can be faced with legal issues during inspection abroad. For example, if the employer does not apply for A1 in Poland and travels to work in Germany, the employer should report this employee to the social security system in Germany instead. According to her testimonies in the police files, Sasha lived in a shared accommodation in Sweden under surveillance by her Swedish employer. “In the accommodation, there were cameras that recorded everything that we did, everything that happened, and everything that we talked about.” Within days, she began working, aiming to work between 180-200 hours monthly to earn enough. Her tasks included cleaning offices, homes, and gyms from early morning until late evening, earning seven euros per hour — with payment delayed until after two months, according to the contract. However, she did not receive the salary in total. After three weeks, the owner of the first company who had hired the subcontracting company alerted them to their illegal employment status. “We got threats from our Polish employer and the Swedish subcontractor, that if we went to the police we wouldn’t receive our salaries”. Sasha and 10 others sought help from the Swedish Migration Agency, leading to a court case involving suspected exploitation. The court later sentenced the company owner for breaking the Aliens Act , however, he not found guilty of charges of exploitation, and thus was merely required to pay fines. These job offers, like the one Sasha worked under, exploit the 'A1 construction' loophole, allowing non-EU migrants employed by Polish agencies to work in Sweden without local social security contributions, making them attractive hires for cost-conscious employers and exposing individuals to organised exploitation. A disadvantage to the cleaners coming from outside of the EU is that they lack an understanding of the official languages, and usually it’s only the recruiters that can communicate with them. This shared language makes the workers trust the recruiters even more, Helena Lantz confirms, making it easier for recruiters to exploit them. Investigating crossborder work It took nearly 30 years after its establishment in 1993 for the EU to establish its own institution to monitor mobile work, the European Labour Authority (ELA) which was founded in 2019. ELA’s mission is to detect cross-border violations of labour laws. “As a member state, it is not enough to inspect your own territory. You need to also cooperate with other member states to cross-check for violations of labour mobility rules with them,” ELA's executive director Cosmin Boiangiu tells EUobserver. That’s why ELA has initiated collaborations with police and customs authorities across the 27 EU member states and with Europol. In 2023, the institution conducted 76 joint inspections — a relatively new endeavour, as Boiangiu admits. “But that’s what we want: less talk, more action”. Boiangiu hopes for increased engagement from member states in reporting labour market issues. So far, ELA investigated precarious conditions in the road transportation and construction sector, as well as in agriculture and seasonal work. In the next year, the cleaning industry, among others, will specifically be investigated, director Boiangiu confirms. ELA already has received indications about precarious working conditions in further EU countries, such as Ireland. “We will continue to concentrate on sectors with the objective to limit the occurrence of abusive practices like undeclared work,” he says. At ELA, they understand the challenges associated with inspecting the European cleaning industry which in some countries is categorised as a high-risk sector for black market work. The complexity in control arises from the multitude of small businesses involved, with people constantly moving from one location to another, as usually seen in subcontracting. “We are aware that misuse of subcontracting is a big problem and that’s why the topic is high on our agenda,” Boiangiu emphasises. Ironically, it is EU institutions themselves which currently hold half a dozen cleaning contracts worth more than €211m using opaque chains of companies, outsourcing or subcontracting since 2020, including the European Parliament, Council and Commission. This is revealed by internal documents released under the EU’s Freedom of Information process for this research. An investigation by Germany's Zeit Online and the French investigative portal Mediapart shows that migrant cleaners in the European Parliament testify to facing exploitation and poor working conditions despite the EU's promises of fair work. Outsourcing to companies often leads to systemic abuses, with workers reporting harassment, overwork, and inadequate protection, particularly exacerbated during the Covid-19 pandemic. “If journalists try to interview you, refuse and give us the information,” supervisors wrote in messages to cleaners hired by one of the two companies which currently clean the EU Parliament in Brussels. Reform is on its way All EU countries require better monitoring of mobile work, the ELA states. “We have the rules in place; now, we need to do a better job of enforcing them,” the director asserts, recognising that ELA’s effectiveness also hinges on voluntary participation from EU members. So far, supranational law as expressed in the Posted Workers Directive is still bypassed. The question persists: Can ELA truly effect change? Cosmin Boiangiu explains, “One of the most vulnerable category of workers in Europe right now are third-country nationals. More and more European citizens know about their rights and therefore are more difficult to exploit.” Workers from former Soviet countries, for instance, know less about their rights, he confirms. But, for investigations into such third-nation workers, ELA’s current mandate is not applicable and all too limited. Critics and lawmakers in Brussels agree that there needs to be a stronger mandate: for this, there has already been a resolution in the European Parliament and it is now in the hands of the commission to take a reform further, a process which will at least last several months. “For now, we are doing the best with what we have,” the ELA director says. To monitor work conditions in the EU, the agency currently has an annual budget of €50m. To Boiangiu, the question of financing is central, but it does not stop there. “Every year we grow, and we will come to a point where we may need more human resources to effectively fulfil our mission.”
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At this point, the institution monitors 15 million mobile workers in the EU – with limited capacity, director Boiangiu has to admit. “The ELA has 144 employees,” he points out.
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The cleaning industry across Europe is increasingly under scrutiny for its treatment of employees and disregard for the European standard of fair labour laws. A six-month-long investigation into the European cleaning industry shed light on a complex network across Europe and exploitative business practices.
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[
"Health & Society"
] |
health-and-society
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2024-06-06T15:10:45.181Z
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https://euobserver.com/health-and-society/arfbfcd875
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ECB lowers interest rates for the first time in five years
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The European Central Bank (ECB) reduced its key interest rate 25 basis points to 3.75 percent on Thursday (6 June). The sharp decline in inflation since last year allowed for a loosening of monetary policy. The big question now is how much more the bank will lower borrowing costs this year. Italian central banker Piero Cippolone earlier this year called for rates to be “dialled back swiftly.” But wages have grown faster than expected on average. And most economists expect two more rate cuts at the September and December ECB governing council meetings. The bank remained cautious on Thursday and said it would take a “data-dependent and meeting-by-meeting approach” to future easing and was not “pre-committing” to more rate cuts. “Despite the progress over recent quarters, domestic price pressures remain strong as wage growth is elevated, and inflation is likely to stay above target well into next year,” the ECB said. “Wages are not an easy matter” to predict,” ECB president Christine Lagarde told the press. Taking Germany, where wage growth has been strong, as an example, she said civil servants had been compensated for the first time since 2024, explaining why public wages had jumped 12 percent. “This will not be the same in 2025,” she said, explaining why the ECB had decided to lower interest rates. “We are seeing those wage increases on a declining path.” According to the latest forecast, eurozone inflation will level out at 2.5 percent this year, 2.2 percent in 2025, and 1.9 percent the year after. This means that in the medium term, average inflation will dip below target. The EU’s statistics bureau Eurostat data for May show that inflation in some countries is already far below target, including in Italy (0.8 percent), Lithuania (0.8 percent), Finland (0.5 percent) and Latvia (0.2 percent). Prolonged periods of low inflation or deflation in combination with low growth and high interest rates can be risky and can cause debt to GDP-ratio to increase. It was “now appropriate to moderate the degree of monetary policy restriction” in response to inflation’s decline, the bank added. The ECB said high lending costs had “made a major contribution to bringing inflation back down” without offering more details of the effects that monetary policy has had on inflation. The Bank of Canada reduced its benchmark rate on Wednesday and said more moves might come — becoming the first Group of Seven central bank to do so. In Europe, Sweden’s Riksbank and the Swiss National Bank had already lowered interest rates. Japan conversely raised its interest rate for the first time in seventeen years in March to 0.1 percent, up from minus 0.1 percent. Despite widely differing rate policies however, inflation trajectories have been “the same across the globe,” Gianluca Benigno, a macroeconomist and professor at the University of Lausanne, recently remarked on social media. The United States Federal Reserve is increasingly expected to reduce interest rates for the first time in September.
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Wester is a journalist from the Netherlands with a focus on the green economy. He joined EUobserver in September 2021. Previously he was editor-in-chief of Vice, Motherboard, a science-based website, and climate economy journalist for The Correspondent.
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The European Central Bank loosened its monetary policy and lowered borrowing costs by 0.25 percent.
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[
"Green Economy"
] |
green-economy
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2024-06-06T14:37:24.524Z
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https://euobserver.com/green-economy/ar7a695f3b
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Disinformation often worst three days ahead of EU elections, says official
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EU officials are raising the alarm at the increasing sophistication of disinformation campaigns — as tens of millions of European citizens head to the voting booths over the next few days. With some 360 million people eligible to vote in the European Union, including 26 million first time voters, the issue has taken on a renewed sense of urgency. "The most problematic moment is actually starting nowadays, the three days, the 72 hours before the elections happen," an EU official told reporters on Wednesday (5 June) in Brussels. The official warned methods are becoming more sophisticated, spanning techniques that seek to amplify false and misleading statements. Among those cited is Doppelganger, a Russia-based influence operation network operating in Europe since at least May 2022. The campaign spoofed domain names and created content falsely attributed to reputable news websites. Vera Jourova, the EU commissioner for values and transparency, has made similar recent comments . She said deep fakes have been used in elections last year, noting that disinformation is also being amplified by artificial intelligence, fake accounts, and fake likes. Germany, France, Poland are also faced with barrage of Russian scripted disinformation tailored to each country, she said. And fact-checkers are also being targeted. Operation Overlord, first detected by a Finnish software company, sent massive amounts of false information to some 800 fact-checkers in 75 countries. EU officials say other campaigns aim to undermine people's trust in the voting process, spread false voting instructions, seek to polarise debates and discredit the media. One conspiracy in Italy suggests that a low voter turnout will trigger an "EU exit" referendum. Posted on Facebook, the false claim then invited people not to vote. A similar false story surfaced in Germany and Spain claiming EU ballots are invalid because of holes and cut corners. Another posted in Germany on TikTok and X falsely claimed that multiple voting and marks on the ballots are allowed. The issue is particularly sensitive in Germany because the country will send 96 MEPs to the legislature, the most of any EU member state. Other falsehoods are being pushed by politicians, including the Hungarian government , which is set to take over the EU's six month rotating presidency. Last week, it made the bogus claim that the EU was seeking to introduce mandatory military conscription following comments in a debate in Germany by Manfred Weber, the leader of the European People's Party. “Manfred Weber has never supported EU-wide compulsory military service. Consequently, he has never brought up the idea, either publicly or at internal forums," said Weber's spokesperson told Hungarian media. And Weber, in an interview with Der Spiegel this week , described it as fake news. The EU's digital services (DSA) act requires platforms like Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, TikTok, and X to combat false and misleading information. The European Commission, for its part, has since launched infringement cases against X and Meta on potential DSA violations related to election integrity.
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Nikolaj joined EUobserver in 2012 and covers home affairs. He is originally from Denmark, but spent much of his life in France and in Belgium. He was awarded the King Baudouin Foundation grant for investigative journalism in 2010.
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EU officials are raising the alarm at the increasing sophistication of disinformation campaigns — as tens of millions of European citizens head to the voting booths over the next few days.
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[
"EU Elections"
] |
eu-elections
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2024-06-06T14:20:47.159Z
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https://euobserver.com/eu-elections/arf6d875e2
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EU silent on Israel's killing of journalism out of Gaza
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As military censorship and the targeted killing of media workers have cast a pall across Gaza, the silence of the EU’s vice-president for values and transparency Věra Jourová has become deafening. Jourová is tasked with preserving press freedom and pluralism and she has repeatedly spoken out against threats to these in Ukraine , Georgia and Russia . She has posted about the “pure evil of the Kremlin which kills civilians, destroys cities and tries to kill information too.” But where Gaza is concerned her defence of diversity has been muted, although she has pushed for censorship of pro-Hamas content on Facebook, and tweeted that “Democracies work together to address the pressing issues of our time. We stand with Israel and Ukraine.” Jourová’s stance ignores the fact that “democracies” do not generally shut down news outlets – such as Al Jazeera – which are critical of them, or video feeds from news agencies like Associated Press , which they use. They do not impose military censorship regimes that on average spike two stories per day and suppress information once an hour, forcing newspapers like Haaretz to run redacted copy . Nor do they ban journalists from entering areas in which their soldiers have been accused of committing acts of genocide. Democracies do not target journalists trying to bear witness to war crimes, killing more than 100 members of a pre-war Gaza press corps that numbered around 1,000 . As Reporters Without Borders put it : “Israel is eradicating journalism in Gaza.” So why is Jourova speechless? We don’t know for sure but perhaps the EU is simply used to this state of affairs. After all, no one was ever held accountable for the 20 media workers who the Committee to Protect Journalists says were killed by Israeli military fire between 2001 and 7 October, 2023. Maybe it’s also because, unlike with Russian propaganda, Israeli disinformation – such as fabricated phone calls , videos and Hamas HQs under hospitals – ceases to be “fake news” when it is credulously reported by major western news outlets, and then memory holed. Could it be that the spread of censorship to these outlets - CNN , the New York Times , CBC and the BBC – has helped normalise an information war aimed less at Hamas than the civil society forces in Israel and abroad which could help bring the conflict to an end? Of course, US backing for Israel complicates an independent EU stance. So does the blanket support for the carnage in Israel. But here, it is Israel’s domestic blackout of bad news from Gaza that has forged the war consensus . Israeli reporters – who must submit Gaza stories to a censor before publication – say that their audience is simply unaware of Palestinian suffering Speaking after a webinar organised by the Media Diversity Institute and the International Centre for Journalists in May, Oren Persico, a writer for the investigative Israeli magazine The Seventh Eye , said: “The fact that Israeli media does not show dead or wounded Gazans causes a growing gap between the Israeli perception of reality and the international one, and as a result there is often anger at international officials who criticize Israel's conduct.” Israel's military censors spiked a record 613 stories last year according to a recent survey by +972 magazine. Another MDI webinar speaker, +972’s editor Ghousoon Bisharat said: “Israeli law requires journalists to submit any article dealing with security issues to the Military Censor for review prior to publication; the definition of ‘security issues’ is very broad, detailed across six dense pages. The decision of what to send to the Censor is made daily in the media at the discretion of editors. No other country that defines itself as a ‘Western democracy’ operates a similar institution.” Raed Othman, the director of the Palestinian news agency Ma’an News Agency said that the news stories which emerged from this process “incite the Israeli public to hatred, which is reflected in their attacks on journalists.” He pointed to Israel’s bombing of 86 press offices in Gaza – including Ma’an’s – and the closure or destruction of 24 radio stations as evidence for the targeting of media workers, many of whom have been killed in their homes and cars. He said that of Ma’an’s four journalists in the Gaza Strip before the war, one was now missing, one was living in a camp after her apartment was destroyed, a third was only able to make intermittent contact, while Ma’an’s bureau chief had lost 28 members of his family and was now focused on trying to get his children out of Gaza. Raed’s own safety in the West Bank was “a topic of constant concern,” he said, owing to the dangers of murder, arrest, imprisonment, or defamation. Some 44 Palestinian journalists arrested since 7 October are still in Israeli jails under administrative detention laws that deny them access to lawyers, Bisharat said. Jourova should recognise the implications of all this. As she herself said in 2018: “If journalists risk their lives when doing their jobs, it is an alarm signal… Independent media play a crucial supervisory role in any democracy. Journalists are a key partner for justice and for upholding the rule of law.” This is true, so true in fact that it should now be incumbent on all EU leaders - including Jourova - to explain how their silence in the face of this clarion alarm signal ringing out from Gaza differs from complicity. Milica Pesic is executive director of the Media Diversity Institute . Milica Pesic is executive director of the
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Media Diversity Institute
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As military censorship and the targeted killing of media workers have cast a pall across Gaza, the silence of the EU’s vice-president for values and transparency Věra Jourová has become deafening.
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[
"EU & the World",
"Health & Society"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2024-06-06T10:22:47.016Z
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https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar2ae1cf23
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The EU's 'Bellwether state'? Dutch exit polls will give first glimpse into voting
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The Netherlands will be the first EU member state to vote in the European election on Thursday (6 June), with most other countries heading to the ballot on Sunday. The Dutch exit polls, appearing at 9pm, could thus drive speculation about the EU-wide results, in particular about the performance of the far-right. As in 2019, the Dutch head to the ballot boxes early, due to a long-standing tradition of voting on Wednesdays — plus strong opposition to Sunday votes among a small but influential group of ultra-orthodox protestants in the Netherlands. Though not exactly a US-style “Bellwether state” (where political analysts use early results from specific states to predict the overall winner of the presidential election), the Dutch exit polls might provide some early insights into the European Parliament's future composition. Five years ago, the Dutch results were somewhat indicative of later developments. Social democrats came out on top, bolstering then lead-candidate Frans Timmermans’ ultimately failed bid for the commission presidency. Still, Timmermans ended up playing a leading role as the commissioner in charge of the Green Deal. This time around, however, Dutch politics has been gripped by the rise of far-right forces, with Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV), projected to rocket from one to nine MEPs, while a combined list of the Greens and social democrats (GL-PvdA) coming second with eight, according to the latest polls. A Wilders’ victory could embolden allies from the Identity and Democracy group (ID) like National Rally (RN) in France, and Flemish Interest (VB) in Flanders, who will seize on a positive result to fire-up voters in their countries still to go to the polls. Moreover, the Dutch results could prove interesting for European liberals as well. Liberal party group Renew Europe could have as many as three separate member parties in the Netherlands, with the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) currently polling at five seats, and Democrats ‘66 (D66) polling at two, and potentially the pan-European Volt, who also could end up joining the European Greens instead. A strong performance of the more conservative-liberal VVD, outgoing prime minister Mark Rutte’s party, could improve the party’s position within Renew. Divisions among the liberals emerged when the VVD joined the far-right PVV in forming a government in May, with French Renew leader Valérie Hayer calling for the VVD’s expulsion. For the centre-right Christian democrat European People’s Party (EPP), the Dutch vote also implies further fragmentation. The newly emerged New Social Contract (NSC) and Farmer Citizen Movement (BBB), both partner in the far-right coalition in The Hague, want to apply for EPP membership, drawing objections of the CDA, the traditional Dutch Christian democrat force. Domestic concerns Notwithstanding such pan-European trends, in the end the Dutch campaign has been strongly marked by domestic politics, in particular by the newly formed far-right government coalition. Both the PVV and GL-PvdA have tried to cast the election as a two horse-race between their national leaders. Wilders’ has sought to turn the election into a vote of approval of ‘his’ new government, posting on x.com that Timmermans, who now leads GL-PvdA in the Dutch parliament, must “not become the biggest”. Greens and socialists are hoping for a moral victory as well, after Timmermans failed to become prime minister after the national elections in November , and have urged voters to prevent a PVV election win. But with the national coalition talks dominating Dutch politics in the past months, voter turnout could prove disappointing, according to political scientist Simon Otjes, particularly without a recognisable senior political figurehead like Timmermans. “Few people are now concerned with the European elections,” Otjes told the EUobserver, adding that this was evident from polling. In EU election projections, the Green-socialists are nearly tied with the far-right PVV for the EU elections, whereas in national election surveys, the PVV is far ahead. Consequently, low turnout could even benefit progressives, he argued, with PVV voters less interested in European politics. However, according to Otjes, most interesting was the ever-increasing fragmentation of Dutch politics, with up to six different parties hovering around the three percent voting threshold. “The Netherlands is turning into the seven dwarfs,” he observed, adding that this could benefit the largest parties significantly. “If smaller parties fail to reach the threshold, all those remainder seats will end up with GL-PvdA and the PVV.” Piet Ruig is a Brussels-based journalist who previously worked for the Dutch public broadcaster VPRO.
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Piet Ruig
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With exit polls coming out on Thursday night, the Dutch EU election 'results' arrive well before the rest of Europe has voted. The Netherlands is by no means a true 'bellwether state' — but the exit polls might still give some indication of how Europeans are voting generally.
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[
"EU Elections"
] |
eu-elections
|
2024-06-05T16:51:47.937Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-elections/ar0565fc7e
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Has the ECB's rate policy been a success?
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The European Central Bank (ECB) is expected to start lowering interest rates by 0.25 percent on Thursday (6 June). This will reduce the main interest rate from a multi-decade high of four percent down to 3.75 percent, reducing the lending costs for households and businesses, which could result in a slight uptick in economic activity. This brings to an end one of the steepest and most impactful series of rate hikes in post-war European history, which makes it an interesting moment to look back, at how it has impacted the economy as a whole and wage earners specifically and at some of the arguments that have emerged from it. For the time being, lending rates will still remain high. And few expect rates to fall to the sub-zero levels of the pre-pandemic era anytime soon. With overall prices now only 2.6 percent higher in May compared to last year, the bank is fast approaching its two-percent inflation target. So, one of the hotly-debated questions amongst economists now is how far and by how much interest rates will fall from here. Disagreement It's necessary to briefly look at some of the arguments which vary wildly. Some ECB hawks, such as Austria’s Robert Holzmann, fear inflation could pick up again, as inflation actually increased a little last month compared to April’s 2.4 percent. This is mainly driven by services like hospitality – not energy or goods – partly related to an uptick in wages in Europe in the first quarter of 2024. Therefore, this week, he said he would only agree to one rate decrease. Other rate-watchers however, like Robin Brooks, a senior analyst at the Brookings Institute, a Washington-based institute, have consistently warned that the eurozone is headed for deflation. He believes the ECB should “never have increased borrowing costs in the first place” because there “never was demand-led inflation” in Europe. To most, this may seem like a dry debate about interest rates at first glance. But it is a fundamental critique of the ECB’s rate policies, and it prompts the question: who should bear the cost of inflation in the first place? Supply-shock This is a difficult debate to make sense of — because many of the arguments used by those critical of the ECB are often also used by the bank's own senior management. As ECB president Christine Lagarde has admitted on many occasions herself, raising interest rates won’t change energy prices. This is because supply issues in the energy and food sectors caused prices to rise. Record corporate profits then kept prices high after the initial shock. Yet all of these price-drivers are not affected by higher interest rates, which is a tool aimed at lowering consumption and demand from businesses and households. Therefore, many like Brooks raised the question: Why increase rates in the first place? The ECB's reasoning evolved somewhat, but in 2023, it solidified around the idea what had started as a supply shock in the energy and food sectors somehow morphed into a mixture of supply and excess demand . But this argument was questioned from the very beginning. Erik Fossing Nielsen, chief economist at Unicredit, found it “extremely unlikely” demand had anything to do with it and noted in one of his weekly monetary wrap-ups that personal consumption in the eurozone was a “stunning” 0.8 percent below 2019 levels in real terms. Some conservative lobby outfits continue to blame inflation on the monetary stimulus during the Covid-19 pandemic. But especially in Europe there is no proof monetary support has resulted in "too much money is chasing too few goods" as the neoliberal economist Milton Friedman once described it. Financial historian Adam Tooze — who described the ECB’s rate policies as a “blunt force, high-risk policy” in one of his Chartbook newsletters last year — shared a graph that drove home the vast difference between US household spending, which has steadily increased, and German consumption, which has stagnated since 2017 and shows no signs of recovery . Indeed, it has now become abundantly clear from the ECB’s own data that wages — a core mover of demand — have done little to push up prices, suggesting that inflation in the eurozone was supply-driven rather than demand-driven. Since interest rates address domestic demand, not supply, the decision by the bank's governing council to commit to the steepest increase in lending rates in its history regardless, remains a point of heavy contention to this day. But more on that later. Let's first look at some of the consequences The first thing to say is that some of the worst fears raised by critics of the ECB’s rate policies have not come to pass. Unemployment has not increased, as many expected. According to commission figures, eurozone unemployment is lower today (6.4 percent) than it was in 2019 ( 7.5 percent ). However, that is not to say the ECB’s rate impact has been mild. Although there are signs of recovery, prioritising classic wage-restraint policies by raising interest rates has done little to prevent the steepest drop in wage share in recent history (wage share is the portion of GDP allocated to workers). From fear of uncontrolled wage increases in response to higher prices, the ECB erred on the side of caution, tightening the money supply to prevent wages from rising. However, it largely failed to even mention the core driver of inflation until after the fact. Lagarde later admitted that two-thirds of inflation was related to profits (the usual share is one-third). Another consequence of the ECB’s policy, not eagerly discussed by the bank’s management, is that high rates have enabled record rates-profits on EU commercial bank deposits, whose boards gave shareholders a record pay-out of €120bn in 2023 alone. Already last year, some MEPs on the green-left side of the political aisle criticised Lagarde — who was hard-pressed to explain how such excess fitted into the ECB’s overarching narrative of belt-tightening. Many have noted that demand for loans cratered in 2023. This has hampered business investments in machinery and people which are needed to remain competitive. Dutch central banker Klaas Knot made clear in a recent interview that this decline in lending “was a feature not a bug” of monetary policy. But when historic bank profits are also a ‘feature, not a bug’ of ECB policy, one starts to wonder if current rate policies are still fit for purpose. Rasmus Andresen, a German Green MEP in the EU Parliament’s monetary affairs committee and the rapporteur for the parliament’s annual report on the ECB in 2022, has described the ECB’s policies as “very damaging” for German industry. Furthermore, ECB critics have pointed out that high borrowing costs have also undermined investments in renewables. This is because wind and solar projects are almost exclusively loan-funded (as opposed to gas and oil projects, which are more often paid upfront). This has had dire effects on some of the biggest players in the renewables sector. Central bankers rarely speak of this widely-acknowledged fact. This is not to say the problem isn’t on their radar. Speaking at an economics festival in Trento in May, Piero Cippolone, the Italian central bank chief, described the massively-increased cost of the green transition as a “tragedy on the horizon” – Europe’s next great problem to solve. In March, Cipollone called for rates to be “dialled back swiftly.” But in terms of policy solutions, central bankers have so far seen fit to shift responsibility to governments, which remain largely silent on the effects of interest rates on renewables. "As I speak, the private sector benefits from the same interest rates whether it finances renewables, gas or coal. This is totally absurd," French president Emmanuel Macron said about the impasse in December. But he has been the exception. Most in the higher echelons of government policy — protective of central bank independence as they are — have been reluctant to critique ECB rate policies, leading to a policy vacuum at the heart of European economic policymaking that has done little to spur public debate on the issue. This is remarkable. It is a harsh fact that the EU is now largely back on the same low-growth trajectory it started four years ago. Not all of this is a consequence of interest rates. But it is no wonder experienced rate-watchers like Brooks question whether lowering economic activity is the right tool in such an environment. Since its beginning, monetary strategy has been sold to the public as a difficult trade-off between curbing surging prices and economic growth. While inflation is indeed now lower, the ECB has offered little evidence of effectiveness. Have they been effective? Returning to Thursday's rate discussion, the question of their general effectiveness remains open. According to a benchmark model cited by ECB economists, the impact of a one-percent rate hike on inflation after one year ranges from a low 0.1 percentage point to as much as 0.8 percentage points. Despite widely differing rate policies, inflation trajectories have been “the same across the globe,” Gianluca Benigno, a macroeconomist and professor at the University of Lausanne, recently remarked on social media. As Tooze noted in his substack newsletter , uncertainty over the effects of rates on inflation becomes an argument to “double down” on it. This may seem illogical but it is firmly rooted in the ECB’s stated policy that signalling a strong rate response to inflation thus “anchors” inflation expectations in society—simply said: if workers and businesses know the central bank has taken strong action, they expect inflation to come down, adjusting wages along with it. As the ECB’s own explainer notes, “it’s easily understood.” This may be true. There is just one problem: people don't seem to really base their expectations on central bank actions. The latest example of this came out of a survey conducted in May by the Social Economics Lab, a research initiative connected to Harvard University. The results coming out of the questionnaire showed that over half of the respondents believe that inflation will increase following an increase in interest rate — the exact opposite of what central banks are aiming to achieve. Maybe listen to the people more? The surveyed group consisted of US citizens, so the results may be different in Europe. However, it is interesting to note what people think are effective ways to curb inflation when asked in simple terms. All central banks, whether the United States Federal Reserve or the ECB, have sold their rate policies to the public as a difficult trade-off between two evils: high inflation and lower economic growth. But when asked simply, in non-abstract language, very few people surveyed by the Social Economics Lab think it is necessary for central banks to dampen demand or increase unemployment to reduce inflation. Conversely, there is a lot of support for policies to help low-income households cope with inflation, such as cash transfers, food stamps or income support (as happened in most EU countries during the Covid pandemic and the early days of the energy crisis). There also is a lot of support for measures that target corporate profits directly and for measures to freeze the prices of essentials. Another poll by the US-based think-tank Data for Progress showed similar results: 69 percent of voters believe the government should do more to regulate grocery stores that raise prices to maximise profits. Whatever the right mix is, it is doubtful that protecting people against future price shocks — which ECB central bankers assume will become more frequent, as a consequence of, among other things, climate change — should predominantly or exclusively “demand-driven” (through wage restraint and higher unemployment), as Dutch central banker Knot believes . If people had more of a say, it would probably consist of a wider range of measures and tools that seek to limit the impact of inflation prices on workers rather than magnify it. And maybe those people would have a point.
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Wester is a journalist from the Netherlands with a focus on the green economy. He joined EUobserver in September 2021. Previously he was editor-in-chief of Vice, Motherboard, a science-based website, and climate economy journalist for The Correspondent.
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Now that the European Central Bank is expected to lower interest rates, it's interesting to examine some of the impacts of its policies and potentially glean some lessons learned.
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[
"Green Economy"
] |
green-economy
|
2024-06-05T16:51:35.469Z
|
https://euobserver.com/green-economy/arcf4d71f7
|
'Political homophobia' strikes back in Georgia
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As EU cities prepare to show their love of diversity in summer festivals, “political homophobia" is making a comeback in Georgia and closer to home. The 2024 Gay Pride season has already begun in Vienna, with festivals also due in freewheeling Amsterdam, Paris, and Rome in the next three months, as well as in more conservative EU capitals, such as Athens, Budapest, and Warsaw. Protection of LGBTIQ+ rights has historically fanned out east with EU enlargement, because Europe’s 1993 Copenhagen criteria for eligibility and its 2010 Lisbon Treaty forbid discrimination against minorities. But there won’t be a Gay Pride in EU-candidate country Georgia this summer, where activists fear for their safety amid a homophobic backlash by an anti-Western ruler. And behind the rainbow flags inside the EU, LGBTIQ+ activists also worry that European Parliament elections could see far-right MEPs set back their movement. Mariam Kvaratskhelia, who co-organised Tbilisi Pride in 2023, said nowhere was safe after police let a far-right mob storm their event last year. “It was a closed festival on private property out of town and even here we were attacked and people had to be evacuated,” she told EUobserver from Tbilisi on Wednesday (5 June). “This year, for the first time, they [unknown agents] have come to my apartment building, where I live, and plastered photos and graffiti of me on several floors, saying I was a lesbian and a foreign agent,” she added. The ruling Georgian Dream party of billionaire financier Bidzina Ivanishvili used to speak highly of LGBTIQ+ values and applied for EU membership in March 2022. But it marked a break with the West on 3 June, when it signed into law a Russian-style purge on “ foreign agents ”, despite EU warnings this could halt its progress. And it has now promised an anti-LGBTIQ+ purge that would disalign it still further from EU norms, in what Kvaratskhelia called “a new level” of “geopolitical" and "political homophobia”. “Yesterday, they announced they’d amend some 18 laws, banning any kind of medical intervention to change sex, like hormone therapy, banning any LGBTQI content in education, on TV, in the arts, removing our right to free assembly. If the changes go through, any kind of public coming out could be criminalised as ‘pro-LGBTQI propaganda’. They’re trying to erase us from normal life,” she said. “This isn’t just worse than Hungary. Sex-changes aren’t forbidden even in China and Iran,” Kvaratskhelia said. The full purge was unlikely to go ahead before Georgian elections in October due to legal technicalities, she added. But the climate was already so toxic that “thousands” of Georgians have fled to the EU, Kvaratskhelia said. “I’m getting messages every day from people asking me to write supporting letters for asylum applications because of what’s going on here,” she said. For Chaber, the head of Ilga-Europe, a pro-LGBTQI+ advocacy group in Brussels, it was time for the EU to "clearly communicate that advancing such regressive laws endangers Georgia's candidate status and contradicts the union's fundamental values". For the EU foreign service: "Since the draft legislation is not publicly available yet, we are not able to comment on its substance". “As an EU candidate country, Georgia is expected to align its laws with EU legislation. This process also includes the Copenhagen criteria, which specifically require adherence to principles of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights”, its spokesman added. But for EU officials, who have monitored Russian propaganda , it came as no surprise Ivanishvili was now weaponising sexuality in his pro-Russia swerve. “Anti-LGBTIQ narratives are standard and recurrent features in disinformation activities against the EU ... This is often connected to narratives about the decadent or decaying West,” the EU foreign service spokesman said. And despite its principles, EU diplomacy is wary of playing into its enemies’ hands by reacting with sanctions or with strident pro-LGBTIQ+ rhetoric. “The foreign agents law and now the anti-LGBTI law are designed to be red rags to EU media and intellectual elites,” an EU diplomat said. "Let's not try to fight Moscow by promoting sexual minorities in this region [the South Caucasus] right now, there will be a better time for this later down the line," the diplomat added. Meanwhile, as EU voters began to elect new MEPs on Thursday, Ilga-Europe’s Chaber warned that Georgia was just part of a wider culture war. Putin's straight Europe Russian president Vladimir Putin has presented himself as a defender of white and straight Europe in his propaganda. And “it’s challenging to definitively state whether Putin's vision is winning or losing,” Chaber said. There had been “substantial progress” on LGBTIQ+ rights in the EU in the past five years and surveys indicated “a significant portion of the population supports diversity and inclusion”, the Ilga-Europe chief said. Anti-foreign agents law protests in Tbilisi had shown further cause for optimism, Chaber added. But with rightwing populists polling to make gains in several EU countries in the June elections, Chaber also said “a far-right leaning European Parliament would pose significant challenges for advancing and protecting LGBTI rights” in future. And “we observe a worrying trend of governments and politicians increasingly using hate speech”, Chaber added. "This weaponisation of LGBTI rights for political gain contributes to social division and rising hate and violence," the human-rights activist said. “The upcoming elections will be a crucial battleground for these [EU] values,” Chaber said.
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Andrew Rettman is EUobserver's foreign editor, writing about foreign and security issues since 2005. He is Polish, but grew up in the UK, and lives in Brussels. He has also written for The Guardian, The Times of London, and Intelligence Online.
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As EU cities prepare to show their love of diversity in summer festivals, “political homophobia" is making a comeback in Georgia and closer to home.
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[
"EU & the World",
"EU Elections"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2024-06-05T16:51:15.525Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/arb7e312e7
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EU cashes in on €130m in rejected visa applications
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EU governments rake in €130m per year in rejected visa application fees, dubbed as 'reverse remittances', according to new analysis shared with EUobserver. The cost of Schengen visa rejections in 2023 was €130m, up from €105m in 2022, the data compiled by Marta Foresti and Otho Mantegazza at LAGO Collective finds. The total sum is likely to increase in 2024 since the visa application fee to travel to the EU will increase from €80 to €90 for adults on 11 June, following a recent decision by the EU Commission. The UK, meanwhile, raised £44m (€50m) in rejected fees. The fees are non-refundable, regardless of the outcome. The figures do not account for the costs incurred by not being able to travel for business and leisure, or bills for legal advice and private agencies involved in processing visa applications. African and Asian countries bear 90 percent of the costs for rejected Schengen visas. The data also shows that rejection rates of short-term visitor visas to Europe and the UK are higher for low and middle-income countries. African countries, in particular, are disproportionately affected, with rejection rates as high as 40-50 percent for Ghana, Senegal and Nigeria. The largest number of visa applications to the EU come from Morocco and Algeria, according to the data. “Visa inequality has very tangible consequences and the world’s poorest pay the price,” Marta Foresti, founder of LAGO Collective and senior visiting fellow at the ODI thinktank, told EUobserver. “You can think of the costs of rejected visas as ‘reverse remittances’, money flowing from poor to rich countries. We never hear about these costs when discussing aid or migration, it is time to change that,” she added. For its part, the EU estimates that about half of all irregular migrants within the bloc’s 27 member states result from visa overstays. Last year, over 83,000 people were returned to countries outside the EU, a return rate of 19 percent, according to the EU Commission. Over the past year, the EU has begun to use visa restrictions as a political tool, using Article 25a of its 2019 visa code — a provision which allows it to apply visa restrictions for countries with low rates of migrant returns. In April, the EU Council agreed to impose visa sanctions on Ethiopia, including a ban on obtaining visas for multiple entries into EU countries, while diplomatic and service passport holders will no longer be exempt from visa fees. EU ministers also extended the processing time for visas from 15 days to 45 days, citing Ethiopia's lack of co-operation in the return of its nationals staying illegally in EU countries. Also in April, EU ministers lifted visa restrictions on Gambia, that had been imposed in 2021, after its migrant return rate increased from 14 percent in 2022, to 37 percent in 2023. Although the EU has promised to include legal pathways, student and work exchange programmes, and other mechanisms in its trade deals with African states, the focus of a series of recent economic support agreements with Tunisia, Mauritania and Egypt, worth over €8bn has been paying these governments to tighten migration control.
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Benjamin Fox is a seasoned reporter and editor, previously working for fellow Brussels publication Euractiv. His reporting has also been published in the Guardian, the East African, Euractiv, Private Eye and Africa Confidential, among others. He heads up the AU-EU section at EUobserver, based in Nairobi, Kenya.
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EU governments rake in €130m per year in rejected visa application fees, dubbed as 'reverse remittances' by critics, according to new analysis shared with EUobserver.
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[
"EU & the World",
"Africa"
] |
eu-and-the-world
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2024-06-05T15:13:12.309Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar1aabb08b
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The vote of second-generation Europeans in EU elections: 'Our voices matter'
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"Voting in European elections creates a sense of crumbling in me: it reassures and frightens me at the same time," says Hager, the daughter of a Tunisian father and Algerian mother. This compliance officer working for a private company lives in a small northern municipality near Genoa, on Italy's Ligurian Mediterranean Sea. Hager has been active in political circles close to the centre-left Italian Democratic Party (PD) since the age of 16. Today, she is 25 and already disillusioned: "My struggles do not find an echo in the party, so I stepped away from active militancy." "In small towns like my small Italian province, I hardly see people similar to me doing politics. Initially, I justified this absence as a lack of interest from the second generation. Over the years, I realised that it is not a question of numbers but of representativeness," she explains. "I will vote, but the EU divides me" As required by Italian law, Hager, who arrived in Italy at a few months old with her parents, was granted citizenship at 18 and only then could travel freely within the Schengen area. "A privilege that finally made me feel European. I will vote, but the EU divides me: on the one hand, I see an openness towards issues of inclusion and gender equality, and on the other hand, support for problematic migration policies such as those with north African countries or Albania." Often invisible in political, cultural, and media spaces, Hager is part of a generation of young European citizens with a migrant background — some of them with dual citizenship — whose vote tells the story of the success or failure of policies to include minorities in the European social fabric. Several factors contributed to orienting their vote on 6-9 June, in a period that many call “unprecedented,” and “different from other historical moments experienced by our generation.” The migration policies implemented by the last legislature are among them: "I know that the mobility I finally enjoy within the European Union is not the same as my peers on the other side of the Mediterranean. I find it terrible that some of them, in their 20s, do not have the possibility to travel freely, and many of them die at sea," Hager concludes. 'Gaza changed everything' Echoing her words is Ghadah, 27, an Italian aspiring screenwriter of Algerian-Egyptian origin, who shares with Heger a family story of migration from North Africa to Europe. According to Ghadah, the war in Gaza also had a significant influence on her perception of voting for the European Parliament. "Since 7 October, I have experienced a significant crisis of confidence in all political parties. As someone with an Arab background, I feel a deep sense of identification with Palestinians due to historical issues," she explains, referring to the resonance that the war in Gaza is causing in the enduring wounds from the French colonisation of Algeria. "For me, there is this visceral sense of recognition dealing with a conflict whose effects we see live on social media. Sometimes, I tell myself: this person looks like my grandmother; this could be my cousin, my uncle. There is a kind of physical recognition that is painful," she adds. "We are confronting one of the most violent conflicts in recent years, and yet the EU remains deaf” Ghadah has not yet decided whether to go to the polls this weekend. For her, the European Union's stance on the war in Gaza has contributed to widening the distance with the institutions, so much so that she says it is not even “a party political issue, but almost a personal one”: “It is as if all politics sees us as expendable. I can't afford to vote for those who dehumanise the Palestinians and, in a way, me too." Layla, a 29-year-old Franco-Iranian born in Paris to parents who migrated to Europe for educational purposes, currently works in a cooperation in Romania. While she acknowledges the issue at hand, she disagrees with the solution: "I believe that few people today truly grasp the complexity of this historical moment within European institutions. We are confronting one of the most violent conflicts in recent years, and yet the EU remains deaf.” “Gaza intensifies my desire to vote: I see my vote as a political statement, and the conflict in Gaza significantly influences my decision," she affirms, explicitly stating that she will vote for the ecologist party. According to this young French-Iranian, the voting behaviour of citizens with a migrant background in Europe is not uniform, as she can observe significant differences and approaches within the Iranian community itself depending on the migration wave. At a time of street participation and protests in front of universities across Europe, the war in Gaza opened up political spaces of representation other than those offered by traditional institutions and the practice of voting. "What is certain is that I do not feel represented neither as French nor as an EU citizen. I learn from young Romanians who seem to be more aware of the urgency of voting than us French," Layla remarks, as an expatriate working in Bucharest alongside Ukrainian refugees. "I don't understand the double standards of the EU regarding the serious conflicts in Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Palestine," reiterates Miriam, a 25-year-old Italo-Tunisian. Layla is a graduate student in Area and Global Studies for International Cooperation, specialising in African studies. If she does not feel represented as an EU citizen, it is precisely because of the "inconsistency" and "hypocrisy" she has observed in numerous EU foreign policy choices since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, up to Gaza. A law student, Samira, a 21-year-old French-Algerian who grew up in the Paris banlieue, confirms: “My vote cannot but be influenced by the urgency of the current historical moment. I will vote for a Palestinian candidate who will bring a different voice to the European institutions, even if I do not agree with other measures of her party. But I recognise myself in her,” she says, referring to the Franco-Palestinian candidate Rima Hassan of the far-left La France Insoumise (LFI). The diaspora vote experience When she first arrived in Brussels in 2014 with a degree in law and a specialisation in European law, Céline Fabrequette found herself among a group of interns at the European institutions where an old pattern was replicated: she was the only racialised person. "I was used to it: I come from a French family of Cameroonian origin living in Burgundy, where I was the only black person in the school class," she says. The issue of representativeness has come up as a taboo several times in European institutions. In 2019, it was pointed out to Ursula Von Der Leyen that there were no non-whites in her team. Von Der Leyen replied, “I hope that will change one day, that would be nice,” as reported by Euronews. Since then, however, few changes have occurred. Nevertheless, representativeness was a personal issue for Céline. With a group of friends and colleagues, she decided to found the association Diaspora Vote a few months before the 2019 parliamentary elections. Its aim: to empower the second and third generations and encourage them to vote. “Many people tell us that they do not feel represented. The issues faced by minorities often go unnoticed, but understanding how the EU addresses these concerns is essential for ensuring democratic functioning for everyone. Our vote matters,” Céline adds. Five years later, her association is growing. Diaspora Vote counts 23 “ambassadors” in seven European countries. Each represents a community and works with its people to bridge the gap between EU institutions and neighbourhoods with migration backgrounds through meetings, public training, and workshops. Between April and May alone, some 17 events were organised in Ireland, Portugal, Greece, France, Belgium, Germany, and Austria. "Just think, for example, of the recently discussed issue of housing insulation. Who lives in the neighbourhoods with the least-insulated houses?" “It is necessary for European institutions to recognise us as citizens, not just as actors who help them build relationships on the African continent, in the Maghreb, in the Middle East... We are also citizens of the EU within the EU, and our demands should be considered. This means not ignoring the issue of institutional racism. However, no data has been produced yet on discrimination,” she explains from Brussels. In parallel, 50 young association members have worked with MEPs over the past few years within the framework of the Work With Your MEP program, providing them and their assistants with recommendations on addressing issues faced by discriminated minorities. "We have collaborated with Dutch MEP Samira Rafaela, for instance, who worked on the gender equality bill. If you read the word 'intersectionality' in the text, it is also thanks to the work of Diaspora Vote!" Céline exclaims with satisfaction when describing the association's lobbying work. For Diaspora Vote, reaching out to communities with a migrant background in Europe is crucial because the issues discussed in Brussels often affect them closely, despite the absence of representation. Céline concludes: "Just think, for example, of the recently discussed issue of housing insulation. Who lives in the neighbourhoods with the least-insulated houses?" More Europe and the privilege of not voting Originally from Morocco, Soufian, a 22-year-old student in international public administration at the Hague University of Applied Sciences, is familiar with the “necessary work” of Diaspora Vote in Brussels. His choice is clear: “From my point of view, the EU has its strengths, such as the Green Deal, and weaknesses, such as the approval of the recent Asylum Pact. I support the reform of the treaties for a more united, compact, and transparent EU,” he says, making it clear that he will vote for the Dutch party Volt for its vision of a federal United Europe. Yet, the common feeling is that we are moving towards an opposite European context. The daughter of Egyptian parents who migrated to Italy in the 1970s, Riham, a 35-year-old designer, observes: "I have the impression that we are very much closing in on ourselves and that nationalist policies forget the rights of minorities." Even for her, who obtained citizenship when she came of age, voting is a necessary democratic moment that "should always be exercised despite indecision”. "I find myself in a middle ground that paradoxically makes me feel more represented at the European level. Maybe that is why European politics reassures me" Certain words often return among the second generation: ‘indecision’, ‘representativeness,’ and ‘disconnection.’ But also ‘reassurance.’ A Spanish-Egyptian who grew up in Italy, Youssef, a 28-year-old journalist for a daily newspaper, cannot vote in national and regional elections and referendums because he resides in an EU country of which he is not a citizen. "I find myself in a middle ground that paradoxically makes me feel more represented at the European level. Maybe that is why European politics reassures me," he explains. In some cases, levels of discrimination either do not resemble each other or overlap. This is the case for Leila, 31, whose mother is from southern Italy and whose father is Tunisian. She lives in Milan and says she has suffered double discrimination as both a Tunisian and a Neapolitan, which will affect her vote. “Of course, I will go and vote. For me, not voting cannot be considered a protest vote because it would mean handing Europe over to the extreme right,” she says. Active in civil society, Leila has established herself as a public voice in the second-generation debate in Italy. She still happens to be “the only black person in the room,” a phrase borrowed from the title of a book by the Sri Lankan-Italian author Nadeesha Uyangoda that brought the issue of racism to the general public. “I recently attended a public meeting where many people told me that they did not want to vote because of the lack of clarity of political figures in Gaza,” she explains. “I think, however, that not going to vote is a privilege of those who can say: ‘Whatever, nothing changes.’ You can say this because you are not directly affected by the reforms that some factions of the extreme right are carrying out, questioning the civil and social rights of discriminated minorities,” she concludes. Arianna Poletti is a freelance journalist who moved to Tunisia in 2019, after working for French weekly magazine Jeune Afrique. She has covered environmental, social, and postcolonial issues between North Africa and Europe. Her articles have appeared in Al Jazeera, New Lines Magazine, Mongabay, El País, Médiapart, Le Monde Diplomatique, Socialter, Internazionale. Her investigative projects have been supported by Journalismfund Europe and the
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Earth Journalism Network
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Migration, the EU's response to Gaza and representation among people working in and voted into EU institutions are seen as major issues for second-generation European migrants.
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[
"Migration",
"EU Elections"
] |
migration
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2024-06-05T14:41:17.931Z
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https://euobserver.com/migration/ar498e9653
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Why are the EPP flirting with far-right fundamentalists?
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When nearly 200 million Europeans cast their ballot this weekend, they will not only have expressed a preference for a certain party, or for certain candidates. They will have made a life-shaping choice about the type of society they will live in for the years to come. While European elections were traditionally about a choice between more conservative or progressive forces along the classical left-right divide, this has radically changed. In the upcoming elections citizens will get to choose between fundamentals; being pro or anti-democracy, being for or against freedom, being for or against solidarity, being for or against the European project of social and economic progress and shared prosperity. Indeed, emboldened by the combined success of ultra-conservatism and Trumpism in the US, Europe’s far-right learned how to become more presentable , more effective using social media , better at pretending to represent working people, and good at using their presence in the European Parliament to undermine the European Union’s very existence from inside. Traditional conservatives have not remained immune to the more radical far-right discourse . It is a denial of their very identity and history, but the idea that the party of Robert Schuman, Helmut Kohl or Simone Veil could team up with the heirs of Mussolini, Franco, and Jean-Marie Le Pen, has started to flourish. Such denial, for the sake of holding on to power at any price, has even started to gain ground among some of Europe’s liberal parties, questioning their very identity too. Europe’s multiple and daunting challenges will not fade away during election night. Russia continues to bombard Ukraine, threatening Europe’s security and integrity. Innocent people keep dying in a war between the far-right Israeli government and the terrorist group Hamas. Democracy and the rule of law remain under attack. Climate change is getting worse. Many millions of Europeans still suffer from excessive living and housing costs, precarious working conditions, discrimination, social exclusion and poverty. Women keep fighting for effective equality and LGBTQIA+ persons remain in an ongoing struggle for rights. Meanwhile, the extreme right does not worry about these issues, but as always, cares only about preserving fantasised national identities, where migrants are the scapegoat, following a well-known nationalistic playbook Faced with challenges, we cannot afford to have a weak EU incapable of acting, or to backtrack on vital policies, not least climate change or social cohesion policy. Europe’s destiny must be to remain a beacon of peace, a thriving democracy where the rule of law is respected. We must be a continent of freedom, of individual rights and equal opportunities, with a social market economy – a unique model which embeds social justice and progress with economic growth, so no one is left behind. We must become a global leader in climate policy. EU break-up? Withdrawing from this future would push the EU into decades of democratic, social and economic decline, which would ultimately lead to our Union’s break-up and Europe’s swift fall into geo-political irrelevance. We will not let that happen. Instead, Europe needs to do more. It needs to do more to accelerate its decarbonisation, better protect its environment and the health of its citizens, and improve living and working conditions across urban and rural areas . It needs to more pro-actively support the transformation of industry, so we are a leading global player, built on the foundations of quality jobs, a skilled workforce and enhanced workers’ rights. This also means developing a sustainable and inclusive economy, anchored to a 'Made in Europe' approach geared towards fully-fledged strategic autonomy. Europe needs to do more to match the massive investment gap. The social, green and digital transformation of our economy will only be a true success with an ambitious permanent investment capacity. Europe has to ensure that this comprehensive transition serves its people and its regions by connecting its green, social and regional policies in new ways and by creating strong and accessible public services all across Europe. Furthermore, the European Pillar of Social Rights needs to be full realised. It can and will improve people’s daily lives, for instance by ensuring affordable housing for all. With a view to achieving the EU 2030 targets for employment, skills and poverty reduction, we must also update and relaunch the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan. This is how we put Europe on the right course. And Europe must also become more effective in protecting its democracies, from internal and external threats. This means never compromising when it comes to upholding the rule of law. And it means pursuing a common and strong defence capacity and procurement strategy to fend off physical and hybrid threats. This is the choice that stands in front of us. If pro-European, pro-democracy and pro-sustainable forces stand by these values, if we deliver ambitious policies to address these challenges, then the EU will have another five years to show that we can solve today’s existential crises, together. If they do not, when the next European elections are called in five years’ time, we may not have a second chance. Now more than ever, this election is a choice between two different futures. Nicolas Schmit is the lead 'Spitzenkandidat' for the Socialists & Democrats , and a Luxembourg EU commissioner for jobs and social rights. Iratxe García Pérez is a Spanish MEP and president of the S&D group in the European Parliament and first vice president of the Party of European Socialists. Nicolas Schmit is the lead 'Spitzenkandidat' for the Socialists & Democrats , and a Luxembourg EU commissioner for jobs and social rights.
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Iratxe García Pérez
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The idea that the European People's Party, the party of Robert Schuman, Helmut Kohl or Simone Veil, could team up with the heirs of Mussolini, Franco, and Jean-Marie Le Pen, has started to flourish, warns S&D Spitzenkandidat Nicolas Schmit and Iratxe García Pérez
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[
"EU Elections"
] |
*
|
2024-06-05T11:53:53.250Z
|
https://euobserver.com/*/ar9c659a9d
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France, Germany, Poland 'main Russian disinfo election targets', warns Jourová
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France, Germany and Poland have recently become the main targets of Russian disinformation campaigns in the run-up to this weekend's elections, EU Commission vice-president Věra Jourová told a group of journalists in Brussels on Tuesday (4 June). Before the 6-9 June European Parliament vote, these big countries had been “under permanent attack[s],” she said, citing non-public research from the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO). Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, long-running disinformation campaigns led by the Kremlin have been an increasing source of concern for EU policymakers — especially when it comes to the impact on elections. Russian disinformation, Jourová said, varies by country because Kremlin propaganda targets national sensitivities. In France, disinformation campaigns have been focused on the Olympic Games and French overseas territory in the Pacific, New Caledonia, while narratives in Germany have focused on migration and security. In Poland, Kremlin propaganda has been linked to Ukrainian refugees and the war. Last week, a fake news report claimed that prime minister Donald Tusk was mobilising 200,000 men starting on 1 July. Officials have denied this, attributing it to a possible Russian cyberattack on the Polish press agency. “Being in this information war [with Russia] means that the platforms simply need to do more,” Jourová also said, as she briefed journalists about her recent meetings with CEOs of the Big Tech companies — namely TikTok, Google, X (Twitter), Facebook and Instagram's parent company Meta, and Youtube, also owned by Google. “But, of course, when you have a country of 80 million [citizens], it requires bigger capacities than a country of eight million,” she said. By 'doing more', she was referring to measures such as hiring locals to better understand Russian narratives and national sensitivities in EU member states or increasing companies’ capacity for content moderation and fact-checking. According to the Digital Service Act (DSA), platforms may face sanctions if they are unable to prove they took mitigating measures against disinformation. However, tweaking algorithms to recognise Russian-sanctioned media and ensuring that Russian propaganda does not spread unchecked is “the absolute minimum” expected by the EU commission, Jourová also said. The EU announced bans on Sputnik and Russia Today in March 2022, right after the invasion. But the latest round of sanctions has also targeted the broadcasting activities of four more Russian outlets - Voice of Europe, RIA Novosti, Izvestia, and Rossiyskaya Gazeta. “And still recently, we saw some of the prominent, very convincing [and] compelling texts created by pro-Kremlin forces rank[ing] high in some of the platforms,” the Czech politician continued, warning of potential penalties. “We will have to do our jobs as enforcers to possibly sanction that”. The EU Commission is expected to come out with an assessment of the online electoral campaigns and how platforms have tackled disinformation linked to the 6-9 June EU elections by September. But for the next mandate, Jourová said that child protection will become one of the priorities of the commission under future digital legislation. The Czech commissioner, who publicly said that she will not seek another term, also would like to see a broader disinformation strategy. She said this initiative should aim to improve national and European communication, raise awareness among citizens, increase media literacy, strengthen the role of media, open the debate about whether certain disinformation activities classify as crime and counter foreign interference. “ Foreign interference remains a very serious threat and it may grow in the future,” Jourová warned, in the wake of allegations of Chinese espionage and possible payments by Russia to Alternative for Germany (AfD) MEPs.
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Elena is EUobserver's editor-in-chief. She is from Spain and has studied journalism and new media in Spanish and Belgian universities. Previously she worked on European affairs at VoteWatch Europe and the Spanish news agency EFE.
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France, Germany and Poland have recently become the main targets of Russian disinformation campaigns in the run-up to this weekend's EU elections, said EU Commission vice-president Věra Jourová.
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[
"Digital",
"EU Elections"
] |
search
|
2024-06-04T15:53:50.700Z
|
https://euobserver.com/search/Jeton%20Zulfaj
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Why all would-be MEPs should sign the Child Rights Manifesto
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This weekend's elections are rightfully seen as a crossroad to define the future of the European Union. It is paramount to include children’s priorities in today’s decision-making, as they are one of the most impacted groups by the decisions that we will take in the upcoming years. But, as future members of the European Parliament, are we listening to children? Are we putting their needs and rights at the centre of our political agendas? Are we committing to adopting a child-lens approach when shaping future European policies? So far, over 150 candidates replied ‘yes’ to all these questions by signing the Child Rights Manifesto . Endorsed by a coalition of 23 child rights organisations, the manifesto is a pledge to us, EU election candidates, to ensure we will prioritise children’s rights throughout our mandates if elected. However, we need to maintain the momentum and keep this number growing. We must hold ourselves even more accountable to children when making important decisions that affect their lives. In the past five years as members of the European Parliament, we have seen some important progress being made – for example, the adoption of the EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child and the European Child Guarantee . Together, these initiatives help advance EU policies and funding opportunities that protect children's rights and provide essential services for vulnerable children. The past European Parliament legislature also saw the emergence of the Youth Action Plan , aiming for the EU to collaborate with young people to shape its external action and towards achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Progress has been made but circumstances in which many children live, within and outside the European Union, continue to show how the EU, in the upcoming 2024-2029 legislature, must keep children’s needs on the front burner. Poverty and social exclusion are on the rise, putting at risk one-in-four children in the EU Climate change is affecting the lives of one billion children all over the world – this is one-in-seven children globally. The number of conflicts, including at Europe’s borders, keeps increasing, with a record number of children – more than one-in-six – now living in a conflict zone worldwide. The commitments listed in the manifesto are not vague promises, but concrete actions. Starting by re-establishing the Intergroup on Children's Rights , which is the first and only cross-party cross-national formal body in the European Parliament dedicated to protecting children’s rights. That is why all of us must ensure the Intergroup gets re-established. Another practical step outlined in the manifesto is adopting a child-centred EU budget and investing in all children as part of current and future EU internal and external funding. The before-mentioned EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child needs to be effectively implemented through EU and national action plans that are adequately resourced and monitored. While the European Child Guarantee needs adequate funding, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Children’s consultations are taking place around Europe and beyond, such as the #EuropeKidsWant survey , collecting the voices of over 9,000 children in Europe. Children are asking the future European Parliament members not just to listen to their voices but to hear and act upon them. This starts by committing to putting children’s rights at the heart of our mandates. This is why we are urging all of us as EU election candidates, no matter from which party or member state we come, to sign the Child Rights Manifesto and work with and for children to build the European Union that children want, where they can grow and thrive. Milan Brglez is a Slovenian MEP with the Socialists & Democrats, Caterina Chinnici is an Italian MEP with the European People's Party, and Hilde Vautmans is a Belgian MEP with Renew Europe. They are co-chairs of the Intergroup on Children's Rights Milan Brglez is a Slovenian MEP with the Socialists & Democrats, Caterina Chinnici is an Italian MEP with the European People's Party, and
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Hilde Vautmans
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Progress has been made but circumstances in which many children live, within and outside the European Union, continue to show how the EU, in the upcoming 2024-2029 legislature, must keep children’s needs on the front burner.
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[
"Health & Society",
"EU Elections"
] |
health-and-society
|
2024-06-04T12:34:15.248Z
|
https://euobserver.com/health-and-society/ar8c35cef1
|
While EU leaders look away from Gaza's agony, European voters do care
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Two devastating wars in the EU’s neighbourhood provide a chilling backdrop to this weekend’s European elections. Both conflicts represent egregious breaches of international law and blatant violations of human rights. Both are testing politicians’ commitment to “European values”. Yet only one is getting the attention it deserves. European politicians and policymakers have rightly described the Russia-Ukraine conflict as an “existential” challenge. Sanctions have been slapped on Russia and Ukraine is getting more money, more weapons and a promise of EU membership. Ukrainian refugees have been welcomed and the country’s flag adorns EU and national buildings and, occasionally, the ensembles worn by European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen. All this is good. But try doing the same for Gaza and - spoiler alert - it will be difficult. The EU’s sadly underwhelming collective response to Israel’s offensive in Gaza, following the October 7 terror attack by Hamas, is well-documented. But some facts are worth repeating. Eight months into Israel’s collective punishment of Gaza and despite recent rulings by the International Court of Justice, EU exports of arms and military equipment to Israel have not stopped, imports of weapons and surveillance technology from Israel continue and the EU-Israel agreement has not been suspended over human rights violations. European Commissioner Oliver Varhelyi claims the dubious “honour” of having met Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and defence minister Yoav Gallant even as the International Criminal Court's prosecutor asks for arrest warrants against both men over alleged war crimes. Despite the recent recognition of the Palestinian state by Spain, Ireland, Norway and Slovenia, Europe’s cosying up to Israel is causing irreparable damage to the bloc’s global reputation. Many fear that by allowing Israel to flout international laws, the US and Europe have fatally damaged an already-fragilised global rules-based order. Yes, the EU is continuing to provide desperately humanitarian aid to Gaza and contributions have resumed for UNRWA. But such assistance cannot become a fig leaf for political inaction. Behind the headlines, there are many insidious restrictions on Europeans’ freedom of expression. In some part s of Europe, carrying the red, green, black and white Palestinian flag, wearing the traditional black and white keffiyeh or even a T-shirt with an image of watermelons (which have become symbols of Palestine as a way to bypass attempts to censor the flag) can get you cautioned, fined or detained by police. Ramy Al-Asheq , a Palestinian-Syrian poet who lives in Berlin, has had the keffiyeh pattern tattooed on his forearm because while a scarf can be pulled off, a tattoo can only be removed if “you cut off my arm.” Others are opting for less permanent henna tattoos of the keffiyeh or like Palestinian-American supermodel Bella Hadid, turning their scarves into dresses. At last month’s Eurovision song contest Palestinian-Swedish singer Eric Saade thought he could get away by wearing the keffiyeh on his wrist. But he still got reprimanded because “the EBU seems to think my ethnicity is controversial.” #BrusselsSoWhite Reactions are not that different in the EU’s “Brussels So White” institutions. Civil servants who join pro-Gaza vigils outside the EU Commission and Council of Ministers every Thursday say their keffiyehs often get cold stares and nasty comments from those who see the scarf as “a provocation”. As the world looks on in amazement, across Europe, student encampments and protests demanding that universities sever ties with Israel have been marred by clashes with police and arrests. Some European journalists have lost jobs over their support of Palestinian rights or criticism of the Israeli government. Requests for the creation of a Ukraine-style visa scheme for Palestinians trapped in Gaza or rapid family reunification for those with relatives in Europe remain unheeded. And yet, while their leaders try to look the other way, many people do care. Pro-Palestine rallies and demonstrations continue across Europe, providing vivid proof that hundreds of thousands of Europeans are angry and frustrated at their governments’ failure to stop the carnage in Gaza. The EU faces a "difficult" choice between its support for the rule of law and its support for Israel according to Josep Borrell, the EU’s foreign and security policy chief. Elections could offer a way to correct course. Stopping the catastrophe in Gaza does not appear to be top of the agenda for any of the EU candidates seeking top Commission jobs or hoping to join the EU parliament. Yet European politicians and policymakers who are passive in the face of a “plausible genocide” and the starvation and bombing of babies and children in Gaza, must be held to account. This week when we enter the voting booth, we have a choice. Voters can use their ballot to accelerate the EU’s drift towards once-forbidden far-right territory where it is okay to be racist and to dehumanise brown and black people, both at home and abroad. Or we can elect ethical politicians with a moral compass who are not afraid to stand on the right side of history and will try to end Europe’s double standards. Far-right parties and their friends and allies in the mainstream are confident of winning more votes in the elections and wielding more power and greater influence afterwards. We can prove them wrong. By voting wisely we can save European values from a certain death by a thousand cuts. Shada Islam is an EUobserver columnist, and independent EU analyst and commentator who runs her own strategy and advisory company New Horizons Project . She has recently won the European Woman in Media award and the Media Career Award 2023 for her outstanding work and powerful voice on EU affairs and focus on building an inclusive Union of Equality. Shada Islam is an EUobserver columnist, and independent EU analyst and commentator who runs her own strategy and advisory company New Horizons Project . She has recently won the European Woman in Media award and the
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Media Career Award 2023
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Stopping the catastrophe in Gaza does not appear to be top of the agenda for any of the EU candidates seeking top Commission jobs or hoping to join the EU parliament.
|
[
"EU & the World",
"EU Elections"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2024-06-04T08:45:12.268Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/areed9b08b
|
Russia fears ahead of Belgium's double EU and national elections
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Two leading Belgian parties have hit back at allegations they were Russia-friendly, as the EU host-state prepares for double elections. MEPs from the rightwing Flemish NVA party and the far-left PVDA party told EUobserver they fully aligned with mainstream Western views condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The NVA's Assita Kanko, an MEP, said on Monday (3 June): "There is absolutely no connection between the Russian regime and my political party or our candidates. We fully support Ukraine". "Two weeks ago, I met a delegation of Ukrainian mothers in the European Parliament. I heard their stories and saw their tears, felt their pain," she added. Marc Botenga, an MEP from PVDA, said the Russia allegations were "preposterous". The PVDA had opposed Russian president Vladimir Putin's regime for over 20 years due to its greed and "barbarity", Botenga said. "We firmly condemned Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine from day one ... Russia must stop its invasion and withdraw all its troops," he added. The allegations of undue “Russian influence” in Belgium’s Flemish political scene were chronicled in a 37-page dossier circulated on Monday by a Belgian politician of Ukrainian origin, Marta Barandiy, who is running to become an MEP. These focused on the Flemish far-right Vlaams Belang party, some of whose best known MPs and former MPs, such as Frank Creyelman and Filip Dewinter, were overtly pro-Russian. The report raised concern the NVA could “become an ally to Vlaams Belang” after the elections and named an NVA party member who had collaborated with a Belgian far-right activist accused of Russian spy links. It also detailed PVDA abstentions on Russia-critical motions, its MPs’ pro-Russian speeches, and its ties with “Russia-mouthpiece” academics, despite the PVDA’s officially pro-Ukrainian line. But the NVA’s Kanko said her party would never join the same group as Vlaams Belang in the EU Parliament: “No. This point about my party is disinformation”. And the PVDA’s Botenga said it was an “attempt to criminalise” his party’s authentic views, for instance on the need for Russia-Ukraine peace talks. Vlaams Belang didn’t reply to EUobserver. Vlaams Belang and the NVA have three MEPs each in the current EU Parliament while PVDA has one, with polls indicating a similar outcome in the EU election on Sunday (9 June). Twin elections Belgium, the symbolic host-state of the EU institutions, is also holding national elections on the same day, in which Vlaams Belang, the NVA, and PVDA are expected to come out as three of the biggest winners . Barandiy’s new anti-establishment party, Voor U, isn’t on the radar. Meanwhile, Belgium’s current government, led by Flemish liberal Alexander De Croo, has also highlighted the Russian menace in the run-up to the votes. On 12 April, De Croo personally announced a judicial probe into allegations Russia had bribed far-right MEPs, prompting police raids in the EU Parliament in Brussels on 29 May. Belgium has expelled dozens of Russian spies working in its embassies and consulates in Brussels and Antwerp in the past two years. "We are exercising caution about foreign interference when it comes to this [EU election] campaign”, a contact in the Belgian authorities told this website. "Belgium has expelled about 60 Russian diplomats,” Belgium’s homeland intelligence service, the VSSE, said. Hungary's Ukraine veto And also on Monday, Belgian foreign minister Hadja Lahbib laid into the Moscow-friendly Hungary, after it once again vetoed EU money for Ukraine. Hungary should be stripped of its voting rights in the EU Council due to prime minister Viktor Orbán's illiberal rule at home and due to his "veto attitude", she told the Politico news website . Lahbib's call saw Hungarian foreign minister Péter Szijjártó fire back on social-media platform X that she "wants to silence pro-peace Hungary," echoing the PVDA's line in Belgium. The EU initiated a sanctions procedure against Hungary in 2018 under Article 7 of the EU Treaty on breach of basic values, with the EU Council to discuss the state of play on 25 June - one week before Budapest takes over the EU presidency until 2025. The Austrian foreign ministry told Politico it backed Habib, but despite the public pressure on Orbán, there was no real plan afoot to advance Article 7 at the upcoming meeting or to block Hungary's EU red-carpet moment, a Belgian source told EUobserver. And looking at the wider picture, Barandiy, the Belgian MEP-hopeful, whose NGO, Promote Ukraine , has held weekly protests outside Russia’s EU embassy in Brussels, said she was “worried”. “All at the same time: the far right taking over the European Parliament and national parliaments, the Hungarian EU presidency, and Trump might be elected in the US,” she said, referring to Putin-friendly former US president Donald Trump. “I’m afraid Ukraine might be pushed into negotiations by the end of the year,” she said, referring to potential capitulations to Russia. Barandiy previously told EUobserver how she feared a break-in at her Brussels office was the work of "Russian forces."
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Andrew Rettman is EUobserver's foreign editor, writing about foreign and security issues since 2005. He is Polish, but grew up in the UK, and lives in Brussels. He has also written for The Guardian, The Times of London, and Intelligence Online.
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Two leading Belgian parties have hit back at allegations they were Russia-friendly, as the EU host-state prepares for double elections.
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[
"EU & the World",
"EU Elections"
] |
eu-and-the-world
|
2024-06-04T08:31:19.688Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/arc03073af
|
Michel: we've 'paid the bill' for von der Leyen's 'geopolitical' commission
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EU in-fighting is heating up ahead of the European elections — with official internal documents slamming the "geopolitical commission" of EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen and making her re-election anything but foregranted. Von der Leyen's self-proclaimed 2019 geopolitical commission pushed her beyond her role as the head of the EU executive, prompting concerns among national leaders about impartiality and politicisation of the institution and casting doubt on her suitability for the job. “I am not certain what we need is a political commission. What we need for sure is a political union. There is a difference,” EU Council president Charles Michel told a group of journalists in Brussels on Monday (3 June) This so-called geopolitical commission has been seen “as a way for the commission to be less impartial,” Michel explained, noting that there is a need for an “impartial commission” when it comes to, for example, foreign affairs — where the EU executive doesn’t have competences Von der Leyen’s leadership on the pandemic and Ukraine war has gained respect, even from socialist-led nations, such as Spain. But her handling of the war in Gaza is likely her biggest controversy. Michel told journalists the initial position of the commission was “politicised” and “not representative” of member states’ position. “We paid the bill,” he also said, referring to the damage to the EU’s image in the region and regretting when the commission made statements “without any legitimacy”. These concerns have been reflected in an internal paper which sums up discussions between the EU council chief and EU leaders about the next strategic agenda, which indicates the need for the role and competencies of each institution to be “better respected”. “The concepts of a ‘political’ or even ‘geopolitical’ commission raised mixed concerns, from implications on impartiality to institutional imbalance,” according to the paper, seen by EUobserver. It also adds that EU leaders have expressed "strong reservations" against what is seen as "the politicisation" of rule of law conditionality — used to block EU money over rule of law concerns in countries like Hungary. As this strategy has made her more focused on external relations, additional concerns about von der Leyen’s second term also arise from her perceived neglection towards internal economic affairs and enforcement of EU legislation. The EU Commission has launched fewer infringement procedures than it did in the past. “For reasons that I don’t know, there is less interest … this is regrettable [and] it is a mistake,” Michel said. ‘Difficult' top jobs talks When discussions resurface in Brussels about the institutions' top jobs , the most attention is given to the European Commission presidency — because it is considered the most powerful position in terms of public visibility, legislative authority, and budgetary weight. But Michel, who will lead top jobs talks during an informal dinner planned for mid-June and the upcoming European Council, will himself also be replaced in the reshuffle of EU top positions. “I am not the only one who thinks that it will not be easy,” he said, describing decisions as “complex” as proven after the last European elections. Following the last 2019 European elections, EU leaders appointed von der Leyen from Angela Merkel's defence ministry in Berlin — using their treaty powers and completely bypassing the Spitzenkandidaten process . Now von der Leyen, the incumbent German conservative, is the lead candidate for the European People’s Party (EPP) which is expected to remain the largest party after the weekend elections. But other names are already circulating, notably that of Italian technocrat and former European Central Bank chief Mario Draghi . Despite the result of the European Parliament elections, Michel noted that the decision about who becomes commission president is ultimately in the hands of the EU heads of state of government. While some EU leaders view the Spitzenkandidaten system — which has led von der Leyen to campaign across Europe from Madrid to Warsaw — as conflicting with the principle of the commission's independence outlined in the treaties, others favour this process. “This is why it’s a complex task,” said Michel “[But] it is our duty to make a decision by the end of June,” he also said. July vote? If EU leaders announce their top job nominations by the end of June, MEPs will be able to vote on the EU Commission chief during the plenary session in July. However, concerns about von der Leyen's nomination include doubts about whether she will have enough support from MEPs, especially after Socialists and Democrats (S&D), Renew Europe liberals, and Green MEPs threatened to withdraw their support. This comes as von der Leyen has faced criticism for cosying up with Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni 's Brothers of Italy party, which is part of the European Conservatives and Reformists Group. Before the official dinner of EU leaders on 17 June and the European Council later in June, talks about top jobs will also take place during the meeting of the G7 in Italy and the Ukraine Peace Conference in Switerzland.
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Elena is EUobserver's editor-in-chief. She is from Spain and has studied journalism and new media in Spanish and Belgian universities. Previously she worked on European affairs at VoteWatch Europe and the Spanish news agency EFE.
|
EU in-fighting is heating up ahead of the European elections — with official internal documents slamming the "geopolitical commission" of EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen and making her re-election anything but foregranted.
|
[
"EU Political",
"EU Elections"
] |
eu-political
|
2024-06-03T16:20:58.275Z
|
https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar70197388
|
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