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Libyan civil war (2014–2020) | As of February 2015, damage and disorder from the war has been considerable. There are frequent electric outages, little business activity, and a loss in revenues from oil by 90%. Over 5,700 people died from the fighting by the end of 2016, and some sources claim nearly a third of the country's population has fled to Tunisia as refugees.
Since Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar had captured the ports of Libya's state-run oil company, the National Oil Corporation, in Es Sider and Ra's Lanuf, oil production has risen from 220,000 barrels a day to about 600,000 barrels per day.
The war has prompted a considerable number of the country's sizeable foreign labour force to leave the country as extremist groups such as ISIL have targeted them; prior to the 2011, the Egyptian Ministry of Labour estimated that there were two million Egyptians working in the country yet since the escalation of attacks on Egyptian labourers the Egyptian Foreign Ministry estimates more than 800,000 Egyptians have left the country to return to Egypt.
Land mines remain a persistent threat in the country as numerous militias, especially ISIL, have made heavy use of land mines and other hidden explosives; the rapidly changing front lines has meant many of these devices remain in areas out of active combat zones; civilians remain the primary casualties inflicted by land mines with mines alone killing 145 people and wounding another 1,465 according to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
In a report, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) revealed that it had registered over 45,600 refugees and asylum seekers in Libya during 2019. The World Food Programme reported that an estimated 435,000 people had been forcibly displaced from their homes during the conflict.
On 22 October 2019, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) reported that children have been suffering from different sorts of malnutrition in the war-torn nations, including Libya.
Executive Director of UNICEF said on 18 January 2020, that thousands of Libyan children were at risk of being killed due to the ongoing conflict in Libya. Since hostile clashes between the Libyan government and Haftar's LNA forces (backed by the UAE and Egypt) have broken out in Tripoli and western Libya, conditions of children and civilians have worsened.
The blockade on Libya's major oil fields and production units by Haftar's forces has sown losses of over $255 million within the six-day period ending 23 January, according to the National Oil Corporation in Libya. The NOC and ENI, which runs Mellitah Oil & Gas in Libya, have suffered a production loss of 155,000 oil barrels per day due to the blockade on production facilities imposed by Haftar's LNA. The entities claim losing revenue of around $9.4mn per day.
Since the beginning of Libyan conflict, thousands of refugees forced to live in detention centres are suffering from mental health problems, especially women and children, who are struggling to confront the deaths of their family members in the war.
On 7 February 2020, the UNHCR reported that the overall number of migrants intercepted by the Libyan coast guard in January surged 121% against the same period in 2019. The ongoing war has turned the country into a huge haven for migrants fleeing violence and poverty in Africa and the Middle East.
On 6 April, an armed group invaded a control station in Shwerif, the Great Man-Made River project, stopped water from being pumped to Tripoli, and threatened the workers. The armed group's move was a way to pressure and force the release of the detained family members. On 10 April 2020, the United Nations humanitarian coordinator for Libya, Yacoub El Hillo condemned the water supply cutoff as "particularly reprehensible".
On 21 April 2020, the UN took in to consideration the "dramatic increase" of shelling on densely populated areas of Tripoli, and claimed that continuation of war is worsening the humanitarian situation of Libya. The organisation also warned that such activities could possibly lead to war crimes.
The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) in its first quarter report for 2020 on the civilian casualty in Libya cited that approximately 131 casualties have taken place between 1 January and 31 March 2020. The figures included 64 deaths and 67 injuries, all of which were a result of the ground fighting, bombing and targeted killing led by Khalifa Haftar's army, the LNA, backed by the United Arab Emirates.
On 5 May 2020, The International Criminal Court's chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, raised concerns over the continuous spree of attacks by Haftar on Tripoli. The prosecutor said that actions endanger lives and warned of possible war crimes due to current affairs. "Of particular concern to my Office are the high numbers of civilian casualties, largely reported to be resulting from airstrikes and shelling operations," she expressed in a statement.
On 10 November 2020, prominent Libyan activist, Hanane al-Barassi, was killed in Benghazi. The 46-year-old Barassi was an outspoken critic of humanitarian abuses committed in the eastern areas controlled by UAE-backed Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA). She was known for giving voice to female victims of violence through the videos she posted on social media. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libyan_civil_war_(2014%E2%80%932020) |
Kafala system | According to a 2008 HRW report, under the kafala system in Saudi Arabia, "an employer assumes responsibility for a hired migrant worker and must grant explicit permission before the worker can enter Saudi Arabia, transfer employment, or leave the country. The kafala system gives the employer immense control over the worker." HRW stated that "some abusive employers exploit the kafala system and force domestic workers to continue working against their will and forbid them from returning to their countries of origin" and that this is "incompatible with Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights".
HRW stated that "the combination of the high recruitment fees paid by Saudi employers and the power granted them by the kafala system to control whether a worker can change employers or exit the country made some employers feel entitled to exert 'ownership' over a domestic worker" and that the "sense of ownership ... creates slavery-like conditions". In 2018, France 24 and ALQST reported on the use of Twitter and other online social networks by kafala system employers, "kafils", to "sell" domestic workers to other kafils, in violation of Saudi law. ALQST described the online trading as "slavery 2.0".
Several Indonesian domestic workers were executed in Saudi Arabia during 2015–2018. Siti Zaeneb and Karni were beheaded in April 2015. Muhammad Zaini Misin was executed in March 2018 for having killed his employer. On 29 October 2018, Tuti Tursilawati, also an Indonesian domestic worker in Saudi Arabia, was executed for having killed her employer, an action which she claimed had been in self-defense in relation to sexual abuse. Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi lodged an official complaint concerning the execution, which was carried out without warning and despite an appeal against the sentence.
From 1991 to 2019, 300000 Bangladeshi women went to Saudi Arabia under the kafala system. In early November 2019, protests took place in Dhaka in response to the case of Sumi Akter, who claimed "merciless sexual assaults", being locked up for 15 days, and having her hands burnt by hot oil by her Saudi employers. The case of another Bangladeshi, Nazma Begum, who claimed being tortured, also attracted media attention. Both had been promised jobs as hospital cleaning staff but were tricked into becoming household servants. Begum died in Saudi Arabia of an untreated illness.
On 4 November 2020, as part of its 2030 vision, Saudi Arabia announced a reformation plan for its labor law. Effective on 14 March 2021, the new measures are meant to curb the kafala system through:
Mandatory digital documentation of labor contracts.
Dropping the stipulation of sponsor consent for exit visas, final exit visas, re-entry visas, and change of sponsor, so long as they are to be applied for after the end of a contractual term or an appropriate notice period previously specified in the contract. Other requirements may still apply in case of applying within a contractual term.
The changes are to be implemented in the Absher and Qiwa portals, both being part of the e-government in Saudi Arabia.
In March 2021, Saudi Arabia introduced new labour reforms, allowing some migrant workers to change jobs without their employer's consent. Human Rights Watch claimed that the reforms did not dismantle the abuses of the kafala system, "leaving migrant workers at high risk of abuse". Many domestic workers and farmers who are not covered by the labour law are still vulnerable to multifold abuses, including passport confiscation, delayed wages and even forced labour. Although migrant workers are allowed to request an exit permit without their employer's permission, the need to have an exit permit in order to leave the country is a human rights violation.
An investigation by France 24 in April 2021 documented abuses of female migrant workers in Saudi Arabia. A 22-year-old woman migrant worker from Madagascar was murdered by the underground prostitution mafia she used to work for after running away from her employer's home and buried without a coffin in al-Jubail. Due to the practice of some sponsors who confiscate the passports of migrant workers, young women from East Africa find it difficult to return home after perceived mistreatment by their employers. The women often end up falling into prostitution. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kafala_system |
1948 Arab–Israeli War | King Abdullah was the commander of the Arab Legion, the strongest Arab army involved in the war according to Eugene Rogan and Avi Shlaim in 2007. (In contrast, Morris wrote in 2008 that the Egyptian army was the most powerful and threatening army.) The Arab Legion had about 10,000 soldiers, trained and commanded by British officers.
In 1946–47, Abdullah said that he had no intention to "resist or impede the partition of Palestine and creation of a Jewish state." Ideally, Abdullah would have liked to annex all of Palestine, but he was prepared to compromise. He supported the partition, intending that the West Bank area of the British Mandate allocated for the Arab state be annexed to Jordan. Abdullah held secret meetings with the Jewish Agency (at which the future Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir was among the delegates) that reached an agreement of Jewish non-interference with Jordanian annexation of the West Bank (although Abdullah failed in his goal of acquiring an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea through the Negev desert) and of Jordanian agreement not to attack the area of the Jewish state contained in the United Nations partition resolution (in which Jerusalem was given neither to the Arab nor the Jewish state, but was to be an internationally administered area). In order to keep their support to his plan of annexation of the Arab State, Abdullah promised to the British he would not attack the Jewish State.
The neighbouring Arab states pressured Abdullah into joining them in an "all-Arab military invasion" against the newly created State of Israel, that he used to restore his prestige in the Arab world, which had grown suspicious of his relatively good relationship with Western and Jewish leaders. Jordan's undertakings not to cross partition lines were not taken at face value. While repeating assurances that Jordan would only take areas allocated to a future Arab state, on the eve of war Tawfik Abu al-Huda told the British that were other Arab armies to advance against Israel, Jordan would follow suit. On 23 May Abdullah told the French consul in Amman that he "was determined to fight Zionism and prevent the establishment of an Israeli state on the border of his kingdom".
Abdullah's role in this war became substantial. He saw himself as the "supreme commander of the Arab forces" and "persuaded the Arab League to appoint him" to this position. Through his leadership, the Arabs fought the 1948 war to meet Abdullah's political goals. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1948_Arab%E2%80%93Israeli_War |
Helwan riots (1945) | By the beginning of April 1945, it had become obvious that the war was coming to a close and that the 6th South African Armoured Division as well as many other South African troops serving as divisional, corps and army troops would require transportation back to South Africa for demobilisation. On 1 May, the Union Defence Force realised that no plans had yet been made to get all men back and instructions were prepared, whereby No. 1 and 5 Wings of the South African Air Force (SAAF) were to be merged to form No. 4 Group. This Group was to be used in an Intensified Transport Service/Shuttle Service to move 5,000 troops per month by air commencing 1 July 1945. A further 15,000 men were to be transported home by sea during the second half of the year, resulting in the repatriation of 45,000 soldiers by the end of the year. In addition to the 6th South African Armoured Division and other troops in Italy, there were thousands of recently released South African prisoners of war who had been held in Italy. These men were from the 2nd South African Infantry Division and had been captured at the Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk battles in the western desert. Their numbers had not been factored into the demobilisation plans.
The staging depot at Helwan north of Cairo was soon overcrowded and by 20 August 1945, the depot, designed to hold 5,000 men was holding 9,000. An official announcement on 9 August stated that 3,000 to 5,000 men were expected to be repatriated by sea at the end of the month, but less than a week later it was announced that the expected shipping had been delayed, and that further announcements would be made later. Food was in short supply and the lack of adequate numbers of chefs caused extended queues and delays at meal times. The standard of discipline deteriorated further as the men arriving at the depot were split up alphabetically by surname, and then according to their demobilisation categories (A, B, C, etc., based on their initial date of volunteering for service abroad). This meant that men were grouped together with fellow soldiers and NCOs whom they did not know and unit structures were lost. Morale declined even further when it was decided that 500 volunteers would go home as a top priority to assist in the demobilisation process back in South Africa, their return home irrespective of their demobilisation category. In addition, all trading rights except those of the NAAFI were controlled by Egyptians; the men felt that they were being exploited by inflated prices charged by these traders. There was also unhappiness over the two cinemas, when men who had bought tickets frequently found that they were unable to get in due to lack of space. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helwan_riots_(1945) |
Numidia | The Numidian kingdom was very famous for its agricultural yield; besides lettuce, beans, and other grains already consumed by Berbers since the dawn of time, Numidia was very productive when it came to its famously high-quality wheat, very similar to the wheat farmed along the banks of the Egyptian Nile. According to Roman historian Pliny the elder:
Among the wheat imports of Rome, is light wheat imported from Gallia which does not surpass the weight of a bushel (Boisseau) 20 livres. The weight of the wheat of Sardinia supasses that of Gallia by half a livre, the wheat of Biossia surpasses that of Gallia by an entire livre, wheras the wheat of Africa surpasses the weight of wheat of Gallia by a whole livre and three fourths.
In 179 BC, King Masinissa of Numidia received a golden crown from the inhabitants of Delos, as he had offered them a shipload of grain. A statue of Masinissa was erected in Delos in his honor, with an inscription by a native from Rhodes. His sons, too, had statues erected on the island of Delos; the King of Bithynia, Nicomedes, had also dedicated a statue to Masinissa. By 143 AD, the export of olive oil from Numidia rivaled its grain export throughout the Roman Empire.
In 200 BC, the Roman Army stationed in Macedonia received 17,508 hectoliters of Numidian wheat; in 198 BC, the Roman Army in Greece was sent, once again, the same amount of wheat. In 191 BC, Rome received 26,262 hectoliters of wheat and 21,885 hectoliters of barley; Greece, the same year, received 43,770 hectoliters of wheat and 26,262 hectoliters of barley. Then, in 171 BC, the Roman army in Macedonia received 87,540 hectoliters of wheat.
In total Rome received:
in 200 BC: 14,000 tonnes of wheat and 10,500 tonnes of barley.
in 198 BC: 14,000 tonnes of wheat.
in 191 BC: 56,000 tonnes of wheat and 28,900 tonnes of barley.
in 170 BC: 70,000 tonnes of wheat.
These numbers only represent a fraction from the reserves of the kingdom of Massinissa. His contributions to the Romans in 170 BC appear to be only a fraction of the kingdom's total production, as he was upset by Rome's decision to pay for the provided wheat that year. Massinissa hadn't laid his hands yet on the fertile lands of the Emporia (North West Ancient Libya) nor the great plains full of fertile soil yet; generally, barley was his kingdom's main produce, as they grew barley in light, mountainous and hilly soil which is suitable for its cultivation. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Numidia |
Siege of Baghdad | On 13 February, the sack of Baghdad began. This was not an act of wanton destruction, as it has commonly been presented, but rather a calculated decision to show the consequences of defying the Mongol Empire. Sayyids, scholars, merchants who traded with the Mongols, and the Christians in the city on whose behalf Hulegu's wife Doquz Khatun, herself a Christian, had interceded, were deemed worthy and were instructed to mark their doors so their houses would be spared. The rest of the city was subject to pillaging and killing for a full week. According to Kirakos Gandzaketsi, a 13th-century Armenian historian, the Christians in Hulegu's army took special pleasure in Baghdad's sack. It is unknown how many inhabitants were killed: later Muslim writers estimated between 800,000 and two million deaths, while Hulegu himself, in a letter to Louis IX of France, noted that his army had killed 200,000. Figures may have been inflated by a subsequent epidemic among the survivors; scholars have debated whether this was a outbreak of plague, a precursor to the Black Death.
Two days into the looting, on 15 February, Hulegu visited the caliphal palace and forced al-Musta'sim to reveal his treasures; some was distributed among commanders such as Guo Kan, but most loaded onto wagons and transported either to Mongke in Karakorum or to Shahi Island in Azerbaijan, where Hulegu would be buried. Having granted the palace to Makkikha to be the Christians' church, Hulegu then held a celebratory banquet in which he mockingly played host to the caliph. Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, who was likely present, recorded the following dialogue:
[Hulegu] set a golden tray before the Caliph and said: "Eat!"
"It is not edible," said the Caliph.
"Then why did you keep it," asked the khan, "and not give it to your soldiers? And why did you not make these iron doors into arrow-heads and come to the bank of the river so that I might not have been able to cross it?"
"Such", replied the Caliph, "was God's will."
"What will befall you," said the khan, "is also God's will."
This incident is likely the source of a folktale, reproduced in the writings of Christian writers such as Marco Polo, in which Hulegu subsequently locked al-Musta'sim in a cell surrounded by his treasures, whereupon he starved to death in four days. In reality, on 20 February, after Hulegu had halted the plundering and killing and moved his camp away from the city to escape the increasingly putrid air, al-Musta'sim was executed alongside his whole family and court. To avoid spilling a royal's blood, a great taboo for the Mongols, the caliph was wrapped in a rolled-up carpet and trampled to death by horses. Hulegu had debated whether to put al-Musta'sim to death at all, but eventually decided on doing so to break the myth of the caliphate being an all-powerful, invulnerable, and inviolate entity.
If, as later writers allege, al-Alqami had betrayed Baghdad to the Mongols, Hulegu would have had him executed—such was the Mongol policy regarding all traitors. Instead, because of his efforts to dissuade the caliph from a foolish path, he was reappointed to the vizierate, although he died less than three months later. Having also appointed a Khwarazmian daruyachi ('overseer official') named Ali Ba'atar for the region and stationed 3,000 soldiers in the city, Hulegu gave instructions to rebuild Baghdad and to open its bazaars. On 8 March, he left the area, travelling northwards to Hamadan and then Azerbaijan, where he remained for a year. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Baghdad |
History of the Spanish language | During the 16th century, the three voiced sibilant phonemes—dental /d͡z/, apico-alveolar /z/, and palato-alveolar /ʒ/ (as in Old Spanish fazer, casa, and ojo, respectively) lost their voicing and merged with their voiceless counterparts: /t͡s/, /s/, and /ʃ/ (as in caçar, passar, and baxar respectively). The character ⟨ç⟩, called ⟨c⟩ cedilla, originated in Old Spanish but has been replaced by ⟨z⟩ in the modern language.
Additionally, the affricate /t͡s/ lost its stop component, to become a laminodental fricative, [s̪]. As a result, the sound system then contained two sibilant fricative phonemes whose contrast depended entirely on a subtle distinction between their places of articulation: apicoalveolar, in the case of the /s/, and laminodental, in the case of the new fricative sibilant /s̪/, which was derived from the affricate /t͡s/. The distinction between the sounds grew in the dialects of northern and central Spain by paradigmatic dissimilation, but dialects in Andalusia and the Americas merged both sounds.
The dissimilation in the northern and central dialects occurred with the laminodental fricative moving forward to an interdental place of articulation, losing its sibilance to become [θ]. The sound is represented in modern spelling by ⟨c⟩ before ⟨e⟩ or ⟨i⟩ and by ⟨z⟩ elsewhere. In the south of Spain, the deaffrication of /t͡s/ resulted in a direct merger with /s/, as both were homorganic, and the new phoneme became either laminodental [s̪] ("seseo", in the Americas and parts of Andalusia) or [θ] ("ceceo", in a few parts of Andalusia). In general, coastal regions of Andalusia preferred [θ], and more inland regions preferred [s̪] (see the map at ceceo).
During the colonization of the Americas, most settlers came from the south of Spain; that is the cause, according to almost all scholars, for nearly all Spanish speakers in the New World still speaking a language variety derived mainly from the Western Andalusian and Canarian dialects.
Meanwhile, the alveopalatal fricative /ʃ/, the result of the merger of voiceless /ʃ/ (spelled ⟨x⟩ in Old Spanish) with voiced /ʒ/ (spelled with ⟨j⟩ in some words and in others with ⟨g⟩ before ⟨e⟩ or ⟨i⟩), was moved backward in all dialects, to become (depending on geographical variety) velar [x], uvular [χ] (in parts of Spain) or glottal [h] (in Andalusia, Canary Islands, and parts of the Americas, especially the Caribbean region). | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Spanish_language |
Hassan al-Turabi | After a political falling out with President Omar al-Bashir in 1999, al-Turabi was imprisoned based on allegations of conspiracy before being released in October 2003. Arrested again in 2004 for allegedly being part of a plot to overthrow the government, he was released on 28 June 2005.
In 2004 he was reported to have been associated with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), an Islamist armed rebel group involved in the War in Darfur, whose leader, Khalil Ibrahim used to be one of Mr Turabi's followers. al-Turabi himself has denied any association. Turabi spent 16 months in prison from 2004 until 28 June 2005, during which time he spent several weeks on a hunger strike.
After the JEM attacked Khartoum and Omdurman on 10 May 2008, al-Turabi was arrested on the morning of 12 May 2008, along with other members of his Popular Congress Party (PCP). He said that he had expected the arrest, which occurred while he was returning to Khartoum from a PCP gathering in Sennar. He was questioned and released without charge later in the day, after about 12 hours in detention.
Presidential advisor Mustafa Osman Ismail said that al-Turabi's name had been found on JEM documents, but he denied that al-Turabi had been arrested, asserting that he had merely been "summoned" for questioning. al-Turabi, however, said that it was an arrest and that he had been held at Kobar Prison. According to al-Turabi, he was questioned regarding the relationship between the PCP and JEM, but he did not answer this question, although he denied that there was a relationship after his release; he also said that he was asked why he did not condemn the rebel attack. He said that the security officers questioning him had "terrified" him and that, although they claimed to have proof against him, they did not show him this proof when he asked to see it.
Salva Kiir Mayardit, the First Vice-President of Sudan and President of the Government of Southern Sudan, said that there had been no discussion about arresting al-Turabi at a presidency meeting on the previous day and that there was no security report implicating him. He alleged that al-Turabi was being used as a scapegoat.
In an interview on 17 May 2008, al-Turabi described the JEM's attack on Khartoum as "positive" and said that there was "so much misery in Darfur, genocidal measures actually". He also said that the JEM attack could spark more unrest.
On 12 January 2009, al-Turabi called on Bashir to surrender himself to the International Criminal Court for the sake of the country, while holding Bashir politically responsible for war crimes in Darfur. (He later changed his position and opposed Bashir turning himself in.) He was then arrested on 14 January and held in prison for two months (until 8 March) at the Kobar Prison before being moved to Port Sudan prison. During this time members of his family expressed concern about his health and his being held in solitary confinement at least some of the time. Amnesty International also released a statement about al-Turabi's arrest on 16 January, describing it as "arbitrary" and politically motivated. Noting al-Turabi's advanced age and his need for medication and a special diet. The Sudanese Media Centre reported on 19 January that al-Turabi would be put on trial for his alleged assistance to the JEM.
On 8 March, he was released only days after the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against Omar al-Bashir. On 11 April 2009, the PCP called for the creation of a transitional government to lead Sudan to the planned 2010 election, and al-Turabi suggested that he would not stand as a candidate due to his advanced age; he emphasized the importance of leadership coming from younger generations and said that he did not have enough energy to run. In April al-Turabi was stopped at Khartoum International Airport and prevented from travelling to Paris for medical tests despite having obtained permission to travel from the interior ministry.
al-Turabi announced on 2 January 2010 that the PCP had designated his deputy, Abdallah Deng Nhial, as its candidate for the 2010 presidential election. al-Turabi was again arrested in mid May 2010, but was released on 1 July 2010.
On 18 January 2011, security forces arrested al-Turabi in Khartoum, presumably due to the recent instability of Sudan’s politics. al-Turabi commented on the recent price rises in Sudan stating it could result at a "popular uprising" if the unrealistic rises were not reversed. He added that the government should take lessons from the recent Tunisian Revolution. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hassan_al-Turabi |
Druze | Jean-Marc Aractingi, La Face Cachée des Druzes "Les Francs-Maçons de l'Orient", 251 pages, Editeur : Independently published (2020), ISBN 978-1689584821
Jean-Marc Aractingi, "Les Druzes et la Franc-maçonnerie", in Les Cahiers de l'Orient, no. 69, 1er trimestre 2003, Paris: L'Équerre et le Croissant, éditions Les Cahiers de l'Orient
Jean-Marc Aractingi, "Points de convergence dans les rituels et symboles chez les Druzes et chez les francs-maçons", in Les Cahiers, Jean Scot Erigène, no 8, Franc-maçonnerie et Islamité, Paris: la Grande Loge de France.
Pinhas Inabri – "Pan-Arabism versus Pan-Islam – Where Do the Druze Fit?"
Abu Fakhr, Sakr (2000). "Voices from the Golan". Journal of Palestine Studies. 29 (4): 5–36. doi:10.1525/jps.2000.29.4.02p00787.
Aractingi, Jean-Marc; Lochon, Christian (2008). Secrets initiatiques en Islam et rituels maçonniques-Ismaéliens, Druzes, Alaouites, Confréries soufies. Paris: L'Harmattan. ISBN 978-2-296-06536-9..
Rabih Alameddine I, the Divine: A Novel in First Chapters, Norton (2002). ISBN 0-393-32356-0.
B. Destani, ed. Minorities in the Middle East: Druze Communities 1840–1974, 4 volumes, Slough: Archive Editions (2006). ISBN 1-84097-165-7.
R. Scott Kennedy "The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance" Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Winter, 1984), pp. 48–46.
Dr. Anis Obeid: The Druze & Their Faith in Tawhid, Syracuse University Press (2006). ISBN 0-8156-3097-2.
Shamai, Shmuel (1990). "Critical Sociology of Education Theory in Practice: The Druze Education in the Golan". British Journal of Sociology of Education. 11 (4): 449–463. doi:10.1080/0142569900110406.
Samy Swayd The Druzes: An Annotated Bibliography, Kirkland, Washington: ISES Publications (1998). ISBN 0-9662932-0-7.
Bashar Tarabieh "Education, Control and Resistance in the Golan Heights". Middle East Report, No. 194/195, Odds against Peace (May–August 1995), pp. 43–47.
Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Druses" . Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 8 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. pp. 603–606.
Dr. Said Hany:
Druze Trilogy 1 – Philosophy. USA. 2020. ISBN 978-0-244-23549-9
Druze Trilogy 2 – Theology. USA. 2020. ISBN 978-0-244-23701-1
Druze Trilogy 3 – Genealogy. USA. 2020. ISBN 978-0-244-83701-3 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Druze |
Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan | Seychellois government records show that, between 1995 and 2010, Sheikh Khalifa had spent $2 million buying up more than 66 acres of land on the Seychelles' main island of Mahé, where what was to be his palace was being built. The Seychelles' government has received large aid packages from the UAE, most notably a $130 million injection that was used in social service and military aid, which funded patrol boats for the Seychelles' anti-piracy efforts. In 2008, the UAE came to the indebted Seychelles government's aid, with a $30 million injection.
Sheikh Khalifa paid $500,000 for the 29.8-acre site of his palace in 2005, according to the sales document. A Seychelles planning authority initially rejected the palace's building plans, a decision overturned by President James Michel's cabinet. A month after the start of construction of the palace, the national utility company warned that the site's plans posed threats to the water supply. Joel Morgan, the Seychelles' minister of the environment, said the government did not tender the land because it wanted it to go to Sheikh Khalifa. Morgan said "the letter of the law" might not have been followed in the land sale.
In February 2010, the sewage system set up by Ascon, the company building the palace, for the site's construction workers overflowed, sending rivers of waste through the region, which is home to more than 8000 residents. Local government agencies and officials from Khalifa's office responded quickly to the problem, sending in technical experts and engineers. Government officials concluded that Ascon ignored health and building codes for their workers, and fined the company $81,000. Ascon blamed the incident on "unpredicted weather conditions". Khalifa's presidential office offered to pay $15 million to replace the water-piping system for the mountainside, and Seychelles' government representatives and residents say Ascon has offered to pay roughly $8,000 to each of the 360 households that were affected by the pollution.
Through the Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan Foundation, the UAE supported the Yemeni people in August 2015 with 3,000 tonnes of food and aid supplies. By 19 August 2015, the foundation had sent Yemen 7,800 tonnes of food, medicine, and medical supplies.
In April 2016, Sheikh Khalifa was named in the Panama Papers by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists; he reportedly owned luxury properties in London worth more than $1.7 billion via shell companies that Mossack Fonseca set up and administers for him in the British Virgin Islands. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khalifa_bin_Zayed_Al_Nahyan |
Human rights in post-invasion Iraq | "OneWorld.net's Latest Coverage on Iraq". Archived from the original on 2008-02-02. Retrieved 2006-03-16.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
Pictures of the abuse by US soldiers, courtesy of The Memory Hole. Note that the full set of pictures has not been released, including the rape of a young Iraqi by a military contractor.
April 7, 2003 DOD Briefing on Geneva Convention, EPW's and War Crimes at the Wayback Machine (archived January 30, 2006)
The Guardian: Soldier arrested over Iraqi torture photos (May 31, 2003)
Washington Post: 'Torture Lite' Takes Hold in War on Terror (March 3, 2004)
US tactics condemned by British officers (April 21, 2004) (Daily Telegraph)
CBS 60 minutes II: Abuse Of Iraqi POWs By GIs Probed (April 29, 2004)
BBC: US acts after Iraq prisoner abuse, (30 April 2004)
Doubt cast on Iraq torture photos (May 2, 2004) (BBC)
13 reasons why this picture may not be all it seems (May 2, 2004) (Daily Telegraph)
This Is Not A Hoax. I Saw It, I Was There (Answers to some of the objections; May 3, 2004) (The Daily Mirror) (Alternative link)
A third UK soldier steps up (May 7, 2004) (The Guardian)
Mirror admits it was "hoaxed" (May 15, 2004) (The Daily Mirror)
Two Danish physicians attest to British abuse (May 15, 2004) Archived October 23, 2004, at the Wayback Machine (The New Zealand Herald)
New Details of Prison Abuse Emerge (May 21, 2004)
Report: Army doctors involved in Abu Ghraib abuse (2004-08-20) (Reuters)
Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib - Interview with Seymour Hersh by Democracy Now! on September 14, 2004.
Journalists Among Those Abused by US Troops (IFEX)
U.S. State Department on Iraq Human rights in 2004 (released 2005) Country Reports on Human Rights Practices section on Iraq. 460 KB in size for the Iraq portion alone. HTML. One page. No pictures, all English text.
Editorial: Patterns of Abuse, New York Times, May 23, 2005
UN raises alarm on death squads and torture in Iraq (Reuters, September 8, 2005)
US Troops Seize Award-Winning Iraqi Journalist, The Guardian, January 9, 2006
Thank You Joe Darby – A site for expressions of support for Joe Darby, the soldier that exposed the graphic photos and video and brought the Abu Ghraib prison scandal to light.
Iraq general's killer reprimanded, BBC, January 24, 2006
Mild Penalties in Military Abuse Cases, Los Angeles Times, January 25, 2006 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_rights_in_post-invasion_Iraq |
Arab Islamic Republic | On 11 January 1974, the Djerba Declaration was signed by Bourgiba and Gaddafi, which committed the two states to becoming a single state, to be named the Arab Islamic Republic. The agreement was signed on the island of Djerba and thus, is also known as the Djerba Declaration or the Djerba Accord. Referendums were scheduled in each country to vote on the issue. The spontaneous tactic in trying to gain unity with another state on the part of Gaddafi displays a different approach than the previous union attempt with Egypt, where long negotiations did not work out. It is possible that Bourguiba was the original pursuant of a union between Libya and Tunisia, as Bourguiba wanted a regional ally and also wanted to "wean Libya away from Egypt".
The union agreement was a surprise to observers, as previously it was thought that Bourguiba had not supported the idea, in part due to tensions brought about by the speech by Gaddafi in Tunis in December 1972. This change in support could also have been influenced by the presence of 30,000 Tunisians working in Libya at the time and helping the Tunisian economy. As Tunisia suffered from a labour surplus, a foreign debt of one billion and a lack of natural resources, a closer economic union with the resource rich but labour poor Libya would have been an attractive alternative. Why Bourguiba decided to agree to the union is not completely known, but it is known that the Djerba agreement was seen with suspicion by Tunisians and Algerians, as well as outside these states both regionally and internationally.
The Arab Islamic Republic was supposed to have "a single constitution, a single army, and a single President." Under the agreement, Bourguiba was to be president, but Gaddafi wanted to keep the Ministry of Defence. Prior to the Djerba Declaration multiple agreements dealing with singular, separate issues had previously been arranged between the two states on "trade, customs duties, investment, regulation for migrant workers, social security, and the creation of a joint shipping company", but the agreements were not publicly noted as pursuing a union of the two states. Support for the unity beyond Bourguiba came from others within the Tunisian government, thinking that it would further benefit the Tunisian economy; the most prominent supporter was Tunisian Foreign Minister Mohamed Masmoudi.
The length of time the union lasted is contentious, with one source saying it lasted one month, while another says it lasted only a single day and a third indicating it lasted a few days. What is known though is that Tunisia reconsidered the deal soon after signing it, as Tunisia was supportive of economic benefits gained from the union, but not for giving up Tunisian sovereignty. Thus, as the Tunisian socialist PSD party resisted the union plans due to their view that the arrangement was not clear enough and did not include how political institutions would be structured, Bourguiba rescinded on his decision to form the Arab Islamic Republic. The referendum in Tunisia was postponed to 20 March 1974, as announced on 12 January 1974. Following Bourguiba's removal of Tunisia from the agreement, the biggest supporter of the union, Tunisian Foreign Minister Masmoudi was fired.
Before the agreement was dissolved, Gaddafi had thought that one merger within the region would lead to regional unification and ultimately unification of the Arab world. Following the union's inception and fallout, Bourguiba's judgement and capacity to lead Tunisia was questioned after he announced the union with Libya. Bechir Ben Yahmed, a Tunisian journalist noted, "For me, he [Bourguiba] died in January, 1974, in Djerba, when during several minutes of face-to-face with Gaddafi, he signed, on hotel stationary, that famous charter of union." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Islamic_Republic |
Husayn ibn Ali | Despite the advice of Muhammad ibn Hanafiyya, Abdullah ibn Umar, and the constant insistence of Abd Allah ibn Abbas in Mecca, Husayn did not back down from his decision to go to Kufa. Ibn 'Abbas pointed out that the Kufis had left both his father Ali and his brother Hasan alone, and suggested that Husayn go to Yemen instead of Kufa, or at least not take women and children with him if he were to go to Iraq. Husayn insisted on his decision and wrote about his motives and goals in a famous letter or will that he gave to Muhammad ibn al Hanafiyyah
"I did not go out for fun and selfishness and for corruption and oppression; Rather, my goal is to correct the corruptions that have occurred in the nation of my ancestors. I want to command the good and forbid the bad, and follow the tradition of my grandfather and the way of my father Ali ibn Abi Talib. So, whoever accepts this truth (and follows me) has accepted the way of God and whoever rejects (and does not follow me) I will walk (my way) with patience and perseverance so that God may be the judge between me and this nation and he is the best judge."
Then, Husayn, who had not yet received the letters of the new events of Kufa, prepared to leave for Kufa on the 8th or 10th of Dhu al-Hijjah 60 AH / 10 or 12 September 680 AD. Instead of performing Hajj, he performed Umrah, and in the absence of the Governor of Mecca, Amr ibn Sa'id ibn As, who was performing Hajj on the outskirts of the city, secretly left the city with his companions and family. Fifty men from Husayn's relatives and friends – who could fight if needed – accompanied Husayn, including women and children. He took the northerly route through the Arabian Desert. On persuasion of Husayn's cousin Abd Allah ibn Ja'far, the governor of Mecca Amr ibn Sa'id sent his brother and Ibn Ja'far after Husayn in order to assure him safety in Mecca and bring him back. Husayn refused to return, relating that Muhammad had ordered him in a dream to move forward irrespective of the consequences. Further on the way, he received the news of the execution of Ibn Aqil and the indifference of the people of Kufa.
He informed his followers of the situation and asked them to leave. Most of the people who had joined him on the way left, while his companions from Mecca decided to stay with him.
On the way, Husayn encountered various people. In response to Husayn's question about the situation in Iraq, the poet Farzadaq explicitly told him that the hearts of the Iraqi people are with you, but their swords are in the service of the Umayyads. But Husayn's decision was unwavering, and in response to those who tried to dissuade him, he said that things were in God's hands and that God wanted the best for His servants and would not be hostile to anyone who was right. The news of the murder of Muslim ibn Aqeel and Hani ibn Arwa was reported by some travellers, for the first time in Thalabiyah.
When Husayn reached the area of Zabalah, he found out that his messenger, Qais ibn Mushar Sa'idawi – or his brother-in-law, Abdullah ibn Yaqtar – who had been sent from Hejaz to Kufa to inform the people of Husayn's imminent arrival, was exposed and killed by falling from the roof of Kufa Palace. Upon hearing this, Husayn allowed his supporters to leave the caravan due to the depressing issues such as the betrayal of the Kufis. A number of those who had joined him on the way, parted away. But those who had come with Husayn from Hejaz did not leave him. The news from Kufa showed that the situation there had completely changed from what Muslim had reported. The political assessments made it clear to Husayn that going to Kufa was no longer apt.
In the area of Sharaf or Zuhsam, armies emerged from Kufa under the leadership of Hurr ibn Yazid. With the weather being hot there, Husayn ordered water to be given to them and then announced his motives to the army and said:
"You did not have an Imam and I became the means of uniting the ummah. Our family is more deserving of government than anyone else, and those in power do not deserve it and rule unjustly. If you support me, I will go to Kufa. But if you do not want me anymore, I will return to my first place."
Ibn Ziyad had stationed troops on the routes into Kufa. Husayn and his followers were intercepted by the vanguard of Yazid's army, about 1,000 men led by Hurr ibn Yazid al-Tamimi, south of Kufa near Qadisiyya. Husayn said to them:I did not come to you until your letters were brought to me, and your messengers came to me saying, 'Come to us, for we have no imam.' ... Therefore, if you give me what you guaranteed in your covenants and sworn testimonies, I will come to your town. If you will not and are averse to my coming, I will leave you for the place from which I came to you. He then showed them the letters he had received from the Kufans, including some in Hurr's force. Hurr denied any knowledge of the letters and stated that Husayn must go with him to Ibn Ziyad, which Husayn refused to do. Hurr responded that he would not allow Husayn to either enter Kufa or go back to Medina, but that he was free to travel anywhere else he wished. Nevertheless, he did not prevent four Kufans from joining Husayn. Husayn's caravan started to move towards Qadisiyya, and Hurr followed them. At Naynawa, Hurr received orders from Ibn Ziyad to force Husayn's caravan to halt in a desolate place without fortifications or water. One of Husayn's companions suggested that they attack Hurr and move to the fortified village of al-Aqr. Husayn refused, stating that he did not want to start the hostilities.
According to Valiri, Hurr ordered his army to take Husayn and his companions to Ibn Ziyad without fighting and intended to persuade Husayn to do so. But when he saw that Husayn was moving his caravan, he did not dare to follow it. However, Madlung and Bahramian write that when Husayn was ready to leave, Hurr blocked his way and said that if Husayn did not accept the order given by Ibn Ziyad, Hurr would not allow him to go to Medina or Kufa. He suggested to Husayn to neither go to Kufa nor to Medina, rather write a letter to Yazid or Ibn Ziyad and wait for their orders, hoping to avoid this difficult situation by receiving an answer. But Husayn did not heed to his advice and continued to Azad or Qadisiyah. Hurr informed Husayn that he was doing this for Husayn and that if there would be a war, Husayn would be killed. Husayn, however, was not afraid of death and stopped in an area called Karbala, on the outskirts of Kufa.
In one place, Husayn recited a sermon and said: "I do not see death except as martyrdom and living with the oppressors except as hardship." In another place, he explained the reason for his opposition to the government while recalling the bitterness of breaking the allegiance of the people of Kufa with his father and brother, saying, "These people have submitted to the obedience of Satan and have left the obedience of God the Merciful." On the way, he refused to accept the offer to go to the tribe of Tayy by pointing to his pact with Hurr about not returning. Later, a messenger from Ibn Ziad came to Hur and, without greeting Husayn, gave a letter to Hur in which Ibn Ziad had ordered him to not to stop in a place where Husayn can have easy access to water. With this letter, Obaidullah wanted to force Husayn to fight. Zuhair ibn Qayn suggested to Husayn to attack the small army of Hur and capture the fortified village of Akr. But Husayn did not accept; Because he did not want to start a war.
On 2 October 680 (2 Muharram 61 AH), Husayn arrived at Karbala, a desert plain 70 kilometers (43 mi) north of Kufa, and set up camp.
On the following day, a 4,000-strong Kufan army arrived under the command of Umar ibn Sa'd. He had been appointed governor of Rayy to suppress a local rebellion, but then recalled to confront Husayn. Initially, he was unwilling to fight Husayn, but complied following Ibn Ziyad's threat to revoke his governorship. After negotiations with Husayn, Ibn Sa'd wrote to Ibn Ziyad that Husayn was willing to return. Ibn Ziyad replied that Husayn must surrender or he should be subdued by force, and that to compel him, he and his companions should be denied access to the Euphrates river. Ibn Sa'd stationed 500 horsemen on the route leading to the river. Husayn and his companions remained without water for three days before a group of fifty men led by his half-brother Abbas was able to access the river. They could only fill twenty water-skins.
Husayn and Ibn Sa'd met during the night to negotiate a settlement; it was rumored that Husayn made three proposals: either he be allowed to return to Medina, submit to Yazid directly, or be sent to a border post where he would fight alongside the Muslim armies. According to Madelung, these reports are probably untrue as Husayn at this stage is unlikely to have considered submitting to Yazid. A mawla of Husayn's wife later claimed that Husayn had suggested that he be allowed to leave, so that all parties could allow the fluid political situation to clarify. Ibn Sa'd sent the proposal, whatever it was, to Ibn Ziyad, who is reported to have accepted but then persuaded otherwise by Shemr ibn Ziljawshan. Shemr argued that Husayn was in his domain and letting him go would be to demonstrate weakness. Ibn Ziyad then sent Shemr with orders to ask Husayn for his allegiance once more and to attack, kill and disfigure him if he was to refuse, as "a rebel, a seditious person, a brigand, an oppressor and he was to do no further harm after his death". If Ibn Sa'd was unwilling to carry out the attack, he was instructed to hand over command to Shemr. Ibn Sa'd cursed Shemr and accused him of foiling his attempts to reach a peaceful settlement but agreed to carry out the orders. He remarked that Husayn would not submit because there was "a proud soul in him".
The army advanced toward Husayn's camp on the evening of 9 October. Husayn sent Abbas to ask Ibn Sa'd to wait until the next morning, so that they could consider the matter. Ibn Sa'd agreed to this respite. Husayn told his men that they were all free to leave, with his family, under the cover of night, since their opponents only wanted him. Very few availed themselves of this opportunity. Defense arrangements were made: tents were brought together and tied to one another and a ditch was dug behind the tents and filled with wood ready to be set alight in case of attack. Husayn and his followers then spent the rest of the night praying. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Husayn_ibn_Ali |
Algeria | Under the pretext of a slight to their consul, the French invaded and captured Algiers in 1830. According to several historians, the methods used by the French to establish control over Algeria reached genocidal proportions. Historian Ben Kiernan wrote on the French conquest of Algeria: "By 1875, the French conquest was complete. The war had killed approximately 825,000 indigenous Algerians since 1830." French losses from 1831 to 1851 were 92,329 dead in the hospital and only 3,336 killed in action. In 1872, The Algerian population stood at about 2.9 million. French policy was predicated on "civilising" the country. The slave trade and piracy in Algeria ceased following the French conquest. The conquest of Algeria by the French took some time and resulted in considerable bloodshed. A combination of violence and disease epidemics caused the indigenous Algerian population to decline by nearly one-third from 1830 to 1872. On 17 September 1860, Napoleon III declared "Our first duty is to take care of the happiness of the three million Arabs, whom the fate of arms has brought under our domination." During this time, only Kabylia resisted, the Kabylians were not colonized until after the Mokrani Revolt in 1871.
Alexis de Tocqueville wrote and never completed an unpublished essay outlining his ideas for how to transform Algeria from an occupied tributary state to a colonial regime, wherein he advocated for a mixed system of "total domination and total colonization" whereby French military would wage total war against civilian populations while a colonial administration would provide rule of law and property rights to settlers within French occupied cities.
From 1848 until independence, France administered the whole Mediterranean region of Algeria as an integral part and département of the nation. One of France's longest-held overseas territories, Algeria became a destination for hundreds of thousands of European immigrants, who became known as colons and later, as Pied-Noirs. Between 1825 and 1847, 50,000 French people emigrated to Algeria. These settlers benefited from the French government's confiscation of communal land from tribal peoples, and the application of modern agricultural techniques that increased the amount of arable land. Many Europeans settled in Oran and Algiers, and by the early 20th century they formed a majority of the population in both cities.
During the late 19th and early 20th century, the European share was almost a fifth of the population. The French government aimed at making Algeria an assimilated part of France, and this included substantial educational investments especially after 1900. The indigenous cultural and religious resistance heavily opposed this tendency, but in contrast to the other colonized countries' path in central Asia and Caucasus, Algeria kept its individual skills and a relatively human-capital intensive agriculture.
During the Second World War, Algeria came under Vichy control before being liberated by the Allies in Operation Torch, which saw the first large-scale deployment of American troops in the North African campaign.
Gradually, dissatisfaction among the Muslim population, which lacked political and economic status under the colonial system, gave rise to demands for greater political autonomy and eventually independence from France. In May 1945, the uprising against the occupying French forces was suppressed through what is now known as the Sétif and Guelma massacre. Tensions between the two population groups came to a head in 1954, when the first violent events of what was later called the Algerian War began after the publication of the Declaration of 1 November 1954. Historians have estimated that between 30,000 and 150,000 Harkis and their dependents were killed by the National Liberation Front (FLN) or by lynch mobs in Algeria. The FLN used hit and run attacks in Algeria and France as part of its war, and the French conducted severe reprisals. In addition, the French destroyed over 8,000 villages and relocated over 2 million Algerians to concentration camps.
The war led to the death of hundreds of thousands of Algerians and hundreds of thousands of injuries. Historians, like Alistair Horne and Raymond Aron, state that the actual number of Algerian Muslim war dead was far greater than the original FLN and official French estimates but was less than the 1 million deaths claimed by the Algerian government after independence. Horne estimated Algerian casualties during the span of eight years to be around 700,000. The war uprooted more than 2 million Algerians.
The war against French rule concluded in 1962, when Algeria gained complete independence following the March 1962 Evian agreements and the July 1962 self-determination referendum. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algeria |
Yahya Muhammad Hamid ed-Din | From 1934 until his assassination in 1948, Yahya redirected his energies toward internal consolidation of his authority and the creation of a viable central government, answerable to him personally. To this end, control of the hinterland was strengthened by the establishment of a standing army and the naming of his sons as governors of key provinces. Tighter control over affairs in Sana'a, the capital, was assured by expanding the scope of administrative functions and appointing other sons as supervisors of old and new political institutions . The regime sent Yemen's first students abroad : military cadets to Iraq in the 1930s and civilian students, the "Famous Forty," to Lebanon in the late 1940s. An early attempt was made to introduce some direction to the nascent national economy by the establishment of a Yemen trading company. Even with these changes, Yahya's Yemen was a semi-feudal state in which even the most basic measures required his personal approval.
Imam Yahya was largely admired by the Jews of Yemen, who saw him as their patron and protector. Earlier, in 1906, the Jews of Sana'a had come out in full-force to welcome the Imam who returned to the city after the Turks had temporarily left it. However, by 1922, in response to outside pressure, Imam Yahya promulgated an edict that prohibited Yemeni Jewish emigration. Although the ban on emigration remained the official policy of the state until 1949, Jews were able to bypass its policy by secretly going into the British Protectorate of Aden. Throughout the early 1940s, Imam Yahya turned a blind eye to Jewish emigration, neither prohibiting it nor officially permitting it, but rather giving his unspoken consent to the departure of Jews from Sana'a and other central Yemeni settlements. During the Imam's reign, he reinforced an old edict prohibiting Jews from building their houses higher than Muslim houses. The Imam appointed Yihya Yitzhak Halevi as one of four representatives of the Jewish community, responsible for conveying matters of state to his community and collecting the annual Poll-tax, a position which he held until his death. After the Imam's assassination in 1948, the king's emigration policy continued under his son Ahmad. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yahya_Muhammad_Hamid_ed-Din |
Sultanate of Sulu | The Sulu sultanate became notorious for its so-called "Moro Raids" or acts of piracy on Spanish settlements in the Visayan areas with the aim of capturing slaves and other goods from these coastal towns. Tausug pirates used boats known collectively by Europeans as proas (predominantly the lanong and garay warships), which varied in design and were much lighter than the Spanish galleons and could easily out-sail these ships, and also often carried large swivel guns or lantaka and also carried a crew of pirates from different ethnic groups throughout Sulu, such as the Iranun, Bajaus and Tausugs alike. By the 18th century, Sulu pirates had become virtual masters of the Sulu seas and the surrounding areas, wreaking havoc on Spanish settlements. This prompted the Spaniards to build a number of fortifications across the Visayan islands of Cebu and Bohol; churches were built on higher ground, and watchtowers were built along coastlines to warn of impending raids.
The maritime supremacy of Sulu was not directly controlled by the sultan; independent datus and warlords waged their own wars against the Spaniards and even with the capture of Jolo on numerous occasions by the Spaniards, other settlements like Maimbung, Banguingui and Tawi-Tawi were used as assembly areas and hideouts for pirates.
The sultanate's control over the Sulu seas was at its height around the late 17th to early 18th centuries when Moro raids became very common for the Visayans and Spaniards.
In Sulu and in the Mindanao interior, the slave trade flourished and majority of the slaves that were being imported and exported were of Visayan ethnicity; the term Bisaya eventually became synonymous to "slave" in these areas. Its maritime supremacy over the Spaniards, at the time, the Spaniards acquired steam-powered ships that began to curb Muslim piracy in the region, the Moro piratical raids began to decrease in number until Governor Narciso Clavería launched the Balanguingui expedition in 1848 to crush the pirate settlements there, effectively ending the Moro pirate raids. By the last quarter of the 19th century, Moro pirates had virtually disappeared and the maritime influence of the sultanate became dependent on the Chinese junk trade. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sultanate_of_Sulu |
Nergal | Resheph, a western god of war and plague, was already associated with Nergal in Ebla in the third millennium BCE, though the connection was not exclusive, as he also occurs in contexts which seem to indicate a relation with Ea (known in Ebla as Hayya) instead. Furthermore, the Eblaite scribes never used Nergal's name as a logographic representation of Resheph's. According to Alfonso Archi, it is difficult to further speculate about the nature of Resheph and his relation to other deities in Eblaite religion due to lack of information about his individual characteristics. The equivalence between Nergal and the same western gods is also known from Ugarit, where Resheph was additionally associated with the planet Mars, much like Nergal in Mesopotamia. Documents from Emar on the Euphrates mention a god called "Nergal of the KI.LAM" (seemingly a term designating a market), commonly identified with Resheph by researchers. Additionally, "Lugal-Rasap" functioned as a title of Nergal in Mesopotamia according to god lists.
It has been proposed that in Urkesh, a Hurrian city in northern Syria, Nergal's name was used to represent a local deity of Hurrian origin logographically. Two possible explanations have been proposed: Aštabi and Kumarbi. The former was a god of Eblaite origin, later associated with Ninurta rather than Nergal, while the latter was the Hurrian "father of the gods", usually associated with Enlil and Dagan. Gernot Wilhelm concludes in a recent publication that the identification of Nergal in the early Urkesh inscriptions as Kumarbi is not implausible, but at the same remains impossible to conclusively prove. He points out that it is also not impossible that Kumarbi only developed as a distinct deity at a later point in time. Alfonso Archi notes that it also possible the god meant is Nergal himself, as he is attested in other Hurrian sources as an actively worshiped deity.
In the Yazılıkaya sanctuary, Nergal's name was apparently applied to a so-called "sword god" depicted on one of the reliefs, most likely a presently unidentified local god of death.
The Elamite god Simut was frequently associated with Nergal, shared his association with the planet Mars and possibly his warlike character, though unlike his Mesopotamian counterpart he was not an underworld deity. In one case he appears alongside Laṣ. Wouter Henkelman additionally proposes that "Nergal of Hubshal (or Hubshan)" known from Assyrian sources was Simut. However, other identities of the deity identified by this moniker have been proposed as well, with Volkert Haas instead identifying him as Ugur. Yet another possibility is that Emu was the deity meant.
Based on lexical lists, two Kassite gods were identified with Nergal, Shugab and Dur.
In a Middle Assyrian god list, "Kammush" appears among the epithets of Nergal. According to Wilfred G. Lambert it cannot be established whether this indicates an equation with either the third millennium BCE god Kamish known from the Ebla texts, or the Iron Age god Chemosh from Moab.
In late, Hellenistic sources from Palmyra, Hatra and Tarsus Heracles served as the interpretatio graeca of Nergal. Heracles and Nergal were also both (at different points in time) associated with the Anatolian god Sandas. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nergal |
Ghadir Khumm | In Shia and some Sunni sources, two verses of the Qur'an are associated with the Ghadir Khumm: verse 5:3, which announces the perfection of Islam, and verse 5:67, which urges Muhammad to fulfill his divine instructions. The latter, sometimes known as the verse of tabligh (Arabic: تبليغ, lit. 'proclamation'), has been linked to the Ghadir Khumm by the Sunni exegetes al-Suyuti (d. 1505) and al-Razi (d. 1210), and the Shi'a exegete al-Qumi (d. 939), among others. The verse of tabligh warns Muhammad:
O Messenger! Convey that which has been sent down unto thee from thy Lord, and if thou dost not, thou wilt not have conveyed His message. And God will protect thee from mankind. Surely God guides not disbelieving people.
Revealed before the Ghadir Khumm, according to the Shi'a, this verse spurred Muhammad to deliver his announcement about 'Ali, which he had delayed fearing the reaction of some of his companions. Sunnis offer different views, one of which connects this verse to Muhammad's criticism of Jews and Christians. Nevertheless, the verse of tabligh is highly likely linked to the events that followed the Farewell Pilgrimage, including the Ghadir Khumm, because chapter (sura) five of the Qur'an is often associated with Muhammad's final years in Medina. Verse 5:3 of the Qur'an, also known as the verse of ikmal al-din (Arabic: إِکْمَال الدِّيْن, lit. 'perfection of religion'), is similarly connected to the Ghadir Khumm in some Sunni reports by al-Tabari and the Sunni exegete al-Baghdadi (d. 1071), and by the Shia exegete al-Tusi (d. 1067), among others. In contrast, most Sunni commentators associate this verse with the Farewell Pilgrimage, and this is also the opinion of al-Ya'qubi. Among various Sunni views, the verse of ikmal al-din may refer to the establishment of the rites for Hajj during the Farewell Pilgrimage or the closure of Islamic legislation with the revelation of dietary instructions in the remainder of this verse, although some injunctions about riba were possibly revealed after this verse. The verse of ikmal al-din includes the passage:
This day those who disbelieve have despaired of your religion. So fear them not, but fear Me! This day I have perfected for you your religion, and completed My Blessing upon you, and have approved for you as religion, Submission (Islam). | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghadir_Khumm |
Energy in the State of Palestine | Almost all liquid fuel used in the Palestinian territories is supplied by or via Israel. The supply of petroleum is centrally located at two different terminals in the West Bank and one terminal at the Israel–Gaza barrier, at the Kerem Shalom crossing. These terminals do not have storage capacity for petroleum, which must therefore be used daily.
In the case of Gaza, imported fuel is required to power the Gaza power plant, as well as for transportation and generators. The diesel fuel has been exempted from the blockade of the Gaza Strip, with some limitations, which has been in place since 2007.
In 2011, Hamas began buying cheaper fuel from Egypt, bringing it via a network of tunnels, and refused to buy it from Israel.
In early 2012, disagreement between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas led to Egypt reducing supplies of fuel being smuggled through the tunnels, while Hamas continued to refuse to accept fuel from or via Israel. Egypt attempted to stop the use of tunnels for delivery of Egyptian fuel purchased by Palestinian authorities, and severely reduced supply through the tunnel network. As the crisis deepened, Hamas wanted fuel to be imported from Egypt with the Rafah terminal between Egypt and Gaza being equipped for fuel transfer, and refused to accept fuel delivered via Kerem Shalom. This proposal was inconsistent with Egypt's agreement with Israel and the PA.
In mid-February, the crisis escalated and Hamas rejected an Egyptian proposal to bring in fuel via Kerem Shalom. Ahmed Abu Al-Amreen of the Hamas-run Energy Authority refused it on the grounds that Kerem Shalom is operated by Israel. Egypt could not ship diesel fuel to Gaza through the Rafah crossing, which is limited to the movement of individuals.
In early March, the head of Gaza's Energy Authority again insisted that Egypt transfer fuel through Rafah, although this crossing was not equipped to handle the 500,000 litres needed each day. In late March, Egypt agreed to provide 600,000 litres of fuel to Gaza daily, but it had no way of delivering it to which Hamas would agree.
Israel permitted the entry of the normal diesel for hospitals, and also shipped 150,000 litres of diesel through Kerem Shalom, which was paid for by the Red Cross. In April 2012, the PA and Hamas reached a deal, with the involvement of the Red Cross, for the transfer of fuel via Kerem Shalom, with the fuel being accepted by the PA, which was then transferred to Hamas after Hamas made payment to the PA. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_in_the_State_of_Palestine |
Ancient Carthage | Carthage's economic successes, buoyed by its vast maritime trade network, led to the development of a powerful navy to protect and secure vital shipping lanes. Its hegemony brought it into increasing conflict with the Greeks of Syracuse, who also sought control of the central Mediterranean. Founded in the mid seventh century BC, Syracuse had risen to become one of the wealthiest and most powerful Greek city states, and the preeminent Greek polity in the region.
The island of Sicily, lying at Carthage's doorstep, became the main arena on which this conflict played out. From their earliest days, both the Greeks and Phoenicians had been attracted to the large, centrally-located island, each establishing a large number of colonies and trading posts along its coasts; battles raged between these settlements for centuries, with neither side ever having total, long-term control over the island.
In 480 BC, Gelo, the tyrant of Syracuse, attempted to unite the island under his rule with the backing of other Greek city-states. Threatened by the potential power of a united Sicily, Carthage intervened militarily, led by King Hamilcar of the Magonid dynasty. Traditional accounts, including by Herodotus and Diodorus, number Hamilcar's army at around 300,000; though likely exaggerated, it was likely of formidable strength.
While sailing to Sicily, Hamilcar suffered losses due to poor weather. Landing at Panormus (modern-day Palermo), he spent three days reorganizing his forces and repairing his battered fleet. The Carthaginians marched along the coast to Himera, making camp before engaging in battle against the forces of Syracuse and its ally Agrigentum. The Greeks won a decisive victory, inflicting heavy losses on the Carthaginians, including their leader Hamilcar, who was either killed during the battle or committed suicide in shame. As a result, the Carthaginian nobility sued for peace.
The conflict proved to be a major turning point for Carthage. Though it would retain some presence in Sicily, most of the island would remain in Greek (and later Roman) hands. The Carthaginians would never again expand their territory or sphere of influence on the island to any meaningful degree, instead turning their attention to securing or increasing their hold in North Africa and Iberia. The death of King Hamilcar and the disastrous conduct of the war also prompted political reforms that established an oligarchic republic. Carthage would henceforth constrain its rulers through assemblies of both nobles and the common people. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ancient_Carthage |
Fatimid Caliphate | Abun-Nasr, Jamil (1987). A history of the Maghrib in the Islamic period. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521337674.
Brett, Michael (2001). The Rise of the Fatimids: The World of the Mediterranean and the Middle East in the Fourth Century of the Hijra, Tenth Century CE. The Medieval Mediterranean. Vol. 30. Leiden: Brill. ISBN 978-9004117419.
Brett, Michael (2017). The Fatimid Empire. The Edinburgh History of the Islamic Empires. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. ISBN 978-0-7486-4076-8.
Canard, Marius (1965). "Fāṭimids". In Lewis, B.; Pellat, Ch. & Schacht, J. (eds.). The Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Volume II: C–G. Leiden: E. J. Brill. pp. 850–862. OCLC 495469475.
Cortese, Delia, "Fatimids", in Muhammad in History, Thought, and Culture: An Encyclopedia of the Prophet of God (2 vols.), Edited by C. Fitzpatrick and A. Walker, Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO, 2014, Vol I, pp. 187–191.
Dachraoui, F. [in French] (1986). "al-Mahdī ʿUbayd Allāh". In Bosworth, C. E.; van Donzel, E.; Lewis, B. & Pellat, Ch. (eds.). The Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Volume V: Khe–Mahi. Leiden: E. J. Brill. pp. 1242–1244. ISBN 978-90-04-07819-2.
Daftary, Farhad (2007). The Ismāʿı̄lı̄s: Their History and Doctrines (Second ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-61636-2.
Daftary, Farhad (1999). "Fatimids". In Yarshater, Ehsan (ed.). Encyclopædia Iranica, Volume IX/4: Fārs II–Fauna III. London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul. pp. 423–426. ISBN 978-0-933273-32-0.
Halm, Heinz (1991). Das Reich des Mahdi: Der Aufstieg der Fatimiden (in German). Munich: C.H. Beck. ISBN 978-3-406-35497-7.
English translation: Halm, Heinz (1996). The Empire of the Mahdi: The Rise of the Fatimids. Translated by Bonner, Michael. Brill. ISBN 9004100563.
Halm, Heinz (2014). "Fāṭimids". In Fleet, Kate; Krämer, Gudrun; Matringe, Denis; Nawas, John; Rowson, Everett (eds.). Encyclopaedia of Islam (3rd ed.). Brill Online. ISSN 1873-9830.
Hofer, Nathan (2017). "Sufism in Fatimid Egypt and The Problem of Historiographical Inertia". Journal of Islamic Studies. 28 (1): 28–67. doi:10.1093/jis/etw042.
Kennedy, Hugh (2023). The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: The Islamic Near East from the 6th to the 11th Century (2nd ed.). Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-367-36690-2.
Köhler, Michael A. [in German] (2013). Hirschler, Konrad [in German] (ed.). Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle East. Translated by Holt, Peter M. Leiden: Brill. ISBN 978-90-04-24890-8.
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Lev, Yaacov (1995). "The Fatimids and Byzantium, tenth–12th Centuries". Graeco-Arabica. 6: 190–208. OCLC 183390203.
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Madelung, Wilferd (1978). "Ismāʿīliyya". In van Donzel, E.; Lewis, B.; Pellat, Ch. & Bosworth, C. E. (eds.). The Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Volume IV: Iran–Kha. Leiden: E. J. Brill. pp. 198–206. OCLC 758278456.
Madelung, W. (1986). "al-Mahdī". In Bosworth, C. E.; van Donzel, E.; Lewis, B. & Pellat, Ch. (eds.). The Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Volume V: Khe–Mahi. Leiden: E. J. Brill. pp. 1230–1238. ISBN 978-90-04-07819-2.
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Sanders, Paula (1994). Ritual, Politics, and the City in Fatimid Cairo. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. ISBN 0-7914-1781-6.
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Walker, Paul E. (1998). "The Ismā'īlī Da'wa and the Fātimid caliphate". In Petry, Carl F. (ed.). The Cambridge History of Egypt, Volume 1: Islamic Egypt, 640–1517. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 120–150. ISBN 0-521-47137-0.
Walker, Paul E. (2002). Exploring an Islamic Empire: Fatimid History and its Sources. London: I.B. Tauris. ISBN 978-1860646928.
Walker, Paul E. (2018). "Fāṭimids". In Madelung, Wilferd; Daftary, Farhad (eds.). Encyclopaedia Islamica Online. Brill Online. ISSN 1875-9831. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fatimid_Caliphate |
Hurrians | The Hurrian culture made a great impact on the religion of the Hittites. From the Hurrian cult centre at Kummanni in Kizzuwatna, Hurrian religion spread to the Hittite people. Syncretism merged the Old Hittite and Hurrian religions. Hurrian religion spread to Syria, where Baal became the counterpart of Teshub. The Hurrian religion, in different forms, influenced the entire ancient Near East, except ancient Egypt and southern Mesopotamia.
While the Hurrian and Urartian languages are related, there is little similarity between corresponding systems of belief.
The main gods in the Hurrian pantheon were:
Teshub, Teshup, the mighty weather god.
Hebat, Hepa, his wife, the mother goddess, later equated with the main sun goddess of the Hittites
Sarruma, Šarruma, their son, a mountain god of Syrian origin.
Kumarbi, grain god, the father of Teshub and a "father of gods" similar to Enlil; his home as described in mythology is the city of Urkesh.
Shaushka, Šauska, the Hurrian counterpart of Ishtar, and a goddess of love, war and healing.
Shimegi, Šimegi, the sun god.
Kushuh, Kušuh, the moon god and a guardian of oaths. Symbols of the sun and the crescent moon appear joined together in the Hurrian iconography.
Nergal, a Sumerian deity of the netherworld, who had a prominent temple in Urkesh in the earliest period of recorded Hurrian history. Possibly a stand-in for a god whose Hurrian name is presently unknown.
Ea, Hayya, the god of wisdom, who was also Sumerian in origin.
Allani, goddess of the netherworld.
Ishara, a goddess of Syrian origin.
Aštabi, a war god.
Nupatik, a prominent god of uncertain function.
Hutena and Hutellura, fate and birth goddesses.
Hurrian cylinder seals often depict mythological creatures such as winged humans or animals, dragons and other monsters. The interpretation of these depictions of gods and demons remains uncertain. They may have been both protective and evil spirits. Some are reminiscent of the Assyrian shedu.
The Hurrian gods do not appear to have had particular home temples, like in the Mesopotamian or Ancient Egyptian religion. Some important cult centres were Kummanni in Kizzuwatna and Hittite Yazilikaya. Harran was at least later a religious centre for the moon god, and Shauskha had an important temple in Nineve, when the city was under Hurrian rule. A temple of Nergal was built in Urkesh in the late third millennium BC. The town of Kahat was a religious centre in the kingdom of Mitanni.
The Hurrian myth "The Songs of Ullikummi", preserved among the Hittites, is a parallel to Hesiod's Theogony; the castration of Uranus by Cronus may be derived from the castration of Anu by Kumarbi, while Zeus's overthrow of Cronus and Cronus's regurgitation of the swallowed gods is like the Hurrian myth of Teshub and Kumarbi. It has been argued that the worship of Attis drew on Hurrian myth. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurrians |
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