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118. The Government submitted that the decision to grant a residence order in respect of the second applicant in favour of the mother had been based on the best interests of the child. There had therefore been no discrimination. The Government referred to the case of Tiemann v. France and Germany ((dec.), nos. 47457/99 and 47458/99, 27 April 2000) where the decisions to grant a residence order to the mother had been found to be in the bests interests of the children and therefore compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention. Like in Tiemann, the first applicant in the present case had been trying to separate the second applicant from his mother. In such circumstances the domestic courts had achieved a balance between the interests of the first applicant, the second applicant and M., in particular by granting the first applicant contact rights. Despite the fact that the second applicant lived in another town, the first applicant could still visit him and maintain contact by other means. | 11 |
30. The applicants submitted that the relationship between the first and second applicants came within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention because they remained married and had chosen to maintain regular contact with each other, including in order to continue jointly raising their young daughter. The ties between the first and the fourth applicants clearly fell within the scope of “family life” within the meaning of Article 8. Furthermore, the first applicant maintained a close relationship with the third applicant – his adult stepdaughter – and her child. The Government’s contention that the family unit had disintegrated ignored the reality of their relationship, and in particular the fact that the first applicant had to a great extent relied on the support of his family to be able to cope with and stabilise his mental health condition. | 11 |
145. The applicant contended that the regime covering covert surveillance between a detainee who was a “vulnerable person” within the meaning of the Code of Practice and an “appropriate adult” (see paragraph 13 above) was not “in accordance with the law” as required by paragraph 2 of Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, he submitted that even though these consultations were not protected by legal professional privilege, in view of the vulnerability of the detainee they should be as frank as possible. As such, they were analogous to consultations with legal and medical advisors and their covert surveillance should also have been treated as intrusive – rather than directed – surveillance. | 11 |
35. The applicant organisation complained that the entry of police officers onto its premises and the seizure of documents, public notary fees and taxes, as well as the questioning of its staff members, were unlawful, had impinged on its duty of professional secrecy and had breached its right to home, private life and correspondence under Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 11 |
28. The applicants also submitted that the twin daughters should, under Article <mask> of the Convention, be entitled to regular contact with their father. Moreover, the first applicant had become the father of a third child in 2012, from a relationship with another Swiss national. He was now living with her and they hoped to get married as soon as possible. | 11 |
25. The applicant complained about the courts’ judgments in the proceedings under the Media Act refusing him compensation in respect of the publication of an article and two photographs in the issue of Profil of 12 July 2004. He alleged a violation of his right to respect for his private life as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 11 |
43. The Government did not deny that the notion of private life, which was also referred to in Article <mask> of the Convention, could sometimes encompass information enabling a person’s physical or social identity to be established. However, they pointed out that the State had not refused to furnish the applicant with information but had taken into account her mother’s refusal from the beginning to allow her identity to be disclosed. | 11 |
56. The applicant complained under Articles 5 §§ 1, 3 and 4 of the Convention that his detention at the Kumkapı Foreigners’ Admission and Accommodation Centre had no legal basis and that there were no judicial remedies available to him to challenge the lawfulness of his detention. He maintained under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention that he had no right to compensation under domestic law in respect of these complaints. He further claimed under Article <mask> of the Convention that his right to family life had been breached on account of his unlawful detention. | 11 |
33. The applicant complained that his observation via GPS and its aggregation with several further measures of surveillance, as well as the use of the data obtained thereby in the criminal proceedings against him, had breached his right to respect for his private life as provided in Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: | 11 |
73. The applicant complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, he submitted that the construction of a cemetery near his house had led to the contamination of his supply of drinking water and water used for private gardening purposes, preventing him from making normal use of his home and its amenities, including the soil of his own plot of land, and negatively affecting his and his family’s physical and mental health. | 11 |
13. The applicant complained under Articles 6 § 3 (c) and 8 of the Convention that letters from his lawyers and from the Registry of the Court had been opened and read by the administration of Lovech Prison. The Court is of the view that the complaint falls to be examined solely under Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 11 |
31. The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention had had a legal basis in Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Constitution of 1991 and the relevant provisions of the CCP, which were fully in line with the requirements of the Convention. The interference had furthermore pursued a legitimate aim and had been necessary for its attainment. The search in the applicant’s office had been directly related to the needs of the investigation, as the objects found and seized there had had a direct link with the offence under investigation. Moreover, both the applicant and two independent observers – neighbours who had had no interest in the outcome of the case – had been present during the search. The intrusion in the applicant’s privacy had been kept to a minimum: the contents of his computer’s hard drive and of the seized disks had been explored through a special piece of software using keywords, which meant that the contents of his electronic documents had not been checked in full. There was no indication that the information obtained had been revealed to a third party, copied or improperly used. Finally, the interference had not lasted unreasonably long, as the computer had been given back to the applicant two months after its seizure. | 11 |
56. The Government contested these arguments and maintained that the apartment block in question had not been an illegal construction although the administrative proceedings concerning the building permit disclosed some irregularities of a procedural nature. They submitted that the major part of the land in question had been, at least since the 1970s, designated for multi-family housing. It could not therefore be said that the local development plan was suddenly altered to a substantial degree. Moreover, the applicants did not sustain any damage on account of the apartment block having been constructed on the adjacent plot of land. In particular, they were not prevented from constructing on the land belonging to them as the local authorities had granted the first applicant planning permission in 1997 and 2001. Only one of the three applicants still lived in Puławy and the others had been living in Austria and in Germany and therefore they could not claim a violation of their right to respect for their “home” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. Finally, the Government indicated several types of remedies which the applicants should have exhausted before making their complaint to the Court. In particular they should have brought a civil action for compensation if they had sustained any damage in consequence of the actions of public authorities or the private investor. The Government underlined that the apartment block had been built legally, in accordance with all safety and technical requirements, and that thus there had been no obligation on the authorities to demolish it or to prevent its construction. | 11 |
44. The applicant maintained that the reversal of the award for damages in respect of his dismissal from the Police Force because he had allegedly been negligent towards the acts of torture committed by other officers in his control, was plainly incompatible with the respondent State’s obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention. The reversal of the award had undermined the protection of his moral and psychological integrity and reputation, being encompassed in the protection guaranteed by Article 8. | 11 |
89. The applicant complained that her right to respect for her private and family life had been violated as a result of her sterilisation, which had been carried out contrary to the requirements of the relevant law and without her and her mother’s full and informed consent. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention which, in its relevant parts, provides: | 11 |
66. The applicant complained that the domestic authorities had failed to secure his right to respect for his family life guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention in that they had not acted expeditiously in the non-contentious proceedings for the return of his son under the Hague Convention. He also complained that the length of those proceedings was incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and under Article 13 that he had not had an effective remedy for his Convention complaints. The relevant part of those Articles reads as follows: | 11 |
38. The applicants, without relying on any particular provision of the Convention, complain that their dismissal based on the allegation of the commission of criminal offences for which they have been acquitted brought great shame on them and that it deprived them of their material well-being. The Court, being a master of characterisation to be given in law to the facts of any case before it (see Akdeniz v. Turkey, no. 25165/94, § 88, 31 May 2005), considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: | 11 |
41. The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the courts’ assessment of the evidence and interpretation of the law and challenged the outcome of the proceedings. She further complained under Articles 3 and 14 of the Convention of her own suffering and discrimination allegedly caused by the domestic courts. The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the State authorities had failed to respect her right to a home guaranteed by this provision. She also relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. | 11 |
39. The applicant complained that there was a breach of his right to respect of family life in that the domestic courts failed to correctly apply the Hague Convention criteria when deciding on his request for a return order. The complaint falls to be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention. He also claimed under Article 6 of the Convention that the proceedings under the Hague Convention had been unfair. Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention provide, in so far as relevant: | 11 |
77. The applicants complained, firstly, that their children had been placed in care unjustifiably, and, secondly, by a letter of 12 April 2012, that they had been unable to obtain the children’s return to their family, given the dismissal of their action by the Bucharest Court of Appeal in a final judgement of 20 March 2012. They relied in essence on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides: | 11 |
110. The applicants asserted that Article <mask> of the Convention guaranteed the right to a normal family life and was therefore applicable to the present case, regard being had in particular to the Court’s extensive view of the question. They argued that the Law of 4 March 2002 had infringed that right and constituted interference with its exercise, but that none of the conditions required for such interference to be compatible with the Convention, namely that it should be in accordance with the law, pursue a legitimate aim and be necessary, had been satisfied. In the first place, the legislation was neither clear nor precise, contrary to the requirements established by the Court’s case-law, in that the reference to national solidarity remained vague and imprecise. Secondly, and above all, the interference did not pursue a legitimate and compelling objective. In particular, the considerations linked to improving the organisation of the health service, chief among which was the concern to avoid increases in insurance premiums for doctors and health-care establishments, could not justify giving the latter immunity in respect of their negligent acts or omissions. As regards the State’s positive obligation, this could not be considered to have been discharged since, by depriving C. and her parents of a remedy whereby they could obtain compensation for the damage consisting of the special burdens arising from her disability, the legislature had prevented the family’s interests from being protected practically and effectively. | 11 |
64. The applicants complained that the decisions of the domestic courts in the main proceedings to withdraw parts of their parental authority had been disproportionate and had been based on unfair proceedings that had lacked sufficient factual foundation. They further alleged that their religious beliefs were the reason their parental rights had been withdrawn and that they had been prevented from raising their children in compliance with their religious beliefs. Lastly, the applicants complained that the main proceedings before the family courts had been unreasonably long. The applicants relied on Article <mask> of the Convention. Moreover, they invoked Articles 6 § 1 and 9 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. The Court, as master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Kutzner v. Germany, no. 46544/99, § 56, ECHR 2002‑I), finds it appropriate to examine all complaints solely under Article 8 of the Convention, which reads, as far as relevant, as follows: | 11 |
169. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 3 (a) of the Convention that he had not been informed promptly of the nature and cause of the accusation against him in the second set of proceedings. He also complained under Article 7 that, in both sets of criminal proceedings, the acts for which he had been convicted did not constitute a criminal offence. Lastly, he complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the searches conducted on 22 May 2007 in his flat and the newspapers' office had violated his right to respect for his home. | 11 |
28. The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that their right to family life had been infringed as a result of the Austrian courts’ decisions to refuse them access to their former foster child. They also submitted that the conduct of the Austrian courts amounted to a breach of the “reasonable time” requirement under Article 6 of the Convention. The Government contested that argument. | 11 |
80. The applicant complained that he had not been allowed to meet in private with his lawyer and had been separated from him by a glass partition, preventing normal discussion or work with documents. As a result they had had to shout to hear each other and had both refused on several occasions to meet in such conditions, informing the court that they were unable to prepare for hearings. The applicant lodged his initial complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention but in his subsequent observations he referred to it under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. | 11 |
56. The applicants initially complained that the first applicant’s expulsion to Turkey would entail a violation not only of Article 8 but also of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. However, after his expulsion to Turkey on 16 July 2011, they submitted in their pleadings to the Court of 18 October 2011 that they only maintained their complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
41. The Government said in conclusion that the child's persistent refusal to see her mother was the only reason why the access arrangements had not been complied with. It would be going beyond the State's positive obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention to take coercive measures to force the child to meet her mother. Therefore, even assuming that there had been an interference with the applicant's right to respect for her family life, it had been justified under paragraph 2 of Article 8. | 11 |
51. The applicants complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention by reason of the unlawful search at their apartment and the failure to investigate properly their complaint concerning that search. They further complained that, in relation to the search on 2 November, that the warrant issued was both imprecise and contained errors. Article 8 reads as follows: | 11 |
17. The Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. The eviction order had been in accordance with the law; it had pursued a legitimate aim and had been necessary in order to protect the rights of individuals in need of housing. The Government also pointed out that the applicant had not brought any counter-claim against the administration of Grozny and had not submitted any claims for provision with alternative accommodation. Furthermore, the applicant had not applied to the state authorities with a request to help her with solving her housing problem. After her eviction the applicant had returned living to the flat in which she had been registered until 2005. | 11 |
28. The applicant claimed that the Swiss authorities had not complied with their obligations, inherent in Article <mask> of the Convention, to allow him to reside in Switzerland, thereby enabling him to enjoy family and private life in that country. He submitted that his personal interests in remaining in Switzerland outweighed the State’s interest in securing public order and safety, and that his expulsion for an undetermined period of time was a disproportionate measure under Article 8 of the Convention. He alleged that the facts of his case were comparable to those in Emre v. Switzerland (no. 42034/04, 22 May 2008) because he too had been living in Switzerland for a long time, had established strong social and professional ties to that country and no longer had ties with his home country, Peru. In addition, he was enjoying family life in Switzerland since he had been residing there with his second wife between 2005 and 2008, and several of his brothers and sisters were living in the respondent State. Furthermore, by contrast to Emre (cited above), he had been sentenced only once. | 11 |
20. The applicant maintained under Article <mask> of the Convention that his appointment to the new post -which had compelled him to move to another city- as well as alleged unfounded accusations against him, had interfered with his right to respect for family life. He further claimed that financial consequences arising from his appointment, such as transportation and accommodation costs, had amounted to a violation of his rights under Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the Convention | 11 |
58. The Government averred that the applicants’ complaint under Article 8 refers only to the fact that the alleged perpetrators had been acquitted and that the applicants had been forced to leave town in order to protect the first applicant after the incidents. In their view, these aspects should not fall within the realm of Article <mask> of the Convention and in any case the applicants could not be considered victims of a violation of that Article. They put forward that the applicants had chosen to leave and had not been forced to do so by the authorities; the applicants had also waited for nine months after the end of the proceedings and almost seven years after the events before they had actually moved. The Government also pointed out that the applicants had failed to complain to the authorities about any impact on their private and family lives of the allegedly ineffective investigation. | 11 |
78. The applicant stated that her inability to effectively opt for any alternative model of childbirth and the requirement for her to surrender to the obstetric model of birth care in hospital – causing her to experience obstetric violence – represented a serious breach of her right to decide on the circumstances in which to give birth, and interference with her right to physical and psychological integrity under Article <mask> of the Convention. Although she believed that the circumstances of her case called for an assessment primarily in terms of the Government’s positive obligations, the applicant intended to apply a holistic approach to the assessment of whether the damage sustained by her was justifiable in the light of the relevant principles of the Convention, bearing in mind that the underlying principles of legality, legitimacy and proportionality were inherent in both the positive and negative obligations of the State. | 11 |
52. The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to substantiate her complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention by specifying any particular consequences that the police decision had had on her private life. Moreover, the police decision predominantly consisted of allegations made by the applicant's husband. The applicant had not shown that she had attempted to contest these allegations domestically, for example, by filing an action under Articles 11 et. seq. of the Civil Code, or by a criminal complaint against her husband on the grounds of false accusation. Nor had the applicant claimed before the Court that her husband's allegations were false. | 11 |
42. The applicants submitted that the second applicant was integrated in Austria and had a right to an employment permit under Article <mask> of the Convention. They submitted in this regard that the second applicant had been legally residing in Austria since 1991 and had a wife and a daughter in Austria who, in the interim, had become Austrian nationals. He had already worked for the applicant company for seven years. The applicants submitted that a claim to work by a foreign worker permanently established with his family in the host country was, at the very least, an arguable right. The right of a foreign employee to an employment permit was furthermore indirectly recognised by the case-law of the Constitutional Court according to which an alien was not to be discriminated against by another alien. Further, the competent authorities did not have an unfettered discretion to decide whether or not an employment permit should be granted but were bound by the conditions laid down in the Employment of Aliens Act. The applicants argued that the second applicant’s right to employment in Austria could be deduced from the Geneva Refugee Convention, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Association Agreement between Austria and Turkey and the European Social Charter. | 11 |
84. The Government objected that the scope of the applicant’s original complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention, as expressed in his initial submission and defined by the Court’s admissibility decision, did not cover his subsequent objections in respect of the continued existence of his StB file in the State’s hands, its legal framework, legitimacy and proportionality. They maintained that, in any event, the last-mentioned criteria were met. | 11 |
34. The Government claimed that the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her home had been proportionate and “necessary in a democratic society” because the applicant had moved into the flat unlawfully and she had had an alternative place in which to live. In addition, the interference had aimed to protect A.’s right to respect for his home. In that respect, while the lawfulness of establishing one’s home in a particular place and the availability of alternative accommodation might be relevant for the assessment of the proportionality of an eviction, the Court observes that those matters were not examined by the domestic courts in the present case. As regards A.’s interests, the Court agrees that in the present case the domestic courts had to balance two competing private interests, namely A.’s right and the applicant’s right to occupy the State-owned flat under a social tenancy agreement following the death of the tenant. However, the Court is not convinced that in taking the decision to evict the applicant, the domestic courts balanced those interests in a way compatible with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
33. The applicant complained of ill-treatment by the police which had seriously endangered his life and had led to serious consequences for his health. He also complained of the lack of an effective investigation into his allegations. The applicant further submitted that there had been a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention as a result of the physical harm suffered by him and that, in breach of Article 13 of the Convention, he had had no effective remedies against the breaches enumerated above. Articles 2, 3, 8 and 13 of the Convention, on which the applicant relied, read as follows: | 11 |
45. The applicant also complained under Articles 3, 6 and 13 of the Convention that his appeal against the judgment of 8 June 2004 had not been examined. In his letter of 30 October 2006 the applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about monitoring of his correspondence with a non-governmental organisation. Lastly, he complained under Article 34 of the Convention about his transfer from one prison to another. | 11 |
56. The applicants’ complaints concerning the procedure followed by the Italian courts were communicated to the Government under Article <mask> of the Convention, which, whilst it contains no explicit procedural requirements, requires that the decision-making process leading to measures of interference must be fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded by that Article (see, inter alia, Iosub Caras v. Romania, no. 7198/04, § 41, 27 July 2006, and Moretti and Benedetti v. Italy, no. 16318/07, § 27, ECHR 2010‑... (extracts)). | 11 |
26. The Government submitted that the applicant had not been subject to any physical or verbal violence subsequent to the publication of the article. They further maintained that the applicant had requested the public prosecutor’s office to punish the author of the article published in the Bolu Express and had not requested security protection. The Government therefore considered that there had been no violation of Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention in the present case. They stated, however, that the applicant’s complaints under this head should be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention. At the same time, the Government did not submit any observations under Article 8 and left it to the Court’s discretion to rule on the applicant’s complaints under this head. | 11 |
92. The Government of Cyprus submitted that the killing of Solomos Solomou, a member of the applicants’ family, was a deliberate action destroying the family unit as such, which violated Article <mask> of the Convention. They furthermore submitted that, in breach of Article 14 of the Convention, the Turkish authorities had adopted a discriminatory policy with regard to Greek Cypriots. It was hard to believe that Turkey would have acted in the same murderous way if Solomos Solomou had been a Turk. | 11 |
37. The applicant submitted that the searches at his office and apartment constituted an interference with his rights guaranteed under Article <mask> of the Convention. He considered that, while pursuing a legitimate aim under paragraph 2 of that Article, the interference was neither “in accordance with the law”, nor “necessary in a democratic society”. In particular, he referred to the lack of detail in the court’s decision authorising the searches, which failed to identify the object(s) to be searched, the time-frame for the searches or the person responsible for carrying it out, despite express legal requirements to give such detail. Moreover, the searches conducted on the basis of vaguely worded search warrants and without any special measures being taken to safeguard the confidentiality of files in a lawyer’s office, necessarily resulted in a disproportionate interference with the applicant’s rights. In particular, he referred to the opening, by the investigating authority, of his safe and of all his files at his office, which undermined his lawyer-client privilege. | 11 |
120. The applicants did not allege a lack of effective domestic remedies in respect of their complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court decided of its own motion to examine this question under Article 13 in the present case (see, for a similar approach, Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), no. 33509/04, § 89, ECHR 2009), and requested the parties in applications nos. 35090/09, 35845/11, and 45694/13 to address the issue of availability of effective domestic remedies. Article 13 of the Convention provides as follows: | 11 |
52. The applicants complained that the freeing order was a disproportionate interference with their rights guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention because the domestic authorities failed to keep their assessment of their family situation under review and because the reasons given by the trial judge were neither relevant nor sufficient. The applicants also argued that, procedurally, it was improper for a freeing order to have been made in advance of an adoption order. If the freeing order had been refused, the applicants would have been able to participate at the adoption order hearing. | 11 |
24. The Government did not dispute the applicability of Article <mask> of the Convention to the circumstances of the present case. They submitted, however, that the applicants could hardly be considered as having been adversely affected by the absence of the possibility to have long-term family visits, given that they had not even been using their right to short-term visits. The Government observed in that connection that the second applicant had visited the first applicant only on two occasions in 2003 and 2004 and never thereafter. | 11 |
89. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention of the outcome of the criminal proceedings brought by him against his former wife in so far as he stated that the authorities had shown themselves to be partial and to favour his wife, and that the same facts as those which constituted the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention also gave rise to a breach of Articles 13 and 5 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention. | 11 |
45. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that not being allowed long-stay visits from his partner and his sister had caused him intolerable mental and physical suffering. He also complained, under Article 8 taken in conjunction with Article 14, that his entitlement in that connection had been restricted more than that of a convicted person serving a prison sentence. The relevant parts of Article 8 and Article 14 provide as follows: | 11 |
47. The applicant also contested the argument that there was a public interest in the article at issue. Even if there were a public debate about the occurrences at the seminary or about the moral standards proclaimed by the Roman Catholic Church in respect of homosexuality, this did not justify attacking him in a defamatory manner, giving his full name and publishing a picture taken at a private party. He alleged that to permit reporting on his private life and publication of his picture just because he was a priest deprived him of the protection which was afforded to any other person under Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
73. The Government further submitted that the present case was different from the case of Görgülü v. Germany, (no. 74969/01, 26 February 2004), where the Court had found a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, because by contrast to the Görgülü case, the child in the present case was older than ten years of age and the first applicant had not been prevented from maintaining contact with her. Indeed, X had stated in the domestic proceedings that her grandparents had not prevented her from communicating with her father, but that her father had never attempted to contact her. In any event, the first applicant had never applied for contact rights. There was also evidence in the case file that X had been traumatised by the only contact she had had with her father, in January 2010 (see paragraph 26 above). | 11 |
143. The applicants’ complaint concerning their inability to enjoy family life with Arbi Karimov concerns the same facts as those examined above under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. Having regard to its above findings under these provisions, the Court considers that this complaint should be declared admissible. However, it finds that no separate issue arises under Article <mask> of the Convention in this respect (see, mutatis mutandis, Ruianu v. Romania, no. 34647/97, § 66, 17 June 2003; Laino v. Italy [GC], no. 33158/96, § 25, ECHR 1999‑I; and Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, 16 December 1997, § 50 Reports 1997‑VIII). | 11 |
104. The applicants complained that the State authorities had not complied with their procedural positive obligation under Article 3 and/or Article <mask> of the Convention in that they had refused to prosecute the first applicant’s father for the criminal offence of child abuse he had committed against her. They also complained that the domestic authorities had not discharged their positive obligation under either of those Articles in that they had failed to remove the first applicant from her father’s care and thus prevent him from committing further violent acts against her. Those Articles read as follows: | 11 |
19. The applicant alleged that there had been a breach of his right to respect for his private life on account of the order to provide a biological sample for inclusion in the FNAEG and the fact that his refusal to comply with that order has resulted in a criminal conviction. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides: | 11 |
116. The applicants invoked Article <mask> of the Convention, arguing that the abuse suffered by them in their private and family life and the local authority’s lack of action to prevent that abuse was a violation of their right to respect for their physical and moral integrity. They had needed protection from the assaults and abuse, which could and should have been provided by the local authority in whom the care of the applicants had been vested. | 11 |
49. The applicants complained that their separation during the ten days that the second applicant was in hospital violated their right to respect for their private and family life under Article <mask> of the Convention. The second applicant further complained that the decision to take a blood sample and photographs without consent constituted an unjustified and disproportionate interference with her physical and moral integrity. | 11 |
57. The applicant complained that the domestic authorities had failed to secure her right to respect for her family life in that: (a) they had not taken any measures to facilitate the voluntary return of her children; (b) the domestic courts had not acted expeditiously in the proceedings for the return of children; and (c) in the same proceedings the courts had refused to order the return of her children. She also complained that by deciding in the civil proceedings for divorce and child custody that all three of her children were to live with their father, the domestic courts had breached her right to respect for her family life. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows: | 11 |
28. The Government argued that the German courts had not failed to protect the applicant’s right under Article <mask> of the Convention when they had refused his request for an injunction. The courts had extensively examined his action in line with the Court’s case-law regarding balancing Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention. The German courts had correctly concluded that the journalist had complied with his journalistic duty of care. In particular, the article had been free from exaggerations and based on reliable official reports. Both aspects had been considered by the Court of Appeal in detail. Moreover, the Government submitted that the public had a valid interest in the publication of articles in an online archive of a newspaper, if they had been lawfully published originally and were recognisable as archived old-news stories. In the present case, both requirements had been met. Lastly, the Government pointed out that the applicant’s submissions regarding the right to be forgotten and the correlating judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union were negligible, since the judgment concerned completely different circumstances and no relevant principles could be derived from it for the present case. | 11 |
14. The applicant also complained of a violation of his right to respect for his family life resulting from the length of the proceedings complained of. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, he submitted that due to the unreasonable length of the proceedings, his company went bankrupt, and that he was under criminal indictment for an excessive period. | 11 |
40. The applicant alleged that he had not been provided with an opportunity to appeal against the decision of 31 May 2002, in contravention of Articles 3, 5 and 6 of the Convention. He further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that Dr. N's visit to his flat on 5 June 2002 had been an interference with his right to respect for his private life and that, on the basis of her decision of 5 June 2002 to admit him to hospital, he had been arrested and taken to a police station. He complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that his involuntary placement in a psychiatric hospital might warrant the restriction of his legal capacity, in which case he would be unable to sell or buy property. Lastly, without providing further detail, the applicant alleged a violation of his rights provided for in Articles 2, 4, 7 to 10, 13, 17, and 18 of the Convention. | 11 |
73. The applicants submitted that the second applicant’s detention also violated Article <mask> of the Convention as it constituted disproportionate interference with their right to respect for their private and family life. The Belgian State was or should have been aware of the first applicant’s refugee status in Canada because of the letters it had received from Mr Ma. and the UNHCR’s intervention. The applicants argued that family reunification was a fundamental right of refugees and cited, among other authorities, Recommendation 1327 (1997)of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the protection and reinforcement of the human rights of refugees and asylum-seekers in Europe. In their submission, the obligations incumbent on States that were parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child signed in New York on 20 November 1989 (and in particular, Articles 3 and 10 thereof) could be used as a guide when assessing whether the interference with the child’s family life had been necessary. The reasons given by the Government in no way justified the interference, which had consisted of the second applicant’s detention notwithstanding a proposal by her lawyer for her to be placed with foster parents. Her illegal entry was not a reason for denying her fundamental rights; nor did her inability to travel to the Netherlands prevent her placement with foster parents. Furthermore, although family reunification in Canada would have taken some time, there had been no need to keep the child in a closed centre. Nor could the fact that members of her family had been located in Kinshasa serve to justify her detention since she was the daughter of a person with recognised refugee status and her return to her country of origin placed her safety and even her life at risk. The fact that the first applicant had been granted refugee status in Canada should, furthermore, have alerted the Belgian authorities to the need to act with great caution. Lastly, while the applicants accepted that the first applicant had been wrong to ask her brother to bring her daughter to Europe, they said that she had done so in the belief that it was in her daughter’s best interests. | 11 |
105. The applicant submitted that the prolonged distress and anguish caused by his son's disappearance over the past eleven years amounted to a violation of his right to respect for family life within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. According to the applicant, this breach was the direct result of the respondent State's failure to protect his son's right to life, liberty and security pursuant to Articles 2 and 5 of the Convention. | 11 |
82. The applicants claimed 60,000 euros (EUR) (EUR 20,000 each) in respect of the non‑pecuniary damage arising out of the violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. They submitted that their physical separation had engendered feelings of loneliness and hopelessness. The second applicant had had to take sedatives for a year after the expulsion of her husband. The relationship between the first applicant and his daughter had suffered serious damage as a result of their being apart. This had been exacerbated by the fact that the third applicant had epilepsy, which had grown worse as a result of the stress caused by her father’s absence. The option for the whole family to settle in Turkey was not viable because there, unlike in Bulgaria, the costly medication needed for the third applicant’s epilepsy would not be provided free of charge. Moreover, neither the second nor the third applicant spoke Turkish. | 11 |
43. The applicants complained that the exclusion order against the first applicant gave rise to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicants further complained that their separation as a result of the exclusion order caused both of them irreparable mental harm and therefore constituted inhuman and degrading treatment pursuant to Article 3 of the Convention. The Court considers that the complaint concerning the effects of the expulsion on the applicants’ mental health also falls under Article 8 (see Bensaid v. the United Kingdom, no. 44599/98, §§ 46-47, ECHR 2001‑I, with further references), and will consequently examine it under that head. Article 8 reads as follows: | 11 |
59. The applicant stressed in particular that the interference with his private and family life had not been in accordance with the law, had not pursued a legitimate aim and had been disproportionate. He pointed out that although he had been dismissed as a result of the withdrawal of his canonical mandate, this measure had been a direct consequence of his second marriage. Thus, his chances of pursuing his specific professional activity had been seriously affected on account of events mainly related to the personal choices he had made in the context of his private and family life. Moreover, precisely because of his specialised educational background and skills, it had been difficult for him to secure alternative employment or be entitled to social assistance. He therefore considered that this clearly showed that there had been an interference with his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
51. The Government claimed that the applicant’s complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention was inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. In particular, in connection with the first aspect of the complaint concerning the period of his pre-trial detention, they submitted that the applicant had never requested a family visit in accordance with the procedure provided for in section 89 of the Law on Imprisonment, in force at the material time (see paragraph 29 above). As for the subsequent post‑conviction period, he had been entitled to supplementary visits with the consent of the governor of the relevant prison, but he had never availed himself of this opportunity. | 11 |
53. The applicant resided in Switzerland between 1989 and 2008, that is to say for more than eighteen years – with a short interruption in 1993-94 – and he worked and raised his family there. The Court has therefore no reason to doubt that the applicant had established social, professional and family ties in the respondent State. The immigration measures taken by the domestic authorities therefore clearly interfered with his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. This has also been acknowledged by the Swiss Government. | 11 |
45. The Government disagreed that there had been an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention on account of the restriction of the confidentiality of his meetings with his lawyer. The Government submitted that, were the Court to find that there had been an interference, it had been justified under the second paragraph of Article 8. They submitted that the restriction had been in accordance with the law, namely section 5 of Law no. 5275, and had pursued the legitimate aim of ensuring order and security in the prison and protecting the rights of convicted prisoners and detainees. | 11 |
175. The applicants maintained that the Social Welfare Board and the courts failed to carry out a proper examination of the applicants’ request for reunification of their family, and thus exceeded their margin of appreciation. The applicants stressed that taking into care should be regarded as a temporary measure to be discontinued as soon as possible and that, in the present case, care was expected to be of long duration, as the authorities’ presumption from the very beginning was that these children would never be returned to their biological parents. The meetings with the children under strict supervision were, in the applicants’ opinion, so unnatural that the parents and the children were not able to form normal family ties and they never had an opportunity to have a normal family life together. As the Government’s intention not to reunite the family was also repeated several times by the Government before the Court, the violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in this respect had been established. The authorities had acted in a clearly arbitrary way without any intention at all to terminate the care, whatever the circumstances. | 11 |
48. The applicants complained that the Supreme Court, in its decision of 15 October 1996 in the enforcement proceedings, had ordered a review of questions which had already been dealt with in the final return order under the Hague Convention and that this review had eventually led to the non-enforcement of the return order. They alleged a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention which, as far as material, reads as follows: | 11 |
73. The applicant also alleged that the ex-officio reopening of the social security proceedings, which had resulted in the quashing of the final decision granting her a right to a pension, was in breach of the principle of legal certainty under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. She also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention of an interference with her right to respect for her private and family life in that by divesting her of the EWK pension the authorities had deprived her of her sole source of income and the financial resources indispensable for her livelihood. | 11 |
57. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the written obligation not to abscond and the seizure of his international travel passports constituted an unlawful and disproportionate interference with his private and family life, which was largely concentrated in another country. He emphasised that subsequent to the written undertaking not to abscond until the date of his application to the Court, he was at no point summoned by the investigator for the purpose of taking part in any investigatory procedure. | 11 |
210. The applicants further maintained that the third applicant’s right to respect for her home under Article <mask> of the Convention and their right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had been violated, as the means employed by the authorities had been disproportionate to the aims sought to be achieved. They also referred to the domestic courts’ decisions by which the first applicant’s claim for compensation had been rejected and argued that the right to compensation for the destroyed property established, according to the Government, in a number of legal instruments, was illusory and not enforceable in practice. | 11 |
45. The applicants asserted that, regardless of the danger to one’s health, the deterioration of the environment fell to be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention where it adversely affected one’s life. They agreed that Article 8 was not violated every time environmental deterioration occurred. They understood the importance of urban development and the economic interests associated with it. They also understood that States had discretion in making decisions about urban planning. On the other hand, the applicants had no doubt that any State interference with the environment should strike a fair balance between the competing interests of the individuals and the community as a whole. In the present case the issue of the fair balance was rather simple. In its decisions nos. 3955/1995 and 3956/1995 the Supreme Administrative Court had itself tipped the balance in favour of the swamp and against urban development. Consequently, the Greek authorities were obliged to abide by their own choice. However, in failing to comply with the above-mentioned decisions, they had allowed the destruction of the swamp. | 11 |
44. The Government acknowledged that the impugned court decisions had amounted to an interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression. However, the interference had been prescribed by law and had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation of A.L., as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. Referring to Kasabova v. Bulgaria (no. 22385/03, § 54, 19 April 2011) and Axel Springer AG (cited above, §§ 85-86, 89), the Government also claimed that the interference had been proportionate. They maintained that the States must be given a certain margin of appreciation in striking the appropriate balance between the right to freedom of expression and the right to respect for private life (Kasabova, cited above, § 60). | 11 |
47. The Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. The eviction order had been in accordance with the law, it had pursued a legitimate aim and had been necessary in order to protect the rights of forced migrants. The housing occupied by the applicants was federal property managed by the FMS, which distributed it to forced migrants in need of housing and their families. The first applicant had lost her status of a forced migrant in 2001 and since that time she had been unlawfully occupying the housing in question. Such unlawful occupation breached the rights of forced migrants in need of accommodation. | 11 |
203. The Government claimed that the interference with the applicant’s home had been justified under paragraph 2 of Article <mask> of the Convention. Thus, the applicant had been suspected of having organised in 1999 the embezzlement of property and shares of several companies active in the oil industry. The applicant was a lawyer and a member of the Moscow Bar; as a result, special rules set out in Chapter 52 of the CCrP applied to him. Those rules required that any investigative measure affecting the applicant should be preceded by a court authorisation. | 11 |
154. The applicants complained that the search of their house carried out by Russian servicemen on 20 July 2004 breached their right to respect for their home. The fifth, seventh, eighth and tenth applicants complained that the killing of their father breached their right to respect for family life. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows: | 11 |
102. The applicants, referring to the Court's case-law, submitted that they were entitled to the protection of Article <mask> of the Convention as they were a family, had at all relevant times permanently lived together and had been financially dependent on one another. The existence of true family life between the applicants could not be denied on the sole ground that Mr Al‑Nashif had a second religious marriage. Such a situation was not uncommon in the cultural traditions of many peoples. | 11 |
46. The applicants further complained of violations of Articles 6, 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention. In this connection, they alleged that they had been denied a fair trial as a result of the national courts’ decisions based on the opinion of the Ministry of Justice. The interference in question had also constituted a breach of their right to family life protected by Article <mask> of the Convention. Furthermore, the applicants claimed to have been denied an effective remedy for their grievances in breach of Article 13. Finally, they alleged that the violations in question had occurred as a result of their Greek ethnic origin and their Christian Orthodox faith. | 11 |
103. The applicant also complained that the search constituted unjustified interference with her right to respect for her home and private life, as protected by Article <mask> of the Convention. She noted that her laptop, which had been seized, contained private information which she did not consider was necessary for the purposes of the investigation. She objected, in that regard, to the wide scope of the search warrant. | 11 |
81. The Government disagreed. They accepted that the first applicant’s psychiatric examination constituted interference with his private life within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They argued, however, that this interference was justified under paragraph 2 of the provision at issue. In particular, the assessment had been carried out based on Mrs L.’s complaints about the first applicant’s deviant behaviour, which had posed a threat to her own safety and the safety of others. These complaints had not been unsubstantiated; in particular, in June 2000 the first applicant had injured Mrs L. Other villagers had also complained to various authorities about the first applicant’s provocative conduct. The Government submitted in this regard copies of complaints concerning the first applicant’s conduct signed by various individuals and dated 2000 – 2003. In the light of this, the first applicant’s psychiatric examination had pursued a legitimate aim – namely, protection of the rights of others. It had been necessary in a democratic society and was conducted in accordance with the law. In particular, the relevant provision was section 11 of the Law of Ukraine “On Psychiatric Assistance”, authorising forcible psychiatric assessments of persons manifesting real intention to commit acts putting others in danger. Lastly, the Government submitted that the lawfulness of the application of that provision in the first applicant’s case had been confirmed by judicial authorities of two levels in the course of the contested proceedings. | 11 |
27. The applicants complained that their right to respect for family life had been violated by their separation from their child, that their right to moral and physical integrity under the private life aspect had been violated, that their right to reputation had been violated, affecting their right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and that they had been deprived of the right to have inherent procedural safeguards in place and observed to ensure the protection of the above rights. Article <mask> of the Convention provides as relevant: | 11 |
30. The applicant complained that her and her minor son’s eviction had been ordered by the courts unfairly and without their personal situation being taken into account. She also complained that the process of enforcing the eviction order had been brutal and arbitrary. The applicant invoked a number of the Convention provisions in respect of the above-mentioned complaints. The Court, being master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, considers that the above-mentioned complaints fall to be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention. This provision reads as follows: | 11 |
153. The applicants maintained that the search conducted at their home had not been “in accordance with the law” and could not be regarded as being necessary in a democratic society and had therefore been in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. They also contended that the first applicant could claim to be a victim of the alleged violation because he had been staying overnight at the other applicants’ house. The applicants further maintained that in the course of the search USD 12,000 and RUB 40,000 had been stolen from their house, and claimed that the failure to investigate these allegations amounted to a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. | 11 |
11. The Government contended that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies. They maintained that, in the context of the criminal proceedings against the applicant, the High Court could only examine the conformity of the interception with the legal norms then in force and that no complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention had been raised in that regard. Moreover, the applicant had had a remedy at his disposal in the form of a civil action for damages, but had failed to use it. The Government provided copies of the decisions delivered by the domestic courts in a case in which a claimant had successfully brought a civil-law action. | 11 |
59. The applicant stressed the social and economic problems she faced on account of her illegal status in Latvia. She could not work legally or receive allowances or social security benefits; moreover, she lived under constant threat of losing the only accommodation she had. With regard to the regularisation of her daughter’s stay and her subsequent naturalisation, the applicant considered that these measures did not afford adequate redress for the damage they had both sustained as a result of their ordeals. In sum, there had been a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
41. The applicant complained of a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention on account of the outcome and the length of the Hague Convention proceedings. The applicant also argued that the breach of Article 8 of the Convention resulted from the domestic court’s decisions to entertain E.N.’s divorce petition and to issue interim orders on the child’s residence and child support when the Hague Convention proceedings were pending. | 11 |
25. The applicants complained that the refusal of the Supreme Court of Cassation to allow the second applicant to travel abroad had breached their right to respect for their private and family life, as provided for in Article <mask> of the Convention, and that they did not have an effective remedy in this respect. The relevant parts of Articles 8 and 13 read: | 11 |
58. The Government relied on the Court’s case-law in cases against Latvia to argue that the circumstances of the present case were different from cases where the Court found a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention (Lavents v. Latvia, no. 58442/00, 28 November 2002; Moisejevs, cited above; and Kornakovs v. Latvia, no. 61005/00, 15 June 2006), and were instead comparable to those where no violation was found (see Nazarenko v. Latvia, no. 76843/01, 1 February 2007, and Čistiakov v. Latvia, no. 67275/01, 8 February 2007). | 11 |
77. The applicant claimed that the refusal to exempt her from the obligation to hold a provisional residence visa and the refusal to admit her to the Netherlands breached her right under Article <mask> of the Convention. Her intention had been from the outset to settle in the Netherlands with her partner, later her husband, and this had at all relevant times been known to the Netherlands immigration authorities. The applicant submitted that the Court should place emphasis on the question as to whether a fair balance had been struck between the competing interests involved. She considered that in her case no fair balance had been struck for the following reasons. | 11 |
67. The Government submitted that the case revealed no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. While they accepted that the relevant domestic decisions constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her family life, they contended that they had been in accordance with domestic law and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the health and morals and the rights and freedoms of X. The Government further considered that the measures taken by the Swedish authorities had been “necessary in a democratic society”. | 11 |
74. The Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust effective domestic remedies. In particular, he could have appealed against the court decision of 6 December 2004 authorising the interception of his mobile telephone communications. The fact that the applicant had not been provided with a copy of that decision should not have prevented him from lodging such an appeal. Alternatively, the applicant could have complained about his telephone being tapped and the interception of his communications by the police to a higher police body, a prosecutor, or a court. Lastly, the Government submitted that the interception of the applicant’s communications had not infringed his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. Such interception had been duly authorised by a court. The case file had contained all the relevant information and it had been accessible to the applicant and his lawyer. | 11 |
31. The applicant complained that his allegations in respect of Article 3 also gave rise to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. In addition, he complained about restrictions on telephone calls. As regards the latter, the applicant submitted that he had often been under pressure from other inmates to terminate his telephone conversations before the allotted time had expired. | 11 |
28. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention of the manner in which the national court had decided on his claim against the company operating the mine. He complained furthermore under Article <mask> of the Convention of an infringement of his right to a home. Lastly, he complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that he had been deprived of the possibility to “use freely” his property. | 11 |
18. The Government did not make any submissions under this head on their observations on the merits of the case. In their earlier observations on the admissibility of the application, however, the Government had made limited submissions under this head. In particular, they disputed the applicant’s complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention, on the basis that the notion of “home” in Article 8 could not be interpreted to cover an area of the State where one had grown up and where the family had its roots but where one no longer lived (Loizidou (merits), cited above, p. 2238, § 66). | 11 |
90. The applicants complained that their allegations in respect of Article 3 also gave rise to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. In addition, they complained about restrictions on visits and telephone calls. As regards the latter, the applicants submitted that they had had the right to use a telephone only twice a week and that they had often been under pressure from other inmates to terminate their telephone conversations before the allotted time had expired. | 11 |
16. The applicant argued that neither the prosecution authorities nor the District Court had carried out a thorough examination of his criminal complaint. As a result, his right to reputation, which the Hungarian authorities were under an obligation to protect pursuant to Article <mask> of the Convention, had been violated. He stressed that the impugned statement had targeted him as an official rather than a politician – a consideration ignored by the domestic authorities. In his view, the ruling of the domestic court was also incompatible with the second paragraph of Article 10 of the Convention, which provides insofar as relevant as follows: | 11 |
134. The Government considered that there had been no interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her private life and her home, because the level of noise and other alleged nuisance had not attained the minimum level of severity required by Article <mask> of the Convention. Contrary to the case of Oluić (cited above) the level of noise in the case at issue had been excessive only a few times and had not been sufficiently severe to raise an issue under Article 8. The Government firstly pointed out that the applicant’s house was located near a road. Moreover, the measurements of 5 October 2005 (see paragraphs 30 and 31 above) had showed that the level of noise had not been excessive and had not posed any threat to the health of persons living in the surrounding dwellings. The measurements of 21 January 2008 (see paragraphs 62 and 63 above) had showed that the noise had only slightly exceeded the permitted levels. It was true that this report had showed that the permitted level of noise had been significantly exceeded (by 13 and 15 dB) in the living room of the applicant’s flat on the first floor and inside the flat on the ground floor, but that had happened only when chairs were being dragged, which had been only a temporary occurrence that could not affect any of the applicant’s rights. Furthermore, the measurements of March 2008 (see paragraph 69 above) had found that the level of noise was excessive during the night, but that needed to be viewed in the context of the fact that the house was located near a road. The expert report of 14 November 2008 concerning the noise insulation in the house (see paragraphs 48-49 and 52 above) had first found the noise insulation insufficient but then, after the company had carried out the necessary work on the insulation, the report had found the noise insulation adequate. In addition, the expert report commissioned during the civil proceedings confirmed that the noise in the applicant’s flat did not exceed permitted levels, and in that regard the applicant had all the procedural guarantees of a fair trial to challenge the findings. The Government also pointed out that the expert reports had not found the level of any other emissions affecting the applicant’s flat excessive. The applicant had not argued or demonstrated that she had suffered any damage to her health or well-being as a result of the alleged nuisance or that it had adversely affected any of her property rights and interests. | 11 |
137. The Government challenged the existence of a family life in the present case, relying essentially on the absence of a biological link between the applicants and the child and on the illegality of the applicants’ conduct under Italian law. They submitted that, in view of the applicants’ unlawful conduct, no tie protected by Article <mask> of the Convention could exist between them and the child. They also argued that the applicants had lived with the child for only eight months. | 11 |
73. The applicant also complained that the domestic court had failed to secure the effective exercise of his right of contact during the Hague Convention proceedings. As a result, his contact with the child had been irregular and rare, as it had been at the absolute discretion of the abducting mother. That, in the applicant’s view, had led to the break-up of the father‑son relationship, and it had been in breach of Article 21 of the Hague Convention and in violation of his and his son’s right to respect for their family life under Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
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