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31. The Government submitted that, under Netherlands law, access arrangements could be made under Article 1:377a of the Civil Code between the child and a legal parent, and under Article 1:377f of the Civil Code between the child and a third person who had a close personal relationship with the child. The biological father was considered a legal parent if he was married to the child’s mother or if he had recognised the child. In such a situation, the legal tie between the father and the child constituted ipso jure family life within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
30. The Government admitted that the applicants’ eviction had constituted an inference with their right set out in Article <mask> of the Convention. They considered, however, that such interference had been lawful, had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of persons eligible to social housing and had been proportionate to that aim. Lastly, the Government submitted that the flat had not been recovered by the municipality and the applicants continued to reside there. | 11 |
119. The applicant replied that the main reason why the interference had amounted to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention was because it had been unlawful. According to the criminal procedural law, the precondition for declaring a person “wanted” by the investigative authorities was the initiation of criminal proceedings, in which the person was suspected of or charged with an offence (paragraph 42 above). In the present case, however, the authorities had implicated the applicant in a murder by posting his photograph on the boards of “wanted” persons in police stations, without ever having launched criminal proceedings against him. Consequently, the applicant had been unlawfully and libellously implicated in a very grave crime in the eyes of the public. | 11 |
48. The Government contended that Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable in the present case, arguing that the reasons for the applicant’s dismissal from his job of religious education teacher were not pertinent to his private or family life. The Government pointed out that, when dismissing the applicant from his post, the schools had not examined any circumstances of his private and family life but had based their dismissal decision on purely formal grounds, namely the withdrawal of the applicant’s canonical mandate. At the same time, the schools had had no knowledge of the reasons for the withdrawal of the applicant’s canonical mandate; nor had it been for the schools to examine the reasons for the Church’s decision. | 11 |
74. The applicants complained of the refusal by the German courts to grant an injunction against any further publication of the photo that had appeared on 20 February 2002 in the magazines Frau im Spiegel, issue no. 9/02, and Frau aktuell, issue no. 9/02. They alleged that there had been a violation of their right to respect for their private life, as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows: | 11 |
51. The applicant disagreed and maintained that she had raised the complaint on her own behalf. She had indicated her name in “the applicant” field in the application form and it was evident that, in the absence of any specific indication to the contrary, she had complained of a violation of her rights under the Convention. She also relied on quotes from her application form to further substantiate this. The applicant indicated that her submissions had been as follows: “I consider Article <mask> of the Convention to be violated” and that she as “the mother of Oļegs Petrovs was refused rights, granted by law, to object to removal of organs”. | 11 |
154. The applicants complained that they had had no access to a court, contrary to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, as under domestic law they were barred from bringing a civil claim to obtain compensation for the deaths of their relatives in the absence of any tangible results from the criminal investigation, and that the killings of their close relatives had constituted an unlawful and brutal interference with their family life, in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. The respective Convention provisions in so far as relevant read as follows: | 11 |
53. The applicant’s first complaint was that the authorities had not done enough to enable him to inform his family of his arrest and placement in detention. This raises an issue under the authorities’ positive obligations flowing from Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court has had occasion to hold that in view of the deep anxiety that the disappearance of a family member can cause, even for a short period, and the consequent importance for someone who has been arrested to be able to get in touch with his or her family promptly, there is an obligation under that Article to enable an detainee to contact them rapidly after being taken into custody (see Sarı and Çolak v. Turkey, nos. 42596/98 and 42603/98, §§ 33-37, ECHR 2006-V (extracts)). In some cases this can also amount to an important safeguard to prevent arbitrary detention (see, mutatis mutandis, Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, §§ 122-24, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III). Indeed, in Bulgaria such an obligation is set out in section 243 of the 2009 Act (see paragraph 26 above). As evidenced by that provision, as well as the other relevant provisions of Bulgarian law, European Union law and international law (see paragraphs 23 to 27 above), that obligation takes on an added importance when the detainee is an alien whose family may be in a different country. | 11 |
105. The Government submitted, among other arguments, that during the whole period at issue the applicant was afforded the opportunity to lead his normal and family life. Most importantly, the administrative proceedings in connection with the decision to expel the applicant from Lithuania had come to an end. The applicant was issued with a permanent residence permit. The Government could be understood as arguing that the applicant may no longer claim to be a “victim” of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
249. The applicant alleged that the restrictive guardianship regime, including his placement in the Pastra social care home and the physical living conditions there, had amounted to unjustified interference with his right to respect for his private life and home. He submitted that Bulgarian law had not afforded him a sufficient and accessible remedy in that respect. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention taken alone and in conjunction with Article 13. | 11 |
72. The applicant firstly complained that (i) the decisions to order her to undergo a psychiatric examination and to arrest her and (ii) her detention for a total period of eighty-three days were in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. However, the Court considers that these complaints do not raise any separate issue which is not covered by the finding of a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, the D.G. judgment cited above, § 107). | 11 |
101. The applicant argued that the domestic courts had violated Article 14 read in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention. He maintained that in a similar case involving a fully-bodied father the courts would have not set contact at two hours per visit and four visits a month and without the possibility of the child in question being taken to the father’s home. The domestic courts had not only failed to assist the applicant, who was disabled, but they had discriminated against him with their decisions. In cases involving non-disabled parties, the Polish courts underlined that the child should be aware that he or she had two parents and should have the possibility of spending time with both of them. In the applicant’s case, this right was refused to him. | 11 |
51. The Government also noted that in the Marzari case (see Marzari v. Italy (dec.) no. 36448/97, 4 May 1999) the Court held that, although Article 8 did not guarantee the right to have one’s housing problem solved by the authorities, a refusal of the authorities to provide assistance in this respect to an individual suffering from a severe illness could in certain circumstances raise an issue under Article <mask> of the Convention because of the impact of such a refusal on the private life of the individual. In that connection they first emphasized that the applicant, as an indigent person who faced eviction, had never contacted the Zadar Welfare Centre or requested to be provided with accommodation even though in the proceedings before the Court she claimed that she had no family members who could support her and provide her with a place to live. Nevertheless, the Government stressed, the competent social services were familiar with the applicant’s situation, and were prepared, in the event of her eviction, to offer her social assistance by accommodating her in a nursing home for the elderly and the infirm or in a foster family. The administrative proceedings in which such assistance would be granted would be instituted by the Zadar Welfare Centre of its own motion, which would choose the accommodation facility and determine how the costs of such accommodation would be met. Those proceedings could also be instituted upon the applicant’s request. Pursuant to the Social Welfare Act the costs of such accommodation were to be covered from the applicant’s income. If her income was insufficient to cover the full cost, the difference had to be covered by those who were obliged to support her or, if they failed to do so, by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. In support of their allegations the Government submitted two reports of 21 August 2009 and 17 May 2011 prepared by the Zadar Social Welfare Centre for the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare concerning the applicant’s situation. | 11 |
37. The applicants claimed that the Swiss authorities had not complied with their obligations, inherent in Article <mask> of the Convention, to allow R., L. and B. to reside legally in Switzerland, thereby enabling them to enjoy family life in that country. They submitted that their interest in their children being allowed to reside in Switzerland outweighed those of the respondent State in refusing that permission. They insisted that the three children, who had been living in Switzerland illegally since 15 August 2009, were well integrated in the respondent State and especially in the school system. Therefore, no public interest of the respondent State would justify the refusal of residence permits for the children. | 11 |
97. The applicant further complained about the fact that on the night of 19 September 1999 the police officers had invited reporters from the “Antena 1” television channel to film him handcuffed, covered in blood and with his clothes torn. He also claimed that the footage taken on this occasion had been repeatedly broadcast without his consent. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 11 |
71. The applicant submitted that the authorities’ refusals to transfer him to a prison closer to his home address had amounted to an unjustified interference with his right to respect for his family life guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. He emphasised that he had in fact been denied any opportunity of seeing his elderly mother for many years. | 11 |
36. The applicant complained that his right to freedom of movement had been infringed and his private life affected as a result of the authorities’ refusal to issue him a passport. While the applicant himself expressly referred to Article <mask> of the Convention in this regard, the Court considers that the substance of the complaint more properly falls to be examined under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention (see Stamose v. Bulgaria, no. 29713/05, § 43, ECHR 2012, with further references), which reads as follows, in the relevant part: | 11 |
36. The applicant also complained about the same facts under Articles 10 (freedom of expression) and 11 (freedom of association) of the Convention. However, in the light of the considerations and conclusion above (paragraphs 30-35) in relation to the applicant’s complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention, the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine them separately under Article 10 or 11. | 11 |
17. The Government argued that the application was inadmissible for two reasons. First, as in the case of Abulail and Ludneva v. Bulgaria ((dec.), no. 21341/07, 13 November 2014), the first applicant had not raised in the domestic judicial proceedings a complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention. Second, he could have brought a tort action against the State, in view of the fact that the decisions concerning his detention pending expulsion had been quashed. | 11 |
88. The applicants alleged that the failure to treat their daughter correctly and in time, which had led to the deterioration in her health and her subsequent death, and the manner in which the District Court had dealt with their action were in breach of their right to respect for their private and family life under Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, provides as follows: | 11 |
23. The applicant complained that the disclosure of information of a medical nature by the CFD to her employer constituted a violation of her right to respect for private life as provided in Article <mask> of the Convention. She also alleged that the proceedings in which her action against the CFD had been examined had been unfair because the courts had adopted arbitrary decisions and failed to give reasons for them. Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention, on which the applicant relied, read as follows: | 11 |
73. The Government submitted that in his initial application to the Court and in his subsequent written submissions before the Chamber, the applicant had not alleged any failure on the part of the State to adopt sufficient legal rules and measures to regulate motor vehicle traffic on public roads. Nor had he mentioned any aspect falling within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
31. The applicants submitted that the District Court had not rejected the petition for visiting rights on the ground that the visiting rights would endanger the child’s welfare. The request had instead been rejected on the ground that not granting visiting rights to the foster parents would not endanger the welfare of the child. Such a criterion was not in accordance with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Regional Court and the Supreme Court had not examined what would really be in the child’s interests but had concentrated on the issue of the applicants’ standing in the proceedings. They had found that because of the considerable period of time which had elapsed since the proceedings had started the applicants could no longer be considered F.’s foster parents. Such an approach was unacceptable. It was the responsibility of the Austrian courts that the proceedings had been conducted at such a slow pace and that they had consisted of a continuing exchange of submissions between the parties, the District Courts and various youth welfare bodies, whereas the authorities should have acted particularly speedily given what was at stake for the applicants and the importance the element of time has in such proceedings. Once the District Court had made its decision, the visiting rights had been refused with the argument that it had been a very long time since the child had been with the applicants. Thus, the delay caused by the Austrian courts had been used as an argument for refusing the visiting rights. The applicants did acknowledge the importance of the child’s welfare but considered that regard should also be had to the interests of the foster parents. | 11 |
61. The applicants complained, alleging a violation of their respective rights to respect for family life on account of the lack of practical opportunities for prison visits stemming from decisions to allocate prisoners to remote penal facilities and their subsequent inability to obtain transfers to other facilities. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows: | 11 |
29. The applicants further complained that there had been an unlawful interference with their child’s right to respect for his private life in view of the dismissal of their action for damages by the lower domestic courts. In particular, they disputed the reasoning given by those courts, namely that the mental maturity of their son, who was only one day old, was not sufficiently developed for him to perceive the alleged infringement of his personality rights. The applicants relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, of which the relevant part reads as follows: | 11 |
79. The applicant complained under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention that his deportation to Israel or the Gaza Strip, directly or indirectly, would expose him to a real risk of ill-treatment and/or death, bearing in mind that he and his family had been targeted by Israeli forces before and that he was wanted in Israel. He further maintained under Article <mask> of the Convention that his removal from Turkey would constitute an interference with the family life that he had established with his wife in Turkey. | 11 |
21. The Government alleged that there had been no violation of the applicant’s Article 13 rights, submitting that under section 78 of PACE the judge could have regard to Article <mask> of the Convention when exercising his discretion to exclude evidence from trial proceedings. However, it did not appear that the applicant had ever submitted during his trial that the intercepted messages should be excluded from the evidence under section 78 on the basis that they had been obtained in breach of Article 8, and added that in the circumstances it cannot be said that such a submission would necessarily have failed. In this way, the Government claimed that the present case was distinguishable from the above-mentioned Khan case. | 11 |
108. The applicant companies asserted that they had been directly and personally affected by the secret surveillance of the third applicant, who had been a member of their supervisory boards. They had thus been de facto victims of the violation of their rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. It was impossible to differentiate between company officials and the companies themselves. Furthermore, after submitting its observations to the Court, the second applicant company notified the Court of a new fact – according to information provided by the relevant mobile service operator, the telephone number which had been subject to secret surveillance had been registered to the second applicant company between 2003 and 2008, and not to the third applicant. In any event, the secret surveillance had been carried out in the context of the criminal investigation against the applicant companies. | 11 |
40. The applicant argued that she had properly exhausted available remedies and that any other remedies would have been redundant. She further argued that the level of noise had been such as to fall within the ambit of Article <mask> of the Convention. The exposure of the applicant and her family to the excessive noise had persisted over a period of some eight years and occurred nightly. It had caused the applicant, her husband and their daughter severe medical problems. | 11 |
72. The applicant argued that V.L.‑Ž. had not been entitled to protection of his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention because of his alleged collaboration with the Nazi regime (see paragraph 55 above). However, the domestic courts found those allegations to be unsubstantiated by any available facts, and the Court accepts their conclusion as well-founded (see paragraph 71 above). It therefore considers that nothing in V.L.-Ž.’s prior conduct deprived him of protection against false and defamatory statements. | 11 |
118. The applicants' complaint concerning their inability to enjoy family life with Aslambek Ismailov, Aslan Ismailov, Yaragi Ismailov, Khizir Ismailov and Yusi Daydayev concerns the same matters as those examined above under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. Having regard to its above findings under these provisions, the Court considers that this complaint should be declared admissible. However, it finds that no separate issue arises under Article <mask> of the Convention in this respect (see, mutatis mutandis, Ruianu v. Romania, no. 34647/97, § 66, 17 June 2003; Laino v. Italy [GC], no. 33158/96, § 25, ECHR 1999‑I; and Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, judgment of 16 December 1997, § 50 Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VIII). | 11 |
18. The applicant complained that he had been dismissed from his position of Vice-President, three years and ten months before the statutory date of his term’s expiry, by means of an ad hominem legislative measure. In the initial application of 20 June 2012 he invoked Articles 6, 13 and 14 of the Convention, as well as Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, and contended, in particular, that his dismissal had ruined his career and reputation as well as his social and professional relationships and had also resulted in his unjustified deprivation of the peaceful enjoyment of the benefits that would have been due to him during his term of office. In a memorial summarising his arguments following the disjoinder, on 19 March 2014, of the present complaint from the initial application (see paragraph 1 above), the applicant also invoked Article <mask> of the Convention and explicitly argued that the termination of his mandate had violated his right to respect for private life, including the development of relationships of a professional nature. | 11 |
52. The applicant furthermore underlined that the mani pulite campaign had been conducted in an unfair way and pursuing a political aim. In particular, a number of violations of the secrecy covering the investigations were committed in order to attract the attention of the media. He concluded that by releasing the interceptions into the public domain the Italian authorities had failed to respect the positive obligations imposed on them by Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
48. The Government noted that the necessity of the measure had been assessed twice, with a possibility of rejection – first by the Attorney General and subsequently by the Vilnius Regional Court. The contested operational measure had been necessary and had been applied in the interests of national security, public safety and the prevention of crime. The authorities had had operational information about the applicant’s possible involvement in criminal activities. The applicant had close connections with J.B. and persons from J.B.’s milieu. Most importantly, in the course of the operational investigation in respect of J.B., the authorities had learned about his threats to the State President. That information had later been confirmed when intercepting the applicant’s telephone conversation with J.B., in which the latter used psychological pressure and demanded that his requirements be reported to the head of State. Subsequently, J.B. had been convicted of having threatened the State President. The Government also observed that both J.B. and the applicant had had close relations with the State President and had played a significant role in the political activities of the President’s political party and his electoral campaign; at the time of surveillance the applicant had been a member of the Vilnius City Municipal Council. In this connection the Government also referred to the Court’s judgment in Craxi v. Italy (no. 2) (no. 25337/94, § 64, 17 July 2003), submitting that politicians inevitably and knowingly laid themselves open to close scrutiny by both journalists and the public at large. Therefore, even acknowledging that no investigation had been carried out by the SSD in order to reveal the circumstances in which the journalists had obtained the recording of the intercepted conversation, the question of fulfilment of the State’s positive obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention could not arise. | 11 |
75. The applicants replied that they had used the remedies which could directly provide them with adequate redress. Those that they had left unexplored were neither adequate nor effective. The eviction procedure under section 45 of the 1951 Property Act was only applicable to a flat’s owner, whereas in the present case the nuisances had been created by tenants. In any event, that procedure was quite burdensome when compared with the quick and effective remedies that they had used. A claim under section 109(1) of the Act would not have been effective either. Firstly, that provision was very general. Secondly, as was evident from the domestic courts’ case‑law, any claim under it would have been premised on showing that the activities in a neighbouring flat were unlawful, which could be determined only in separate proceedings concerned with the legality of the works in the flat. The domestic case‑law also showed that that such a claim could be successful only if it touched upon the technical aspects of a reconstruction in a neighbouring property. Moreover, such a claim protected directly the integrity of a property, not the private lives or homes of those living in it. By contrast, section 38 of the 2001 Territorial Organisation Act and of regulation 10(3) of the Regulations on the Manner of Carrying On Commercial Activities on the Territory of the Municipality of Sofia were intended to safeguard precisely the interests protected under Article <mask> of the Convention. By asking the authorities to apply those provisions, the applicants had had recourse to the most appropriate avenue of redress. | 11 |
14. The Government submitted that the domestic courts had in essence established a violation of the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. Moreover, they had decided the amount of compensation based on their direct knowledge of the case and on the basis of the parties’ arguments and evidence. The applicant had been awarded compensation in respect of this breach of Article 8 and consequently no longer had victim status. The award made by the domestic courts had been reasonable in the light of the relatively short period of the applicant’s in-patient treatment and the lack of evidence of any long-lasting effects on the applicant. | 11 |
78. The Government argued that that the applicant had failed to bring his complaint before the Court within the six-month time-limit. In the Government’s view, the final domestic decision had been the judgment of the Dubrovnik County Court of 28 May 2009 and not the decision of the Constitutional Court of 26 November 2009 on which the applicant had relied when he had lodged his application with the Court. In the Government’s view, the applicant should have been aware of the case-law of the Constitutional Court to the effect that constitutional complaints brought by subsidiary prosecutors in criminal proceedings were inadmissible. Finally, the Government argued that in respect of any complaint concerning the substantive aspect of Article <mask> of the Convention the six-month time-limit had to be calculated from 17 April 2009, the date on which the criminal prosecution against the applicant’s assailant had become time-barred. | 11 |
23. The Government submitted that it had not been confirmed that the impugned letter was indeed intercepted, and if so, whether it was intercepted and opened by the authorities. They referred to the fact that the notice on the envelope which indicated that the letter had been opened and read was not signed. Should the Court accept that this was indeed the case, the Government decline to take a stand as to whether this amounted to an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for correspondence within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
120. The applicants alleged that the disappearance of their relative had amounted to a violation of their right to respect for family life. They also complained that the search carried out at their house on 4 February 2003 had been illegal and constituted a violation of their right to respect for their home. It thus disclosed a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. They also referred to the unlawful seizure of their property during the search and relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. These Articles provide as follows: | 11 |
38. The Government noted that the respondent State's positive obligation, which was inherent in the effective respect for family life, was not absolute. Referring to the Court's case-law, they admitted that domestic measures hindering the mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each other's company amounted to an interference with the rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. Such interference constituted a violation of that provision unless it was “in accordance with law”, pursued an aim or aims that were legitimate under paragraph 2 of Article 8 and could be regarded as “necessary in a democratic society”. The Government further stressed that in assessing whether or not a refusal of access to the non-custodial parent was in conformity with Article 8, the interests of the child predominated. | 11 |
28. The applicant submitted, relying on the Court’s findings as to the existence of family life for the purposes of Article 8 in Boughanemi v. France (judgment of 24 April 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-II, pp. 607-08, § 35) and C. v. Belgium (judgment of 7 August 1996, Reports 1996-III, pp. 922-23, § 25), that the only important factor in determining the existence of “family life” was the tie between himself and A. already created by the mere fact that he was her biological father, without the need to rely on additional circumstances to demonstrate the existence of other bonds between them. According to the applicant, family life within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention existed ipso jure between him and A. on the ground of his biological fatherhood. | 11 |
31. The Government accepted that the ruling by which the applicant was partly deprived of her legal capacity had amounted to an interference with her right to respect for her private life under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, in their view the interference had been based in law, had pursued a legitimate aim and had been proportionate to the aim sought. The legal basis for the interference had been section 159 of the Family Act. The ruling in question had been adopted in order to protect the applicant, as it had been established that she was not able to look after her own rights and interests in terms of disposing of her assets and making decisions concerning her medical treatment. The applicant had run up debts of about HRK 40,000, whereas her monthly pension amounted to about HRK 3,950. | 11 |
28. The Government submitted that the applicants had failed to prove any non-pecuniary damage beyond that for which the domestic courts had already awarded compensation. In their submissions to the domestic courts the applicants had never referred to any case-law of the European Court to prove that the award needed to be increased. The Government argued that the present case did not differ in any significant manner from that of Pentiacova and Others v. Moldova ((dec.), no. 14462/03, ECHR 2005-I), in which the Court had found no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in respect of the State’s insufficient funding of haemodialysis. | 11 |
64. The Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. They firstly pointed out that he had failed to submit his complaints about the insufficient contacts with his child to the social services which could have taken necessary measures to remedy his situation. Secondly, they stressed that he had failed to make the same complaints he had raised before the Court under Article <mask> of the Convention in his constitutional complaint lodged with the Constitutional Court. | 11 |
63. The Government pointed out that for both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, the point of departure had been that, while establishing a family-law relationship between the applicant and S. through recognition might serve interests protected by Article <mask> of the Convention, it might also harm S.’s interests as protected by that provision; a balance had therefore to be struck between the competing interests of the applicant and the child. | 11 |
40. The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had not been allocated a replacement flat in lieu of the one over which he had had an occupancy right and which had been destroyed during the war. However, the Convention does not guarantee a right to be provided with a home (see Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27238/95, § 99, ECHR 2001‑I). The interests protected by the notion of a “home” within the meaning of Article 8 include the peaceful enjoyment of one’s existing residence. Accordingly, this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. | 11 |
40. The applicant originally complained under Article 10 about the refusal of the domestic courts to issue him with copies of the minutes of the hearings in the criminal proceedings against him and of the video of his arrest. The Court considered that it was more appropriate to examine this complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant further complained under Article 8 of the Convention that his telephone conversations had been illegally recorded by the person who had set him up. Article 8 reads as follows: | 11 |
24. The applicant complained about the search of his house. As in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, he alleged a breach of his rights as a result of (i) the court's decision to order the search and the search as such, and (ii) procedural shortcomings in the way in which the police had proceeded. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which in its relevant part provides: | 11 |
34. The applicant submitted in reply that a person’s name was part of his private life. Article <mask> of the Convention conferred on an individual the right to decide whether and under what conditions third parties could use his name for advertising purposes. He emphasised that such protection also covered an individual’s forename where its use would make it possible to identify the individual concerned, as in the present case, because otherwise the company would not have confined itself to using his forename. He further pointed out that in the instant case he was relying not so much on his right to protection of his reputation as on his right to his own name and the freedom to make his own decisions as to who should be allowed to use it for advertising purposes. Moreover, he had not forfeited his right to protection of his reputation simply because he had published his book. Therefore, the applicant contended that this complaint fell within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention. | 11 |
125. The Government admitted that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his home. However, they considered it to have been in compliance with the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government observed that the search of the applicant’s home had been based on the judicial ruling of 19 May 2004 and that it had been necessary for the prevention of crime. While the aforementioned ruling had concerned a criminal investigation in respect of a different person, Mr B., it had become known to the investigator that the applicant might have been involved in the production and sale of illegal drugs. Accordingly, it had been legitimate to verify this information by way of a search. Lastly, the Government emphasised that the lawfulness of the search in question had been reaffirmed by the courts of three levels of jurisdiction in the course of the trial and appeal proceedings. | 11 |
66. The applicant argued that the administrative removal order and its possible enforcement constituted an interference with his “family life”. The applicant was living with his common-law wife Ms A. and had fathered two of her children; both had his patronymic; the son also had his family name on his birth certificate. The national courts did not examine the matter relating to Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
32. The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that on 30 December 2001 police officers had entered the front garden of her house by climbing over the fence without any proper authorisation and had accordingly violated her right to respect for her home. She also complained that on an unspecified date prior to 30 December 2001 the police officers had entered her house in her absence and carried out a search without any authorisation. Article 8 reads as follows: | 11 |
51. The Government maintained that the application was inadmissible because the applicant had not exhausted the domestic remedies in respect of claiming damages from the state due to the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. They referred to, inter alia, the Swedish Supreme Court’s decisions and judgments of 9 June 2005 and 21 September 2007 as well as the Chancellor of Justice’s decision of 23 June 2009 (see paragraphs 45-47), in which individuals had been awarded compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage due to the violation of different Articles of the Convention. They also pointed out that the Svea Court of Appeal had, in a judgment dated 12 January 2006, concluded that there had been a violation of Article 8 and that non-pecuniary damages should be awarded on the basis of the principle established in the Supreme Court’s judgment NJA 2005 p. 462. In the Government’s opinion, Swedish law thus provided a remedy in the form of compensation for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage in respect of any violation of the Convention, including under Article 8, at the time when the application was lodged with the Court. The application was lodged with the Court one and a half years after the delivery of the first of the mentioned Supreme Court judgments and one year after the Svea Court of Appeal’s judgment concerning Article 8 in particular. Accordingly, the legal position under domestic law had to be considered to have been sufficiently clear at the time when the present application was introduced before the Court. | 11 |
174. The applicant alleged that her right to respect for her private life had been breached, as on 28 May 2003 the State authorities had called the press, who took photographs of her when she was being transferred by force to the Socola hospital and published them in various newspapers. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, provides: | 11 |
42. The Government referred to the Constitutional Court's judgment of 3 October 1989 and to the case-law of the Commission (see Zukrigl, decision cited above, and H.F. v. Austria, no. 22646/93, Commission decision of 26 June 1995, unreported), pointing out that the Commission had found no indication of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention either taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14 in respect of Article 209 of the Austrian Criminal Code. As to Sutherland (cited above), the Government pointed out that there was an important difference, namely that under Article 209 the adolescent participating in the offence was not punishable. Moreover, they referred to the fact that, in 1995, Parliament had heard numerous experts and had discussed Article 209 extensively with a view to abolishing it, but had decided to uphold it, as the provision was still considered necessary, within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention, for the protection of male adolescents. | 11 |
51. The Government requested that the case be “struck out”, as the applicants could no longer claim to be “victims” of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, given that they had obtained the visas. They explained that the French authorities had agreed in principle to family reunification (see paragraph 9 above) and that it was only the discovery of the irregularities in the civil-status documents submitted in support of the visa applications which had delayed the issue of these visas. They had been issued as soon as the Yaoundé tribunal de grande instance’s judgment of 3 June 2010 had been brought to the authorities’ attention. Examination of a possible violation of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention had thus ended at the stage of evidence of the documents’ authenticity; verification of the genuine nature of the applicant’s filiation had been essential standard practice, was in accordance with the legislation and could not be contrary to the stipulations of Article 8. | 11 |
61. The applicant further expressed doubts as to the “lawfulness” of the interference. Firstly, in her view, section 38 of the Aliens Act was to be read in conjunction with section 49, which stated that international treaties took precedence over domestic legislation. The Latvian authorities should therefore take account of Article <mask> of the Convention, which guaranteed the applicant’s right to respect for her private and family life and constituted a reason for not deporting her. Secondly, the applicant challenged the Government’s argument that her registration of a residence in Russia had automatically cancelled out – or “rendered invalid” – her residence registration in Latvia. On the contrary, her residence permit had been valid until 9 April 1998, when the Directorate had removed her name from the register of residents and issued an order for her deportation; hence, her residence in Latvia had been perfectly legal until then. Lastly, the applicant contested the view that the effects of the provisions in question were foreseeable. In her opinion, it was not obvious who was or was not covered by the Non‑Citizens Act, a fact demonstrated by the numerous sets of judicial proceedings which had been brought on that very subject. | 11 |
44. The Government accepted that A. had not been detained for psychiatric treatment after his conviction on 7 January 2002. They further recognised that despite the District Court having been notified by a letter dated 15 January 2002 that A. had been released from hospital on 14 January 2002 the District Court had only ordered his detention for treatment on 22 January 2002, following the applicant's filing of a new criminal complaint. This, by the Government's own admission, rendered the applicant's complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention “not manifestly ill-founded”. | 11 |
48. The applicant claimed that he had been discriminated against in the enjoyment of his right to respect for his private life when compared both to fathers whose paternity had been established on other grounds and to mothers because, unlike him, they were entitled to request the Prosecutor General to challenge paternity on their behalf. In connection with this complaint the applicant also alleged a lack of an effective remedy. He relied on Articles 13 and 14, read in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
118. The applicants alleged that the intrusion by Russian servicemen into their house on 9 April 2003 had infringed their right to respect for their home. They also complained under the same head that their right to respect for family life had been breached as a result of Akhmed Shaipov’s abduction. They relied in this respect on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides: | 11 |
105. The applicant alleged that the authorities had allowed the so-called “Wildstein list”, containing names of persons whose files had been collected by the Institute, to be leaked and made public. In addition, she averred that the State had failed to take adequate steps to inform the public about the actual character of the impugned list. These facts, in her view, amounted to a breach of her right to respect for her private life under Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
171. The Government further argued that the alleged interference with the applicants’ rights secured by Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had been lawful, as the counter-terrorist operations in the territory of the Chechen Republic, in the context of which the strike of 12 September 1999 had been performed, had been carried out on the basis of the Suppression of Terrorism Act of 25 July 1998 and “relevant regulations of State bodies”. They further insisted that the strike resulting in the damage to or destruction of the applicants’ homes and property had been necessary in order to suppress the criminal activity of members of illegal armed groups and to prevent terrorist attacks they had been preparing. Lastly, the Government submitted that the applicants could have obtained compensation for the alleged damage in civil proceedings. | 11 |
85. The Government maintained that the cemetery had been built in the interests of the villagers of Tatariv, as there had been absolutely no other place in the mountainous region near the village that could be used for a cemetery. They further stated that while it was true that the cemetery had been built in breach of environmental health laws and regulations as it had lacked the health protection zone required by law, the authorities had done all they could to prohibit burials and to provide the applicant with an opportunity to be re-housed, even though such an obligation to resettle had not existed in law. According to them, he had continuously rejected such proposals. In this respect they supplied letters of 10, 15 and 16 December 2009 from Tarariv Council and the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional State Administration, in which the municipal authorities stated that the applicant was not interested in resettlement (see paragraph 34 above). The Government accepted that the fact that the cemetery was placed on the VL plot engaged State’s positive obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
49. The Government submitted that the authorities had taken all the necessary steps that could reasonably be demanded of them. They stressed the complexity of the matter and the fact that the parties were in conflict. They submitted that the courts concerned had held many lengthy hearings and heard witnesses. The Government concluded that the length of the proceedings to change the residence order, instituted by the applicant on 8 April 2008, did not amount to a breach of the applicant's right to respect for his family life under Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
41. The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 and Article <mask> of the Convention about the unfairness of the proceedings and of an infringement of their right to private life. They argued that the domestic courts had erred in finding that the land had been assigned and sold to them unlawfully. They also submitted that the domestic courts should have rejected the former owner’s civil claim as time-barred. The Court considers it appropriate to examine this complaint solely under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. | 11 |
58. The applicant submitted that, under the Court’s case-law, she should not be required to have recourse both to civil and criminal remedies in respect of the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. If there was more than one remedy available, the applicant need not exhaust more than one (see Yağcı and Sargın v. Turkey, 8 June 1995, §§ 42-44, Series A no. 319‑A). She further referred to a judgment in which the Court had found that the applicants, having exhausted all possible means available to them in the criminal-justice system, were not required, in the absence of a criminal prosecution in connection with their complaints, to embark on another attempt to obtain redress by bringing an action for damages (see Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, § 86, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑VIII). | 11 |
233. The Government stressed that Article <mask> of the Convention did not include the right to buy a home, but only protected a person’s right to respect for his or her present home (see Sorić, decision cited above). As the SZ protected the legal status of former holders of occupancy rights, by guaranteeing them tenancy for an indefinite period and a non-profit rent, the applicants’ direct possession of the dwellings was not in any way disturbed by the impugned provisions. As the Constitutional Court pointed out, the holders of occupancy rights and their spouses and close family members had the right to continue to live in denationalised dwellings in conditions comparable to those in other European countries (paragraph 65 above). | 11 |
32. The Government accepted that the impossibility for the applicant to have his father's paternity established after the expiry of the five-year time-limit had constituted an interference with his private life under Article <mask> of the Convention. The impugned measures had had a basis in Finnish legislation, namely in section 7, subsection 2, of the Implementing Act of the Paternity Act. | 11 |
102. The applicants stated at the outset that the Court was required to rule solely on the disputed measures taken by the Italian authorities in respect of the child, and then only on the basis of Article <mask> of the Convention, for the purpose of determining whether there had been a violation of the applicants’ private and family life. In their view, given the Chamber’s decision to declare inadmissible the complaint concerning the refusal to register the child’s Russian birth certificate in Italy, the Court was not required to rule on whether a State’s decisions to authorise or prohibit the practice of gestational surrogacy on its territory, or the conditions for recognition of a parent-child relationship in respect of children legally conceived in another country, were compatible with the Convention. | 11 |
42. The applicant complained of a violation of her private and family life on the ground that, firstly, the body of her stillborn child had been taken from her and buried without her knowledge in a communal grave in the cemetery and, secondly, that it had been transported from the hospital to the cemetery in an inappropriate vehicle. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 11 |
230. The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies, as he had never raised any of the specific allegations in the present complaint before any domestic authority and had never relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, or provisions of domestic law of the same or a similar nature, in his applications to the domestic authorities. The Government noted that, under the CCrP, it was open to the applicant to complain to the domestic courts about any actions of the prosecuting or investigating authorities violating his rights. The Government acknowledged that visits to the applicant by his family (but not his lawyers) had indeed been restricted during the pre-trial investigation in the interests of justice, and that the CCrP provided a relevant legal basis for this. However, according to the Government, neither the applicant nor his family members had been prohibited from corresponding in writing. | 11 |
99. The Government contested that claim. In particular, they submitted that the Court, when deciding on his earlier application in respect of the same return proceedings, had already awarded the applicant EUR 7,500 for non-pecuniary damage for the violation of Article <mask> of the Convention (see Adžić, cited above, § 103). They urged the Court to take that sum into account. | 11 |
85. The applicant also alleged a breach of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention since the criminal proceedings against him had not established his guilt. He lastly complained under Article <mask> of the Convention on account of his separation from his family as a result of his detention and the adverse effects it had on his family. He submitted that throughout his period in detention he received no news about his family. | 11 |
25. The Government admitted that the applicants’ eviction had constituted an inference with their right set out in Article <mask> of the Convention. They considered, however, that such interference had been lawful, had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of persons eligible to social housing and had been proportionate to that aim. As regards Mr Presnyakov (application, no. 25624/15), the Government noted that he could not claim to be a victim of the violation alleged. He had not had the flat registered as his place of residence. Pursuant to the official documents, he resided elsewhere. Nor had he been a party to the civil proceedings concerning the determination of the applicants’ rights in respect of the flat. | 11 |
69. The Government accepted that Article <mask> of the Convention protected legal professional privilege. They submitted, however, that there had been no “interference” by the authorities with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life, home or correspondence within the meaning of the second paragraph of that provision, as he did not complain of any concrete event that had affected him personally. | 11 |
81. The Government conceded that Article <mask> of the Convention was applicable. The Court sees no reason to hold otherwise. It is well‑established in its case-law that the storing of information relating to an individual’s private life in a secret register and the release of such information comes within the scope of Article 8 § 1 (see, Leander v. Sweden, 26 March 1987, § 48, Series A no. 116; Rotaru v. Romania [GC], no. 28341/95, § 43, ECHR 2000‑V). | 11 |
69. The applicants claimed that their removal from Latvia had violated their right to respect for their “private life”, their “family life” and their “home” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They considered that their removal had not been required by Latvian law or by the Latvian-Russian treaty on the withdrawal of the Russian troops, interpreted correctly, and that in any event the resultant interference with their above rights had pursued no legitimate aim and had not been necessary in a democratic society. The applicants also stated that, on the basis of the Latvian courts' incorrect interpretation of the Latvian-Russian treaty on the withdrawal of the Russian troops, they had lost their legal status in Latvia and had been forced to leave the country as a result of political changes rather than of their own actions. | 11 |
98. The Government argued that Article <mask> of the Convention did not apply in this case because the applicant had not been directly affected by the contested measure and because even if he had been affected, he had willingly renounced his right to privacy by publicly exchanging the files in question (see paragraphs 92 and 93 above). In order to answer those questions, the Court must consider whether the applicant, or any other individual using the Internet, had a reasonable expectation that his otherwise public online activity would remain anonymous (see paragraphs 115 to 118 above). | 11 |
46. The applicant complained that the neighbour who had converted the attic above her flat into another flat had failed to carry out the necessary soundproofing work and that she had therefore been disturbed by the noise coming from the flat above her. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: | 11 |
87. The Government challenged the sums claimed by the applicant. In particular, they considered that there were no grounds for her request for reimbursement of the costs incurred during the second set of proceedings before the Latvian courts, as the effective aim of those proceedings had been to challenge a final decision. Hence, the proceedings in question had been extraordinary and were not to be taken into consideration for the purposes of exhaustion of domestic remedies. Similarly, in its partial decision of 15 February 2001, the Court had declared only one of the applicant’s complaints admissible – the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention – and had rejected the remainder. In the Government’s view, that fact should be taken into account in calculating the amount to be reimbursed under Article 41 of the Convention. | 11 |
108. The applicants stated that they could no longer enjoy family life with their sons following their abduction by the State authorities. They also claimed that the search carried out at their house on 26 April 2003 had been illegal, which constituted a violation of their right to respect for their home. It thus disclosed a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, provides: | 11 |
465. The applicants complained that they could not correspond freely with their families and with the Court. In particular, they asserted that they had not been able to apply to the Court freely, and that in order to do so they had had to call on the assistance of their wives. They further complained that they could not receive visits from their families except with the prior agreement of the “President of the MRT”. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant parts of which provide: | 11 |
823. The Government maintained that there had been no interference with the applicants’ rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government emphasised that any limitation of the applicants’ rights under Article 8 was related to their criminal conviction and was inherent in the very concept of criminal punishment. The Government described the geographical position of the Krasnokamensk colony (where the first applicant had been sent) and the Kharp colony (where the second applicant had been sent) and transport routes linking them to Moscow, where the applicants’ families lived. They concluded that there had been no interference with the applicants’ private lives on account of their placement in those particular penal colonies. | 11 |
822. The applicants complained that they had been sent to serve their prison terms in very remote colonies situated thousands of kilometres from their homes. In their words, this had seriously hindered their contacts with the outside world, and, in particular, with their families and their lawyers. The applicants referred to Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 11 |
32. The Government argued that, while the adoption of M. constituted interference with the applicant's right to respect for his family life under Article <mask> of the Convention, the interference was justified under paragraph 2 of that Article. It had a legal basis, namely Article 181 § 3 of the Civil Code, and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of the applicant's minor daughter, by protecting her health, including her psychological well-being, and her legal interest in consolidating and formalising de facto family ties with her adoptive father. According to the case-law of the Austrian courts, the well-being of the child concerned was in itself not sufficient to justify overruling a parent's refusal of consent under Article 181 § 3. Only persistent conduct absolutely contrary to family values on the part of a parent could justify such a decision. In the present case, the applicant had demonstrated such conduct by repeatedly threatening and grossly insulting the child's mother in the presence of the child, at that time very young, during previous contact visits. As result, the child had suffered from anxiety and severe somatic disorders. The applicant had acted as the child's father only in the first months of her life. After the breakdown of his relationship the applicant, by his conduct towards the child's mother who had custody of the child, had made the exercise of his rights and duties as a father impossible. His refusal to consent to the adoption prevented the husband of the child's mother from taking on a role which he himself could no longer fulfil. Furthermore, he had discontinued maintenance payments for the child five years prior to the adoption being granted, thereby leaving it to others to care for his daughter. When questioned about the reasons for his refusal to give consent, the applicant had merely stated that he wished to visit his daughter and that her mother was preventing him from doing so. Such submissions could not be regarded as decisive reasons. Furthermore, the applicant had insisted on evidence being heard from the child in his own and the other parties' presence, apparently without caring much about the stress that would inevitably be caused to the child. The applicant had been sufficiently involved in the decision-making process. As it had transpired after several unsuccessful attempts that the applicant, for personal reasons, was unable to attend a hearing by the court competent to deal with the case, he had given evidence before another court under letters rogatory. Moreover, he had expressly stated at the beginning of the proceedings that he did not wish to be further involved in the proceedings and that his written submissions should be regarded as his statements. | 11 |
92. The applicant further submitted that the monitoring of the correspondence sent to him by the Court on 23 February 1999 was in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. He pointed out that under Article 103 § 1 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences 1997, which entered into force on 1 September 1998, the prisoner's correspondence should have been delivered to him without delay and was not subject to censorship. Furthermore, contrary to § 37(4) of the Rules of Detention on Remand 1998 the letter of 23 February 1999 was not opened in the applicant's presence. | 11 |
56. The applicant complained under Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention that the decision on his administrative removal from Russia had violated his right to respect for his private and family life. He argued, in particular, that the severity of the punishment, which had disrupted his family life, had been disproportionate to the gravity of the administrative offence of which he had been found guilty. The Court will examine the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 11 |
59. The applicant complained under Article 5 §§ 2 and 3 of the Convention that he had not been informed of the reasons for his arrest in 1996 and that the length of his detention in police custody in 1996 and 2002 had been excessive. The applicant further complained under Article 5 §§ 1 and 3, Article 6 § 2 and Article <mask> of the Convention that (i) there had been no reasonable suspicion to justify his being remanded in custody, (ii) the length of his detention had been excessive, and (iii) his right to respect for family life had been breached due to the excessive amount of time he had spent in detention. | 11 |
22. The Government first contended that, taking into account the young age of the girls when they were placed with the applicants’ family, it was not possible to state unambiguously that the ties between the girls and the applicants were strong enough to be qualified as “family life” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. Therefore, in the original award of permanent custody of both children to SŠ and VŠ, the State had not interfered with the applicants’ rights. | 11 |
25. The Government contended that the applicant had not expressly complained of a violation of his right to respect for his private life guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. His complaint had only concerned the alleged unlawfulness of the recordings, the lack of proper authorisation and the procedure followed for the transcription of the conversations recorded. In their view, those arguments pertained to the sphere of Article 6 of the Convention. | 11 |
102. The Government argued that the present case did not disclose a violation of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention. They submitted that that the domestic courts had underlined on numerous occasions that the applicant’s disability was not, per se, a motive for the dismissal of his application for an extension of contact. However, taking into account the best interests of the child, it could not go unnoticed that the aforementioned disability had given rise to a communication barrier between the applicant and his son, since the applicant used only sign language and the child communicated orally. Therefore, the form of contact should be adjusted to reflect the situation of the family. | 11 |
108. The applicant further alleged that the authorities had failed to take adequate measures to secure her rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. Firstly, the Government had not sought to justify the interference with her Article 8 rights with any valid reason. Secondly, they had failed to implement effective measures in order to prevent or minimise environmental pollution. In spite of compelling evidence of unacceptable levels of pollution from the Severstal plant, in breach of the domestic limits, the Government had merely asserted that “no question arose of limitation, suspension, or discontinuation of its activity in connection with environmental pollution”. | 11 |
115. The applicants contended under Article <mask> of the Convention that their right to respect for their family life and home had been violated as they had been forcibly displaced from their village and had been prevented from returning. They maintained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that they had lost the possibility of using and enjoying their property on account of the restrictions imposed by the authorities on their return to their village. They further complained under Article 13 of the Convention that they had no effective remedy for their various Convention grievances. | 11 |
22. The applicant submitted that prior to his deportation he enjoyed family life within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention with his spouse, his three children and with his grandchild. He had co-habited with his spouse since 1980 and they have been married for twenty-two years. Their three children were born in the United Kingdom and have always lived in the family home. Even though the eldest child was an adult when the applicant was deported, he was not an independent person who had started his own family life. Rather, he was a student who still lived in the family home and who depended financially and emotionally on his parents. His daughter lived with him and prior to the applicant's deportation he relied on both of his parents to help him raise her while he pursued his studies. Following his deportation he relied solely on his mother. | 11 |
53. The Government further asserted that, if the complaints made under Article 6 § 1 and Article <mask> of the Convention were to be considered together under Article 8 of the Convention alone, the applicants had not exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention in that they had not sought redress before the ordinary courts by way of an action for protection of personal integrity under Article 11 et seq. of the Civil Code. In line with the Court’s decision of 31 August 2001 in the case of Babjak and Others v. Slovakia (73693/01), this action was an effective remedy in the Convention sense and the applicants ought to have resorted to it in order to comply with the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies. | 11 |
48. The applicants did not dispute that the interference in question had had a lawful basis, namely Article 9 of the Civil Code, nor that it pursued a legitimate aim, namely “protection of the rights of others” with regard to the Prince’s right to private life and to his own image. Nonetheless, they expressed a reservation in this respect, and alleged that the domestic courts had interpreted in too broad a manner the concept of private life within the meaning of Article 9 of the Civil Code and Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
66. The applicants also complained that the way in which the domestic courts had dealt with the actions of 27 May 1996 and 14 January 1997 for the deprivation of Mr P.’s parental rights over the second applicant and the action of 27 March 1997 relating to the second applicant’s adoption and, in particular, their failure to decide on the merits of these actions amounted to a violation of their right to respect for their family life. They alleged a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, provides as follows: | 11 |
63. The Government admitted that the national courts’ decisions to order the applicants’ eviction had constituted an inference with their rights set out in Article <mask> of the Convention. They considered, however, that such interference had been lawful, had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of persons eligible to social housing and had been proportionate to that aim. They further pointed out that the eviction order had not been enforced and that the applicants continued to reside in the flats. | 11 |
22. The Government argued that the censorship of the applicant's letters related only to his correspondence with private persons, the censorship being allowed by the valid decisions of a prosecutor in accordance with the applicable domestic law. The decisions had been taken in order to protect the witnesses and victims in a number of sets of criminal proceedings against the applicant, and as such the censorship had been justified by the second paragraph of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
60. The Government submitted that the relationship between the applicant and the child, P., did not constitute a family life within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They noted, in particular, that the applicant and the child’s mother had ceased living together when the latter had become pregnant, and that the applicant had never lived with the child and had barely seen her. Moreover, he had demonstrated no interest in the child, either before her birth or afterwards; he had lodged a claim to establish his paternity in respect of the child only a year after the child had been born and had never paid child maintenance or otherwise supported the child, which had prompted the child’s mother to bring a claim for child maintenance and the termination of the applicant’s parental rights. Furthermore, the child had continuously lived in a family unit and was brought up by her mother’s husband, A.K., with whom she had established family ties. | 11 |
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