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oyMrpubpqfFAeZPpD | I don't think the evaluations we're describing here are about measuring capabilites. More like measuring whether our oversight (and other aspects) suffice for avoiding misalignment failures.
Measuring capabilities should be easy. | 2024-02-21T17:23:56.651Z | 2 | 2xLB6GGYLvAgp67XS | qhaSoR6vGmKnqGYLE | Protocol evaluations: good analogies vs control | protocol-evaluations-good-analogies-vs-control | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/qhaSoR6vGmKnqGYLE/protocol-evaluations-good-analogies-vs-control | Fabien Roger | 2024-02-19T18:00:09.794Z |
LALAZhstDdgzaEWeg | > Non-deceptive failures are easy to notice, but they're not necessarily easy to eliminate
I agree, I was trying to note this in my second paragraph, but I guess this was insufficiently clear.
I added the sentence "Being easy-to-study doesn't imply easy-to-solve".
> I think I take them more seriously than you.
Seem... | 2024-02-21T17:26:51.202Z | 4 | c9oyMJtKzntpivtuG | qhaSoR6vGmKnqGYLE | Protocol evaluations: good analogies vs control | protocol-evaluations-good-analogies-vs-control | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/qhaSoR6vGmKnqGYLE/protocol-evaluations-good-analogies-vs-control | Fabien Roger | 2024-02-19T18:00:09.794Z |
i4y7yubjaPSNZoafQ | I think literal extinction from AI is a somewhat odd outcome to study as it heavily depends on difficult to reason about properties of the world (e.g. the probability that Aliens would trade substantial sums of resources for emulated human minds and the way acausal trade works in practice).
For more discussion see [he... | 2024-02-21T19:39:50.437Z | 10 | null | d5oqvgCR7SDf5m4k4 | Extinction Risks from AI: Invisible to Science? | extinction-risks-from-ai-invisible-to-science | http://arxiv.org/abs/2403.05540 | VojtaKovarik | 2024-02-21T18:07:33.986Z |
RFbzpFMPiGtiee2Zf | I absolutely agree that if we could create AIs which are very capable overall, but very unlikely to scheme that would be very useful.
That said, the core method by which we'd rule out scheming, insufficient ability to do opaque agency (aka opaque goal-directed reasoning), also rules out most other serious misalignment... | 2024-02-21T23:49:57.049Z | 2 | 4PbxLueojJPyjzDd9 | qhaSoR6vGmKnqGYLE | Protocol evaluations: good analogies vs control | protocol-evaluations-good-analogies-vs-control | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/qhaSoR6vGmKnqGYLE/protocol-evaluations-good-analogies-vs-control | Fabien Roger | 2024-02-19T18:00:09.794Z |
nm2WsDfaFtaAiThxs | I would say "catastrophic outcome (>50% chance the AI kills >1 billion people)" or something and then footnote. Not sure though. The standard approach is to say "existential risk". | 2024-02-22T00:49:25.697Z | 2 | 4mzNR5Bz6sMAxJntc | d5oqvgCR7SDf5m4k4 | Extinction Risks from AI: Invisible to Science? | extinction-risks-from-ai-invisible-to-science | http://arxiv.org/abs/2403.05540 | VojtaKovarik | 2024-02-21T18:07:33.986Z |
pTJBWxviu5Bqc98v4 | Maybe "full loss-of-control to AIs"? Idk. | 2024-02-22T02:02:38.857Z | 5 | kh9egiTBCECMFxsoM | d5oqvgCR7SDf5m4k4 | Extinction Risks from AI: Invisible to Science? | extinction-risks-from-ai-invisible-to-science | http://arxiv.org/abs/2403.05540 | VojtaKovarik | 2024-02-21T18:07:33.986Z |
ssnDydciLfnbuAG9K | Note that the openai-microsoft deal stops at AGI. We might hope that AGI will be invoked prior to models which are existentially dangerous. | 2024-02-25T21:42:56.841Z | 2 | 9qfKjpNGq85Rrc8jn | oPbiQfRotHYuC3wfE | OpenAI: Preparedness framework | openai-preparedness-framework | https://openai.com/safety/preparedness | Zach Stein-Perlman | 2023-12-18T18:30:10.153Z |
Bt25ve9SsGh59esK4 | I think these tasks would be in scope as long as these tasks can be done fully digitally and can be done relatively easily in text. (And it's possible to setup the task in a docker container etc etc.)
Quoting the desiderata from the post:
> Plays to strengths of LLM agents: ideally, most of the tasks can be completed... | 2024-02-27T22:34:39.278Z | 3 | t2sRyJeZzhrHobuQT | gAkCCaBBHD4gcwxmv | Bounty: Diverse hard tasks for LLM agents | bounty-diverse-hard-tasks-for-llm-agents | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/gAkCCaBBHD4gcwxmv/bounty-diverse-hard-tasks-for-llm-agents | Beth Barnes | 2023-12-17T01:04:05.460Z |
QNBftRXT4gCtH4q4g | > Since there are “more” possible schemers than non-schemers, the argument goes, we should expect training to produce schemers most of the time. In Carlsmith’s words:
It's important to note that the exact counting argument you quote isn't one that Carlsmith endorses, just one that he is explaning. And in fact Carlsmit... | 2024-02-27T23:18:29.002Z | 46 | null | YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo | Counting arguments provide no evidence for AI doom | counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo/counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | Nora Belrose | 2024-02-27T23:03:49.296Z |
uAGa3oLkChK6auBnL | I agree that you can't adopt a uniform prior. (By uniform prior, I assume you mean something like, we represent goals as functions from world states to a (real) number where the number says how good the world state is, then we take a uniform distribution over this function space. (Uniform sampling from function space i... | 2024-02-27T23:33:12.025Z | 25 | KigQrEeEk4cnB5hLf | YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo | Counting arguments provide no evidence for AI doom | counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo/counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | Nora Belrose | 2024-02-27T23:03:49.296Z |
agHXe9yjuxZY5S2cn | I'm sympathetic to pushing back on counting arguments on the ground 'it's hard to know what the exact measure should be, so maybe the measure on the goal of "directly pursue high performance/anything nearly perfectly correlated the outcome that it reinforced (aka reward)" is comparable/bigger than the measure on "liter... | 2024-02-28T00:45:46.895Z | 6 | WcWFjsmsqaptk7eBn | YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo | Counting arguments provide no evidence for AI doom | counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo/counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | Nora Belrose | 2024-02-27T23:03:49.296Z |
YjpqFTY6FCD2692oP | I think that if you do assume a fixed goal slot and outline an overall architecture, then there are pretty good arguments for a serious probabilty of scheming.
(Though there are also plenty of bad arguments, including some that people have made in the past : ).)
That said, I'm sympathetic to some version of the "Agai... | 2024-02-28T01:32:02.759Z | 24 | null | YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo | Counting arguments provide no evidence for AI doom | counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo/counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | Nora Belrose | 2024-02-27T23:03:49.296Z |
cMktrTxJmLTyN9KXM | > Ultimately I think you've only rebutted one argument for scheming—the counting argument. A more plausible argument for scheming, in my opinion, is simply that the way we train AIs—including the data we train them on—could reward AIs that scheme over AIs that are honest and don't scheme.
It's worth noting here that C... | 2024-02-28T01:55:49.010Z | 9 | nYsLKCxBXjCMXoZgb | YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo | Counting arguments provide no evidence for AI doom | counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo/counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | Nora Belrose | 2024-02-27T23:03:49.296Z |
dq6cb35FwKzs7mEej | I think in Ajeya's story the core threat model isn't well described as scheming and is better described as seeking some proxy of reward. | 2024-02-28T05:17:49.003Z | 4 | putSG7G5QM5fwod9b | YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo | Counting arguments provide no evidence for AI doom | counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo/counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | Nora Belrose | 2024-02-27T23:03:49.296Z |
LwxxsgrvGhqae8XD2 | > The key distinction in my view is whether the designers of the reward function intended for lies to be reinforced or not.
Hmm, I don't think the intention is the key thing (at least with how I use the word and how I think Joe uses the word), I think the key thing is whether the reinforcement/reward process actively... | 2024-02-28T05:20:29.609Z | 4 | putSG7G5QM5fwod9b | YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo | Counting arguments provide no evidence for AI doom | counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo/counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | Nora Belrose | 2024-02-27T23:03:49.296Z |
weMNzSWaK6iQCscbc | [Low importance aside]
> Evan then goes on to try to use the complexity of the simplest member of each model class as an estimate for the size of the classes (which is probably wrong, IMO, but I'm also not entirely sure how he's defining the "complexity" of a given member in this context)
I think this is equivalent t... | 2024-02-28T16:25:12.600Z | 5 | WcWFjsmsqaptk7eBn | YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo | Counting arguments provide no evidence for AI doom | counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo/counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | Nora Belrose | 2024-02-27T23:03:49.296Z |
McLBtSYmidvbqtwFH | My overall sense is that with substantial commited effort (but no need for fundamental advances) and some amount of within US coordination, it's reasonably, but not amazingly, likely to work. (See [here](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/kcKrE9mzEHrdqtDpE/the-case-for-ensuring-that-powerful-ais-are-controlled) for some d... | 2024-02-28T16:41:17.952Z | 2 | hPtLebjFZXrXj926x | ysuXxa5uarpGzrTfH | China-AI forecasts | china-ai-forecasts | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/ysuXxa5uarpGzrTfH/china-ai-forecasts | [deleted] | 2024-02-25T16:49:33.652Z |
93yj79kbkcCiYNuZ2 | > The current literature on scheming appears to have been inspired by Paul Christiano’s speculations about malign intelligences in Solomonoff induction
This doesn't seem right. The linked post by Paul here is about the (extremely speculative) case where consequentialist life emerges organically inside of full blown si... | 2024-02-28T19:26:19.887Z | 17 | null | YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo | Counting arguments provide no evidence for AI doom | counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo/counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | Nora Belrose | 2024-02-27T23:03:49.296Z |
3h7Bseg4yx2MYcZBq | > Since both types of AIs are: (1) playing the training game, (2) lying in order to obtain power, it makes sense to call both of them "schemers", as that simply matches the way the term is typically used.
I agree this matches typical usage (and also matches usage in the overall post we're commenting on), but sadly th... | 2024-02-28T19:32:43.908Z | 2 | uFyb3k2nZdbuAS2dc | YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo | Counting arguments provide no evidence for AI doom | counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo/counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | Nora Belrose | 2024-02-27T23:03:49.296Z |
7H7qsxH9vgFnJMq3Q | I found the explanation at the point where you introduce $b$ confusing.
Here's a revised version of the text there that would have been less confusing to me (assuming I haven't made any errors):
> - Complexity of simplest deceptive objective: $l + b$ where $l$ is the number of bits needed to select the part of the ob... | 2024-02-29T00:34:05.560Z | 8 | RtMbgqXnrasA3xiNu | YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo | Counting arguments provide no evidence for AI doom | counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo/counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | Nora Belrose | 2024-02-27T23:03:49.296Z |
ZbgYPY8HgewR2iu9i | > Complexity of simplest aligned objective: $a$
In this argument, you've implicitly assumed that there is only one function/structure which suffices for being getting high enough training performance to be selected while also not being a long term objective (aka a deceptive objective).
I could imagine this being basi... | 2024-02-29T00:39:52.892Z | 7 | RtMbgqXnrasA3xiNu | YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo | Counting arguments provide no evidence for AI doom | counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo/counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | Nora Belrose | 2024-02-27T23:03:49.296Z |
hYDpGY3fboEGCGuRQ | It currently seems to me like almost all the interesting work is in the step where we need to know whether a hypothesis implies harm.
Putting this in language which makes the situation more clear to me, "we need to know whether a given predictative model predicts/'thinks' that a given action will result in bad outcome... | 2024-03-01T02:29:10.241Z | 30 | null | edvyWfKdJHnoPkM2J | Bengio's Alignment Proposal: "Towards a Cautious Scientist AI with Convergent Safety Bounds" | bengio-s-alignment-proposal-towards-a-cautious-scientist-ai | https://yoshuabengio.org/2024/02/26/towards-a-cautious-scientist-ai-with-convergent-safety-bounds/ | mattmacdermott | 2024-02-29T13:59:34.959Z |
qLqJqfbtnGSnBbxm5 | The charitable interpretation here is that we'll compute E[harm|action] (or more generally E[utility|action]) using our posterior over hypothesis and then choose what action to execute based on this. (Or at least we'll pause and refer actions to humans if E[harm|action] is too high.)
I think "ruling out the possiblity... | 2024-03-02T03:15:11.937Z | 2 | agch82WzKtmnr6Na7 | edvyWfKdJHnoPkM2J | Bengio's Alignment Proposal: "Towards a Cautious Scientist AI with Convergent Safety Bounds" | bengio-s-alignment-proposal-towards-a-cautious-scientist-ai | https://yoshuabengio.org/2024/02/26/towards-a-cautious-scientist-ai-with-convergent-safety-bounds/ | mattmacdermott | 2024-02-29T13:59:34.959Z |
zbkfMyEQ6CLjoY9ie | I'm skeptical this realistically improves much over doing normal ensembling (ensembling is basically just taking a small number of samples from the posterior anyway).
It could in principle be better, but this would require that estimating relatively low measure predictions is key (predictions which wouldn't come up in... | 2024-03-02T16:23:30.209Z | 4 | PZs5hgagupogFQXD2 | edvyWfKdJHnoPkM2J | Bengio's Alignment Proposal: "Towards a Cautious Scientist AI with Convergent Safety Bounds" | bengio-s-alignment-proposal-towards-a-cautious-scientist-ai | https://yoshuabengio.org/2024/02/26/towards-a-cautious-scientist-ai-with-convergent-safety-bounds/ | mattmacdermott | 2024-02-29T13:59:34.959Z |
fhfFegGNAaPcoGDpK | [A bunch of what I'm going to say is maybe obvious, but I'm uncertain what will and won't be obvious, so I'm saying it anyway.]
> E.g. being able to choose at what threshold you start paying attention to a hypothesis which predicts harm, and vary it depending on the context, seems like a big plus.
We can already pick... | 2024-03-03T00:27:05.744Z | 2 | P4N4rA5Hv2GdioByj | edvyWfKdJHnoPkM2J | Bengio's Alignment Proposal: "Towards a Cautious Scientist AI with Convergent Safety Bounds" | bengio-s-alignment-proposal-towards-a-cautious-scientist-ai | https://yoshuabengio.org/2024/02/26/towards-a-cautious-scientist-ai-with-convergent-safety-bounds/ | mattmacdermott | 2024-02-29T13:59:34.959Z |
Bpmymy8ZLwvzRi4jD | The exact language you use in the post is:
> We therefore conclude that we should assign very low credence to the spontaneous emergence of scheming in future AI systems— perhaps 0.1% or less.
I personally think there is a moderate gap (perhaps factor of 3) between "world is ended by serious[^serious] spontaneous sche... | 2024-03-04T01:51:58.862Z | 13 | iBW3q2ez3s9jjcsaL | YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo | Counting arguments provide no evidence for AI doom | counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo/counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | Nora Belrose | 2024-02-27T23:03:49.296Z |
n4DgtXrKkZatPaHKC | I think science/trade sims for acausal trade and other purposes are likely[^reasoning] and if they occur, they likely have reasonably high measure.
My very unconfident subjective expectation for the measure on these sorts of science/trade sims is >1/100,000th (of all measure). (With massive model uncertainty due to ar... | 2024-03-04T06:02:21.487Z | 12 | null | di4Dhho4xZ4x9ABna | Are we so good to simulate? | are-we-so-good-to-simulate | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/di4Dhho4xZ4x9ABna/are-we-so-good-to-simulate | KatjaGrace | 2024-03-04T05:20:03.535Z |
JBW7RWzXJYvZrPjjB | See also discussion [here](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo/counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom?commentId=uAGa3oLkChK6auBnL). | 2024-03-05T02:01:07.106Z | 4 | G23SvKc8NFXdRukZu | YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo | Counting arguments provide no evidence for AI doom | counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo/counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | Nora Belrose | 2024-02-27T23:03:49.296Z |
TWaBGZLmNgDFZaBZw | > I definitely thought you were making a counting argument over function space
I've argued multiple times that Evan was not *intending* to make a counting argument in function space:
- In discussion with Alex Turner (TurnTrout) when commenting on an earlier draft of this post.
- In discussion with Quintin after shari... | 2024-03-05T03:09:03.960Z | 17 | gNnW674ezhESgeZdR | YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo | Counting arguments provide no evidence for AI doom | counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo/counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | Nora Belrose | 2024-02-27T23:03:49.296Z |
4tHDqeNHdJEzAts5y | > From my perspective, it's very frustrating to hear that there (apparently) are valid counting arguments but also they aren't the obvious well-known ones that everyone seems to talk about. (But also the real arguments aren't linkable.)
Personally, I don't think there are "solid" counting arguments, but I think you ca... | 2024-03-05T03:27:47.133Z | 6 | e47Ssm8LjGWGi9QSt | YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo | Counting arguments provide no evidence for AI doom | counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo/counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | Nora Belrose | 2024-02-27T23:03:49.296Z |
ddtDzCwN23dP7eKST | > If that's truly your remaining objection, then I think that you should retract the unmerited criticisms about how they're trying to prove 0.9999... != 1 or whatever. In my opinion, you have confidently misrepresented their arguments, and the discussion would benefit from your revisions.
This point seems right to me:... | 2024-03-05T03:39:23.496Z | 16 | e47Ssm8LjGWGi9QSt | YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo | Counting arguments provide no evidence for AI doom | counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo/counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | Nora Belrose | 2024-02-27T23:03:49.296Z |
afRhWHWuS6f8JD99G | Quick clarification point.
Under disclaimers you note:
> I am not covering training setups where we purposefully train an AI to be agentic and autonomous. I just think it's not plausible that we just keep scaling up networks, run pretraining + light RLHF, and then produce a schemer.[2]
Later, you say
> Let me start... | 2024-03-05T03:47:15.899Z | 72 | null | yQSmcfN4kA7rATHGK | Many arguments for AI x-risk are wrong | many-arguments-for-ai-x-risk-are-wrong | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/yQSmcfN4kA7rATHGK/many-arguments-for-ai-x-risk-are-wrong | TurnTrout | 2024-03-05T02:31:00.990Z |
oyxYwPAoaRqtEXhdN | > This section doesn’t prove that scheming is impossible, it just dismantles a common support for the claim.
It's worth noting that this exact counting argument (counting functions), isn't an argument that people typically associated with counting arguments (e.g. Evan) endorse as what they were trying to argue about.... | 2024-03-05T04:49:37.846Z | 53 | null | yQSmcfN4kA7rATHGK | Many arguments for AI x-risk are wrong | many-arguments-for-ai-x-risk-are-wrong | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/yQSmcfN4kA7rATHGK/many-arguments-for-ai-x-risk-are-wrong | TurnTrout | 2024-03-05T02:31:00.990Z |
axqBaN8NESkfqS76A | > scaling up networks, running pretraining + light RLHF, probably doesn't by itself produce a schemer
I agree with this point as stated, but think the probability is more like 5% than 0.1%. So probably no scheming, but this is hardly hugely reassuring. The word "probably" still leaves in a lot of risk; I also think st... | 2024-03-05T05:10:21.996Z | 40 | 3GjoCDfM4qee57gqG | yQSmcfN4kA7rATHGK | Many arguments for AI x-risk are wrong | many-arguments-for-ai-x-risk-are-wrong | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/yQSmcfN4kA7rATHGK/many-arguments-for-ai-x-risk-are-wrong | TurnTrout | 2024-03-05T02:31:00.990Z |
Sk7P4aPFN3R7yLqSo | > but I don't think AI Safety via Debate presupposes an AI being motivated by the training signal
This seems right to me.
I often imagine debate (and similar techniques) being applied in the (low-stakes/average-case/non-concentrate) [control](https://www.lesswrong.com/tag/control-ai) setting. The control setting is t... | 2024-03-05T16:35:00.932Z | 4 | GYPvPK7zjCkFnXppc | yQSmcfN4kA7rATHGK | Many arguments for AI x-risk are wrong | many-arguments-for-ai-x-risk-are-wrong | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/yQSmcfN4kA7rATHGK/many-arguments-for-ai-x-risk-are-wrong | TurnTrout | 2024-03-05T02:31:00.990Z |
LhqnG3riSakbtKhjh | This is in the data constrained case right?
Maybe noise makes training worse because the model can't learn to just ignore it due to insufficient data? (E.g., making training more noisy means convergence/compute efficiency is lower.)
Also, does this decrease the size of the dataset by a factor of 5 in the uniform nois... | 2024-03-05T19:15:41.166Z | 4 | AoxYQR9jLSLtjvLno | 8yCXeafJo67tYe5L4 | And All the Shoggoths Merely Players | and-all-the-shoggoths-merely-players | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/8yCXeafJo67tYe5L4/and-all-the-shoggoths-merely-players | Zack_M_Davis | 2024-02-10T19:56:59.513Z |
ZLGecexn8c5yvzc23 | > this doesn't matter that much if e.g. it happens (sufficiently) after you'd get ~human-level automated AI safety R&D with safer setups, e.g. imitation learning and no/less RL fine-tuning.
Yep. The way I would put this:
- It barely matters if you transition to this sort of architecture well after human obsolescence.... | 2024-03-06T02:45:49.377Z | 6 | HiHSizJB7eDN9CRFw | yQSmcfN4kA7rATHGK | Many arguments for AI x-risk are wrong | many-arguments-for-ai-x-risk-are-wrong | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/yQSmcfN4kA7rATHGK/many-arguments-for-ai-x-risk-are-wrong | TurnTrout | 2024-03-05T02:31:00.990Z |
5AFtejfEWAyaX6pMY | I think of "light RLHF" as "RLHF which doesn't teach the model qualitatively new things, but instead just steers the model at a high level". In practice, a single round of DPO on <100,000 examples surely counts, but I'm unsure about the exact limits.
(In principle, a small amount of RL can update a model very far, I d... | 2024-03-10T18:22:58.755Z | 13 | SMifMLp442mCdWbwp | yQSmcfN4kA7rATHGK | Many arguments for AI x-risk are wrong | many-arguments-for-ai-x-risk-are-wrong | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/yQSmcfN4kA7rATHGK/many-arguments-for-ai-x-risk-are-wrong | TurnTrout | 2024-03-05T02:31:00.990Z |
CHfNg3ygrn4cmyejj | I now think there another important caveat in my views here. I was thinking about the question:
1. *Conditional on human obsoleting[^safety] AI being reached by "scaling up networks, running pretraining + light RLHF", how likely is it that that we'll end up with scheming issues?*
[^safety]: Or at least AI safety rese... | 2024-03-10T18:36:20.435Z | 2 | axqBaN8NESkfqS76A | yQSmcfN4kA7rATHGK | Many arguments for AI x-risk are wrong | many-arguments-for-ai-x-risk-are-wrong | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/yQSmcfN4kA7rATHGK/many-arguments-for-ai-x-risk-are-wrong | TurnTrout | 2024-03-05T02:31:00.990Z |
sP5Q9RSgtpwsow3fy | One quick intuition pump: do you think a team of 10,000 of the smartest human engineers and scientists could do this if they had perfect photographic memory, were immortal, and could think for a billion years?
To keep the situation analogous to an AI needing to do this quickly, we'll suppose this team of humans is sub... | 2024-03-10T21:46:18.015Z | 4 | YtxTbKt65r8g9AvsB | bc8Ssx5ys6zqu3eq9 | "Diamondoid bacteria" nanobots: deadly threat or dead-end? A nanotech investigation | diamondoid-bacteria-nanobots-deadly-threat-or-dead-end-a | https://titotal.substack.com/p/diamondoid-bacteria-nanobots-deadly | titotal | 2023-09-29T14:01:15.453Z |
HekXAfPcYBzPz5St4 | > That's a more comparable example.
I don't understand where your confidence is coming from here, but fair enough. It wasn't clear to me if your take was more like "wildly, wildly superintelligent AI will be considerably weaker than a team of humans thinking for a billion years" or more like "literally impossible with... | 2024-03-11T04:20:51.575Z | 4 | sxjHpvJ7XjRRXNYQo | bc8Ssx5ys6zqu3eq9 | "Diamondoid bacteria" nanobots: deadly threat or dead-end? A nanotech investigation | diamondoid-bacteria-nanobots-deadly-threat-or-dead-end-a | https://titotal.substack.com/p/diamondoid-bacteria-nanobots-deadly | titotal | 2023-09-29T14:01:15.453Z |
gbJy6LCbFEWEscGrp | [Engine game](http://engine-game.com/)? "Deckbuilding puzzle game with daily challenges." | 2024-03-11T04:29:29.905Z | 3 | null | DvRBSzFjfaPYBhwmj | One-shot strategy games? | one-shot-strategy-games | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/DvRBSzFjfaPYBhwmj/one-shot-strategy-games | Raemon | 2024-03-11T00:19:20.480Z |
ky89wSPYGcJiQWnvh | > I really appreciate that in that case they did make falsifiable claims; I wonder whether either author has at any point acknowledged that they were falsified
AFAICT, the only falsified claim in the paper is the "three plus five equals" claim you mentioned. This is in this appendix and doesn't seem that clear to me w... | 2024-03-11T05:04:34.261Z | 2 | EBLfJRi3w7bDBFEiF | HxRjHq3QG8vcYy4yy | The Stochastic Parrot Hypothesis is debatable for the last generation of LLMs | the-stochastic-parrot-hypothesis-is-debatable-for-the-last | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/HxRjHq3QG8vcYy4yy/the-stochastic-parrot-hypothesis-is-debatable-for-the-last | Quentin FEUILLADE--MONTIXI | 2023-11-07T16:12:20.031Z |
HmNLGg7YLaCACo7yR | > 'Stochastic parrots' 2020 actually does make many falsifiable claims. [...] The problem is that those claims have generally all been falsified, quite rapidly.
The paper seems quite wrong to me, but I actually don't think any of the specific claims have been falsified other than the the specific "three plus five" cla... | 2024-03-11T05:15:26.995Z | 2 | aiAgmCTmuCK65qMnj | HxRjHq3QG8vcYy4yy | The Stochastic Parrot Hypothesis is debatable for the last generation of LLMs | the-stochastic-parrot-hypothesis-is-debatable-for-the-last | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/HxRjHq3QG8vcYy4yy/the-stochastic-parrot-hypothesis-is-debatable-for-the-last | Quentin FEUILLADE--MONTIXI | 2023-11-07T16:12:20.031Z |
epwXfw2TWNvgL3z5p | > Why? You've gone into circular logic here.
I wasn't trying to justify anything, just noting my stance. | 2024-03-11T06:07:33.151Z | 2 | 4MLi4iKKvabkJbubk | bc8Ssx5ys6zqu3eq9 | "Diamondoid bacteria" nanobots: deadly threat or dead-end? A nanotech investigation | diamondoid-bacteria-nanobots-deadly-threat-or-dead-end-a | https://titotal.substack.com/p/diamondoid-bacteria-nanobots-deadly | titotal | 2023-09-29T14:01:15.453Z |
kkrZokwPMGpJpmR8v | > By the way, where's this number coming from? (10^30 FLOP) You keep repeating it.
Extremely rough and slightly conservatively small ball park number for how many FLOP will be used to create powerful AIs. The idea being that this will represent roughly how many FLOP could plausibly be available at the time.
GPT-4 is ... | 2024-03-11T06:09:31.824Z | 2 | 4MLi4iKKvabkJbubk | bc8Ssx5ys6zqu3eq9 | "Diamondoid bacteria" nanobots: deadly threat or dead-end? A nanotech investigation | diamondoid-bacteria-nanobots-deadly-threat-or-dead-end-a | https://titotal.substack.com/p/diamondoid-bacteria-nanobots-deadly | titotal | 2023-09-29T14:01:15.453Z |
tXccFuvNgYjrkSL6j | > then I suggest you taboo the term AGI
FWIW, I do taboo this term and thus didn't use it in this conversation until you introduced it. | 2024-03-11T06:14:40.611Z | 4 | 4MLi4iKKvabkJbubk | bc8Ssx5ys6zqu3eq9 | "Diamondoid bacteria" nanobots: deadly threat or dead-end? A nanotech investigation | diamondoid-bacteria-nanobots-deadly-threat-or-dead-end-a | https://titotal.substack.com/p/diamondoid-bacteria-nanobots-deadly | titotal | 2023-09-29T14:01:15.453Z |
zKz4aqRA9pNfcCADi | Definition in the [OpenAI Charter](https://openai.com/charter):
> artificial general intelligence (AGI)—by which we mean highly autonomous systems that outperform humans at most economically valuable work
A [post on the topic by Richard](https://www.alignmentforum.org/posts/BoA3agdkAzL6HQtQP/clarifying-and-predicting... | 2024-03-11T07:03:10.839Z | 3 | PwsJJAfg7ork3KaoD | bc8Ssx5ys6zqu3eq9 | "Diamondoid bacteria" nanobots: deadly threat or dead-end? A nanotech investigation | diamondoid-bacteria-nanobots-deadly-threat-or-dead-end-a | https://titotal.substack.com/p/diamondoid-bacteria-nanobots-deadly | titotal | 2023-09-29T14:01:15.453Z |
BmqQdRjdtwERrCFtu | > My assumption is that when people say AGI here they mean Bostrom's ASI, and they got linked because Eliezer believed (and believes still?) that AGI will FOOM into ASI almost immediately, which it has not.
In case this wasn't clear from early discussion, I disagree with Eliezer on a number of topics, including takeof... | 2024-03-11T07:11:27.300Z | 2 | PwsJJAfg7ork3KaoD | bc8Ssx5ys6zqu3eq9 | "Diamondoid bacteria" nanobots: deadly threat or dead-end? A nanotech investigation | diamondoid-bacteria-nanobots-deadly-threat-or-dead-end-a | https://titotal.substack.com/p/diamondoid-bacteria-nanobots-deadly | titotal | 2023-09-29T14:01:15.453Z |
7gY7gLz44kFb6dEpK | Also, I'm going to peace out of this discussion FYI. | 2024-03-11T07:11:59.016Z | 2 | BmqQdRjdtwERrCFtu | bc8Ssx5ys6zqu3eq9 | "Diamondoid bacteria" nanobots: deadly threat or dead-end? A nanotech investigation | diamondoid-bacteria-nanobots-deadly-threat-or-dead-end-a | https://titotal.substack.com/p/diamondoid-bacteria-nanobots-deadly | titotal | 2023-09-29T14:01:15.453Z |
8bNnQizLHJrgGCTYz | As far as the orthogonality thesis, relevant context is:
- The [arbital page which defines it more precisely](https://arbital.com/p/orthogonality/): "The Orthogonality Thesis asserts that there can exist arbitrarily intelligent agents pursuing any kind of goal."
- [Yudkowsky's tweet](https://twitter.com/ESYudkowsky/st... | 2024-03-11T07:44:46.879Z | 8 | null | RbynKk3evb6RiLryL | Deconstructing Bostrom's Classic Argument for AI Doom | deconstructing-bostrom-s-classic-argument-for-ai-doom | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8H3dblxkLhY | Nora Belrose | 2024-03-11T05:58:11.968Z |
tdbkxFTt4gBtjciao | > I mean, the most straightforward reading of Chapters 7 and 8 of Superintelligence is just a possibility-therefore-probability fallacy in my opinion.
The most relevant quote from *Superintelligence* (that I could find) is:
> Second, the orthogonality thesis suggests that we cannot blithely assume that a superintell... | 2024-03-11T08:04:02.535Z | 5 | vCriobZJiburqhJo8 | RbynKk3evb6RiLryL | Deconstructing Bostrom's Classic Argument for AI Doom | deconstructing-bostrom-s-classic-argument-for-ai-doom | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8H3dblxkLhY | Nora Belrose | 2024-03-11T05:58:11.968Z |
fZFL69deEQg9FjR3C | Hmm, maybe I'm interpreting the statement to mean something weaker and more handwavy than you are. I agree with claims like "with current technology, it can be hard to make an AI pursue some goals as competently as other goals" and "if a goal is hard to specify given available training data, then it's harder to make an... | 2024-03-11T15:22:48.162Z | 5 | 8te3bGFBYRKWrPFdM | RbynKk3evb6RiLryL | Deconstructing Bostrom's Classic Argument for AI Doom | deconstructing-bostrom-s-classic-argument-for-ai-doom | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8H3dblxkLhY | Nora Belrose | 2024-03-11T05:58:11.968Z |
WBG2C2ciarxDPaixc | [minor]
I'm a bit confused or I think you need some additional caveats in the intro. I would have said that Bayesian statistics with typical models is well understood as bias toward short description length but there are important caveats in the neural network case, at least conceptually.
(That said, minimum descript... | 2024-03-11T15:38:13.950Z | 11 | null | nWRj6Ey8e5siAEXbK | Simple versus Short: Higher-order degeneracy and error-correction | simple-versus-short-higher-order-degeneracy-and-error-1 | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/nWRj6Ey8e5siAEXbK/simple-versus-short-higher-order-degeneracy-and-error-1 | Daniel Murfet | 2024-03-11T07:52:46.307Z |
biJAYu9H7vzLmhdZ8 | > I assume you mean 'won't generalize to answering questions about both modalities', and that's false.
Oops, my wording was confusing. I was imagining something like having a transformer which can take in both text tokens and image tokens (patches), but each training sequence is either only images or only text. (Let's... | 2024-03-11T22:31:46.140Z | 4 | opMdjJfszStdedivk | HxRjHq3QG8vcYy4yy | The Stochastic Parrot Hypothesis is debatable for the last generation of LLMs | the-stochastic-parrot-hypothesis-is-debatable-for-the-last | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/HxRjHq3QG8vcYy4yy/the-stochastic-parrot-hypothesis-is-debatable-for-the-last | Quentin FEUILLADE--MONTIXI | 2023-11-07T16:12:20.031Z |
faEEQuC4rLwFEJuwr | FWIW, I agree that if powerful AI is achieved via pure pre-training, then deceptive alignment is less likely, but this "the prediction goal is simple" argument seems very wrong to me. We care about the simplicity of the goal *in terms of the world model* (which will surely be heavily shaped by the importance of various... | 2024-03-12T00:47:22.240Z | 6 | NDdMurdvxvRiX7rEL | YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo | Counting arguments provide no evidence for AI doom | counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YsFZF3K9tuzbfrLxo/counting-arguments-provide-no-evidence-for-ai-doom | Nora Belrose | 2024-02-27T23:03:49.296Z |
FPfneqkNk8BfYFg8Z | Intuitions about simplicity in regimes where speed is unimportant (e.g. turing machines with minimal speed bound) != intuitions from the solomonoff prior being malign due to the emergence of life within these turing machines.
It seems important to not equivocate between these.
(Sorry for the terse response, hopefully... | 2024-03-12T00:56:13.586Z | 4 | 3bpCRaa2JCMdb8YLB | RbynKk3evb6RiLryL | Deconstructing Bostrom's Classic Argument for AI Doom | deconstructing-bostrom-s-classic-argument-for-ai-doom | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8H3dblxkLhY | Nora Belrose | 2024-03-11T05:58:11.968Z |
8bAr3NDKFMFeJBMmu | I find myself confused about the operationalizations of a few things:
In a few places in the report, the term "extinction" is used and some arguments are specifically about extinction being unlikely. I put a much lower probability on human extinction than extremely bad outcomes due to AI (perhaps extinction is 5x lowe... | 2024-03-13T01:44:02.290Z | 6 | null | 94K6pskgqBmuxsJLx | Results from an Adversarial Collaboration on AI Risk (FRI) | results-from-an-adversarial-collaboration-on-ai-risk-fri | https://forecastingresearch.org/s/AIcollaboration.pdf | Josh Rosenberg | 2024-03-11T20:00:24.642Z |
KtiZSM3mcaGtgjLcL | This is cross posted from the EA forum and Jhrosenberg has responded there: [link](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/orhjaZ3AJMHzDzckZ/results-from-an-adversarial-collaboration-on-ai-risk-fri?commentId=6DHyspKgKqBBEiTkB) | 2024-03-13T17:39:57.770Z | 3 | 8bAr3NDKFMFeJBMmu | 94K6pskgqBmuxsJLx | Results from an Adversarial Collaboration on AI Risk (FRI) | results-from-an-adversarial-collaboration-on-ai-risk-fri | https://forecastingresearch.org/s/AIcollaboration.pdf | Josh Rosenberg | 2024-03-11T20:00:24.642Z |
FXjbYfPbHiFna5vxf | One missing piece of context from this response is that a central case under discussion is the case where the employer is hypothetically aligned with the goals of its employees (as is often the case for small non-profits hiring heavily mission aligned employees).
By "hypothetically", I just mean that the employees (an... | 2024-03-14T00:12:16.791Z | 4 | HsnwTi8wfYEzuQY4u | qZELudpvcmaronerv | Jobs, Relationships, and Other Cults | jobs-relationships-and-other-cults | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/qZELudpvcmaronerv/jobs-relationships-and-other-cults | Ruby | 2024-03-13T05:58:45.043Z |
ouFZoTiQPvqubYFRv | I think working on mechanistic intepretability in a variety of domains, architectures, and modalities seems like a reasonable research diversification bet.
However, it feels pretty odd to me to describe branching out into other modalities as crucial when we haven't yet really done anything useful with mechanistic inte... | 2024-03-14T00:27:27.736Z | 5 | null | kobJymvvcvhbjWFKe | Laying the Foundations for Vision and Multimodal Mechanistic Interpretability & Open Problems | laying-the-foundations-for-vision-and-multimodal-mechanistic | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/kobJymvvcvhbjWFKe/laying-the-foundations-for-vision-and-multimodal-mechanistic | Sonia Joseph | 2024-03-13T17:09:17.027Z |
n6fvxjTbYvk3YKkiK | > An H100 running FP8 calculations can do 3-4e12 FLOPs
This is incorrect.
An H100 can do 3-4e15 GP8 FLOP/sec.
(nvidia claims 3,958 teraFLOP/sec [here](https://www.nvidia.com/en-us/data-center/h100/). teraFLOPS = 1e12 FLOP/sec, so 3,958 * 1e12 is about 4e15.) | 2024-03-14T00:35:04.296Z | 3 | null | bce63kvsAMcwxPipX | Highlights from Lex Fridman’s interview of Yann LeCun | highlights-from-lex-fridman-s-interview-of-yann-lecun | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/bce63kvsAMcwxPipX/highlights-from-lex-fridman-s-interview-of-yann-lecun | Joel Burget | 2024-03-13T20:58:13.052Z |
8vLRYEMhwCEuPC7Mo | Also you say:
> So, as a lower bound we're talking 3-4000 GPUs and as an upper bound 3-4e9. Overall, more uncertainty than LeCun's estimate but in very roughly the same ballpark.
This isn't a lower bound according to Carlsmith as he says:
> Overall, I think it **more likely than not** that 1e15 FLOP/s is enough to p... | 2024-03-14T00:37:00.502Z | 2 | n6fvxjTbYvk3YKkiK | bce63kvsAMcwxPipX | Highlights from Lex Fridman’s interview of Yann LeCun | highlights-from-lex-fridman-s-interview-of-yann-lecun | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/bce63kvsAMcwxPipX/highlights-from-lex-fridman-s-interview-of-yann-lecun | Joel Burget | 2024-03-13T20:58:13.052Z |
JXCHSunrCigqXmuHH | > For instance, the phenomenon of in-context learning by language models used to be considered a black box, now it has been explained through interpretability efforts.
Has it? I'm quite skeptical. (Separately, only a small fraction of the efforts you're talking about are well described as mech interp or would require ... | 2024-03-14T04:31:42.247Z | 4 | 7ctwyNzDuK2ex3Zgg | kobJymvvcvhbjWFKe | Laying the Foundations for Vision and Multimodal Mechanistic Interpretability & Open Problems | laying-the-foundations-for-vision-and-multimodal-mechanistic | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/kobJymvvcvhbjWFKe/laying-the-foundations-for-vision-and-multimodal-mechanistic | Sonia Joseph | 2024-03-13T17:09:17.027Z |
sFF2yijjCjc2DNKxR | > I think the objective of interpretability research is to demystify the mechanisms of AI models, and not pushing the boundaries in terms of achieving tangible results
Insofar as the objective of intepretability research was to do something useful (e.g. detect misalignment or remove it in extremely powerful future AI... | 2024-03-14T04:37:26.978Z | 2 | 7ctwyNzDuK2ex3Zgg | kobJymvvcvhbjWFKe | Laying the Foundations for Vision and Multimodal Mechanistic Interpretability & Open Problems | laying-the-foundations-for-vision-and-multimodal-mechanistic | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/kobJymvvcvhbjWFKe/laying-the-foundations-for-vision-and-multimodal-mechanistic | Sonia Joseph | 2024-03-13T17:09:17.027Z |
hDRWGy4TDFgyC5op3 | > Also see Interpreting the learning of deceit for another proposal/research agenda to deal with this threat model.
On a quick skim, I think this makes additional assumptions that seem pretty uncertain. | 2024-03-14T04:40:26.298Z | 2 | 2YyACegqtBHurQcLj | yQSmcfN4kA7rATHGK | Many arguments for AI x-risk are wrong | many-arguments-for-ai-x-risk-are-wrong | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/yQSmcfN4kA7rATHGK/many-arguments-for-ai-x-risk-are-wrong | TurnTrout | 2024-03-05T02:31:00.990Z |
jaCgpHjrkLhFzX8eR | It seems like the question you're asking is close to (2) in my above decomposition. Aren't you worried that long before human obsoleting AI (or AI safety researcher obsoleting AI), these architectures are very uncompetitive and thus won't be viable given realistic delay budgets?
Or at least it seems like it might init... | 2024-03-14T16:46:08.659Z | 2 | zm4zQYLBf9m8zNbnx | yQSmcfN4kA7rATHGK | Many arguments for AI x-risk are wrong | many-arguments-for-ai-x-risk-are-wrong | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/yQSmcfN4kA7rATHGK/many-arguments-for-ai-x-risk-are-wrong | TurnTrout | 2024-03-05T02:31:00.990Z |
NJsYNrunNpxDDZbdu | > So it makes more sense to me to view every employment relationship, to the extent it exists, as transactional: the employer wants one thing, the worker another, and they exchange labor for money.
I mean, this is certainly not the relationship I have with my employer.
Here is an alternative approach you could use wh... | 2024-03-14T17:07:02.502Z | 4 | xoPB6usxGDe2Y7JZp | qZELudpvcmaronerv | Jobs, Relationships, and Other Cults | jobs-relationships-and-other-cults | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/qZELudpvcmaronerv/jobs-relationships-and-other-cults | Ruby | 2024-03-13T05:58:45.043Z |
QCNudaT5D6wFLdTfD | Edit: habryka edited the parent comment to clarify and I now agree. I'm keeping this comment as is for posterity, but note the discussion below.
> My sense is almost everyone here expects that we will almost certainly arrive at dangerous capabilities with something else in addition to autoregressive LLMs
This exact s... | 2024-03-15T18:46:15.290Z | 3 | EmaM6czoXt5dAQAkd | bce63kvsAMcwxPipX | Highlights from Lex Fridman’s interview of Yann LeCun | highlights-from-lex-fridman-s-interview-of-yann-lecun | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/bce63kvsAMcwxPipX/highlights-from-lex-fridman-s-interview-of-yann-lecun | Joel Burget | 2024-03-13T20:58:13.052Z |
d2AhKsFh4GwchM6DA | > I was including the current level of RLHF as already not qualifying as "pure autoregressive LLMs". IMO the RLHF is doing a bunch of important work at least at current capability levels (and my guess is also will do some important work at the first dangerous capability levels).
Oh, ok, I retract my claim.
> Also, I... | 2024-03-15T23:26:01.693Z | 2 | WmfjjuJqMywmuYheL | bce63kvsAMcwxPipX | Highlights from Lex Fridman’s interview of Yann LeCun | highlights-from-lex-fridman-s-interview-of-yann-lecun | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/bce63kvsAMcwxPipX/highlights-from-lex-fridman-s-interview-of-yann-lecun | Joel Burget | 2024-03-13T20:58:13.052Z |
Ahpodi4NmSMtbcw9E | OpenAI and Anthropic often hire people without PhDs (often undergraduate degrees, sometimes masters, rarely no undergrad).
Edit: And I think these people in practice get at least some research mentorship.
They typically have some prior work/research/ml experience, but not necessarily any specific one of these. | 2024-03-16T19:51:30.245Z | 6 | y3i7omd2khENdt4ry | yi7shfo6YfhDEYizA | More people getting into AI safety should do a PhD | more-people-getting-into-ai-safety-should-do-a-phd | https://gleave.me/post/why-do-phd/ | AdamGleave | 2024-03-14T22:14:48.855Z |
zmJzx44XM52p73Sfu | I don't think Deepmind has ever required a PhD for research engineers, just for research scientists.
In practice these roles are pretty different at deepmind from my cached understanding. (At least on many deepmind teams?) | 2024-03-17T02:46:12.034Z | 2 | hejZY2FWt9GmcWQ35 | yi7shfo6YfhDEYizA | More people getting into AI safety should do a PhD | more-people-getting-into-ai-safety-should-do-a-phd | https://gleave.me/post/why-do-phd/ | AdamGleave | 2024-03-14T22:14:48.855Z |
HSmmuPCADbrzQ3upz | (Yep, wasn't trying to disagree with you, just clarifying.) | 2024-03-17T17:36:20.401Z | 4 | dXECCLjH7nanLbRZg | yi7shfo6YfhDEYizA | More people getting into AI safety should do a PhD | more-people-getting-into-ai-safety-should-do-a-phd | https://gleave.me/post/why-do-phd/ | AdamGleave | 2024-03-14T22:14:48.855Z |
64QngpwjCYtEDeDeC | Which of these titles are click bait?
I disagree with the thesis of some, but none seem like click bait titles to me. | 2024-03-17T17:39:34.094Z | 4 | C36h9kMMhfHPWuGXh | RXkm28FpqTFBrWqNj | Clickbait Soapboxing | clickbait-soapboxing | https://daystareld.com/clickbait-soapboxing/ | DaystarEld | 2024-03-13T14:09:29.890Z |
WoriK7BTkf9EbKxLB | There is some discussion [here](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/dxgEaDrEBkkE96CXr/thoughts-on-responsible-scaling-policies-and-regulation#Thoughts_on_an_AI_pause) and [here](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/Np5Q3Mhz2AiPtejGN/we-re-not-ready-thoughts-on-pausing-and-responsible-scaling-4#If_it_were_all_up_to_me__the_world... | 2024-03-17T18:46:52.846Z | 3 | null | X9Z9vdG7kEFTBkA6h | What could a policy banning AGI look like? | what-could-a-policy-banning-agi-look-like | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/X9Z9vdG7kEFTBkA6h/what-could-a-policy-banning-agi-look-like | TsviBT | 2024-03-13T14:19:07.783Z |
MM2pdqKbTuuepnzW3 | [SOTA LLMs seem to be wildly, wildly superhuman than humans at literal next token prediction](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/htrZrxduciZ5QaCjw/language-models-seem-to-be-much-better-than-humans-at-next).
It's unclear if this implies fundamental differences in how they work versus different specializations.
(It's pos... | 2024-03-18T02:47:41.591Z | 9 | null | FyRDZDvgsFNLkeyHF | What is the best argument that LLMs are shoggoths? | what-is-the-best-argument-that-llms-are-shoggoths | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/FyRDZDvgsFNLkeyHF/what-is-the-best-argument-that-llms-are-shoggoths | JoshuaFox | 2024-03-17T11:36:23.636Z |
qodScJpnZQR2mezNS | > Someone will create an agent that gets 80%+ on SWE-Bench within six months.
I think this is probably above the effective cap on the current implementation of SWE-bench (where you can't see test cases) because often test cases are specific to the implementation.
E.g. the test cases assume that a given method was na... | 2024-03-18T20:39:39.243Z | 7 | T5JpjMZH2WDqnm38G | wovJBkfZ8rTyLoEKv | On Devin | on-devin | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/wovJBkfZ8rTyLoEKv/on-devin | Zvi | 2024-03-18T13:20:04.779Z |
Ab7JduZABCfMghxKC | > Devin can sometimes (13.8% of the time?!) do actual real jobs on Upwork with nothing but a prompt to ‘figure it out.’
You imply in this post that SWE-bench corresponds to jobs on Upwork. This is incorrect, [SWE-bench](https://www.swebench.com/) corresponds to issue and pull request pairs on 12 python repos. | 2024-03-18T20:42:28.701Z | 13 | null | wovJBkfZ8rTyLoEKv | On Devin | on-devin | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/wovJBkfZ8rTyLoEKv/on-devin | Zvi | 2024-03-18T13:20:04.779Z |
gZKPPecPNCy4KqYjg | > Anyone -- and in particular Evhub -- have updated views on this post with the benefit of hindsight?
I intuitively don't like this approach, but I have trouble articulating exactly why. I've tried to explain a bit in this comment, but I don't think I'm quite saying the right thing.
One issue I have is that it doesn'... | 2024-03-19T03:42:57.305Z | 8 | vD62vckjjrkqHhmpw | FDJnZt8Ks2djouQTZ | How do we become confident in the safety of a machine learning system? | how-do-we-become-confident-in-the-safety-of-a-machine | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/FDJnZt8Ks2djouQTZ/how-do-we-become-confident-in-the-safety-of-a-machine | evhub | 2021-11-08T22:49:41.080Z |
qkdB89qgpauHdeaM7 | > I'd personally like to see this written up in more details (or a reference).
No current write up exists from my understanding. I might write this up as part of a broader project expanding various points about scheming. | 2024-03-19T21:01:34.654Z | 3 | HhrXDcodyBhgioqsg | yQSmcfN4kA7rATHGK | Many arguments for AI x-risk are wrong | many-arguments-for-ai-x-risk-are-wrong | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/yQSmcfN4kA7rATHGK/many-arguments-for-ai-x-risk-are-wrong | TurnTrout | 2024-03-05T02:31:00.990Z |
LjzwvtxPnbmP7L2ZM | > Leaving aside that I'm not sure what you would 'train' the supervisor model on
I'm imagining you train it to imitate human judgements of "was this action egregiously bad" on a combination of real AI actions and synthetic actions. This could fail to generalize to actual bad actions from your actual AI even if humans ... | 2024-03-20T00:16:36.381Z | 2 | dqaE9bvErw5rDJqCA | yQSmcfN4kA7rATHGK | Many arguments for AI x-risk are wrong | many-arguments-for-ai-x-risk-are-wrong | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/yQSmcfN4kA7rATHGK/many-arguments-for-ai-x-risk-are-wrong | TurnTrout | 2024-03-05T02:31:00.990Z |
ztBDpNNCeFGnx5mC8 | Another overall reaction I have to your comment:
> Security/safety is, as always, a property of the system as a whole, and not of any individual part, such as a particular model checkpoint.
Yes of course, but the key threat model under discussion here is scheming which centrally involves a specific black box individu... | 2024-03-20T01:15:29.563Z | 3 | LjzwvtxPnbmP7L2ZM | yQSmcfN4kA7rATHGK | Many arguments for AI x-risk are wrong | many-arguments-for-ai-x-risk-are-wrong | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/yQSmcfN4kA7rATHGK/many-arguments-for-ai-x-risk-are-wrong | TurnTrout | 2024-03-05T02:31:00.990Z |
cHANS4XNu7mkhg7u9 | On mamba, I explain why Nora is right in [this comment](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/mxa7XZ8ajE2oarWcr/lawrencec-s-shortform?commentId=C9XWzQvSenSHpQ5dH) | 2024-03-21T16:09:38.615Z | 6 | null | iH5Sejb4dJGA2oTaP | AI #56: Blackwell That Ends Well | ai-56-blackwell-that-ends-well | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/iH5Sejb4dJGA2oTaP/ai-56-blackwell-that-ends-well | Zvi | 2024-03-21T12:10:05.412Z |
g9BvNFB3uix3ckxt9 | Shapley seems like quite an arbitrary choice (why uniform over all coalitions?).
I think the actually mathematically right thing is just EDT/UDT, though this doesn't imply a clear notion of credit. (Maximizing shapley yields crazy results.)
Unfortunately, I don't think there is a correct notion of credit. | 2024-03-24T18:14:22.165Z | 8 | fj7RnMEdSE2F7uyjC | LKC3XfWxPzZXK7Esd | Leading The Parade | leading-the-parade | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/LKC3XfWxPzZXK7Esd/leading-the-parade | johnswentworth | 2024-01-31T22:39:56.499Z |
C2BzqgceSFerAAr6q | I think the core confusion is that outer/inner (mis)-alignment have different (reasonable) meanings which are often mixed up:
* **Threat models:** **outer misalignment and inner misalignment.**
* **Desiderata sufficient for a particular type of proposal for AI safety:** For a given AI, solve outer alignment and in... | 2024-03-25T19:40:52.255Z | 25 | null | hueNHXKc4xdn6cfB4 | On the Confusion between Inner and Outer Misalignment | on-the-confusion-between-inner-and-outer-misalignment | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/hueNHXKc4xdn6cfB4/on-the-confusion-between-inner-and-outer-misalignment | Chris_Leong | 2024-03-25T11:59:34.553Z |
grqLciitWqTmhTe3W | I see the intuition here, but I think the actual answer on how convex agents behave is pretty messy and complicated for a few reasons:
- Otherwise convex agents might act as though resources are bounded. This could be because they assign sufficiently high probability to literally bounded universes or because they thin... | 2024-03-25T22:29:55.952Z | 12 | DmdRwgMHmGKdL9tdZ | H67tq5sWPeHJxSqG8 | All About Concave and Convex Agents | all-about-concave-and-convex-agents | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/H67tq5sWPeHJxSqG8/all-about-concave-and-convex-agents | mako yass | 2024-03-24T21:37:17.922Z |
Ltr9oQYFCKE2FRGtk | I think this mostly just reveals that "AGI" and "human-level" are bad terms.
Under your proposed usage, modern transformers are (IMO) brutally [non-central](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/yCWPkLi8wJvewPbEp/the-noncentral-fallacy-the-worst-argument-in-the-world) with respect to the terms "AGI" and "human-level" from t... | 2024-03-26T18:15:18.085Z | 16 | null | gP8tvspKG79RqACTn | Modern Transformers are AGI, and Human-Level | modern-transformers-are-agi-and-human-level | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/gP8tvspKG79RqACTn/modern-transformers-are-agi-and-human-level | abramdemski | 2024-03-26T17:46:19.373Z |
NeDefncJux46yJAff | > I propose that LLMs cannot do things in this category at human level, as of today—e.g. AutoGPT basically doesn’t work, last I heard. And this category of capability isn’t just a random cherrypicked task, but rather central to human capabilities, I claim.
What would you claim is a central example of a task which req... | 2024-03-26T18:40:04.198Z | 12 | j8FCCxHFvdc4RfDgT | gP8tvspKG79RqACTn | Modern Transformers are AGI, and Human-Level | modern-transformers-are-agi-and-human-level | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/gP8tvspKG79RqACTn/modern-transformers-are-agi-and-human-level | abramdemski | 2024-03-26T17:46:19.373Z |
uuEWj45C4vH9kpFhD | > Superintelligence
To me, superintelligence implies qualitatively much smarter than the best humans. I don't think this is needed for AI to be transformative. Fast and cheap-to-run AIs which are as qualitatively smart as humans would likely be transformative. | 2024-03-26T22:23:19.065Z | 6 | ZR43eyxgexBvXTCGA | gP8tvspKG79RqACTn | Modern Transformers are AGI, and Human-Level | modern-transformers-are-agi-and-human-level | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/gP8tvspKG79RqACTn/modern-transformers-are-agi-and-human-level | abramdemski | 2024-03-26T17:46:19.373Z |
7YtLjaXjT7q59uEKE | Oh, by "as qualitatively smart as humans" I meant "as qualitatively smart as the best human experts".
I also maybe disagree with:
> In terms of "fast and cheap and comparable to the average human" - well, then for a number of roles and niches we're already there.
Or at least the % of economic activity covered by thi... | 2024-03-27T03:30:29.475Z | 2 | PhSAsosKqpvnGTNe9 | gP8tvspKG79RqACTn | Modern Transformers are AGI, and Human-Level | modern-transformers-are-agi-and-human-level | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/gP8tvspKG79RqACTn/modern-transformers-are-agi-and-human-level | abramdemski | 2024-03-26T17:46:19.373Z |
5R9Kf2HZEkkM6x3wS | > The benefits are transparency about who is influencing society
In this particular case, I don't really see any transparency benefits. If it was the case that there was important public information attached to Scott's full name, then this argument would make sense to me.
(E.g. if Scott Alexander was actually Mark Zu... | 2024-03-27T20:49:45.490Z | 7 | 4LdjRfqcMCvsyEsYc | oYnwTuxySiaZYDrur | My Interview With Cade Metz on His Reporting About Slate Star Codex | my-interview-with-cade-metz-on-his-reporting-about-slate | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/oYnwTuxySiaZYDrur/my-interview-with-cade-metz-on-his-reporting-about-slate | Zack_M_Davis | 2024-03-26T17:18:05.114Z |
fxYjJenYXiGcyn6Lo | How else will you train your AI?
Here are some other options which IMO reduce to a slight variation on the same thing or are unlikely to work:
- Train your AI on predicting/imitating a huge amount of human output and then prompt/finetune the model to imitate humans philosophy and hope this works. This is a reasonable... | 2024-03-29T17:42:38.961Z | 7 | kEnqHC3nhy6kEScEi | pzmRDnoi4mNtqu6Ji | The Cognitive-Theoretic Model of the Universe: A Partial Summary and Review | the-cognitive-theoretic-model-of-the-universe-a-partial | https://unstablerontology.substack.com/p/the-cognitive-theoretic-model-of | jessicata | 2024-03-27T19:59:27.893Z |
ZZZfu3qJTyzgzBgtM | > You might say "but there are clear historical cases where asteroids hit the earth and caused catastrophes", but I think geological evolution is just a really bad reference class for this type of thinking. After all, we are directing the asteroid this time, not geological evolution.
This paragraph gives me bad vibes.... | 2024-04-01T20:43:24.057Z | 19 | sK4cFfB8yovCWEfet | tBy4RvCzhYyrrMFj3 | [April Fools' Day] Introducing Open Asteroid Impact | introducing-open-asteroid-impact | https://openasteroidimpact.org/ | Linch | 2024-04-01T08:14:15.800Z |
GJAippZ6ZzCagSnDb | You [commented elsewhere](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/CrFdivehG4kobhjfC/ejt-s-shortform?commentId=b4fLPmzgwCKHLAdum) asking for feedback on this post. So, here is my feedback.
On my initial skim it doesn't seem to me like this approach is a particularly promising approach for prosaic AI safety. I have a variety of... | 2024-04-02T18:18:35.685Z | 18 | null | YbEbwYWkf8mv9jnmi | The Shutdown Problem: Incomplete Preferences as a Solution | the-shutdown-problem-incomplete-preferences-as-a-solution | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YbEbwYWkf8mv9jnmi/the-shutdown-problem-incomplete-preferences-as-a-solution | Elliott Thornley (EJT) | 2024-02-23T16:01:16.378Z |
NetFBtKiDwRHdjtmu | It seems worth noting that there are good a priori reasons to think that you can't do much better than around the "size of network" if you want a full explanation of the network's behavior. So, for models that are 10 terabytes in size, you should perhaps be expecting a "model manual" which is around 10 terabytes in siz... | 2024-04-03T18:07:46.624Z | 29 | null | 64MizJXzyvrYpeKqm | Sparsify: A mechanistic interpretability research agenda | sparsify-a-mechanistic-interpretability-research-agenda | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/64MizJXzyvrYpeKqm/sparsify-a-mechanistic-interpretability-research-agenda | Lee Sharkey | 2024-04-03T12:34:12.043Z |
a2XwXSMSH3S4Fcvk6 | It makes me a bit worried that this post seems to implicitly assume that SAEs work well at their stated purpose. This seems pretty unclear based on the empirical evidence and I would bet against.[^work]
[^work]: To be clear, the seem like a reasonable direction to explore and they very likely improve on the state of t... | 2024-04-03T18:18:56.208Z | 58 | null | 64MizJXzyvrYpeKqm | Sparsify: A mechanistic interpretability research agenda | sparsify-a-mechanistic-interpretability-research-agenda | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/64MizJXzyvrYpeKqm/sparsify-a-mechanistic-interpretability-research-agenda | Lee Sharkey | 2024-04-03T12:34:12.043Z |
HDbLQxBd4Ewg8QG6D | > Reactions to the paper were mostly positive, but discussion was minimal and the ideas largely failed to gain traction. I suspect that muted reception was in part due to the size of the paper, which tried to both establish the research area (predictive models) and develop a novel contribution (conditioning them).
I t... | 2024-04-03T18:34:49.635Z | 13 | null | RHDB3BdnvM233bnhG | The Case for Predictive Models | the-case-for-predictive-models | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/RHDB3BdnvM233bnhG/the-case-for-predictive-models | Rubi J. Hudson | 2024-04-03T18:22:20.243Z |
faqmpBDqJ4GDLuwBm | For the proposed safety strategy (conditioning models to generate safety research based on alternative future worlds) to beat naive baselines (RLHF), you need:
- The CPM abstraction to hold extremely strongly in unlikely ways. E.g., models need to generalize basically like this.
- The advantage has to be coming from u... | 2024-04-03T23:16:46.141Z | 14 | ce8QDR9zrHwaoZyDK | RHDB3BdnvM233bnhG | The Case for Predictive Models | the-case-for-predictive-models | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/RHDB3BdnvM233bnhG/the-case-for-predictive-models | Rubi J. Hudson | 2024-04-03T18:22:20.243Z |
87ERfXA7A3AvHausB | > I also agree that bigger models are much riskier, but I have the expectation that we're going to get them anyway
I think I was a bit unclear. Suppose that by default GPT-6 if maximally elicited would be transformatively useful (e.g. capable of speeding up AI safety R&D by 10x). Then I'm saying CPM would require coor... | 2024-04-04T16:14:02.349Z | 5 | kWLwZaQGBgCooMMYr | RHDB3BdnvM233bnhG | The Case for Predictive Models | the-case-for-predictive-models | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/RHDB3BdnvM233bnhG/the-case-for-predictive-models | Rubi J. Hudson | 2024-04-03T18:22:20.243Z |
Xd5Ygp6iWrqjs2B7M | METR (formerly ARC Evals) included results on base models in their recent work ["Measuring the impact of post-training enhancements"](https://metr.github.io/autonomy-evals-guide/elicitation-gap/#3.-results) ("post-training enhancements"=elicitation). They found that GPT-4-base performed poorly in their scaffold and pro... | 2024-04-04T19:17:45.869Z | 15 | null | dgFC394qZHgj2cWAg | Run evals on base models too! | run-evals-on-base-models-too | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/dgFC394qZHgj2cWAg/run-evals-on-base-models-too | orthonormal | 2024-04-04T18:43:25.468Z |
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