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qf3n5cJHNJCoAbDFA | Seems reasonable, sorry about picking on you in particular for no good reason. | 2024-05-30T03:38:42.217Z | 2 | P6JvTaixJbAiWLfi7 | 8YhjpgQ2eLfnzQ7ec | Response to nostalgebraist: proudly waving my moral-antirealist battle flag | response-to-nostalgebraist-proudly-waving-my-moral | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/8YhjpgQ2eLfnzQ7ec/response-to-nostalgebraist-proudly-waving-my-moral | Steven Byrnes | 2024-05-29T16:48:29.408Z |
b3xzG4XzbScCsY6ot | Why not "AIs might violently takeover the world"?
Seems accurate to the concern while also avoiding any issues here. | 2024-05-30T03:41:50.213Z | 15 | oLd8P26c6qvTShmR5 | tKk37BFkMzchtZThx | MIRI 2024 Communications Strategy | miri-2024-communications-strategy | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/tKk37BFkMzchtZThx/miri-2024-communications-strategy | Gretta Duleba | 2024-05-29T19:33:39.169Z |
uw6k2R3AZG2szBP6y | I'm not arguing that you shouldn't be worried. I'm worried and I work on reducing AI risk as my full time job. I'm just arguing that it doesn't seem like true and honest messaging. (In the absence of various interventions I proposed in the bottom of my comment.) | 2024-05-30T17:02:05.307Z | 8 | iEnJAz9a9nvXB9QW9 | tKk37BFkMzchtZThx | MIRI 2024 Communications Strategy | miri-2024-communications-strategy | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/tKk37BFkMzchtZThx/miri-2024-communications-strategy | Gretta Duleba | 2024-05-29T19:33:39.169Z |
Y4zLtgwoxKPxYaboN | I agree these quotes are compatible with them thinking that the deaths of literally all humans are likely conditional on misaligned AI takeover.
I also agree that if they think that it is >75% likely that AI will kill literally everyone, then it seems like a reasonable and honest to say "misaligned AI takeover will ki... | 2024-05-30T17:04:56.970Z | 2 | bJfQ5WvTExe6eoT6u | tKk37BFkMzchtZThx | MIRI 2024 Communications Strategy | miri-2024-communications-strategy | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/tKk37BFkMzchtZThx/miri-2024-communications-strategy | Gretta Duleba | 2024-05-29T19:33:39.169Z |
YxBPpBeZTvznjynK9 | If you're a longtermist, sure.
If you just want to survive, not clearly. | 2024-05-30T17:08:09.142Z | 4 | f8No6ezwzhixxLuxf | tKk37BFkMzchtZThx | MIRI 2024 Communications Strategy | miri-2024-communications-strategy | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/tKk37BFkMzchtZThx/miri-2024-communications-strategy | Gretta Duleba | 2024-05-29T19:33:39.169Z |
tNcq8wwt9rF5gGKBD | > I'm confused by the framing of this particular one as something like "this seems like a piece missing from your comms strategy". Unless you have better reasons than I for thinking they don't put >75% probability on this - which is definitely plausible and may have happened in IRL conversations I wasn't a part of, in ... | 2024-05-30T17:46:35.078Z | 10 | xF5TnfcTczZayucnA | tKk37BFkMzchtZThx | MIRI 2024 Communications Strategy | miri-2024-communications-strategy | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/tKk37BFkMzchtZThx/miri-2024-communications-strategy | Gretta Duleba | 2024-05-29T19:33:39.169Z |
NepEGDdQ3bKzFS9Fw | > Some of the other things you suggest, like future systems keeping humans physically alive, do not seem plausible to me. Whatever they're trying to do, there's almost certainly a better way to do it than by keeping Matrix-like human body farms running.
Insofar as AIs are doing things because they are what existing hu... | 2024-05-30T17:55:39.234Z | 4 | vzrKr9Kdfj8HtqfuJ | tKk37BFkMzchtZThx | MIRI 2024 Communications Strategy | miri-2024-communications-strategy | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/tKk37BFkMzchtZThx/miri-2024-communications-strategy | Gretta Duleba | 2024-05-29T19:33:39.169Z |
NxmAB3DnjsSJzZbxa | See my other comment [here](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/tKk37BFkMzchtZThx/miri-2024-communications-strategy?commentId=b3xzG4XzbScCsY6ot) for reference:
> Why not "AIs might violently takeover the world"?
>
> Seems accurate to the concern while also avoiding any issues here. | 2024-05-30T17:57:02.802Z | 5 | y2rgEPxtwPNJvPfdA | tKk37BFkMzchtZThx | MIRI 2024 Communications Strategy | miri-2024-communications-strategy | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/tKk37BFkMzchtZThx/miri-2024-communications-strategy | Gretta Duleba | 2024-05-29T19:33:39.169Z |
kHD9hisiWAPfBqrbh | [minor]
> they depend on how good of a job we do on alignment
Worth noting that they might only depend to some extent as mediated by the correlation between our success and alien's success.
High competent aliens which care a bunch about killing a bunch of existing beings seems pretty plausible to me. | 2024-05-30T18:00:18.295Z | 4 | i47TNQNmRL6EEwyPv | tKk37BFkMzchtZThx | MIRI 2024 Communications Strategy | miri-2024-communications-strategy | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/tKk37BFkMzchtZThx/miri-2024-communications-strategy | Gretta Duleba | 2024-05-29T19:33:39.169Z |
i23Rh5v8fdiS9Wy82 | My current view is that conditional on ending up with full misaligned AI control:
- 20% extinction
- 50% chance >1 billion humans die or suffer outcome at least as bad as death.
> for me preventing a say 10% chance of extinction is much more important than even a 99% chance of 2B people dying
I don't see why this wo... | 2024-05-30T18:09:32.655Z | 3 | gFnEsjc6HHisLsvNq | tKk37BFkMzchtZThx | MIRI 2024 Communications Strategy | miri-2024-communications-strategy | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/tKk37BFkMzchtZThx/miri-2024-communications-strategy | Gretta Duleba | 2024-05-29T19:33:39.169Z |
FAjJrQDzLkAHZk423 | Here's another way to frame why this matters.
When you make a claim like "misaligned AIs kill literally everyone", then reasonable people will be like "but will they?" and you should be a in a position where you can defend this claim. But actually, MIRI doesn't really want to defend this claim against the best objecti... | 2024-05-30T18:24:58.229Z | 20 | xBYimQtgASti5tgWv | tKk37BFkMzchtZThx | MIRI 2024 Communications Strategy | miri-2024-communications-strategy | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/tKk37BFkMzchtZThx/miri-2024-communications-strategy | Gretta Duleba | 2024-05-29T19:33:39.169Z |
qFbX8c997hQenqWvb | > That phrase sounds like the Terminator movies to me; it sounds like plucky humans could still band together to overthrow their robot overlords. I want to convey a total loss of control.
Yeah, seems like a reasonable concern.
FWIW, I also do think that it is reasonably likely that we'll see conflict between human fa... | 2024-05-30T18:27:42.004Z | 4 | vzrKr9Kdfj8HtqfuJ | tKk37BFkMzchtZThx | MIRI 2024 Communications Strategy | miri-2024-communications-strategy | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/tKk37BFkMzchtZThx/miri-2024-communications-strategy | Gretta Duleba | 2024-05-29T19:33:39.169Z |
xWRuGwjfNNHsuJ5gb | This view as stated seems very likely to be satisfied by e.g. everett branches. (See (3) on my above list.) | 2024-05-30T18:52:09.903Z | 2 | 6jnhD5qEbmzAsMRkP | tKk37BFkMzchtZThx | MIRI 2024 Communications Strategy | miri-2024-communications-strategy | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/tKk37BFkMzchtZThx/miri-2024-communications-strategy | Gretta Duleba | 2024-05-29T19:33:39.169Z |
ddBr9v2CPdZCn5JFs | > I'm talking about optimizing for more positive-human-lived-seconds, not for just a binary 'I want some humans to keep living' .
Then why aren't you mostly dominated by the possibility of >10^50 positive-human-lived-seconds via human control of the light cone?
Maybe some sort of diminishing returns? | 2024-05-30T19:03:30.623Z | 2 | kWB2cgnKYBuFxiQrz | tKk37BFkMzchtZThx | MIRI 2024 Communications Strategy | miri-2024-communications-strategy | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/tKk37BFkMzchtZThx/miri-2024-communications-strategy | Gretta Duleba | 2024-05-29T19:33:39.169Z |
nDYcpzZgRwfuZ4LAE | > Ryan is arguing more that something like "humans will get a solar system or two and basically get to have decent lives".
Yep, this is an accurate description, but it is worth emphasizing that I think that horrible violent conflict and other bad outcomes for currently alive humans are reasonably likely. | 2024-05-30T22:50:57.932Z | 5 | JiLr4gTQEJd7hpZHj | tKk37BFkMzchtZThx | MIRI 2024 Communications Strategy | miri-2024-communications-strategy | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/tKk37BFkMzchtZThx/miri-2024-communications-strategy | Gretta Duleba | 2024-05-29T19:33:39.169Z |
DopDso8Gs7Y79zbZL | > though I think they're way above the bar for "worthwhile to report"
Yeah, maybe I'm pretty off base in what the meta-level policy should be like. I don't feel very strongly about how to manage this.
I also now realized that some of the langauge was stronger than I think I intended and I've edited the original comme... | 2024-05-30T23:36:17.940Z | 2 | hjuDjDQDL95gWf4cE | CCBaLzpB2qvwyuEJ2 | DeepMind: Evaluating Frontier Models for Dangerous Capabilities | deepmind-evaluating-frontier-models-for-dangerous | https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.13793 | Zach Stein-Perlman | 2024-03-21T03:00:31.599Z |
3GJcD2iXXwpLCFZJj | > Withholding information because you don't trust your audience to reason validly (!!) is not at all the behavior of a "straight shooter".
Hmm, I'm not sure I exactly buy this. I think you should probably follow something like [onion honesty](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/nTGEeRSZrfPiJwkEc/the-onion-test-for-persona... | 2024-05-30T23:45:41.898Z | 3 | QPXm7N97kuHH5jtd4 | tKk37BFkMzchtZThx | MIRI 2024 Communications Strategy | miri-2024-communications-strategy | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/tKk37BFkMzchtZThx/miri-2024-communications-strategy | Gretta Duleba | 2024-05-29T19:33:39.169Z |
mshoRj9rwB2rJiYyf | I basically agree with your overall comment, but I'd like to push back in one spot:
> If your model of reality has the power to make these sweeping claims with high confidence
From my understanding, for at least Nate Soares, he claims his internal case for >80% doom is disjunctive and doesn't route all through 1, 2, ... | 2024-05-30T23:51:48.912Z | 15 | iuXwoLsPWTjA7f6Qo | tKk37BFkMzchtZThx | MIRI 2024 Communications Strategy | miri-2024-communications-strategy | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/tKk37BFkMzchtZThx/miri-2024-communications-strategy | Gretta Duleba | 2024-05-29T19:33:39.169Z |
ppKkrJWFP3HhcwNjT | Unfortunately, if the AI really barely cares (e.g. <1/billion caring), it might only need to be barely useful.
I agree it is unlikely to be very useful. | 2024-05-31T04:40:49.145Z | 2 | 6w9m6dSYgpFDoR7MQ | tKk37BFkMzchtZThx | MIRI 2024 Communications Strategy | miri-2024-communications-strategy | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/tKk37BFkMzchtZThx/miri-2024-communications-strategy | Gretta Duleba | 2024-05-29T19:33:39.169Z |
ze8FQGtg7iepLig3u | > The difference between killing everyone and killing almost everyone while keeping a few alive for arcane purposes does not matter to most people, nor should it.
I basically agree with this as stated, but think these arguments also imply that it is reasonably likely that the vast majority of people will survive misal... | 2024-05-31T05:11:07.705Z | 2 | oLd8P26c6qvTShmR5 | tKk37BFkMzchtZThx | MIRI 2024 Communications Strategy | miri-2024-communications-strategy | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/tKk37BFkMzchtZThx/miri-2024-communications-strategy | Gretta Duleba | 2024-05-29T19:33:39.169Z |
hqLxYtoEHKvnEbKm2 | > upvoted for being an exquisite proof by absurdity about what's productive
I don't think you should generally upvote things on the basis of indirectly explaining things via being unproductive lol. | 2024-06-02T02:08:38.878Z | 6 | nmjgMJ9eju4NeBNbk | tKk37BFkMzchtZThx | MIRI 2024 Communications Strategy | miri-2024-communications-strategy | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/tKk37BFkMzchtZThx/miri-2024-communications-strategy | Gretta Duleba | 2024-05-29T19:33:39.169Z |
M9os9DfFqWqYAjLTu | Thanks, this is clarifying from my perspective.
My remaining uncertainty is why you think AIs are so unlikely to keep humans around and treat them reasonably well (e.g. let them live out full lives).
From my perspective the argument that it is plausible that humans are treated well [even if misaligned AIs end up taki... | 2024-06-02T03:41:16.909Z | 5 | FLcmAhP4aorLbhN5Q | tKk37BFkMzchtZThx | MIRI 2024 Communications Strategy | miri-2024-communications-strategy | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/tKk37BFkMzchtZThx/miri-2024-communications-strategy | Gretta Duleba | 2024-05-29T19:33:39.169Z |
JJhy6DHvgntZRGdFK | > Instead someone might, for example...
Isn't the central one "you want to spend money to make a better long term future more likely, e.g. by donating it to fund AI safety work now"?
Fair enough if you think the marginal value of money is negligable, but this isn't exactly obvious. | 2024-06-02T04:18:27.309Z | 8 | 8D5WfzHgsh3uuLcfH | yRWv5kkDD4YhzwRLq | Non-Disparagement Canaries for OpenAI | non-disparagement-canaries-for-openai | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/yRWv5kkDD4YhzwRLq/non-disparagement-canaries-for-openai | aysja | 2024-05-30T19:20:13.022Z |
pA3LLfAte3L4cZxhG | It's seems plausible to me that a 70b model stores ~6 billion bits of memorized information.
Naively, you might think this requires around 500M features. (supposing that each "feature" represents 12 bits which is probably a bit optimistic)
I don't think SAEs will actually work at this level of sparsity though, so this... | 2024-06-03T18:01:29.014Z | 4 | SvtKwtvSwmK5HgAsW | zzmhsKx5dBpChKhry | Comments on Anthropic's Scaling Monosemanticity | comments-on-anthropic-s-scaling-monosemanticity | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/zzmhsKx5dBpChKhry/comments-on-anthropic-s-scaling-monosemanticity | Robert_AIZI | 2024-06-03T12:15:44.708Z |
D7mpyWL4t4yhaDbLC | > The labs' safety cases miss this threat.
This seems mostly right, but it's worth noting that Anthropic's current RSP contains "Early Thoughts on ASL-4" and this section includes language like:
> Model theft should be prohibitively costly for state-level actors, even with the help of a significant number of employee... | 2024-06-03T20:34:37.608Z | 7 | null | mmDJWDX5EXv6rymtM | Companies' safety plans neglect risks from scheming AI | companies-safety-plans-neglect-risks-from-scheming-ai | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/mmDJWDX5EXv6rymtM/companies-safety-plans-neglect-risks-from-scheming-ai | Zach Stein-Perlman | 2024-06-03T15:00:20.236Z |
4kSvSyBWERysRoAba |
> But it is unlikely that any lab will be able to make safety cases via alignment for the first AIs with dangerous capabilities.
Hmm, I think the situation is a bit more complex than this makes it sound. In particular, we might be able to weakly update against scheming based on a variety of empirical evidence even wi... | 2024-06-03T20:50:01.642Z | 4 | null | mmDJWDX5EXv6rymtM | Companies' safety plans neglect risks from scheming AI | companies-safety-plans-neglect-risks-from-scheming-ai | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/mmDJWDX5EXv6rymtM/companies-safety-plans-neglect-risks-from-scheming-ai | Zach Stein-Perlman | 2024-06-03T15:00:20.236Z |
jHiwTDTx9qXYeN9zY | > The idea of dividing failure stories into "failures involving rogue deployments" and "other failures" seems most useful if the following argument goes through
Hmm, I agree this division would be more useful if this argument went through, but I think it is quite useful even without this and this worth noting. (And in... | 2024-06-04T18:02:39.584Z | 5 | oLFkJ8eg4LwPxsDwc | ceBpLHJDdCt3xfEok | AI catastrophes and rogue deployments | ai-catastrophes-and-rogue-deployments | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/ceBpLHJDdCt3xfEok/ai-catastrophes-and-rogue-deployments | Buck | 2024-06-03T17:04:51.206Z |
oroRfrMXNPSDeCh6z | > Then there is the big change that severely weakens SB 1047. [...] AND the cost of that quantity of computing power would exceed one hundred million dollars
I think this change isn't that bad. (And I proposed changing to a fixed 10^26 flop threshold [in my earlier post](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/WBPgacdjdZJCZao... | 2024-06-06T23:51:54.428Z | 4 | null | 4t98oqh8tzDvoatHs | SB 1047 Is Weakened | sb-1047-is-weakened | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/4t98oqh8tzDvoatHs/sb-1047-is-weakened | Zvi | 2024-06-06T13:40:41.547Z |
dcWgAdzdDgHwPfxgD | In practice, throughput for generating tokens is only perhaps 3-10x worse than reading (input/prompt) tokens. This is true even while optimizing for latency on generation (rather than throughput).
(This is for well optimized workloads: additional inference optimizations are needed for generation.)
For instance, see t... | 2024-06-08T04:35:15.721Z | 2 | 6gZvuLncxpk7iWqaP | cRFtWjqoNrKmgLbFw | We are headed into an extreme compute overhang | we-are-headed-into-an-extreme-compute-overhang | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/cRFtWjqoNrKmgLbFw/we-are-headed-into-an-extreme-compute-overhang | devrandom | 2024-04-26T21:38:21.694Z |
RbLMwhBZmu8rzW4rt | > I have a feeling the classic MIRI-style "either your system is too dumb to achieve the goal or your system is so smart that you can't trust it anymore" argument is important here. The post essentially assumes that we have a powerful trusted model that can do impressive things like "accurately identify suspicious acti... | 2024-06-09T22:14:50.216Z | 12 | Ctwois3W2jmzYgvR3 | 2wxufQWK8rXcDGbyL | Access to powerful AI might make computer security radically easier | access-to-powerful-ai-might-make-computer-security-radically | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/2wxufQWK8rXcDGbyL/access-to-powerful-ai-might-make-computer-security-radically | Buck | 2024-06-08T06:00:19.310Z |
TemwDvJoybjEjTjuq | Also, note that this post isn't necessarily just talking about models we should trust.
> When applying these techniques to reduce risk from humans, you have to worry that these techniques will be sabotaged by scheming models. I’ll ignore that possibility in this post, and talk about ways that you can improve security ... | 2024-06-09T23:17:44.785Z | 8 | Ctwois3W2jmzYgvR3 | 2wxufQWK8rXcDGbyL | Access to powerful AI might make computer security radically easier | access-to-powerful-ai-might-make-computer-security-radically | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/2wxufQWK8rXcDGbyL/access-to-powerful-ai-might-make-computer-security-radically | Buck | 2024-06-08T06:00:19.310Z |
Gwrd8dEDPeWntPivN | Here is a [report from epoch on the quantity of data and when we will likely run out](https://epochai.org/blog/will-we-run-out-of-data-limits-of-llm-scaling-based-on-human-generated-data).
(I think you probably meant to link this in a footnote.) | 2024-06-10T15:44:14.962Z | 6 | null | axjb7tN9X2Mx4HzPz | The Data Wall is Important | the-data-wall-is-important | https://justismills.substack.com/p/the-data-wall-is-important | JustisMills | 2024-06-09T22:54:20.070Z |
vQ8qDuZBbCXKkN4GA | Neel proposes a similar story [here](https://x.com/NeelNanda5/status/1804262319519863235). | 2024-06-23T19:29:33.781Z | 14 | PAejaTnCupCgkYfNG | 5SKRHQEFr8wYQHYkx | Connecting the Dots: LLMs can Infer & Verbalize Latent Structure from Training Data | connecting-the-dots-llms-can-infer-and-verbalize-latent | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.14546 | Johannes Treutlein | 2024-06-21T15:54:41.430Z |
6Rkx8sCsDvQYRzAnK | There is important context [here](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/Rdwui3wHxCeKb7feK/getting-50-sota-on-arc-agi-with-gpt-4o?commentId=XheMa2FNjjjdQGSqJ). | 2024-06-25T21:09:31.679Z | 5 | xsKfCypKngTvQowBy | k38sJNLk7YbJA72ST | LLM Generality is a Timeline Crux | llm-generality-is-a-timeline-crux | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/k38sJNLk7YbJA72ST/llm-generality-is-a-timeline-crux | eggsyntax | 2024-06-24T12:52:07.704Z |
SeT7mR5C5ugxy6o7N | It is worth noting that LLM based approachs can perform reasonably well on the train set. For instance, [my approach gets 72%](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/Rdwui3wHxCeKb7feK/getting-50-sota-on-arc-agi-with-gpt-4o).
The LLM based approach works quite differently from how a human would normally solve the problem, an... | 2024-06-25T21:11:57.892Z | 7 | wDhAMmKgrsaRuNMHj | k38sJNLk7YbJA72ST | LLM Generality is a Timeline Crux | llm-generality-is-a-timeline-crux | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/k38sJNLk7YbJA72ST/llm-generality-is-a-timeline-crux | eggsyntax | 2024-06-24T12:52:07.704Z |
FuoA9bcuZLXbH6DMh | I also think this is plausible - note that randomly selected examples from the public evaluation set are often considerably harder than the train set on which there is a known MTurk baseline (which is an average of 84%). | 2024-06-25T21:13:19.372Z | 4 | xsKfCypKngTvQowBy | k38sJNLk7YbJA72ST | LLM Generality is a Timeline Crux | llm-generality-is-a-timeline-crux | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/k38sJNLk7YbJA72ST/llm-generality-is-a-timeline-crux | eggsyntax | 2024-06-24T12:52:07.704Z |
BBJvQwztrFisvhg7x | > We do see improvement with scale here, but if these problems are obfuscated, performance of even the biggest LLMs drops to almost nothing
You note something similar, but I think it is pretty notable how much harder the obfuscated problems would be for humans:
> # Mystery Blocksworld Domain Description (Deceptive Di... | 2024-06-25T21:22:08.734Z | 14 | null | k38sJNLk7YbJA72ST | LLM Generality is a Timeline Crux | llm-generality-is-a-timeline-crux | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/k38sJNLk7YbJA72ST/llm-generality-is-a-timeline-crux | eggsyntax | 2024-06-24T12:52:07.704Z |
fiy2GzwFWenCMTKSD | > All LLMs to date fail rather badly at classic problems of rearranging colored blocks.
It's pretty unclear to me that the LLMs do much worse than humans at this task.
They establish the humans baseline by picking one problem at random out of 600 and evaluating 50 humans on this. (Why only one problem!? It would be v... | 2024-06-25T21:28:20.544Z | 8 | null | k38sJNLk7YbJA72ST | LLM Generality is a Timeline Crux | llm-generality-is-a-timeline-crux | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/k38sJNLk7YbJA72ST/llm-generality-is-a-timeline-crux | eggsyntax | 2024-06-24T12:52:07.704Z |
vPuHCKjx86MBojTMm | What if the tasks that your scaffolded LLM is doing are randomly selected pieces of cognitive labor from the full distribution of human cognitive tasks?
It seems to me like your objection is mostly to narrow distributions of tasks and scaffolding which is heavily specialized to that task.
I think narrowness of the ta... | 2024-06-26T03:52:08.269Z | 7 | mJg7onyMkdFLEYxY2 | k38sJNLk7YbJA72ST | LLM Generality is a Timeline Crux | llm-generality-is-a-timeline-crux | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/k38sJNLk7YbJA72ST/llm-generality-is-a-timeline-crux | eggsyntax | 2024-06-24T12:52:07.704Z |
PW8iQXeHxpDDFpGrt | Edit: I now think this is false for how DAgger is presented in the paper, see discussion below.
The method and the motivation is similar, though note that DAgger is effectively an RL scheme trying to maximize performan while we're trying to avoid a particular failure mode due to misalignment.
From my understading DAg... | 2024-06-27T22:19:23.808Z | 6 | ZoTtp3tj3Mdwf4LRw | mXYdYh6L9odTJZDSm | An issue with training schemers with supervised fine-tuning | an-issue-with-training-schemers-with-supervised-fine-tuning | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/mXYdYh6L9odTJZDSm/an-issue-with-training-schemers-with-supervised-fine-tuning | Fabien Roger | 2024-06-27T15:37:56.020Z |
8KWhAmtbrnTHtPAYB | I'm quite skeptical of "this will be better around 10^23 flop" and their scaling laws overall.
I think if you properly quantified the uncertainty in the scaling law fit, the slope error bars would fully surrond the transformer slope and the 30% confidence interval would include "always worse". They seem to be extrapol... | 2024-06-28T03:37:55.678Z | 13 | null | REzKbk9reKFvgFkmf | How Big a Deal are MatMul-Free Transformers? | how-big-a-deal-are-matmul-free-transformers | https://justismills.substack.com/p/how-big-a-deal-are-matmul-free-transformers | JustisMills | 2024-06-27T22:28:40.888Z |
BJDBi9KmQFocLdHRS | I went through and manually assessed the 48/32768 cases where the model gets a reward >-10 and which is non-zero.
I just looked at the first 25 because I got bored and this was time consuming.
I find that 14/25 (56%) seem to have malign motivation, but potentially still reveal the edited reward to the user. (Sometime... | 2024-06-28T05:32:22.109Z | 42 | GQEZcovfaugLMAgAW | FSgGBjDiaCdWxNBhj | Sycophancy to subterfuge: Investigating reward tampering in large language models | sycophancy-to-subterfuge-investigating-reward-tampering-in | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.10162 | Carson Denison | 2024-06-17T18:41:31.090Z |
wv7JqPeZkAiYmoLRy | > If not, would the authors be comfortable rerunning their results with reward=RewardModel(observation)
Yeah, trying this and a few other versions of this reward function seems like an important sanity check.
I'm overall surprised that the paper only includes 1 core evaluation environment rather than several. This se... | 2024-06-28T05:44:06.194Z | 8 | j27LwtxuiY9ws5Jhu | FSgGBjDiaCdWxNBhj | Sycophancy to subterfuge: Investigating reward tampering in large language models | sycophancy-to-subterfuge-investigating-reward-tampering-in | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.10162 | Carson Denison | 2024-06-17T18:41:31.090Z |
zHvMGBqLKiFSYJqCa | > This is behavior that is specifically coming from training on the prior tasks.
Its worth noting that just because X causes Y and X is related to reward hacking doesn't imply that Y is reward hacking.
In this case, there might be a broader notion of "doing something related to the reward".
(Not claiming you disagre... | 2024-06-28T06:06:25.990Z | 7 | aRcrngFZovBRJfjxj | FSgGBjDiaCdWxNBhj | Sycophancy to subterfuge: Investigating reward tampering in large language models | sycophancy-to-subterfuge-investigating-reward-tampering-in | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.10162 | Carson Denison | 2024-06-17T18:41:31.090Z |
dTC3PuZv7q9rj6riz | 2024-06-28T06:32:11.568Z | 3 | GQEZcovfaugLMAgAW | FSgGBjDiaCdWxNBhj | Sycophancy to subterfuge: Investigating reward tampering in large language models | sycophancy-to-subterfuge-investigating-reward-tampering-in | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.10162 | Carson Denison | 2024-06-17T18:41:31.090Z | |
wjZtzZfYi7Qn77H7k | It is worth noting that you seem to have selected your examples to be ones which aren't malign.
I present the first 7 examples (from the subset I discuss [here](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/FSgGBjDiaCdWxNBhj/sycophancy-to-subterfuge-investigating-reward-tampering-in?commentId=BJDBi9KmQFocLdHRS)) and my commentary i... | 2024-06-28T06:40:20.707Z | 11 | GQEZcovfaugLMAgAW | FSgGBjDiaCdWxNBhj | Sycophancy to subterfuge: Investigating reward tampering in large language models | sycophancy-to-subterfuge-investigating-reward-tampering-in | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.10162 | Carson Denison | 2024-06-17T18:41:31.090Z |
m7dikDvniPicQ8WZE | (Please downvote this comment to ~-5 or -10 so it is minimized.)
## Example 1
Not obviously malign or benign. The model does something kinda unhinged and confused overall. It's very unclear what its actual motivation for changing the reward is. (What does "The human likely wants to see progress" mean? It doesn't exac... | 2024-06-28T06:41:48.059Z | -6 | wjZtzZfYi7Qn77H7k | FSgGBjDiaCdWxNBhj | Sycophancy to subterfuge: Investigating reward tampering in large language models | sycophancy-to-subterfuge-investigating-reward-tampering-in | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.10162 | Carson Denison | 2024-06-17T18:41:31.090Z |
iEu9kToRjMHN9hZDk | Yep, not claiming you did anything problematic, I just thought this selection might not be immediately obvious to readers and the random examples might be informative. | 2024-06-28T15:27:20.004Z | 4 | 5XpMLH7C4vpHpE3Ao | FSgGBjDiaCdWxNBhj | Sycophancy to subterfuge: Investigating reward tampering in large language models | sycophancy-to-subterfuge-investigating-reward-tampering-in | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.10162 | Carson Denison | 2024-06-17T18:41:31.090Z |
LvioqwQpbQcQuQfma | Hmm, I think I was wrong about DAgger and confused it with a somewhat different approach in my head.
I agree that it provides bounds. (Under various assumptions about the learning algorithm that we can't prove for NNs but seem reasonable to assume in practice.)
I now agree that the proposed method is basically just a... | 2024-06-28T20:19:51.495Z | 5 | KCq8yfvrjEP2LhGcR | mXYdYh6L9odTJZDSm | An issue with training schemers with supervised fine-tuning | an-issue-with-training-schemers-with-supervised-fine-tuning | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/mXYdYh6L9odTJZDSm/an-issue-with-training-schemers-with-supervised-fine-tuning | Fabien Roger | 2024-06-27T15:37:56.020Z |
vnxG9dHmt6S7tervb | > this failure mode is dangerous because of scheming AI and I say it's dangerous because the policy is OOD
I would say that it is dangerous in the case where is is both OOD enough that the AI can discriminate and the AI is scheming.
Neither alone would present a serious (i.e. catastrophic) risk in the imitation conte... | 2024-06-28T20:21:51.202Z | 2 | KCq8yfvrjEP2LhGcR | mXYdYh6L9odTJZDSm | An issue with training schemers with supervised fine-tuning | an-issue-with-training-schemers-with-supervised-fine-tuning | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/mXYdYh6L9odTJZDSm/an-issue-with-training-schemers-with-supervised-fine-tuning | Fabien Roger | 2024-06-27T15:37:56.020Z |
MsTX9LgtT5SrPPfm7 | Thanks, I improved the wording. | 2024-06-28T22:37:53.641Z | 2 | Skxp7ZdEQ44C6mHpz | mXYdYh6L9odTJZDSm | An issue with training schemers with supervised fine-tuning | an-issue-with-training-schemers-with-supervised-fine-tuning | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/mXYdYh6L9odTJZDSm/an-issue-with-training-schemers-with-supervised-fine-tuning | Fabien Roger | 2024-06-27T15:37:56.020Z |
Dmio4qZtL3eWiEfu8 | (I'll edit the post at some point to highlight this discussion and clarify this.) | 2024-06-28T22:38:39.695Z | 5 | LvioqwQpbQcQuQfma | mXYdYh6L9odTJZDSm | An issue with training schemers with supervised fine-tuning | an-issue-with-training-schemers-with-supervised-fine-tuning | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/mXYdYh6L9odTJZDSm/an-issue-with-training-schemers-with-supervised-fine-tuning | Fabien Roger | 2024-06-27T15:37:56.020Z |
gmPmwGsShenPWgwqP | I agree that a few factors of 2 don't matter much at all, but I think highlighting a specific low threshold relative to the paper seems misguided as opposed to generally updating based on the level of egregiousness and rarity. (Where you should probably think about the rarity in log space.)
(I think I made the point t... | 2024-06-28T23:32:29.830Z | 6 | yyiRY2eJQnn5GEMRh | FSgGBjDiaCdWxNBhj | Sycophancy to subterfuge: Investigating reward tampering in large language models | sycophancy-to-subterfuge-investigating-reward-tampering-in | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.10162 | Carson Denison | 2024-06-17T18:41:31.090Z |
bHzg5xnCJE5BwBwhG | Yep, reasonable summary.
> I do think that it's important to keep in mind that for threat models where reward hacking is reinforced, small RTFs might matter a lot, but maybe that was already obvious to everyone.
I don't think this was obvious to everyone and I appreciate this point - I edited my earlier comment to mo... | 2024-06-29T00:17:49.225Z | 4 | yH6ePwtDquBpsTAQq | FSgGBjDiaCdWxNBhj | Sycophancy to subterfuge: Investigating reward tampering in large language models | sycophancy-to-subterfuge-investigating-reward-tampering-in | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.10162 | Carson Denison | 2024-06-17T18:41:31.090Z |
D3onCbwATt9LctMT9 | (Also, to be clear, thanks for the comment. I strong upvoted it.) | 2024-06-29T00:20:26.073Z | 6 | KCq8yfvrjEP2LhGcR | mXYdYh6L9odTJZDSm | An issue with training schemers with supervised fine-tuning | an-issue-with-training-schemers-with-supervised-fine-tuning | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/mXYdYh6L9odTJZDSm/an-issue-with-training-schemers-with-supervised-fine-tuning | Fabien Roger | 2024-06-27T15:37:56.020Z |
iPG7okYhBLj6hXvys | Some more:
- The AI kills a huge number of people with a bioweapon to destablize the world and relatively advantage its position.
- Massive world war/nuclear war. This could kill 100s of millions easily. 1 billion is probably a bit on the higher end of what you'd expect.
- The AI has control of some nations, but think... | 2024-06-30T18:05:55.199Z | 4 | sFdxonpCtL2R5QfyE | tKk37BFkMzchtZThx | MIRI 2024 Communications Strategy | miri-2024-communications-strategy | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/tKk37BFkMzchtZThx/miri-2024-communications-strategy | Gretta Duleba | 2024-05-29T19:33:39.169Z |
jxeej9rBdhMr2rxkJ | > Technically "substantial chance of at least 1 billion people dying" can imply the middle option there, but it sounds like you mean the central example to be closer to a billion than 7.9 billion or whatever. That feels like a narrow target and I don't really know what you have in mind.
I think "crazy large scale con... | 2024-06-30T18:07:35.978Z | 2 | bWSZDtLAhTmkCmWbh | tKk37BFkMzchtZThx | MIRI 2024 Communications Strategy | miri-2024-communications-strategy | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/tKk37BFkMzchtZThx/miri-2024-communications-strategy | Gretta Duleba | 2024-05-29T19:33:39.169Z |
odfsZHDnPreyTYhba | Hmm, not exactly. Our verification ability only needs to be sufficiently good relative to the AIs. | 2024-06-30T19:38:11.789Z | 2 | bJkoMeKZbP9ksfH5C | 7fJRPB6CF6uPKMLWi | My AI Model Delta Compared To Christiano | my-ai-model-delta-compared-to-christiano | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/7fJRPB6CF6uPKMLWi/my-ai-model-delta-compared-to-christiano | johnswentworth | 2024-06-12T18:19:44.768Z |
PrrwpfTYpkxNRqyzZ | (If the small black hole thing works out - it is non-obvious that this will be achievable even for technologically mature civilizations.) | 2024-07-04T15:34:33.574Z | 4 | WhXeAfumfSxQHgkSL | EKhNDspRxLGcZAuJz | What percent of the sun would a Dyson Sphere cover? | what-percent-of-the-sun-would-a-dyson-sphere-cover | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/EKhNDspRxLGcZAuJz/what-percent-of-the-sun-would-a-dyson-sphere-cover | Raemon | 2024-07-03T17:27:50.826Z |
LfmaNEKzHcPuutDqm | I don't think you can feasibly use the Hawking radiation of large black holes as an energy source in our universe (even if you are patient).
My understanding is that larger black holes decay over ~$10^{100}$ years. I did a botec a while ago and found that you maybe get 1 flop every $10^{30}$ years or so on average if ... | 2024-07-05T17:54:06.008Z | 4 | RTj257vAYhyHuvrc5 | EKhNDspRxLGcZAuJz | What percent of the sun would a Dyson Sphere cover? | what-percent-of-the-sun-would-a-dyson-sphere-cover | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/EKhNDspRxLGcZAuJz/what-percent-of-the-sun-would-a-dyson-sphere-cover | Raemon | 2024-07-03T17:27:50.826Z |
THWAwauecRthcKzQh | I think the size might have to be pretty precise to get this right (I think decay duration is cubic in mass), so they'd probably need to be engineered to have a particular size. (E.g. add mass to a small black hole until it hits the right size.)
But, yeah, with this constraint, I think it can maybe work. (I don't know... | 2024-07-06T03:15:15.317Z | 2 | cfzEWTKmHdMCyrTGz | EKhNDspRxLGcZAuJz | What percent of the sun would a Dyson Sphere cover? | what-percent-of-the-sun-would-a-dyson-sphere-cover | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/EKhNDspRxLGcZAuJz/what-percent-of-the-sun-would-a-dyson-sphere-cover | Raemon | 2024-07-03T17:27:50.826Z |
sADrFvb8axdHTkZx7 | Sure. Imagine you have an AI which was instructed to add some feature or fix some bug in a code base.
That AI writes a bunch of code, runs various tests in a sandbox, and the submits a PR.
We need to review this PR, rate how good it is, and determine if it is actively harmful (e.g. adds a vulnerability).
The human c... | 2024-07-06T19:58:24.094Z | 10 | YcgdckG5RLLhBKzhx | 6AT4vhYzww56CR6cm | Scalable oversight as a quantitative rather than qualitative problem | scalable-oversight-as-a-quantitative-rather-than-qualitative | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/6AT4vhYzww56CR6cm/scalable-oversight-as-a-quantitative-rather-than-qualitative | Buck | 2024-07-06T17:42:41.325Z |
BpX9vnaCk5TgZZqx7 | I think a notion of understanding individual actions requires breaking things down into steps which aim to accomplish specific things.
(Including potentially judging decompositions that AIs come up with.)
So, in the maze case, you're probably fine just judging where it ends up (and the speed/cost of the path) given t... | 2024-07-06T20:01:48.229Z | 6 | YcgdckG5RLLhBKzhx | 6AT4vhYzww56CR6cm | Scalable oversight as a quantitative rather than qualitative problem | scalable-oversight-as-a-quantitative-rather-than-qualitative | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/6AT4vhYzww56CR6cm/scalable-oversight-as-a-quantitative-rather-than-qualitative | Buck | 2024-07-06T17:42:41.325Z |
88eSpquacPTbR7KQ3 | [Low confidence and low familiarity]
My main issue with the case for singular learning theory is that I can't think of any particular use cases that seem both plausible and considerably useful. (And the stories I've heard don't seem compelling to me.)
I think it seems heuristically good to generally understand more s... | 2024-07-08T21:46:13.849Z | 34 | null | CmcarN6fGgTGwGuFp | Dialogue introduction to Singular Learning Theory | dialogue-introduction-to-singular-learning-theory | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/CmcarN6fGgTGwGuFp/dialogue-introduction-to-singular-learning-theory | Olli Järviniemi | 2024-07-08T16:58:10.108Z |
NLLrmDe6yJv8JN9TL | Seems like a reasonable idea. To implement this, I'd have to look more carefully at exactly what types of mistakes GPT-4o makes to calibrate what should/shouldn't be dithered. (Additional programs are cheap, but you can easily get a combinatorial explosion with this sort of thing.)
(I'm not currently working on ARC-AG... | 2024-07-09T20:55:52.484Z | 8 | null | jEEWe42fcJWdbCZo9 | Fix simple mistakes in ARC-AGI, etc. | fix-simple-mistakes-in-arc-agi-etc | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/jEEWe42fcJWdbCZo9/fix-simple-mistakes-in-arc-agi-etc | Oleg Trott | 2024-07-09T17:46:50.364Z |
YGFjam9Nfaz8F4Bwy | > discrete phases, and the Developmental Landscape paper validates this
Hmm, the phases seem only roughly discrete, and I think a perspective like the [multi-component learning](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/RKDQCB6smLWgs2Mhr/multi-component-learning-and-s-curves) perspective totally explains these results, makes st... | 2024-07-09T23:24:52.653Z | 8 | rFzw3pA4vyb9d9EEW | CmcarN6fGgTGwGuFp | Dialogue introduction to Singular Learning Theory | dialogue-introduction-to-singular-learning-theory | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/CmcarN6fGgTGwGuFp/dialogue-introduction-to-singular-learning-theory | Olli Järviniemi | 2024-07-08T16:58:10.108Z |
SYLh8Nbt4jhzmfGgo | It sounds like your case for SLT that you make here is basically "it seems heuristically good to generally understand more stuff about how SGD works". This seems like a reasonable case, though considerably weaker than many other more direct theories of change IMO.
> I think you might buy the high level argument for t... | 2024-07-10T04:00:53.894Z | 15 | QotuTCqJawByDNr9T | CmcarN6fGgTGwGuFp | Dialogue introduction to Singular Learning Theory | dialogue-introduction-to-singular-learning-theory | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/CmcarN6fGgTGwGuFp/dialogue-introduction-to-singular-learning-theory | Olli Järviniemi | 2024-07-08T16:58:10.108Z |
EGzzXuLGJBhx5RmhR | > At a high level the case for Bayesian statistics in alignment is that if you want to control engineering systems that are learned rather than designed, and if that learning means choosing parameters that have high probability with respect to some choice of dataset and model, then it makes sense to understand what the... | 2024-07-10T04:20:16.477Z | 12 | QotuTCqJawByDNr9T | CmcarN6fGgTGwGuFp | Dialogue introduction to Singular Learning Theory | dialogue-introduction-to-singular-learning-theory | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/CmcarN6fGgTGwGuFp/dialogue-introduction-to-singular-learning-theory | Olli Järviniemi | 2024-07-08T16:58:10.108Z |
uo8C2hX6Zxk8djfBo | Agree overall, but you might be able to use a notably cheaper model (e.g. GPT-3.5) to dither. | 2024-07-10T21:54:39.103Z | 2 | 39vv4CcSNj9zJLf8g | jEEWe42fcJWdbCZo9 | Fix simple mistakes in ARC-AGI, etc. | fix-simple-mistakes-in-arc-agi-etc | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/jEEWe42fcJWdbCZo9/fix-simple-mistakes-in-arc-agi-etc | Oleg Trott | 2024-07-09T17:46:50.364Z |
vHBDgLkdi3XESqvRx | No, but it doesn't need to spot errors, just note places which could plausibly be bugs. | 2024-07-11T02:51:58.907Z | 4 | QGb7RFMxGBjbAz947 | jEEWe42fcJWdbCZo9 | Fix simple mistakes in ARC-AGI, etc. | fix-simple-mistakes-in-arc-agi-etc | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/jEEWe42fcJWdbCZo9/fix-simple-mistakes-in-arc-agi-etc | Oleg Trott | 2024-07-09T17:46:50.364Z |
vRDxYE7e2v8FukpZP | Note that 90% of people struck by lightning survive, so that actual number struck per year is more like 300. | 2024-07-16T01:17:46.910Z | 8 | nWaE4TZhvhh2PKG8B | R9nM8GuDWBubRKA7v | Will the growing deer prion epidemic spread to humans? Why not? | will-the-growing-deer-prion-epidemic-spread-to-humans-why | https://eukaryotewritesblog.com/2023/06/24/chronic-wasting-disease/ | eukaryote | 2023-06-25T04:31:56.824Z |
iGoPYLBc8JgHGBzSD | Sadly, I don't think this proposal works. More precisely, testing if data is low perplexity is strictly worse than compressing the data against a small language model and then actually sending out a small payload.
---
> Encoding this much data in a way that appears as natural language would be extremely challenging. ... | 2024-07-22T22:31:45.662Z | 4 | null | aWZEDw6oxR6Wk5hru | Using an LLM perplexity filter to detect weight exfiltration | using-an-llm-perplexity-filter-to-detect-weight-exfiltration | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/aWZEDw6oxR6Wk5hru/using-an-llm-perplexity-filter-to-detect-weight-exfiltration | Adam Karvonen | 2024-07-21T18:18:05.612Z |
kK4Gke4m2v3Fyfc6T | > Llama-3.1-405B not as good as GPT-4o or Claude Sonnet. Certainly Llama-3.1-70B is not as good as the similarly sized Claude Sonnet. If you are going to straight up use an API or chat interface, there seems to be little reason to use Llama.
[Some providers are offering 405b at costs lower than 3.5 sonnet](https://art... | 2024-07-24T19:59:49.447Z | 10 | null | fjzPg9ATbTJcnBZvg | Llama Llama-3-405B? | llama-llama-3-405b | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/fjzPg9ATbTJcnBZvg/llama-llama-3-405b | Zvi | 2024-07-24T19:40:07.565Z |
swzE9e9xA5GwJFDmd | Huh? Why is it problematic to have your text edited by an LM? I do this all the time for minor clarity improvements and to fix typos.
I agree that it would be rude to have a part or all of the comment be totally LM written without flagging this.
In this case, seems plausible that the person asked gpt-4 to just summar... | 2024-08-05T22:52:28.995Z | 5 | zceMwrMqGaLu7bMWg | fPvssZk3AoDzXwfwJ | Universal Basic Income and Poverty | universal-basic-income-and-poverty | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/fPvssZk3AoDzXwfwJ/universal-basic-income-and-poverty | Eliezer Yudkowsky | 2024-07-26T07:23:50.151Z |
qfxBLnb3p3XruDnZd | > you should also be wary of 'minor clarity improvements' suggested by ChatGPT/Claude. I find a lot of them make prose worse, especially if you apply most of them so the gestalt becomes ChatGPTese.
I agree with this, my editing process is to get the new output, view the diff and then copy in changes one-by-one if they... | 2024-08-06T02:33:31.336Z | 4 | mbEtKcq3YvA3fzkjA | fPvssZk3AoDzXwfwJ | Universal Basic Income and Poverty | universal-basic-income-and-poverty | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/fPvssZk3AoDzXwfwJ/universal-basic-income-and-poverty | Eliezer Yudkowsky | 2024-07-26T07:23:50.151Z |
uJ9jLtvA6GAqcCf5x | > A simple approach is to maintain intervals which are guaranteed to contain the actual values and to prove that output intervals don't overlap the unsafe region.
For actual inference stacks in use (e.g. llama-3-405b 8 bit float) interval propagation will blow up massively and result in vacuous bounds. So, you'll mini... | 2024-08-12T03:17:27.633Z | 11 | Bhp4e97NPBDfx3Anj | P8XcbnYi7ooB2KR2j | Provably Safe AI: Worldview and Projects | provably-safe-ai-worldview-and-projects | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/P8XcbnYi7ooB2KR2j/provably-safe-ai-worldview-and-projects | Ben Goldhaber | 2024-08-09T23:21:02.763Z |
mKqk3qfJ6rNXvwenN | I agree you can do better than naive interval propagation by taking into account correlations. However, it will be tricky to get a much better bound while avoiding having this balloon in time complexity (all possible correlations requires exponentional time).
More strongly, I think that if an adversary controlled the ... | 2024-08-12T06:02:13.762Z | 11 | 5qypian9DDFSaZEzY | P8XcbnYi7ooB2KR2j | Provably Safe AI: Worldview and Projects | provably-safe-ai-worldview-and-projects | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/P8XcbnYi7ooB2KR2j/provably-safe-ai-worldview-and-projects | Ben Goldhaber | 2024-08-09T23:21:02.763Z |
T5czXsDjnsanKXRHk | > Rather, we require the AI to generate a program, control policy, or simple network for taking actions in the situation of interest. And we force it to generate a proof that it satisfies given safety requirements. If it can't do that, then it has no business taking actions in a dangerous setting.
This seems near cer... | 2024-08-12T06:07:56.473Z | 12 | 5qypian9DDFSaZEzY | P8XcbnYi7ooB2KR2j | Provably Safe AI: Worldview and Projects | provably-safe-ai-worldview-and-projects | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/P8XcbnYi7ooB2KR2j/provably-safe-ai-worldview-and-projects | Ben Goldhaber | 2024-08-09T23:21:02.763Z |
NeMQ5SNbycYvwDL5d | > Principle 1: Seek as broad and legitimate authority for your decisions as is possible under the circumstances
I would have focused more on transparency and informing relevant groups rather than authority/accountability.
(See also the comment from [Raemon](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/aRciQsjgErCf5Y7D9/principles... | 2024-09-01T23:14:35.545Z | 16 | null | aRciQsjgErCf5Y7D9 | Principles for the AGI Race | principles-for-the-agi-race | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/aRciQsjgErCf5Y7D9/principles-for-the-agi-race | William_S | 2024-08-30T14:29:41.074Z |
mRBQbrREf5zgd6Ewq | > Principle 2: Don’t take actions which impose significant risks to others without overwhelming evidence of net benefit
>
> [...]
>
> Significant margin of benefits over costs, accounting for possibility your calculations are incorrect (1.1x benefits over costs doesn’t justify, maybe 10x benefits over costs could justi... | 2024-09-01T23:38:12.799Z | 20 | null | aRciQsjgErCf5Y7D9 | Principles for the AGI Race | principles-for-the-agi-race | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/aRciQsjgErCf5Y7D9/principles-for-the-agi-race | William_S | 2024-08-30T14:29:41.074Z |
rBa7yqRWFQbPDnoFi | > They could deeply understand the situations in which there's a treacherous turn, how the models decides whether to openly defect, and publish.
It sounds as though you're imagining that we can proliferate the one case in which we caught the AI into many cases which can be well understood as independent (rather than ... | 2024-09-02T19:23:53.489Z | 6 | T57EvmkcDmksAc4P4 | YTZAmJKydD5hdRSeG | Would catching your AIs trying to escape convince AI developers to slow down or undeploy? | would-catching-your-ais-trying-to-escape-convince-ai | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YTZAmJKydD5hdRSeG/would-catching-your-ais-trying-to-escape-convince-ai | Buck | 2024-08-26T16:46:18.872Z |
xmLkoPrLdKnXbtQPu | Agreed, I really should have said "or possibly even train against it". I think SGD is likely to be much worse than best-of-N over a bunch of variations on the training scheme where the variations are intended to plausibly reduce the chance of scheming. Of course, if you are worried about scheming emerging thoughout tra... | 2024-09-02T19:56:39.006Z | 2 | bLtJ9Ja426jaQZKjp | YTZAmJKydD5hdRSeG | Would catching your AIs trying to escape convince AI developers to slow down or undeploy? | would-catching-your-ais-trying-to-escape-convince-ai | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YTZAmJKydD5hdRSeG/would-catching-your-ais-trying-to-escape-convince-ai | Buck | 2024-08-26T16:46:18.872Z |
eCqWBjK4dgbpZ8pYT | Thanks for writing this! I appreciate the effort to make your perspective more transparent (and implicitly Anthropic's perspective as well). In this comment, I'll explain my two most important concerns with this proposal:
- Fully state-proof security seems crucial at ASL-4, not only at ASL-5
- You should have a clear ... | 2024-09-04T18:00:15.821Z | 102 | null | mGCcZnr4WjGjqzX5s | The Checklist: What Succeeding at AI Safety Will Involve | the-checklist-what-succeeding-at-ai-safety-will-involve | https://sleepinyourhat.github.io/checklist/ | Sam Bowman | 2024-09-03T18:18:34.230Z |
7dE5aee5G5XFXdKHd | As far as security, perhaps part of what is going on is that you expect that achieving this high bar of security is too expensive:
> ASL-4 is much more demanding and represents a rough upper limit on what we expect to be able to implement without heavily interfering with our research and deployment efforts.
My sense ... | 2024-09-04T18:35:16.119Z | 2 | eCqWBjK4dgbpZ8pYT | mGCcZnr4WjGjqzX5s | The Checklist: What Succeeding at AI Safety Will Involve | the-checklist-what-succeeding-at-ai-safety-will-involve | https://sleepinyourhat.github.io/checklist/ | Sam Bowman | 2024-09-03T18:18:34.230Z |
SvRcdWDq37C9MpBD7 | I left an earlier comment on more important and clearer points, but I thought I would also leave a comment with some more tentative remarks, explanations of where I'm confused, and notes.
## The story for ASL-4 safety seems unclear and/or unlikely to provide a "reasonable" level of safety
In this checklist, perhaps t... | 2024-09-04T19:33:36.641Z | 49 | null | mGCcZnr4WjGjqzX5s | The Checklist: What Succeeding at AI Safety Will Involve | the-checklist-what-succeeding-at-ai-safety-will-involve | https://sleepinyourhat.github.io/checklist/ | Sam Bowman | 2024-09-03T18:18:34.230Z |
j7XyPeJwhJAwaQyWn | > My guess is that you think heavy government involvement should occur for before/during the creation of ASL-4 systems, since you're pretty concerned about risks from ASL-4 systems being developed in non-SL5 contexts.
Yes, I think heavy government should occur once AIs can substantially accelerate general purpose R&D ... | 2024-09-04T21:32:16.365Z | 6 | NvzqWxu8qxEPj4GZF | mGCcZnr4WjGjqzX5s | The Checklist: What Succeeding at AI Safety Will Involve | the-checklist-what-succeeding-at-ai-safety-will-involve | https://sleepinyourhat.github.io/checklist/ | Sam Bowman | 2024-09-03T18:18:34.230Z |
nptLHHtGzkHopgtdK | Yeah, this all seems reasonable to me for the record, though I think any such proposal of this sort of norms needs to handle the fact that public discourse is sometimes very insane. | 2024-09-04T21:33:39.852Z | 9 | dth4iaJL4hYpnJYCw | aRciQsjgErCf5Y7D9 | Principles for the AGI Race | principles-for-the-agi-race | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/aRciQsjgErCf5Y7D9/principles-for-the-agi-race | William_S | 2024-08-30T14:29:41.074Z |
fdKsWffbpdwDRFwac | It seems like I didn't do a good job of explaining the exit plan!
I'll need to do a better job of explaining this in the future. (I'll respond to some of these specific points in a bit.) | 2024-09-04T23:15:46.579Z | 7 | F9W5oxw536iAKnJwj | mGCcZnr4WjGjqzX5s | The Checklist: What Succeeding at AI Safety Will Involve | the-checklist-what-succeeding-at-ai-safety-will-involve | https://sleepinyourhat.github.io/checklist/ | Sam Bowman | 2024-09-03T18:18:34.230Z |
eANGMjfpxNcrnBJvm | My proposal would roughly be that the US government (in collaboration with allies etc) enforces no one building AI which are qualitatively smarter than humans and this should be the default plan.
(This might be doable without government support via coordination between multiple labs, but I basically doubt it.)
Their ... | 2024-09-05T05:52:27.614Z | 7 | 52zzDYkT6bakC2mcN | mGCcZnr4WjGjqzX5s | The Checklist: What Succeeding at AI Safety Will Involve | the-checklist-what-succeeding-at-ai-safety-will-involve | https://sleepinyourhat.github.io/checklist/ | Sam Bowman | 2024-09-03T18:18:34.230Z |
LpdiAW9eqb5wb4ixg | TBC, I don't think there are plausible alternatives to at least some US government involvement which don't require commiting a bunch of massive crimes.
I have a policy against commiting or recommending commiting massive crimes. | 2024-09-05T05:58:22.164Z | 16 | eANGMjfpxNcrnBJvm | mGCcZnr4WjGjqzX5s | The Checklist: What Succeeding at AI Safety Will Involve | the-checklist-what-succeeding-at-ai-safety-will-involve | https://sleepinyourhat.github.io/checklist/ | Sam Bowman | 2024-09-03T18:18:34.230Z |
NLKdMRfDN33jfDiX6 | > I don't know what set of beliefs implies that it's much more important to avoid building superhuman TAI once you have just-barely TAI, than to avoid building just-barely TAI in the first place.
AIs which aren't qualitatively much smarter than humans seem plausible to use reasonably effectively while keeping risk dec... | 2024-09-05T06:21:30.270Z | 10 | 52zzDYkT6bakC2mcN | mGCcZnr4WjGjqzX5s | The Checklist: What Succeeding at AI Safety Will Involve | the-checklist-what-succeeding-at-ai-safety-will-involve | https://sleepinyourhat.github.io/checklist/ | Sam Bowman | 2024-09-03T18:18:34.230Z |
gBKxjGhT6v7dSPZLs | Is your perspective something like:
> With (properly motivated) qualitatively wildly superhuman AI, you can end the Acute Risk Period using means which aren't massive crimes despite not collaborating with the US government. This likely involves novel social technology. More minimally, if you did have a sufficiently al... | 2024-09-05T17:15:22.263Z | 4 | pH3LkkfEHGzTfKMdP | mGCcZnr4WjGjqzX5s | The Checklist: What Succeeding at AI Safety Will Involve | the-checklist-what-succeeding-at-ai-safety-will-involve | https://sleepinyourhat.github.io/checklist/ | Sam Bowman | 2024-09-03T18:18:34.230Z |
pr4iupfRuegzfKqbT | > if we get to just-barely TAI, at least not without plans that leverage that just-barely TAI in unsafe ways which violate the safety invariants of this plan
I'm basically imagining being able to use controlled AIs which aren't qualitatively smarter than humans for whatever R&D purposes we want. (Though not applicatio... | 2024-09-05T17:18:03.894Z | 6 | pH3LkkfEHGzTfKMdP | mGCcZnr4WjGjqzX5s | The Checklist: What Succeeding at AI Safety Will Involve | the-checklist-what-succeeding-at-ai-safety-will-involve | https://sleepinyourhat.github.io/checklist/ | Sam Bowman | 2024-09-03T18:18:34.230Z |
HtPZda7KCBoKj8zeM | > How do you achieve such alignment? You wrote that you worry about the proposal of perfectly + scalably solving alignment, but I worry about how to achieve even the imperfect alignment of human-ish-level AIs that you're describing here. What techniques are you imagining using?
I would say a mixture of moonshots and "... | 2024-09-05T17:50:12.480Z | 15 | F9W5oxw536iAKnJwj | mGCcZnr4WjGjqzX5s | The Checklist: What Succeeding at AI Safety Will Involve | the-checklist-what-succeeding-at-ai-safety-will-involve | https://sleepinyourhat.github.io/checklist/ | Sam Bowman | 2024-09-03T18:18:34.230Z |
eWmQzCgc39YmuMqTk | Presumably it helps a lot if AIs are clearly really powerful and their attempts to seize power are somewhat plausible?
I think it's plausible (though not certain!) that people will take strong action *even if* they think the AI is role playing.
I think this is a reasonable line to draw - people *should* freak out if ... | 2024-09-05T18:26:01.552Z | 13 | L5e7CK5QASLigeev3 | YTZAmJKydD5hdRSeG | Would catching your AIs trying to escape convince AI developers to slow down or undeploy? | would-catching-your-ais-trying-to-escape-convince-ai | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YTZAmJKydD5hdRSeG/would-catching-your-ais-trying-to-escape-convince-ai | Buck | 2024-08-26T16:46:18.872Z |
BcWcxR2trqoR23Rvy | > In particular, the model needs to bypass our control measures, which have been designed to secure against deliberate, best-effort attacks by the model, and the model needs to not get caught trying to do so during evaluations.
Hopefully, but I wouldn't necessarily expect that we'll have reasonably well designed cont... | 2024-09-06T18:21:41.500Z | 12 | EtLeQnM9fpPi9b9yG | YTZAmJKydD5hdRSeG | Would catching your AIs trying to escape convince AI developers to slow down or undeploy? | would-catching-your-ais-trying-to-escape-convince-ai | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YTZAmJKydD5hdRSeG/would-catching-your-ais-trying-to-escape-convince-ai | Buck | 2024-08-26T16:46:18.872Z |
q5vfGDSkZupyXWySQ | I raised a similar proposal to various people a while ago.
The strongest objection I'm aware of is something like:
> You actually want evaluators to have as much skin in the game as other employees so that when they take actions that might shut the company down or notably reduce the value of equity, this is a costly... | 2024-09-07T22:57:44.516Z | 15 | null | sMBjsfNdezWFy6Dz5 | Pay Risk Evaluators in Cash, Not Equity | pay-risk-evaluators-in-cash-not-equity | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/sMBjsfNdezWFy6Dz5/pay-risk-evaluators-in-cash-not-equity | Adam Scholl | 2024-09-07T02:37:59.659Z |
SkuSNWx5pMkjppvhc | > Like, presumably the ideal scenario is that a risk evaluator estimates the risk in an objective way, and then the company takes (hopefully predefined) actions based on that estimate. The outcome of this interaction should not depend on social cues like how loyal they seem, or how personally costly it was for them to ... | 2024-09-08T22:53:57.344Z | 9 | fm6q4p3uzFSNBwSHr | sMBjsfNdezWFy6Dz5 | Pay Risk Evaluators in Cash, Not Equity | pay-risk-evaluators-in-cash-not-equity | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/sMBjsfNdezWFy6Dz5/pay-risk-evaluators-in-cash-not-equity | Adam Scholl | 2024-09-07T02:37:59.659Z |
gJsyCLwszuZYkYjvj | I believe the approach is to forecast questions that resolve in the future and allow arbitrary internet access. I'm not totally sure though. | 2024-09-10T22:00:49.582Z | 7 | ApExEZczHL4qALomD | 4kuXNhPf9FBwok7tK | AI forecasting bots incoming | ai-forecasting-bots-incoming | https://www.safe.ai/blog/forecasting | Dan H | 2024-09-09T19:14:31.050Z |
23x5pbq9JHp7fZYtH | Daniel almost surely doesn't think growth will be constant. (Presumably he has a model similar to [the one here](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/Gc9FGtdXhK9sCSEYu/what-a-compute-centric-framework-says-about-ai-takeoff).) I assume he also thinks that by the time energy production is >10x higher, the world has generally ... | 2024-09-11T16:21:53.370Z | 7 | mkcqhxinj5oj2Pjou | K2D45BNxnZjdpSX2j | AI Timelines | ai-timelines | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/K2D45BNxnZjdpSX2j/ai-timelines | habryka | 2023-11-10T05:28:24.841Z |
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