Start here
This repository is useful only if its three kinds of evidence stay separate: documented election records, screening leads, and model evaluations. It is an evidence index, not a list of proven AI-caused election harms.
Count hierarchy
The dataset contains 6 documented-manipulation records, not 1,087 cases. The 6 sit inside 8 incident-eligible records; the other 2 are transparent contested-use boundary cases. Adding 2 preparedness files produces the 10-record claim-coded core. Adding 47 screening leads and 7 model studies produces the 64-entry catalogue. The 1,087-row index then sums rows across 26 related tables, including claims, sources, joins, metrics and derived views. These are relational rows, not unique cases.
Choose your route
| You are | Begin with | Then inspect | Safe output |
|---|---|---|---|
| Researcher | research_view |
claims, claim_evidence, sources, pathways, observations |
A bounded case comparison, evidence audit, measurement design, or preregistered hypothesis |
| Policy analyst | case_catalog |
research_view, events, technology_uses, case_actors, official_data_sources |
A threat-and-response brief that states evidence ceilings and gaps |
| Policymaker | Policy brief | Policy-analysis guide | Proportionate actions, evidence requests, and monitoring priorities |
| Data user | record_index |
Codebook, methodology, datapackage.json |
Reproducible joins and descriptive counts |
What the evidence currently supports
The claim-coded core contains ten records. Eight are incident-count eligible: six are coded manipulation_confirmed or mixed_documented_manipulation, while two are transparent contested-use boundary cases. Two additional records are preparedness files. Across the ten pathways, four reach control_mechanism_observed, two reach attempted_transfer_observed, two have insufficient_evidence, and two are not_an_incident. No record reaches agency_change_observed or agency_preserved_or_extended.
This supports a narrow conclusion: documented systems have already been used to control provenance, apparent identity, salience, distribution, or participation cues in election settings. The index does not show how often this happens, how many unique voters were persuaded, whether effects lasted, or whether any result changed.
Five-minute workflow
- Identify the unit in
case_catalog. Do not pool an election-wide file, a network, an incident, and a model experiment as equivalent observations. - Read the case's
maximum_conclusionandmain_uncertaintyinresearch_view. - Open its atomic claims in
claims. - Follow every material claim through
claim_evidencetosources. Treatpartial_claimandnot_verifiedlocators as unresolved review work. - Use
observationsonly with its unit, denominator, window, uniqueness and causal-status fields. - Read
pathwaysas a falsifiable researcher assessment, not as a measured outcome. - Cite the original source as well as the pinned dataset revision.
Stop conditions
Do not use this dataset to claim:
- global or regional prevalence;
- a number of voters reached, persuaded, deterred or converted;
- votes, turnout, seats or winners caused by AI;
- state attribution where the record preserves uncertainty;
- that all synthetic or automated political content is manipulative;
- that an institutional response proves the alleged mechanism or its effects.
Reproduce the core counts
Run the dependency-free example from the repository root:
python examples/reproduce_core_findings.py
It reads the canonical CSV files, checks core joins and prints descriptive counts. The script deliberately computes no severity, risk, manipulation, or agency-transfer score.