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6,500 | sci.crypt | re how do they know what keys to ask for re clipper in article johnson trwacs johnson trwacs fp trw com steve johnson writes brad clarinet com brad templeton writes and of course you have to identify yourself to the phone company and since the phone company complies with court orders they will know the magic number of ... |
6,501 | sci.crypt | re what is going on in article apr cc curtin edu au zrepachol cc curtin edu au paul repacholi writes if you can t be bothered reading get the video manufacturing consent in reply to mail queries i don t know if a video is available yet i asked about a month ao and was told rsn several have also asked which of chomskys ... |
6,502 | sci.crypt | re white house public encryption management fact sheet i have a question about digital communications encryption the fact sheet mentioned encryption decryption microcircuitry with special keys for law enforcement for wire tapping purposes if i wanted to couldn t i develop encryption of my own that is if me and a partne... |
6,503 | sci.crypt | re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow in article strnlghtc lgfi jqa netcom com strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes though some may argue about the nose of the camel it s worth noting that the government proposal is limited to scrambled telephony if it is only used for that purpose and does n... |
6,504 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more in apr clarinet com brad clarinet com sez do the police normally reveal every tap they do even if no charges are laid in many ways it would be a positive step if they had to judges set time limits on warrants i assume under the relevant federal law usc sec d the authorizing ... |
6,505 | sci.crypt | re how do they know what keys to ask for re clipper in article apr clarinet com brad clarinet com brad templeton writes the actual algorithm is classified however their main thrust here is for cellular phones and encryption is only over the radio end not end to end i think end to end will come later encrypting just the... |
6,506 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more in article tcmayc m xv jex netcom com tcmay netcom com timothy c may writes but is it any worse than the current unsecure system it becomes much worse of course if the government then uses this clinton clipper to argue for restrictions on unapproved encryption this is the ma... |
6,507 | sci.crypt | powerful similarity too a unix tool of cryptographic significance is available for anonymous ftp agrep a fast approximate pattern matching tool source code project available from cs arizona edu in directory agrep agrep is a very fast fuzzy search tool with a tremendous number of powerful search options the one most obv... |
6,508 | sci.crypt | pgp vs i ve seen pgp mentioned for the mac platform i use on ms dos is there a for ms dos if so a site or two that has it available i d need executables although source would be nice to review what was fixed or changed from thanks mwe mearle netcom com finger for pgp public key
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6,509 | sci.crypt | re what is going on zrepachol cc curtin edu au paul repacholi writes in article apr cc curtin edu au zrepachol cc curtin edu au paul repacholi writes if you can t be bothered reading get the video manufacturing consent in reply to mail queries i don t know if a video is available yet i asked about a month ao and was to... |
6,510 | sci.crypt | clipper some new thoughts i d desparately prefer it if we didn t rehash the same arguments that went on ad infinitum last time that s especially true for sci crypt for that matter i ve created alt privacy clipper since the traffic is appearing in many different groups right now i m going to focus here on some technical... |
6,511 | sci.crypt | how does it really work was re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption this announcement is somewhat disconcerting it doesn t do anything evil in and of itself but bodes badly for the future of open algorithms and standards in information security i won t start panicking until unless des or... |
6,512 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more i change login passwords every couple of months i sure would suck if i had to get a new sparc station everytime i wanted to do this it seems that this is what they expect you to do if you want to routinely change your password on your phone i m sure the government contractor... |
6,513 | sci.crypt | re how to detect use of an illegal cipher in article betel camelot betel camelot bradley edu robert crawford writes jay fenton fenton kaleida com writes how can the government tell which encryption method one is using without being able to decode the traffic i e in order to accuse me of using an unauthorized strong enc... |
6,514 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more tcmay netcom com timothy c may writes but is it any worse than the current unsecure system it becomes much worse of course if the government then uses this clinton clipper to argue for restrictions on unapproved encryption this is the main concern of most of us i think the c... |
6,515 | sci.crypt | re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow gtoal news ibmpcug co uk graham toal writes try reading between the lines david there are strong hints in there that they re angling for nren next where i honestly didn t see any and the only conceivable meaning of applying this particular technology to a comput... |
6,516 | sci.crypt | new clipper chip proposal from the guv i saw this article posted in a local newsgroup i haven t seen it or any followup traffic relating to it in these groups or other groups which i subscribe to so i am posting it here so others can read it check it out and comment on it and provide ideas for handling these sorts of t... |
6,517 | sci.crypt | re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow in article qp d e dorothy ibmpcug co uk gtoal news ibmpcug co uk graham toal writes try reading between the lines david there are strong hints in there that they re angling for nren next and the only conceivable meaning of applying this particular technology to ... |
6,518 | sci.crypt | don t fight clipper chip subvert or replace it clipper chip is a response to the fact that there is no business or professional body in a position to establish a standard and provide chipsets to implement it for analog or digial transmission systems rsa might be in position to do it if they had active cooperation of a ... |
6,519 | sci.crypt | re trinomial based prng i tried to mail peter boucher who posted the question but my e mail bounced so apologies to thsoe who are not interested trinomials are all of the form x a x b where a have you read bremner a on trinomials of type x n ax m math scand pp zbl mr k ljunggren w on the irreducibility of certain trino... |
6,520 | sci.crypt | re clipper crap encryption s dual edge sword encryption helps to protect the privacy of individuals and industry but it also can shield criminals and terrorists we need the clipper chip and other necessity is the plea for every infringement of human freedom it is the argument of tyrants it is the creed of slaves willia... |
6,521 | sci.crypt | re don t fight clipper chip subvert or replace it robert lewis glendenning rlglende netcom com wrote clipper chip is a response to the fact that there is no business or professional body in a position to establish a standard and provide chipsets to implement it for analog or digial transmission systems rsa might be in ... |
6,522 | sci.crypt | re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow one presumes the system could work as follows a blank clips are manufactured by mykotronx and vlsi the number produced is carefully audited and they are shipped to the first escrow house it programs the chips with its half the key and prints out a paper slip wit... |
6,523 | sci.crypt | re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow in article qnupd jpm news intercon com amanda intercon com amanda walker writes jhesse netcom com john hesse writes oh great wonderful news nobody can listen in except the feds hey it s better than the status quo i am far less worried about the feds tapping my p... |
6,524 | sci.crypt | re patents was rc rc in article matt wardibm med yale edu matt wardsgi med yale edu matt healy writes and bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de vesselin bontchev wrote and ahaley eoe co uk andrew haley writes about coca cola and pepsi cola and what they can teach us surely if we must use pop patent law examples to d... |
6,525 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more in article qpg finn dns nmsu edu amolitor nmsu edu andrew molitor writes in article tcmayc m xv jex netcom com tcmay netcom com timothy c may writes but is it any worse than the current unsecure system it becomes much worse of course if the government then uses this clinton ... |
6,526 | sci.crypt | re how to detect use of an illegal cipher in article apr clarinet com brad clarinet com brad templeton writes your honour the suspect suddenly started using another level of cryptography and we can t tap his phone calls any more he must have something to hide please sign the warrant to search his house what they would ... |
6,527 | sci.crypt | re how does it really work was re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption marc vanheyningen mvanheyn cs indiana edu writes the main thing i just don t get is whether this chip implements symmetric or asymmetric cryptographic techniques anybody know i don t know but i m as willing to specula... |
6,528 | sci.crypt | re the battle is joined in article apr qualcomm com karn servo qualcomm com phil karn writes it looks like dorothy denning s wrong headed ideas have gotten to the administration even sooner than we feared i d lay long odds that it was the other way around clinton didn t just pull this plan out of any bodily orifices th... |
6,529 | sci.crypt | the source of that announcement the message from the nist about the clipper chip comes from the following address clipper csrc ncsl nist gov clipper chip announcement just who is that i asked myself or rather i asked the computer telnet csrc ncsl nist gov trying connected to csrc ncsl nist gov escape character is first... |
6,530 | sci.crypt | remote file system security in light of my recent paranoia concerning government proposals i d love to see a unix based encryption scheme that kept some files encrypted on the host machine say all the files in your home directory used a key system that could not be compromised by eavesdropping over a modem line it seem... |
6,531 | sci.crypt | re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow brad clarinet com brad templeton and yes this has to be a public key system or it would be almost impossible to handle it might not be rsa but that does not mean that pkp doesn t get paid until pkp has the patent on the general concept of public key encryption a... |
6,532 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more in article qpg finn dns nmsu edu amolitor nmsu edu andrew molitor writes in article tcmayc m xv jex netcom com tcmay netcom com timothy c may writes tim may whose sig block may get him busted in the new regime isn t this just a little melodramatic not at all two weeks ago i ... |
6,533 | sci.crypt | re fifth amendment and passwords in article apr sugra uucp ken sugra uucp kenneth ng writes in article apr linus mitre org ptrei bistromath mitre org peter trei writes judge i grant you immunity from whatever may be learned from the key itself you the keyphrase is i confess to deliberately evading copyright the file en... |
6,534 | sci.crypt | re the source of that announcement telnet csrc ncsl nist gov trying connected to csrc ncsl nist gov escape character is first org sendmail nist ready at sat apr edt expn clipper csspab mail gw ncsl nist gov denning cs georgetown edu hoffman seas gwu edu mkapor eff org rotenberg cpsr org rivest mit edu mhellman stanford... |
6,535 | sci.crypt | re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow in article brad clarinet com brad templeton writes the greatest danger of the escrow database if it were kept on disk would be the chance that a complete copy could somehow leak out you of course then it s hard to backup however i think the consequences of no ba... |
6,536 | sci.crypt | re the source of that announcement also note from branstad tis com and walker tis com whois h rs internic net tis dom trusted information systems inc tis dom washington road route glenwood md domain name tis com administrative contact walker stephen t stw walker tis com technical contact zone contact dalva david i did ... |
6,537 | sci.crypt | re how to detect use of an illegal cipher in article c nmb cof news claremont edu ebrandt jarthur claremont edu eli brandt writes i probably shouldn t say this but they could try to detect the use of an illegal cypher by transmitting in the clear some statistical properties of the plaintext an old fashioned wiretap cou... |
6,538 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more in article bu edu uni acs bu edu shaen bernhardt writes i wish i could agree with you ask yourself this why would any private sector entity wish to buy a crypto system that was known to be at least partially compromised key escrows in this instance why would any private sect... |
6,539 | sci.crypt | re wh announcement q who was consulted the congress industry a we have on going discussions with congress and industry on encryption issues and expect those discussions to intensify as we carry out our review of encryption policy we have briefed members of congress and industry leaders on the decisions related to this ... |
6,540 | sci.crypt | re the battle is joined in article apr qualcomm com karn servo qualcomm com phil karn writes it looks like dorothy denning s wrong headed ideas have gotten to the administration even sooner than we feared if the administration is this far along is it possible that the government been working on it for a while and has b... |
6,541 | sci.crypt | re the battle is joined in article c nn i d q news claremont edu ebrandt jarthur claremont edu eli brandt writes in article apr qualcomm com karn servo qualcomm com phil karn writes it looks like dorothy denning s wrong headed ideas have gotten to the administration even sooner than we feared i d lay long odds that it ... |
6,542 | sci.crypt | clipper chip i have lurked here a bit lately and though some of the math is unknown to me found it interesting i thought i would post an article i found in the saturday april toronto star clipper chip to protect privacy washington reuter president bill clinton announced yesterday a plan to plant a new clipper chip in e... |
6,543 | sci.crypt | re the source of that announcement marc horowitz n nzu marc mit edu wrote the message from the nist about the clipper chip comes from the following address clipper csrc ncsl nist gov clipper chip announcement just who is that i asked myself or rather i asked the computer telnet csrc ncsl nist gov list of name elided fo... |
6,544 | sci.crypt | is there any security in the clipper it seems to me that all discussions about clipper security are almost irrelevant if i cannot choose the key but have to use a key chosen for me by the foundry the security of the whole universe of users is as good or as bad as the security of vlsi technologies inc it is a trivial ef... |
6,545 | sci.crypt | re the old key registration idea begin pgp signed message in article qn ic hp access digex net pcw access digex com peter wayner writes the system is vulnerable to simple phone swapping attacks like this criminals will quickly figure this out and go to town depends its possible that the phone sends its serial number in... |
6,546 | sci.crypt | re pem and mime in article qg m e nigel msen com emv garnet msen com edward vielmetti writes w c newell jr wcn u washington edu wrote before we can have a global multimedia e mail solution there must be some definition of a minimum service level and mime does not provide for this yet before the internet will invest in ... |
6,547 | sci.crypt | need source of feal encrytion algorithm hi i am interested in the source of feal encryption algorithm does someone of you know where i can get the source from or where i can find documentation about feal thanks in advance ciao hermann please email me
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6,548 | sci.crypt | re don t fight clipper chip subvert or replace it the clipper chip is just the culmination of dorthy denning et all but lets ignore that for the moment the fundamental question is can the government stop me from using encryption ignoring for the moment the question of patented processes such as public keys can the gove... |
6,549 | sci.crypt | wh proposal from police point of view it might pay to start looking at what this proposal might mean to a police agency it just might be a bad idea for them too ok suppose the ny state police want to tap a suspect s phone they need a warrant just like the old days but unlike the old days they now need to a get two fede... |
6,550 | sci.crypt | re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption andrew richard conway arc leland stanford edu wrote p s i can t work out why the us government doesn t want to sell them overseas after all they are rather easy for us interests to decode so make a perfect tool for industrial military espionage lul... |
6,551 | sci.crypt | re don t fight clipper chip subvert or replace it in article ygoland wright ygoland wright seas ucla edu the jester writes ignoring for the moment the question of patented processes such as public keys can the government stop me from using an encryption process following precedent in other areas the government is likel... |
6,552 | sci.crypt | re the battle is joined in article c nn i d q news claremont edu ebrandt jarthur claremont edu eli brandt writes in article apr qualcomm com karn servo qualcomm com phil karn writes it looks like dorothy denning s wrong headed ideas have gotten to the administration even sooner than we feared i d lay long odds that it ... |
6,553 | sci.crypt | re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption the dead giveaway is the repeated protestations that the new plan is aimed at criminals drug dealers terrorists etc you d think the tactic would be too obvious to trot out yet again after a decade of sarah and the rest of the brady bunch using it t... |
6,554 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more in article apr clarinet com brad clarinet com brad templeton writes in article tcmayc m xv jex netcom com tcmay netcom com timothy c may writes getting the court order to reveal the key also makes decipherable all past conversations which may be on tape or disk or whatver as... |
6,555 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more amolitor nmsu edu andrew molitor writes yes those evil guys in the fbi can probably with some effort abuse the system i got news for you if the evil guys in the fbi decide they want to persecute you they re gonna and if richard nixon had had this kind of toy he wouldn t have... |
6,556 | sci.crypt | re source of random bits on a unix workstation bennett todd salomon brothers inc ny bet sbi com wrote however unless i missed something the only source they suggested aside from a hardware rng that seems available and unguessable by an intruder when a unix is fresh booted is i o buffers related to network traffic i bel... |
6,557 | sci.crypt | re an open letter to mr clinton in article strnlghtc m cv hx netcom com strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes here s a simple way to convert the clipper proposal to an unexceptionable one make it voluntary that is you get high quality secure nsa classified technology if you agree to escrow your key otherwise you ... |
6,558 | sci.crypt | need help i am currently writing a paper on computer protocols security i would appreciate your help i currently have no insight into these topics except that they relate to security in multilevel security network please semd me any references books faqs or contact persons names and internet addresses the topics i am i... |
6,559 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more in article qpg finn dns nmsu edu amolitor nmsu edu andrew molitor writes in article tcmayc m xv jex netcom com tcmay netcom com timothy c may writes but is it any worse than the current unsecure system it becomes much worse of course if the government then uses this clinton ... |
6,560 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more in apr clarinet com brad clarinet com brad templeton writes it occurs to me that if they get a wiretap order on you and the escrow houses release your code to the cops your code is now no longer secure a very good point it s in the hands of cops and while i am sure most of t... |
6,561 | sci.crypt | re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow in article strnlghtc lgfi jqa netcom com strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes though some may argue about the nose of the camel it s worth noting that the government proposal is limited to scrambled telephony if it is only used for that purpose and does n... |
6,562 | sci.crypt | clipper chip technical details i received the following two notes from martin hellman with details on how clipper will work they are posted with his permission the implications of some details are fascinating date sat apr pdt from martin hellman hellman isl stanford edu to a long list of recipients subject clipper chip... |
6,563 | sci.crypt | re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow in article qnupd jpm news intercon com amanda intercon com amanda walker writes from amanda intercon com amanda walker jhesse netcom com john hesse writes oh great wonderful news nobody can listen in except the feds hey it s better than the status quo i am far l... |
6,564 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more in article qovj m ni umd edu louie sayshell umd edu louis a mamakos writes in article tcmayc m xv jex netcom com tcmay netcom com timothy c may writes but is it any worse than the current unsecure system it becomes much worse of course if the government then uses this clinto... |
6,565 | sci.crypt | are we being hysterical no in article qpg finn dns nmsu edu amolitor nmsu edu andrew molitor writes in article tcmayc m xv jex netcom com tcmay netcom com timothy c may writes but is it any worse than the current unsecure system it becomes much worse of course if the government then uses this clinton clipper to argue f... |
6,566 | sci.crypt | re the source of that announcement in article tcmayc o mrs netcom com tcmay netcom com timothy c may writes i know that at least one person on that list says the first he heard of clipper was in the friday morning newspaper and another has already fired off a letter of protest to nist my point i suspect this list inter... |
6,567 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more in article apr yuma acns colostate edu holland cs colostate edu douglas craig holland writes note that measures to protect yourself from tempest surveillance are still classified as far as i know i think this to be inaccurate one can buy tempest equipment commercially even m... |
6,568 | sci.crypt | re clipper chip technical details short summary of what bellovin says hellman says the nsa says there is a global key g plus one key u c for each chip c the user can choose a new session key k p for each phone call p he makes chip c knows three keys g its own u c and the user s k p the government as a whole knows g and... |
6,569 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more douglas craig holland holland cs colostate edu writes with e mail if they can t break your pgp encryption they ll just call up one of their tempest trucks and read the electromagnetic emmisions from your computer or terminal note that measures to protect yourself from tempes... |
6,570 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more al escom com al donaldson writes amolitor nmsu edu andrew molitor writes yes those evil guys in the fbi can probably with some effort abuse the system i got news for you if the evil guys in the fbi decide they want to persecute you they re gonna and if richard nixon had had ... |
6,571 | sci.crypt | re an open letter to mr clinton in article c oy z ily chinet chi il us schneier chinet chi il us bruce schneier writes in article strnlghtc m cv hx netcom com strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes here s a simple way to convert the clipper proposal to an unexceptionable one make it voluntary that is you get high ... |
6,572 | sci.crypt | who should be hearing my views on clipper being a browser of this group for some time and being very concerned about the clipper chip proposal i am hoping someone with more knowledge can help out who would be the most influential people to write to protesting the obvious next step hinted at by this proposal heads of wh... |
6,573 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more in article apr ringer cs utsa edu whughes lonestar utsa edu william w hughes writes in article qpg finn dns nmsu edu amolitor nmsu edu andrew molitor writes in article tcmayc m xv jex netcom com tcmay netcom com timothy c may writes tim may whose sig block may get him busted... |
6,574 | sci.crypt | big brother clipper chip there are some issues which come to mind when one considers the law enforcement aspects of the use of the big brother clipper chip the drug dealers and terrorists aren t going to let themselves be caught by using this type of encryption in the new york times reported that government investigato... |
6,575 | sci.crypt | clipper chip and key exchange methods i was wanting to ask the same question dan bernstein asked how does the clipper chip exchange keys if the public key is only or bits long does anyone know of any public key schemes that are secure with that key size diffie hellman or maybe el gamal with p set to a constant value pr... |
6,576 | sci.crypt | re is there any security in the clipper zeev ccc amdahl com ze ev wurman writes but do we really believe that the various governments including ours won t have the full lists of all the keys ever manufactured yes but they ll be encrypted with cripple chip encryption the encryption algorithm so great it s top secret and... |
6,577 | sci.crypt | clipper chip how would it work with all the talk about this clipper chip i have developed one question how does it work if you use this then how does it get decrypted on the other end does the other party receiving the phone call mail etc have to know some code to undo it do i use a different method for calling one par... |
6,578 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more in article apr yuma acns colostate edu holland cs colostate edu douglas craig holland writes with e mail if they can t break your pgp encryption they ll just call up one of their tempest trucks and read the electromagnetic emmisions from your computer or terminal note that m... |
6,579 | sci.crypt | fighting the clipper initiative here are some ideas for those of you who want to oppose the white house clipper chip crypto initiative i think this is going to be a tough measure to fight since the government has invested a lot of resources in developing this high profile initiative they are serious about it now it won... |
6,580 | sci.crypt | how can clipper stay classified maybe i don t know enough to know what i am asking but with millions of these things about how could the algorythm possibly stay secret couldn t some clever hackers just grind the thing down layer by layer and see how it worked brian mcbee mcbeeb atlantis cs orst edu finger me for pgp ke... |
6,581 | sci.crypt | why the clipper algorithm is secret the cryptographic protocol though is another matter i see no valid reasons for keeping it secret and as i hope i ve shown above there are a lot of ways to do things that aren t quite as bad it just occurred to me why the algorithm is secret if it were published one could then build p... |
6,582 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more in article c pgfu ia dscomsa desy de hallam zeus desy de writes views would be to recruit them as spooks they can be guaranteed to give the government line when it counts in us history it has been the socialists such as myself who have been persecuted and in russia capitalis... |
6,583 | sci.crypt | re clipper chip technical details thus said djb silverton berkeley edu d j bernstein short summary of what bellovin says hellman says the nsa says there is a global key g plus one key u c for each chip c the user can choose a new session key k p for each phone call p he makes chip c knows three keys g its own u c and t... |
6,584 | sci.crypt | what the clipper nay sayers sound like to me the following is available in some ftp archive somewhere i insert my comments liberally throughout this demonic memo of big brotherdom white house announcement on screw thread standards this is to announce that the american national standards institute or whatever it is has ... |
6,585 | sci.crypt | re white house wiretap chip disinformation sheet the attorney general will procure and utilize encryption devices to the extent needed to preserve the government s ability to conduct lawful electronic surveillance and to fulfill the need for secure law enforcement communications further the attorney general shall utili... |
6,586 | sci.crypt | re what the clipper nay sayers sound like to me a bunch of well meaning maybe cynnical text about screw thread sizes the rights of people to have their own standards and the non right of the gov to regulate screw threads well as funny as your little comment may seem it has very little to do with your personal privacy a... |
6,587 | sci.crypt | crypto conference i need to know the following information about the upcoming crypto conference the address to submit articles and the number of copies needed thanks jonathan demarrais jed pollux usc edu jay jed pollux usc edu university of southern california what a depressingly stupid machine marvin
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6,588 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes what follows is my opinion it is not asserted to be the truth so no flames please it comes out of a background of years as a senior corporate staff executive in two fortune companies i d be happy to use a crypto system supplied by ... |
6,589 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more holland cs colostate edu douglas craig holland writes with e mail if they can t break your pgp encryption they ll just call up one of their tempest trucks and read the electromagnetic emmisions from your computer or terminal note that measures to protect yourself from tempes... |
6,590 | sci.crypt | some thoughts on clipper proposal i envision incorporation of new standart into various communication systems thus making it prevalent on the market therefore cheap the way to do that may be detaching crypto chip from communication equipment it seems logical to provide clipper chip to the end user not as a part of phon... |
6,591 | sci.crypt | underground encryption was re text of white house announcement in article qmugcinnpu gap caltech edu hal cco caltech edu hal finney writes it looks like the worst nightmares raised by dorothy denning s proposals are coming true if the government continues on this course i imagine that we will see strong cryptography ma... |
6,592 | sci.crypt | unix crypt for dos i ve recently moved from unix to a dos box and have a number of files that i used crypt to protect does anyone know of a dos version of crypt i ve found one but it insists on six letter keys and i used some shorter ones thanks for your help doug
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6,593 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more in article qpg finn dns nmsu edu amolitor nmsu edu andrew molitor writes not to pick on mr may in particular of course but isn t this kind of the domino theory when one little country falls its neighbor will surely follow and before you know it we re all mining salt in siber... |
6,594 | sci.crypt | re clipper some new thoughts the cryptographic algorythm must be kept secret or private individuals could make clipperclones with which they could transmit messages which the feds would not have ready access to this is clearly unacceptable i hope somebody starts doing this soon after the first ones are released
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6,595 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more in article apr clarinet com brad clarinet com brad templeton writes once it hits land you can record it if you have telco access the telco isn t supposed to give that without a warrant that s the rule today but even so the evidence would not be admissible i think unless the ... |
6,596 | sci.crypt | re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow in article apr yuma acns colostate edu holland cs colostate edu douglas craig holland writes let me ask you this would you trust richard nixon with your crypto keys i wouldn t i take it you mean president nixon not private citizen nixon sure nothing i m doing wo... |
6,597 | sci.crypt | re white house wiretap chip disinformation sheet in article wcs apr rainier att com wcs anchor ho att com bill stewart writes the attorney general will procure and utilize encryption devices to the extent needed to preserve the government s ability to conduct lawful electronic surveillance and to fulfill the need for s... |
6,598 | sci.crypt | re wh proposal from police point of view dwight tuinstra posts a very interesting message in which he comments on the effects of the clipper chip on state and local police actually reading between the lines it could be a very good thing for civil liberties in one respect since it will at least prevent cowboy cops and c... |
6,599 | sci.crypt | re clipper chip technical details djb silverton berkeley edu d j bernstein writes summary elided the system as described here can t possibly work what happens when someone plugs the above ciphertext into a receiving chip to get m the receiving chip needs k p to get k p the receiving chip needs u c the only information ... |
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