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6,600 | sci.crypt | re clipper chip technical details in article apr silverton berkeley edu djb silverton berkeley edu d j bernstein writes short summary of what bellovin says hellman says the nsa says there is a global key g plus one key u c for each chip c the user can choose a new session key k p for each phone call p he makes chip c k... |
6,601 | sci.crypt | corporate acceptance of the wiretap chip strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes what follows is my opinion it is not asserted to be the truth so no flames please it comes out of a background of years as a senior corporate staff executive in two fortune companies i d be happy to use a crypto system supplied by the ... |
6,602 | sci.crypt | re why the clipper algorithm is secret in apr iecc cambridge ma us johnl iecc cambridge ma us john r levine writes quoting someone else here the cryptographic protocol though is another matter i see no valid reasons for keeping it secret and as i hope i ve shown above there are a lot of ways to do things that aren t qu... |
6,603 | sci.crypt | the wiretap chip clones and secure key exchange u uicvm uic edu writes the cryptographic algorythm must be kept secret or private individuals could make clipperclones with which they could transmit messages which the feds would not have ready access to not necessarily i ve been thinking about this and if this chip sche... |
6,604 | sci.crypt | re how to detect use of an illegal cipher in article c nmb cof news claremont edu ebrandt jarthur claremont edu eli brandt writes get their copy of your key any criminal who s going to use encryption will do it under cover of clipper the only way to avoid this will be to try to prohibit strong encryption this isn t tru... |
6,605 | sci.crypt | re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow in article apr magnus acs ohio state edu jebright magnus acs ohio state edu james r ebright writes in article brad clarinet com brad templeton writes the greatest danger of the escrow database if it were kept on disk would be the chance that a complete copy coul... |
6,606 | sci.crypt | competing standard perhaps one way of getting away from this cripple chip that the u s government seems to be pushing would be to come up with a good alternative for example how about a scheme using rsa and some hybrid of des cfb and another strong stream cipher maybe idea cfb this could be substantially the same as th... |
6,607 | sci.crypt | re clipper chip technical details in article apr ulysses att com smb research att com steven bellovin writes nothing was said about where k p comes from oh hellman said each user will get to choose his or her own key that s the key which i called k p the session key according to hellman if alice and bob are communicati... |
6,608 | sci.crypt | re fighting the clipper initiative prz sage cgd ucar edu philip zimmermann writes philip i think your ideas are well taken and constructive thanks for articulating them in this forum work the press talk with your local newspaper s science and technology reporter write to your favorite trade rags better yet write some a... |
6,609 | sci.crypt | re why the clipper algorithm is secret johnl iecc cambridge ma us john r levine writes the cryptographic protocol though is another matter i see no valid reasons for keeping it secret and as i hope i ve shown above there it just occurred to me why the algorithm is secret if it were published one could then build physic... |
6,610 | sci.crypt | re fighting the clipper initiative as a flaming libertarian paranoid extremist i at a loss for specific objections that don t sound frighteningly technical the idea that foisting the cripple chip standard on us manufacturers would result in saying sayonara to yet another high tech market isn t technical isn t in the le... |
6,611 | sci.crypt | re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryp brad clarinet com brad templeton writes let s assume for the moment that the system really is secure unless you get both halves of the encryption key from the two independent escrow houses let s say you even trust the escrow houses one is the aclu and ... |
6,612 | sci.crypt | re automatic online encryption of data from andersom spot colorado edu marc anderson also how about a box that you plug your phone into which would allow encrypted voice communications with someone who has a similar box digitizing input speech transmitting and decrypting on the other end i don t know how a public key s... |
6,613 | sci.crypt | re clipper chip technical details the protocol key management description published so far is either incomplete or incorrect it leaves me with no idea of how the system would actually work i hope the cpsr foia request succeeds so that we get full details wouldn t it be easier just to ask denning cs georgetown edu g
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6,614 | sci.crypt | re corporate acceptance of the wiretap chip indeed if nsa really designed the algorithm to be secure it s very likely as secure as idea or key des however the system as a whole isn t resistant to practical cryptanalysis in the puzzle palace bamford describes how several nsa employees were turned by foreign presumably k... |
6,615 | sci.crypt | clipper proposal key length danny weitzner djw eff org writes april initial eff analysis of clinton privacy and security proposal details of the proposal escrow the bit key will be divided between two escrow agents each of whom hold bits of each key the manufacturer of the communications device would be required to reg... |
6,616 | sci.crypt | re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption in article bontchev fbihh bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de writes and since the us constitutions guarantees the right to every american to bear arms why is not every american entitled as a matter of have you read the applicable part of the ... |
6,617 | sci.crypt | off the shelf cheap des keyseach machine was re corporate acceptance of the wiretap chip in article bb c mizzou missouri edu c mizzou missouri edu john kelsey writes strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes stuff deleted existence of the key registry system seems to make possible all kinds of possible attacks at a s... |
6,618 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any amolitor nmsu edu andrew molitor writes not to pick on mr may in particular of course but isn t this kind of the domino theory when one little country falls its neighbor will surely follow and before you know it we re all mining salt in siberia for not turning in our captain crun... |
6,619 | sci.crypt | re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption in article apr clarinet com brad clarinet com brad templeton writes let s assume for the moment that the system really is secure unless you get both halves of the encryption key from the two independent escrow houses let s say you even trust the es... |
6,620 | sci.crypt | re an open letter to mr clinton strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes here s a simple way to convert the clipper proposal to an unexceptionable one make it voluntary as usually you are not reading the proposal does say that it is a voluntary program this doesn t make it more desirable though that is you get high ... |
6,621 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes what follows is my opinion it is not asserted to be the truth so no flames please it is incompetent like almost anything you have posted here so you ll be flamed sorry it comes out of a background of years as a senior corporate sta... |
6,622 | sci.crypt | re what the clipper nay sayers sound like to me nathaniel sammons ns lance colostate edu wrote on mon apr gmt if the gov establishes a cryptography standard that has to be used by everyone and everyone s personal key is divided into two segments and stored at two separate albeit easy to find places and that key is only... |
6,623 | sci.crypt | re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes though some may argue about the nose of the camel it s worth noting that the government proposal is limited to scrambled telephony if it is only used for that purpose and does not extend to electronic mail or file as u... |
6,624 | sci.crypt | re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes nothing i m doing would be of the slightest interest to president nixon a typical example of seep minded thinking we all know that david sternlight is a jerk but i m afraid that in this case of the population will thin... |
6,625 | sci.crypt | more technical details here are some corrections and additions to hellman s note courtesy of dorothy denning again this is reposted with permission two requests first note the roles of s and s it appears to me and others that anyone who knows those values can construct the unit key and the nature of the generation proc... |
6,626 | sci.crypt | re wh proposal from police point of view strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes dwight tuinstra posts a very interesting message in which he comments on the effects of the clipper chip on state and local police actually reading between the lines it could be a very good thing for civil liberties in one respect sinc... |
6,627 | sci.crypt | re powerful similarity too i ve been asked to supply more specific directions for automated fetching of the source and documentation for agrep the powerful similarity pattern matching tool it is at cs arizona edu in directory agrep readme agrep agrep tar z agrep agrep ps z agrep agrep ps z the ps suffixed files are the... |
6,628 | sci.crypt | re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption misinterpretation though it should be a crime in itself is what united states lawyers use to make their bread and butter in manchester ct a few years ago a small company wanted to run a game system galled lasergames similar in many aspects to photo... |
6,629 | sci.crypt | report on privacy protecting off line cash available i recently published a new privacy protecting off line electronic cash system as a technical report at cwi being a phd student at david chaum s cryptography group our group has a long history in research in the field of privacy protecting cash systems the report is c... |
6,630 | sci.crypt | re the source of that announcement in marc apr oliver mit edu marc mit edu marc horowitz n nzu writes i received mail from mitch kapor saying that he did not ask to be on the list and does not know why he was added i m sure the same applies to others on the list so i guess my initial theory was right that the clipper l... |
6,631 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more uni acs bu edu shaen bernhardt writes i wish i could agree with you ask yourself this why would any private sector entity wish to buy a crypto system that was known to be at least partially compromised a to use for sensitive but not strategically important traffic b if the s... |
6,632 | sci.crypt | re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption rlward afterlife ncsc mil robert ward writes and since the us constitutions guarantees the right to every american to bear arms why is not every american entitled as a matter of have you read the applicable part of the constitution and interpreted ... |
6,633 | sci.crypt | re why the clipper algorithm is secret in article apr iecc cambridge ma us johnl iecc cambridge ma us john r levine writes it just occurred to me why the algorithm is secret if it were published one could then build physically identical clone versions of the chip that would interoperate with official clipper chips but ... |
6,634 | sci.crypt | help me please i am a phd student can i get the sci crypt group posted directly to me also i would like some feed back on the encryption schemes that my research in finite fields can be applied to any takers reply to gamv udcf gla ac uk thanks yours gavin
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6,635 | sci.crypt | re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow pmetzger snark shearson com perry e metzger writes i m a political dissident i m scared shitless of the feds listening in on my calls my opinions are the sort that would get me disappeared in a slightly less free society and who knows what sort of society we wil... |
6,636 | sci.crypt | re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip rlward afterlife ncsc mil robert ward writes it refers to the right of the people to organize a militia not for individuals to carry handguns grenades and assault rifles false as federal courts have affirmed on many occasions this is getting out of sci crypt ... |
6,637 | sci.crypt | re fifth amendment and passwords i am postive someone will correct me if i am wrong but doesn t the fifth also cover not being forced to do actions that are self incriminating from mike godwin mnemonic eff org posted with permission carl sadly it does not suspects can be compelled to give handwriting and voice exemplar... |
6,638 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more in article qpg finn dns nmsu edu amolitor nmsu edu andrew molitor writes yes those evil guys in the fbi can probably with some effort abuse the system i got news for you if the evil guys in the fbi decide they want to persecute you they re gonna and you re gonna hate it fact... |
6,639 | sci.crypt | suggestions for escrow agencies was re more technical details below is my response to dr denning s letter to steven bellovin comments are invited paul in alt privacy clipper steve bellovin posted your message to him which included a brief passage concerning selection of agencies as escrow agencies i am glad to see that... |
6,640 | sci.crypt | re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption you re drifting off topic in any case if you check on any of the topics devoted to gun rights issues you will find ample evidence that the misinformation is your assertion that the term the people in the second amendment has mysteriously taken on a... |
6,641 | sci.crypt | re more technical details in article apr ulysses att com smb research att com steven bellovin writes here are some corrections and additions to hellman s note courtesy of dorothy denning again this is reposted with permission two requests first note the roles of s and s it appears to me and others that anyone who knows... |
6,642 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more amanda walker amanda intercon com wrote uni acs bu edu shaen bernhardt writes deletions how can you reconcile the administrations self proclaimed purpose of providing law enforcement with access to encrypted data without making the clipper system the only crypto available in... |
6,643 | sci.crypt | re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow in article strnlghtc pucl kp netcom com strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes in article apr yuma acns colostate edu holland cs colostate edu douglas craig holland writes let me ask you this would you trust richard nixon with your crypto keys i wouldn t i ... |
6,644 | sci.crypt | re what is going on in article gthomas sfu ca gthomas fraser sfu ca guy thomas writes zrepachol cc curtin edu au paul repacholi writes in article apr cc curtin edu au zrepachol cc curtin edu au paul repacholi writes if you can t be bothered reading get the video manufacturing consent in reply to mail queries i don t kn... |
6,645 | sci.crypt | re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow in article strnlghtc pucl kp netcom com strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes in article apr yuma acns colostate edu holland cs colostate edu douglas craig holland writes let me ask you this would you trust richard nixon with your crypto keys i wouldn t i ... |
6,646 | sci.crypt | re fifth amendment and passwords in article apr colnet cmhnet org res colnet cmhnet org rob stampfli writes sadly it does not suspects can be compelled to give handwriting and voice exemplars and to take blood and dna tests i am sure that mike is correct on this point i am also pretty sure that administering truth seru... |
6,647 | sci.crypt | re more technical details in article apr bernina ethz ch caronni nessie cs id ethz ch germano caronni actually dorothy denning writes the seeds s and s do not change let me see if i have this straight if a person knows s and s and the serial number of the unit it s easy to reconstruct uk of course if they know sk the f... |
6,648 | sci.crypt | re key registering bodies if we do not trust the nsa to be a registrar of clipper chip key halves i would not trust mitre either mitre does lots of work for nsa at least in the trusted product evaluation program evaluation of commercial off the shelf software for its efficacy in safeguarding classified information and ... |
6,649 | sci.crypt | re wh proposal from police point of view in article strnlghtc puor netcom com strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes there has been extensive discussion in the eff forum for example about inadmissible taps being used to develop information that could then lead to admissible evidence this might put a stop to such t... |
6,650 | sci.crypt | re more technical details hmm followup on my own posting well who cares first let me try to work out the facts that we get to know about the clipper chip from what hellman and denning were able to tell us the chip itself is not confined to digital telephony but performs general encryption in a symmetric manner the chip... |
6,651 | sci.crypt | re white house public encryption management fact sheet in article qnav r l transfer stratus com cme ellisun sw stratus com carl ellison writes in article c lgaz dove nist gov clipper csrc ncsl nist gov clipper chip announcement writes further the attorney general shall utilize funds from the department of justice asset... |
6,652 | sci.crypt | re clipper chip long follow up in article rand org jim rand org jim gillogly writes this document is in the anonymous ftp directory at nist looks to me like the other shoe has dropped jim gillogly trewesday astron s r thanks for posting this and making it available this post will be long i will comment on most of it an... |
6,653 | sci.crypt | re more technical details the system or family key would appear to be cryptographically useless since every chip must know it and be able to remove its effects from the bitstream i daresay that it will be widely known almost immediately after this system is deployed and since it s been pointed out that there is not a s... |
6,654 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more for example i don t own a cordless phone with clipper i would if the local men in blue really want to listen to me talk to my friends or order pizza i m no worse off than i am now and i don t have to worry about local kids or nosy neighbors i do tend to agree sigh so where c... |
6,655 | sci.crypt | re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption in article apr afterlife ncsc mil rlward afterlife ncsc mil robert ward writes in article bontchev fbihh bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de writes and since the us constitutions guarantees the right to every american to bear arms why is not e... |
6,656 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more in strnlghtc nrhw qb netcom com strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes in article bu edu uni acs bu edu shaen bernhardt writes i wish i could agree with you ask yourself this why would any private sector entity wish to buy a crypto system that was known to be at least p... |
6,657 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more in article rwing uucp pat rwing uucp pat myrto writes fishing expeditions without the target s knowlege don t give up the right to be safe from that that should be non negotiable and clinton and co know it which is probably why they quietly developed this thing figuring if t... |
6,658 | sci.crypt | screw the people crypto is for hard core hackers spooks only since the wiretap chip is being distributed internationally allowing the u s government to spy on foreign governments companies and people as as well as to wiretap domestic citizens this is a world wide issue please put distribution world on the distrubution ... |
6,659 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more geoff ficus cs ucla edu geoffrey kuenning writes bullshit the bush administration and the career gestapo were responsible for this horror and the careerists presented it to the new presidency as a fait accompli that doesn t excuse clinton and gore from criticism for being so... |
6,660 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more geoff ficus cs ucla edu geoffrey kuenning writes it always amazes me how quick people are to blame whatever administration is current for things they couldn t possibly have initiated this chip had to take years to develop yet already we re claiming that the clinton administr... |
6,661 | sci.crypt | re fifth amendment and passwords in article apr qualcomm com karn unix ka q ampr org phil karn writes in article apr colnet cmhnet org res colnet cmhnet org rob stampfli writes sadly it does not suspects can be compelled to give handwriting and voice exemplars and to take blood and dna tests i am sure that mike is corr... |
6,662 | sci.crypt | re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption gee i guess they should also have such a repository for house keys car keys safety deposit keys rdl
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6,663 | sci.crypt | re what the clipper nay sayers sound like to me in article qsvfcinnq v dns nmsu edu amolitor moink nmsu edu andrew molitor writes the following is available in some ftp archive somewhere i insert my comments liberally throughout this demonic memo of big brotherdom white house announcement on screw thread standards this... |
6,664 | sci.crypt | some questions regarding big brother clipper in previous postings by hellman bellovin etal it was reported the big brother clipper chip will encrypt plaintext in bit blocks as is done with des the users key k which can be derived from rsa diffy hellman etc is used to encrypt plaintext m and is then used to form a three... |
6,665 | sci.crypt | re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow in article strnlghtc pucl kp netcom com strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes in article apr yuma acns colostate edu holland cs colostate edu douglas craig holland writes let me ask you this would you trust richard nixon with your crypto keys i wouldn t i ... |
6,666 | sci.crypt | re key registering bodies in article dockmaster ncsc mil grant dockmaster ncsc mil lynn r grant writes if we do not trust the nsa to be a registrar of clipper chip key halves i would not trust mitre either i wouldn t trust mitre for another reason remember the cuckoo s egg how great was their security eh nsa well with ... |
6,667 | sci.crypt | re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow begin pgp signed message in article pmetzger apr snark shearson com pmetzger snark shearson com perry e metzger writes in article qnupd jpm news intercon com amanda intercon com amanda walker writes from amanda intercon com amanda walker jhesse netcom com john h... |
6,668 | sci.crypt | screw the people crypto is for hard core hackers spooks only i suspect that this clipper thing could backfire on the gov in a big hurry i expect that products using these chips will socket them rather than soldering them since once the keys are handed over by the escrow agencies the chip is so much garbage and will nee... |
6,669 | sci.crypt | re fifth amendment and passwords in article qv m i geraldo cc utexas edu mccoy ccwf cc utexas edu jim mccoy writes i set up a bbs that uses public key encryption and encryption of files on disk the general setup is designed so that when users connect they send a private key encrypted using the system public key and the... |
6,670 | sci.crypt | re more technical details another objection occurred to me there was a comment about how supposedly there would only be one decode box operated by the fbi this is flat ridiculous and i don t believe it for a millisecond even if they in fact only build one or two or some other small number of these that won t stop other... |
6,671 | sci.crypt | cripple chip how about this the telco has your clipper key the telco has your intended partner s key if he is using one whenever you call the message gets decrypted and reencrypted wihtout y key exchange i know it s a stupid system but for the feds it d be great the point of this isn t to take over the crypto market bt... |
6,672 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more johnson trwacs fp trw com steve johnson writes tim may whose sig block may get him busted in the new regime a remark i heard the other day is beginning to take on increasingly frightening significance the comment was made that in other parts of the world the democrats note t... |
6,673 | sci.crypt | re wh proposal from police point of view in article pmetzger apr snark shearson com pmetzger lehman com writes in article strnlghtc puor netcom com strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes there has been extensive discussion in the eff forum for example about inadmissible taps being used to develop information that ... |
6,674 | sci.crypt | re fifth amendment and passwords in article apr bernina ethz ch caronni nessie cs id ethz ch germano caronni writes just a question as a provider of a public bbs service aren t you bound by law to gurantee intelligble access to the data of the users on the bbs if police comes with sufficent authorisation i guessed this... |
6,675 | sci.crypt | re why the clipper algorithm is secret in article c pstr lu panix com dfl panix com danny o bedlam writes the algorithm is classified because a military contract or similar government equivalent to military has been let for this proprietary design that the feds say that nsa developed is there a patent is that patent pu... |
6,676 | sci.crypt | clipper chip bush did it in article wcs apr rainier att com wcs anchor ho att com bill stewart writes this is the democrats version defend free speech reject republicans followed by speech control this must have been in the works for some time the bush administration must have been working on it for quite a while clint... |
6,677 | sci.crypt | the clipper chip a technical summary the following document summarizes the clipper chip how it is used how programming of the chip is coupled to key generation and the escrow process and how law enforcement decrypts communications since there has been some speculation on this news group about my own involvement in this... |
6,678 | sci.crypt | clipper and ranting libertarians i would think that you could reduce the defense of using non clipper based encryption technologies to defending freedom of expression ie free speech that you have to right to express whatever you want in whatever form your little heart desires so long as you do not impinge on the rights... |
6,679 | sci.crypt | would clipper make a good cover for other encryption method clipper might be a good way to cover the use of another layer of encryption currently when you send an encrypted message an opponent can usually tell that you are using encryption which encryption method you are using because that information is usually in the... |
6,680 | sci.crypt | re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption in article qnpjuinn ci gap caltech edu hal cco caltech edu hal finney writes brad clarinet com brad templeton writes their strategy is a business one rather than legal one they are pushing to get a standard in place a secret standard and if they ge... |
6,681 | sci.crypt | re more technical details encrypted under k then k will be encrypted under the unit key uk and the serial number of the unit added to produce a three part message which will then be encrypted under the system key sk producing e e m k e k uk serial number sk my understanding is that e m k is not encrypted under sk calle... |
6,682 | sci.crypt | re more technical details srt duke cs duke edu stephen r tate writes now i m not one of the people who distrusts the government at every turn but taking someone s word for it that the s s pairs are not kept around is pushing what i m willing to believe just a little bit too far even if they somehow address this issue i... |
6,683 | sci.crypt | the escrow database here is a disturbing thought now we no longer live in the days of big filing cabinets we live in the electronic age i asked myself how big could the escrow database get how hard might it be to steal the whole thing particularly were i an nsa official operating with the tacit permission of the escrow... |
6,684 | sci.crypt | re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption rlward afterlife ncsc mil robert ward writes in article bontchev fbihh bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de writes and since the us constitutions guarantees the right to every american to bear arms why is not every american entitled as a matter... |
6,685 | sci.crypt | re fighting the clipper initiative steve b access digex com steve brinich writes as a flaming libertarian paranoid extremist i at a loss for specific objections that don t sound frighteningly technical the idea that foisting the cripple chip standard on us manufacturers would result in saying sayonara to yet another hi... |
6,686 | sci.crypt | re clipper chip bush did it johng ecs comm mot com john gilbert writes this must have been in the works for some time the bush administration must have been working on it for quite a while clinton simply took the credit or blame depending on how you look at it and the initiative for actual implementation clinton is not... |
6,687 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more dave ihnat ignatz chinet chi il us wrote in article qpg finn dns nmsu edu amolitor nmsu edu andrew molitor writes not to pick on mr may in particular of course but isn t this kind of the domino theory when one little country falls its neighbor will surely follow and before y... |
6,688 | sci.crypt | re source of random bits on a unix workstation in article qs cg cq msuinfo cl msu edu mrr scss cl msu edu mark riordan writes a few more sources are statistics on your filesystems easily and quickly obtained and the output from the rusage system call you can also exec a finger to one or more favorite heavily used syste... |
6,689 | sci.crypt | re white house public encryption management fact sheet alan barrett barrett lucy ee und ac za wrote in article c lgaz dove nist gov clipper csrc ncsl nist gov clipper chip announcement writes in making this decision i do not intend to prevent the private sector from developing or the government from approving other mic... |
6,690 | sci.crypt | do we need the clipper for cheap security amanda intercon com amanda walker writes the answer seems obvious to me they wouldn t there is other hardware out there not compromised des as an example triple des as a better one so where can i buy a des encrypted cellular phone how much does it cost personally cylink stuff i... |
6,691 | sci.crypt | re would clipper make a good cover for other encryption method in article apr eff org kadie eff org carl m kadie writes clipper might be a good way to cover the use of another layer of encryption true but will traditional encryptions schemes when further encrypted by clipper be more vulnerable to attacks such as partia... |
6,692 | sci.crypt | re screw the people crypto is for hard core hackers spooks only in article c qy m de agora rain com jhart agora rain com jim hart writes since the wiretap chip is being distributed internationally allowing the u s government to spy on foreign governments companies and people as as well as to wiretap domestic citizens t... |
6,693 | sci.crypt | re the escrow database perry e metzger pmetzger snark shearson com wrote here is a disturbing thought good stuff elided don t pretend that no one unauthorized will ever get their hands on the escrow databases secret the escrow databases aren t the sorts of secrets that our teachers told us about but they are the sort o... |
6,694 | sci.crypt | re once tapped your code is no good any more in strnlghtc p zp zm netcom com strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes in article apr yuma acns colostate edu holland cs colostate edu douglas craig holland writes note that measures to protect yourself from tempest surveillance are still classified as far as i know i t... |
6,695 | sci.crypt | re screw the people crypto is for hard core hackers spooks only in article almaden ibm com ameline vnet ibm com ian ameline writes i also believe that someone will reverse engineer the clipper chip and knowlege of the algorithm will likely be fairly widespread the chip and algorithm are classified if you reverse engine... |
6,696 | sci.crypt | re do we need the clipper for cheap security from pmetzger snark shearson com perry e metzger indeed were it not for the government doing everything possible to stop them qualcomm would have designed strong encryption right in to the cdma cellular phone system they are pioneering were it not for the nsa and company che... |
6,697 | sci.crypt | re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow the cops feds do not need to be able to get hold of your private key to listen in to cellular conversations encryption is not end to end but cellphone to base station it has to be this way so that cellular users and fixed installations can talk to each other for... |
6,698 | sci.crypt | screw the people crypto is for hard core hackers spooks only since the at t wiretap chip is scheduled to be distributed internationally allowing the u s government to spy on foreign governments companies and people as as well as to wiretap domestic citizens this is a world wide issue thus distribution world ygoland wri... |
6,699 | sci.crypt | screw the people crypto is for hard core hackers spooks only date apr gmt from jhart agora rain com jim hart simply everyone should have this attitude the only people who can have this attitude are the most hard core computer hackers who never make phone calls away from their computer in yeards everybody will be talkig... |
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