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ATT&CK ID:S0141
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Windows
Winnti for Windows can determine if the OS on a compromised host is newer than Windows XP.[398] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used Tor and a variety of commercial VPN services to route brute force authentication attempts.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used compromised domain administrator credentials as part of their lateral movement.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1591.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Identify Business Tempo
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business tempo that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business tempo may include a variety of details, including operational hours/days of the week. This information ma... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0111
ATT&CK Technique Name:schtasks
schtasks is used to schedule tasks on a Windows system to run at a specific date and time.[155] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Use auditing tools capable of detecting privilege and service abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0241
ATT&CK Technique Name:RATANKBA
RATANKBA uses tasklist /svc to display running tasks.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1430.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Impersonate SS7 Nodes
Adversaries may exploit the lack of authentication in signaling system network nodes to track the to track the location of mobile devices by impersonating a node. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete takes photos from the computer’s web camera.[25][26][27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0247
ATT&CK Technique Name:NavRAT
NavRAT logs the keystrokes on the targeted system.[120] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0613
ATT&CK Technique Name:PS1
CostaBricks can download additional payloads onto a compromised host.[124] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot has the ability to use DLL side-loading for execution.[55] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Practical Defenses Against Adversarial Machine Learning
Adversarial machine learning has hit the spotlight as a topic relevant to practically-minded security teams, but noise and hype have diluted the discourse to gradient-based comparisons of blueberry muffins and chihuahuas. This fails to reflect... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 added their own devices as allowed IDs for active sync using Set-CASMailbox, allowing it to obtain copies of victim mailboxes. It also added additional permissions (such as Mail.Read and Mail.ReadWrite) to compromised Ap... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can establish a LNK file in the startup folder for persistence.[245] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0813
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Process and Device Authentication
Devices should authenticate all messages between master and outstation assets. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has used a scheduled task named SRCheck to mask the execution of a malicious .dll.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1592.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hardware
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host hardware that can be used during targeting. Information about hardware infrastructure may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional compone... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0582
ATT&CK Technique Name:LookBack
LookBack sets up a Registry Run key to establish a persistence mechanism.[145] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI; restrict other users that are allowed to connect, or disallow all users from connecting remotely to WMI. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork has added the path of its second-stage malware to the startup folder to achieve persistence. One of its file stealers has also persisted by adding a Registry Run key.[190][191] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crimson
Crimson contains commands to list files and directories, as well as search for files matching certain extensions from a defined list.[88][89][90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0810
ATT&CK Technique Name:Out-of-Band Communications Channel
Provide operators with redundant, out-of-band communication to support monitoring and control of the operational processes, especially when recovering from a network outage [8]. Out-of-band communication should utilize diverse systems and technol... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has used a payload that removes itself after running. TeamTNT also has deleted locally staged files for collecting credentials or scan results for local IP addresses after exfiltrating them.[236][237] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1056.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Keylogging
Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept ke... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 DevSecOps: What, Why and How
Security is often added towards the end of a typical DevOps cycle, through manual/automated review. In DevSecOps, security can be injected at every stage of a DevOps pipeline in an automated fashion. Having a DevSecOps pipeline enables an organisation to:Create a secu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Epic
Epic has overwritten the function pointer in the extra window memory of Explorer's Shell_TrayWnd in order to execute malicious code in the context of the explorer.exe process.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 can call multiple Windows APIs for execution, to share memory, and defense evasion.[45][46] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Breaking the Isolation: Cross-Account AWS Vulnerabilities
Multiple AWS services were found to be vulnerable to a new cross-account vulnerability class. An attacker could manipulate various services in AWS and cause them to perform actions on other clients' resources due to unsafe identity policies ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet is known to use RSA keys for encrypting C2 traffic. [17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has leveraged the Microsoft Graph API to perform various actions across Azure and M365 environments. They have also utilized AADInternals PowerShell Modules to access the API [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAFNIUM
HAFNIUM has used 7-Zip and WinRAR to compress stolen files for exfiltration.[33][34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0444
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRat
ShimRat has installed a Windows service to maintain persistence on victim machines.[110] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors enabled WinRM over HTTP/HTTPS as a backup persistence mechanism using the following command: cscript //nologo "C:\Windows\System32\winrm.vbs" set winrm/config/service@{EnableCompatibilityHttpsListener="true"}.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0505
ATT&CK Technique Name:Desert Scorpion
Desert Scorpion can collect attacker-specified files, including files located on external storage.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0520
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLINDINGCAN
BLINDINGCAN has used AES and XOR to decrypt its DLLs.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0237
ATT&CK Technique Name:GravityRAT
GravityRAT supports file encryption (AES with the key "lolomycin2017").[141] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has acquired Amazon S3 buckets to use in C2.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has searched for information on the target company's website.[3] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Stopping Snake Oil with Smaller Healthcare Providers: Addressing Security with Actionable Plans and Maximum Value
Healthcare has been the most affected industry by ransomware, data breaches, and hacks. Every week there is news of yet another provider that has been hacked. In multiple cases, this h... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Deconstructing the Phishing Campaigns that Target Gmail Users
With over 1.4 billion active users and million of companies entrusting it to handle their email, Gmail has a unique vantage point on how phishing groups operate. In this talk we look into Gmail telemetry to illuminate the differences bet... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Grant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 ReCertifying Active Directory Certificate Services
Microsoft's Active Directory Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) implementation, known as Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), has unfortunately flown under the radar of the defensive industry. AD CS is widely deployed and provides attackers ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0099
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT-C-36
APT-C-36 obtained and used a modified variant of Imminent Monitor.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 downloaded malicious payloads onto compromised systems.[85] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has compressed data into .zip files prior to exfiltration.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0418
ATT&CK Technique Name:ViceLeaker
ViceLeaker can copy arbitrary files from the device to the C2 server, can exfiltrate browsing history, can exfiltrate the SD card structure, and can exfiltrate pictures as the user takes them.[31][32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0520
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLINDINGCAN
BLINDINGCAN has loaded and executed DLLs in memory during runtime on a victim machine.[4] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Another Road Leads to the Host: From a Message to VM Escape on Nvidia vGPU
NVIDIA has a huge market share in the area of vGPU. Starting from supporting artificial intelligence, deep learning, data science to cloud gaming, the vGPU is getting more and more perceived to the general public. The vGPU c... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Heyoka Backdoor
Heyoka Backdoor can gather process information.[123] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:INCONTROLLER
INCONTROLLER can wipe the memory of Omron PLCs and reset settings through the remote HTTP service.[2][3][4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1068
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackCat
BlackCat has the ability to stop VM services on compromised networks.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1556.008
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Provider DLL
Adversaries may register malicious network provider dynamic link libraries (DLLs) to capture cleartext user credentials during the authentication process. Network provider DLLs allow Windows to interface with specific network protocols and can also support ... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Site Isolation: Confining Untrustworthy Code in the Web Browser
In the late 2000s, web browsers moved from single-process to multi-process architectures, introducing a sandbox boundary between untrustworthy code from the web and local resources. While effective at the time, the security landscape ha... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0369
ATT&CK Technique Name:CoinTicker
CoinTicker executes a Python script to download its second stage.[118] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has disabled and uninstalled security tools such as Alibaba, Tencent, and BMC cloud monitoring agents on cloud-based infrastructure.[86][87] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
Later implants used by APT28, such as CHOPSTICK, use a blend of HTTP, HTTPS, and other legitimate channels for C2, depending on module configuration.[17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0615
ATT&CK Technique Name:SombRAT
SombRAT has the ability to modify its process memory to hide process command-line arguments.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling can browse directories on a compromised host.[76][77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dust Storm
During Operation Dust Storm, attackers used VBS code to decode payloads.[163] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has collected files from various information repositories.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0473
ATT&CK Technique Name:Avenger
Avenger has the ability to inject shellcode into svchost.exe.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0368
ATT&CK Technique Name:NotPetya
NotPetya can use valid credentials with PsExec or wmic to spread itself to remote systems.[8][9] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Phoenix Domain Attack: Vulnerable Links in Domain Name Delegation and Revocation
Phoenix Domain is a general and novel attack that allows adversaries to maintain the revoked malicious domain continuously resolvable at scale, which enables an old, mitigated attack, Ghost Domain. Phoenix Domain has ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:BISCUIT
BISCUIT has a command to collect the processor type, operation system, computer name, uptime, and whether the system is a laptop or PC.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has used steganography in multiple operations to conceal malicious payloads.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy uses PowerView and Pywerview to perform discovery commands such as net user, net group, net local group, etc.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0607
ATT&CK Technique Name:KillDisk
KillDisk has attempted to get the access token of a process by calling OpenProcessToken. If KillDisk gets the access token, then it attempt to modify the token privileges with AdjustTokenPrivileges.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has gained access to credentials via exported copies of the ntds.dit Active Directory database.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Restrict Registry permissions to disallow the modification of sensitive Registry keys such as HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\NetworkProvider\Order. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Consider disabling auto-mounting of disk image files (i.e., .iso, .img, .vhd, and .vhdx). This can be achieved by modifying the Registry values related to the Windows Explorer file associations in order to disable the automatic Explorer "Mount a... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 IAM The One Who Knocks
As organizations start their cloud journey, many are looking at leveraging multi-cloud for their infrastructure. Although this gives teams great flexibility in building their environments, each service provider has a unique paradigm for configuring and managing the configurati... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:HTTPBrowser
HTTPBrowser is capable of listing files, folders, and drives on a victim.[144][145] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can execute a WMI query to gather information about the installed antivirus engine.[13][14] | secon |
title:botconf2018 Red Teamer 2.0: Automating the C&C Set up Process
This talk follows the amazing documentation provided by Steve Borosh (@424f424f) and Jeff Dimmock’s (@bluscreenofjeff) on their dedicated repo.Besides, it follows several experiences of red team operations leveraging the tips issued by these authors.W... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 MITRE ATT&CK: The Play at Home Edition
You've seen the tactics and techniques. You've read the descriptions. However, something is missing…how do you take the theory of MITRE ATT&CK™ and actually DO something with it? At first glance, it is easy to be overwhelmed by the ATT&CK framework. Where do y... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has added batch scripts to the startup folder.[257] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0010
For C0010, UNC3890 actors established domains that appeared to be legitimate services and entities, such as LinkedIn, Facebook, Office 365, and Pfizer.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kevin
Variants of Kevin can communicate over DNS through queries to the server for constructed domain names with embedded information.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay can schedule tasks via the Windows COM API to maintain persistence.[146] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed can gain system level privilege by passing SeDebugPrivilege to the AdjustTokenPrivilege API.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 has been known to use -WindowStyle Hidden to conceal PowerShell windows.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0657
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLUELIGHT
BLUELIGHT can download additional files onto the host.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0359
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nltest
Nltest may be used to enumerate remote domain controllers using options such as /dclist and /dsgetdc.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 used file names beginning with USERS, SYSUSER, and SYSLOG for DEADEYE, and changed KEYPLUG file extensions from .vmp to .upx likely to avoid hunting detections.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater maintains persistence on victim networks through side-loading dlls to trick legitimate programs into running malware.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0090
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rover
Rover copies files from removable drives to C:\system.[86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mimikatz
Mimikatz performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources. It contains functionality to acquire information about credentials in many ways, including from the credential v... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0536
ATT&CK Technique Name:GPlayed
GPlayed can show a phishing WebView pretending to be a Google service that collects credit card information.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0408
ATT&CK Technique Name:FlexiSpy
FlexiSpy can collect a list of known Wi-Fi access points.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1062
ATT&CK Technique Name:S.O.V.A.
S.O.V.A. has been distributed in obfuscated and packed form.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1069
ATT&CK Technique Name:Permission Groups Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to discover group and permission settings. This information can help adversaries determine which user accounts and groups are available, the membership of users in particular groups, and which users and groups have elevated permis... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Disable Wake-on-LAN if it is not needed within an environment. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Darkhotel
Darkhotel has used malware that is disguised as a Secure Shell (SSH) tool.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:gh0st RAT
gh0st RAT has checked for the existence of a Service key to determine if it has already been installed on the system.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:ComRAT
ComRAT has used a scheduled task to launch its PowerShell loader.[41][42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Domain Policy Modification
Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in domain environments. Domains provide a centralized means of managing how computer resources (ex: computers, user accounts) can act, and interact ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used domain administrators' accounts to help facilitate lateral movement on compromised networks.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet schedules a network job to execute two minutes after host infection.[167] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has used PowerShell to drop and execute malware loaders.[207] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.