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ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal has used the Windows API to communicate with the Service Control Manager to execute a thread.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0543
ATT&CK Technique Name:Spark
Spark has used HTTP POST requests to communicate with its C2 server to receive commands.[315] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Legal Pitfalls to Avoid in Security Incidents
Privilege, two-track investigations, OFAC, insurance coverage, and preserving evidence... Lawyers think about this stuff from the jump in a security incident, and you should be aware of them too. Often, attorneys are brought into a security incident afte... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Enforce the principle of least privilege by limiting dashboard visibility to only the required users. When using Kubernetes, avoid giving users wildcard permissions or adding users to the system:masters group, and use RoleBindings rather than ClusterRoleBind... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Restrict permissions and access to the AD FS server to only originate from privileged access workstations.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0100
ATT&CK Technique Name:Inception
Inception has ensured persistence at system boot by setting the value regsvr32 %path%\ctfmonrn.dll /s.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1034
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrifeWater
StrifeWater has create a scheduled task named Mozilla\Firefox Default Browser Agent 409046Z0FF4A39CB for persistence.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0624
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ecipekac
Ecipekac can abuse the legitimate application policytool.exe to load a malicious DLL.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:DnsSystem
DnsSystem has lured victims into opening macro-enabled Word documents for execution.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0023
ATT&CK Technique Name:CHOPSTICK
Part of APT28's operation involved using CHOPSTICK modules to copy itself to air-gapped machines and using files written to USB sticks to transfer data and command traffic.[7][6][8] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Hands Off and Putting SLAB/SLUB Feng Shui in a Blackbox
Successful exploitation against a Linux kernel vulnerability requires the manipulation of memory layout. Over the past years, security researchers have already invented and summarized various memory layout manipulation mechanisms. However, it i... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can search for a variety of security software programs, EDR systems, and malware analysis tools.[58][59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Axiom
Axiom has used exploits for multiple vulnerabilities including CVE-2014-0322, CVE-2012-4792, CVE-2012-1889, and CVE-2013-3893.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0400
ATT&CK Technique Name:RobbinHood
RobbinHood will search for an RSA encryption key and then perform its encryption process on the system files.[77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT has used a custom encryption scheme for communication between scripts.[252] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0444
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRat
ShimRat can uninstall itself from compromised hosts, as well create and modify directories, delete, move, copy, and rename files.[215] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZIRCONIUM
ZIRCONIUM has used a tool to open a Windows Command Shell on a remote host.[358] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Managing for Success: Maintaining a Healthy Bug Bounty Program Long Term
Your bounty program has launched and is clicking along… but are you getting optimal results once the initial excitement wanes? How do you measure and report on program success? How can you build gamification and incentive mod... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Configure the Increase Scheduling Priority option to only allow the Administrators group the rights to schedule a priority process. This can be can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 renamed software and DLLs with legitimate names to appear benign.[154][155] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0264
ATT&CK Technique Name:OopsIE
OopsIE stages the output from command execution and collected files in specific folders before exfiltration.[72] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dust Storm
During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors relied on potential victims to open a malicious Microsoft Word document sent via email.[177] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1552.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Credentials In Files
Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has used a tool to query Active Directory using LDAP, discovering information about computers listed in AD.[77][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0570
ATT&CK Technique Name:BitPaymer
BitPaymer can modify the timestamp of an executable so that it can be identified and restored by the decryption tool.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has sent spearphising emails with malicious attachments to potential victims using compromised and/or spoofed email accounts.[167][168][169] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0588
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldMax
The GoldMax Linux variant has used a crontab entry with a @reboot line to gain persistence.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors used several remote administration tools as persistent infiltration channels.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has used a DCSync command with Mimikatz to retrieve credentials from an exploited controller.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the Makecab utility to compress and a version of WinRAR to create password-protected archives of stolen data prior to exfiltration.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0689
ATT&CK Technique Name:WhisperGate
WhisperGate can enumerate connected remote logical drives.[60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has obtained valid emails addresses while conducting research against target organizations that were subsequently used in spearphishing campaigns.[19] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Infiltrating Corporate Intranet Like NSA - Pre-auth RCE on Leading SSL VPNs
SSL VPNs protect corporate assets from Internet exposure, but what if SSL VPNs themselves are vulnerable? They're exposed to the Internet, trusted to reliably guard the only way to intranet. However, we found pre-auth RCEs o... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mongall
Mongall can inject a DLL into rundll32.exe for execution.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0446
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ryuk
Ryuk has used the Windows command line to create a Registry entry under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to establish persistence.[230] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1055.014
ATT&CK Technique Name:VDSO Hijacking
Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via VDSO hijacking in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Virtual dynamic shared object (vdso) hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0804
ATT&CK Technique Name:Human User Authentication
All remote services should require strong authentication before providing user access. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has compressed exfiltrated data with RAR and used RomeoDelta malware to archive specified directories in .zip format, encrypt the .zip file, and upload it to C2. [29][30][31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1057
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Loss Prevention
Data loss prevention can detect and block sensitive data being copied to USB devices. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0344
ATT&CK Technique Name:Azorult
Azorult can download and execute additional files. Azorult has also downloaded a ransomware payload called Hermes.[44][45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0189
ATT&CK Technique Name:ISMInjector
ISMInjector hollows out a newly created process RegASM.exe and injects its payload into the hollowed process.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0265
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kazuar
Kazuar gathers information on local groups and members on the victim’s machine.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1497.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Checks
Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0516
ATT&CK Technique Name:SoreFang
SoreFang can enumerate domain groups by executing net.exe group /domain.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0095
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete has sent phishing emails that contain a link to an external server with ZIP and RAR archives.[67][68] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Your Trash Kernel Bug, My Precious 0-day
The advance of kernel fuzzing techniques significantly benefits the discovery of kernel bugs. According to our statistics on Syzbot, Syzkaller has already unveiled more than 2,000 kernel bug reports on Linux over the past two years. From the security analyst... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Skeletons in the App Sandbox: 5+ Ways to Escape
The safety and trust promised by the App Store is in large part due to mandatory sandboxing requirements. The required App Sandbox lets users install apps with abandon and without worry, keeping malicious ones contained. This talk will deep dive into ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1517
ATT&CK Technique Name:Access Notifications
Adversaries may collect data within notifications sent by the operating system or other applications. Notifications may contain sensitive data such as one-time authentication codes sent over SMS, email, or other mediums. In the case of Credential Access, advers... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:gh0st RAT
gh0st RAT has used an encrypted protocol within TCP segments to communicate with the C2.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0432
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bread
Bread has used native code in an attempt to disguise malicious functionality.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0422
ATT&CK Technique Name:Anubis
Anubis can exfiltrate files encrypted with the ransomware module from the device and can modify external storage.[2][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla has used process hollowing to create and manipulate processes through sections of unmapped memory by reallocating that space with its malicious code.[3] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 Confidence in Chaos: Strategies for World-Class Security Operations
You've just found out the smart-lights in the cafeteria are connected to your corporate network and can be dimmed from anywhere in the world, the sales team has been spinning up unmanaged AWS accounts to do customer demos, and your ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0176
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wingbird
Wingbird exploits CVE-2016-4117 to allow an executable to gain escalated privileges.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0669
ATT&CK Technique Name:KOCTOPUS
KOCTOPUS can use the LoadResource and CreateProcessW APIs for execution.[104] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:XTunnel
XTunnel uses SSL/TLS and RC4 to encrypt traffic.[71][8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Disable the default to "hide file extensions for known file types" in Windows OS.[7][8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mimikatz
Mimikatz's SEKURLSA::Pth module can impersonate a user, with only a password hash, to execute arbitrary commands.[12][13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:SeaDuke
Some SeaDuke samples have a module to extract email from Microsoft Exchange servers using compromised credentials.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0399
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pallas
Pallas has the ability to delete attacker-specified files from compromised devices.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0808
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Network Traffic
Utilize strong cryptographic techniques and protocols to prevent eavesdropping on network communications. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
title:botconf2022 Suricata
Suricata is a well known open source network threat detection engine. As such it combines network security monitoring capabilities with advanced intrusion detection mechanisms. Dataset is one of the features that is at the border of these two worlds. This presentation will introduce the featu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI is heavily obfuscated and includes encrypted configuration files.[189] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0801
ATT&CK Technique Name:Access Management
Authenticate all access to field controllers before authorizing access to, or modification of, a device's state, logic, or programs. Centralized authentication techniques can help manage the large number of field controller accounts needed across the ICS. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1070.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:File Deletion
Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: Ingress Tool Transfer) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Picking Lockfiles: Attacking & Defending Your Supply Chain
An advantage of open source software (OSS) development is that it enables contributions from the public, adding new features and improvements. This also makes OSS projects a target of supply chain attacks. We present both an offensive and ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0624
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ecipekac
Ecipekac can abuse the legitimate application policytool.exe to load a malicious DLL.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal has collected information from a compromised host.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0327
ATT&CK Technique Name:Skygofree
Skygofree can record video or capture photos when an infected device is in a specified location.[17] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 Attacking Browser Sandbox: Live Persistently and Prosperously
The Sandbox technique has been widely adopted in almost all web browsers and is proven effective for attack mitigation. With the consistent increase of new features in sandbox policy, it has become almost too much of an effort for atta... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit the privileges of user accounts so that only authorized administrators can perform Winlogon helper changes. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 has lured victims into clicking malicious links delivered through spearphishing.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has added a user named DefaultAccount to the Administrators and Remote Desktop Users groups.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0143
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flame
Flame contains modules to infect USB sticks and spread laterally to other Windows systems the stick is plugged into using Autorun functionality.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0181
ATT&CK Technique Name:FALLCHILL
FALLCHILL has been installed as a Windows service.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0481
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ragnar Locker
Ragnar Locker can delete volume shadow copies using vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0448
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rising Sun
Rising Sun has collected data and files from a compromised host.[159] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Do not allow administrator accounts that have permissions to add component software on these services to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0359
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nltest
Nltest may be used to enumerate trusted domains by using commands such as nltest /domain_trusts.[20][21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1629.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prevent Application Removal
Adversaries may abuse the Android device administration API to prevent the user from uninstalling a target application. In earlier versions of Android, device administrator applications needed their administration capabilities explicitly deactivated ... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Crashing Your Way to Medium-IL: Exploiting the PDB Parser for Privilege Escalation
If you have ever done Windows debugging or crash dump analysis, you must be familiar with PDB files. These files store debugging information (or 'symbols') about a program, and are parsed by debuggers such as WinDBG a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 has a tool that can detect the existence of remote systems.[8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0625
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cuba
Cuba has been dropped onto systems and used for lateral movement via obfuscated PowerShell scripts.[69] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0261
ATT&CK Technique Name:Catchamas
Catchamas collects keystrokes from the victim’s machine.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0237
ATT&CK Technique Name:GravityRAT
GravityRAT creates a scheduled task to ensure it is re-executed everyday.[74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum's loader can create a new service named NtmsSvc to execute the payload.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Squirrelwaffle
Squirrelwaffle has gathered victim computer information and configurations.[347] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0170
ATT&CK Technique Name:Helminth
The executable version of Helminth has a module to log clipboard contents.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors used compromised VPN accounts to gain access to victim systems.[48] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 The Discovery of a Government Malware and an Unexpected Spy Scandal
In early 2019, we revealed the existence of a new intrusion software built and primarily used in Italy by the authorities. The company that created this software managed to stay under the radar for several years, until we identifie... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0394
ATT&CK Technique Name:HiddenWasp
HiddenWasp creates a user account as a means to provide initial persistence to the compromised machine.[13] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 hAFL1: Our Journey of Fuzzing Hyper-V and Discovering a 0-Day
Fuzzers are tremendously important in the realm of vulnerability research, as they automate the process of bug discovery by rapidly feeding a target with numerous inputs. Several factors make up an efficient fuzzer. One of them is structu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1134.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Token Impersonation/Theft
Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, an adversary can duplicate an existing token using DuplicateToken or DuplicateTokenEx. The token can then be used w... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0199
ATT&CK Technique Name:TURNEDUP
TURNEDUP is capable of injecting code into the APC queue of a created Rundll32 process as part of an "Early Bird injection."[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0336
ATT&CK Technique Name:NanoCore
NanoCore creates a RunOnce key in the Registry to execute its VBS scripts each time the user logs on to the machine.[176] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group encrypted malware such as DRATzarus with XOR and DLL files with base64.[103][239][240][241] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1016
ATT&CK Technique Name:Vulnerability Scanning
Continuous monitoring of vulnerability sources and the use of automatic and manual code review tools should also be implemented as well.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails with malicious links which includes phishing for consent with OAuth 2.0. Additionally, users may perform visual checks of the domains they visit; however, homographs in ASCII and i... | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.