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ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group developed custom tools such as Sumarta, DBLL Dropper, Torisma, and DRATzarus for their operations.[22][23][24][25] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Keynote: Hacking the Cybersecurity Puzzle
Jen Easterly, the new Director for the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), lays out her vision for how hackers, the government, and private sector can work together to confront cyber threats and solve tomorrow’s cyber puzzles before they... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Modify network and/or host firewall rules, as well as other network controls, to only allow legitimate BITS traffic. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0512
ATT&CK Technique Name:FatDuke
FatDuke can get user agent strings for the default browser from HKCU\Software\Classes\http\shell\open\command.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0262
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuasarRAT
QuasarRAT can generate a UAC pop-up Window to prompt the target user to run a command as the administrator.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1574.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:DLL Search Order Hijacking
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. Hijacking DLL loads may be for the purpose of establishing per... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 InfoSec Philosophies for the Corrupt Economy
The majority of systematic approaches to information security are created by contributors from stable nation states, where the design assumes that the originator is wholesome and true, the playing field is lush and green and the children frolic care-free ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0250
ATT&CK Technique Name:Koadic
Koadic has used PowerShell to establish persistence.[130] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Crashing Your Way to Medium-IL: Exploiting the PDB Parser for Privilege Escalation
If you have ever done Windows debugging or crash dump analysis, you must be familiar with PDB files. These files store debugging information (or 'symbols') about a program, and are parsed by debuggers such as WinDBG ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the Winlogon helper process by using application control [14] tools like AppLocker [15] [16] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1484.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Group Policy Modification
Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and compute... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0648
ATT&CK Technique Name:JSS Loader
JSS Loader has the ability to launch scheduled tasks to establish persistence.[89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0127
ATT&CK Technique Name:BBSRAT
BBSRAT has been loaded through DLL side-loading of a legitimate Citrix executable that is set to persist through the Registry Run key location HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ssonsvr.exe. | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 Back to the Future. Cross-Protocol Attacks in the Era of 5G
The state of mobile technologies can be baffling. We are already seeing deployment of 5G networks with astounding bandwidth and minimal latency. Yet, standards reliant on SS7, a technology developed in the 1970s, still continue to domina... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Do not store credentials within the Registry. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has gathered user identities and credentials to gain initial access to a victim's organization; the group has also called an organization's help desk to reset a target's credentials.[12] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 From Coordinated Disclosure to Cooperative Vulnerability Research When Dealing with Critical Software Stacks
When it comes to critical software stacks (like embedded network libraries or real-time OSs), is it time to change the way we, as researchers, approach vendors when disclosing vulnerabilitie... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0408
ATT&CK Technique Name:FlexiSpy
FlexiSpy can take screenshots of other applications.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0358
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ruler
Ruler can be used to automate the abuse of Outlook Rules to establish persistence.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy can be used to establish persistence using a systemd service.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has run reg add ‘HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList’ /v to hide a newly created user.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0555
ATT&CK Technique Name:CHEMISTGAMES
CHEMISTGAMES has used HTTPS for C2 communication.[2] | secon |
title:botconf2018 In-depth Formbook Malware Analysis
Form-grabber malware are nowadays quite common. They provide simple yet effective methods for stealing infected users’ credentials. They are named thereby since they target HTML forms’ submissions, made by web-browsers. Sometimes, they also provide classical password... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Milan
Milan can establish persistence on a targeted host with scheduled tasks.[109][110] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0400
ATT&CK Technique Name:RobbinHood
RobbinHood stops 181 Windows services on the system before beginning the encryption process.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0550
ATT&CK Technique Name:DoubleAgent
DoubleAgent has deleted or renamed specific files.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit's Get-Keystrokes Exfiltration module can log keystrokes.[139][140] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used Rundll32.exe to execute payloads.[91][92] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 has used tools to compress data before exfilling it.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0677
ATT&CK Technique Name:AADInternals
AADInternals can inject a malicious DLL (PTASpy) into the AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService to backdoor Azure AD Pass-Through Authentication.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA505
TA505 has used PowerShell to download and execute malware and reconnaissance scripts.[221][222][223][224] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0478
ATT&CK Technique Name:EventBot
EventBot has encrypted base64-encoded payload data using RC4 and Curve25519.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0011
During C0011, Transparent Tribe sent malicious attachments via email to student targets in India.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0550
ATT&CK Technique Name:DoubleAgent
DoubleAgent has downloaded additional code to root devices, such as TowelRoot.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0529
ATT&CK Technique Name:CarbonSteal
CarbonSteal can silently accept an incoming phone call.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0500
ATT&CK Technique Name:MCMD
MCMD can Base64 encode output strings prior to sending to C2.[206] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZIRCONIUM
ZIRCONIUM has used multi-stage packers for exploit code.[96] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0431
ATT&CK Technique Name:HotCroissant
HotCroissant has the ability to retrieve a list of services on the infected host.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0536
ATT&CK Technique Name:GPlayed
GPlayed can request device administrator permissions.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0807
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Allowlists
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system host files to specify what external connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0802
ATT&CK Technique Name:Communication Authenticity
Protocols used for control functions should provide authenticity through MAC functions or digital signatures. If not, utilize bump-in-the-wire devices or VPNs to enforce communication authenticity between devices that are not capable of supporting this (e... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0539
ATT&CK Technique Name:Red Alert 2.0
Red Alert 2.0 has used malicious overlays to collect banking credentials.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:cmd
cmd can be used to find information about the operating system.[92] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0405
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exodus
Exodus Two extracts information from Facebook, Facebook Messenger, Gmail, IMO, Skype, Telegram, Viber, WhatsApp, and WeChat.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0599
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kinsing
Kinsing has downloaded additional lateral movement scripts from C2.[245] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1555.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Credentials from Web Browsers
Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has exfiltrated stolen files and data to actor-controlled Blogspot accounts.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0262
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuasarRAT
QuasarRAT can determine the country a victim host is located in.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 harvests credentials using Invoke-Mimikatz or Windows Credentials Editor (WCE).[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carberp
Carberp can start a remote VNC session by downloading a new plugin.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1556
ATT&CK Technique Name:Modify Authentication Process
Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:PlugX
A version of PlugX loads as shellcode within a .NET Framework project using msbuild.exe, presumably to bypass application control techniques.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1547.012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Print Processors
Adversaries may abuse print processors to run malicious DLLs during system boot for persistence and/or privilege escalation. Print processors are DLLs that are loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, during boot. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 has created a scheduled task named "AdobeFlashSync" to establish persistence.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0291
ATT&CK Technique Name:PJApps
PJApps has the capability to collect and leak the victim's location.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:cmd
cmd can be used to copy files to/from a remotely connected external system.[113] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0023
ATT&CK Technique Name:CHOPSTICK
CHOPSTICK is capable of performing remote file transmission.[111] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0348
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cardinal RAT
Cardinal RAT can uninstall itself, including deleting its executable.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Drinik
Drinik can use keylogging to steal user banking credentials.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has exploited or attempted to exploit Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472) and EternalBlue (MS17-010) vulnerabilities.[39][40][41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0674
ATT&CK Technique Name:CharmPower
CharmPower has the ability to use ipconfig to enumerate system network settings.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used the Office Test persistence mechanism within Microsoft Office by adding the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf to execute code.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet infects remote servers via network shares and by infecting WinCC database views with malicious code.[11] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Picking Lockfiles: Attacking & Defending Your Supply Chain
An advantage of open source software (OSS) development is that it enables contributions from the public, adding new features and improvements. This also makes OSS projects a target of supply chain attacks. We present both an offensive and d... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE has been spread via e-mail campaigns utilizing malicious attachments.[162][163] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1137.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Office Test
Adversaries may abuse the Microsoft Office "Office Test" Registry key to obtain persistence on a compromised system. An Office Test Registry location exists that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed every time an Office application is star... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has used multi-stage malware components that inject later stages into separate processes.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0239
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bankshot
Bankshot grabs a user token using WTSQueryUserToken and then creates a process by impersonating a logged-on user.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0535
ATT&CK Technique Name:Golden Cup
Golden Cup can collect the device’s phone number and IMSI.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shark
Shark binaries have been named audioddg.pdb and Winlangdb.pdb in order to appear legitimate.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0453
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pony
Pony has used the Adobe Reader icon for the downloaded file to look more trustworthy.[124] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has likely obtained a list of hosts in the victim environment.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0256
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mosquito
Mosquito establishes persistence under the Registry key HKCU\Software\Run auto_update.[166] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has used named and hijacked scheduled tasks to establish persistence.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has used JavaScript to create a shortcut file in the Startup folder that points to its main backdoor.[21][22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0134
ATT&CK Technique Name:Transparent Tribe
Transparent Tribe can mimic legitimate Windows directories by using the same icons and names.[171] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0947
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Audit the integrity of PLC system and application code functionality, such as the manipulation of standard function blocks (e.g., Organizational Blocks) that manage the execution of application logic programs. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0073
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT19
APT19 used Regsvr32 to bypass application control techniques.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1078.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cloud Accounts
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, servi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has collected valid email addresses that were subsequently used in spearphishing campaigns.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has executed a variety of PowerShell scripts.[126][127][128][129] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 used a ConfuserEx obfuscated BADPOTATO exploit to abuse named-pipe impersonation for local NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM privilege escalation.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0634
ATT&CK Technique Name:EnvyScout
EnvyScout has the ability to proxy execution of malicious files with Rundll32.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0582
ATT&CK Technique Name:LookBack
LookBack uses a modified version of RC4 for data transfer.[83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1516
ATT&CK Technique Name:Input Injection
A malicious application can inject input to the user interface to mimic user interaction through the abuse of Android's accessibility APIs. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM has the ability to remove Registry entries that it created for persistence.[9] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Breaking Parser Logic: Take Your Path Normalization off and Pop 0days Out!
We propose a new exploit technique that brings a whole-new attack surface to defeat path normalization, which is complicated in implementation due to many implicit properties and edge cases. This complication, being under-est... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0485
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mandrake
Mandrake uses foreground persistence to keep a service running. It shows the user a transparent notification to evade detection.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has used Nltest to obtain information about domain controllers.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Putter Panda
A dropper used by Putter Panda installs itself into the ASEP Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with a value named McUpdate.[210] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1058
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prestige
Prestige has leveraged the CryptoPP C++ library to encrypt files on target systems using AES and appended filenames with .enc.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0432
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bread
Bread has utilized JavaScript within WebViews that loaded a URL hosted on a Bread-controlled server which provided functions to run. Bread downloads billing fraud execution steps at runtime.[5] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Engaging the Next Generation of Cybersecurity Professionals: The Power of Security Zines
Security Zines is a unique initiative that uses comics, single-page flyers, and visual presentations to teach about cybersecurity in a fun and interactive way. Our goal is to make learning about infosec, apps... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0576
ATT&CK Technique Name:MegaCortex
MegaCortex can enable SeDebugPrivilege and adjust token privileges.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has used a script to iterate through a list of compromised PoS systems, copy and remove data to a log file, and to bind to events from the submit payment button.[14][15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0448
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rising Sun
Rising Sun can detect the computer name, operating system, and drive information, including drive type, total number of bytes on disk, total number of free bytes on disk, and name of a specified volume.[311] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Use user training as a way to bring awareness and raise suspicion for potentially malicious events and dialog boxes (ex: Office documents prompting for credentials). | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1064
ATT&CK Technique Name:SVCReady
SVCReady can collect the username from an infected host.[185] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.