text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0269
ATT&CK Technique Name:QUADAGENT
QUADAGENT encodes C2 communications with base64.[74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used InstallUtil.exe to execute malicious software.[4] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Skeletons in the App Sandbox: 5+ Ways to Escape
The safety and trust promised by the App Store is in large part due to mandatory sandboxing requirements. The required App Sandbox lets users install apps with abandon and without worry, keeping malicious ones contained. This talk will deep dive into a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0581
ATT&CK Technique Name:IronNetInjector
IronNetInjector can use IronPython scripts to load payloads with the help of a .NET injector.[20] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 CastGuard: Mitigating Type Confusion in C++
Type confusion vulnerabilities offer incredibly powerful primitives to exploit writers. Many traditional types of memory safety issues (bounds violations, temporal safety) can be automatically detected and prevented in some manner, even if it comes at a pe... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0533
ATT&CK Technique Name:SLOTHFULMEDIA
SLOTHFULMEDIA has collected system name, OS version, adapter information, memory usage, and disk information from a victim machine.[337] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 A Framework for Evaluating and Patching the Human Factor in Cybersecurity
Social engineering (SE) attacks have dramatically changed in recent years: They are no longer limited to PCs and they goes way beyond phishing. Despite those changes, current methods for evaluating the resilience of users to ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling can execute binaries through process hollowing.[15] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Look, No Hands! -- The Remote, Interaction-less Attack Surface of the iPhone
There have been rumors of remote vulnerabilities requiring no user interaction being used to attack the iPhone, but limited information is available about the technical aspects of these attacks on modern devices. This prese... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has exploited vulnerabilities in the VBoxDrv.sys driver to obtain kernel mode privileges.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0150
ATT&CK Technique Name:POSHSPY
POSHSPY uses a WMI event subscription to establish persistence.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0099
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT-C-36
APT-C-36 has used a macro function to set scheduled tasks, disguised as those used by Google.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:SeaDuke
Some SeaDuke samples have a module to use pass the ticket with Kerberos for authentication.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0491
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrongPity
StrongPity can identify the IP address of a compromised host.[220] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0335
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbon
Carbon creates several tasks for later execution to continue persistence on the victim’s machine.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0662
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSession
RCSession has the ability to modify a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[58][218] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0241
ATT&CK Technique Name:RATANKBA
RATANKBA performs a reflective DLL injection using a given pid.[59][60] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Can You Roll Your Own SIEM?
At Two Sigma, we had sunk over $1 million in licensing for a popular third-party SIEM product and were paying an additional $200,000 in annual maintenance. We were limited on what data sources we could leverage as our license was restricted to a low daily ingestion rate. ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling can record screen content in AVI format.[5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbanak
Carbanak enables concurrent Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) sessions.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1548.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Setuid and Setgid
An adversary may abuse configurations where an application has the setuid or setgid bits set in order to get code running in a different (and possibly more privileged) user’s context. On Linux or macOS, when the setuid or setgid bits are set for an application... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET has dropped a malicious applet into an app's .../Contents/MacOS/ folder of a previously launched app to bypass Gatekeeper's security checks on first launch apps (prior to macOS 13).[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1563.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:RDP Hijacking
Adversaries may hijack a legitimate user’s remote desktop session to move laterally within an environment. Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface o... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:EXOTIC LILY
EXOTIC LILY has searched for information on targeted individuals on business databases including RocketReach and CrunchBase.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0668
ATT&CK Technique Name:TinyTurla
TinyTurla can go through a list of C2 server IPs and will try to register with each until one responds.[47] | secon |
title:botconf2022 Qakbot malware family evolution
The goal of this presentation is to study and analyse the evolution of the code and the capabilities of Qakbot. In particular, we’ll identify new features being added over time, features that remain stable, and features that are removed over the observation period. The ... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 Keynote - Our Kryptonite: A Defendable Internet
Five years ago, Thomas Dullien (aka Halvar Flake) presented a keynote at Blackhat Asia that grabbed me like no other. His talk, titled “Why We Are Not Building a Defendable Internet” explored the economics and incentive structures in IT security: Who i... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1078.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Domain Accounts
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are c... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0454
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cadelspy
Cadelspy has the ability to steal information about printers and the documents sent to printers.[12] | secon |
title:botconf2016 Analysis of Free Movies and Series Websites Guided by Users Search Terms
Cybercriminals employ websites to infect victims with malware using techniques such as drive-by-download or social engineering. On the other hand, several approaches (e.g. client honeypots) exist to detect malicious websites. Non... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0947
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Perform integrity checks of firmware before uploading it on a device. Utilize cryptographic hashes to verify the firmware has not been tampered with by comparing it to a trusted hash of the firmware. This could be from trusted data sources (e.g., vendor site) or through a thi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0163
ATT&CK Technique Name:Janicab
Janicab used a cron job for persistence on Mac devices.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has prepended a space to all of their terminal commands to operate without leaving traces in the HISTCONTROL environment.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can execute a PowerShell script received from C2.[31][32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0372
ATT&CK Technique Name:LockerGoga
LockerGoga has been signed with stolen certificates in order to make it look more legitimate.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can sort and collect specific documents as well as generate a list of all files on a newly inserted drive and store them in an encrypted file.[19][20] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Hunting Invisible Salamanders: Cryptographic (in)Security with Attacker-Controlled Keys
<span style="font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-size:
10pt;">Deploying new cryptography often means using existing building blocks in new ways. A prime example is authenticated encryption (AE). Until recently... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0502
ATT&CK Technique Name:Drovorub
Drovorub can use a port forwarding rule on its agent module to relay network traffic through the client module to a remote host on the same network.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Mitigation of some variants of this technique could be achieved through the use of stateful firewalls, depending upon how it is implemented. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Lessons and Lulz: The 4th Annual Black Hat USA NOC Report
Back with another year of soul crushing statistics, the Black Hat NOC team will be sharing all of the data that keeps us equally puzzled, and entertained, year after year. We'll let you know all the tools and techniques we're using to set up,... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0668
ATT&CK Technique Name:TinyTurla
TinyTurla can save its configuration parameters in the Registry.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot's second stage DLL has set a timer using "timeSetEvent" to schedule its next execution.[5] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Action Bias and the Two Most Dangerous Words in Cybersecurity
Most cybersecurity professionals acknowledge that achieving perfect security is impossible. Yet, they nobly strive for perfection as the ultimate goal and feel loss, failure, and regret when incidents inevitably occur. Human instinct, esp... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1046
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowGoop
PowGoop can use a modified Base64 encoding mechanism to send data to and from the C2 server.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate can collected the IP address and domain name of a compromised host.[224] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has stored obfuscated JavaScript code in an image file named temp.jpg.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1061
ATT&CK Technique Name:AbstractEmu
AbstractEmu can use rooting exploits to silently give itself permissions or install additional malware.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Ensure that all wired and/or wireless traffic is encrypted appropriately. Use best practices for authentication protocols, such as Kerberos, and ensure web traffic that may contain credentials is protected by SSL/TLS. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0418
ATT&CK Technique Name:ViceLeaker
ViceLeaker can take photos from both the front and back cameras.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1053.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cron
Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The cron utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The crontab file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and th... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 Debug Resurrection on Nordic nRF52 Series
Nordic nRF52 System-on-Chips (SoCs) are unquestionably dominating the IoT dedicated platforms market today, especially for short range communications (BLE, Zigbee…) and asset tracking segments.The entire family consists of six different nRF52 platforms, all... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0257
ATT&CK Technique Name:VERMIN
VERMIN is obfuscated using the obfuscation tool called ConfuserEx.[347] | secon |
title:botconf2020 Your *aaS is on fire, or how threat actors (ab)use cloud providers
In order to make a successful espionage campaign we need a couple things, one of them is infrastructure for both infection and exfiltration. Nowadays everyone was, is or will be moving their infra to the cloud so why not APTs?. Why set... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEMP.Veles
TEMP.Veles utilized remote desktop protocol (RDP) jump boxes to move into the ICS environment. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium can drop itself in C:\Windows\System32\spool\prtprocs\x64\winprint.dll to be loaded automatically by the spoolsv Windows service.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.[92][93] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Squirrelwaffle
Squirrelwaffle has been distributed via malicious Microsoft Office documents within spam emails.[210] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet has the ability to generate new C2 domains.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1061
ATT&CK Technique Name:AbstractEmu
AbstractEmu can intercept SMS messages containing two factor authentication codes.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0073
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT19
APT19 launched an HTTP malware variant and a Port 22 malware variant using a legitimate executable that loaded the malicious DLL.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0801
ATT&CK Technique Name:Monitor Process State
Adversaries may gather information about the physical process state. This information may be used to gain more information about the process itself or used as a trigger for malicious actions. The sources of process state information may vary such as, OPC tags,... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
A keylogging tool used by APT3 gathers network information from the victim, including the MAC address, IP address, WINS, DHCP server, and gateway.[16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0539
ATT&CK Technique Name:Red Alert 2.0
Red Alert 2.0 can collect the device’s call log.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0242
ATT&CK Technique Name:SynAck
SynAck checks its directory location in an attempt to avoid launching in a sandbox.[294][295] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has used rundll32.exe to execute binaries, scripts, and Control Panel Item files and to execute code via proxy to avoid triggering security tools.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0079
ATT&CK Technique Name:MobileOrder
MobileOrder has a command to upload to its C2 server victim browser bookmarks.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1072
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer2
Industroyer2 has the ability to cyclically enumerate running processes such as PServiceControl.exe, PService_PDD.exe, and other targets supplied through a hardcoded configuration.[130] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Return to Sender - Detecting Kernel Exploits with eBPF
One of the fastest growing subsystems in the Linux Kernel is, without any doubt, eBPF (extended Berkeley Packet Filter). Although eBPF initially targeted network monitoring and filtering use cases, its capabilities have been broadened over time.... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0345
ATT&CK Technique Name:Seasalt
Seasalt uses cmd.exe to create a reverse shell on the infected endpoint.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0538
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crutch
Crutch has established persistence with a scheduled task impersonating the Outlook item finder.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used a custom protocol for command and control.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0072
ATT&CK Technique Name:OwaAuth
OwaAuth is a Web shell that appears to be exclusively used by Threat Group-3390. It is installed as an ISAPI filter on Exchange servers and shares characteristics with the China Chopper Web shell.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1043
ATT&CK Technique Name:ccf32
ccf32 has copied files to a remote machine infected with Chinoxy or another backdoor.[3] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Legal Landmines: How Law and Policy are Rapidly Shaping Information Security
The Internet was a much different place 25 years ago. Technology, and the free flow of information has rapidly changed the world forever. Along with that change came the frightening prospect of losing all of our privacy, a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Developer Guidance
Enable the Hardened Runtime capability when developing applications. Do not include the com.apple.security.get-task-allow entitlement with the value set to any variation of true. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1074.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remote Data Staging
Adversaries may stage data collected from multiple systems in a central location or directory on one system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Archive Collected Data. Interactive com... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 "We Are About to Land": How CloudDragon Turns a Nightmare Into Reality
On October 27th, 2020, the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency of the United States (CISA) jointly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Defense Cyber National Mission Force (CN... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0526
ATT&CK Technique Name:KGH_SPY
KGH_SPY can collect credentials from the Windows Credential Manager.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has used Registry Run keys to establish automatic execution at system startup.[270][271] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0806
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Force I/O
Adversaries may repetitively or successively change I/O point values to perform an action. Brute Force I/O may be achieved by changing either a range of I/O point values or a single point value repeatedly to manipulate a process function. The adversary's goal and th... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
During execution, Threat Group-3390 malware deobfuscates and decompresses code that was encoded with Metasploit’s shikata_ga_nai encoder as well as compressed with LZNT1 compression.[230] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aoqin Dragon
Aoqin Dragon has used a dropper that employs a worm infection strategy using a removable device to breach a secure network environment.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0610
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideTwist
SideTwist has primarily used port 443 for C2 but can use port 80 as a fallback.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has used rundll32.exe to execute MiniDump from comsvcs.dll when dumping LSASS memory.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1491
ATT&CK Technique Name:Defacement
Adversaries may modify visual content available internally or externally to an enterprise network, thus affecting the integrity of the original content. Reasons for Defacement include delivering messaging, intimidation, or claiming (possibly false) credit for an intrusio... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0543
ATT&CK Technique Name:Spark
Spark has checked the results of the GetKeyboardLayoutList and the language name returned by GetLocaleInfoA to make sure they contain the word "Arabic" before executing.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1049
ATT&CK Technique Name:Antivirus/Antimalware
Anti-virus can also automatically quarantine suspicious files. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0396
ATT&CK Technique Name:EvilBunny
EvilBunny has used various API calls as part of its checks to see if the malware is running in a sandbox.[75] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crimson
Crimson can spread across systems by infecting removable media.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEMP.Veles
TEMP.Veles used timestomping to modify the $STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute on tools.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cleaver
Cleaver has used custom tools to facilitate ARP cache poisoning.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1102.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:One-Way Communication
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to a compromised system without receiving return output over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to hos... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Elise
Elise executes systeminfo after initial communication is made to the remote server.[123] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole avoids analysis by encrypting all strings, internal files, configuration data and by using a custom executable format.[168][169] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Sleight of ARM: Demystifying Intel Houdini
ARM is taking over the computer industry. In recent years, we have seen some of the major players in the industry switch from x86-based processors to ARM processors. Most notable is Apple, which has supported the transition to ARM from x86 with a binary tr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
On Android 11 and up, users are not prompted with the option to select "Allow all the time" and must navigate to the settings page to manually select this option. On iOS 14 and up, users can select whether to provide Precise Location for each installed applica... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1055.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Thread Execution Hijacking
Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Thread Execution Hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live p... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit contains a collection of CodeExecution modules that inject code (DLL, shellcode) into a process.[52][53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0445
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRatReporter
ShimRatReporter gathered the local privileges for the infected host.[6] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.