Dataset Viewer
Auto-converted to Parquet Duplicate
sentence
stringlengths
1
13.5k
labels
listlengths
0
15
doc_title
stringclasses
84 values
Update: Due to naming convention consistency in the industry, CrowdStrike is now calling this variant of Petya – NotPetya.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
Executive Summary This technical analysis provides an in-depth analysis and review of NotPetya.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
For more information on CrowdStrike’s proactive protection features see the earlier CrowdStrike blog on how Falcon Endpoint Protection prevents the NotPetya attack.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
NotPetya combines ransomware with the ability to propagate itself across a network.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
It spreads to Microsoft Windows machines using several propagation methods, including the EternalBlue exploit for the CVE-2017-0144 vulnerability in the SMB service.
[ "T1210" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
This is the same vulnerability Microsoft reported on in MS17-010, which was exploited so successfully in the recent WannaCry ransomware outbreak.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
Once a machine is infected by NotPetya, a series of malicious activities ensue, including the following: Dropped files Process hashes and process privilege checks Credential theft Token impersonation Malware propagation Network node enumeration SMB copy and remote execution SMBv1 exploitation via EternalBlue UNC write ...
[ "T1570" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
Do NOT pay the ransom.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
No files will be recovered if the ransom is paid.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
Dropped Files
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
The following files are dropped by the malware:
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
Ransomware DLL C:\windows\perfc.dat
[ "T1140" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
The malware decompresses its resource named 0x3 of type RT_RCDATA, and writes the contents to C:\Windows\dllhost.dat.
[ "T1140" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
Analysis of dllhost.dat shows that it is a copy of the PsExec utility, which is a telnet replacement that allows execution of processes on other systems.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
C:\windows\dllhost.dat Credential theft module Written as a .tmp file to the temp directory Ransomware splash and warning files Command Line Execution
[ "T1059.003", "T1218.011" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
The malware is a DLL that is launched using rundll32.exe: “C:\Windows\perfc.dat”,#1 18
[ "T1218.011" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
[“username1:pass1” “username2:pass2” … ] Perfc.dat is the malware name.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
It is executed with the following arguments: #1 → This is the ordinal number of the exported function 18 → Minutes used to determine how long to wait for the scheduled shutdown “username:pass” → Credentials to be used to propagate the malware on the network.
[ "T1057" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
Process Hashes and Process Privilege Checks Upon being loaded, the malware starts a subroutine that hashes each running process on the system, and compares each hash with 3 hardcoded hashes: 0x6403527E → avp.exe associated with Kaspersky AV 0x23214B44 → ns.exe associated with Norton Security 0x651B3005 → ccSvcHst.exe a...
[ "T1057", "T1518.001" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
= 0xFF → none PROC_FLAG
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
= 0xFB → ns.exe or ccSvcHst.exe PROC_FLAG
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
= 0xF7 → avp.exe PROC_FLAG
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
= 0xF3 → avp.exe and either ns.exe and/or ccSvcHst.exe
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
In addition, within the same subroutine, the malware attempts to gain various levels of privilege.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
It uses a global flag PRIV_FLAG to track the extent of privileges the malware is able to obtain.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
PRIV_FLAG = 0 → no privileges PRIV_FLAG = 1 → SeShutdownPrivilege.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
Ability to shutdown the system. PRIV_FLAG
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
= 2 → SeDebugPrivilege.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
Required to either debug or adjust memory for a process owned by another account PRIV_FLAG
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
= 3 → SeShutdownPrivilege & SeDebugPrivilege PRIV_FLAG
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
= 4 → SeTcbPrivilege.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
Process can assume the identity of any user PRIV_FLAG
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
= 5 → SeShutdownPrivilege & SeTcbPrivilege PRIV_FLAG
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
= 6 → SeDebugPrivilege & SeTcbPrivilege PRIV_FLAG
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
= 7 → SeShutdownPrivilege & SeDebugPrivilege & SeTcbPrivilege These 2 flags have a considerable impact on the execution of the malware.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
The credential theft module is dropped if the malware has one of the following privileges: (It should be noted that the PROC_FLAG can any of the possible values) SeDebugPrivilege SeShutdownPrivilege & SeDebugPrivilege SeDebugPrivilege & SeTcbPrivilege SeShutdownPrivilege & SeDebugPrivilege & SeTcbPrivilege The MBR over...
[ "T1106" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
As an argument to the DLL (see command line execution section) Communication via a named pipe from the credential theft module To create a named pipe, a random GUID is generated, and the credential theft module is launched as a child process with the named pipe as an argument.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
Communication is constantly monitored by a thread that invokes PeekNamedPipe to copy data from the pipe.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
Credential Theft Module Depending on the OS architecture, the malware will either drop a 32-bit version or a 64-bit version of the credential theft module.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
The malware decompresses a resource (0x1 if the OS is x86, 0x2 if the OS is x64) of type RT_RCDATA using zlib 1.2.8 compression.
[ "T1140" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
The resulting contents are then written to a randomly named .tmp file in the %TEMP% folder.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
Upon being loaded, the module initializes and sets up a CNG provider.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
It calls OpenProcess on lsass.exe with access flag set to VM_READ, and looks for the modules wdigest.dll and lsasrv.dll loaded in the lsass.exe process.
[ "T1003.001" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
wdigest.dll → Digest authentication security package.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
Used to: Authenticate client access with integrity protection to a directory service using LDAP Authenticate client access using SASL Authenticate client access to a web site lsasrv.dll → Authentication security component.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
The lsasrv.dll is a LSA (Local Security Authority)
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
Server service, which both enforces security policies and acts as the security package manager for the LSA This file extracts credentials from LSASS similar to Mimikatz.
[ "T1003.001" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
The extracted credentials are sent to the NotPetya process via the named pipe.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
Token Impersonation Impersonation occurs only if the process has the required privilege level to assume the identity of another user.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
OpenProcessToken and GetTokenInformation is used to grab the TokenSessionId for terminal service sessions.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
Each token is duplicated and the new handle is saved to a list.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
For each of the duplicated tokens, a new thread is created in suspended mode.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
The impersonated token replaces the current thread token with SetThreadToken and the thread is resumed.
[ "T1570" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
This thread is then used to execute the SMB copy and remote execution section as the impersonated user.
[ "T1570" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
Malware Propagation The following methods are used to spread across a network: Network node enumeration SMB copy and remote execution SMB exploitation via EternalBlue Network Node Enumeration
[ "T1210", "T1570" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
The malware attempts to gather a list of known TCP endpoints and IP addresses to check whether it can connect to the IPs via SMB ports 445 and 139.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
The malware creates a thread for core work that invokes the following API’s: GetExtendedTcpTable to retrieve a list of TCP endpoints GetIpNetTable to retrieve the IPv4 to physical address mapping table → Gets a MIB_IPNETTABLE structure NetServerEnum to get a list of servers on the domain with the following parameters: ...
[ "T1082", "T1106" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
The API returns a SERVER_INFO_101 structure that contains an sv101_type field.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
The malware checks to see if the value of that field is SV_TYPE_SERVER_NT, SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_CTRL, or a SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_BAKCTRL.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
If the field is either of the values mentioned, the following takes place: DhcpEnumSubnets to get an enumerated list of subnets on the server DhcpGetSubnetInfo on each subnet on the list to get the DHCP_SUBNET_STATE value to see whether the DhcpSubnetEnabled flag is set DhcpEnumSubnetClients on each subnet with the afo...
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
This function returns an enumerated list of clients associated with the IP addresses in each subnet.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
For each client, the following occurs: Obtains the IP address from the ClientIpAddress field in the DHCP_CLIENT_INFO structure Attempts to establish a socket connection to the client IPs over ports 445 and 139 (both associated with SMB) SMB Copy and Remote Execution There are two approaches to using valid credentials t...
[ "T1016", "T1078", "T1210", "T1570" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
SMBv1 Exploitation via EternalBlue NotPetya has the capability to exploit SMBv1 via the well known EternalBlue exploit.
[ "T1210" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
Once the exploit is launched, the shellcode will end up writing the file and executing the malware on the target machine.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
UNC Write to Admin$ WNetAddConnection2W is used to connect to a server using the default credentials for the impersonated token, and an attempt is made to write the file to: \\server-name\\admin$\\malware-name UNC write to admin$ CreateFile and WriteFile are used to write the file to the remote server.
[ "T1078", "T1106" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
The typical filename is perfc.dat.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
Remote Execution Remote execution relies on either PsExec or WMIC.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
DLLHost.dat (psexec) The following command will execute on the remote machine: C:\Windows\dllhost.dat \\<target host> -accepteula -s
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
-d C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe “C:\Windows\perfc.dat”,#1 18 “<additional creds for arguments>”” -accepteula → This suppresses the display of the license dialog -s
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
→ run as system -d → do not wait for process termination -u → username (not shown here) -p → password (not shown here) WMIC
[ "T1047" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
The following command will execute on the remote as the specified user: C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmic.exe /node:”<server name>” /user:”<username>”
[ "T1047" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
/password:”<password>” process call create “C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe \”C:\Windows\perfc.dat\” #1 19 “<additional creds for arguments>”” /node → specify server name /user → username /password → password Process call create → execute remote command Once the command line arguments are generated, either CreateProce...
[ "T1059.003", "T1106" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
MBR Ransomware Physical Drive Manipulation The malware calls DeviceIOControl on //./PhysicalDrive0 with IOCTL_DISK_GET_PARTITION_INFO_EX control code to get PARTITION_INFORMATION_EX structure.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
The structure represents the physical location on the disk.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
The malware takes the following steps to modify the MBR: Reads the MBR and encodes it using XOR encoding with key 0x7 The first sector is overwritten by a custom boot loader
[ "T1027" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
The next 31 sectors are then overwritten by 16-bit code that is responsible for encrypting the MFT using Salsa20 encryption Sector 32 contains the following: CRYPT_FLAG
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
–> Initially, this byte is set to 0, which denotes that the MFT has not been encrypted.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
The 16-bit code uses this flag to determine whether to infect the MFT A random array of bytes 0x20 in length is generated using CryptGenRangom.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
This is used as the Salsa20 encryption key.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
In addition, another random array of bytes 0x8 in length is created using the same API call; this is used as the nonce for the encryption.
[ "T1106" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
The malware also writes the hardcoded string 1Mz7153HMuxXTuR2R1t78mGSdzaAtNbBWX in the sector.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
This is the Bitcoin wallet that is later displayed on the splash screen.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
A random blob is created by CryptGenRandom 0x3C bytes in length.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
This is presented as the user’s personal installation key on the splash screen.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
It should be noted that this personal installation key is random in nature; and therefore there is no way to trace it back to the victim machine Sector 33 contains all 0x7’s.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
This is used as an integrity check for the decryption process.
[ "T1140" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
Sector 34 contains the original MBR that was encoded by XORing with 0x7 MFT Encryption As mentioned previously, the malware has its own custom boot loader once the machine has been infected and rebooted.
[ "T1027" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
This code within the MBR is responsible for loading the code which encrypts the MFT using Salsa20, displays the ransom note, and accepts the private key.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
It should be noted that the code is a low-level 16-bit code that uses BIOS interrupt calls to display text to the user, accept user input, and read/write to various sectors.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
Since this code is run outside of the OS, its capabilities are quite limited.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
However, its main purpose is to encrypt or decrypt the MFT, which it is able to accomplish using Salsa20.
[ "T1140" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
The following are the BIOS interrupt services used throughout the code: int 0x13 – read/write sectors on disk int 0x10 – display text int 0x19 – cause disk reboot int 0x16 – obtain keystrokes, and status of keyboard buffer The code first checks the CRYPT_FLAG in sector 32 to see whether it has been set to 1 (encrypted)...
[ "T1056.001" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
The first time a machine is infected, the CRYPT_FLAG is always set to 0 (not encrypted), which leads the malware to invoke a subroutine that displays the following decoy check disk screen to the user.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
In reality, the subroutine performs the following functions: Sets the CRYPT_FLAG to 1.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
This is performed before any encryption actually takes place Encrypts the contents of Sector 33 using the Salsa20 cipher.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
Shortly after the encryption, the buffer containing the Salsa20 key is overwritten; therefore, the key is destroyed Encrypts the MFT and stores
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
a counter of MFT records that are encrypted Causes a disk reboot Upon a second reboot, the NotPetya ransomware note is displayed as shown below:
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
In addition, it initiates a loop that waits for the user to input the purchased key.
[]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
Once the key is entered, the code attempts to decrypt the contents of Sector 33, which were previously encrypted using Salsa20 key.
[ "T1027", "T1140" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
Once the sector is decrypted, the code reads all 512 bytes of the sector and ensures that they all equal 0x7.
[ "T1140" ]
NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft
End of preview. Expand in Data Studio

TRAM ATT&CK Multi-Label (cleaned, with leak-free splits)

Sentence-level multi-label mapping of cyber threat intelligence prose to MITRE ATT&CK technique IDs. Derived from MITRE CTID's TRAM corpus, deduplicated and republished with two split schemes so that leakage can be measured rather than assumed.

Everything here is regenerated by python scripts/01_build_dataset.py. No row was edited by hand.

Why this exists

The upstream corpus contains 19,178 sentences drawn from only 151 source reports. Threat reports repeat phrasing heavily, both within a report and across reports covering the same campaign, so the sentence-level random split that most work uses puts near-identical prose on both sides of the evaluation.

This release ships both splits and expects you to report both:

Config Construction Use it for
document No source report appears in more than one split Reporting. The honest number.
random Naive sentence-level shuffle Comparison against prior work that split this way

Construction

Step Effect
Raw sentences 19,178
Strip scraped title: … url: … headers 7 rows became empty and were dropped
Deduplicate (case/punctuation-insensitive) 415 duplicate groups, 714 rows removed
of which appeared in more than one document 370
Merge labels across duplicates 12 labels recovered that a naive drop would have lost
Drop techniques in <3 documents T1557.001 only (1 document), 7 label instances
Final 18,437 sentences · 4,024 labelled (21.8%) · 49 techniques · 151 documents

Deduplication takes the union of labels across duplicates. Two copies of one sentence annotated [T1027] and [T1027, T1140] are one sentence annotated inconsistently; keeping the union recovers the label instead of discarding it with the duplicate row. The surviving row keeps the first document it appeared in, so no sentence can span two documents.

T1557.001 is dropped because it appears in exactly one document. It cannot be placed in train and test, so it is either untrainable or unevaluable. Dropping it and saying so beats reporting F1 = 0.00 for it.

Splits

Config Split Sentences Labelled
document train 11,668 2,684
document dev 3,134 631
document test 3,635 709
random train 12,905 2,837
random dev 2,765 610
random test 2,767 577

The document split is built by group-aware multi-label stratification in two phases. A plain greedy pass fails here: with a 70/15/15 target the train split always shows the largest absolute label deficit, so it absorbs every document containing a rare technique and the test set ends up with none. Phase 1 therefore reserves one document per technique for each split, rarest technique first; phase 2 packs the remainder using deficit normalised by split size.

Consequences, both worth knowing:

  • All 49 techniques appear in all three document splits. The naive random split does not manage this. T1072 has zero dev examples, so its threshold cannot be tuned.
  • Coverage seeding costs some size balance. The document split lands at roughly 63/17/20 rather than 70/15/15. Larger dev and test sets make the estimates more stable, so this was accepted rather than corrected.

Fields

{
  "sentence":  "The dropper base64-encodes its configuration before writing it to disk.",
  "labels":    ["T1027"],
  "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat ..."
}

labels is empty for 78.2% of rows. These are real negatives and should be kept. A detector that fires on every sentence of a threat report is useless to an analyst.

Known limitations

  • 50 techniques, not the full ATT&CK matrix. The upstream corpus covers the 49 retained here. A technique outside that set will never be predicted.
  • Heavy long tail. T1027 has 678 instances; the rarest retained techniques have roughly 20. Macro-averaged metrics are the meaningful ones.
  • Single-sentence context. Labels were assigned per sentence, so techniques only inferable from surrounding paragraphs are under-represented.
  • 151 documents is not many. Even the document split is one draw from a small pool; treat differences of a point or two as noise.
  • Annotation is not exhaustive. Some unlabelled sentences do describe techniques. Absolute recall is therefore pessimistic.

Licence and provenance

Derived from the TRAM corpus, released by the MITRE Center for Threat-Informed Defense under Apache-2.0; this derivative keeps Apache-2.0. The underlying sentences are fragments of publicly-published vendor threat reports as redistributed by MITRE CTID.

Technique names come from MITRE ATT&CK STIX data, used under the ATT&CK Terms of Use. ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.

AnnoCTR was deliberately not merged in. It is CC-BY-SA 4.0, and share-alike would relicense this entire dataset and restrict downstream reuse. It remains a good candidate for a separately-licensed evaluation split.

Citation

@misc{tram_attack_multilabel_clean,
  title  = {TRAM ATT&CK Multi-Label (cleaned, leak-free splits)},
  author = {Varol Cagdas Tok},
  year   = {2026},
  url    = {https://huggingface.co/datasets/ctokx/tram-attack-multilabel-clean},
  note   = {Derived from MITRE CTID TRAM, Apache-2.0}
}

Please also cite the upstream corpus:

@misc{tram,
  title        = {TRAM: Threat Report ATT&CK Mapper},
  author       = {{MITRE Center for Threat-Informed Defense}},
  howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/tram}}
}
Downloads last month
29

Models trained or fine-tuned on ctokx/tram-attack-multilabel-clean