sentence stringlengths 1 13.5k | labels listlengths 0 15 | doc_title stringclasses 84
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If this is successful, the CRYPT_FLAG is set to 2 (decrypted), and the same key is used to decrypt the MFT. | [
"T1140"
] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
Furthermore, the original encoded MBR in Sector 34 is also decoded, and placed back into Sector 0, as shown below. | [
"T1027",
"T1140"
] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
File Encryption Along with MFT encryption | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
, the malware also targets certain files. | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
The following table contains the file extensions that are targeted: .3ds .7z .accdb .ai .asp .aspx .avhd .back .bak | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
.c .cfg .conf .cpp .cs .ctl | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
.dbf .disk .djvu .doc .docx. | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
.dwg | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
.eml .fdb .gz | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
.h .hdd .kdbx .mail .mdb .msg .nrg .ora | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
.ost .ova | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
.ovf | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
.pdf .php | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
.pmf .ppt .pptx .pst .pvi .py .pyc | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
.rar | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
.rtf | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
.sln .sql .tar .vbox .vbs .vcb .vdi .vfd .vmc | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
.vmdk .vmsd .vmx .vsdx .vsv .work .xls .xlsx .xvd .zip | [
"T1083"
] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
The malware only targets fixed drives on the system. | [
"T1083"
] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
It invokes CryptGenKey to generate an AES-128 key. | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
This key is used to encrypt all the files on the system. | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
The malware will first start enumerating files in the directory it is being executed from. | [
"T1083"
] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
The following steps are taken to encrypt the individual files: Gets file handle Gets the file size Creates a file mapping of the file with PAGE_READWRITE protection Maps the view of the file mapping with FILE_MAP_WRITE | FILE_MAP_READ access Calls CryptEncrypt to encrypt the contents of the file using AES-128 Once the ... | [
"T1106"
] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
The “personal installation key” is the result of the AES-128 key encrypted with an RSA-2048 key, which is included in the malware. | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
Once the README.txt is dropped on disk, CryptDestroyKey is invoked to release the handle to the key. | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
The following message is then displayed to the user: System Shutdown NotPetya employs a few methods to ensure that the system reboots so that the boot loader loads the MFT encryptor code. | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
It spawns cmd.exe with the following commandline: | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
/c schtasks /Create/SC once /TN “” /TR “C:\Windows\system32\shutdown.exe /r /f” | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
/ST <HH:MM> | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
The <HH:MM> value depends on the second parameter when being invoked by rundll32.exe. | [
"T1218.011"
] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
If the second parameter is 30, the scheduled task will trigger 30 minutes after the malware execution. | [
"T1053.005"
] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
However, if no second parameter is provided, the scheduled task is set to trigger 60 minutes after the malware execution by default. | [
"T1053.005"
] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
Explanation of schtask parameters: /TN → taskname (not providing a custom name forces Windows to provide a random GUID as a name) /TR → taskrun. | [
"T1053.005"
] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
Path and filename of the task to be run /ST → starttime Explanation of shutdown.exe parameters: | [
"T1053.005"
] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
/r → reboot after shutdown /f → forces running applications to close In addition, it also invokes the API NTRaiseHardError. | [
"T1106"
] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
This is an undocumented Windows API that causes the system to reboot. | [
"T1106"
] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
If the API fails to execute, the malware calls InitiateSystemShutdownExW with the flag set to reboot the machine. | [
"T1106"
] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
Anti-Forensics The malware employs anti-forensics practices throughout its execution. | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
For instance, immediately after execution, it loads itself in memory, and deletes itself from the disk. | [
"T1027"
] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
However, before deletion, it zeros out the file contents on disk to ensure that the malware cannot be recovered via disk forensics. | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
The malware uses a similar approach for the credential theft module it drops as well. | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
Once the contents of its resource section are decompressed and written to disk, it zeros out the memory buffer containing the decompressed PE files. | [
"T1140"
] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
Furthermore, once execution of those files take place, it zeroes out its file contents before deleting from the disk. | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
The malware also spawns cmd.exe to execute the following command: | [
"T1059.003"
] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
/c wevtutil cl Setup & wevtutil cl System & wevtutil cl Security & wevtutil cl Application & fsutil usn deletejournal /D | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
C:” This command is responsible for clearing out the following logs: Setup logs: contains events related to application setup System logs: contains events pertaining to system components Security logs: contains events such as logon attempts, file creation, access, deletion Application logs: contains events logged by ap... | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
Appendix A: Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
Below is the relevant data for the files analyzed. | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
File: Dropper / Payload Size: 362360 MD5: 71B6A493388E7D0B40C83CE903BC6B04 SHA256: 027CC450EF5F8C5F653329641EC1FED91F694E0D229928963B30F6B0D7D3A745 Compiled: Sun, Jun 18 2017, 7:14:36 – 32-bit DLL Signature Corrupt Subject: Microsoft Corporation Issuer: Microsoft Code Signing PCA | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
File:Credential Theft Module 32-bit Size: 47616 MD5: 2813D34F6197EB4DF42C886EC7F234A1 SHA256: EAE9771E2EEB7EA3C6059485DA39E77B8C0C369232F01334954FBAC1C186C998 Compiled: Tue, Jun 6 2017, 13:31:37 – 32-bit EXE File:Credential Theft Module 64-bit Size: 57344 MD5: 7E37AB34ECDCC3E77E24522DDFD4852D SHA256: 02ef73bd2458627ed7... | [] | NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft |
Earth Zhulong: | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/b/earth-zhulong-familiar-patterns-target-southeast-asian-firms.html Cyber Crime Earth Zhulong: | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms In 2022, we discovered Earth Zhulong, a hacking group that has been targeting Asian firms similar to another well-known threat actor. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
In this article, we unravel their new tactics, techniques and procedures that they apply on their misdeeds. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
By: Ted Lee February 08, 2023Read time: ( words) Save to Folio Subscribe Introduction In 2022, we discovered a hacking group that has been targeting telecom, technology, and media sectors in Southeast Asia since 2020. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
We track this particular group as Earth Zhulong. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
We believe that Earth Zhulong is likely related to the Chinese-linked hacking group 1937CN based on similar code in the custom shellcode loader and victimology. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
In this post, we’ll introduce Earth Zhulong’s new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in the recent campaign and the evolution of their custom shellcode loader, “ShellFang”. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
Through the TTPs, we see that they are sophisticated and meticulous as malicious actors. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
They adopt multiple approaches to obfuscate their tools and eliminate their footprint after finishing the operation. | [
"T1027"
] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
As a result, we have exerted greater effort to hunt down and analyze their tools to fully understand the attack scenario. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
In addition, we have verified three different variants of ShellFang were used from 2020 to 2022. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
The latest variant demonstrates that threat actors have adopted more obfuscation techniques, including abusing exception mechanisms to obfuscate the execution flow of programs and Windows API hashing. | [
"T1027",
"T1106"
] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
In early 2022, we further discovered that Earth Zhulong abused group policy objects (GPO) to install loaders and launch Cobalt Strike on their target hosts. | [
"T1484.001"
] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
Several hack tools were also found on the infected hosts, including tunneling, port scanning, a Go-lang based backdoor and an information stealer used to harvest internal information. | [
"T1005"
] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
Compared to old variants, code structure in the latest variant is dramatically different and there are few shared features between old and the latest variant. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
However, we found the relationship during the long-term investigation and finally correlated old variants with the latest one. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
We believe the relationship found in this research could bring this notorious hacking group back to public sight and the findings here will be helpful to future research on hacker groups which are active in Southeast Asia. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
Initial Access – Lure document Back in 2020, through the command and control (C&C) domain observed in our investigation, we found a lure document with a malicious macro. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
Once the victim opens the document, the embedded macro will be executed, injecting the shellcode into rundll32.exe. | [
"T1055",
"T1204.002"
] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
We have identified the embedded shellcode as a Cobalt Strike shellcode which will be used to build connection to a remote hacking machine. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
We believe this lure document is one of the approaches used by the threat actors to compromise their targets. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
Figure 1. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
Screenshot of decoy document Figure 2. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
Malicious macro embedded in the document Figure 3. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
Shellcode which is used for code injection. | [
"T1055",
"T1484.001"
] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
Propagation through GPO In early 2022, we further observed new TTPs used to spread malware in the victim’s environment. | [
"T1484.001"
] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
After getting access to the internal network, they perform domain exploration using SharpHound. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
Once they successfully compromise the domain controller, they will submit immediate tasks to the hosts in the domain through GPO as seen in Figure 5, As the hosts receive the task through GPO, they will run a PowerShell script named “co.ps1” and create scheduled tasks for persistence. Figure 4. | [
"T1053.005",
"T1484.001"
] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
Overview of attack scenario Figure 5. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
PowerShell script to create a ImmediateTask through GPO | [
"T1053.005"
] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
As shown in Figure 6, threat actors use multi-layered AES encryption and base64 encoding to obfuscate “co.ps1”. | [
"T1027"
] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
Heavy obfuscation in a simple but useful anti-analysis approach makes it difficult for security products to detect their scripts. | [
"T1027"
] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
After clearing the obfuscation, we found the script is used to deploy malware components (win.exe, gm.dll, and lengs.medil.xml) on the infected machine. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
Figure 6. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
Heavily obfuscated PowerShell script Figure 7. | [
"T1027"
] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
Cleaned content of co.ps1 Earth Zhulong adopted DLL sideloading techniques to run their malware. | [
"T1574.002"
] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
“win.exe” is a renamed GoogleToolbarNotifier application. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
The malicious DLL “gtn.dll”, which we named as “ShellFang”, loads when a legitimate executable is launched. | [
"T1574.002"
] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
It then calls the export function, “Go”, to start the loading procedure of the encrypted payload to decrypt the payload called “lengs.medil.xml”, which is the Cobalt Strike beacon. Figure 8. win.exe file information Figure 9. win.exe will call the malicious export function in gtn.dll Evolution of ShellFang loader Durin... | [
"T1027",
"T1140"
] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
Although they always used DLL sideloading to launch their malware, they never stopped changing the code structure of their shellcode loader. | [
"T1574.002"
] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
Here we summarize the information we collected from 2020 to 2022 and verify three different variants used by Earth Zhulong. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
Loader prior to 2020 (Variant 1) | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
The earliest variant of ShellFang was observed in a victim’s environment in 2020. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
However, based on the timestamp of export function, this variant was compiled in 2017. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
The code structure of ShellFang is simple. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
It would read the encrypted payload (“nkford.nlp” is the payload in this case) then decrypt it and run it in the memory. | [
"T1027",
"T1140"
] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
The shellcode loader used XOR with a 26 byte keyset and started a long sleep after finishing shellcode execution. Figure 10. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
Main function of earliest variants Loader in 2021 (Variant 2) Compared to the variant in 2020, there was no big change in 2021. | [] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
They changed the decryption function into RC4 instead of the original XOR, but the code structure was basically the same as the previous variant. | [
"T1140"
] | Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms |
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