>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Alex COLÓN-ROSARIO, Defendant, Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-19\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the First Circuit\\nNo. 17-2122\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n ALEX COLÓN-ROSARIO,\\n\\n Defendant, Appellant.\\n\\n\\n APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO\\n\\n [Hon. Louis Guirola, Jr., U.S. District Judge]\\n\\n\\n Before\\n\\n Kayatta, Circuit Judge,\\n Souter,** Associate Justice,\\n and Selya, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n\\n Irma R. Valldejuli on brief for appellant.\\n Rosa Emilia Rodriguez-Velez, United States Attorney, Mariana\\nE. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief,\\nAppellate Division, and Julia M. Meconiates, Assistant United\\nStates Attorney, on brief for appellee.\\n\\n\\n April 19, 2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n \\n Of the Southern District of Mississippi, sitting by\\ndesignation.\\n ** Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the\\n\\nSupreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation.\\n\\f SELYA, Circuit Judge. Dismayed by his 240-month prison\\n\\nsentence, defendant-appellant Alex Colón-Rosario claims that the\\n\\nprosecutor committed various breaches of his plea agreement (the\\n\\nAgreement) during the disposition hearing. Since the appellant\\n\\nraises these claims for the first time on appeal, our review is\\n\\nsolely for plain error. Discerning none, we affirm the judgment\\n\\nbelow.\\n\\nI. BACKGROUND\\n\\n We briefly rehearse the relevant facts and travel of the\\n\\ncase. Because this appeal trails in the wake of a guilty plea, we\\n\\ndraw our account from the Agreement, the change-of-plea colloquy,\\n\\nthe presentence investigation report (PSI Report), and the\\n\\ntranscript of the disposition hearing. See United States v.\\n\\nColeman, 884 F.3d 67, 69 (1st Cir. 2018).\\n\\n Following the expiration of a restraining order\\n\\npreviously obtained by the mother of his seven-year-old son, the\\n\\nappellant began taking the boy to his house for weekend visits.\\n\\nDuring these interludes, the appellant voiced threats of violence,\\n\\nabused his son physically and sexually, and took pornographic\\n\\npictures. The boy's mother eventually noticed a significant change\\n\\nin his behavior and learned of the abuse. On February 7, 2014,\\n\\nshe notified the sex-crimes division of the Puerto Rico Police\\n\\nDepartment.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 2 -\\n\\f Matters deteriorated even further when, on March 28,\\n\\n2014, the son either threatened or attempted to commit suicide\\n\\nthree times during the course of the day. After the third\\n\\nincident, the boy was hospitalized in a mental institution. He\\n\\nwas discharged after eight days of inpatient care.\\n\\n We fast-forward to June 3, 2015, when a federal grand\\n\\njury sitting in the District of Puerto Rico charged the appellant\\n\\nwith three counts of transporting a minor (his son) with the intent\\n\\nto engage in criminal sexual activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a).\\n\\nThe appellant initially maintained his innocence but, in due\\n\\ncourse, he entered into the Agreement and pleaded guilty to one\\n\\ncount of the indictment.1 The Agreement embodied the parties'\\n\\nstipulation to a total offense level (TOL) of 35. This figure\\n\\nincluded a two-level enhancement for the parental relationship,\\n\\nsee USSG §2G1.3(b)(1); an eight-level enhancement for the victim's\\n\\nage, see id. §2G1.3(b)(5); and a three-level reduction for\\n\\nacceptance of responsibility, see id. §3E1.1(b). Although the\\n\\nAgreement indicated that other enhancements could be applied, they\\n\\nwere omitted (apparently on purpose) from the offense level\\n\\ncalculation. The Agreement left open the applicable criminal\\n\\nhistory category (CHC) but noted that a CHC of I would yield a\\n\\nguideline sentencing range (GSR) of 168-210 months. Not\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Pursuant to the Agreement, the other two counts of the\\nindictment were dismissed at the time of sentencing.\\n\\n\\n - 3 -\\n\\fcoincidentally, the Agreement constrained the government to argue\\n\\nfor a sentence of 168 months (the bottom of the putative GSR).\\n\\nFinally, the Agreement contained a waiver-of-appeal provision,\\n\\nwhich would take effect only if the district court sentenced the\\n\\nappellant \\\"according to [the Agreement's] terms, conditions and\\n\\nrecommendations, or sentence[d] him to any term of incarceration\\n\\nwithin the applicable guideline range based on a [TOL] of 35.\\\"\\n\\n The tectonic plates shifted, though, when the probation\\n\\ndepartment compiled the PSI Report. There, the probation\\n\\ndepartment recommended a TOL of 43 — a figure reached by beginning\\n\\nwith a higher base offense level and including enhancements that\\n\\nhad not been factored into the guideline calculations used in the\\n\\nAgreement, such as enhancements for threats or force, the victim's\\n\\nvulnerability, serious bodily injury, and a pattern of criminal\\n\\nactivity. See id. §§2A3.1(b)(1), 2A3.1(b)(4)(B), 3A1.1(b)(1),\\n\\n4B1.5(b)(1). In combination with a CHC of I, this increased TOL\\n\\nboosted the appellant's GSR to life imprisonment. Neither party\\n\\nobjected to the guideline calculations adumbrated in the PSI\\n\\nReport.\\n\\n The appellant proceeded to file a sentencing memorandum\\n\\nseeking a 120-month sentence (the mandatory minimum for the offense\\n\\nof conviction). The memorandum outlined what he believed were\\n\\nmitigating factors, such as his impoverished childhood and his\\n\\nlack of education. The government's sentencing memorandum\\n\\n\\n - 4 -\\n\\fdefended the GSR calculated in the Agreement and explained that\\n\\nthis calculation was \\\"result-oriented\\\" in that the government had\\n\\ntendered the plea offer to protect the victim from the trauma of\\n\\na trial. Accordingly, the government asked the court to impose a\\n\\n168-month sentence.\\n\\n The disposition hearing was held on October 25, 2017.2\\n\\nAt the hearing, the sentencing court adopted the guideline\\n\\ncalculations set out in the PSI Report (not those limned in the\\n\\nAgreement). Defense counsel argued for the mandatory minimum\\n\\nsentence — a 120-month term of immurement. For his part, the\\n\\nprosecutor argued in support of an incarcerative sentence of 168\\n\\nmonths. After considering the contentions of counsel, the PSI\\n\\nReport, and the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the\\n\\ncourt sentenced the appellant to a prison term of 240 months. This\\n\\ntimely appeal followed.\\n\\nII. ANALYSIS\\n\\n The appellant argues that the government failed to honor\\n\\nthe commitments that it undertook in the Agreement. The various\\n\\nincidents of alleged breach relate to the government's supposed\\n\\nfailure to advocate straightforwardly for the sentence that it had\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2Hurricane Maria struck Puerto Rico prior to sentencing. The\\nUnited States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico was\\nforced to close temporarily and the sentencing phase of this case\\nwas conducted in a courtroom located in the Southern District of\\nMississippi.\\n\\n\\n - 5 -\\n\\fagreed to recommend. There is, however, a threshold issue\\n\\nregarding the Agreement's waiver-of-appeal provision. We start\\n\\nthere.\\n\\n A. The Waiver-of-Appeal Provision.\\n\\n The government posits that this appeal should be\\n\\ndismissed because the appellant's opening brief failed to address\\n\\nthe waiver-of-appeal provision at all. In the government's view,\\n\\na defendant who signs a plea agreement containing an appeal waiver\\n\\nand then attempts to appeal must perforce explain, in his opening\\n\\nbrief, why the waiver does not pretermit the appeal. For this\\n\\nproposition, the government relies on our decision in United States\\n\\nv. Miliano, in which we held that the defendant had an affirmative\\n\\nobligation to explain up-front why the waiver-of-appeal provision\\n\\nin his plea agreement was inapplicable. See 480 F.3d 605, 608\\n\\n(1st Cir. 2007). We further held that, absent such an explanation,\\n\\nthe defendant \\\"forfeit[ed] any right to contend either that the\\n\\nwaiver should not be enforced or that it d[id] not apply.\\\" Id.\\n\\n Everything depends on context, though, and the\\n\\ngovernment wrests Miliano from it contextual moorings. The rule\\n\\nestablished there pertains only when a colorable question exists\\n\\nas to whether a waiver-of-appeal provision applies. There is no\\n\\nsuch question here.\\n\\n It is black-letter law that a waiver-of-appeal provision\\n\\nprecludes only those appeals that fall within its scope. See\\n\\n\\n - 6 -\\n\\fUnited States v. Fernández-Cabrera, 625 F.3d 48, 51 (1st Cir.\\n\\n2010). In this instance, the waiver-of-appeal provision\\n\\nobliterated the right to appeal only if the district court\\n\\nsentenced the appellant \\\"according to [the Agreement's] terms,\\n\\nconditions and recommendations, or sentence[d] him to any term of\\n\\nincarceration within the applicable guideline range based on a\\n\\n[TOL] of 35.\\\" It is luminously clear that the sentence imposed\\n\\ndid not fall within those parameters: the sentencing court\\n\\neschewed the guideline calculations specified in the Agreement,\\n\\nadopted a more onerous set of calculations, and imposed a sentence\\n\\nsubstantially above the sentencing recommendations described in\\n\\nthe Agreement. Given that the plain language of the waiver-of-\\n\\nappeal provision makes manifest that it does not apply to the\\n\\nsentence actually imposed by the district court,3 it would have\\n\\nserved no useful purpose for the appellant to address the appeal\\n\\nwaiver in his opening brief — and he was under no obligation to do\\n\\nso. See United States v. Ocasio-Cancel, 727 F.3d 85, 89 (1st Cir.\\n\\n2013) (holding appeal waiver inapplicable when plain meaning of\\n\\nplea agreement \\\"vitiated the waiver-of-appeal provision in its\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3The proof of the pudding is that the government, in its\\nbrief on appeal, argues only that the appellant has defaulted by\\nfailing to address the waiver-of-appeal provision. It does not\\nargue that the waiver-of-appeal provision can plausibly be read to\\nbar this appeal. Indeed, the government concedes that \\\"the waiver\\nof appeal was not triggered because the district court did not\\nsentence [the appellant] within the total offense level of 35.\\\"\\n\\n\\n - 7 -\\n\\fentirety\\\"); cf. Allen v. Att'y Gen. of Me., 80 F.3d 569, 573 (1st\\n\\nCir. 1996) (explaining that \\\"[t]he law . . . should not require\\n\\nlitigants to engage in empty gestures\\\").\\n\\n B. The Appellant's Claims.\\n\\n This brings us to the appellant's claims of error. Our\\n\\nstarting point is his claim that the prosecutor violated the\\n\\nAgreement by telling the district court that there were no\\n\\nmitigating factors in the appellant's case and that the only reason\\n\\nthe government made such a \\\"sweetheart deal\\\" was to avoid exposing\\n\\nthe victim (a young boy) to the rigors of trial. Because the\\n\\nappellant failed to preserve this claim below, our review is solely\\n\\nfor plain error. See United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60\\n\\n(1st Cir. 2001).\\n\\n As we have said, plain error is \\\"a formidable standard\\n\\nof appellate review.\\\" United States v. Saxena, 229 F.3d 1, 5 (1st\\n\\nCir. 2000); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). It requires an appellant\\n\\nto show \\\"(1) that an error occurred (2) which was clear or obvious\\n\\nand which not only (3) affected the defendant's substantial rights,\\n\\nbut also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public\\n\\nreputation of judicial proceedings.\\\" Duarte, 246 F.3d at 60\\n\\n(citing Johnson v. United States 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997)).\\n\\nWithin this rubric, an error is deemed to affect an appellant's\\n\\nsubstantial rights only when the error \\\"likely affected the outcome\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 8 -\\n\\fof the proceedings.\\\" United States v. Almonte-Nuñez, 771 F.3d 84,\\n\\n89 (1st Cir. 2014).\\n\\n We detect nothing resembling plain error here. The\\n\\nAgreement committed the government to recommend a sentence of 168\\n\\nmonths. Because the appellant's plea rested, in part, on this\\n\\npromise, the promise had to be fulfilled. See Santobello v. New\\n\\nYork, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). We add, moreover, that in the\\n\\nplea-agreement context, \\\"we hold the government to 'the most\\n\\nmeticulous standards of both promise and performance.'\\\" United\\n\\nStates v. Montañez-Quiñones, 911 F.3d 59, 64 (1st Cir. 2018)\\n\\n(quoting Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir.\\n\\n1973)), cert. denied, ____ S. Ct. _____ (2019) [2019 WL 635196].\\n\\nSatisfying these standards demands more than mere \\\"lip service.\\\"\\n\\nSaxena, 229 F.3d at 6. Here, however, the government fulfilled\\n\\nthe commitment that it had made. We explain briefly.\\n\\n To begin, the government's obligation to honor its plea-\\n\\nagreement commitments does not exist in a vacuum. The government\\n\\nhas a corollary obligation to furnish the sentencing court with\\n\\naccurate information and to answer the court's questions\\n\\nforthrightly. See Almonte-Nuñez, 771 F.3d at 90. When carrying\\n\\nout these duties, the government is under no compulsion to sugar-\\n\\ncoat the facts. See id. at 91.\\n\\n In the case at hand, the \\\"sweetheart deal\\\" statement to\\n\\nwhich the appellant refers was not a spontaneous utterance. To\\n\\n\\n - 9 -\\n\\fthe contrary, it was made in response to defense counsel's\\n\\nassertion that the government had agreed to recommend a bottom-\\n\\nof-the-range sentence and to allow the appellant to argue for a\\n\\ndownward variance because of mitigating factors in the appellant's\\n\\nlife. This assertion misrepresented the government's rationale,\\n\\nand the prosecutor had a right — indeed, a duty — to correct the\\n\\nmisrepresentation and inform the sentencing court of the actual\\n\\nrationale. See id. at 89-90. That is exactly what the prosecutor\\n\\ndid: he explained that \\\"[t]he only reason [the appellant] got\\n\\nthis sweetheart deal [wa]s because of the damage to the victim\\n\\nthat would occur at trial.\\\" Since the challenged statement was\\n\\nmade \\\"to correct what the [prosecutor] reasonably viewed as a\\n\\nmisstatement of fact by defense counsel,\\\" the statement did not\\n\\nwork a breach of the Agreement. Id. at 90.\\n\\n In a variation on this theme, the appellant attacks the\\n\\n\\\"sweetheart deal\\\" comment from a different angle. He suggests\\n\\nthat the comment shows that the government acted in bad faith and\\n\\n\\\"induce[d] him to plea.\\\" But this suggestion is pulled out of\\n\\nthin air: protecting a minor victim from exposure to trial may\\n\\nconstitute a legitimate reason for offering a defendant a reduced\\n\\nsentence. Cf. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct. for Norfolk Cty.,\\n\\n457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982) (concluding that state's interest in\\n\\n\\\"safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor\\n\\n[victim] is a compelling one\\\").\\n\\n\\n - 10 -\\n\\f The appellant next asserts that the prosecutor breached\\n\\nthe Agreement by \\\"vigorously\\\" delineating certain aggravating\\n\\nfactors pertaining to his case. He notes that, at the disposition\\n\\nhearing, the prosecutor made much of the fact that the victim was\\n\\nthe appellant's minor son and recounted that the abuse consisted\\n\\nof oral sex, sodomy, physical harm, threats of violence, and rape.\\n\\nThis assertion, too, is subject only to plain error review — and\\n\\nat any rate, it is unavailing.\\n\\n As we already have indicated, the government has an\\n\\naffirmative obligation to supply the sentencing court with\\n\\naccurate facts, including relevant offense characteristics. See\\n\\nAlmonte-Nuñez, 771 F.3d at 90. The appellant was not entitled to\\n\\nhave the government soft-pedal those facts. See id. at 91.\\n\\n In all events, \\\"[w]hen the parties agree that a defendant\\n\\nmay argue for a particular sentence while the government may argue\\n\\nfor a somewhat stiffer sentence, the government is not constrained\\n\\nto pull its punches when arguing for the stiffer sentence.\\\"\\n\\nMontañez-Quiñones, 911 F.3d at 65. So it is here. The Agreement\\n\\ncontemplated that the government would recommend a 168-month\\n\\nsentence and that the appellant would ask for a 120-month sentence.\\n\\nConsistent with that framework, it was well within bounds for the\\n\\nprosecutor to recount the offense characteristics and to explain\\n\\nwhy those characteristics justified a 168-month sentence rather\\n\\nthan the more lenient sentence that the appellant was seeking.\\n\\n\\n - 11 -\\n\\fThat the details of the offense of conviction were repulsive does\\n\\nnot in any way circumscribe the scope of the prosecutor's\\n\\npermissible advocacy. See id.\\n\\n In a last ditch effort to snatch victory from the jaws\\n\\nof defeat, the appellant asseverates that the prosecutor\\n\\ntransgressed the Agreement by telling the sentencing court that\\n\\n\\\"[t]he nature and circumstances of the offense, the seriousness of\\n\\nthe offense, [and] the requirements for just punishment do not\\n\\nscream for a [downward] variance or a departure\\\" from the GSR.\\n\\nBecause a 168-month sentence necessitated a downward variance from\\n\\nthe GSR adopted by the sentencing court, the quoted statement — in\\n\\nthe appellant's view — undermined the foundation on which the\\n\\nproposed 168-month sentence rested. Thus, the appellant says the\\n\\nprosecutor took with the left hand what he was committed to give\\n\\nwith the right hand.\\n\\n This asseveration need not detain us. While the quoted\\n\\nstatement is admittedly unclear as to which GSR calculation the\\n\\nprosecutor had in mind when speaking of the lack of any predicate\\n\\nfor \\\"a variance or a departure\\\" — the GSR mentioned in the\\n\\nAgreement or the GSR adopted by the court — the prosecutor\\n\\nclarified any ambiguity within a matter of moments. He told the\\n\\ncourt that when he stated that \\\"nothing the defense has said would\\n\\nimply that [the appellant] deserved a variance,\\\" he was referring\\n\\nto a \\\"variance [from] our calculation [in] the plea agreement.\\\"\\n\\n\\n - 12 -\\n\\fWhen assessing a claim that a prosecutor has breached a plea\\n\\nagreement, we must consider the sentencing record as a whole. See\\n\\nAlmonte-Nuñez, 771 F.3d at 91. Seen in this light, we discern no\\n\\nhint of plain error in the challenged statement.\\n\\nIII. CONCLUSION\\n\\n We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,\\n\\nthe judgment of the district court is\\n\\n\\n\\nAffirmed.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 13 -\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1488,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4613231,"string":"4,613,231"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Vincent ANZALONE, Defendant, Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Anzalone"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-24"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-1454P"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Torruella, Selya, Barron\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the First Circuit\\n\\n\\nNo. 17-1454\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n VINCENT ANZALONE,\\n\\n Defendant, Appellant.\\n\\n\\n APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS\\n\\n [Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]\\n\\n\\n Before\\n\\n Torruella, Selya, and Barron,\\n Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\n Zainabu Rumala, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal\\nPublic Defender Office, was on brief, for appellant.\\n Randall E. Kromm, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom\\nAndrew E. Lelling, United States Attorney, was on brief, for\\nappellee.\\n\\n\\n\\n April 24, 2019\\n\\f TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. This case is one of many\\n\\narising nationwide from the 2015 FBI investigation into Playpen,\\n\\nan online forum hosted in the Tor Network that allowed users to\\n\\nupload, download, and distribute child pornography. Through that\\n\\ninvestigation, defendant-appellant Vincent Anzalone (\\\"Anzalone\\\")\\n\\nwas identified as a Playpen user and indicted for possession and\\n\\nreceipt of child pornography. Anzalone thereafter moved to\\n\\nsuppress all evidence obtained pursuant to a Network Investigative\\n\\nTechnique (\\\"NIT\\\") warrant and to dismiss his indictment for\\n\\noutrageous government conduct. The district court denied both\\n\\nrequests, which Anzalone asks us to reconsider on appeal, and we\\n\\nnow affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Those interested in the particulars of the FBI's Playpen\\n\\nsting should refer to our opinion in United States v. Levin, 874\\n\\nF.3d 316, 319-21 (1st Cir. 2017), which was the first case to come\\n\\nbefore this court in relation to this investigation. The\\n\\nbackground that follows thus only focuses on the facts most\\n\\npertinent to Anzalone's case.\\n\\n On the evening of February 19, 2015, the FBI assumed\\n\\ncontrol of Playpen and decided to maintain the website live for\\n\\ntwo weeks to identify and apprehend its users. On February 20,\\n\\nthe government obtained a warrant from a magistrate judge in the\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fEastern District of Virginia authorizing it to deploy the NIT.\\n\\nId. at 320. A meticulous 31-page affidavit accompanied the FBI's\\n\\napplication for this warrant. The affidavit's statement of facts\\n\\nin support of probable cause described, among other things, the\\n\\npurpose of Playpen, the Tor Network and its hidden services, the\\n\\ndifficulty of coming across Playpen without seeking out its\\n\\ncontent, and the appearance of Playpen's homepage on February 18,\\n\\n2015 -- two days before the FBI applied for the NIT warrant. With\\n\\nregards to Playpen's homepage, the affidavit averred that the page\\n\\nshowed \\\"two images depicting partially clothed prepubescent\\n\\nfemales with their legs spread apart.\\\" 1 The affidavit also\\n\\nexplained that Playpen counseled its visitors not to use their\\n\\nreal email addresses to register with the website.\\n\\n Technicalities aside, the NIT allowed the FBI to\\n\\nidentify Playpen users when they entered their credentials to\\n\\naccess the website. Id. The NIT eventually led to the\\n\\nidentification of Anzalone as a Playpen user. During the two\\n\\nweeks that the government ran Playpen, Anzalone was logged into\\n\\nthe website for twelve hours. On October 21, 2015, the FBI\\n\\nexecuted a search warrant of Anzalone's residence. Anzalone\\n\\n\\n1 These images, however, were switched out by Playpen's\\nadministrator before the government took over the site on February\\n19 and changed for the image of just one female, sitting cross-\\nlegged in a dress and stockings.\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fwaived his Miranda rights and, in an interview at his home with\\n\\nthe FBI Child Exploitation Task Force agents who executed the\\n\\nwarrant, admitted to possessing child pornography and to\\n\\ndownloading it multiple times a week for five or six years.\\n\\n On November 12, 2015, Anzalone was indicted with one\\n\\ncount of possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C.\\n\\n§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and one count of receipt of child pornography\\n\\nunder 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A). Anzalone then moved to suppress\\n\\nall the evidence resulting from the NIT warrant, arguing that the\\n\\nwarrant: (1) was not rooted in probable cause; (2) lacked\\n\\nparticularity; (3) was supported by a misleading affidavit; and\\n\\n(4) was issued in excess of the magistrate judge's limited\\n\\nterritorial jurisdiction. Anzalone also sought to dismiss the\\n\\nindictment alleging that the government engaged in outrageous\\n\\nconduct by running Playpen for two weeks after seizing its control.\\n\\nThe district court denied these two motions, see United States v.\\n\\nAnzalone, 221 F. Supp. 3d 189 (D. Mass. 2016) (denying the motion\\n\\nto dismiss); United States v. Anzalone, 208 F. Supp. 3d 358 (D.\\n\\nMass. 2016) (denying the motion to suppress), after which Anzalone\\n\\npled guilty to both charges while reserving his right to appeal.\\n\\nAnzalone was sentenced to 84 months in prison and five years of\\n\\nsupervised release.\\n\\n\\t\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f II.\\n\\n Anzalone contests the district court's denial of his\\n\\nmotion to suppress on four grounds. First, Anzalone claims that\\n\\nthe affidavit presented to the magistrate judge in support of the\\n\\nNIT warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause. Second,\\n\\nhe maintains that the government included misstatements in the\\n\\nwarrant affidavit. Third, Anzalone insists that the magistrate\\n\\njudge lacked jurisdiction to issue the NIT warrant pursuant to\\n\\nRule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Lastly, he\\n\\nargues that the good faith exception established in United States\\n\\nv. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), does not apply because the government\\n\\nsupplied misleading information to the magistrate judge and knew\\n\\nof the jurisdictional limitations of Rule 41.\\n\\n As a threshold matter, we find that our decision in Levin\\n\\nforecloses both Anzalone's challenge under Rule 41 and his argument\\n\\nabout the alleged inapplicability of the Leon good faith exception.\\n\\nIn Levin, we examined the same NIT warrant and considered a similar\\n\\nargument about the magistrate judge's alleged lack of jurisdiction\\n\\nto issue the warrant under Rule 41 as a basis to suppress evidence.\\n\\n874 F.3d at 318, 321. We concluded that the Leon good faith\\n\\nexception applied and suppression was not warranted \\\"[r]egardless\\n\\nof whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred.\\\" Id. at 321.\\n\\nSpecifically, we observed that there was no government conduct to\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fdeter since \\\"[f]aced with the novel question of whether an NIT\\n\\nwarrant can issue -- for which there was no precedent on point --\\n\\nthe government turned to the courts for guidance\\\" and that, \\\"if\\n\\nanything, such conduct should be encouraged, because it leaves it\\n\\nto the courts to resolve novel legal issues.\\\" Id. at 323. We are\\n\\nbound to follow Levin's reasoning on these issues here.2 See\\n\\nUnited States v. Guzmán, 419 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting\\n\\nthat, under the law of the circuit doctrine, courts of appeal are\\n\\n\\\"ordinarily . . . constrained by prior panel decisions directly\\n\\n(or even closely) on point\\\").\\n\\n We take advantage of this opportunity, however, to\\n\\nconsider a question raised by Anzalone that was not addressed in\\n\\nLevin: whether probable cause supported the NIT warrant. Anzalone\\n\\nargues that it did not, but we disagree.\\n\\n Our review of probable cause determinations is de novo.\\n\\nSee United States v. Tanguay, 787 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2015). \\\"A\\n\\n\\n2 All of our sister circuits to address the Rule 41 jurisdiction\\nissue with regards to this NIT warrant have also held that\\nsuppression is not warranted and the good faith exception applies.\\nSee United States v. Moorehead, 912 F.3d 963, 969 (6th Cir. 2019);\\nUnited States v. Kienast, 907 F.3d 522, 528 (7th Cir. 2018); United\\nStates v. Henderson, 906 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2018); United\\nStates v. Werdene, 883 F.3d 204, 207 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 139\\nS. Ct. 260 (2018); United States v. McLamb, 880 F.3d 685, 691 (4th\\nCir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 156 (2018); United States v.\\nHorton, 863 F.3d 1041, 1052 (8th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S.\\nCt. 1440 (2018); United States v. Workman, 863 F.3d 1313, 1321\\n(10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1546 (2018).\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fwarrant application must demonstrate probable cause to believe\\n\\nthat (1) a crime has been committed -- the 'commission' element,\\n\\nand (2) enumerated evidence of the offense will be found at the\\n\\nplace to be searched -- the so-called 'nexus' element.\\\" United\\n\\nStates v. Feliz, 182 F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir. 1999). Like the\\n\\nmagistrate judge and the district court, we are tasked with making\\n\\n\\\"a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the\\n\\ncircumstances . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or\\n\\nevidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.\\\" Illinois\\n\\nv. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (citations omitted); see also\\n\\nUnited States v. Rivera, 825 F.3d 59, 63 (1st Cir. 2016) (noting\\n\\nthat probable cause \\\"does not demand certainty, or proof beyond a\\n\\nreasonable doubt, or even proof by a preponderance of the\\n\\nevidence\\\"). Recently, in District of Columbia v. Wesby, the\\n\\nSupreme Court reiterated that probable cause determinations are to\\n\\nbe informed by the totality of circumstances and not by the\\n\\nconsideration of different pieces of evidence in isolation. 138\\n\\nS. Ct. 577, 588 (2018).\\n\\n Anzalone argues that the affidavit's description of the\\n\\nimage on Playpen's homepage (i.e., that the homepage showed two\\n\\n\\\"partially clothed prepubescent females with their legs spread\\n\\napart\\\") was insufficient to establish probable cause. He also\\n\\ninsists that some allegations in the affidavit -- such as that\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fusers had to download the Tor Network and take several other\\n\\naffirmative steps to locate Playpen and that the site's homepage\\n\\nemphasized anonymity -- are not indicative of criminality. In\\n\\nmaking these arguments, Anzalone forgets that probable cause\\n\\ndeterminations hinge not on discrete pieces of standalone\\n\\nevidence, but on the totality of circumstances. Wesby, 138 S. Ct.\\n\\nat 588. And here, the totality of the information asserted in the\\n\\nwarrant affidavit -- Playpen's hidden nature on the Tor Network,\\n\\nits registration requirement, its focus on anonymity, and the image\\n\\ndepicted on its homepage -- established the fair probability that\\n\\nusers went into Playpen to access child pornography. See Gates,\\n\\n462 U.S. at 238. Thus, the district court was correct to deny\\n\\nAnzalone's motion to suppress for lack of probable cause.3\\n\\n\\t\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n3 Anzalone further argues that probable cause cannot be\\nestablished because the FBI \\\"was reckless in seeking the warrant\\\"\\nsince its affidavit presented an inaccurate description of\\nPlaypen. According to Anzalone, the FBI knew at the time it\\nsubmitted its warrant affidavit on February 20 that the image on\\nPlaypen's homepage had changed from depicting two females to just\\none female. We agree with the district court that the FBI affiant\\nwas not reckless in failing to reexamine Playpen's homepage\\nimmediately prior to applying for the warrant on February 20. The\\naffidavit described the image that appeared on the homepage until\\nFebruary 18, and that image was only changed on February 19 -- the\\nday before the FBI applied for the NIT warrant. Moreover, we find\\nthat the warrant affidavit would have still supported probable\\ncause had it just described the new image uploaded on February 19.\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n\\f III.\\n\\n Next, we consider the district court's denial of\\n\\nAnzalone's motion to dismiss the indictment. In this motion,\\n\\nAnzalone alleged that the FBI's decision to operate Playpen for\\n\\ntwo weeks amounted to outrageous government conduct that violated\\n\\nhis right to due process. Our review is de novo. United States\\n\\nv. Luisi, 482 F.3d 43, 58 (1st Cir. 2007).\\n\\n According to Anzalone, prior to seizing Playpen and\\n\\noperating it for two weeks, \\\"never ha[d] the government distributed\\n\\nchild pornography to hundreds of thousands of individuals with no\\n\\ncontrol over or knowledge of how those images were later shared\\n\\nwith others,\\\" thus exemplifying the reason why the FBI's Playpen\\n\\nsting \\\"was the epitome of outrageous conduct.\\\" Anzalone avers\\n\\nfurther that \\\"the government . . . engaged in misconduct that\\n\\ncannot be condoned by this Court\\\" since it \\\"committ[ed] the crime\\n\\nof child pornography distribution.\\\" He insists that, to identify\\n\\nsite users, the FBI had alternatives other than maintaining Playpen\\n\\nat full operability, such as replacing \\\"images of real children\\\"\\n\\nwith \\\"[l]egal child erotica or virtual child pornography\\\" or\\n\\nredirecting visitors to a \\\"Playpen clone which lacked any illegal\\n\\ncontent.\\\"\\n\\n Law enforcement conduct encroaches on a defendant's due\\n\\nprocess rights if it violates \\\"fundamental fairness\\\" and \\\"shock[s]\\n\\n\\n -9-\\n\\f. . . the universal sense of justice.\\\" United States v. Russell,\\n\\n411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973) (quoting Kinsella v. United States ex\\n\\nrel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960)). \\\"In limited\\n\\ncircumstances, courts may dismiss criminal charges in response to\\n\\noutrageous government misconduct.\\\" United States v. Djokich, 693\\n\\nF.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 2012). We consider outrageous government\\n\\nconduct claims \\\"holistically, evaluating the 'totality of the\\n\\nrelevant circumstances' while recognizing that 'outrageousness, by\\n\\nits nature, requires an ad hoc determination' that cannot 'usefully\\n\\nbe broken down into a series of discrete components.'\\\" United\\n\\nStates v. Therrien, 847 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting United\\n\\nStates v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1993)). We have also\\n\\nsaid that the outrageous government conduct defense may be viable\\n\\n\\\"where law enforcement personnel become so overinvolved in a\\n\\nfelonious venture that they can fairly be said either to have\\n\\ncreat[ed] the crime or to have coerc[ed] the defendant's\\n\\nparticipation in it.\\\" Santana, 6 F.3d at 5 (citations omitted).\\n\\nThis defense, however, has never succeeded in our Circuit, see\\n\\nLuisi, 482 F.3d at 59, in part because \\\"[t]he law frowns on the\\n\\nexoneration of a defendant for reasons unrelated to his guilt or\\n\\ninnocence,\\\" and thus \\\"the power to dismiss charges based solely on\\n\\ngovernment misconduct must be used sparingly,\\\" United States v.\\n\\nGuzmán, 282 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2002).\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n\\f To be sure, the strategy that the government employed in\\n\\nthis case falls close to the line. In an ideal world, there would\\n\\nbe effective ways to intercept individuals who trade and distribute\\n\\nchild pornography online other than running a child pornography\\n\\nwebsite for two weeks. But we live in a less than ideal world.\\n\\nUltimately, we agree with the district court that the FBI's Playpen\\n\\nsting does not clear the high bar we have set for the outrageous\\n\\ngovernment conduct defense to succeed. See Therrien, 847 F.3d at\\n\\n14 (noting that a \\\"defendant's claim of outrageous government\\n\\nmisconduct faces a demanding standard\\\"); United States v. Gifford,\\n\\n17 F.3d 462, 471 (1st Cir. 1994) (\\\"[F]undamental fairness is not\\n\\ncompromised in a child pornography case merely because the\\n\\ngovernment supplies the contraband.\\\").\\n\\n Here, an FBI agent supportably opined that disabling or\\n\\nshutting down portions of Playpen \\\"would have alerted [site users]\\n\\nimmediately to the FBI takeover.\\\" Before deciding to operate the\\n\\nwebsite for two weeks, the FBI assessed the pros and cons of its\\n\\noperation and determined that its chosen path \\\"outweighed the\\n\\noption of just removing Playpen from existence and waiting until\\n\\nanother such website popped up 24 hours later.\\\" Among other\\n\\nthings, the FBI concluded that maintaining the website would allow\\n\\nit to identify distributors of child pornography and rescue\\n\\nchildren from abuse. The record also shows that the government\\n\\n\\n -11-\\n\\fdid not make any improvements to the website and that 49 children\\n\\nwere rescued from sexual exploitation as a result of the\\n\\ngovernment's two-week operation of the site. Finally, Anzalone's\\n\\ndecision to become a registered Playpen user and download child\\n\\npornography was his very own and not a result of the government's\\n\\ndesign or coercion. See Santana, 6 F.3d at 5; compare with, United\\n\\nStates v. Chin, 934 F.2d 393, 398-99 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that\\n\\nsuccessful outrageous government conduct claims usually arise out\\n\\nof interference with the defendant's person); Huguez v. United\\n\\nStates, 406 F.2d 366, 381-82 (9th Cir. 1968) (finding that it was\\n\\noutrageous conduct for the government to forcibly remove cocaine\\n\\npackets from defendant's rectum). Therefore, after considering\\n\\nthe totality of the circumstances, we have no grounds to reverse\\n\\nthe denial of Anzalone's motion to dismiss the indictment.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment\\n\\nis affirmed.\\n\\n Affirmed.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -12-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4390484/\", \"author_raw\": \"TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"TORRUELLA"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SELYA"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613231/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Vincent ANZALONE, Defendant, Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-24\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\n\n\nNo. 17-1454\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n Appellee,\n\n v.\n\n VINCENT ANZALONE,\n\n Defendant, Appellant.\n\n\n APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS\n\n [Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]\n\n\n Before\n\n Torruella, Selya, and Barron,\n Circuit Judges.\n\n\n Zainabu Rumala, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal\nPublic Defender Office, was on brief, for appellant.\n Randall E. Kromm, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom\nAndrew E. Lelling, United States Attorney, was on brief, for\nappellee.\n\n\n\n April 24, 2019\n\f TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. This case is one of many\n\narising nationwide from the 2015 FBI investigation into Playpen,\n\nan online forum hosted in the Tor Network that allowed users to\n\nupload, download, and distribute child pornography. Through that\n\ninvestigation, defendant-appellant Vincent Anzalone (\"Anzalone\")\n\nwas identified as a Playpen user and indicted for possession and\n\nreceipt of child pornography. Anzalone thereafter moved to\n\nsuppress all evidence obtained pursuant to a Network Investigative\n\nTechnique (\"NIT\") warrant and to dismiss his indictment for\n\noutrageous government conduct. The district court denied both\n\nrequests, which Anzalone asks us to reconsider on appeal, and we\n\nnow affirm.\n\n I.\n\n Those interested in the particulars of the FBI's Playpen\n\nsting should refer to our opinion in United States v. Levin, 874\n\nF.3d 316, 319-21 (1st Cir. 2017), which was the first case to come\n\nbefore this court in relation to this investigation. The\n\nbackground that follows thus only focuses on the facts most\n\npertinent to Anzalone's case.\n\n On the evening of February 19, 2015, the FBI assumed\n\ncontrol of Playpen and decided to maintain the website live for\n\ntwo weeks to identify and apprehend its users. On February 20,\n\nthe government obtained a warrant from a magistrate judge in the\n\n\n -2-\n\fEastern District of Virginia authorizing it to deploy the NIT.\n\nId. at 320. A meticulous 31-page affidavit accompanied the FBI's\n\napplication for this warrant. The affidavit's statement of facts\n\nin support of probable cause described, among other things, the\n\npurpose of Playpen, the Tor Network and its hidden services, the\n\ndifficulty of coming across Playpen without seeking out its\n\ncontent, and the appearance of Playpen's homepage on February 18,\n\n2015 -- two days before the FBI applied for the NIT warrant. With\n\nregards to Playpen's homepage, the affidavit averred that the page\n\nshowed \"two images depicting partially clothed prepubescent\n\nfemales with their legs spread apart.\" 1 The affidavit also\n\nexplained that Playpen counseled its visitors not to use their\n\nreal email addresses to register with the website.\n\n Technicalities aside, the NIT allowed the FBI to\n\nidentify Playpen users when they entered their credentials to\n\naccess the website. Id. The NIT eventually led to the\n\nidentification of Anzalone as a Playpen user. During the two\n\nweeks that the government ran Playpen, Anzalone was logged into\n\nthe website for twelve hours. On October 21, 2015, the FBI\n\nexecuted a search warrant of Anzalone's residence. Anzalone\n\n\n1 These images, however, were switched out by Playpen's\nadministrator before the government took over the site on February\n19 and changed for the image of just one female, sitting cross-\nlegged in a dress and stockings.\n\n\n -3-\n\fwaived his Miranda rights and, in an interview at his home with\n\nthe FBI Child Exploitation Task Force agents who executed the\n\nwarrant, admitted to possessing child pornography and to\n\ndownloading it multiple times a week for five or six years.\n\n On November 12, 2015, Anzalone was indicted with one\n\ncount of possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C.\n\n§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and one count of receipt of child pornography\n\nunder 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A). Anzalone then moved to suppress\n\nall the evidence resulting from the NIT warrant, arguing that the\n\nwarrant: (1) was not rooted in probable cause; (2) lacked\n\nparticularity; (3) was supported by a misleading affidavit; and\n\n(4) was issued in excess of the magistrate judge's limited\n\nterritorial jurisdiction. Anzalone also sought to dismiss the\n\nindictment alleging that the government engaged in outrageous\n\nconduct by running Playpen for two weeks after seizing its control.\n\nThe district court denied these two motions, see United States v.\n\nAnzalone, 221 F. Supp. 3d 189 (D. Mass. 2016) (denying the motion\n\nto dismiss); United States v. Anzalone, 208 F. Supp. 3d 358 (D.\n\nMass. 2016) (denying the motion to suppress), after which Anzalone\n\npled guilty to both charges while reserving his right to appeal.\n\nAnzalone was sentenced to 84 months in prison and five years of\n\nsupervised release.\n\n\t\n\n\n -4-\n\f II.\n\n Anzalone contests the district court's denial of his\n\nmotion to suppress on four grounds. First, Anzalone claims that\n\nthe affidavit presented to the magistrate judge in support of the\n\nNIT warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause. Second,\n\nhe maintains that the government included misstatements in the\n\nwarrant affidavit. Third, Anzalone insists that the magistrate\n\njudge lacked jurisdiction to issue the NIT warrant pursuant to\n\nRule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Lastly, he\n\nargues that the good faith exception established in United States\n\nv. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), does not apply because the government\n\nsupplied misleading information to the magistrate judge and knew\n\nof the jurisdictional limitations of Rule 41.\n\n As a threshold matter, we find that our decision in Levin\n\nforecloses both Anzalone's challenge under Rule 41 and his argument\n\nabout the alleged inapplicability of the Leon good faith exception.\n\nIn Levin, we examined the same NIT warrant and considered a similar\n\nargument about the magistrate judge's alleged lack of jurisdiction\n\nto issue the warrant under Rule 41 as a basis to suppress evidence.\n\n874 F.3d at 318, 321. We concluded that the Leon good faith\n\nexception applied and suppression was not warranted \"[r]egardless\n\nof whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred.\" Id. at 321.\n\nSpecifically, we observed that there was no government conduct to\n\n\n -5-\n\fdeter since \"[f]aced with the novel question of whether an NIT\n\nwarrant can issue -- for which there was no precedent on point --\n\nthe government turned to the courts for guidance\" and that, \"if\n\nanything, such conduct should be encouraged, because it leaves it\n\nto the courts to resolve novel legal issues.\" Id. at 323. We are\n\nbound to follow Levin's reasoning on these issues here.2 See\n\nUnited States v. Guzmán, 419 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting\n\nthat, under the law of the circuit doctrine, courts of appeal are\n\n\"ordinarily . . . constrained by prior panel decisions directly\n\n(or even closely) on point\").\n\n We take advantage of this opportunity, however, to\n\nconsider a question raised by Anzalone that was not addressed in\n\nLevin: whether probable cause supported the NIT warrant. Anzalone\n\nargues that it did not, but we disagree.\n\n Our review of probable cause determinations is de novo.\n\nSee United States v. Tanguay, 787 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2015). \"A\n\n\n2 All of our sister circuits to address the Rule 41 jurisdiction\nissue with regards to this NIT warrant have also held that\nsuppression is not warranted and the good faith exception applies.\nSee United States v. Moorehead, 912 F.3d 963, 969 (6th Cir. 2019);\nUnited States v. Kienast, 907 F.3d 522, 528 (7th Cir. 2018); United\nStates v. Henderson, 906 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2018); United\nStates v. Werdene, 883 F.3d 204, 207 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 139\nS. Ct. 260 (2018); United States v. McLamb, 880 F.3d 685, 691 (4th\nCir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 156 (2018); United States v.\nHorton, 863 F.3d 1041, 1052 (8th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S.\nCt. 1440 (2018); United States v. Workman, 863 F.3d 1313, 1321\n(10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1546 (2018).\n\n\n -6-\n\fwarrant application must demonstrate probable cause to believe\n\nthat (1) a crime has been committed -- the 'commission' element,\n\nand (2) enumerated evidence of the offense will be found at the\n\nplace to be searched -- the so-called 'nexus' element.\" United\n\nStates v. Feliz, 182 F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir. 1999). Like the\n\nmagistrate judge and the district court, we are tasked with making\n\n\"a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the\n\ncircumstances . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or\n\nevidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.\" Illinois\n\nv. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (citations omitted); see also\n\nUnited States v. Rivera, 825 F.3d 59, 63 (1st Cir. 2016) (noting\n\nthat probable cause \"does not demand certainty, or proof beyond a\n\nreasonable doubt, or even proof by a preponderance of the\n\nevidence\"). Recently, in District of Columbia v. Wesby, the\n\nSupreme Court reiterated that probable cause determinations are to\n\nbe informed by the totality of circumstances and not by the\n\nconsideration of different pieces of evidence in isolation. 138\n\nS. Ct. 577, 588 (2018).\n\n Anzalone argues that the affidavit's description of the\n\nimage on Playpen's homepage (i.e., that the homepage showed two\n\n\"partially clothed prepubescent females with their legs spread\n\napart\") was insufficient to establish probable cause. He also\n\ninsists that some allegations in the affidavit -- such as that\n\n\n -7-\n\fusers had to download the Tor Network and take several other\n\naffirmative steps to locate Playpen and that the site's homepage\n\nemphasized anonymity -- are not indicative of criminality. In\n\nmaking these arguments, Anzalone forgets that probable cause\n\ndeterminations hinge not on discrete pieces of standalone\n\nevidence, but on the totality of circumstances. Wesby, 138 S. Ct.\n\nat 588. And here, the totality of the information asserted in the\n\nwarrant affidavit -- Playpen's hidden nature on the Tor Network,\n\nits registration requirement, its focus on anonymity, and the image\n\ndepicted on its homepage -- established the fair probability that\n\nusers went into Playpen to access child pornography. See Gates,\n\n462 U.S. at 238. Thus, the district court was correct to deny\n\nAnzalone's motion to suppress for lack of probable cause.3\n\n\t\n\n\n\n\n3 Anzalone further argues that probable cause cannot be\nestablished because the FBI \"was reckless in seeking the warrant\"\nsince its affidavit presented an inaccurate description of\nPlaypen. According to Anzalone, the FBI knew at the time it\nsubmitted its warrant affidavit on February 20 that the image on\nPlaypen's homepage had changed from depicting two females to just\none female. We agree with the district court that the FBI affiant\nwas not reckless in failing to reexamine Playpen's homepage\nimmediately prior to applying for the warrant on February 20. The\naffidavit described the image that appeared on the homepage until\nFebruary 18, and that image was only changed on February 19 -- the\nday before the FBI applied for the NIT warrant. Moreover, we find\nthat the warrant affidavit would have still supported probable\ncause had it just described the new image uploaded on February 19.\n\n\n -8-\n\f III.\n\n Next, we consider the district court's denial of\n\nAnzalone's motion to dismiss the indictment. In this motion,\n\nAnzalone alleged that the FBI's decision to operate Playpen for\n\ntwo weeks amounted to outrageous government conduct that violated\n\nhis right to due process. Our review is de novo. United States\n\nv. Luisi, 482 F.3d 43, 58 (1st Cir. 2007).\n\n According to Anzalone, prior to seizing Playpen and\n\noperating it for two weeks, \"never ha[d] the government distributed\n\nchild pornography to hundreds of thousands of individuals with no\n\ncontrol over or knowledge of how those images were later shared\n\nwith others,\" thus exemplifying the reason why the FBI's Playpen\n\nsting \"was the epitome of outrageous conduct.\" Anzalone avers\n\nfurther that \"the government . . . engaged in misconduct that\n\ncannot be condoned by this Court\" since it \"committ[ed] the crime\n\nof child pornography distribution.\" He insists that, to identify\n\nsite users, the FBI had alternatives other than maintaining Playpen\n\nat full operability, such as replacing \"images of real children\"\n\nwith \"[l]egal child erotica or virtual child pornography\" or\n\nredirecting visitors to a \"Playpen clone which lacked any illegal\n\ncontent.\"\n\n Law enforcement conduct encroaches on a defendant's due\n\nprocess rights if it violates \"fundamental fairness\" and \"shock[s]\n\n\n -9-\n\f. . . the universal sense of justice.\" United States v. Russell,\n\n411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973) (quoting Kinsella v. United States ex\n\nrel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960)). \"In limited\n\ncircumstances, courts may dismiss criminal charges in response to\n\noutrageous government misconduct.\" United States v. Djokich, 693\n\nF.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 2012). We consider outrageous government\n\nconduct claims \"holistically, evaluating the 'totality of the\n\nrelevant circumstances' while recognizing that 'outrageousness, by\n\nits nature, requires an ad hoc determination' that cannot 'usefully\n\nbe broken down into a series of discrete components.'\" United\n\nStates v. Therrien, 847 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting United\n\nStates v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1993)). We have also\n\nsaid that the outrageous government conduct defense may be viable\n\n\"where law enforcement personnel become so overinvolved in a\n\nfelonious venture that they can fairly be said either to have\n\ncreat[ed] the crime or to have coerc[ed] the defendant's\n\nparticipation in it.\" Santana, 6 F.3d at 5 (citations omitted).\n\nThis defense, however, has never succeeded in our Circuit, see\n\nLuisi, 482 F.3d at 59, in part because \"[t]he law frowns on the\n\nexoneration of a defendant for reasons unrelated to his guilt or\n\ninnocence,\" and thus \"the power to dismiss charges based solely on\n\ngovernment misconduct must be used sparingly,\" United States v.\n\nGuzmán, 282 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2002).\n\n\n -10-\n\f To be sure, the strategy that the government employed in\n\nthis case falls close to the line. In an ideal world, there would\n\nbe effective ways to intercept individuals who trade and distribute\n\nchild pornography online other than running a child pornography\n\nwebsite for two weeks. But we live in a less than ideal world.\n\nUltimately, we agree with the district court that the FBI's Playpen\n\nsting does not clear the high bar we have set for the outrageous\n\ngovernment conduct defense to succeed. See Therrien, 847 F.3d at\n\n14 (noting that a \"defendant's claim of outrageous government\n\nmisconduct faces a demanding standard\"); United States v. Gifford,\n\n17 F.3d 462, 471 (1st Cir. 1994) (\"[F]undamental fairness is not\n\ncompromised in a child pornography case merely because the\n\ngovernment supplies the contraband.\").\n\n Here, an FBI agent supportably opined that disabling or\n\nshutting down portions of Playpen \"would have alerted [site users]\n\nimmediately to the FBI takeover.\" Before deciding to operate the\n\nwebsite for two weeks, the FBI assessed the pros and cons of its\n\noperation and determined that its chosen path \"outweighed the\n\noption of just removing Playpen from existence and waiting until\n\nanother such website popped up 24 hours later.\" Among other\n\nthings, the FBI concluded that maintaining the website would allow\n\nit to identify distributors of child pornography and rescue\n\nchildren from abuse. The record also shows that the government\n\n\n -11-\n\fdid not make any improvements to the website and that 49 children\n\nwere rescued from sexual exploitation as a result of the\n\ngovernment's two-week operation of the site. Finally, Anzalone's\n\ndecision to become a registered Playpen user and download child\n\npornography was his very own and not a result of the government's\n\ndesign or coercion. See Santana, 6 F.3d at 5; compare with, United\n\nStates v. Chin, 934 F.2d 393, 398-99 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that\n\nsuccessful outrageous government conduct claims usually arise out\n\nof interference with the defendant's person); Huguez v. United\n\nStates, 406 F.2d 366, 381-82 (9th Cir. 1968) (finding that it was\n\noutrageous conduct for the government to forcibly remove cocaine\n\npackets from defendant's rectum). Therefore, after considering\n\nthe totality of the circumstances, we have no grounds to reverse\n\nthe denial of Anzalone's motion to dismiss the indictment.\n\n IV.\n\n For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment\n\nis affirmed.\n\n Affirmed.\n\n\n\n\n -12-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Vincent ANZALONE, Defendant, Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-24\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the First Circuit\\n\\n\\nNo. 17-1454\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n VINCENT ANZALONE,\\n\\n Defendant, Appellant.\\n\\n\\n APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS\\n\\n [Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]\\n\\n\\n Before\\n\\n Torruella, Selya, and Barron,\\n Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\n Zainabu Rumala, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal\\nPublic Defender Office, was on brief, for appellant.\\n Randall E. Kromm, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom\\nAndrew E. Lelling, United States Attorney, was on brief, for\\nappellee.\\n\\n\\n\\n April 24, 2019\\n\\f TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. This case is one of many\\n\\narising nationwide from the 2015 FBI investigation into Playpen,\\n\\nan online forum hosted in the Tor Network that allowed users to\\n\\nupload, download, and distribute child pornography. Through that\\n\\ninvestigation, defendant-appellant Vincent Anzalone (\\\"Anzalone\\\")\\n\\nwas identified as a Playpen user and indicted for possession and\\n\\nreceipt of child pornography. Anzalone thereafter moved to\\n\\nsuppress all evidence obtained pursuant to a Network Investigative\\n\\nTechnique (\\\"NIT\\\") warrant and to dismiss his indictment for\\n\\noutrageous government conduct. The district court denied both\\n\\nrequests, which Anzalone asks us to reconsider on appeal, and we\\n\\nnow affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Those interested in the particulars of the FBI's Playpen\\n\\nsting should refer to our opinion in United States v. Levin, 874\\n\\nF.3d 316, 319-21 (1st Cir. 2017), which was the first case to come\\n\\nbefore this court in relation to this investigation. The\\n\\nbackground that follows thus only focuses on the facts most\\n\\npertinent to Anzalone's case.\\n\\n On the evening of February 19, 2015, the FBI assumed\\n\\ncontrol of Playpen and decided to maintain the website live for\\n\\ntwo weeks to identify and apprehend its users. On February 20,\\n\\nthe government obtained a warrant from a magistrate judge in the\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fEastern District of Virginia authorizing it to deploy the NIT.\\n\\nId. at 320. A meticulous 31-page affidavit accompanied the FBI's\\n\\napplication for this warrant. The affidavit's statement of facts\\n\\nin support of probable cause described, among other things, the\\n\\npurpose of Playpen, the Tor Network and its hidden services, the\\n\\ndifficulty of coming across Playpen without seeking out its\\n\\ncontent, and the appearance of Playpen's homepage on February 18,\\n\\n2015 -- two days before the FBI applied for the NIT warrant. With\\n\\nregards to Playpen's homepage, the affidavit averred that the page\\n\\nshowed \\\"two images depicting partially clothed prepubescent\\n\\nfemales with their legs spread apart.\\\" 1 The affidavit also\\n\\nexplained that Playpen counseled its visitors not to use their\\n\\nreal email addresses to register with the website.\\n\\n Technicalities aside, the NIT allowed the FBI to\\n\\nidentify Playpen users when they entered their credentials to\\n\\naccess the website. Id. The NIT eventually led to the\\n\\nidentification of Anzalone as a Playpen user. During the two\\n\\nweeks that the government ran Playpen, Anzalone was logged into\\n\\nthe website for twelve hours. On October 21, 2015, the FBI\\n\\nexecuted a search warrant of Anzalone's residence. Anzalone\\n\\n\\n1 These images, however, were switched out by Playpen's\\nadministrator before the government took over the site on February\\n19 and changed for the image of just one female, sitting cross-\\nlegged in a dress and stockings.\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fwaived his Miranda rights and, in an interview at his home with\\n\\nthe FBI Child Exploitation Task Force agents who executed the\\n\\nwarrant, admitted to possessing child pornography and to\\n\\ndownloading it multiple times a week for five or six years.\\n\\n On November 12, 2015, Anzalone was indicted with one\\n\\ncount of possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C.\\n\\n§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and one count of receipt of child pornography\\n\\nunder 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A). Anzalone then moved to suppress\\n\\nall the evidence resulting from the NIT warrant, arguing that the\\n\\nwarrant: (1) was not rooted in probable cause; (2) lacked\\n\\nparticularity; (3) was supported by a misleading affidavit; and\\n\\n(4) was issued in excess of the magistrate judge's limited\\n\\nterritorial jurisdiction. Anzalone also sought to dismiss the\\n\\nindictment alleging that the government engaged in outrageous\\n\\nconduct by running Playpen for two weeks after seizing its control.\\n\\nThe district court denied these two motions, see United States v.\\n\\nAnzalone, 221 F. Supp. 3d 189 (D. Mass. 2016) (denying the motion\\n\\nto dismiss); United States v. Anzalone, 208 F. Supp. 3d 358 (D.\\n\\nMass. 2016) (denying the motion to suppress), after which Anzalone\\n\\npled guilty to both charges while reserving his right to appeal.\\n\\nAnzalone was sentenced to 84 months in prison and five years of\\n\\nsupervised release.\\n\\n\\t\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f II.\\n\\n Anzalone contests the district court's denial of his\\n\\nmotion to suppress on four grounds. First, Anzalone claims that\\n\\nthe affidavit presented to the magistrate judge in support of the\\n\\nNIT warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause. Second,\\n\\nhe maintains that the government included misstatements in the\\n\\nwarrant affidavit. Third, Anzalone insists that the magistrate\\n\\njudge lacked jurisdiction to issue the NIT warrant pursuant to\\n\\nRule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Lastly, he\\n\\nargues that the good faith exception established in United States\\n\\nv. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), does not apply because the government\\n\\nsupplied misleading information to the magistrate judge and knew\\n\\nof the jurisdictional limitations of Rule 41.\\n\\n As a threshold matter, we find that our decision in Levin\\n\\nforecloses both Anzalone's challenge under Rule 41 and his argument\\n\\nabout the alleged inapplicability of the Leon good faith exception.\\n\\nIn Levin, we examined the same NIT warrant and considered a similar\\n\\nargument about the magistrate judge's alleged lack of jurisdiction\\n\\nto issue the warrant under Rule 41 as a basis to suppress evidence.\\n\\n874 F.3d at 318, 321. We concluded that the Leon good faith\\n\\nexception applied and suppression was not warranted \\\"[r]egardless\\n\\nof whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred.\\\" Id. at 321.\\n\\nSpecifically, we observed that there was no government conduct to\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fdeter since \\\"[f]aced with the novel question of whether an NIT\\n\\nwarrant can issue -- for which there was no precedent on point --\\n\\nthe government turned to the courts for guidance\\\" and that, \\\"if\\n\\nanything, such conduct should be encouraged, because it leaves it\\n\\nto the courts to resolve novel legal issues.\\\" Id. at 323. We are\\n\\nbound to follow Levin's reasoning on these issues here.2 See\\n\\nUnited States v. Guzmán, 419 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting\\n\\nthat, under the law of the circuit doctrine, courts of appeal are\\n\\n\\\"ordinarily . . . constrained by prior panel decisions directly\\n\\n(or even closely) on point\\\").\\n\\n We take advantage of this opportunity, however, to\\n\\nconsider a question raised by Anzalone that was not addressed in\\n\\nLevin: whether probable cause supported the NIT warrant. Anzalone\\n\\nargues that it did not, but we disagree.\\n\\n Our review of probable cause determinations is de novo.\\n\\nSee United States v. Tanguay, 787 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2015). \\\"A\\n\\n\\n2 All of our sister circuits to address the Rule 41 jurisdiction\\nissue with regards to this NIT warrant have also held that\\nsuppression is not warranted and the good faith exception applies.\\nSee United States v. Moorehead, 912 F.3d 963, 969 (6th Cir. 2019);\\nUnited States v. Kienast, 907 F.3d 522, 528 (7th Cir. 2018); United\\nStates v. Henderson, 906 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2018); United\\nStates v. Werdene, 883 F.3d 204, 207 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 139\\nS. Ct. 260 (2018); United States v. McLamb, 880 F.3d 685, 691 (4th\\nCir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 156 (2018); United States v.\\nHorton, 863 F.3d 1041, 1052 (8th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S.\\nCt. 1440 (2018); United States v. Workman, 863 F.3d 1313, 1321\\n(10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1546 (2018).\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fwarrant application must demonstrate probable cause to believe\\n\\nthat (1) a crime has been committed -- the 'commission' element,\\n\\nand (2) enumerated evidence of the offense will be found at the\\n\\nplace to be searched -- the so-called 'nexus' element.\\\" United\\n\\nStates v. Feliz, 182 F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir. 1999). Like the\\n\\nmagistrate judge and the district court, we are tasked with making\\n\\n\\\"a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the\\n\\ncircumstances . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or\\n\\nevidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.\\\" Illinois\\n\\nv. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (citations omitted); see also\\n\\nUnited States v. Rivera, 825 F.3d 59, 63 (1st Cir. 2016) (noting\\n\\nthat probable cause \\\"does not demand certainty, or proof beyond a\\n\\nreasonable doubt, or even proof by a preponderance of the\\n\\nevidence\\\"). Recently, in District of Columbia v. Wesby, the\\n\\nSupreme Court reiterated that probable cause determinations are to\\n\\nbe informed by the totality of circumstances and not by the\\n\\nconsideration of different pieces of evidence in isolation. 138\\n\\nS. Ct. 577, 588 (2018).\\n\\n Anzalone argues that the affidavit's description of the\\n\\nimage on Playpen's homepage (i.e., that the homepage showed two\\n\\n\\\"partially clothed prepubescent females with their legs spread\\n\\napart\\\") was insufficient to establish probable cause. He also\\n\\ninsists that some allegations in the affidavit -- such as that\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fusers had to download the Tor Network and take several other\\n\\naffirmative steps to locate Playpen and that the site's homepage\\n\\nemphasized anonymity -- are not indicative of criminality. In\\n\\nmaking these arguments, Anzalone forgets that probable cause\\n\\ndeterminations hinge not on discrete pieces of standalone\\n\\nevidence, but on the totality of circumstances. Wesby, 138 S. Ct.\\n\\nat 588. And here, the totality of the information asserted in the\\n\\nwarrant affidavit -- Playpen's hidden nature on the Tor Network,\\n\\nits registration requirement, its focus on anonymity, and the image\\n\\ndepicted on its homepage -- established the fair probability that\\n\\nusers went into Playpen to access child pornography. See Gates,\\n\\n462 U.S. at 238. Thus, the district court was correct to deny\\n\\nAnzalone's motion to suppress for lack of probable cause.3\\n\\n\\t\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n3 Anzalone further argues that probable cause cannot be\\nestablished because the FBI \\\"was reckless in seeking the warrant\\\"\\nsince its affidavit presented an inaccurate description of\\nPlaypen. According to Anzalone, the FBI knew at the time it\\nsubmitted its warrant affidavit on February 20 that the image on\\nPlaypen's homepage had changed from depicting two females to just\\none female. We agree with the district court that the FBI affiant\\nwas not reckless in failing to reexamine Playpen's homepage\\nimmediately prior to applying for the warrant on February 20. The\\naffidavit described the image that appeared on the homepage until\\nFebruary 18, and that image was only changed on February 19 -- the\\nday before the FBI applied for the NIT warrant. Moreover, we find\\nthat the warrant affidavit would have still supported probable\\ncause had it just described the new image uploaded on February 19.\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n\\f III.\\n\\n Next, we consider the district court's denial of\\n\\nAnzalone's motion to dismiss the indictment. In this motion,\\n\\nAnzalone alleged that the FBI's decision to operate Playpen for\\n\\ntwo weeks amounted to outrageous government conduct that violated\\n\\nhis right to due process. Our review is de novo. United States\\n\\nv. Luisi, 482 F.3d 43, 58 (1st Cir. 2007).\\n\\n According to Anzalone, prior to seizing Playpen and\\n\\noperating it for two weeks, \\\"never ha[d] the government distributed\\n\\nchild pornography to hundreds of thousands of individuals with no\\n\\ncontrol over or knowledge of how those images were later shared\\n\\nwith others,\\\" thus exemplifying the reason why the FBI's Playpen\\n\\nsting \\\"was the epitome of outrageous conduct.\\\" Anzalone avers\\n\\nfurther that \\\"the government . . . engaged in misconduct that\\n\\ncannot be condoned by this Court\\\" since it \\\"committ[ed] the crime\\n\\nof child pornography distribution.\\\" He insists that, to identify\\n\\nsite users, the FBI had alternatives other than maintaining Playpen\\n\\nat full operability, such as replacing \\\"images of real children\\\"\\n\\nwith \\\"[l]egal child erotica or virtual child pornography\\\" or\\n\\nredirecting visitors to a \\\"Playpen clone which lacked any illegal\\n\\ncontent.\\\"\\n\\n Law enforcement conduct encroaches on a defendant's due\\n\\nprocess rights if it violates \\\"fundamental fairness\\\" and \\\"shock[s]\\n\\n\\n -9-\\n\\f. . . the universal sense of justice.\\\" United States v. Russell,\\n\\n411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973) (quoting Kinsella v. United States ex\\n\\nrel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960)). \\\"In limited\\n\\ncircumstances, courts may dismiss criminal charges in response to\\n\\noutrageous government misconduct.\\\" United States v. Djokich, 693\\n\\nF.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 2012). We consider outrageous government\\n\\nconduct claims \\\"holistically, evaluating the 'totality of the\\n\\nrelevant circumstances' while recognizing that 'outrageousness, by\\n\\nits nature, requires an ad hoc determination' that cannot 'usefully\\n\\nbe broken down into a series of discrete components.'\\\" United\\n\\nStates v. Therrien, 847 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting United\\n\\nStates v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1993)). We have also\\n\\nsaid that the outrageous government conduct defense may be viable\\n\\n\\\"where law enforcement personnel become so overinvolved in a\\n\\nfelonious venture that they can fairly be said either to have\\n\\ncreat[ed] the crime or to have coerc[ed] the defendant's\\n\\nparticipation in it.\\\" Santana, 6 F.3d at 5 (citations omitted).\\n\\nThis defense, however, has never succeeded in our Circuit, see\\n\\nLuisi, 482 F.3d at 59, in part because \\\"[t]he law frowns on the\\n\\nexoneration of a defendant for reasons unrelated to his guilt or\\n\\ninnocence,\\\" and thus \\\"the power to dismiss charges based solely on\\n\\ngovernment misconduct must be used sparingly,\\\" United States v.\\n\\nGuzmán, 282 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2002).\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n\\f To be sure, the strategy that the government employed in\\n\\nthis case falls close to the line. In an ideal world, there would\\n\\nbe effective ways to intercept individuals who trade and distribute\\n\\nchild pornography online other than running a child pornography\\n\\nwebsite for two weeks. But we live in a less than ideal world.\\n\\nUltimately, we agree with the district court that the FBI's Playpen\\n\\nsting does not clear the high bar we have set for the outrageous\\n\\ngovernment conduct defense to succeed. See Therrien, 847 F.3d at\\n\\n14 (noting that a \\\"defendant's claim of outrageous government\\n\\nmisconduct faces a demanding standard\\\"); United States v. Gifford,\\n\\n17 F.3d 462, 471 (1st Cir. 1994) (\\\"[F]undamental fairness is not\\n\\ncompromised in a child pornography case merely because the\\n\\ngovernment supplies the contraband.\\\").\\n\\n Here, an FBI agent supportably opined that disabling or\\n\\nshutting down portions of Playpen \\\"would have alerted [site users]\\n\\nimmediately to the FBI takeover.\\\" Before deciding to operate the\\n\\nwebsite for two weeks, the FBI assessed the pros and cons of its\\n\\noperation and determined that its chosen path \\\"outweighed the\\n\\noption of just removing Playpen from existence and waiting until\\n\\nanother such website popped up 24 hours later.\\\" Among other\\n\\nthings, the FBI concluded that maintaining the website would allow\\n\\nit to identify distributors of child pornography and rescue\\n\\nchildren from abuse. The record also shows that the government\\n\\n\\n -11-\\n\\fdid not make any improvements to the website and that 49 children\\n\\nwere rescued from sexual exploitation as a result of the\\n\\ngovernment's two-week operation of the site. Finally, Anzalone's\\n\\ndecision to become a registered Playpen user and download child\\n\\npornography was his very own and not a result of the government's\\n\\ndesign or coercion. See Santana, 6 F.3d at 5; compare with, United\\n\\nStates v. Chin, 934 F.2d 393, 398-99 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that\\n\\nsuccessful outrageous government conduct claims usually arise out\\n\\nof interference with the defendant's person); Huguez v. United\\n\\nStates, 406 F.2d 366, 381-82 (9th Cir. 1968) (finding that it was\\n\\noutrageous conduct for the government to forcibly remove cocaine\\n\\npackets from defendant's rectum). Therefore, after considering\\n\\nthe totality of the circumstances, we have no grounds to reverse\\n\\nthe denial of Anzalone's motion to dismiss the indictment.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment\\n\\nis affirmed.\\n\\n Affirmed.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -12-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1489,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4613232,"string":"4,613,232"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Frank STAPLES, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Richard GERRY, Warden, New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, William Wrenn, Commissioner of the New Hampshire Department of Corrections, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Jeffrey Brown, New Hampshire Parole Board, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Donna Sytek, New Hampshire Parole Board, Defendant, in Both Her Individual and Official Capacities, Mark Furlone, New Hampshire Parole Board, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, James Daly, Chaplain of the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Kim Lacasse, Director of Classifications at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both Her Individual and Official Capacities, Joseph Michaud, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Ronald Gagliardi, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Jon Fouts, Head of Security at New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Christopher Kench, Correctional Officer at the N.H. State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Leo Deusault, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Paul Cascio, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Marc Miller, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Michael Edmark, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Scott Marshall, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Joseph Diament, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Marc Theriault, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Paul Courchesne, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, in Both His Individual and Official Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Robert Parent, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities. Defendants, Appellees."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Staples v. Gerry"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-24"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1727P"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Lynch, Thompson, Barron\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BARRON, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the First Circuit\\n\\n\\nNo. 18-1727\\n\\n FRANK STAPLES,\\n\\n Plaintiff, Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nRICHARD GERRY, Warden, New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in\\n both his individual and official capacities, WILLIAM WRENN,\\n Commissioner of the New Hampshire Department of Corrections,\\n Defendant, in both his individual and official capacities,\\n JEFFREY BROWN, New Hampshire Parole Board, Defendant, in both\\n his individual and official capacities, DONNA SYTEK, New\\n Hampshire Parole Board, Defendant, in both her individual and\\n official capacities, MARK FURLONE, New Hampshire Parole Board,\\nDefendant, in both his individual and official capacities, JAMES\\n DALY, Chaplain of the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in\\n both his individual and official capacities, KIM LACASSE,\\n Director of classifications at the New Hampshire State Prison,\\n Defendant, in both her individual and official capacities,\\n JOSEPH MICHAUD, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State\\n Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and official\\n capacities, RONALD GAGLIARDI, Correctional Officer at the New\\n Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and\\n official capacities, JON FOUTS, Head of Security at New\\n Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and\\n official capacities, CHRISTOPHER KENCH, Correctional Officer at\\n the N.H. State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and\\n official capacities, LEO DEUSAULT, Correctional Officer at the\\n New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual\\n and official capacities, PAUL CASCIO, Correctional Officer at\\n the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his\\n individual and official capacities, MARC MILLER, Correctional\\n Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both\\n his individual and official capacities, MICHAEL EDMARK,\\n Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison,\\nDefendant, in both his individual and official capacities, SCOTT\\n MARSHALL, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State\\n Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and official\\n capacities, JOSEPH DIAMENT, Correctional Officer at the New\\n\\f Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and\\nofficial capacities, MARC THERIAULT, Correctional Officer at the\\n New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual\\n and official capacities, PAUL COURCHESNE, Correctional Officer\\n at the New Hampshire State Prison, in both his individual and\\n official Defendant, in both his individual and official\\n capacities, ROBERT PARENT, Correctional Officer at the New\\n Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and\\n official capacities.\\n\\n Defendants, Appellees.\\n\\n\\n APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE\\n\\n [Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]\\n\\n\\n Before\\n\\n Lynch, Thompson, and Barron,\\n Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\n Donna J. Brown, with whom Wadleigh, Starr & Peters, P.L.L.C.,\\nwas on brief, for appellant.\\n Francis C. Fredericks, Senior Assistant Attorney General,\\nwith whom Gordon J. MacDonald, Attorney General, was on brief, for\\nappellees.\\n\\n\\n\\n April 24, 2019\\n\\f BARRON, Circuit Judge. This appeal concerns three\\n\\nclaims that a New Hampshire State Prison (\\\"NHSP\\\") inmate brought\\n\\nagainst two of the prison's officers in a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C.\\n\\n§ 1983 alleging violations of his federal constitutional rights.\\n\\nThe inmate alleges in the first of these claims that, in 2013, one\\n\\nof the officers pushed him against a pillar, allegedly causing him\\n\\nto hit his head on it, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The\\n\\ninmate alleges in the other claims that, in 2015, the other officer\\n\\nsprayed pepper spray into his cell, in violation of both the First\\n\\nAmendment and the Eighth Amendment. The officers moved for summary\\n\\njudgment on those claims based on qualified immunity. The District\\n\\nCourt granted the motion, and the inmate appealed. We affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n The plaintiff is Frank Staples, a NHSP inmate at all\\n\\nrelevant times. The defendants are two NHSP corrections officers,\\n\\nRobert Parent and Scott Marshall. The following facts are not in\\n\\ndispute, except where expressly noted otherwise.\\n\\n In November 2011, Staples was transferred from a New\\n\\nHampshire county prison to the Special Housing Unit (\\\"SHU\\\") of the\\n\\nNHSP, a facility run by the New Hampshire Department of Corrections\\n\\n(\\\"NHDOC\\\"). Around that same time, Staples started practicing\\n\\nTaoism, including the Taoist practice of growing long hair.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 3 -\\n\\f NHDOC policy set a one-fourth inch limit on facial hair\\n\\nlength that was enforced in all units except the SHU. Staples\\n\\ngrew a lengthy beard between November 2011 and September 2013.\\n\\n In September 2013, NHDOC staff decided to transfer\\n\\nStaples from the SHU to the Close Custody Unit (\\\"CCU\\\"), which did\\n\\nenforce the NHDOC facial hair policy. CCU staff escorted Staples\\n\\nand five other inmates to the office area of the CCU for intake.\\n\\nParent, a sergeant in the CCU, ordered Staples to trim his beard.\\n\\nStaples became visibly upset and refused to shave. Parent asked\\n\\nStaples to fill out a written statement form.\\n\\n The parties dispute what Parent said when he handed\\n\\nStaples the form. The government claims that Parent asked Staples\\n\\nto explain why he was refusing to enter the CCU. Staples claims\\n\\nthat Parent actually asked Staples, \\\"[t]ell me why you want to be\\n\\nPC.\\\" Staples contends that \\\"PC\\\" is short for \\\"protective custody,\\\"\\n\\na label associated with \\\"snitch[es]\\\" and \\\"sex offender[s]\\\" that\\n\\ncould put Staples in a dangerous position with other inmates.\\n\\n The parties agree that Staples took the form and tore it\\n\\nin half. At the moment at which Staples tore up the form, Staples\\n\\nwas within \\\"arms' reach\\\" (\\\"three to four feet\\\") of Parent. Parent\\n\\nthen swiftly pushed Staples against a support pillar in the office\\n\\nin order to restrain him. Another officer, Robert Leitner, then\\n\\nhandcuffed Staples.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 4 -\\n\\f Staples claims that Parent \\\"took [his] arm and threw it\\n\\nbehind [him] and pushed\\\" him and \\\"slammed him face first into [the]\\n\\ncement pillar.\\\" Parent claims that he was not holding Staples's\\n\\narm but only the \\\"center of his back\\\" and that \\\"the front of\\n\\n[Staples's] body was pressed up against the pillar,\\\" but that\\n\\n\\\"Staples'[s] head did not make any contact with the pole.\\\"\\n\\n A different officer escorted Staples to an isolation\\n\\ncell. Video footage of the search conducted of Staples upon\\n\\nentering the cell shows Staples without any obvious marks on his\\n\\nforehead and without any obvious signs of discomfort.\\n\\n Pursuant to NHDOC policy, Staples was offered medical\\n\\nattention, which Staples accepted. Officers escorted Staples to\\n\\nthe NHSP Health Services Center. Staples reported bilateral wrist\\n\\ntingling and intermittent lower back and shoulder pain. A nurse\\n\\nexamined Staples and concluded that Staples's wrist functioning\\n\\n\\\"was within normal limits\\\" and reported that she \\\"did not observe\\n\\nany visible sign of injury, such as redness or bruising, to Inmate\\n\\nStaples'[s] wrists, back, head, or shoulder.\\\" The nurse \\\"did not\\n\\nrecommend that Inmate Staples receive any follow up medical care\\n\\nas [she] saw no indication that continued care was necessary.\\\"\\n\\n On December 13, 2014, Staples filed a lawsuit detailing\\n\\nhis disputes with NHSP officers relating to the NHDOC facial hair\\n\\npolicy and seeking damages. On December 24, 2014, Staples received\\n\\na \\\"Hurt Feelings Report\\\" that was slipped under his cell door.\\n\\n\\n - 5 -\\n\\fThe \\\"Hurt Feelings Report\\\" is a mock form that allegedly purports\\n\\nto \\\"assist whiners in documenting hurt feelings,\\\" and suggests\\n\\nthat a person who complains is a \\\"sissy,\\\" \\\"candy-ass,\\\" and a\\n\\n\\\"wimp.\\\" Staples was allegedly told by other officers that Marshall\\n\\nhad arranged for Staples to receive the document, and Marshall\\n\\nallegedly later asked Staples, \\\"[O]h, did you get that?\\\" in\\n\\nreference to the document. Marshall does not admit to sending\\n\\nStaples the Hurt Feelings Report or to making the comment in\\n\\nreference to it.\\n\\n In July 2015, NHDOC staff decided to move Staples from\\n\\nthe \\\"D-tier\\\" in the SHU to the \\\"I-tier\\\" in the same unit. Staples\\n\\nviewed the transfer to \\\"I-tier\\\" as punitive.\\n\\n Officers David Dionne and Kory McCauley unsuccessfully\\n\\nattempted to get Staples to leave his cell to complete the move.\\n\\nThe two officers then met with Marshall, the SHU sergeant, to\\n\\ndetermine how to effectuate the move. Marshall ordered them to\\n\\ntry to get Staples's voluntary compliance with the move by talking\\n\\nto Staples again during their next rounds. Dionne did so, and\\n\\nStaples again refused. Dionne again conferred with Marshall.\\n\\nMarshall made the decision to use pepper spray to extract Staples\\n\\nfrom his cell if Staples continued to refuse to leave.\\n\\n NHDOC policy permits the use of pepper spray to obtain\\n\\nan inmate's compliance with an order to leave his cell. When\\n\\npepper spray is used, the NHDOC policy requires officers to warn\\n\\n\\n - 6 -\\n\\fthe inmate of its use, videotape its use, and offer the inmate\\n\\nmedical attention promptly after.\\n\\n Marshall approached Staples in his cell and ordered\\n\\nStaples to \\\"cuff up\\\" several times. A \\\"cuff up\\\" is when the inmate\\n\\nplaces his hands through the cell's tray slot so the officer can\\n\\nhandcuff him before opening the cell door. Staples refused.\\n\\nMarshall then left the tier to get the pepper spray, a camera, and\\n\\nOfficers Dionne and McCauley.\\n\\n Marshall, Dionne, and McCauley returned to Staples's\\n\\ncell. McCauley turned the camera on and began recording. Marshall\\n\\nwarned Staples: \\\"I am giving you a direct order or you are going\\n\\nto be sprayed.\\\" Staples replied: \\\"[S]pray me, tase me, do whatever\\n\\nthe fuck you want.\\\"\\n\\n Marshall then sprayed the pepper spray into the cell\\n\\nthrough the tray slot using a cone nozzle, which produces a mist,\\n\\nfor approximately nine seconds. To protect himself from the spray,\\n\\nStaples turned around and covered his face with a blanket.\\n\\n Staples remained in the cell. Less than ten minutes\\n\\nlater, Dionne returned to the cell and offered Staples medical\\n\\nattention, to which Staples responded: \\\"I'm fine, this shit doesn't\\n\\nbother me.\\\" According to Staples, he refused medical attention\\n\\nbecause he did not want to come out of his cell to receive it.\\n\\nShortly thereafter, Dionne escorted a nurse into Staples's cell\\n\\nwho examined Staples and deemed him medically cleared.\\n\\n\\n - 7 -\\n\\f About ninety minutes later, Marshall returned to\\n\\nStaples's cell and offered to move Staples to \\\"H-tier\\\" instead of\\n\\n\\\"I-tier.\\\" Staples agreed. Staples then complied with Dionne's\\n\\norder to \\\"cuff up.\\\" Dionne offered Staples a shower, which he\\n\\naccepted.\\n\\n In June 2016, Staples brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983\\n\\nalleging multiple constitutional and statutory claims against\\n\\ntwenty NHSP officials in the United States District Court for the\\n\\nDistrict of New Hampshire. The defendants moved to dismiss under\\n\\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The District Court\\n\\ndismissed most of the plaintiff's claims, except for the claim\\n\\nthat Parent had violated the Eighth Amendment by using excessive\\n\\nforce against him and the claims that Marshall had violated the\\n\\nFirst Amendment and the Eighth Amendment by using pepper spray\\n\\nagainst him. After discovery on these three remaining claims, the\\n\\ndefendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that they were\\n\\nentitled to qualified immunity. The District Court granted the\\n\\ndefendants' motions. The plaintiff appealed.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. See\\n\\nSch. Union No. 37 v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., 617 F.3d 554, 558 (1st\\n\\nCir. 2010). In undertaking that review, we \\\"draw[] all reasonable\\n\\ninferences in favor of the non-moving party while ignoring\\n\\n'conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported\\n\\n\\n - 8 -\\n\\fspeculation.'\\\" Shafmaster v. United States, 707 F.3d 130, 135\\n\\n(1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d\\n\\n314, 325 (1st Cir. 2009)).\\n\\n We may affirm only if the record reveals \\\"no genuine\\n\\ndispute as to any material fact and [that] the movant is entitled\\n\\nto judgment as a matter of law.\\\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute\\n\\nis \\\"genuine\\\" if \\\"a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor\\n\\nof the nonmoving party.\\\" Meuser v. Fed. Express Corp., 564 F.3d\\n\\n507, 515 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Suarez v. Pueblo Int'l, Inc.,\\n\\n229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2000)).\\n\\n In granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment\\n\\non qualified immunity grounds, the District Court relied on the\\n\\nfirst prong of the qualified immunity analysis. That prong\\n\\nconcerns whether \\\"a plaintiff plead[ed] facts showing . . . that\\n\\nthe official violated a statutory or constitutional right.\\\"\\n\\nAshcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (citing Harlow v.\\n\\nFitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The District Court\\n\\nconcluded that no reasonable jury could conclude from the record\\n\\nthat Parent had violated the Eighth Amendment or that Marshall had\\n\\nviolated the First Amendment or Eighth Amendment. On appeal,\\n\\nStaples contends that the District Court erred in construing the\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 9 -\\n\\frecord because it reveals a \\\"genuine dispute\\\" as to whether the\\n\\ndefendants violated those constitutional provisions.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n We begin with Staples's Eighth Amendment claim against\\n\\nParent for pushing him against the pillar in the CCU. \\\"A claim of\\n\\ncruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment\\n\\nhas two components -- one subjective, focusing on the defendant's\\n\\nmotive for his conduct, and the other objective, focusing on the\\n\\nconduct's effect.\\\" Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 268 (2d Cir.\\n\\n2009) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1992); Blyden\\n\\nv. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 262 (2d Cir. 1999)).\\n\\n To prevail on the objective prong, Staples must show\\n\\nthat \\\"the alleged wrongdoing was objectively 'harmful enough' to\\n\\nestablish a constitutional violation.\\\" Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8\\n\\n(quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). The\\n\\nsubjective prong turns on \\\"whether force was applied in a good\\n\\nfaith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and\\n\\nsadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.\\\" Whitley v.\\n\\nAlbers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481\\n\\nF.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied sub nom.\\n\\nJohn v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)). The \\\"factors\\\" that \\\"are\\n\\nrelevant to that ultimate determination\\\" include \\\"the extent of\\n\\nthe threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably\\n\\nperceived by the responsible officials,\\\" \\\"the need for the\\n\\n\\n - 10 -\\n\\fapplication of force,\\\" \\\"the relationship between the need and the\\n\\namount of force that was used,\\\" \\\"the extent of the injury\\n\\ninflicted,\\\" and \\\"any efforts made to temper the severity of a\\n\\nforceful response.\\\" Id. at 321 (citations and internal quotation\\n\\nmarks omitted).\\n\\n The District Court, reaching only the subjective prong\\n\\nof the inquiry, concluded that the record compelled the conclusion\\n\\nthat Parent had acted \\\"in a good-faith effort to maintain or\\n\\nrestore discipline\\\" and therefore without \\\"malicious[] and\\n\\nsadistic[]\\\" intent. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. On appeal, Staples\\n\\ncontends that \\\"the District Court failed to consider evidence from\\n\\nwhich a jury could conclude that Parent's use of force was planned,\\n\\nsadistic and unnecessary.\\\" But, we do not agree.\\n\\n Parent testified that he was prompted to use the force\\n\\nat issue because he was \\\"surpris[ed]\\\" when Staples \\\"aggressively\\n\\nripped [the form] up.\\\" Parent testified that he thus immediately\\n\\n\\\"put [Staples] against the wall to be handcuffed\\\" \\\"[b]ecause that\\n\\nwas . . . an unusual incident and [he] took control of it as\\n\\nquickly as [he] possibly could.\\\"\\n\\n Staples does not dispute that his \\\"defiance of\\n\\n[Parent's] order[s]\\\" by ripping up the statement form \\\"could\\n\\nreasonably be thought to present a threat to\\\" Parent's safety.\\n\\nWhitley, 475 U.S. at 323-24; see also Stenzel v. Ellis, 916 F.2d\\n\\n423, 426 (8th Cir. 1990) (\\\"When a prisoner, having been warned\\n\\n\\n - 11 -\\n\\fthree times, refuses to comply with a legitimate jail security\\n\\nregulation, the incident has escalated into a\\n\\n'disturbance . . . that indisputably poses significant risks to\\n\\nthe safety of inmates and prison staff.'\\\" (quoting Whitley, 475\\n\\nU.S. at 320)). Thus, this case is not one in which a reasonable\\n\\njury could conclude, even on the officer's own account of why force\\n\\nwas needed, that it was wanton based on an inference that there\\n\\nwas no \\\"need for the application of force.\\\" Whitley, 475 U.S. at\\n\\n321.\\n\\n Nor could a reasonable jury infer from the undisputed\\n\\nrecord that \\\"the relationship between the need and the amount of\\n\\nforce that was used\\\" supports a finding that the use of force was\\n\\nwanton. Id. Staples conceded during his deposition that Parent\\n\\nrestrained him in \\\"one quick movement.\\\" See, e.g., Wright, 554\\n\\nF.3d at 270 (relying on concession made in plaintiff's deposition\\n\\ntestimony). And, while the parties disagree as to whether Staples\\n\\nin fact hit his head against the pillar, Staples admitted that he\\n\\nhit his head \\\"in the course of [Parent] pushing [him] to the pole\\\"\\n\\nand that Parent did not \\\"grab[] his head and slam[] it into the\\n\\npole.\\\" See, e.g., Guitron v. Paul, 675 F.3d 1044, 1046 (7th Cir.\\n\\n2012) (finding that officer did not act \\\"maliciously and\\n\\nsadistically\\\" where he \\\"twisted\\\" inmate's wrist and \\\"slammed\\\" him\\n\\ninto a wall because the officer \\\"did not use any force until [the\\n\\ninmate] disobeyed a command that was designed to maintain order\\n\\n\\n - 12 -\\n\\fwithin the prison; and, when [the officer] applied modest force,\\n\\n[the inmate] remained defiant\\\").\\n\\n Staples does point to what he contends was Parent's\\n\\nstatement during the incident, \\\"[t]ell me why you want to be PC,\\\"\\n\\nwhen he handed him the statement form. Staples also points to\\n\\nwhat he contends was Parent's subsequent admission to him, in a\\n\\nconversation shortly after the CCU incident, that Parent \\\"knew\\n\\n[Staples] wasn't going to shave\\\" and the \\\"whole PC thing . . . was\\n\\n[his] plan to try to get [Staples] to shave.\\\"\\n\\n But, even crediting Staples's testimony that Parent made\\n\\nthese statements, they at most show that Parent wanted to pressure\\n\\nStaples into shaving. Neither statement suffices to permit a\\n\\nreasonable jury to find that Parent pushed Staples into the pillar\\n\\nfor a reason other than the one that Parent gave -- namely, that\\n\\nStaples posed a security risk at the time of the push due to his\\n\\ndefiant act of ripping up the statement form. In fact, beyond\\n\\n\\\"general attacks upon the defendant's credibility,\\\" Staples points\\n\\nto no \\\"affirmative evidence,\\\" Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S.\\n\\n574, 600 (1998), that could suffice to rebut Parent's deposition\\n\\ntestimony that he was prompted to use force to \\\"t[a]ke control\\\" of\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 13 -\\n\\fthe situation when Staples \\\"aggressively ripped [the statement\\n\\nform] up.\\\"1\\n\\n We thus conclude that \\\"the evidence, viewed in the light\\n\\nmost favorable to the plaintiff, [does not] support a reliable\\n\\ninference of wantonness in the infliction of pain.\\\" Whitley, 475\\n\\nU.S. at 322. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court's grant of\\n\\nsummary judgment to Parent on this claim.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n We turn, then, to Staples's First Amendment and Eighth\\n\\nAmendment claims against Marshall for using pepper spray against\\n\\nhim. We start with the First Amendment retaliation claim.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n To make out a prima facie case of First Amendment\\n\\nretaliation, Staples must demonstrate that: (1) he engaged in an\\n\\nactivity protected by the First Amendment; (2) Marshall took an\\n\\nadverse action against him; and (3) there is a causal link between\\n\\nthe protected activity and the adverse action. See Hannon v.\\n\\nBeard, 645 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2011). The government concedes,\\n\\nfor the purposes of this appeal, that Staples's suit challenging\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n To the extent that Staples means to argue that Parent's\\nalleged attempt to label him as a \\\"PC\\\" inmate constitutes an\\nindependent use of force that is also actionable under the Eighth\\nAmendment, Staples did not make this argument in any developed\\nmanner below. See United States v. Rodriguez, 311 F.3d 435, 437\\n(1st Cir. 2002) (\\\"[A] waived issue ordinarily cannot be resurrected\\non appeal.\\\").\\n\\n\\n - 14 -\\n\\fNHDOC's facial hair policy is protected activity under the First\\n\\nAmendment and that the use of pepper spray on an inmate is adverse\\n\\nin the context of retaliation. \\\"The heart of the matter,\\n\\ntherefore, is the third element of the prima facie case: the\\n\\npresence or absence of a causal link between the protected activity\\n\\nundertaken by the plaintiff and the adverse action that he\\n\\nexperienced.\\\" Id. at 49.\\n\\n To make out the third element of the prima facie case,\\n\\nStaples must show that his protected activity \\\"was a substantial\\n\\nor motivating factor for the adverse [action].\\\" Padilla–García v.\\n\\nRodríguez, 212 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2000). Even if Staples\\n\\nsucceeds in making that showing, however, the government may \\\"still\\n\\nprevail[] by showing that [Marshall] would have reached the same\\n\\ndecision in the absence of the protected conduct.\\\" Crawford-El,\\n\\n523 U.S. at 593 (citing Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429\\n\\nU.S. 274, 287 (1977)); see also Padilla–García, 212 F.3d at 74;\\n\\nMcCue v. Bradstreet, 807 F.3d 334, 338 (1st Cir. 2015).\\n\\n The District Court concluded that \\\"even if the evidence\\n\\n[that Staples] cites is minimally sufficient to establish that\\n\\nMarshall was angry with Staples for filing the 2014 lawsuit, the\\n\\nother undisputed evidence . . . leaves no doubt that [Marshall]\\n\\nwould have taken the same action regardless of any retaliatory\\n\\nmotive.\\\" We need not decide whether the District Court was correct\\n\\nin this respect, because we conclude that Staples has not met his\\n\\n\\n - 15 -\\n\\fburden to show that a reasonable jury could conclude from this\\n\\nrecord that his protected activity was a \\\"substantial or motivating\\n\\nfactor\\\" for Marshall's decision to use pepper spray against him.\\n\\nPadilla–García, 212 F.3d at 74.\\n\\n To argue otherwise, Staples points out that he had filed\\n\\nthe prison lawsuit in December 2014, seven months before Marshall's\\n\\nuse of pepper spray in July 2015. And, as evidence of Marshall's\\n\\nanimus toward Staples for filing the suit, Staples points to\\n\\nMarshall's alleged sending of the \\\"Hurt Feelings Report\\\" in\\n\\nDecember 2014, shortly after Staples had first filed the suit\\n\\nagainst the prison and to Marshall's earlier alleged comment to\\n\\nhim in September 2013 that \\\"I can't wait to see what that face\\n\\nlooks like without a beard\\\" in connection with his move to the\\n\\nCCU. Staples also points to motions that he filed in the lawsuit\\n\\na week before Marshall used the pepper spray.2 \\\"[This] chronology\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n We note that the record contains no evidence that Marshall\\nwas aware of any motion filed in the lawsuit -- let alone that\\nparticular motion -- prior to his use of the pepper spray. See\\nAmbrose v. Twp. of Robinson, Pa., 303 F.3d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 2002)\\n(\\\"It is only intuitive that for protected conduct to be a\\nsubstantial or motiving factor in a decision, the decisionmakers\\nmust be aware of the protected conduct.\\\"). The government also\\npoints out that the lawsuit involved frequent filings by Staples,\\nwhich generated more than 140 docket entries over the span of a\\nyear.\\n\\n\\n - 16 -\\n\\fof events,\\\" Staples contends, \\\"gives rise to an inference of\\n\\nretaliation.\\\" Hannon, 645 F.3d at 49.\\n\\n But, the record \\\"points to another explanation\\\" for\\n\\nMarshall's decision to use pepper spray -- Staples's multiple\\n\\nrefusals to leave his cell in the days before Marshall's use of\\n\\npepper spray -- \\\"that is so obviously correct as to render the\\n\\ncharge of improper motivation implausible.\\\" Maloy v. Ballori-\\n\\nLage, 744 F.3d 250, 253 (1st Cir. 2014); cf. Micheo-Acevedo v.\\n\\nStericycle of Puerto Rico, Inc., 897 F.3d 360, 366 (1st Cir. 2018),\\n\\ncert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1297 (2019) (noting, in the employment\\n\\ncontext, that \\\"proximity in timing does not alone suffice to create\\n\\na genuine issue of material fact as to [causation]\\\" where the\\n\\nplaintiff's \\\"own unprotected conduct readily explains the timing\\n\\nof . . . the adverse . . . action[]\\\"); Bonilla-Ramirez v. MVM,\\n\\nInc., 904 F.3d 88, 96 (1st Cir. 2018) (same).\\n\\n Here, Marshall testified that his \\\"plan\\\" was \\\"[t]o use\\n\\nthe OC [spray] . . . to get [Staples] to cuff up and come out of\\n\\nhis cell.\\\" Consistent with Marshall's testimony, Staples\\n\\ntestified that he refused the orders to cuff up, that he expected\\n\\nMarshall to \\\"assemble a team and do an extraction\\\" in response to\\n\\nhis refusals, and that he told Marshall to \\\"spray me, tase me, do\\n\\nwhatever the fuck you want\\\" immediately after Marshall warned him\\n\\nthat pepper spray would be used if he continued to refuse to\\n\\ncomply. Thus, Staples does not contest that the conduct that\\n\\n\\n - 17 -\\n\\fMarshall identified as supplying the \\\"justification for using the\\n\\npepper spray against [him]\\\" -- namely, Staples's refusal to cuff\\n\\nup and to leave his cell -- in fact took place. Stallworth v.\\n\\nTyson, 578 F. App'x 948, 951 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam).\\n\\n Nor does Staples contend that Marshall orchestrated the\\n\\nplan to move Staples to a different cell in order to create an\\n\\nexcuse to use pepper spray against him.3 Cf. id. (concluding that\\n\\ngenuine dispute existed as to whether an officer \\\"in fact responded\\n\\nto [plaintiff's] attempt to hurt himself with a razor\\\" where\\n\\nplaintiff averred that the officer \\\"set up\\\" plaintiff by throwing\\n\\nthe razor into the plaintiff's cell). In fact, the undisputed\\n\\nrecord shows that Marshall did not single Staples out for the use\\n\\nof pepper spray. Cf. Saleh v. Upadhyay, 11 F. App'x 241, 257 (4th\\n\\nCir. 2001) (per curiam) (finding genuine issue as to causation\\n\\nwhere the adverse action was taken only against one of six\\n\\nsimilarly situated employees and the employer \\\"presented no\\n\\nevidence to justify the decision to single out [the plaintiff] for\\n\\n[the adverse] treatment\\\"). Rather, Marshall testified that he\\n\\nhad, pursuant to prison policy, used pepper spray on inmates \\\"six\\n\\nto 10\\\" times before. And, Staples points to no contrary evidence\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n Staples does not contend that the move to I-tier was itself\\nthe adverse action for purposes of the First Amendment retaliation\\nclaim.\\n\\n\\n - 18 -\\n\\f\\\"that would support an inference of differential treatment.\\\" Air\\n\\nSunshine, Inc. v. Carl, 663 F.3d 27, 37 (1st Cir. 2011).\\n\\n Staples does try to make the case that Marshall\\n\\n\\\"deviat[ed] from standard operating procedures\\\" in using the\\n\\npepper spray. Hannon, 645 F.3d at 49. But, the record shows that\\n\\nNHDOC Policy and Procedure Directive 5.58 authorizes officers to\\n\\nuse pepper spray after \\\"verbal directives fail to result in an\\n\\ninmate's compliance with officers' commands,\\\" including \\\"after\\n\\n[an] inmate has indicated his refusal to leave [his] cell and is\\n\\nnot complying with staff orders.\\\" When an officer employs pepper\\n\\nspray for such a purpose, NHDOC policy requires the officer to\\n\\nwarn the inmate prior to using the spray, to videotape the use of\\n\\nthe spray, and to disengage and consider other options if the use\\n\\nof the spray does not result in the inmate's compliance. It is\\n\\nundisputed that Marshall complied with these requirements. See\\n\\nAir Sunshine, 663 F.3d at 36 (rejecting plaintiff's First Amendment\\n\\nretaliation claim where there was no basis to conclude that \\\"the\\n\\nrelevant procedures were not followed by [the defendant]\\\").\\n\\n Staples does contend that Marshall violated NHDOC policy\\n\\nby not first attempting to physically extract Staples before\\n\\nresorting to the use of pepper spray. But, an officer -- unnamed\\n\\nin the suit and certified by New Hampshire Police Standards and\\n\\nTraining in the use of pepper spray -- declared in an affidavit\\n\\nthat, under NHDOC policy, \\\"a physical cell extraction is typically\\n\\n\\n - 19 -\\n\\fviewed as a last resort means of gaining an inmate's compliance\\n\\nwith leaving a cell\\\" and that pepper spray is viewed as \\\"a minimal\\n\\nuse of force.\\\" Staples points to nothing in the record to rebut\\n\\nthis competent evidence besides his own speculative testimony that\\n\\nNHDOC policy requires officers to first attempt a physical\\n\\nextraction. See Hannon, 645 F.3d at 49 (\\\"[A]ffidavits and\\n\\ndeposition testimony are effective in opposing summary judgment\\n\\nonly when they are given on personal knowledge, set out facts that\\n\\nwould be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant . . . is\\n\\ncompetent to testify about the matter in question.\\\").\\n\\n Thus, we affirm the District Court's grant of summary\\n\\njudgment to Marshall on Staples's First Amendment retaliation\\n\\nclaim. We turn, then, to Staples's separate claim that Marshall's\\n\\nuse of pepper spray violated the Eighth Amendment.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n \\\"[A]lthough it is not per se unconstitutional for guards\\n\\nto spray mace at prisoners confined in their cells, it is necessary\\n\\nto examine the 'totality of the circumstances, including the\\n\\nprovocation, the amount of [spray] used, and the purposes for which\\n\\nthe [spray] is used [to] determin[e] the validity of the use of\\n\\n[spray] in the prison environment.'\\\" Williams v. Benjamin, 77\\n\\nF.3d 756, 763 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Bailey v. Turner, 736 F.2d\\n\\n963, 969 (4th Cir. 1984)). Here, as we have explained, Marshall\\n\\ntestified that he used pepper spray for a \\\"valid[]\\\" \\\"purpose\\\" -- to\\n\\n\\n - 20 -\\n\\fextract Staples from his cell -- in response to a \\\"valid[]\\\"\\n\\n\\\"provocation\\\" -- Staples refusing multiple orders over several\\n\\ndays to leave his cell. Id.\\n\\n The record amply supports that testimony, and the\\n\\nevidence of Marshall's prior comments to Staples concerning his\\n\\nbeard do not suffice to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that\\n\\nMarshall acted for a reason other than the one that he gave. See\\n\\nSkinner v. Cunningham, 430 F.3d 483, 488 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding\\n\\nno Eighth Amendment violation where an \\\"extraction team sprayed a\\n\\nnon-lethal chemical irritant (derived from cayenne pepper) into\\n\\nthe cell to make [plaintiff] exit the cell without direct physical\\n\\nforce\\\"); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 195 (9th Cir. 1979)\\n\\n(holding \\\"that use of [tear gas] in small amounts may be a\\n\\nnecessary prison technique if a prisoner refuses after adequate\\n\\nwarning to move from a cell\\\"); Allen v. Bosley, 253 F. App'x 658,\\n\\n659 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding the use of pepper spray permissible\\n\\nafter inmate \\\"refused to comply with orders to submit to standard\\n\\nhandcuffing procedure and attempted to block a cell extraction\\n\\nteam from entering his cell\\\"); Rodriguez v. Elmore, 407 F. App'x\\n\\n124, 126 (9th Cir. 2010) (mem.) (same); cf. Torres-Viera v. Laboy-\\n\\nAlvarado, 311 F.3d 105, 108 (1st Cir. 2002) (granting officers\\n\\nqualified immunity where they used tear gas to \\\"respond[] to a\\n\\nsecurity disturbance\\\"); Passmore v. Ianello, 528 F. App'x 144, 148\\n\\n(3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (holding that \\\"the use of pepper spray\\n\\n\\n - 21 -\\n\\fwas reasonable\\\" where defendant \\\"refused to present himself for a\\n\\nmandatory shower at least nine times\\\" before the use of the spray).\\n\\n Nor does the \\\"amount of [spray] used\\\" by Marshall suffice\\n\\nin and of itself to permit a reasonable jury to infer wantonness.\\n\\nWilliams, 77 F.3d at 763 (internal quotation marks omitted). The\\n\\nundisputed record shows that Marshall used a cone nozzle that\\n\\nproduced a mist instead of a harsher stream of pepper spray, that\\n\\nMarshall directed the pepper spray into Staples's cell and not at\\n\\nStaples's person, that Marshall sprayed the pepper spray into the\\n\\nplaintiff's cell for approximately nine seconds, and that Staples\\n\\nwas promptly offered a shower and medical attention after the\\n\\nincident. This case is thus not like those cases on which Staples\\n\\nrelies \\\"where . . . summary judgment in Eighth Amendment excessive\\n\\nforce claims based on pepper spraying\\\" was denied. Burns v. Eaton,\\n\\n752 F.3d 1136, 1140 (8th Cir. 2014). The officers' use of pepper\\n\\nspray in those cases \\\"involved no warning th[e] force would be\\n\\nused, no apparent purpose other than inflicting pain, use of\\n\\nunnecessary 'super-soaker' quantities of the chemical, refusal to\\n\\nallow the victim to wash off the painful chemical for days, and/or\\n\\nuse of additional physical force\\\" and therefore permitted an\\n\\ninference of wantonness. Id. (citing Walker v. Bowersox, 526 F.3d\\n\\n1186, 1189 (8th Cir. 2008); Treats v. Morgan, 308 F.3d 868, 873\\n\\n(8th Cir. 2002); Lawrence v. Bowersox, 297 F.3d 727, 730, 732 (8th\\n\\nCir. 2002)).\\n\\n\\n - 22 -\\n\\f V.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District\\n\\nCourt's grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the\\n\\nplaintiff's First Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims. Each\\n\\nparty shall bear its own costs.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 23 -\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4390485/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARRON, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"LYNCH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"THOMPSON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613232/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Frank STAPLES, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Richard GERRY, Warden, New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, William Wrenn, Commissioner of the New Hampshire Department of Corrections, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Jeffrey Brown, New Hampshire Parole Board, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Donna Sytek, New Hampshire Parole Board, Defendant, in Both Her Individual and Official Capacities, Mark Furlone, New Hampshire Parole Board, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, James Daly, Chaplain of the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Kim Lacasse, Director of Classifications at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both Her Individual and Official Capacities, Joseph Michaud, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Ronald Gagliardi, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Jon Fouts, Head of Security at New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Christopher Kench, Correctional Officer at the N.H. State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Leo Deusault, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Paul Cascio, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Marc Miller, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Michael Edmark, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Scott Marshall, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Joseph Diament, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Marc Theriault, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Paul Courchesne, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, in Both His Individual and Official Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Robert Parent, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities. Defendants, Appellees.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-24\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\n\n\nNo. 18-1727\n\n FRANK STAPLES,\n\n Plaintiff, Appellant,\n\n v.\n\nRICHARD GERRY, Warden, New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in\n both his individual and official capacities, WILLIAM WRENN,\n Commissioner of the New Hampshire Department of Corrections,\n Defendant, in both his individual and official capacities,\n JEFFREY BROWN, New Hampshire Parole Board, Defendant, in both\n his individual and official capacities, DONNA SYTEK, New\n Hampshire Parole Board, Defendant, in both her individual and\n official capacities, MARK FURLONE, New Hampshire Parole Board,\nDefendant, in both his individual and official capacities, JAMES\n DALY, Chaplain of the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in\n both his individual and official capacities, KIM LACASSE,\n Director of classifications at the New Hampshire State Prison,\n Defendant, in both her individual and official capacities,\n JOSEPH MICHAUD, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State\n Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and official\n capacities, RONALD GAGLIARDI, Correctional Officer at the New\n Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and\n official capacities, JON FOUTS, Head of Security at New\n Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and\n official capacities, CHRISTOPHER KENCH, Correctional Officer at\n the N.H. State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and\n official capacities, LEO DEUSAULT, Correctional Officer at the\n New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual\n and official capacities, PAUL CASCIO, Correctional Officer at\n the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his\n individual and official capacities, MARC MILLER, Correctional\n Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both\n his individual and official capacities, MICHAEL EDMARK,\n Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison,\nDefendant, in both his individual and official capacities, SCOTT\n MARSHALL, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State\n Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and official\n capacities, JOSEPH DIAMENT, Correctional Officer at the New\n\f Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and\nofficial capacities, MARC THERIAULT, Correctional Officer at the\n New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual\n and official capacities, PAUL COURCHESNE, Correctional Officer\n at the New Hampshire State Prison, in both his individual and\n official Defendant, in both his individual and official\n capacities, ROBERT PARENT, Correctional Officer at the New\n Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and\n official capacities.\n\n Defendants, Appellees.\n\n\n APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE\n\n [Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]\n\n\n Before\n\n Lynch, Thompson, and Barron,\n Circuit Judges.\n\n\n Donna J. Brown, with whom Wadleigh, Starr & Peters, P.L.L.C.,\nwas on brief, for appellant.\n Francis C. Fredericks, Senior Assistant Attorney General,\nwith whom Gordon J. MacDonald, Attorney General, was on brief, for\nappellees.\n\n\n\n April 24, 2019\n\f BARRON, Circuit Judge. This appeal concerns three\n\nclaims that a New Hampshire State Prison (\"NHSP\") inmate brought\n\nagainst two of the prison's officers in a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C.\n\n§ 1983 alleging violations of his federal constitutional rights.\n\nThe inmate alleges in the first of these claims that, in 2013, one\n\nof the officers pushed him against a pillar, allegedly causing him\n\nto hit his head on it, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The\n\ninmate alleges in the other claims that, in 2015, the other officer\n\nsprayed pepper spray into his cell, in violation of both the First\n\nAmendment and the Eighth Amendment. The officers moved for summary\n\njudgment on those claims based on qualified immunity. The District\n\nCourt granted the motion, and the inmate appealed. We affirm.\n\n I.\n\n The plaintiff is Frank Staples, a NHSP inmate at all\n\nrelevant times. The defendants are two NHSP corrections officers,\n\nRobert Parent and Scott Marshall. The following facts are not in\n\ndispute, except where expressly noted otherwise.\n\n In November 2011, Staples was transferred from a New\n\nHampshire county prison to the Special Housing Unit (\"SHU\") of the\n\nNHSP, a facility run by the New Hampshire Department of Corrections\n\n(\"NHDOC\"). Around that same time, Staples started practicing\n\nTaoism, including the Taoist practice of growing long hair.\n\n\n\n\n - 3 -\n\f NHDOC policy set a one-fourth inch limit on facial hair\n\nlength that was enforced in all units except the SHU. Staples\n\ngrew a lengthy beard between November 2011 and September 2013.\n\n In September 2013, NHDOC staff decided to transfer\n\nStaples from the SHU to the Close Custody Unit (\"CCU\"), which did\n\nenforce the NHDOC facial hair policy. CCU staff escorted Staples\n\nand five other inmates to the office area of the CCU for intake.\n\nParent, a sergeant in the CCU, ordered Staples to trim his beard.\n\nStaples became visibly upset and refused to shave. Parent asked\n\nStaples to fill out a written statement form.\n\n The parties dispute what Parent said when he handed\n\nStaples the form. The government claims that Parent asked Staples\n\nto explain why he was refusing to enter the CCU. Staples claims\n\nthat Parent actually asked Staples, \"[t]ell me why you want to be\n\nPC.\" Staples contends that \"PC\" is short for \"protective custody,\"\n\na label associated with \"snitch[es]\" and \"sex offender[s]\" that\n\ncould put Staples in a dangerous position with other inmates.\n\n The parties agree that Staples took the form and tore it\n\nin half. At the moment at which Staples tore up the form, Staples\n\nwas within \"arms' reach\" (\"three to four feet\") of Parent. Parent\n\nthen swiftly pushed Staples against a support pillar in the office\n\nin order to restrain him. Another officer, Robert Leitner, then\n\nhandcuffed Staples.\n\n\n\n\n - 4 -\n\f Staples claims that Parent \"took [his] arm and threw it\n\nbehind [him] and pushed\" him and \"slammed him face first into [the]\n\ncement pillar.\" Parent claims that he was not holding Staples's\n\narm but only the \"center of his back\" and that \"the front of\n\n[Staples's] body was pressed up against the pillar,\" but that\n\n\"Staples'[s] head did not make any contact with the pole.\"\n\n A different officer escorted Staples to an isolation\n\ncell. Video footage of the search conducted of Staples upon\n\nentering the cell shows Staples without any obvious marks on his\n\nforehead and without any obvious signs of discomfort.\n\n Pursuant to NHDOC policy, Staples was offered medical\n\nattention, which Staples accepted. Officers escorted Staples to\n\nthe NHSP Health Services Center. Staples reported bilateral wrist\n\ntingling and intermittent lower back and shoulder pain. A nurse\n\nexamined Staples and concluded that Staples's wrist functioning\n\n\"was within normal limits\" and reported that she \"did not observe\n\nany visible sign of injury, such as redness or bruising, to Inmate\n\nStaples'[s] wrists, back, head, or shoulder.\" The nurse \"did not\n\nrecommend that Inmate Staples receive any follow up medical care\n\nas [she] saw no indication that continued care was necessary.\"\n\n On December 13, 2014, Staples filed a lawsuit detailing\n\nhis disputes with NHSP officers relating to the NHDOC facial hair\n\npolicy and seeking damages. On December 24, 2014, Staples received\n\na \"Hurt Feelings Report\" that was slipped under his cell door.\n\n\n - 5 -\n\fThe \"Hurt Feelings Report\" is a mock form that allegedly purports\n\nto \"assist whiners in documenting hurt feelings,\" and suggests\n\nthat a person who complains is a \"sissy,\" \"candy-ass,\" and a\n\n\"wimp.\" Staples was allegedly told by other officers that Marshall\n\nhad arranged for Staples to receive the document, and Marshall\n\nallegedly later asked Staples, \"[O]h, did you get that?\" in\n\nreference to the document. Marshall does not admit to sending\n\nStaples the Hurt Feelings Report or to making the comment in\n\nreference to it.\n\n In July 2015, NHDOC staff decided to move Staples from\n\nthe \"D-tier\" in the SHU to the \"I-tier\" in the same unit. Staples\n\nviewed the transfer to \"I-tier\" as punitive.\n\n Officers David Dionne and Kory McCauley unsuccessfully\n\nattempted to get Staples to leave his cell to complete the move.\n\nThe two officers then met with Marshall, the SHU sergeant, to\n\ndetermine how to effectuate the move. Marshall ordered them to\n\ntry to get Staples's voluntary compliance with the move by talking\n\nto Staples again during their next rounds. Dionne did so, and\n\nStaples again refused. Dionne again conferred with Marshall.\n\nMarshall made the decision to use pepper spray to extract Staples\n\nfrom his cell if Staples continued to refuse to leave.\n\n NHDOC policy permits the use of pepper spray to obtain\n\nan inmate's compliance with an order to leave his cell. When\n\npepper spray is used, the NHDOC policy requires officers to warn\n\n\n - 6 -\n\fthe inmate of its use, videotape its use, and offer the inmate\n\nmedical attention promptly after.\n\n Marshall approached Staples in his cell and ordered\n\nStaples to \"cuff up\" several times. A \"cuff up\" is when the inmate\n\nplaces his hands through the cell's tray slot so the officer can\n\nhandcuff him before opening the cell door. Staples refused.\n\nMarshall then left the tier to get the pepper spray, a camera, and\n\nOfficers Dionne and McCauley.\n\n Marshall, Dionne, and McCauley returned to Staples's\n\ncell. McCauley turned the camera on and began recording. Marshall\n\nwarned Staples: \"I am giving you a direct order or you are going\n\nto be sprayed.\" Staples replied: \"[S]pray me, tase me, do whatever\n\nthe fuck you want.\"\n\n Marshall then sprayed the pepper spray into the cell\n\nthrough the tray slot using a cone nozzle, which produces a mist,\n\nfor approximately nine seconds. To protect himself from the spray,\n\nStaples turned around and covered his face with a blanket.\n\n Staples remained in the cell. Less than ten minutes\n\nlater, Dionne returned to the cell and offered Staples medical\n\nattention, to which Staples responded: \"I'm fine, this shit doesn't\n\nbother me.\" According to Staples, he refused medical attention\n\nbecause he did not want to come out of his cell to receive it.\n\nShortly thereafter, Dionne escorted a nurse into Staples's cell\n\nwho examined Staples and deemed him medically cleared.\n\n\n - 7 -\n\f About ninety minutes later, Marshall returned to\n\nStaples's cell and offered to move Staples to \"H-tier\" instead of\n\n\"I-tier.\" Staples agreed. Staples then complied with Dionne's\n\norder to \"cuff up.\" Dionne offered Staples a shower, which he\n\naccepted.\n\n In June 2016, Staples brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983\n\nalleging multiple constitutional and statutory claims against\n\ntwenty NHSP officials in the United States District Court for the\n\nDistrict of New Hampshire. The defendants moved to dismiss under\n\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The District Court\n\ndismissed most of the plaintiff's claims, except for the claim\n\nthat Parent had violated the Eighth Amendment by using excessive\n\nforce against him and the claims that Marshall had violated the\n\nFirst Amendment and the Eighth Amendment by using pepper spray\n\nagainst him. After discovery on these three remaining claims, the\n\ndefendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that they were\n\nentitled to qualified immunity. The District Court granted the\n\ndefendants' motions. The plaintiff appealed.\n\n II.\n\n We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. See\n\nSch. Union No. 37 v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., 617 F.3d 554, 558 (1st\n\nCir. 2010). In undertaking that review, we \"draw[] all reasonable\n\ninferences in favor of the non-moving party while ignoring\n\n'conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported\n\n\n - 8 -\n\fspeculation.'\" Shafmaster v. United States, 707 F.3d 130, 135\n\n(1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d\n\n314, 325 (1st Cir. 2009)).\n\n We may affirm only if the record reveals \"no genuine\n\ndispute as to any material fact and [that] the movant is entitled\n\nto judgment as a matter of law.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute\n\nis \"genuine\" if \"a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor\n\nof the nonmoving party.\" Meuser v. Fed. Express Corp., 564 F.3d\n\n507, 515 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Suarez v. Pueblo Int'l, Inc.,\n\n229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2000)).\n\n In granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment\n\non qualified immunity grounds, the District Court relied on the\n\nfirst prong of the qualified immunity analysis. That prong\n\nconcerns whether \"a plaintiff plead[ed] facts showing . . . that\n\nthe official violated a statutory or constitutional right.\"\n\nAshcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (citing Harlow v.\n\nFitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The District Court\n\nconcluded that no reasonable jury could conclude from the record\n\nthat Parent had violated the Eighth Amendment or that Marshall had\n\nviolated the First Amendment or Eighth Amendment. On appeal,\n\nStaples contends that the District Court erred in construing the\n\n\n\n\n - 9 -\n\frecord because it reveals a \"genuine dispute\" as to whether the\n\ndefendants violated those constitutional provisions.\n\n III.\n\n We begin with Staples's Eighth Amendment claim against\n\nParent for pushing him against the pillar in the CCU. \"A claim of\n\ncruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment\n\nhas two components -- one subjective, focusing on the defendant's\n\nmotive for his conduct, and the other objective, focusing on the\n\nconduct's effect.\" Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 268 (2d Cir.\n\n2009) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1992); Blyden\n\nv. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 262 (2d Cir. 1999)).\n\n To prevail on the objective prong, Staples must show\n\nthat \"the alleged wrongdoing was objectively 'harmful enough' to\n\nestablish a constitutional violation.\" Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8\n\n(quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). The\n\nsubjective prong turns on \"whether force was applied in a good\n\nfaith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and\n\nsadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.\" Whitley v.\n\nAlbers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481\n\nF.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied sub nom.\n\nJohn v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)). The \"factors\" that \"are\n\nrelevant to that ultimate determination\" include \"the extent of\n\nthe threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably\n\nperceived by the responsible officials,\" \"the need for the\n\n\n - 10 -\n\fapplication of force,\" \"the relationship between the need and the\n\namount of force that was used,\" \"the extent of the injury\n\ninflicted,\" and \"any efforts made to temper the severity of a\n\nforceful response.\" Id. at 321 (citations and internal quotation\n\nmarks omitted).\n\n The District Court, reaching only the subjective prong\n\nof the inquiry, concluded that the record compelled the conclusion\n\nthat Parent had acted \"in a good-faith effort to maintain or\n\nrestore discipline\" and therefore without \"malicious[] and\n\nsadistic[]\" intent. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. On appeal, Staples\n\ncontends that \"the District Court failed to consider evidence from\n\nwhich a jury could conclude that Parent's use of force was planned,\n\nsadistic and unnecessary.\" But, we do not agree.\n\n Parent testified that he was prompted to use the force\n\nat issue because he was \"surpris[ed]\" when Staples \"aggressively\n\nripped [the form] up.\" Parent testified that he thus immediately\n\n\"put [Staples] against the wall to be handcuffed\" \"[b]ecause that\n\nwas . . . an unusual incident and [he] took control of it as\n\nquickly as [he] possibly could.\"\n\n Staples does not dispute that his \"defiance of\n\n[Parent's] order[s]\" by ripping up the statement form \"could\n\nreasonably be thought to present a threat to\" Parent's safety.\n\nWhitley, 475 U.S. at 323-24; see also Stenzel v. Ellis, 916 F.2d\n\n423, 426 (8th Cir. 1990) (\"When a prisoner, having been warned\n\n\n - 11 -\n\fthree times, refuses to comply with a legitimate jail security\n\nregulation, the incident has escalated into a\n\n'disturbance . . . that indisputably poses significant risks to\n\nthe safety of inmates and prison staff.'\" (quoting Whitley, 475\n\nU.S. at 320)). Thus, this case is not one in which a reasonable\n\njury could conclude, even on the officer's own account of why force\n\nwas needed, that it was wanton based on an inference that there\n\nwas no \"need for the application of force.\" Whitley, 475 U.S. at\n\n321.\n\n Nor could a reasonable jury infer from the undisputed\n\nrecord that \"the relationship between the need and the amount of\n\nforce that was used\" supports a finding that the use of force was\n\nwanton. Id. Staples conceded during his deposition that Parent\n\nrestrained him in \"one quick movement.\" See, e.g., Wright, 554\n\nF.3d at 270 (relying on concession made in plaintiff's deposition\n\ntestimony). And, while the parties disagree as to whether Staples\n\nin fact hit his head against the pillar, Staples admitted that he\n\nhit his head \"in the course of [Parent] pushing [him] to the pole\"\n\nand that Parent did not \"grab[] his head and slam[] it into the\n\npole.\" See, e.g., Guitron v. Paul, 675 F.3d 1044, 1046 (7th Cir.\n\n2012) (finding that officer did not act \"maliciously and\n\nsadistically\" where he \"twisted\" inmate's wrist and \"slammed\" him\n\ninto a wall because the officer \"did not use any force until [the\n\ninmate] disobeyed a command that was designed to maintain order\n\n\n - 12 -\n\fwithin the prison; and, when [the officer] applied modest force,\n\n[the inmate] remained defiant\").\n\n Staples does point to what he contends was Parent's\n\nstatement during the incident, \"[t]ell me why you want to be PC,\"\n\nwhen he handed him the statement form. Staples also points to\n\nwhat he contends was Parent's subsequent admission to him, in a\n\nconversation shortly after the CCU incident, that Parent \"knew\n\n[Staples] wasn't going to shave\" and the \"whole PC thing . . . was\n\n[his] plan to try to get [Staples] to shave.\"\n\n But, even crediting Staples's testimony that Parent made\n\nthese statements, they at most show that Parent wanted to pressure\n\nStaples into shaving. Neither statement suffices to permit a\n\nreasonable jury to find that Parent pushed Staples into the pillar\n\nfor a reason other than the one that Parent gave -- namely, that\n\nStaples posed a security risk at the time of the push due to his\n\ndefiant act of ripping up the statement form. In fact, beyond\n\n\"general attacks upon the defendant's credibility,\" Staples points\n\nto no \"affirmative evidence,\" Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S.\n\n574, 600 (1998), that could suffice to rebut Parent's deposition\n\ntestimony that he was prompted to use force to \"t[a]ke control\" of\n\n\n\n\n - 13 -\n\fthe situation when Staples \"aggressively ripped [the statement\n\nform] up.\"1\n\n We thus conclude that \"the evidence, viewed in the light\n\nmost favorable to the plaintiff, [does not] support a reliable\n\ninference of wantonness in the infliction of pain.\" Whitley, 475\n\nU.S. at 322. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court's grant of\n\nsummary judgment to Parent on this claim.\n\n IV.\n\n We turn, then, to Staples's First Amendment and Eighth\n\nAmendment claims against Marshall for using pepper spray against\n\nhim. We start with the First Amendment retaliation claim.\n\n A.\n\n To make out a prima facie case of First Amendment\n\nretaliation, Staples must demonstrate that: (1) he engaged in an\n\nactivity protected by the First Amendment; (2) Marshall took an\n\nadverse action against him; and (3) there is a causal link between\n\nthe protected activity and the adverse action. See Hannon v.\n\nBeard, 645 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2011). The government concedes,\n\nfor the purposes of this appeal, that Staples's suit challenging\n\n\n\n 1\n To the extent that Staples means to argue that Parent's\nalleged attempt to label him as a \"PC\" inmate constitutes an\nindependent use of force that is also actionable under the Eighth\nAmendment, Staples did not make this argument in any developed\nmanner below. See United States v. Rodriguez, 311 F.3d 435, 437\n(1st Cir. 2002) (\"[A] waived issue ordinarily cannot be resurrected\non appeal.\").\n\n\n - 14 -\n\fNHDOC's facial hair policy is protected activity under the First\n\nAmendment and that the use of pepper spray on an inmate is adverse\n\nin the context of retaliation. \"The heart of the matter,\n\ntherefore, is the third element of the prima facie case: the\n\npresence or absence of a causal link between the protected activity\n\nundertaken by the plaintiff and the adverse action that he\n\nexperienced.\" Id. at 49.\n\n To make out the third element of the prima facie case,\n\nStaples must show that his protected activity \"was a substantial\n\nor motivating factor for the adverse [action].\" Padilla–García v.\n\nRodríguez, 212 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2000). Even if Staples\n\nsucceeds in making that showing, however, the government may \"still\n\nprevail[] by showing that [Marshall] would have reached the same\n\ndecision in the absence of the protected conduct.\" Crawford-El,\n\n523 U.S. at 593 (citing Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429\n\nU.S. 274, 287 (1977)); see also Padilla–García, 212 F.3d at 74;\n\nMcCue v. Bradstreet, 807 F.3d 334, 338 (1st Cir. 2015).\n\n The District Court concluded that \"even if the evidence\n\n[that Staples] cites is minimally sufficient to establish that\n\nMarshall was angry with Staples for filing the 2014 lawsuit, the\n\nother undisputed evidence . . . leaves no doubt that [Marshall]\n\nwould have taken the same action regardless of any retaliatory\n\nmotive.\" We need not decide whether the District Court was correct\n\nin this respect, because we conclude that Staples has not met his\n\n\n - 15 -\n\fburden to show that a reasonable jury could conclude from this\n\nrecord that his protected activity was a \"substantial or motivating\n\nfactor\" for Marshall's decision to use pepper spray against him.\n\nPadilla–García, 212 F.3d at 74.\n\n To argue otherwise, Staples points out that he had filed\n\nthe prison lawsuit in December 2014, seven months before Marshall's\n\nuse of pepper spray in July 2015. And, as evidence of Marshall's\n\nanimus toward Staples for filing the suit, Staples points to\n\nMarshall's alleged sending of the \"Hurt Feelings Report\" in\n\nDecember 2014, shortly after Staples had first filed the suit\n\nagainst the prison and to Marshall's earlier alleged comment to\n\nhim in September 2013 that \"I can't wait to see what that face\n\nlooks like without a beard\" in connection with his move to the\n\nCCU. Staples also points to motions that he filed in the lawsuit\n\na week before Marshall used the pepper spray.2 \"[This] chronology\n\n\n\n\n 2\n We note that the record contains no evidence that Marshall\nwas aware of any motion filed in the lawsuit -- let alone that\nparticular motion -- prior to his use of the pepper spray. See\nAmbrose v. Twp. of Robinson, Pa., 303 F.3d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 2002)\n(\"It is only intuitive that for protected conduct to be a\nsubstantial or motiving factor in a decision, the decisionmakers\nmust be aware of the protected conduct.\"). The government also\npoints out that the lawsuit involved frequent filings by Staples,\nwhich generated more than 140 docket entries over the span of a\nyear.\n\n\n - 16 -\n\fof events,\" Staples contends, \"gives rise to an inference of\n\nretaliation.\" Hannon, 645 F.3d at 49.\n\n But, the record \"points to another explanation\" for\n\nMarshall's decision to use pepper spray -- Staples's multiple\n\nrefusals to leave his cell in the days before Marshall's use of\n\npepper spray -- \"that is so obviously correct as to render the\n\ncharge of improper motivation implausible.\" Maloy v. Ballori-\n\nLage, 744 F.3d 250, 253 (1st Cir. 2014); cf. Micheo-Acevedo v.\n\nStericycle of Puerto Rico, Inc., 897 F.3d 360, 366 (1st Cir. 2018),\n\ncert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1297 (2019) (noting, in the employment\n\ncontext, that \"proximity in timing does not alone suffice to create\n\na genuine issue of material fact as to [causation]\" where the\n\nplaintiff's \"own unprotected conduct readily explains the timing\n\nof . . . the adverse . . . action[]\"); Bonilla-Ramirez v. MVM,\n\nInc., 904 F.3d 88, 96 (1st Cir. 2018) (same).\n\n Here, Marshall testified that his \"plan\" was \"[t]o use\n\nthe OC [spray] . . . to get [Staples] to cuff up and come out of\n\nhis cell.\" Consistent with Marshall's testimony, Staples\n\ntestified that he refused the orders to cuff up, that he expected\n\nMarshall to \"assemble a team and do an extraction\" in response to\n\nhis refusals, and that he told Marshall to \"spray me, tase me, do\n\nwhatever the fuck you want\" immediately after Marshall warned him\n\nthat pepper spray would be used if he continued to refuse to\n\ncomply. Thus, Staples does not contest that the conduct that\n\n\n - 17 -\n\fMarshall identified as supplying the \"justification for using the\n\npepper spray against [him]\" -- namely, Staples's refusal to cuff\n\nup and to leave his cell -- in fact took place. Stallworth v.\n\nTyson, 578 F. App'x 948, 951 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam).\n\n Nor does Staples contend that Marshall orchestrated the\n\nplan to move Staples to a different cell in order to create an\n\nexcuse to use pepper spray against him.3 Cf. id. (concluding that\n\ngenuine dispute existed as to whether an officer \"in fact responded\n\nto [plaintiff's] attempt to hurt himself with a razor\" where\n\nplaintiff averred that the officer \"set up\" plaintiff by throwing\n\nthe razor into the plaintiff's cell). In fact, the undisputed\n\nrecord shows that Marshall did not single Staples out for the use\n\nof pepper spray. Cf. Saleh v. Upadhyay, 11 F. App'x 241, 257 (4th\n\nCir. 2001) (per curiam) (finding genuine issue as to causation\n\nwhere the adverse action was taken only against one of six\n\nsimilarly situated employees and the employer \"presented no\n\nevidence to justify the decision to single out [the plaintiff] for\n\n[the adverse] treatment\"). Rather, Marshall testified that he\n\nhad, pursuant to prison policy, used pepper spray on inmates \"six\n\nto 10\" times before. And, Staples points to no contrary evidence\n\n\n\n\n 3\n Staples does not contend that the move to I-tier was itself\nthe adverse action for purposes of the First Amendment retaliation\nclaim.\n\n\n - 18 -\n\f\"that would support an inference of differential treatment.\" Air\n\nSunshine, Inc. v. Carl, 663 F.3d 27, 37 (1st Cir. 2011).\n\n Staples does try to make the case that Marshall\n\n\"deviat[ed] from standard operating procedures\" in using the\n\npepper spray. Hannon, 645 F.3d at 49. But, the record shows that\n\nNHDOC Policy and Procedure Directive 5.58 authorizes officers to\n\nuse pepper spray after \"verbal directives fail to result in an\n\ninmate's compliance with officers' commands,\" including \"after\n\n[an] inmate has indicated his refusal to leave [his] cell and is\n\nnot complying with staff orders.\" When an officer employs pepper\n\nspray for such a purpose, NHDOC policy requires the officer to\n\nwarn the inmate prior to using the spray, to videotape the use of\n\nthe spray, and to disengage and consider other options if the use\n\nof the spray does not result in the inmate's compliance. It is\n\nundisputed that Marshall complied with these requirements. See\n\nAir Sunshine, 663 F.3d at 36 (rejecting plaintiff's First Amendment\n\nretaliation claim where there was no basis to conclude that \"the\n\nrelevant procedures were not followed by [the defendant]\").\n\n Staples does contend that Marshall violated NHDOC policy\n\nby not first attempting to physically extract Staples before\n\nresorting to the use of pepper spray. But, an officer -- unnamed\n\nin the suit and certified by New Hampshire Police Standards and\n\nTraining in the use of pepper spray -- declared in an affidavit\n\nthat, under NHDOC policy, \"a physical cell extraction is typically\n\n\n - 19 -\n\fviewed as a last resort means of gaining an inmate's compliance\n\nwith leaving a cell\" and that pepper spray is viewed as \"a minimal\n\nuse of force.\" Staples points to nothing in the record to rebut\n\nthis competent evidence besides his own speculative testimony that\n\nNHDOC policy requires officers to first attempt a physical\n\nextraction. See Hannon, 645 F.3d at 49 (\"[A]ffidavits and\n\ndeposition testimony are effective in opposing summary judgment\n\nonly when they are given on personal knowledge, set out facts that\n\nwould be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant . . . is\n\ncompetent to testify about the matter in question.\").\n\n Thus, we affirm the District Court's grant of summary\n\njudgment to Marshall on Staples's First Amendment retaliation\n\nclaim. We turn, then, to Staples's separate claim that Marshall's\n\nuse of pepper spray violated the Eighth Amendment.\n\n B.\n\n \"[A]lthough it is not per se unconstitutional for guards\n\nto spray mace at prisoners confined in their cells, it is necessary\n\nto examine the 'totality of the circumstances, including the\n\nprovocation, the amount of [spray] used, and the purposes for which\n\nthe [spray] is used [to] determin[e] the validity of the use of\n\n[spray] in the prison environment.'\" Williams v. Benjamin, 77\n\nF.3d 756, 763 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Bailey v. Turner, 736 F.2d\n\n963, 969 (4th Cir. 1984)). Here, as we have explained, Marshall\n\ntestified that he used pepper spray for a \"valid[]\" \"purpose\" -- to\n\n\n - 20 -\n\fextract Staples from his cell -- in response to a \"valid[]\"\n\n\"provocation\" -- Staples refusing multiple orders over several\n\ndays to leave his cell. Id.\n\n The record amply supports that testimony, and the\n\nevidence of Marshall's prior comments to Staples concerning his\n\nbeard do not suffice to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that\n\nMarshall acted for a reason other than the one that he gave. See\n\nSkinner v. Cunningham, 430 F.3d 483, 488 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding\n\nno Eighth Amendment violation where an \"extraction team sprayed a\n\nnon-lethal chemical irritant (derived from cayenne pepper) into\n\nthe cell to make [plaintiff] exit the cell without direct physical\n\nforce\"); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 195 (9th Cir. 1979)\n\n(holding \"that use of [tear gas] in small amounts may be a\n\nnecessary prison technique if a prisoner refuses after adequate\n\nwarning to move from a cell\"); Allen v. Bosley, 253 F. App'x 658,\n\n659 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding the use of pepper spray permissible\n\nafter inmate \"refused to comply with orders to submit to standard\n\nhandcuffing procedure and attempted to block a cell extraction\n\nteam from entering his cell\"); Rodriguez v. Elmore, 407 F. App'x\n\n124, 126 (9th Cir. 2010) (mem.) (same); cf. Torres-Viera v. Laboy-\n\nAlvarado, 311 F.3d 105, 108 (1st Cir. 2002) (granting officers\n\nqualified immunity where they used tear gas to \"respond[] to a\n\nsecurity disturbance\"); Passmore v. Ianello, 528 F. App'x 144, 148\n\n(3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (holding that \"the use of pepper spray\n\n\n - 21 -\n\fwas reasonable\" where defendant \"refused to present himself for a\n\nmandatory shower at least nine times\" before the use of the spray).\n\n Nor does the \"amount of [spray] used\" by Marshall suffice\n\nin and of itself to permit a reasonable jury to infer wantonness.\n\nWilliams, 77 F.3d at 763 (internal quotation marks omitted). The\n\nundisputed record shows that Marshall used a cone nozzle that\n\nproduced a mist instead of a harsher stream of pepper spray, that\n\nMarshall directed the pepper spray into Staples's cell and not at\n\nStaples's person, that Marshall sprayed the pepper spray into the\n\nplaintiff's cell for approximately nine seconds, and that Staples\n\nwas promptly offered a shower and medical attention after the\n\nincident. This case is thus not like those cases on which Staples\n\nrelies \"where . . . summary judgment in Eighth Amendment excessive\n\nforce claims based on pepper spraying\" was denied. Burns v. Eaton,\n\n752 F.3d 1136, 1140 (8th Cir. 2014). The officers' use of pepper\n\nspray in those cases \"involved no warning th[e] force would be\n\nused, no apparent purpose other than inflicting pain, use of\n\nunnecessary 'super-soaker' quantities of the chemical, refusal to\n\nallow the victim to wash off the painful chemical for days, and/or\n\nuse of additional physical force\" and therefore permitted an\n\ninference of wantonness. Id. (citing Walker v. Bowersox, 526 F.3d\n\n1186, 1189 (8th Cir. 2008); Treats v. Morgan, 308 F.3d 868, 873\n\n(8th Cir. 2002); Lawrence v. Bowersox, 297 F.3d 727, 730, 732 (8th\n\nCir. 2002)).\n\n\n - 22 -\n\f V.\n\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District\n\nCourt's grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the\n\nplaintiff's First Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims. Each\n\nparty shall bear its own costs.\n\n\n\n\n - 23 -\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Frank STAPLES, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Richard GERRY, Warden, New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, William Wrenn, Commissioner of the New Hampshire Department of Corrections, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Jeffrey Brown, New Hampshire Parole Board, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Donna Sytek, New Hampshire Parole Board, Defendant, in Both Her Individual and Official Capacities, Mark Furlone, New Hampshire Parole Board, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, James Daly, Chaplain of the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Kim Lacasse, Director of Classifications at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both Her Individual and Official Capacities, Joseph Michaud, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Ronald Gagliardi, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Jon Fouts, Head of Security at New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Christopher Kench, Correctional Officer at the N.H. State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Leo Deusault, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Paul Cascio, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Marc Miller, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Michael Edmark, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Scott Marshall, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Joseph Diament, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Marc Theriault, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Paul Courchesne, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, in Both His Individual and Official Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Robert Parent, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities. Defendants, Appellees.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-24\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the First Circuit\\n\\n\\nNo. 18-1727\\n\\n FRANK STAPLES,\\n\\n Plaintiff, Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nRICHARD GERRY, Warden, New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in\\n both his individual and official capacities, WILLIAM WRENN,\\n Commissioner of the New Hampshire Department of Corrections,\\n Defendant, in both his individual and official capacities,\\n JEFFREY BROWN, New Hampshire Parole Board, Defendant, in both\\n his individual and official capacities, DONNA SYTEK, New\\n Hampshire Parole Board, Defendant, in both her individual and\\n official capacities, MARK FURLONE, New Hampshire Parole Board,\\nDefendant, in both his individual and official capacities, JAMES\\n DALY, Chaplain of the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in\\n both his individual and official capacities, KIM LACASSE,\\n Director of classifications at the New Hampshire State Prison,\\n Defendant, in both her individual and official capacities,\\n JOSEPH MICHAUD, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State\\n Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and official\\n capacities, RONALD GAGLIARDI, Correctional Officer at the New\\n Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and\\n official capacities, JON FOUTS, Head of Security at New\\n Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and\\n official capacities, CHRISTOPHER KENCH, Correctional Officer at\\n the N.H. State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and\\n official capacities, LEO DEUSAULT, Correctional Officer at the\\n New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual\\n and official capacities, PAUL CASCIO, Correctional Officer at\\n the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his\\n individual and official capacities, MARC MILLER, Correctional\\n Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both\\n his individual and official capacities, MICHAEL EDMARK,\\n Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison,\\nDefendant, in both his individual and official capacities, SCOTT\\n MARSHALL, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State\\n Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and official\\n capacities, JOSEPH DIAMENT, Correctional Officer at the New\\n\\f Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and\\nofficial capacities, MARC THERIAULT, Correctional Officer at the\\n New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual\\n and official capacities, PAUL COURCHESNE, Correctional Officer\\n at the New Hampshire State Prison, in both his individual and\\n official Defendant, in both his individual and official\\n capacities, ROBERT PARENT, Correctional Officer at the New\\n Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and\\n official capacities.\\n\\n Defendants, Appellees.\\n\\n\\n APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE\\n\\n [Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]\\n\\n\\n Before\\n\\n Lynch, Thompson, and Barron,\\n Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\n Donna J. Brown, with whom Wadleigh, Starr & Peters, P.L.L.C.,\\nwas on brief, for appellant.\\n Francis C. Fredericks, Senior Assistant Attorney General,\\nwith whom Gordon J. MacDonald, Attorney General, was on brief, for\\nappellees.\\n\\n\\n\\n April 24, 2019\\n\\f BARRON, Circuit Judge. This appeal concerns three\\n\\nclaims that a New Hampshire State Prison (\\\"NHSP\\\") inmate brought\\n\\nagainst two of the prison's officers in a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C.\\n\\n§ 1983 alleging violations of his federal constitutional rights.\\n\\nThe inmate alleges in the first of these claims that, in 2013, one\\n\\nof the officers pushed him against a pillar, allegedly causing him\\n\\nto hit his head on it, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The\\n\\ninmate alleges in the other claims that, in 2015, the other officer\\n\\nsprayed pepper spray into his cell, in violation of both the First\\n\\nAmendment and the Eighth Amendment. The officers moved for summary\\n\\njudgment on those claims based on qualified immunity. The District\\n\\nCourt granted the motion, and the inmate appealed. We affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n The plaintiff is Frank Staples, a NHSP inmate at all\\n\\nrelevant times. The defendants are two NHSP corrections officers,\\n\\nRobert Parent and Scott Marshall. The following facts are not in\\n\\ndispute, except where expressly noted otherwise.\\n\\n In November 2011, Staples was transferred from a New\\n\\nHampshire county prison to the Special Housing Unit (\\\"SHU\\\") of the\\n\\nNHSP, a facility run by the New Hampshire Department of Corrections\\n\\n(\\\"NHDOC\\\"). Around that same time, Staples started practicing\\n\\nTaoism, including the Taoist practice of growing long hair.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 3 -\\n\\f NHDOC policy set a one-fourth inch limit on facial hair\\n\\nlength that was enforced in all units except the SHU. Staples\\n\\ngrew a lengthy beard between November 2011 and September 2013.\\n\\n In September 2013, NHDOC staff decided to transfer\\n\\nStaples from the SHU to the Close Custody Unit (\\\"CCU\\\"), which did\\n\\nenforce the NHDOC facial hair policy. CCU staff escorted Staples\\n\\nand five other inmates to the office area of the CCU for intake.\\n\\nParent, a sergeant in the CCU, ordered Staples to trim his beard.\\n\\nStaples became visibly upset and refused to shave. Parent asked\\n\\nStaples to fill out a written statement form.\\n\\n The parties dispute what Parent said when he handed\\n\\nStaples the form. The government claims that Parent asked Staples\\n\\nto explain why he was refusing to enter the CCU. Staples claims\\n\\nthat Parent actually asked Staples, \\\"[t]ell me why you want to be\\n\\nPC.\\\" Staples contends that \\\"PC\\\" is short for \\\"protective custody,\\\"\\n\\na label associated with \\\"snitch[es]\\\" and \\\"sex offender[s]\\\" that\\n\\ncould put Staples in a dangerous position with other inmates.\\n\\n The parties agree that Staples took the form and tore it\\n\\nin half. At the moment at which Staples tore up the form, Staples\\n\\nwas within \\\"arms' reach\\\" (\\\"three to four feet\\\") of Parent. Parent\\n\\nthen swiftly pushed Staples against a support pillar in the office\\n\\nin order to restrain him. Another officer, Robert Leitner, then\\n\\nhandcuffed Staples.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 4 -\\n\\f Staples claims that Parent \\\"took [his] arm and threw it\\n\\nbehind [him] and pushed\\\" him and \\\"slammed him face first into [the]\\n\\ncement pillar.\\\" Parent claims that he was not holding Staples's\\n\\narm but only the \\\"center of his back\\\" and that \\\"the front of\\n\\n[Staples's] body was pressed up against the pillar,\\\" but that\\n\\n\\\"Staples'[s] head did not make any contact with the pole.\\\"\\n\\n A different officer escorted Staples to an isolation\\n\\ncell. Video footage of the search conducted of Staples upon\\n\\nentering the cell shows Staples without any obvious marks on his\\n\\nforehead and without any obvious signs of discomfort.\\n\\n Pursuant to NHDOC policy, Staples was offered medical\\n\\nattention, which Staples accepted. Officers escorted Staples to\\n\\nthe NHSP Health Services Center. Staples reported bilateral wrist\\n\\ntingling and intermittent lower back and shoulder pain. A nurse\\n\\nexamined Staples and concluded that Staples's wrist functioning\\n\\n\\\"was within normal limits\\\" and reported that she \\\"did not observe\\n\\nany visible sign of injury, such as redness or bruising, to Inmate\\n\\nStaples'[s] wrists, back, head, or shoulder.\\\" The nurse \\\"did not\\n\\nrecommend that Inmate Staples receive any follow up medical care\\n\\nas [she] saw no indication that continued care was necessary.\\\"\\n\\n On December 13, 2014, Staples filed a lawsuit detailing\\n\\nhis disputes with NHSP officers relating to the NHDOC facial hair\\n\\npolicy and seeking damages. On December 24, 2014, Staples received\\n\\na \\\"Hurt Feelings Report\\\" that was slipped under his cell door.\\n\\n\\n - 5 -\\n\\fThe \\\"Hurt Feelings Report\\\" is a mock form that allegedly purports\\n\\nto \\\"assist whiners in documenting hurt feelings,\\\" and suggests\\n\\nthat a person who complains is a \\\"sissy,\\\" \\\"candy-ass,\\\" and a\\n\\n\\\"wimp.\\\" Staples was allegedly told by other officers that Marshall\\n\\nhad arranged for Staples to receive the document, and Marshall\\n\\nallegedly later asked Staples, \\\"[O]h, did you get that?\\\" in\\n\\nreference to the document. Marshall does not admit to sending\\n\\nStaples the Hurt Feelings Report or to making the comment in\\n\\nreference to it.\\n\\n In July 2015, NHDOC staff decided to move Staples from\\n\\nthe \\\"D-tier\\\" in the SHU to the \\\"I-tier\\\" in the same unit. Staples\\n\\nviewed the transfer to \\\"I-tier\\\" as punitive.\\n\\n Officers David Dionne and Kory McCauley unsuccessfully\\n\\nattempted to get Staples to leave his cell to complete the move.\\n\\nThe two officers then met with Marshall, the SHU sergeant, to\\n\\ndetermine how to effectuate the move. Marshall ordered them to\\n\\ntry to get Staples's voluntary compliance with the move by talking\\n\\nto Staples again during their next rounds. Dionne did so, and\\n\\nStaples again refused. Dionne again conferred with Marshall.\\n\\nMarshall made the decision to use pepper spray to extract Staples\\n\\nfrom his cell if Staples continued to refuse to leave.\\n\\n NHDOC policy permits the use of pepper spray to obtain\\n\\nan inmate's compliance with an order to leave his cell. When\\n\\npepper spray is used, the NHDOC policy requires officers to warn\\n\\n\\n - 6 -\\n\\fthe inmate of its use, videotape its use, and offer the inmate\\n\\nmedical attention promptly after.\\n\\n Marshall approached Staples in his cell and ordered\\n\\nStaples to \\\"cuff up\\\" several times. A \\\"cuff up\\\" is when the inmate\\n\\nplaces his hands through the cell's tray slot so the officer can\\n\\nhandcuff him before opening the cell door. Staples refused.\\n\\nMarshall then left the tier to get the pepper spray, a camera, and\\n\\nOfficers Dionne and McCauley.\\n\\n Marshall, Dionne, and McCauley returned to Staples's\\n\\ncell. McCauley turned the camera on and began recording. Marshall\\n\\nwarned Staples: \\\"I am giving you a direct order or you are going\\n\\nto be sprayed.\\\" Staples replied: \\\"[S]pray me, tase me, do whatever\\n\\nthe fuck you want.\\\"\\n\\n Marshall then sprayed the pepper spray into the cell\\n\\nthrough the tray slot using a cone nozzle, which produces a mist,\\n\\nfor approximately nine seconds. To protect himself from the spray,\\n\\nStaples turned around and covered his face with a blanket.\\n\\n Staples remained in the cell. Less than ten minutes\\n\\nlater, Dionne returned to the cell and offered Staples medical\\n\\nattention, to which Staples responded: \\\"I'm fine, this shit doesn't\\n\\nbother me.\\\" According to Staples, he refused medical attention\\n\\nbecause he did not want to come out of his cell to receive it.\\n\\nShortly thereafter, Dionne escorted a nurse into Staples's cell\\n\\nwho examined Staples and deemed him medically cleared.\\n\\n\\n - 7 -\\n\\f About ninety minutes later, Marshall returned to\\n\\nStaples's cell and offered to move Staples to \\\"H-tier\\\" instead of\\n\\n\\\"I-tier.\\\" Staples agreed. Staples then complied with Dionne's\\n\\norder to \\\"cuff up.\\\" Dionne offered Staples a shower, which he\\n\\naccepted.\\n\\n In June 2016, Staples brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983\\n\\nalleging multiple constitutional and statutory claims against\\n\\ntwenty NHSP officials in the United States District Court for the\\n\\nDistrict of New Hampshire. The defendants moved to dismiss under\\n\\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The District Court\\n\\ndismissed most of the plaintiff's claims, except for the claim\\n\\nthat Parent had violated the Eighth Amendment by using excessive\\n\\nforce against him and the claims that Marshall had violated the\\n\\nFirst Amendment and the Eighth Amendment by using pepper spray\\n\\nagainst him. After discovery on these three remaining claims, the\\n\\ndefendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that they were\\n\\nentitled to qualified immunity. The District Court granted the\\n\\ndefendants' motions. The plaintiff appealed.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. See\\n\\nSch. Union No. 37 v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., 617 F.3d 554, 558 (1st\\n\\nCir. 2010). In undertaking that review, we \\\"draw[] all reasonable\\n\\ninferences in favor of the non-moving party while ignoring\\n\\n'conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported\\n\\n\\n - 8 -\\n\\fspeculation.'\\\" Shafmaster v. United States, 707 F.3d 130, 135\\n\\n(1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d\\n\\n314, 325 (1st Cir. 2009)).\\n\\n We may affirm only if the record reveals \\\"no genuine\\n\\ndispute as to any material fact and [that] the movant is entitled\\n\\nto judgment as a matter of law.\\\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute\\n\\nis \\\"genuine\\\" if \\\"a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor\\n\\nof the nonmoving party.\\\" Meuser v. Fed. Express Corp., 564 F.3d\\n\\n507, 515 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Suarez v. Pueblo Int'l, Inc.,\\n\\n229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2000)).\\n\\n In granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment\\n\\non qualified immunity grounds, the District Court relied on the\\n\\nfirst prong of the qualified immunity analysis. That prong\\n\\nconcerns whether \\\"a plaintiff plead[ed] facts showing . . . that\\n\\nthe official violated a statutory or constitutional right.\\\"\\n\\nAshcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (citing Harlow v.\\n\\nFitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The District Court\\n\\nconcluded that no reasonable jury could conclude from the record\\n\\nthat Parent had violated the Eighth Amendment or that Marshall had\\n\\nviolated the First Amendment or Eighth Amendment. On appeal,\\n\\nStaples contends that the District Court erred in construing the\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 9 -\\n\\frecord because it reveals a \\\"genuine dispute\\\" as to whether the\\n\\ndefendants violated those constitutional provisions.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n We begin with Staples's Eighth Amendment claim against\\n\\nParent for pushing him against the pillar in the CCU. \\\"A claim of\\n\\ncruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment\\n\\nhas two components -- one subjective, focusing on the defendant's\\n\\nmotive for his conduct, and the other objective, focusing on the\\n\\nconduct's effect.\\\" Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 268 (2d Cir.\\n\\n2009) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1992); Blyden\\n\\nv. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 262 (2d Cir. 1999)).\\n\\n To prevail on the objective prong, Staples must show\\n\\nthat \\\"the alleged wrongdoing was objectively 'harmful enough' to\\n\\nestablish a constitutional violation.\\\" Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8\\n\\n(quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). The\\n\\nsubjective prong turns on \\\"whether force was applied in a good\\n\\nfaith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and\\n\\nsadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.\\\" Whitley v.\\n\\nAlbers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481\\n\\nF.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied sub nom.\\n\\nJohn v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)). The \\\"factors\\\" that \\\"are\\n\\nrelevant to that ultimate determination\\\" include \\\"the extent of\\n\\nthe threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably\\n\\nperceived by the responsible officials,\\\" \\\"the need for the\\n\\n\\n - 10 -\\n\\fapplication of force,\\\" \\\"the relationship between the need and the\\n\\namount of force that was used,\\\" \\\"the extent of the injury\\n\\ninflicted,\\\" and \\\"any efforts made to temper the severity of a\\n\\nforceful response.\\\" Id. at 321 (citations and internal quotation\\n\\nmarks omitted).\\n\\n The District Court, reaching only the subjective prong\\n\\nof the inquiry, concluded that the record compelled the conclusion\\n\\nthat Parent had acted \\\"in a good-faith effort to maintain or\\n\\nrestore discipline\\\" and therefore without \\\"malicious[] and\\n\\nsadistic[]\\\" intent. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. On appeal, Staples\\n\\ncontends that \\\"the District Court failed to consider evidence from\\n\\nwhich a jury could conclude that Parent's use of force was planned,\\n\\nsadistic and unnecessary.\\\" But, we do not agree.\\n\\n Parent testified that he was prompted to use the force\\n\\nat issue because he was \\\"surpris[ed]\\\" when Staples \\\"aggressively\\n\\nripped [the form] up.\\\" Parent testified that he thus immediately\\n\\n\\\"put [Staples] against the wall to be handcuffed\\\" \\\"[b]ecause that\\n\\nwas . . . an unusual incident and [he] took control of it as\\n\\nquickly as [he] possibly could.\\\"\\n\\n Staples does not dispute that his \\\"defiance of\\n\\n[Parent's] order[s]\\\" by ripping up the statement form \\\"could\\n\\nreasonably be thought to present a threat to\\\" Parent's safety.\\n\\nWhitley, 475 U.S. at 323-24; see also Stenzel v. Ellis, 916 F.2d\\n\\n423, 426 (8th Cir. 1990) (\\\"When a prisoner, having been warned\\n\\n\\n - 11 -\\n\\fthree times, refuses to comply with a legitimate jail security\\n\\nregulation, the incident has escalated into a\\n\\n'disturbance . . . that indisputably poses significant risks to\\n\\nthe safety of inmates and prison staff.'\\\" (quoting Whitley, 475\\n\\nU.S. at 320)). Thus, this case is not one in which a reasonable\\n\\njury could conclude, even on the officer's own account of why force\\n\\nwas needed, that it was wanton based on an inference that there\\n\\nwas no \\\"need for the application of force.\\\" Whitley, 475 U.S. at\\n\\n321.\\n\\n Nor could a reasonable jury infer from the undisputed\\n\\nrecord that \\\"the relationship between the need and the amount of\\n\\nforce that was used\\\" supports a finding that the use of force was\\n\\nwanton. Id. Staples conceded during his deposition that Parent\\n\\nrestrained him in \\\"one quick movement.\\\" See, e.g., Wright, 554\\n\\nF.3d at 270 (relying on concession made in plaintiff's deposition\\n\\ntestimony). And, while the parties disagree as to whether Staples\\n\\nin fact hit his head against the pillar, Staples admitted that he\\n\\nhit his head \\\"in the course of [Parent] pushing [him] to the pole\\\"\\n\\nand that Parent did not \\\"grab[] his head and slam[] it into the\\n\\npole.\\\" See, e.g., Guitron v. Paul, 675 F.3d 1044, 1046 (7th Cir.\\n\\n2012) (finding that officer did not act \\\"maliciously and\\n\\nsadistically\\\" where he \\\"twisted\\\" inmate's wrist and \\\"slammed\\\" him\\n\\ninto a wall because the officer \\\"did not use any force until [the\\n\\ninmate] disobeyed a command that was designed to maintain order\\n\\n\\n - 12 -\\n\\fwithin the prison; and, when [the officer] applied modest force,\\n\\n[the inmate] remained defiant\\\").\\n\\n Staples does point to what he contends was Parent's\\n\\nstatement during the incident, \\\"[t]ell me why you want to be PC,\\\"\\n\\nwhen he handed him the statement form. Staples also points to\\n\\nwhat he contends was Parent's subsequent admission to him, in a\\n\\nconversation shortly after the CCU incident, that Parent \\\"knew\\n\\n[Staples] wasn't going to shave\\\" and the \\\"whole PC thing . . . was\\n\\n[his] plan to try to get [Staples] to shave.\\\"\\n\\n But, even crediting Staples's testimony that Parent made\\n\\nthese statements, they at most show that Parent wanted to pressure\\n\\nStaples into shaving. Neither statement suffices to permit a\\n\\nreasonable jury to find that Parent pushed Staples into the pillar\\n\\nfor a reason other than the one that Parent gave -- namely, that\\n\\nStaples posed a security risk at the time of the push due to his\\n\\ndefiant act of ripping up the statement form. In fact, beyond\\n\\n\\\"general attacks upon the defendant's credibility,\\\" Staples points\\n\\nto no \\\"affirmative evidence,\\\" Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S.\\n\\n574, 600 (1998), that could suffice to rebut Parent's deposition\\n\\ntestimony that he was prompted to use force to \\\"t[a]ke control\\\" of\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 13 -\\n\\fthe situation when Staples \\\"aggressively ripped [the statement\\n\\nform] up.\\\"1\\n\\n We thus conclude that \\\"the evidence, viewed in the light\\n\\nmost favorable to the plaintiff, [does not] support a reliable\\n\\ninference of wantonness in the infliction of pain.\\\" Whitley, 475\\n\\nU.S. at 322. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court's grant of\\n\\nsummary judgment to Parent on this claim.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n We turn, then, to Staples's First Amendment and Eighth\\n\\nAmendment claims against Marshall for using pepper spray against\\n\\nhim. We start with the First Amendment retaliation claim.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n To make out a prima facie case of First Amendment\\n\\nretaliation, Staples must demonstrate that: (1) he engaged in an\\n\\nactivity protected by the First Amendment; (2) Marshall took an\\n\\nadverse action against him; and (3) there is a causal link between\\n\\nthe protected activity and the adverse action. See Hannon v.\\n\\nBeard, 645 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2011). The government concedes,\\n\\nfor the purposes of this appeal, that Staples's suit challenging\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n To the extent that Staples means to argue that Parent's\\nalleged attempt to label him as a \\\"PC\\\" inmate constitutes an\\nindependent use of force that is also actionable under the Eighth\\nAmendment, Staples did not make this argument in any developed\\nmanner below. See United States v. Rodriguez, 311 F.3d 435, 437\\n(1st Cir. 2002) (\\\"[A] waived issue ordinarily cannot be resurrected\\non appeal.\\\").\\n\\n\\n - 14 -\\n\\fNHDOC's facial hair policy is protected activity under the First\\n\\nAmendment and that the use of pepper spray on an inmate is adverse\\n\\nin the context of retaliation. \\\"The heart of the matter,\\n\\ntherefore, is the third element of the prima facie case: the\\n\\npresence or absence of a causal link between the protected activity\\n\\nundertaken by the plaintiff and the adverse action that he\\n\\nexperienced.\\\" Id. at 49.\\n\\n To make out the third element of the prima facie case,\\n\\nStaples must show that his protected activity \\\"was a substantial\\n\\nor motivating factor for the adverse [action].\\\" Padilla–García v.\\n\\nRodríguez, 212 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2000). Even if Staples\\n\\nsucceeds in making that showing, however, the government may \\\"still\\n\\nprevail[] by showing that [Marshall] would have reached the same\\n\\ndecision in the absence of the protected conduct.\\\" Crawford-El,\\n\\n523 U.S. at 593 (citing Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429\\n\\nU.S. 274, 287 (1977)); see also Padilla–García, 212 F.3d at 74;\\n\\nMcCue v. Bradstreet, 807 F.3d 334, 338 (1st Cir. 2015).\\n\\n The District Court concluded that \\\"even if the evidence\\n\\n[that Staples] cites is minimally sufficient to establish that\\n\\nMarshall was angry with Staples for filing the 2014 lawsuit, the\\n\\nother undisputed evidence . . . leaves no doubt that [Marshall]\\n\\nwould have taken the same action regardless of any retaliatory\\n\\nmotive.\\\" We need not decide whether the District Court was correct\\n\\nin this respect, because we conclude that Staples has not met his\\n\\n\\n - 15 -\\n\\fburden to show that a reasonable jury could conclude from this\\n\\nrecord that his protected activity was a \\\"substantial or motivating\\n\\nfactor\\\" for Marshall's decision to use pepper spray against him.\\n\\nPadilla–García, 212 F.3d at 74.\\n\\n To argue otherwise, Staples points out that he had filed\\n\\nthe prison lawsuit in December 2014, seven months before Marshall's\\n\\nuse of pepper spray in July 2015. And, as evidence of Marshall's\\n\\nanimus toward Staples for filing the suit, Staples points to\\n\\nMarshall's alleged sending of the \\\"Hurt Feelings Report\\\" in\\n\\nDecember 2014, shortly after Staples had first filed the suit\\n\\nagainst the prison and to Marshall's earlier alleged comment to\\n\\nhim in September 2013 that \\\"I can't wait to see what that face\\n\\nlooks like without a beard\\\" in connection with his move to the\\n\\nCCU. Staples also points to motions that he filed in the lawsuit\\n\\na week before Marshall used the pepper spray.2 \\\"[This] chronology\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n We note that the record contains no evidence that Marshall\\nwas aware of any motion filed in the lawsuit -- let alone that\\nparticular motion -- prior to his use of the pepper spray. See\\nAmbrose v. Twp. of Robinson, Pa., 303 F.3d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 2002)\\n(\\\"It is only intuitive that for protected conduct to be a\\nsubstantial or motiving factor in a decision, the decisionmakers\\nmust be aware of the protected conduct.\\\"). The government also\\npoints out that the lawsuit involved frequent filings by Staples,\\nwhich generated more than 140 docket entries over the span of a\\nyear.\\n\\n\\n - 16 -\\n\\fof events,\\\" Staples contends, \\\"gives rise to an inference of\\n\\nretaliation.\\\" Hannon, 645 F.3d at 49.\\n\\n But, the record \\\"points to another explanation\\\" for\\n\\nMarshall's decision to use pepper spray -- Staples's multiple\\n\\nrefusals to leave his cell in the days before Marshall's use of\\n\\npepper spray -- \\\"that is so obviously correct as to render the\\n\\ncharge of improper motivation implausible.\\\" Maloy v. Ballori-\\n\\nLage, 744 F.3d 250, 253 (1st Cir. 2014); cf. Micheo-Acevedo v.\\n\\nStericycle of Puerto Rico, Inc., 897 F.3d 360, 366 (1st Cir. 2018),\\n\\ncert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1297 (2019) (noting, in the employment\\n\\ncontext, that \\\"proximity in timing does not alone suffice to create\\n\\na genuine issue of material fact as to [causation]\\\" where the\\n\\nplaintiff's \\\"own unprotected conduct readily explains the timing\\n\\nof . . . the adverse . . . action[]\\\"); Bonilla-Ramirez v. MVM,\\n\\nInc., 904 F.3d 88, 96 (1st Cir. 2018) (same).\\n\\n Here, Marshall testified that his \\\"plan\\\" was \\\"[t]o use\\n\\nthe OC [spray] . . . to get [Staples] to cuff up and come out of\\n\\nhis cell.\\\" Consistent with Marshall's testimony, Staples\\n\\ntestified that he refused the orders to cuff up, that he expected\\n\\nMarshall to \\\"assemble a team and do an extraction\\\" in response to\\n\\nhis refusals, and that he told Marshall to \\\"spray me, tase me, do\\n\\nwhatever the fuck you want\\\" immediately after Marshall warned him\\n\\nthat pepper spray would be used if he continued to refuse to\\n\\ncomply. Thus, Staples does not contest that the conduct that\\n\\n\\n - 17 -\\n\\fMarshall identified as supplying the \\\"justification for using the\\n\\npepper spray against [him]\\\" -- namely, Staples's refusal to cuff\\n\\nup and to leave his cell -- in fact took place. Stallworth v.\\n\\nTyson, 578 F. App'x 948, 951 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam).\\n\\n Nor does Staples contend that Marshall orchestrated the\\n\\nplan to move Staples to a different cell in order to create an\\n\\nexcuse to use pepper spray against him.3 Cf. id. (concluding that\\n\\ngenuine dispute existed as to whether an officer \\\"in fact responded\\n\\nto [plaintiff's] attempt to hurt himself with a razor\\\" where\\n\\nplaintiff averred that the officer \\\"set up\\\" plaintiff by throwing\\n\\nthe razor into the plaintiff's cell). In fact, the undisputed\\n\\nrecord shows that Marshall did not single Staples out for the use\\n\\nof pepper spray. Cf. Saleh v. Upadhyay, 11 F. App'x 241, 257 (4th\\n\\nCir. 2001) (per curiam) (finding genuine issue as to causation\\n\\nwhere the adverse action was taken only against one of six\\n\\nsimilarly situated employees and the employer \\\"presented no\\n\\nevidence to justify the decision to single out [the plaintiff] for\\n\\n[the adverse] treatment\\\"). Rather, Marshall testified that he\\n\\nhad, pursuant to prison policy, used pepper spray on inmates \\\"six\\n\\nto 10\\\" times before. And, Staples points to no contrary evidence\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n Staples does not contend that the move to I-tier was itself\\nthe adverse action for purposes of the First Amendment retaliation\\nclaim.\\n\\n\\n - 18 -\\n\\f\\\"that would support an inference of differential treatment.\\\" Air\\n\\nSunshine, Inc. v. Carl, 663 F.3d 27, 37 (1st Cir. 2011).\\n\\n Staples does try to make the case that Marshall\\n\\n\\\"deviat[ed] from standard operating procedures\\\" in using the\\n\\npepper spray. Hannon, 645 F.3d at 49. But, the record shows that\\n\\nNHDOC Policy and Procedure Directive 5.58 authorizes officers to\\n\\nuse pepper spray after \\\"verbal directives fail to result in an\\n\\ninmate's compliance with officers' commands,\\\" including \\\"after\\n\\n[an] inmate has indicated his refusal to leave [his] cell and is\\n\\nnot complying with staff orders.\\\" When an officer employs pepper\\n\\nspray for such a purpose, NHDOC policy requires the officer to\\n\\nwarn the inmate prior to using the spray, to videotape the use of\\n\\nthe spray, and to disengage and consider other options if the use\\n\\nof the spray does not result in the inmate's compliance. It is\\n\\nundisputed that Marshall complied with these requirements. See\\n\\nAir Sunshine, 663 F.3d at 36 (rejecting plaintiff's First Amendment\\n\\nretaliation claim where there was no basis to conclude that \\\"the\\n\\nrelevant procedures were not followed by [the defendant]\\\").\\n\\n Staples does contend that Marshall violated NHDOC policy\\n\\nby not first attempting to physically extract Staples before\\n\\nresorting to the use of pepper spray. But, an officer -- unnamed\\n\\nin the suit and certified by New Hampshire Police Standards and\\n\\nTraining in the use of pepper spray -- declared in an affidavit\\n\\nthat, under NHDOC policy, \\\"a physical cell extraction is typically\\n\\n\\n - 19 -\\n\\fviewed as a last resort means of gaining an inmate's compliance\\n\\nwith leaving a cell\\\" and that pepper spray is viewed as \\\"a minimal\\n\\nuse of force.\\\" Staples points to nothing in the record to rebut\\n\\nthis competent evidence besides his own speculative testimony that\\n\\nNHDOC policy requires officers to first attempt a physical\\n\\nextraction. See Hannon, 645 F.3d at 49 (\\\"[A]ffidavits and\\n\\ndeposition testimony are effective in opposing summary judgment\\n\\nonly when they are given on personal knowledge, set out facts that\\n\\nwould be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant . . . is\\n\\ncompetent to testify about the matter in question.\\\").\\n\\n Thus, we affirm the District Court's grant of summary\\n\\njudgment to Marshall on Staples's First Amendment retaliation\\n\\nclaim. We turn, then, to Staples's separate claim that Marshall's\\n\\nuse of pepper spray violated the Eighth Amendment.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n \\\"[A]lthough it is not per se unconstitutional for guards\\n\\nto spray mace at prisoners confined in their cells, it is necessary\\n\\nto examine the 'totality of the circumstances, including the\\n\\nprovocation, the amount of [spray] used, and the purposes for which\\n\\nthe [spray] is used [to] determin[e] the validity of the use of\\n\\n[spray] in the prison environment.'\\\" Williams v. Benjamin, 77\\n\\nF.3d 756, 763 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Bailey v. Turner, 736 F.2d\\n\\n963, 969 (4th Cir. 1984)). Here, as we have explained, Marshall\\n\\ntestified that he used pepper spray for a \\\"valid[]\\\" \\\"purpose\\\" -- to\\n\\n\\n - 20 -\\n\\fextract Staples from his cell -- in response to a \\\"valid[]\\\"\\n\\n\\\"provocation\\\" -- Staples refusing multiple orders over several\\n\\ndays to leave his cell. Id.\\n\\n The record amply supports that testimony, and the\\n\\nevidence of Marshall's prior comments to Staples concerning his\\n\\nbeard do not suffice to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that\\n\\nMarshall acted for a reason other than the one that he gave. See\\n\\nSkinner v. Cunningham, 430 F.3d 483, 488 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding\\n\\nno Eighth Amendment violation where an \\\"extraction team sprayed a\\n\\nnon-lethal chemical irritant (derived from cayenne pepper) into\\n\\nthe cell to make [plaintiff] exit the cell without direct physical\\n\\nforce\\\"); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 195 (9th Cir. 1979)\\n\\n(holding \\\"that use of [tear gas] in small amounts may be a\\n\\nnecessary prison technique if a prisoner refuses after adequate\\n\\nwarning to move from a cell\\\"); Allen v. Bosley, 253 F. App'x 658,\\n\\n659 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding the use of pepper spray permissible\\n\\nafter inmate \\\"refused to comply with orders to submit to standard\\n\\nhandcuffing procedure and attempted to block a cell extraction\\n\\nteam from entering his cell\\\"); Rodriguez v. Elmore, 407 F. App'x\\n\\n124, 126 (9th Cir. 2010) (mem.) (same); cf. Torres-Viera v. Laboy-\\n\\nAlvarado, 311 F.3d 105, 108 (1st Cir. 2002) (granting officers\\n\\nqualified immunity where they used tear gas to \\\"respond[] to a\\n\\nsecurity disturbance\\\"); Passmore v. Ianello, 528 F. App'x 144, 148\\n\\n(3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (holding that \\\"the use of pepper spray\\n\\n\\n - 21 -\\n\\fwas reasonable\\\" where defendant \\\"refused to present himself for a\\n\\nmandatory shower at least nine times\\\" before the use of the spray).\\n\\n Nor does the \\\"amount of [spray] used\\\" by Marshall suffice\\n\\nin and of itself to permit a reasonable jury to infer wantonness.\\n\\nWilliams, 77 F.3d at 763 (internal quotation marks omitted). The\\n\\nundisputed record shows that Marshall used a cone nozzle that\\n\\nproduced a mist instead of a harsher stream of pepper spray, that\\n\\nMarshall directed the pepper spray into Staples's cell and not at\\n\\nStaples's person, that Marshall sprayed the pepper spray into the\\n\\nplaintiff's cell for approximately nine seconds, and that Staples\\n\\nwas promptly offered a shower and medical attention after the\\n\\nincident. This case is thus not like those cases on which Staples\\n\\nrelies \\\"where . . . summary judgment in Eighth Amendment excessive\\n\\nforce claims based on pepper spraying\\\" was denied. Burns v. Eaton,\\n\\n752 F.3d 1136, 1140 (8th Cir. 2014). The officers' use of pepper\\n\\nspray in those cases \\\"involved no warning th[e] force would be\\n\\nused, no apparent purpose other than inflicting pain, use of\\n\\nunnecessary 'super-soaker' quantities of the chemical, refusal to\\n\\nallow the victim to wash off the painful chemical for days, and/or\\n\\nuse of additional physical force\\\" and therefore permitted an\\n\\ninference of wantonness. Id. (citing Walker v. Bowersox, 526 F.3d\\n\\n1186, 1189 (8th Cir. 2008); Treats v. Morgan, 308 F.3d 868, 873\\n\\n(8th Cir. 2002); Lawrence v. Bowersox, 297 F.3d 727, 730, 732 (8th\\n\\nCir. 2002)).\\n\\n\\n - 22 -\\n\\f V.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District\\n\\nCourt's grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the\\n\\nplaintiff's First Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims. Each\\n\\nparty shall bear its own costs.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 23 -\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1490,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4613233,"string":"4,613,233"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"In RE: Edgar A. REYES-COLON, Involuntary Debtor. Popular Auto, Inc.; Banco Popular De Puerto Rico, Appellees, Cross-Appellants, v. Edgar A. Reyes-Colon, Appellant, Cross-Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Popular Auto, Inc. v. Reyes-Colon (In Re Reyes-Colon)"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-24"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-1971P"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Howard, Thompson, Kayatta\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"KAYATTA, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the First Circuit\\n\\n\\nNos. 17-1971, 17-1972\\n\\n IN RE: EDGAR A. REYES-COLON,\\n\\n Involuntary Debtor.\\n\\n\\n POPULAR AUTO, INC.;\\n BANCO POPULAR DE PUERTO RICO,\\n\\n Appellees, Cross-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n EDGAR A. REYES-COLON,\\n\\n Appellant, Cross-Appellee.\\n\\n\\n APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO\\n\\n [Hon. Gustavo A. Gelpí, Jr., U.S. District Judge]\\n\\n\\n Before\\n\\n Howard, Chief Judge,\\n Thompson and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\n Michael J. Fencer, with whom Lynne F. Riley, David Koha, and\\nCasner & Edwards, LLP were on brief, for appellant and cross-\\nappellee.\\n Roberto Abesada-Agüet, with whom Sergio E. Criado, Correa-\\nAcevedo & Abesada Law Offices, PSC, Eldia Díaz-Olmo, Díaz-Olmo Law\\nOffices, Gerardo Pavía Cabanillas, and Pavía & Lazaro, PSC were on\\nbrief, for appellees and cross-appellants.\\n\\f April 24, 2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\t\\n\\f KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. Edgar Reyes-Colon (\\\"Reyes-\\n\\nColon\\\"), a licensed plastic surgeon specializing in facial\\n\\ncosmetic surgery, allegedly failed to repay certain debts. In\\n\\nNovember 2006, one of his creditors, Banco Popular de Puerto Rico\\n\\n(\\\"Banco Popular\\\"), filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition that\\n\\na second creditor, Popular Auto (collectively, \\\"the Banks\\\"),\\n\\njoined. Under 11 U.S.C. § 303(b), fewer than three petitioning\\n\\ncreditors cannot force a debtor into bankruptcy unless the debtor\\n\\nhas fewer than twelve creditors in total. So the parties embarked\\n\\non what has now turned into twelve years of litigation concerning\\n\\nthe number of Reyes-Colon's creditors and whether he might somehow\\n\\nbe placed in bankruptcy involuntarily for \\\"equitable\\\" reasons.\\n\\nFor the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the bankruptcy\\n\\ncourt to dismiss the petition for want of a third petitioner.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Reyes-Colon obtained a loan from Popular Auto and\\n\\nguaranteed an affiliate's loan from Banco Popular. On November 22,\\n\\n2006, after Reyes-Colon allegedly failed to pay his debts, Banco\\n\\nPopular filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition, forcing Reyes-\\n\\nColon into bankruptcy proceedings. Popular Auto joined the\\n\\npetition shortly thereafter.\\n\\n In early 2007 the bankruptcy court dismissed the\\n\\ninvoluntary petition, concluding that Reyes-Colon had more than\\n\\ntwelve eligible creditors at the time the involuntary petition was\\n - 3 -\\n\\ffiled and that, after a reasonable opportunity, Banco Popular had\\n\\nfailed to join a third creditor to maintain the petition under\\n\\nsection 303(b)(1). See In re Reyes-Colon, Nos. PR 07-053, 06-\\n\\n04675-GAC, 2008 WL 8664760, at *1 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. Nov. 21, 2008).\\n\\nA year and a half later, the bankruptcy appellate panel (\\\"BAP\\\")\\n\\nset aside the dismissal and remanded the case. Id. The panel\\n\\ndetermined that all creditors should have been given notice and\\n\\nthe opportunity for a hearing before the bankruptcy court dismissed\\n\\nthe case. Id. at *8.\\n\\n Reyes-Colon did not appeal that panel ruling. Instead,\\n\\nthe parties returned to the bankruptcy court for another three-\\n\\nplus years of proceedings. On March 2, 2011, Reyes-Colon moved\\n\\nfor summary judgment, again seeking dismissal of the petition.\\n\\nThe bankruptcy court partially granted the motion on May 23, 2012,\\n\\nholding that Reyes-Colon had fifteen qualified creditors at the\\n\\ntime the involuntary petition was filed. In re Reyes-Colon, 474\\n\\nB.R. 330, 383, 391 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2012). The court nevertheless\\n\\nallowed the parties to conduct discovery and present evidence on\\n\\nwhether \\\"special circumstances\\\" existed to excuse compliance with\\n\\nsection 303(b)(1)'s three-creditor requirement and whether Reyes-\\n\\nColon had been paying his debts as they became due. Id. at 391.\\n\\n The bankruptcy court eventually held evidentiary\\n\\nhearings in late 2015. On September 2, 2016, the bankruptcy court\\n\\ndismissed the involuntary petition, citing Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S.\\n - 4 -\\n\\f415 (2014). In re Reyes-Colon, 558 B.R. 563, 568 (Bankr. D.P.R.\\n\\n2016), rev'd, No. 16-2638 (GAG), 2017 WL 6365433 (D.P.R. Aug. 9,\\n\\n2017). The court found that although Reyes-Colon schemed to\\n\\ndefraud his creditors by misrepresenting his finances, id. at 565,\\n\\nthe court did not have the equitable power to override the\\n\\nprovisions of section 303(b)(1), id. at 568. The Banks appealed\\n\\nto the district court.\\n\\n The district court reversed the dismissal order and\\n\\nremanded to the bankruptcy court. In re Reyes-Colon, 2017 WL\\n\\n6365433, at *1. It found that the involuntary petition did not\\n\\nneed three or more petitioning creditors because Reyes-Colon had\\n\\nfewer than twelve eligible creditors when the petition was filed.\\n\\nId. The court also found that Reyes-Colon was generally not paying\\n\\nhis debts as they became due, and required entry of an order of\\n\\nrelief against Reyes-Colon on remand pursuant to\\n\\nsection 303(h)(1). Id. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Section 303(b) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that an\\n\\ninvoluntary petition against a debtor have at least three\\n\\npetitioning creditors if, at the time the petition was filed, the\\n\\ndebtor had twelve or more eligible creditors. 11 U.S.C.\\n\\n§ 303(b)(1)-(2). Reyes-Colon argues that he had twelve or more\\n\\ncreditors at the time the petition was filed, and that the\\n\\n\\n - 5 -\\n\\finvoluntary petition is therefore insufficient because there are\\n\\nonly two petitioning creditors -- Banco Popular and Popular Auto.\\n\\n In response, the Banks raise two types of arguments.\\n\\nFirst, they claim that Reyes-Colon has procedurally waived his\\n\\nright to put forward the arguments that might arguably support his\\n\\nposition. Second, they argue on the merits that the bankruptcy\\n\\ncourt did indeed err in dismissing their petition.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n We begin with the several asserted threshold issues of\\n\\nwaiver raised by the Banks. When the Banks appealed the bankruptcy\\n\\ncourt summary judgment rulings at issue to the district court,\\n\\nthey argued, among other things, that the bankruptcy court erred\\n\\nin determining that Reyes-Colon had fifteen eligible creditors as\\n\\nof the date the involuntary bankruptcy petition was filed. In\\n\\nresponse, as appellee, Reyes-Colon argued only that the Banks had\\n\\nfailed to preserve the creditor numerosity issue. The district\\n\\ncourt then ruled that Reyes-Colon had fewer than twelve eligible\\n\\ncreditors as of the date of filing and that he was generally not\\n\\npaying his debts as they came due. In re Reyes-Colon, 2017 WL\\n\\n6365433, at *1. In Reyes-Colon's opening brief in this court, he\\n\\nasserts that the bankruptcy court correctly determined that he had\\n\\nmore than twelve eligible creditors when Banco Popular filed its\\n\\npetition and that the district court erred in ruling otherwise.\\n\\nHe devotes very little argument to this effect. Rather, he quotes\\n - 6 -\\n\\fthe statute's text, argues briefly that the burden of proof rests\\n\\non the petitioning creditors, purports to incorporate and refer us\\n\\nto the bankruptcy court's summary judgment order for further\\n\\nexplanation, and then briefly argues that there was at least one\\n\\nother creditor overlooked by the bankruptcy court.\\n\\n The Banks claim waiver by Reyes-Colon, twice over.\\n\\nFirst, they say that by failing to present an argument on the\\n\\nnumber of creditors to the district court, Reyes-Colon waived the\\n\\nability to later defend the bankruptcy court ruling on that issue.\\n\\nSecond, the Banks argue that by failing to develop more fully his\\n\\nargument in favor of the bankruptcy court ruling in his opening\\n\\nbrief in this court, Reyes-Colon again waived his ability to\\n\\ncontend on appeal that he had twelve or more creditors when the\\n\\npetition was filed.\\n\\n These two contentions of waiver pose relatively tricky\\n\\nissues of appellate procedure on which there is no controlling\\n\\nprecedent that has come to our attention. Title 28 U.S.C.\\n\\n§ 158(a)-(b) provides for intermediate appeals either to the\\n\\ndistrict court or to the BAP. See also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8003-\\n\\n05. A party who loses that intermediate review may either accept\\n\\nthe loss and return to the bankruptcy court, with the BAP or\\n\\ndistrict court ruling controlling, see, e.g., In re Hermosilla,\\n\\n450 B.R. 276, 287-88 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011), or may appeal to this\\n\\ncourt, see 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). In the event of an appeal to\\n - 7 -\\n\\fthis court, however, we do not review per se the BAP or district\\n\\ncourt ruling. Rather, we \\\"assess[] the bankruptcy court's decision\\n\\ndirectly,\\\" In re DeMore, 844 F.3d 292, 296 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting\\n\\nIn re Sheedy, 801 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2015)), giving no deference\\n\\nto the intermediate appellate ruling, see In re IDC Clambakes,\\n\\nInc., 852 F.3d 50, 59 (1st Cir. 2017). In short, once a notice of\\n\\nappeal to this court has been filed, the operative ruling under\\n\\nreview is the bankruptcy court ruling, with the BAP or district\\n\\ncourt ruling serving more or less like an amicus brief (albeit one\\n\\nthat can be extremely helpful). In re Old Cold LLC, 879 F.3d 376,\\n\\n383 n.2 (1st Cir. 2018).\\n\\n One resulting oddity is that when the BAP or district\\n\\ncourt disagrees with the bankruptcy court, the appellant in this\\n\\ncourt is the party supporting the ruling under review (the\\n\\nbankruptcy court ruling). Generally, such a party nevertheless\\n\\nexplains in its initial brief why the BAP or district court erred,\\n\\ntreating the intermediate appellate opinion in effect as if it\\n\\nwere the opening brief. Here, though, the district court opinion\\n\\nsaid almost nothing on point (for a reason we will explain next).\\n\\nAnd Reyes-Colon claims to be happy with the bankruptcy court's\\n\\nopinion, with one small exception. So, Reyes-Colon in his opening\\n\\nbrief simply refers us to the bankruptcy court's summary judgment\\n\\norder to demonstrate, in his words, \\\"that [the Banks] failed to\\n\\n\\n - 8 -\\n\\fcarry their burden of proof that, as of the petition date, Reyes-\\n\\nColon had fewer than 12 eligible creditors.\\\"\\n\\n This court has held that \\\"[a]rguments incorporated into\\n\\na brief solely by reference to district court filings are deemed\\n\\nwaived.\\\" United States v. Burgos-Montes, 786 F.3d 92, 111 (1st\\n\\nCir. 2015). But that rule comes from cases where the appellant\\n\\nhas lost in the district court and is seeking to alter a judgment\\n\\nor order through appellate review. There is no controlling\\n\\nprecedent that deems it a defalcation of any type for an appellant\\n\\nwho defends a lower court ruling to rest on that ruling. If a\\n\\nparty truly feels content to rely on the opinion of the bankruptcy\\n\\ncourt as if it were the party's brief, and given that the appellant\\n\\nin a case like this files his brief before the appellee files a\\n\\nbrief criticizing the bankruptcy court decision, we see no reason\\n\\nto deem the defense of that decision to be waived because it is\\n\\nnot restated at length in the opening brief.\\n\\n This is not to say that waiver poses no risk to those\\n\\nwho adopt such an approach. Any argument not in the bankruptcy\\n\\ncourt's opinion will, by definition, be absent from the opening\\n\\nbrief and might be treated as waived. But see Buntin v. City of\\n\\nBos., 813 F.3d 401, 404 (1st Cir. 2015) (observing that this court\\n\\nis not \\\"wedded to the district court's reasoning,\\\" but may affirm\\n\\n\\\"on any basis made evident by the record\\\"). Nor is anything we\\n\\nsay here intended to preclude a party in a case such as this from\\n - 9 -\\n\\fseeking a procedural order changing the order of briefing. Indeed,\\n\\nperhaps a rule deeming the \\\"appellant\\\" to be the party asking us\\n\\nto reverse or vacate the bankruptcy court ruling might make sense.\\n\\nAs matters now stand, though, we reject the Banks' arguments that\\n\\nReyes-Colon has waived his defense of the bankruptcy court's ruling\\n\\nby failing to do more than incorporate it by reference in his brief\\n\\nto this court.\\n\\n The second potential waiver poses a more difficult\\n\\nquestion: To what extent should we require the party who prevails\\n\\nin the bankruptcy court to shepherd on intermediate review by the\\n\\ndistrict court (or the BAP) any arguments that the party will later\\n\\nwant to raise before this court? Because we look through the\\n\\nruling of the intermediate court and review the bankruptcy court\\n\\nruling directly, see In re DeMore, 844 F.3d at 296, one might\\n\\nlogically reason that either party need simply go through the\\n\\nmotions of an intermediate appeal if that party believes that the\\n\\ncase will end up in this court anyway. Permitting parties to treat\\n\\nthe intermediate appeal in that manner, however, would be the\\n\\nequivalent of allowing the parties to forgo a stage of review\\n\\ngenerally mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 158.1 Furthermore, it would\\n\\ndeprive this court of the benefit of the intermediate court's\\n\\nconsidered assessment of the arguments raised on appeal. Here,\\n\\n\\n 1 In limited circumstances, bankruptcy decisions may be\\ndirectly appealed to this court. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A).\\n - 10 -\\n\\ffor example, Reyes-Colon's parsimonious brief focused on issue\\n\\npreservation may well have accounted for the district court's\\n\\ntruncated discussion of the number of creditors. We therefore\\n\\nlack the benefit of any extended analysis of the creditor\\n\\nnumerosity issue by the district court. That benefit can be\\n\\nsubstantial in bankruptcy cases, with the BAP in particular being\\n\\nwell suited to notice collateral effects of potential rulings that\\n\\nmight not be obvious to this court or to the parties. See In re\\n\\nOld Cold LLC, 879 F.3d at 383 n.2.\\n\\n At least two circuits have held that the losing party in\\n\\nthe bankruptcy court cannot raise on appeal to the circuit court\\n\\narguments not presented to the district court on intermediate\\n\\nreview. See In re Bradley, 501 F.3d 421, 433 (5th Cir. 2007);\\n\\nUnited States v. Olson, 4 F.3d 562, 567 (8th Cir. 1993). We are\\n\\naware of no authority, however, addressing the failure of a party\\n\\nwho prevails in the bankruptcy court to restate on intermediate\\n\\nreview arguments adopted by the bankruptcy court in an opinion\\n\\nexplaining its ruling. In that situation, waiver would serve\\n\\nlittle purpose because the district court (or the BAP) would\\n\\nobviously know what arguments the district court adopted as\\n\\npersuasive.\\n\\n The closer question is what to do with an argument not\\n\\ncontained in the bankruptcy court opinion and also not raised on\\n\\nintermediate appeal. One might say that because we can rely on\\n - 11 -\\n\\farguments not presented in the first instance below to sustain a\\n\\njudgment, see Buntin, 813 F.3d at 404, the presence of an\\n\\nintermediate level of review should not alter our ability to rely\\n\\non such arguments here. Alternatively, it would seem to serve all\\n\\ninterests to encourage parties to present all arguments to the\\n\\ndistrict court or the BAP to enhance the utility of the mandated\\n\\nintermediate level of review. Ultimately, we need not resolve\\n\\nthis unusual question of potential waiver because Reyes-Colon\\n\\nraises no such arguments. Rather, as we will explain, we can\\n\\naffirm the judgment here by relying only on the arguments apparent\\n\\nfrom the opinion of the bankruptcy court.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Having determined that Reyes-Colon has not waived his\\n\\nability to maintain that the bankruptcy court correctly dismissed\\n\\nthe petition for the reasons stated by that court, we turn now to\\n\\nthe merits of the Banks' critique of the bankruptcy court's\\n\\nreasoning. That critique consists of three arguments: the\\n\\nbankruptcy court erred by not placing on Reyes-Colon the burden of\\n\\nproving that he had twelve or more eligible creditors; the\\n\\nbankruptcy court erred by not finding that the Banks presented\\n\\nevidence sufficient to show that Reyes-Colon did not have twelve\\n\\nor more eligible creditors; and that, in any event, the bankruptcy\\n\\ncourt erred by not employing equitable discretion to allow the\\n\\npetition. We consider each argument in turn.\\n - 12 -\\n\\f 1.\\n\\n The bankruptcy court found that fifteen of Reyes-Colon's\\n\\ncreditors were eligible to be counted towards section 303(b)(1)'s\\n\\ncreditor numerosity requirement. In re Reyes-Colon, 474 B.R. at\\n\\n383.2 The Banks claim that the bankruptcy court erred by\\n\\neffectively placing on the Banks the burden of proving that there\\n\\nwere fewer than twelve creditors.\\n\\n The Banks misapprehend how proof of creditor numerosity\\n\\nworks in this instance. As the BAP correctly stated in a prior\\n\\nintermediary appeal in this case:\\n\\n The burden of proof with respect to\\n establishing that the Appellee had less than\\n 12 creditors rested with the petitioning\\n creditor. Once the debtor answers that there\\n are more than 12 creditors and files a list in\\n compliance with Bankruptcy Rule 1003(b), the\\n petitioning creditors bear the burden to put\\n the debtor to the test.\\n\\nIn re Reyes-Colon, 2008 WL 8664760, at *4; see also Atlas Mach. &\\n\\nIron Works, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 986 F.2d 709, 715 (4th\\n\\nCir. 1993); In re Zapas, 530 B.R. 560, 567 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015).\\n\\nIn re Fox, No. 93 C 5773, 1994 WL 484596, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2,\\n\\n1994), is not to the contrary. In Fox, the debtor's list of\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The fifteen eligible creditors were: (1) Banco Popular;\\n(2) Popular Auto; (3) R&G Financial Corporation; (4) MediCoop;\\n(5) Eurobank; (6) Westernbank; (7) Bank of America; (8) Miami Dade\\nCounty Tax Collector; (9) COS Insurance; (10) Puerto Rico\\nTelephone; (11) Banco Santander; (12) Citibank; (13) Dorado Beach\\nHOA; (14) Liberty Cable; and (15) Sun Com. See In re Reyes-Colon,\\n474 B.R. at 390.\\n - 13 -\\n\\fcreditors was both unverified and not submitted as part of the\\n\\ndebtor's motion for summary judgment. Id. at *3.\\n\\n The Banks next contend that Reyes-Colon failed to\\n\\nproduce a list of creditors sufficient to place any burden of proof\\n\\non the Banks. Reyes-Colon in fact filed a list in compliance with\\n\\nBankruptcy Rule 1003(b), listing fifty-eight creditors. See Fed.\\n\\nR. Bankr. P. 1003(b) (\\\"If the answer to an involuntary petition\\n\\nfiled by fewer than three creditors avers the existence of 12 or\\n\\nmore creditors, the debtor shall file with the answer a list of\\n\\nall creditors with their addresses, a brief statement of the nature\\n\\nof their claims, and the amounts thereof.\\\"). Later, Reyes-Colon\\n\\nconceded that he had only twenty-two creditors in addition to Banco\\n\\nPopular, as listed in his expert witness report attached to his\\n\\nsummary judgment motion. This action, the Banks argue, was a\\n\\nrejection of the original Rule 1003(b) list. Therefore, they\\n\\nreason, the bankruptcy court could no longer rely on the\\n\\nRule 1003(b) list to shift the burden of proving the number of\\n\\neligible creditors onto the Banks.\\n\\n The Banks mischaracterize Reyes-Colon's actions in\\n\\nsubmitting and relying on his expert report as \\\"rejecting\\\" his\\n\\nRule 1003(b) list. When asked which list of creditors Reyes-Colon\\n\\nintended to be operative at a status conference hearing in\\n\\nApril 2011, Reyes-Colon stated that it was the list \\\"in the expert\\n\\nwitness report.\\\" In this manner, the debtor simply pared down his\\n - 14 -\\n\\foriginal list, hardly a cause for complaint by the petitioning\\n\\ncreditors. That the expert report was not in the typical form one\\n\\nwould expect a Rule 1003(b) list to take is no matter in this\\n\\ninstance. First, Banco Popular itself stressed to the bankruptcy\\n\\ncourt that the relevant creditors list had become the smaller list\\n\\nfound in the expert report, stating that it was willing to \\\"waive\\n\\nthe request of the sworn statement\\\" by Reyes-Colon, as long as\\n\\nReyes-Colon \\\"accept[ed] that the list of creditors that is going\\n\\nto be used is the list submitted by the expert witness on his\\n\\nreport.\\\" Second, the bankruptcy court noted that it would treat\\n\\nthe list attached to Reyes-Colon's expert report as an amended\\n\\nlist. Amended Rule 1003(b) lists are not prohibited and are not\\n\\nuncommon. See, e.g., In re Acis Capital Mgmt., 584 B.R. 115, 132\\n\\n(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018); In re Bos, 561 B.R. 868, 873 (Bankr. N.D.\\n\\nFla. 2016); In re DemirCo Grp. (N. Am.), L.L.C., 343 B.R. 898,\\n\\n901-02 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2006). In short, Reyes-Colon complied\\n\\nwith Rule 1003(b) by providing the initial and then amended list\\n\\nof creditors. So, the burden did indeed shift to the Banks to\\n\\ndispute the existence or eligibility of the creditors.\\n\\n The Banks next argue that, by moving for summary\\n\\njudgment, Reyes-Colon assumed the burden of proof on the creditor\\n\\nnumerosity issue. But Rule 56 does not alter which party bears\\n\\nthe burden of proof on any issue. Rather, it controls what happens\\n\\nto a party that has the burden and fails to meet it sufficiently.\\n - 15 -\\n\\fSee Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (\\\"Rule 56(c)\\n\\nmandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a party who\\n\\nfails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of\\n\\nan element essential to that party's case, and on which that party\\n\\nwill bear the burden of proof at trial.\\\" (emphasis added)); see\\n\\nalso Delgado v. Aero Inv. Corp., 601 F. App'x 12, 15 (1st Cir.\\n\\n2015); In re Rothery, 143 F.3d 546, 549 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining\\n\\nthat after a creditor has carried its burden of coming forward\\n\\nwith evidence that the debtor had fewer than twelve creditors at\\n\\nthe time the involuntary petition was filed, the debtor's \\\"bare\\n\\nallegation\\\" of more than twelve creditors is insufficient to defeat\\n\\nsummary judgment).\\n\\n For all of these reasons, the bankruptcy court properly\\n\\nplaced the burden of proving creditor ineligibility onto the Banks.\\n\\nSee In re Reyes-Colon, 474 B.R. at 363-64. Because the Banks\\n\\nfailed to present evidence as to seven of the listed creditors,\\n\\nthe bankruptcy court correctly determined that those seven\\n\\ncreditors remained eligible for purposes of section 303(b)(1).\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n The Banks next contend that they did come forward with\\n\\nevidence sufficient to carry their burden with respect to four of\\n\\nthe remaining eight creditors found by the district court to be\\n\\neligible creditors. One of those creditors is Miami Dade County\\n\\nTax Collector. The Banks argue to us that Miami Dade County Tax\\n - 16 -\\n\\fCollector is not an eligible creditor because it received a post-\\n\\npetition voidable transfer. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(2) (excluding\\n\\ncertain voidable transfers from consideration in determining\\n\\ncreditor numerosity). But the Banks do not contest Reyes-Colon's\\n\\ncontention that they failed to raise this challenge in the\\n\\nbankruptcy court. And our law is clear that this type of failure\\n\\nin a civil case precludes a party from advancing the argument to\\n\\nsecure a reversal of the court in which the party did not raise\\n\\nthe argument, absent \\\"extraordinary circumstances.\\\" In re Net-\\n\\nVelázquez, 625 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2010).\\n\\n That leaves the Banks able only to claim that the\\n\\ndistrict court erred in finding that Westernbank, Bank of America,\\n\\nand Citibank were eligible creditors. Even if the Banks were\\n\\ncorrect on all three, Reyes-Colon would still have had, at a\\n\\nminimum, twelve eligible creditors at the time the involuntary\\n\\npetition was filed, triggering the requirement that there be at\\n\\nleast three petitioning creditors under section 303(b)(1).\\n\\n 3.\\n\\n We turn, finally, to the Banks' argument that special\\n\\ncircumstances warrant an equitable exception to the creditor\\n\\nnumerosity requirements in this case because Reyes-Colon schemed\\n\\nto defraud his creditors. See In re Reyes-Colon, 558 B.R. at 565.\\n\\n \\\"Congress has given bankruptcy courts the authority to\\n\\n'issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or\\n - 17 -\\n\\fappropriate to carry out the provisions' of the Bankruptcy Code.\\\"\\n\\nIn re Oak Knoll Assocs., L.P., 835 F.3d 24, 34 (1st Cir. 2016)\\n\\n(quoting 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)); see also Marrama v. Citizens Bank of\\n\\nMass., 549 U.S. 365, 375–76 (2007) (noting that bankruptcy courts\\n\\nhave the \\\"inherent power . . . to sanction 'abusive litigation\\n\\npractices'\\\" (quoting Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752,\\n\\n765 (1980))). This court has cautioned, however, that this\\n\\nexpression of authority should not be construed as being \\\"'a roving\\n\\nwrit, much less a free hand' to provide equitable relief.\\\" In re\\n\\nOak Knoll Assocs., L.P., 835 F.3d at 34 (quoting In re Jamo, 283\\n\\nF.3d 392, 403 (1st Cir. 2002)).\\n\\n In Siegel, 571 U.S. at 421, the Supreme Court held that\\n\\nbankruptcy courts \\\"may not contravene specific statutory\\n\\nprovisions\\\" when they exercise their statutory and inherent\\n\\npowers. The bankruptcy court had \\\"surcharge[d]\\\" a debtor's\\n\\nhomestead exemption to defray costs incurred by the bankruptcy\\n\\ntrustee who uncovered the debtor's fraudulent misrepresentations.\\n\\nId. at 420. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the\\n\\nBankruptcy Code's exemption section, 11 U.S.C. § 522, \\\"does not\\n\\ngive courts discretion to grant or withhold exemptions based on\\n\\nwhatever considerations they deem appropriate. Rather, the\\n\\nstatute exhaustively specifies the criteria that will render\\n\\nproperty exempt.\\\" Id. at 423-24, 428. The Court acknowledged\\n\\nthat its holding \\\"may produce inequitable results for trustees and\\n - 18 -\\n\\fcreditors in other cases,\\\" but recognized that Congress, in\\n\\ncreating the Bankruptcy Code, \\\"balanced the difficult choices that\\n\\nexemption limits impose on debtors with the economic harm that\\n\\nexemptions visit on creditors.\\\" Id. at 426-27 (quoting Schwab v.\\n\\nReilly, 560 U.S. 770, 791 (2010)).\\n\\n Siegel may not restrict the bankruptcy court's\\n\\ndiscretion in all instances. See, e.g., United States v. Colón-\\n\\nLedée, 772 F.3d 21, 29 n.10 (1st Cir. 2014). But it makes clear\\n\\nthat the bankruptcy court cannot \\\"override explicit mandates of\\n\\nother sections of the Bankruptcy Code.\\\" Siegel, 571 U.S. at 421\\n\\n(quoting 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 105.01[2], 105-06 (16th ed.\\n\\n2013)); see also In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d 389, 401 (1st\\n\\nCir. 2018) (citing Sunbeam Prod., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686\\n\\nF.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 2012) (\\\"What the Bankruptcy Code provides,\\n\\na judge cannot override by declaring that enforcement would be\\n\\n'inequitable.'\\\")), cert. granted in part sub nom., Mission Prod.\\n\\nHoldings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 397 (2018). Here,\\n\\nthe bankruptcy court would have plainly contravened section 303(b)\\n\\nif it bypassed the involuntary petition's creditor numerosity\\n\\ndeficiency via the \\\"special circumstances\\\" doctrine. Allowing the\\n\\ncase to proceed with only two petitioning creditors would have\\n\\nflown in the face of the Code's directive that there be three\\n\\npetitioning creditors when a debtor has more than twelve creditors\\n\\nat the time the involuntary petition was filed. 11 U.S.C.\\n - 19 -\\n\\f§ 303(b). Siegel forecloses employing equity to waive this plain\\n\\nstatutory requirement.\\n\\n The Banks nonetheless point to In re Zenga, 562 B.R. 341\\n\\n(B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2017), a decision by the Sixth Circuit BAP, to\\n\\nsupport their argument that the \\\"special circumstances\\\" doctrine\\n\\ncan be utilized to overcome section 303 deficiencies post-Siegel.\\n\\nIn Zenga, a creditor filed an involuntary petition against debtors.\\n\\nId. at 345. The debtors moved to dismiss, asserting that they had\\n\\ntwelve or more creditors at the time of filing, and that the\\n\\ninvoluntary petition was deficient under section 303(b)(1)'s\\n\\ncreditor numerosity requirement. Id. The bankruptcy court did\\n\\nnot waive the statutory numerosity requirement. Rather, it\\n\\nestopped the debtors from presenting evidence that they had more\\n\\nthan eleven creditors based on their responses to post-judgment\\n\\nsworn interrogatories that were served in prior state court\\n\\nproceedings. Id. at 345-46.\\n\\n Had Reyes-Colon led the Banks or the bankruptcy court to\\n\\nbelieve that he only had eleven or fewer creditors, a court post-\\n\\nSiegal might well have found him estopped from now presenting\\n\\nargument to the contrary. See Perry v. Blum, 629 F.3d 1, 8 (1st\\n\\nCir. 2010) (explaining that judicial estoppel \\\"prevent[s] a\\n\\nlitigant from taking a litigation position that is inconsistent\\n\\nwith a litigation position successfully asserted by him in an\\n\\nearlier phrase of the same case or in an earlier court\\n - 20 -\\n\\fproceeding\\\"). But the Banks make no such claim. Rather, they\\n\\nassert that he has conducted himself fraudulently to avoid paying\\n\\nhis debts and claiming more creditors than he has. In such a case,\\n\\nestoppel has no role to play, and Siegal otherwise provides no\\n\\nbasis for simply deeming the creditor numerosity requirement to be\\n\\ninapplicable. Dismissal of the involuntary petition was therefore\\n\\nproper.3\\n\\n III.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, the bankruptcy court's\\n\\ndecision is affirmed.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 Because we affirm for the reasons stated in the bankruptcy\\ncourt opinion, we need not address Reyes-Colon's alternative\\nargument for dismissal (that the involuntary petition was filed in\\nbad faith as an improper collection tool), nor do we need to\\ninquire as to whether that argument was waived.\\n - 21 -\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4390486/\", \"author_raw\": \"KAYATTA, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"HOWARD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"THOMPSON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KAYATTA"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613233/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: In RE: Edgar A. REYES-COLON, Involuntary Debtor. Popular Auto, Inc.; Banco Popular De Puerto Rico, Appellees, Cross-Appellants, v. Edgar A. Reyes-Colon, Appellant, Cross-Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-24\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\n\n\nNos. 17-1971, 17-1972\n\n IN RE: EDGAR A. REYES-COLON,\n\n Involuntary Debtor.\n\n\n POPULAR AUTO, INC.;\n BANCO POPULAR DE PUERTO RICO,\n\n Appellees, Cross-Appellants,\n\n v.\n\n EDGAR A. REYES-COLON,\n\n Appellant, Cross-Appellee.\n\n\n APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO\n\n [Hon. Gustavo A. Gelpí, Jr., U.S. District Judge]\n\n\n Before\n\n Howard, Chief Judge,\n Thompson and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.\n\n\n Michael J. Fencer, with whom Lynne F. Riley, David Koha, and\nCasner & Edwards, LLP were on brief, for appellant and cross-\nappellee.\n Roberto Abesada-Agüet, with whom Sergio E. Criado, Correa-\nAcevedo & Abesada Law Offices, PSC, Eldia Díaz-Olmo, Díaz-Olmo Law\nOffices, Gerardo Pavía Cabanillas, and Pavía & Lazaro, PSC were on\nbrief, for appellees and cross-appellants.\n\f April 24, 2019\n\n\n\n\t\n\f KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. Edgar Reyes-Colon (\"Reyes-\n\nColon\"), a licensed plastic surgeon specializing in facial\n\ncosmetic surgery, allegedly failed to repay certain debts. In\n\nNovember 2006, one of his creditors, Banco Popular de Puerto Rico\n\n(\"Banco Popular\"), filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition that\n\na second creditor, Popular Auto (collectively, \"the Banks\"),\n\njoined. Under 11 U.S.C. § 303(b), fewer than three petitioning\n\ncreditors cannot force a debtor into bankruptcy unless the debtor\n\nhas fewer than twelve creditors in total. So the parties embarked\n\non what has now turned into twelve years of litigation concerning\n\nthe number of Reyes-Colon's creditors and whether he might somehow\n\nbe placed in bankruptcy involuntarily for \"equitable\" reasons.\n\nFor the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the bankruptcy\n\ncourt to dismiss the petition for want of a third petitioner.\n\n I.\n\n Reyes-Colon obtained a loan from Popular Auto and\n\nguaranteed an affiliate's loan from Banco Popular. On November 22,\n\n2006, after Reyes-Colon allegedly failed to pay his debts, Banco\n\nPopular filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition, forcing Reyes-\n\nColon into bankruptcy proceedings. Popular Auto joined the\n\npetition shortly thereafter.\n\n In early 2007 the bankruptcy court dismissed the\n\ninvoluntary petition, concluding that Reyes-Colon had more than\n\ntwelve eligible creditors at the time the involuntary petition was\n - 3 -\n\ffiled and that, after a reasonable opportunity, Banco Popular had\n\nfailed to join a third creditor to maintain the petition under\n\nsection 303(b)(1). See In re Reyes-Colon, Nos. PR 07-053, 06-\n\n04675-GAC, 2008 WL 8664760, at *1 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. Nov. 21, 2008).\n\nA year and a half later, the bankruptcy appellate panel (\"BAP\")\n\nset aside the dismissal and remanded the case. Id. The panel\n\ndetermined that all creditors should have been given notice and\n\nthe opportunity for a hearing before the bankruptcy court dismissed\n\nthe case. Id. at *8.\n\n Reyes-Colon did not appeal that panel ruling. Instead,\n\nthe parties returned to the bankruptcy court for another three-\n\nplus years of proceedings. On March 2, 2011, Reyes-Colon moved\n\nfor summary judgment, again seeking dismissal of the petition.\n\nThe bankruptcy court partially granted the motion on May 23, 2012,\n\nholding that Reyes-Colon had fifteen qualified creditors at the\n\ntime the involuntary petition was filed. In re Reyes-Colon, 474\n\nB.R. 330, 383, 391 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2012). The court nevertheless\n\nallowed the parties to conduct discovery and present evidence on\n\nwhether \"special circumstances\" existed to excuse compliance with\n\nsection 303(b)(1)'s three-creditor requirement and whether Reyes-\n\nColon had been paying his debts as they became due. Id. at 391.\n\n The bankruptcy court eventually held evidentiary\n\nhearings in late 2015. On September 2, 2016, the bankruptcy court\n\ndismissed the involuntary petition, citing Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S.\n - 4 -\n\f415 (2014). In re Reyes-Colon, 558 B.R. 563, 568 (Bankr. D.P.R.\n\n2016), rev'd, No. 16-2638 (GAG), 2017 WL 6365433 (D.P.R. Aug. 9,\n\n2017). The court found that although Reyes-Colon schemed to\n\ndefraud his creditors by misrepresenting his finances, id. at 565,\n\nthe court did not have the equitable power to override the\n\nprovisions of section 303(b)(1), id. at 568. The Banks appealed\n\nto the district court.\n\n The district court reversed the dismissal order and\n\nremanded to the bankruptcy court. In re Reyes-Colon, 2017 WL\n\n6365433, at *1. It found that the involuntary petition did not\n\nneed three or more petitioning creditors because Reyes-Colon had\n\nfewer than twelve eligible creditors when the petition was filed.\n\nId. The court also found that Reyes-Colon was generally not paying\n\nhis debts as they became due, and required entry of an order of\n\nrelief against Reyes-Colon on remand pursuant to\n\nsection 303(h)(1). Id. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.\n\n II.\n\n Section 303(b) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that an\n\ninvoluntary petition against a debtor have at least three\n\npetitioning creditors if, at the time the petition was filed, the\n\ndebtor had twelve or more eligible creditors. 11 U.S.C.\n\n§ 303(b)(1)-(2). Reyes-Colon argues that he had twelve or more\n\ncreditors at the time the petition was filed, and that the\n\n\n - 5 -\n\finvoluntary petition is therefore insufficient because there are\n\nonly two petitioning creditors -- Banco Popular and Popular Auto.\n\n In response, the Banks raise two types of arguments.\n\nFirst, they claim that Reyes-Colon has procedurally waived his\n\nright to put forward the arguments that might arguably support his\n\nposition. Second, they argue on the merits that the bankruptcy\n\ncourt did indeed err in dismissing their petition.\n\n A.\n\n We begin with the several asserted threshold issues of\n\nwaiver raised by the Banks. When the Banks appealed the bankruptcy\n\ncourt summary judgment rulings at issue to the district court,\n\nthey argued, among other things, that the bankruptcy court erred\n\nin determining that Reyes-Colon had fifteen eligible creditors as\n\nof the date the involuntary bankruptcy petition was filed. In\n\nresponse, as appellee, Reyes-Colon argued only that the Banks had\n\nfailed to preserve the creditor numerosity issue. The district\n\ncourt then ruled that Reyes-Colon had fewer than twelve eligible\n\ncreditors as of the date of filing and that he was generally not\n\npaying his debts as they came due. In re Reyes-Colon, 2017 WL\n\n6365433, at *1. In Reyes-Colon's opening brief in this court, he\n\nasserts that the bankruptcy court correctly determined that he had\n\nmore than twelve eligible creditors when Banco Popular filed its\n\npetition and that the district court erred in ruling otherwise.\n\nHe devotes very little argument to this effect. Rather, he quotes\n - 6 -\n\fthe statute's text, argues briefly that the burden of proof rests\n\non the petitioning creditors, purports to incorporate and refer us\n\nto the bankruptcy court's summary judgment order for further\n\nexplanation, and then briefly argues that there was at least one\n\nother creditor overlooked by the bankruptcy court.\n\n The Banks claim waiver by Reyes-Colon, twice over.\n\nFirst, they say that by failing to present an argument on the\n\nnumber of creditors to the district court, Reyes-Colon waived the\n\nability to later defend the bankruptcy court ruling on that issue.\n\nSecond, the Banks argue that by failing to develop more fully his\n\nargument in favor of the bankruptcy court ruling in his opening\n\nbrief in this court, Reyes-Colon again waived his ability to\n\ncontend on appeal that he had twelve or more creditors when the\n\npetition was filed.\n\n These two contentions of waiver pose relatively tricky\n\nissues of appellate procedure on which there is no controlling\n\nprecedent that has come to our attention. Title 28 U.S.C.\n\n§ 158(a)-(b) provides for intermediate appeals either to the\n\ndistrict court or to the BAP. See also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8003-\n\n05. A party who loses that intermediate review may either accept\n\nthe loss and return to the bankruptcy court, with the BAP or\n\ndistrict court ruling controlling, see, e.g., In re Hermosilla,\n\n450 B.R. 276, 287-88 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011), or may appeal to this\n\ncourt, see 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). In the event of an appeal to\n - 7 -\n\fthis court, however, we do not review per se the BAP or district\n\ncourt ruling. Rather, we \"assess[] the bankruptcy court's decision\n\ndirectly,\" In re DeMore, 844 F.3d 292, 296 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting\n\nIn re Sheedy, 801 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2015)), giving no deference\n\nto the intermediate appellate ruling, see In re IDC Clambakes,\n\nInc., 852 F.3d 50, 59 (1st Cir. 2017). In short, once a notice of\n\nappeal to this court has been filed, the operative ruling under\n\nreview is the bankruptcy court ruling, with the BAP or district\n\ncourt ruling serving more or less like an amicus brief (albeit one\n\nthat can be extremely helpful). In re Old Cold LLC, 879 F.3d 376,\n\n383 n.2 (1st Cir. 2018).\n\n One resulting oddity is that when the BAP or district\n\ncourt disagrees with the bankruptcy court, the appellant in this\n\ncourt is the party supporting the ruling under review (the\n\nbankruptcy court ruling). Generally, such a party nevertheless\n\nexplains in its initial brief why the BAP or district court erred,\n\ntreating the intermediate appellate opinion in effect as if it\n\nwere the opening brief. Here, though, the district court opinion\n\nsaid almost nothing on point (for a reason we will explain next).\n\nAnd Reyes-Colon claims to be happy with the bankruptcy court's\n\nopinion, with one small exception. So, Reyes-Colon in his opening\n\nbrief simply refers us to the bankruptcy court's summary judgment\n\norder to demonstrate, in his words, \"that [the Banks] failed to\n\n\n - 8 -\n\fcarry their burden of proof that, as of the petition date, Reyes-\n\nColon had fewer than 12 eligible creditors.\"\n\n This court has held that \"[a]rguments incorporated into\n\na brief solely by reference to district court filings are deemed\n\nwaived.\" United States v. Burgos-Montes, 786 F.3d 92, 111 (1st\n\nCir. 2015). But that rule comes from cases where the appellant\n\nhas lost in the district court and is seeking to alter a judgment\n\nor order through appellate review. There is no controlling\n\nprecedent that deems it a defalcation of any type for an appellant\n\nwho defends a lower court ruling to rest on that ruling. If a\n\nparty truly feels content to rely on the opinion of the bankruptcy\n\ncourt as if it were the party's brief, and given that the appellant\n\nin a case like this files his brief before the appellee files a\n\nbrief criticizing the bankruptcy court decision, we see no reason\n\nto deem the defense of that decision to be waived because it is\n\nnot restated at length in the opening brief.\n\n This is not to say that waiver poses no risk to those\n\nwho adopt such an approach. Any argument not in the bankruptcy\n\ncourt's opinion will, by definition, be absent from the opening\n\nbrief and might be treated as waived. But see Buntin v. City of\n\nBos., 813 F.3d 401, 404 (1st Cir. 2015) (observing that this court\n\nis not \"wedded to the district court's reasoning,\" but may affirm\n\n\"on any basis made evident by the record\"). Nor is anything we\n\nsay here intended to preclude a party in a case such as this from\n - 9 -\n\fseeking a procedural order changing the order of briefing. Indeed,\n\nperhaps a rule deeming the \"appellant\" to be the party asking us\n\nto reverse or vacate the bankruptcy court ruling might make sense.\n\nAs matters now stand, though, we reject the Banks' arguments that\n\nReyes-Colon has waived his defense of the bankruptcy court's ruling\n\nby failing to do more than incorporate it by reference in his brief\n\nto this court.\n\n The second potential waiver poses a more difficult\n\nquestion: To what extent should we require the party who prevails\n\nin the bankruptcy court to shepherd on intermediate review by the\n\ndistrict court (or the BAP) any arguments that the party will later\n\nwant to raise before this court? Because we look through the\n\nruling of the intermediate court and review the bankruptcy court\n\nruling directly, see In re DeMore, 844 F.3d at 296, one might\n\nlogically reason that either party need simply go through the\n\nmotions of an intermediate appeal if that party believes that the\n\ncase will end up in this court anyway. Permitting parties to treat\n\nthe intermediate appeal in that manner, however, would be the\n\nequivalent of allowing the parties to forgo a stage of review\n\ngenerally mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 158.1 Furthermore, it would\n\ndeprive this court of the benefit of the intermediate court's\n\nconsidered assessment of the arguments raised on appeal. Here,\n\n\n 1 In limited circumstances, bankruptcy decisions may be\ndirectly appealed to this court. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A).\n - 10 -\n\ffor example, Reyes-Colon's parsimonious brief focused on issue\n\npreservation may well have accounted for the district court's\n\ntruncated discussion of the number of creditors. We therefore\n\nlack the benefit of any extended analysis of the creditor\n\nnumerosity issue by the district court. That benefit can be\n\nsubstantial in bankruptcy cases, with the BAP in particular being\n\nwell suited to notice collateral effects of potential rulings that\n\nmight not be obvious to this court or to the parties. See In re\n\nOld Cold LLC, 879 F.3d at 383 n.2.\n\n At least two circuits have held that the losing party in\n\nthe bankruptcy court cannot raise on appeal to the circuit court\n\narguments not presented to the district court on intermediate\n\nreview. See In re Bradley, 501 F.3d 421, 433 (5th Cir. 2007);\n\nUnited States v. Olson, 4 F.3d 562, 567 (8th Cir. 1993). We are\n\naware of no authority, however, addressing the failure of a party\n\nwho prevails in the bankruptcy court to restate on intermediate\n\nreview arguments adopted by the bankruptcy court in an opinion\n\nexplaining its ruling. In that situation, waiver would serve\n\nlittle purpose because the district court (or the BAP) would\n\nobviously know what arguments the district court adopted as\n\npersuasive.\n\n The closer question is what to do with an argument not\n\ncontained in the bankruptcy court opinion and also not raised on\n\nintermediate appeal. One might say that because we can rely on\n - 11 -\n\farguments not presented in the first instance below to sustain a\n\njudgment, see Buntin, 813 F.3d at 404, the presence of an\n\nintermediate level of review should not alter our ability to rely\n\non such arguments here. Alternatively, it would seem to serve all\n\ninterests to encourage parties to present all arguments to the\n\ndistrict court or the BAP to enhance the utility of the mandated\n\nintermediate level of review. Ultimately, we need not resolve\n\nthis unusual question of potential waiver because Reyes-Colon\n\nraises no such arguments. Rather, as we will explain, we can\n\naffirm the judgment here by relying only on the arguments apparent\n\nfrom the opinion of the bankruptcy court.\n\n B.\n\n Having determined that Reyes-Colon has not waived his\n\nability to maintain that the bankruptcy court correctly dismissed\n\nthe petition for the reasons stated by that court, we turn now to\n\nthe merits of the Banks' critique of the bankruptcy court's\n\nreasoning. That critique consists of three arguments: the\n\nbankruptcy court erred by not placing on Reyes-Colon the burden of\n\nproving that he had twelve or more eligible creditors; the\n\nbankruptcy court erred by not finding that the Banks presented\n\nevidence sufficient to show that Reyes-Colon did not have twelve\n\nor more eligible creditors; and that, in any event, the bankruptcy\n\ncourt erred by not employing equitable discretion to allow the\n\npetition. We consider each argument in turn.\n - 12 -\n\f 1.\n\n The bankruptcy court found that fifteen of Reyes-Colon's\n\ncreditors were eligible to be counted towards section 303(b)(1)'s\n\ncreditor numerosity requirement. In re Reyes-Colon, 474 B.R. at\n\n383.2 The Banks claim that the bankruptcy court erred by\n\neffectively placing on the Banks the burden of proving that there\n\nwere fewer than twelve creditors.\n\n The Banks misapprehend how proof of creditor numerosity\n\nworks in this instance. As the BAP correctly stated in a prior\n\nintermediary appeal in this case:\n\n The burden of proof with respect to\n establishing that the Appellee had less than\n 12 creditors rested with the petitioning\n creditor. Once the debtor answers that there\n are more than 12 creditors and files a list in\n compliance with Bankruptcy Rule 1003(b), the\n petitioning creditors bear the burden to put\n the debtor to the test.\n\nIn re Reyes-Colon, 2008 WL 8664760, at *4; see also Atlas Mach. &\n\nIron Works, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 986 F.2d 709, 715 (4th\n\nCir. 1993); In re Zapas, 530 B.R. 560, 567 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015).\n\nIn re Fox, No. 93 C 5773, 1994 WL 484596, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2,\n\n1994), is not to the contrary. In Fox, the debtor's list of\n\n\n 2\n The fifteen eligible creditors were: (1) Banco Popular;\n(2) Popular Auto; (3) R&G Financial Corporation; (4) MediCoop;\n(5) Eurobank; (6) Westernbank; (7) Bank of America; (8) Miami Dade\nCounty Tax Collector; (9) COS Insurance; (10) Puerto Rico\nTelephone; (11) Banco Santander; (12) Citibank; (13) Dorado Beach\nHOA; (14) Liberty Cable; and (15) Sun Com. See In re Reyes-Colon,\n474 B.R. at 390.\n - 13 -\n\fcreditors was both unverified and not submitted as part of the\n\ndebtor's motion for summary judgment. Id. at *3.\n\n The Banks next contend that Reyes-Colon failed to\n\nproduce a list of creditors sufficient to place any burden of proof\n\non the Banks. Reyes-Colon in fact filed a list in compliance with\n\nBankruptcy Rule 1003(b), listing fifty-eight creditors. See Fed.\n\nR. Bankr. P. 1003(b) (\"If the answer to an involuntary petition\n\nfiled by fewer than three creditors avers the existence of 12 or\n\nmore creditors, the debtor shall file with the answer a list of\n\nall creditors with their addresses, a brief statement of the nature\n\nof their claims, and the amounts thereof.\"). Later, Reyes-Colon\n\nconceded that he had only twenty-two creditors in addition to Banco\n\nPopular, as listed in his expert witness report attached to his\n\nsummary judgment motion. This action, the Banks argue, was a\n\nrejection of the original Rule 1003(b) list. Therefore, they\n\nreason, the bankruptcy court could no longer rely on the\n\nRule 1003(b) list to shift the burden of proving the number of\n\neligible creditors onto the Banks.\n\n The Banks mischaracterize Reyes-Colon's actions in\n\nsubmitting and relying on his expert report as \"rejecting\" his\n\nRule 1003(b) list. When asked which list of creditors Reyes-Colon\n\nintended to be operative at a status conference hearing in\n\nApril 2011, Reyes-Colon stated that it was the list \"in the expert\n\nwitness report.\" In this manner, the debtor simply pared down his\n - 14 -\n\foriginal list, hardly a cause for complaint by the petitioning\n\ncreditors. That the expert report was not in the typical form one\n\nwould expect a Rule 1003(b) list to take is no matter in this\n\ninstance. First, Banco Popular itself stressed to the bankruptcy\n\ncourt that the relevant creditors list had become the smaller list\n\nfound in the expert report, stating that it was willing to \"waive\n\nthe request of the sworn statement\" by Reyes-Colon, as long as\n\nReyes-Colon \"accept[ed] that the list of creditors that is going\n\nto be used is the list submitted by the expert witness on his\n\nreport.\" Second, the bankruptcy court noted that it would treat\n\nthe list attached to Reyes-Colon's expert report as an amended\n\nlist. Amended Rule 1003(b) lists are not prohibited and are not\n\nuncommon. See, e.g., In re Acis Capital Mgmt., 584 B.R. 115, 132\n\n(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018); In re Bos, 561 B.R. 868, 873 (Bankr. N.D.\n\nFla. 2016); In re DemirCo Grp. (N. Am.), L.L.C., 343 B.R. 898,\n\n901-02 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2006). In short, Reyes-Colon complied\n\nwith Rule 1003(b) by providing the initial and then amended list\n\nof creditors. So, the burden did indeed shift to the Banks to\n\ndispute the existence or eligibility of the creditors.\n\n The Banks next argue that, by moving for summary\n\njudgment, Reyes-Colon assumed the burden of proof on the creditor\n\nnumerosity issue. But Rule 56 does not alter which party bears\n\nthe burden of proof on any issue. Rather, it controls what happens\n\nto a party that has the burden and fails to meet it sufficiently.\n - 15 -\n\fSee Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (\"Rule 56(c)\n\nmandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a party who\n\nfails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of\n\nan element essential to that party's case, and on which that party\n\nwill bear the burden of proof at trial.\" (emphasis added)); see\n\nalso Delgado v. Aero Inv. Corp., 601 F. App'x 12, 15 (1st Cir.\n\n2015); In re Rothery, 143 F.3d 546, 549 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining\n\nthat after a creditor has carried its burden of coming forward\n\nwith evidence that the debtor had fewer than twelve creditors at\n\nthe time the involuntary petition was filed, the debtor's \"bare\n\nallegation\" of more than twelve creditors is insufficient to defeat\n\nsummary judgment).\n\n For all of these reasons, the bankruptcy court properly\n\nplaced the burden of proving creditor ineligibility onto the Banks.\n\nSee In re Reyes-Colon, 474 B.R. at 363-64. Because the Banks\n\nfailed to present evidence as to seven of the listed creditors,\n\nthe bankruptcy court correctly determined that those seven\n\ncreditors remained eligible for purposes of section 303(b)(1).\n\n 2.\n\n The Banks next contend that they did come forward with\n\nevidence sufficient to carry their burden with respect to four of\n\nthe remaining eight creditors found by the district court to be\n\neligible creditors. One of those creditors is Miami Dade County\n\nTax Collector. The Banks argue to us that Miami Dade County Tax\n - 16 -\n\fCollector is not an eligible creditor because it received a post-\n\npetition voidable transfer. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(2) (excluding\n\ncertain voidable transfers from consideration in determining\n\ncreditor numerosity). But the Banks do not contest Reyes-Colon's\n\ncontention that they failed to raise this challenge in the\n\nbankruptcy court. And our law is clear that this type of failure\n\nin a civil case precludes a party from advancing the argument to\n\nsecure a reversal of the court in which the party did not raise\n\nthe argument, absent \"extraordinary circumstances.\" In re Net-\n\nVelázquez, 625 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2010).\n\n That leaves the Banks able only to claim that the\n\ndistrict court erred in finding that Westernbank, Bank of America,\n\nand Citibank were eligible creditors. Even if the Banks were\n\ncorrect on all three, Reyes-Colon would still have had, at a\n\nminimum, twelve eligible creditors at the time the involuntary\n\npetition was filed, triggering the requirement that there be at\n\nleast three petitioning creditors under section 303(b)(1).\n\n 3.\n\n We turn, finally, to the Banks' argument that special\n\ncircumstances warrant an equitable exception to the creditor\n\nnumerosity requirements in this case because Reyes-Colon schemed\n\nto defraud his creditors. See In re Reyes-Colon, 558 B.R. at 565.\n\n \"Congress has given bankruptcy courts the authority to\n\n'issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or\n - 17 -\n\fappropriate to carry out the provisions' of the Bankruptcy Code.\"\n\nIn re Oak Knoll Assocs., L.P., 835 F.3d 24, 34 (1st Cir. 2016)\n\n(quoting 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)); see also Marrama v. Citizens Bank of\n\nMass., 549 U.S. 365, 375–76 (2007) (noting that bankruptcy courts\n\nhave the \"inherent power . . . to sanction 'abusive litigation\n\npractices'\" (quoting Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752,\n\n765 (1980))). This court has cautioned, however, that this\n\nexpression of authority should not be construed as being \"'a roving\n\nwrit, much less a free hand' to provide equitable relief.\" In re\n\nOak Knoll Assocs., L.P., 835 F.3d at 34 (quoting In re Jamo, 283\n\nF.3d 392, 403 (1st Cir. 2002)).\n\n In Siegel, 571 U.S. at 421, the Supreme Court held that\n\nbankruptcy courts \"may not contravene specific statutory\n\nprovisions\" when they exercise their statutory and inherent\n\npowers. The bankruptcy court had \"surcharge[d]\" a debtor's\n\nhomestead exemption to defray costs incurred by the bankruptcy\n\ntrustee who uncovered the debtor's fraudulent misrepresentations.\n\nId. at 420. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the\n\nBankruptcy Code's exemption section, 11 U.S.C. § 522, \"does not\n\ngive courts discretion to grant or withhold exemptions based on\n\nwhatever considerations they deem appropriate. Rather, the\n\nstatute exhaustively specifies the criteria that will render\n\nproperty exempt.\" Id. at 423-24, 428. The Court acknowledged\n\nthat its holding \"may produce inequitable results for trustees and\n - 18 -\n\fcreditors in other cases,\" but recognized that Congress, in\n\ncreating the Bankruptcy Code, \"balanced the difficult choices that\n\nexemption limits impose on debtors with the economic harm that\n\nexemptions visit on creditors.\" Id. at 426-27 (quoting Schwab v.\n\nReilly, 560 U.S. 770, 791 (2010)).\n\n Siegel may not restrict the bankruptcy court's\n\ndiscretion in all instances. See, e.g., United States v. Colón-\n\nLedée, 772 F.3d 21, 29 n.10 (1st Cir. 2014). But it makes clear\n\nthat the bankruptcy court cannot \"override explicit mandates of\n\nother sections of the Bankruptcy Code.\" Siegel, 571 U.S. at 421\n\n(quoting 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 105.01[2], 105-06 (16th ed.\n\n2013)); see also In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d 389, 401 (1st\n\nCir. 2018) (citing Sunbeam Prod., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686\n\nF.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 2012) (\"What the Bankruptcy Code provides,\n\na judge cannot override by declaring that enforcement would be\n\n'inequitable.'\")), cert. granted in part sub nom., Mission Prod.\n\nHoldings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 397 (2018). Here,\n\nthe bankruptcy court would have plainly contravened section 303(b)\n\nif it bypassed the involuntary petition's creditor numerosity\n\ndeficiency via the \"special circumstances\" doctrine. Allowing the\n\ncase to proceed with only two petitioning creditors would have\n\nflown in the face of the Code's directive that there be three\n\npetitioning creditors when a debtor has more than twelve creditors\n\nat the time the involuntary petition was filed. 11 U.S.C.\n - 19 -\n\f§ 303(b). Siegel forecloses employing equity to waive this plain\n\nstatutory requirement.\n\n The Banks nonetheless point to In re Zenga, 562 B.R. 341\n\n(B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2017), a decision by the Sixth Circuit BAP, to\n\nsupport their argument that the \"special circumstances\" doctrine\n\ncan be utilized to overcome section 303 deficiencies post-Siegel.\n\nIn Zenga, a creditor filed an involuntary petition against debtors.\n\nId. at 345. The debtors moved to dismiss, asserting that they had\n\ntwelve or more creditors at the time of filing, and that the\n\ninvoluntary petition was deficient under section 303(b)(1)'s\n\ncreditor numerosity requirement. Id. The bankruptcy court did\n\nnot waive the statutory numerosity requirement. Rather, it\n\nestopped the debtors from presenting evidence that they had more\n\nthan eleven creditors based on their responses to post-judgment\n\nsworn interrogatories that were served in prior state court\n\nproceedings. Id. at 345-46.\n\n Had Reyes-Colon led the Banks or the bankruptcy court to\n\nbelieve that he only had eleven or fewer creditors, a court post-\n\nSiegal might well have found him estopped from now presenting\n\nargument to the contrary. See Perry v. Blum, 629 F.3d 1, 8 (1st\n\nCir. 2010) (explaining that judicial estoppel \"prevent[s] a\n\nlitigant from taking a litigation position that is inconsistent\n\nwith a litigation position successfully asserted by him in an\n\nearlier phrase of the same case or in an earlier court\n - 20 -\n\fproceeding\"). But the Banks make no such claim. Rather, they\n\nassert that he has conducted himself fraudulently to avoid paying\n\nhis debts and claiming more creditors than he has. In such a case,\n\nestoppel has no role to play, and Siegal otherwise provides no\n\nbasis for simply deeming the creditor numerosity requirement to be\n\ninapplicable. Dismissal of the involuntary petition was therefore\n\nproper.3\n\n III.\n\n For the foregoing reasons, the bankruptcy court's\n\ndecision is affirmed.\n\n\n\n\n 3 Because we affirm for the reasons stated in the bankruptcy\ncourt opinion, we need not address Reyes-Colon's alternative\nargument for dismissal (that the involuntary petition was filed in\nbad faith as an improper collection tool), nor do we need to\ninquire as to whether that argument was waived.\n - 21 -\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: In RE: Edgar A. REYES-COLON, Involuntary Debtor. Popular Auto, Inc.; Banco Popular De Puerto Rico, Appellees, Cross-Appellants, v. Edgar A. Reyes-Colon, Appellant, Cross-Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-24\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the First Circuit\\n\\n\\nNos. 17-1971, 17-1972\\n\\n IN RE: EDGAR A. REYES-COLON,\\n\\n Involuntary Debtor.\\n\\n\\n POPULAR AUTO, INC.;\\n BANCO POPULAR DE PUERTO RICO,\\n\\n Appellees, Cross-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n EDGAR A. REYES-COLON,\\n\\n Appellant, Cross-Appellee.\\n\\n\\n APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO\\n\\n [Hon. Gustavo A. Gelpí, Jr., U.S. District Judge]\\n\\n\\n Before\\n\\n Howard, Chief Judge,\\n Thompson and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\n Michael J. Fencer, with whom Lynne F. Riley, David Koha, and\\nCasner & Edwards, LLP were on brief, for appellant and cross-\\nappellee.\\n Roberto Abesada-Agüet, with whom Sergio E. Criado, Correa-\\nAcevedo & Abesada Law Offices, PSC, Eldia Díaz-Olmo, Díaz-Olmo Law\\nOffices, Gerardo Pavía Cabanillas, and Pavía & Lazaro, PSC were on\\nbrief, for appellees and cross-appellants.\\n\\f April 24, 2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\t\\n\\f KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. Edgar Reyes-Colon (\\\"Reyes-\\n\\nColon\\\"), a licensed plastic surgeon specializing in facial\\n\\ncosmetic surgery, allegedly failed to repay certain debts. In\\n\\nNovember 2006, one of his creditors, Banco Popular de Puerto Rico\\n\\n(\\\"Banco Popular\\\"), filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition that\\n\\na second creditor, Popular Auto (collectively, \\\"the Banks\\\"),\\n\\njoined. Under 11 U.S.C. § 303(b), fewer than three petitioning\\n\\ncreditors cannot force a debtor into bankruptcy unless the debtor\\n\\nhas fewer than twelve creditors in total. So the parties embarked\\n\\non what has now turned into twelve years of litigation concerning\\n\\nthe number of Reyes-Colon's creditors and whether he might somehow\\n\\nbe placed in bankruptcy involuntarily for \\\"equitable\\\" reasons.\\n\\nFor the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the bankruptcy\\n\\ncourt to dismiss the petition for want of a third petitioner.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Reyes-Colon obtained a loan from Popular Auto and\\n\\nguaranteed an affiliate's loan from Banco Popular. On November 22,\\n\\n2006, after Reyes-Colon allegedly failed to pay his debts, Banco\\n\\nPopular filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition, forcing Reyes-\\n\\nColon into bankruptcy proceedings. Popular Auto joined the\\n\\npetition shortly thereafter.\\n\\n In early 2007 the bankruptcy court dismissed the\\n\\ninvoluntary petition, concluding that Reyes-Colon had more than\\n\\ntwelve eligible creditors at the time the involuntary petition was\\n - 3 -\\n\\ffiled and that, after a reasonable opportunity, Banco Popular had\\n\\nfailed to join a third creditor to maintain the petition under\\n\\nsection 303(b)(1). See In re Reyes-Colon, Nos. PR 07-053, 06-\\n\\n04675-GAC, 2008 WL 8664760, at *1 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. Nov. 21, 2008).\\n\\nA year and a half later, the bankruptcy appellate panel (\\\"BAP\\\")\\n\\nset aside the dismissal and remanded the case. Id. The panel\\n\\ndetermined that all creditors should have been given notice and\\n\\nthe opportunity for a hearing before the bankruptcy court dismissed\\n\\nthe case. Id. at *8.\\n\\n Reyes-Colon did not appeal that panel ruling. Instead,\\n\\nthe parties returned to the bankruptcy court for another three-\\n\\nplus years of proceedings. On March 2, 2011, Reyes-Colon moved\\n\\nfor summary judgment, again seeking dismissal of the petition.\\n\\nThe bankruptcy court partially granted the motion on May 23, 2012,\\n\\nholding that Reyes-Colon had fifteen qualified creditors at the\\n\\ntime the involuntary petition was filed. In re Reyes-Colon, 474\\n\\nB.R. 330, 383, 391 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2012). The court nevertheless\\n\\nallowed the parties to conduct discovery and present evidence on\\n\\nwhether \\\"special circumstances\\\" existed to excuse compliance with\\n\\nsection 303(b)(1)'s three-creditor requirement and whether Reyes-\\n\\nColon had been paying his debts as they became due. Id. at 391.\\n\\n The bankruptcy court eventually held evidentiary\\n\\nhearings in late 2015. On September 2, 2016, the bankruptcy court\\n\\ndismissed the involuntary petition, citing Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S.\\n - 4 -\\n\\f415 (2014). In re Reyes-Colon, 558 B.R. 563, 568 (Bankr. D.P.R.\\n\\n2016), rev'd, No. 16-2638 (GAG), 2017 WL 6365433 (D.P.R. Aug. 9,\\n\\n2017). The court found that although Reyes-Colon schemed to\\n\\ndefraud his creditors by misrepresenting his finances, id. at 565,\\n\\nthe court did not have the equitable power to override the\\n\\nprovisions of section 303(b)(1), id. at 568. The Banks appealed\\n\\nto the district court.\\n\\n The district court reversed the dismissal order and\\n\\nremanded to the bankruptcy court. In re Reyes-Colon, 2017 WL\\n\\n6365433, at *1. It found that the involuntary petition did not\\n\\nneed three or more petitioning creditors because Reyes-Colon had\\n\\nfewer than twelve eligible creditors when the petition was filed.\\n\\nId. The court also found that Reyes-Colon was generally not paying\\n\\nhis debts as they became due, and required entry of an order of\\n\\nrelief against Reyes-Colon on remand pursuant to\\n\\nsection 303(h)(1). Id. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Section 303(b) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that an\\n\\ninvoluntary petition against a debtor have at least three\\n\\npetitioning creditors if, at the time the petition was filed, the\\n\\ndebtor had twelve or more eligible creditors. 11 U.S.C.\\n\\n§ 303(b)(1)-(2). Reyes-Colon argues that he had twelve or more\\n\\ncreditors at the time the petition was filed, and that the\\n\\n\\n - 5 -\\n\\finvoluntary petition is therefore insufficient because there are\\n\\nonly two petitioning creditors -- Banco Popular and Popular Auto.\\n\\n In response, the Banks raise two types of arguments.\\n\\nFirst, they claim that Reyes-Colon has procedurally waived his\\n\\nright to put forward the arguments that might arguably support his\\n\\nposition. Second, they argue on the merits that the bankruptcy\\n\\ncourt did indeed err in dismissing their petition.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n We begin with the several asserted threshold issues of\\n\\nwaiver raised by the Banks. When the Banks appealed the bankruptcy\\n\\ncourt summary judgment rulings at issue to the district court,\\n\\nthey argued, among other things, that the bankruptcy court erred\\n\\nin determining that Reyes-Colon had fifteen eligible creditors as\\n\\nof the date the involuntary bankruptcy petition was filed. In\\n\\nresponse, as appellee, Reyes-Colon argued only that the Banks had\\n\\nfailed to preserve the creditor numerosity issue. The district\\n\\ncourt then ruled that Reyes-Colon had fewer than twelve eligible\\n\\ncreditors as of the date of filing and that he was generally not\\n\\npaying his debts as they came due. In re Reyes-Colon, 2017 WL\\n\\n6365433, at *1. In Reyes-Colon's opening brief in this court, he\\n\\nasserts that the bankruptcy court correctly determined that he had\\n\\nmore than twelve eligible creditors when Banco Popular filed its\\n\\npetition and that the district court erred in ruling otherwise.\\n\\nHe devotes very little argument to this effect. Rather, he quotes\\n - 6 -\\n\\fthe statute's text, argues briefly that the burden of proof rests\\n\\non the petitioning creditors, purports to incorporate and refer us\\n\\nto the bankruptcy court's summary judgment order for further\\n\\nexplanation, and then briefly argues that there was at least one\\n\\nother creditor overlooked by the bankruptcy court.\\n\\n The Banks claim waiver by Reyes-Colon, twice over.\\n\\nFirst, they say that by failing to present an argument on the\\n\\nnumber of creditors to the district court, Reyes-Colon waived the\\n\\nability to later defend the bankruptcy court ruling on that issue.\\n\\nSecond, the Banks argue that by failing to develop more fully his\\n\\nargument in favor of the bankruptcy court ruling in his opening\\n\\nbrief in this court, Reyes-Colon again waived his ability to\\n\\ncontend on appeal that he had twelve or more creditors when the\\n\\npetition was filed.\\n\\n These two contentions of waiver pose relatively tricky\\n\\nissues of appellate procedure on which there is no controlling\\n\\nprecedent that has come to our attention. Title 28 U.S.C.\\n\\n§ 158(a)-(b) provides for intermediate appeals either to the\\n\\ndistrict court or to the BAP. See also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8003-\\n\\n05. A party who loses that intermediate review may either accept\\n\\nthe loss and return to the bankruptcy court, with the BAP or\\n\\ndistrict court ruling controlling, see, e.g., In re Hermosilla,\\n\\n450 B.R. 276, 287-88 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011), or may appeal to this\\n\\ncourt, see 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). In the event of an appeal to\\n - 7 -\\n\\fthis court, however, we do not review per se the BAP or district\\n\\ncourt ruling. Rather, we \\\"assess[] the bankruptcy court's decision\\n\\ndirectly,\\\" In re DeMore, 844 F.3d 292, 296 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting\\n\\nIn re Sheedy, 801 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2015)), giving no deference\\n\\nto the intermediate appellate ruling, see In re IDC Clambakes,\\n\\nInc., 852 F.3d 50, 59 (1st Cir. 2017). In short, once a notice of\\n\\nappeal to this court has been filed, the operative ruling under\\n\\nreview is the bankruptcy court ruling, with the BAP or district\\n\\ncourt ruling serving more or less like an amicus brief (albeit one\\n\\nthat can be extremely helpful). In re Old Cold LLC, 879 F.3d 376,\\n\\n383 n.2 (1st Cir. 2018).\\n\\n One resulting oddity is that when the BAP or district\\n\\ncourt disagrees with the bankruptcy court, the appellant in this\\n\\ncourt is the party supporting the ruling under review (the\\n\\nbankruptcy court ruling). Generally, such a party nevertheless\\n\\nexplains in its initial brief why the BAP or district court erred,\\n\\ntreating the intermediate appellate opinion in effect as if it\\n\\nwere the opening brief. Here, though, the district court opinion\\n\\nsaid almost nothing on point (for a reason we will explain next).\\n\\nAnd Reyes-Colon claims to be happy with the bankruptcy court's\\n\\nopinion, with one small exception. So, Reyes-Colon in his opening\\n\\nbrief simply refers us to the bankruptcy court's summary judgment\\n\\norder to demonstrate, in his words, \\\"that [the Banks] failed to\\n\\n\\n - 8 -\\n\\fcarry their burden of proof that, as of the petition date, Reyes-\\n\\nColon had fewer than 12 eligible creditors.\\\"\\n\\n This court has held that \\\"[a]rguments incorporated into\\n\\na brief solely by reference to district court filings are deemed\\n\\nwaived.\\\" United States v. Burgos-Montes, 786 F.3d 92, 111 (1st\\n\\nCir. 2015). But that rule comes from cases where the appellant\\n\\nhas lost in the district court and is seeking to alter a judgment\\n\\nor order through appellate review. There is no controlling\\n\\nprecedent that deems it a defalcation of any type for an appellant\\n\\nwho defends a lower court ruling to rest on that ruling. If a\\n\\nparty truly feels content to rely on the opinion of the bankruptcy\\n\\ncourt as if it were the party's brief, and given that the appellant\\n\\nin a case like this files his brief before the appellee files a\\n\\nbrief criticizing the bankruptcy court decision, we see no reason\\n\\nto deem the defense of that decision to be waived because it is\\n\\nnot restated at length in the opening brief.\\n\\n This is not to say that waiver poses no risk to those\\n\\nwho adopt such an approach. Any argument not in the bankruptcy\\n\\ncourt's opinion will, by definition, be absent from the opening\\n\\nbrief and might be treated as waived. But see Buntin v. City of\\n\\nBos., 813 F.3d 401, 404 (1st Cir. 2015) (observing that this court\\n\\nis not \\\"wedded to the district court's reasoning,\\\" but may affirm\\n\\n\\\"on any basis made evident by the record\\\"). Nor is anything we\\n\\nsay here intended to preclude a party in a case such as this from\\n - 9 -\\n\\fseeking a procedural order changing the order of briefing. Indeed,\\n\\nperhaps a rule deeming the \\\"appellant\\\" to be the party asking us\\n\\nto reverse or vacate the bankruptcy court ruling might make sense.\\n\\nAs matters now stand, though, we reject the Banks' arguments that\\n\\nReyes-Colon has waived his defense of the bankruptcy court's ruling\\n\\nby failing to do more than incorporate it by reference in his brief\\n\\nto this court.\\n\\n The second potential waiver poses a more difficult\\n\\nquestion: To what extent should we require the party who prevails\\n\\nin the bankruptcy court to shepherd on intermediate review by the\\n\\ndistrict court (or the BAP) any arguments that the party will later\\n\\nwant to raise before this court? Because we look through the\\n\\nruling of the intermediate court and review the bankruptcy court\\n\\nruling directly, see In re DeMore, 844 F.3d at 296, one might\\n\\nlogically reason that either party need simply go through the\\n\\nmotions of an intermediate appeal if that party believes that the\\n\\ncase will end up in this court anyway. Permitting parties to treat\\n\\nthe intermediate appeal in that manner, however, would be the\\n\\nequivalent of allowing the parties to forgo a stage of review\\n\\ngenerally mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 158.1 Furthermore, it would\\n\\ndeprive this court of the benefit of the intermediate court's\\n\\nconsidered assessment of the arguments raised on appeal. Here,\\n\\n\\n 1 In limited circumstances, bankruptcy decisions may be\\ndirectly appealed to this court. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A).\\n - 10 -\\n\\ffor example, Reyes-Colon's parsimonious brief focused on issue\\n\\npreservation may well have accounted for the district court's\\n\\ntruncated discussion of the number of creditors. We therefore\\n\\nlack the benefit of any extended analysis of the creditor\\n\\nnumerosity issue by the district court. That benefit can be\\n\\nsubstantial in bankruptcy cases, with the BAP in particular being\\n\\nwell suited to notice collateral effects of potential rulings that\\n\\nmight not be obvious to this court or to the parties. See In re\\n\\nOld Cold LLC, 879 F.3d at 383 n.2.\\n\\n At least two circuits have held that the losing party in\\n\\nthe bankruptcy court cannot raise on appeal to the circuit court\\n\\narguments not presented to the district court on intermediate\\n\\nreview. See In re Bradley, 501 F.3d 421, 433 (5th Cir. 2007);\\n\\nUnited States v. Olson, 4 F.3d 562, 567 (8th Cir. 1993). We are\\n\\naware of no authority, however, addressing the failure of a party\\n\\nwho prevails in the bankruptcy court to restate on intermediate\\n\\nreview arguments adopted by the bankruptcy court in an opinion\\n\\nexplaining its ruling. In that situation, waiver would serve\\n\\nlittle purpose because the district court (or the BAP) would\\n\\nobviously know what arguments the district court adopted as\\n\\npersuasive.\\n\\n The closer question is what to do with an argument not\\n\\ncontained in the bankruptcy court opinion and also not raised on\\n\\nintermediate appeal. One might say that because we can rely on\\n - 11 -\\n\\farguments not presented in the first instance below to sustain a\\n\\njudgment, see Buntin, 813 F.3d at 404, the presence of an\\n\\nintermediate level of review should not alter our ability to rely\\n\\non such arguments here. Alternatively, it would seem to serve all\\n\\ninterests to encourage parties to present all arguments to the\\n\\ndistrict court or the BAP to enhance the utility of the mandated\\n\\nintermediate level of review. Ultimately, we need not resolve\\n\\nthis unusual question of potential waiver because Reyes-Colon\\n\\nraises no such arguments. Rather, as we will explain, we can\\n\\naffirm the judgment here by relying only on the arguments apparent\\n\\nfrom the opinion of the bankruptcy court.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Having determined that Reyes-Colon has not waived his\\n\\nability to maintain that the bankruptcy court correctly dismissed\\n\\nthe petition for the reasons stated by that court, we turn now to\\n\\nthe merits of the Banks' critique of the bankruptcy court's\\n\\nreasoning. That critique consists of three arguments: the\\n\\nbankruptcy court erred by not placing on Reyes-Colon the burden of\\n\\nproving that he had twelve or more eligible creditors; the\\n\\nbankruptcy court erred by not finding that the Banks presented\\n\\nevidence sufficient to show that Reyes-Colon did not have twelve\\n\\nor more eligible creditors; and that, in any event, the bankruptcy\\n\\ncourt erred by not employing equitable discretion to allow the\\n\\npetition. We consider each argument in turn.\\n - 12 -\\n\\f 1.\\n\\n The bankruptcy court found that fifteen of Reyes-Colon's\\n\\ncreditors were eligible to be counted towards section 303(b)(1)'s\\n\\ncreditor numerosity requirement. In re Reyes-Colon, 474 B.R. at\\n\\n383.2 The Banks claim that the bankruptcy court erred by\\n\\neffectively placing on the Banks the burden of proving that there\\n\\nwere fewer than twelve creditors.\\n\\n The Banks misapprehend how proof of creditor numerosity\\n\\nworks in this instance. As the BAP correctly stated in a prior\\n\\nintermediary appeal in this case:\\n\\n The burden of proof with respect to\\n establishing that the Appellee had less than\\n 12 creditors rested with the petitioning\\n creditor. Once the debtor answers that there\\n are more than 12 creditors and files a list in\\n compliance with Bankruptcy Rule 1003(b), the\\n petitioning creditors bear the burden to put\\n the debtor to the test.\\n\\nIn re Reyes-Colon, 2008 WL 8664760, at *4; see also Atlas Mach. &\\n\\nIron Works, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 986 F.2d 709, 715 (4th\\n\\nCir. 1993); In re Zapas, 530 B.R. 560, 567 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015).\\n\\nIn re Fox, No. 93 C 5773, 1994 WL 484596, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2,\\n\\n1994), is not to the contrary. In Fox, the debtor's list of\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The fifteen eligible creditors were: (1) Banco Popular;\\n(2) Popular Auto; (3) R&G Financial Corporation; (4) MediCoop;\\n(5) Eurobank; (6) Westernbank; (7) Bank of America; (8) Miami Dade\\nCounty Tax Collector; (9) COS Insurance; (10) Puerto Rico\\nTelephone; (11) Banco Santander; (12) Citibank; (13) Dorado Beach\\nHOA; (14) Liberty Cable; and (15) Sun Com. See In re Reyes-Colon,\\n474 B.R. at 390.\\n - 13 -\\n\\fcreditors was both unverified and not submitted as part of the\\n\\ndebtor's motion for summary judgment. Id. at *3.\\n\\n The Banks next contend that Reyes-Colon failed to\\n\\nproduce a list of creditors sufficient to place any burden of proof\\n\\non the Banks. Reyes-Colon in fact filed a list in compliance with\\n\\nBankruptcy Rule 1003(b), listing fifty-eight creditors. See Fed.\\n\\nR. Bankr. P. 1003(b) (\\\"If the answer to an involuntary petition\\n\\nfiled by fewer than three creditors avers the existence of 12 or\\n\\nmore creditors, the debtor shall file with the answer a list of\\n\\nall creditors with their addresses, a brief statement of the nature\\n\\nof their claims, and the amounts thereof.\\\"). Later, Reyes-Colon\\n\\nconceded that he had only twenty-two creditors in addition to Banco\\n\\nPopular, as listed in his expert witness report attached to his\\n\\nsummary judgment motion. This action, the Banks argue, was a\\n\\nrejection of the original Rule 1003(b) list. Therefore, they\\n\\nreason, the bankruptcy court could no longer rely on the\\n\\nRule 1003(b) list to shift the burden of proving the number of\\n\\neligible creditors onto the Banks.\\n\\n The Banks mischaracterize Reyes-Colon's actions in\\n\\nsubmitting and relying on his expert report as \\\"rejecting\\\" his\\n\\nRule 1003(b) list. When asked which list of creditors Reyes-Colon\\n\\nintended to be operative at a status conference hearing in\\n\\nApril 2011, Reyes-Colon stated that it was the list \\\"in the expert\\n\\nwitness report.\\\" In this manner, the debtor simply pared down his\\n - 14 -\\n\\foriginal list, hardly a cause for complaint by the petitioning\\n\\ncreditors. That the expert report was not in the typical form one\\n\\nwould expect a Rule 1003(b) list to take is no matter in this\\n\\ninstance. First, Banco Popular itself stressed to the bankruptcy\\n\\ncourt that the relevant creditors list had become the smaller list\\n\\nfound in the expert report, stating that it was willing to \\\"waive\\n\\nthe request of the sworn statement\\\" by Reyes-Colon, as long as\\n\\nReyes-Colon \\\"accept[ed] that the list of creditors that is going\\n\\nto be used is the list submitted by the expert witness on his\\n\\nreport.\\\" Second, the bankruptcy court noted that it would treat\\n\\nthe list attached to Reyes-Colon's expert report as an amended\\n\\nlist. Amended Rule 1003(b) lists are not prohibited and are not\\n\\nuncommon. See, e.g., In re Acis Capital Mgmt., 584 B.R. 115, 132\\n\\n(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018); In re Bos, 561 B.R. 868, 873 (Bankr. N.D.\\n\\nFla. 2016); In re DemirCo Grp. (N. Am.), L.L.C., 343 B.R. 898,\\n\\n901-02 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2006). In short, Reyes-Colon complied\\n\\nwith Rule 1003(b) by providing the initial and then amended list\\n\\nof creditors. So, the burden did indeed shift to the Banks to\\n\\ndispute the existence or eligibility of the creditors.\\n\\n The Banks next argue that, by moving for summary\\n\\njudgment, Reyes-Colon assumed the burden of proof on the creditor\\n\\nnumerosity issue. But Rule 56 does not alter which party bears\\n\\nthe burden of proof on any issue. Rather, it controls what happens\\n\\nto a party that has the burden and fails to meet it sufficiently.\\n - 15 -\\n\\fSee Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (\\\"Rule 56(c)\\n\\nmandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a party who\\n\\nfails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of\\n\\nan element essential to that party's case, and on which that party\\n\\nwill bear the burden of proof at trial.\\\" (emphasis added)); see\\n\\nalso Delgado v. Aero Inv. Corp., 601 F. App'x 12, 15 (1st Cir.\\n\\n2015); In re Rothery, 143 F.3d 546, 549 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining\\n\\nthat after a creditor has carried its burden of coming forward\\n\\nwith evidence that the debtor had fewer than twelve creditors at\\n\\nthe time the involuntary petition was filed, the debtor's \\\"bare\\n\\nallegation\\\" of more than twelve creditors is insufficient to defeat\\n\\nsummary judgment).\\n\\n For all of these reasons, the bankruptcy court properly\\n\\nplaced the burden of proving creditor ineligibility onto the Banks.\\n\\nSee In re Reyes-Colon, 474 B.R. at 363-64. Because the Banks\\n\\nfailed to present evidence as to seven of the listed creditors,\\n\\nthe bankruptcy court correctly determined that those seven\\n\\ncreditors remained eligible for purposes of section 303(b)(1).\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n The Banks next contend that they did come forward with\\n\\nevidence sufficient to carry their burden with respect to four of\\n\\nthe remaining eight creditors found by the district court to be\\n\\neligible creditors. One of those creditors is Miami Dade County\\n\\nTax Collector. The Banks argue to us that Miami Dade County Tax\\n - 16 -\\n\\fCollector is not an eligible creditor because it received a post-\\n\\npetition voidable transfer. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(2) (excluding\\n\\ncertain voidable transfers from consideration in determining\\n\\ncreditor numerosity). But the Banks do not contest Reyes-Colon's\\n\\ncontention that they failed to raise this challenge in the\\n\\nbankruptcy court. And our law is clear that this type of failure\\n\\nin a civil case precludes a party from advancing the argument to\\n\\nsecure a reversal of the court in which the party did not raise\\n\\nthe argument, absent \\\"extraordinary circumstances.\\\" In re Net-\\n\\nVelázquez, 625 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2010).\\n\\n That leaves the Banks able only to claim that the\\n\\ndistrict court erred in finding that Westernbank, Bank of America,\\n\\nand Citibank were eligible creditors. Even if the Banks were\\n\\ncorrect on all three, Reyes-Colon would still have had, at a\\n\\nminimum, twelve eligible creditors at the time the involuntary\\n\\npetition was filed, triggering the requirement that there be at\\n\\nleast three petitioning creditors under section 303(b)(1).\\n\\n 3.\\n\\n We turn, finally, to the Banks' argument that special\\n\\ncircumstances warrant an equitable exception to the creditor\\n\\nnumerosity requirements in this case because Reyes-Colon schemed\\n\\nto defraud his creditors. See In re Reyes-Colon, 558 B.R. at 565.\\n\\n \\\"Congress has given bankruptcy courts the authority to\\n\\n'issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or\\n - 17 -\\n\\fappropriate to carry out the provisions' of the Bankruptcy Code.\\\"\\n\\nIn re Oak Knoll Assocs., L.P., 835 F.3d 24, 34 (1st Cir. 2016)\\n\\n(quoting 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)); see also Marrama v. Citizens Bank of\\n\\nMass., 549 U.S. 365, 375–76 (2007) (noting that bankruptcy courts\\n\\nhave the \\\"inherent power . . . to sanction 'abusive litigation\\n\\npractices'\\\" (quoting Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752,\\n\\n765 (1980))). This court has cautioned, however, that this\\n\\nexpression of authority should not be construed as being \\\"'a roving\\n\\nwrit, much less a free hand' to provide equitable relief.\\\" In re\\n\\nOak Knoll Assocs., L.P., 835 F.3d at 34 (quoting In re Jamo, 283\\n\\nF.3d 392, 403 (1st Cir. 2002)).\\n\\n In Siegel, 571 U.S. at 421, the Supreme Court held that\\n\\nbankruptcy courts \\\"may not contravene specific statutory\\n\\nprovisions\\\" when they exercise their statutory and inherent\\n\\npowers. The bankruptcy court had \\\"surcharge[d]\\\" a debtor's\\n\\nhomestead exemption to defray costs incurred by the bankruptcy\\n\\ntrustee who uncovered the debtor's fraudulent misrepresentations.\\n\\nId. at 420. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the\\n\\nBankruptcy Code's exemption section, 11 U.S.C. § 522, \\\"does not\\n\\ngive courts discretion to grant or withhold exemptions based on\\n\\nwhatever considerations they deem appropriate. Rather, the\\n\\nstatute exhaustively specifies the criteria that will render\\n\\nproperty exempt.\\\" Id. at 423-24, 428. The Court acknowledged\\n\\nthat its holding \\\"may produce inequitable results for trustees and\\n - 18 -\\n\\fcreditors in other cases,\\\" but recognized that Congress, in\\n\\ncreating the Bankruptcy Code, \\\"balanced the difficult choices that\\n\\nexemption limits impose on debtors with the economic harm that\\n\\nexemptions visit on creditors.\\\" Id. at 426-27 (quoting Schwab v.\\n\\nReilly, 560 U.S. 770, 791 (2010)).\\n\\n Siegel may not restrict the bankruptcy court's\\n\\ndiscretion in all instances. See, e.g., United States v. Colón-\\n\\nLedée, 772 F.3d 21, 29 n.10 (1st Cir. 2014). But it makes clear\\n\\nthat the bankruptcy court cannot \\\"override explicit mandates of\\n\\nother sections of the Bankruptcy Code.\\\" Siegel, 571 U.S. at 421\\n\\n(quoting 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 105.01[2], 105-06 (16th ed.\\n\\n2013)); see also In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d 389, 401 (1st\\n\\nCir. 2018) (citing Sunbeam Prod., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686\\n\\nF.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 2012) (\\\"What the Bankruptcy Code provides,\\n\\na judge cannot override by declaring that enforcement would be\\n\\n'inequitable.'\\\")), cert. granted in part sub nom., Mission Prod.\\n\\nHoldings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 397 (2018). Here,\\n\\nthe bankruptcy court would have plainly contravened section 303(b)\\n\\nif it bypassed the involuntary petition's creditor numerosity\\n\\ndeficiency via the \\\"special circumstances\\\" doctrine. Allowing the\\n\\ncase to proceed with only two petitioning creditors would have\\n\\nflown in the face of the Code's directive that there be three\\n\\npetitioning creditors when a debtor has more than twelve creditors\\n\\nat the time the involuntary petition was filed. 11 U.S.C.\\n - 19 -\\n\\f§ 303(b). Siegel forecloses employing equity to waive this plain\\n\\nstatutory requirement.\\n\\n The Banks nonetheless point to In re Zenga, 562 B.R. 341\\n\\n(B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2017), a decision by the Sixth Circuit BAP, to\\n\\nsupport their argument that the \\\"special circumstances\\\" doctrine\\n\\ncan be utilized to overcome section 303 deficiencies post-Siegel.\\n\\nIn Zenga, a creditor filed an involuntary petition against debtors.\\n\\nId. at 345. The debtors moved to dismiss, asserting that they had\\n\\ntwelve or more creditors at the time of filing, and that the\\n\\ninvoluntary petition was deficient under section 303(b)(1)'s\\n\\ncreditor numerosity requirement. Id. The bankruptcy court did\\n\\nnot waive the statutory numerosity requirement. Rather, it\\n\\nestopped the debtors from presenting evidence that they had more\\n\\nthan eleven creditors based on their responses to post-judgment\\n\\nsworn interrogatories that were served in prior state court\\n\\nproceedings. Id. at 345-46.\\n\\n Had Reyes-Colon led the Banks or the bankruptcy court to\\n\\nbelieve that he only had eleven or fewer creditors, a court post-\\n\\nSiegal might well have found him estopped from now presenting\\n\\nargument to the contrary. See Perry v. Blum, 629 F.3d 1, 8 (1st\\n\\nCir. 2010) (explaining that judicial estoppel \\\"prevent[s] a\\n\\nlitigant from taking a litigation position that is inconsistent\\n\\nwith a litigation position successfully asserted by him in an\\n\\nearlier phrase of the same case or in an earlier court\\n - 20 -\\n\\fproceeding\\\"). But the Banks make no such claim. Rather, they\\n\\nassert that he has conducted himself fraudulently to avoid paying\\n\\nhis debts and claiming more creditors than he has. In such a case,\\n\\nestoppel has no role to play, and Siegal otherwise provides no\\n\\nbasis for simply deeming the creditor numerosity requirement to be\\n\\ninapplicable. Dismissal of the involuntary petition was therefore\\n\\nproper.3\\n\\n III.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, the bankruptcy court's\\n\\ndecision is affirmed.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 Because we affirm for the reasons stated in the bankruptcy\\ncourt opinion, we need not address Reyes-Colon's alternative\\nargument for dismissal (that the involuntary petition was filed in\\nbad faith as an improper collection tool), nor do we need to\\ninquire as to whether that argument was waived.\\n - 21 -\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1491,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4614217,"string":"4,614,217"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"David Seth WORMAN; Anthony Linden; Jason William Sawyer; Paul Nelson Chamberlain; Gun Owners' Action League, Inc. ; On Target Training, Inc.; Overwatch Outpost, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Maura T. HEALEY, in Her Official Capacity as Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; Daniel Bennett, in His Official Capacity as the Secretary of the Executive Office of Public Safety and Security ; Kerry Gilpin, in Her Official Capacity as Superintendent of the Massachusetts State Police, Defendants, Appellees."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Worman v. Healey"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1545P"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Barron, Souter, Selya\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SELYA, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the First Circuit\\n\\n\\nNo. 18-1545\\n\\n DAVID SETH WORMAN; ANTHONY LINDEN; JASON WILLIAM SAWYER; PAUL\\n NELSON CHAMBERLAIN; GUN OWNERS' ACTION LEAGUE, INC.; ON TARGET\\n TRAINING, INC.; OVERWATCH OUTPOST,\\n\\n Plaintiffs, Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nMAURA T. HEALEY, in her official capacity as Attorney General of\\n the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; DANIEL BENNETT, in his\\n official capacity as the Secretary of the Executive Office of\\n Public Safety and Security; KERRY GILPIN, in her official\\n capacity as Superintendent of the Massachusetts State Police,\\n\\n Defendants, Appellees.\\n\\n\\n APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS\\n\\n [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]\\n\\n\\n Before\\n\\n Barron, Circuit Judge,\\n Souter, Associate Justice,\\n and Selya, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n John Parker Sweeney, with whom James Michael Campbell,\\nRichard Paul Campbell, Campbell Campbell Edwards & Conroy PC, T.\\nSky Woodward, James W. Porter, III, Marc A. Nardone, and Bradley\\nArant Boult Cummings LLP, were on brief, for appellants.\\n\\n\\n \\n Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the Supreme\\nCourt of the United States, sitting by designation.\\n\\f Ilya Shapiro, Trevor Burrus, Matthew Larosiere, Joseph G.S.\\nGreenlee, and David B. Kopel on brief for Professors of Second\\nAmendment Law, Cato Institute, Second Amendment Foundation,\\nCitizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, Jews for\\nthe Preservation of Firearms Ownership, Millennial Policy Center,\\nand Independence Institute, amici curiae.\\n Dan M. Peterson, Dan M. Peterson PLLC, C. D. Michel, Sean A.\\nBrady, Anna M. Barvir, and Michel & Associates, P.C., on brief for\\nWestern States Sheriffs' Association, Law Enforcement Legal\\nDefense Fund, Law Enforcement Action Network, International\\nAssociation of Law Enforcement Firearms Instructors, CRPA\\nFoundation, International Law Enforcement Educators and Trainers\\nAssociation, and Law Enforcement Alliance of America, amici\\ncuriae.\\n David H. Thompson, Peter A. Patterson, John D. Ohlendorf, and\\nCooper & Kirk, PLLC, on brief for National Rifle Association of\\nAmerica, Inc., amicus curiae.\\n Julia E. Kobick, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Maura\\nHealey, Attorney General, William W. Porter and Elizabeth Kaplan,\\nAssistant Attorneys General, and Gary Klein, Special Assistant\\nAttorney General, were on brief, for appellees.\\n Jonathan K. Baum, Mark T. Ciani, Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP,\\nJ. Adams Skaggs, and Hannah Shearer on brief for Giffords Law\\nCenter to Prevent Gun Violence, amicus curiae.\\n Mariel Goetz, Kimberly A. Mottley, Laura Stafford, and\\nProskauer Rose LLP, on brief for Brady Center to Prevent Gun\\nViolence, amicus curiae.\\n Edward Notis-McConarty, M. Patrick Moore, Jr., Vanessa A.\\nArslanian, and Hemenway & Barnes LLP on brief for Massachusetts\\nChiefs of Police Association and Massachusetts Major City Chiefs\\nof Police Association, amici curiae.\\n Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General of New Jersey, Andrew J.\\nBruck, Executive Assistant Attorney General, Jeremy M. Feigenbaum\\nand Glenn Moramarco, Assistant Attorneys General, Melissa Medoway,\\nDeputy Attorney General, Xavier Becerra, Attorney General of\\nCalifornia, George Jepsen, Attorney General of Connecticut,\\nMatthew P. Denn, Attorney General of Delaware, Russell A. Suzuki,\\nAttorney General of Hawai'i, Tom Miller, Attorney General of Iowa,\\nBrian E. Frosh, Attorney General of Maryland, Ellen F. Rosenblum,\\nAttorney General of Oregon, Josh Shapiro, Attorney General of\\nPennsylvania, Peter F. Kilmartin, Attorney General of Rhode\\nIsland, Mark R. Herring, Attorney General of Virginia, Thomas J.\\nDonovan, Jr., Attorney General of Vermont, Robert W. Ferguson,\\nAttorney General of Washington, Karl A. Racine, Attorney General\\nfor the District of Columbia, on brief for states of New Jersey,\\nCalifornia, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawai'i, Iowa, Maryland,\\nOregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington,\\n\\fand the District of Columbia, amici curiae.\\n Eric Tirschwell, William J. Taylor, Jr., Mark Anthony\\nFrassetto, Deepak Gupta, Jonathan E. Taylor, and Gupta Wessler\\nPLLC, on brief for Everytown for Gun Safety, amicus curiae.\\n Albert W. Wallis, Elizabeth A. Ritvo, Tristan G. Axelrod,\\nBrown Rudnick LLP, Kenneth A. Sweder, and Sweder & Ross LLP, on\\nbrief for Jewish Alliance for Law and Social Action, Greater Boston\\nInterfaith Organization, Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts,\\nEpiscopal Diocese of Western Massachusetts, Islamic Society of\\nBoston, Massachusetts Council of Churches, Union for Reform\\nJudaism, Central Conference of American Rabbis, Women of Reform\\nJudaism, and Men of Reform Judaism, amici curiae.\\n Ben T. Clements and Clements & Pineault, LLP, on brief for\\nStop Handgun Violence, MA Coalition to Prevent Gun Violence, and\\nMassachusetts General Hospital Gun Violence Prevention Coalition,\\namici curiae.\\n James Murray, pro se, on brief for James Murray, amicus\\ncuriae.\\n\\n\\n\\n April 26, 2019\\n\\f SELYA, Circuit Judge. This high-profile case involves\\n\\na constitutional challenge to a Massachusetts law proscribing the\\n\\nsale, transfer, and possession of certain semiautomatic assault\\n\\nweapons and large-capacity magazines (LCMs). See Mass. Gen. Laws\\n\\nch. 140, §§ 121, 131M (the Act). The plaintiffs assert that they\\n\\nhave an unfettered Second Amendment right to possess the proscribed\\n\\nassault weapons and LCMs in their homes for self-defense.1 The\\n\\ndistrict court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants\\n\\n(a phalanx of state officials). See Worman v. Healey, 293 F. Supp.\\n\\n3d 251, 271 (D. Mass. 2018). Although our reasoning differs in\\n\\ncertain respects from that of the court below, we affirm.\\n\\n We assume, without deciding, that the proscribed weapons\\n\\nhave some degree of protection under the Second Amendment. We\\n\\nfurther assume, again without deciding, that the Act implicates\\n\\nthe core Second Amendment right of self-defense in the home by\\n\\nlaw-abiding, responsible individuals. We hold, however, that the\\n\\nAct's burden on that core right is minimal and, thus, the Act need\\n\\nonly withstand intermediate scrutiny — which it does.\\n\\nI. BACKGROUND\\n\\n We start by rehearsing the background and travel of the\\n\\ncase. The Massachusetts legislature modeled the Act on the 1994\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Throughout this opinion, we use the terms \\\"proscribed\\nassault weapons and LCMs\\\" and \\\"proscribed weapons\\\" interchangeably\\nto describe the semiautomatic assault weapons and LCMs targeted by\\nthe Act.\\n\\n\\n - 4 -\\n\\ffederal Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act\\n\\n(the federal regulation), Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 110101-06, 108\\n\\nStat. 1796, 1996-2010 (1994), which is no longer in effect. The\\n\\nfederal regulation prohibited the manufacture, transfer, and\\n\\npossession of \\\"semiautomatic assault weapons\\\" and the transfer and\\n\\npossession of \\\"large capacity ammunition feeding devices.\\\" Id.\\n\\n§§ 110102-03, 108 Stat. at 1996-2000. For purposes of the federal\\n\\nregulation, the term \\\"semiautomatic assault weapon\\\" was defined to\\n\\ninclude nineteen specific models, as well as any semiautomatic\\n\\nrifle, pistol, or shotgun with two or more combat-style features\\n\\nor the ability to accept a detachable magazine. Id. § 110102(b),\\n\\n108 Stat. at 1997-98. The term \\\"large capacity ammunition feeding\\n\\ndevice\\\" encompassed any magazine or other feeding device that could\\n\\naccept more than ten rounds of ammunition. Id. § 110103(b), 108\\n\\nStat. at 1999. The federal regulation specifically exempted, inter\\n\\nalia, assault weapons that were lawfully possessed on the date of\\n\\nits enactment (September 13, 1994), semiautomatic rifles that\\n\\ncould not hold more than five rounds of ammunition or accept a\\n\\ndetachable magazine holding more than five rounds of ammunition,\\n\\nand a specific list of \\\"long guns most commonly used in hunting\\n\\nand recreational sports.\\\" H.R. Rep. No. 103-489, at 20 (1994);\\n\\nsee Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110102(a), 108 Stat. at 1996-97. In\\n\\nexplicating the purpose of the federal regulation, Congress stated\\n\\nthat semiautomatic assault weapons have \\\"a capability for\\n\\n\\n - 5 -\\n\\flethality — more wounds, more serious, in more victims — far beyond\\n\\nthat of other firearms in general, including other semiautomatic\\n\\nguns.\\\" H.R. Rep. No. 103-489, at 19-20.\\n\\n Four years after Congress enacted the federal\\n\\nregulation, the Massachusetts legislature passed a counterpart\\n\\nstatute, which made it a crime to sell, transfer, or possess\\n\\nsemiautomatic assault weapons as defined by the federal\\n\\nregulation, copies or duplicates of those weapons, and LCMs capable\\n\\nof holding more than ten rounds of ammunition. See Mass. Gen.\\n\\nLaws ch. 140, §§ 121, 131M. The Act contained the same exceptions\\n\\nas the federal regulation, including free passes for weapons\\n\\nlawfully owned on September 13, 1994, and for sundry automatic\\n\\nrifles commonly used for hunting and sport. See id.\\n\\n Congress allowed the federal regulation to expire in\\n\\n2004, but the Massachusetts legislature struck out in a different\\n\\ndirection and made the Massachusetts assault weapons regulation\\n\\npermanent that year. In signing the bill into law, then-Governor\\n\\nRomney declared that semiautomatic assault weapons and LCMs \\\"are\\n\\nnot made for recreation or self-defense. They are instruments of\\n\\ndestruction with the sole purpose of hunting down and killing\\n\\npeople.\\\"\\n\\n We fast-forward to 2016 when the Massachusetts Attorney\\n\\nGeneral, Maura Healey, issued a public enforcement notice designed\\n\\nto \\\"provide[] guidance on the identification of weapons that are\\n\\n\\n - 6 -\\n\\f'copies' or 'duplicates' of the enumerated Assault weapons that\\n\\nare banned under Massachusetts law.\\\" Approximately six months\\n\\nlater, the plaintiffs — a diverse group consisting of Massachusetts\\n\\nfirearm owners, prospective firearm owners, firearm dealers, and\\n\\na firearm advocacy association — brought suit in the federal\\n\\ndistrict court, alleging constitutional violations and seeking\\n\\ndeclaratory and injunctive relief. They named an array of\\n\\ndefendants including (as relevant here) various state officials in\\n\\ntheir representative capacities; claimed that the Act, as\\n\\ninterpreted and enforced by those officials, abridged both the\\n\\nSecond Amendment and the Due Process Clause; and prayed for\\n\\ndeclaratory and injunctive relief.\\n\\n After some procedural skirmishing, not relevant here,\\n\\nthe parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court\\n\\nheard arguments of counsel and reserved decision. The court\\n\\nsubsequently handed down a rescript in which it rejected the\\n\\nplaintiffs' challenges and explained why it was granting the\\n\\ndefendants' summary judgment motion. See Worman, 293 F. Supp. 3d\\n\\nat 258-71. This timely appeal ensued. In it, the plaintiffs\\n\\nchallenge only the district court's rejection of their Second\\n\\nAmendment claims.\\n\\nII. ANALYSIS\\n\\n We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de\\n\\nnovo, taking the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom to\\n\\n\\n - 7 -\\n\\fthe behoof of the non-moving parties (here, the plaintiffs). See\\n\\nHightower v. City of Boston, 693 F.3d 61, 70 (1st Cir. 2012);\\n\\nHoulton Citizens' Coal. v. Town of Houlton, 175 F.3d 178, 184 (1st\\n\\nCir. 1999). \\\"We will affirm only if the record reveals 'that there\\n\\nis no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is\\n\\nentitled to judgment as a matter of law.'\\\" Avery v. Hughes, 661\\n\\nF.3d 690, 693 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).\\n\\nThis standard applies unabated to appeals — like this one — arising\\n\\nout of a district court's disposition of cross-motions for summary\\n\\njudgment. See Blackie v. Maine, 75 F.3d 716, 720-21 (1st Cir.\\n\\n1996). In applying the standard here, we have the benefit not\\n\\nonly of able briefing by the parties but also of a myriad of\\n\\nthoughtful amicus briefs (for which we are grateful).\\n\\n A. The Legal Framework.\\n\\n The Second Amendment states that \\\"[a] well regulated\\n\\nMilitia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right\\n\\nof the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.\\\" U.S.\\n\\nConst. amend. II. In a seminal decision, the Supreme Court held\\n\\nthat the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to keep\\n\\nand bear arms (unconnected to service in the militia). See\\n\\nDistrict of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008). Two\\n\\nyears later, the Court made pellucid that the Second Amendment\\n\\napplies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See\\n\\nMcDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010).\\n\\n\\n - 8 -\\n\\f The law challenged in Heller constituted an \\\"absolute\\n\\nprohibition of handguns held and used for self-defense in the\\n\\nhome,\\\" which (the Court ruled) transgressed the Second Amendment.2\\n\\n554 U.S. at 635-36. Although the Court did not have occasion to\\n\\nexamine \\\"the full scope of the Second Amendment\\\" right, it\\n\\ncautioned that the right \\\"is not unlimited.\\\" Id. at 626. In\\n\\nfurtherance of this cautionary language, the Court admonished that\\n\\n\\\"nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on\\n\\nlongstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons\\n\\nand the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms\\n\\nin sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or\\n\\nlaws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale\\n\\nof arms.\\\" Id. at 626-27. The Court added that the Second Amendment\\n\\ndoes not confer \\\"a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever\\n\\nin any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.\\\" Id. at 626.\\n\\n We glean from the teachings of Heller that four data\\n\\npoints determine the level of protection, if any, that the Second\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Although the present plaintiffs attempt to characterize the\\nAct as an \\\"absolute prohibition\\\" on an entire class of firearms,\\nthat characterization is inapt. The Act applies only to a set of\\nenumerated semiautomatic assault weapons, to semiautomatic assault\\nweapons with particular features, and to magazines of a specific\\ncapacity. Seen in this light, the plaintiffs' \\\"absolute\\nprohibition\\\" argument is circular: essentially, it amounts to a\\nsuggestion that whatever group of weapons a regulation prohibits\\nmay be deemed a \\\"class.\\\" By this logic — which we squarely reject\\n— virtually any regulation could be considered an \\\"absolute\\nprohibition\\\" of a class of weapons.\\n\\n\\n - 9 -\\n\\fAmendment provides. The first data point involves the person who\\n\\nis asserting the right; the second data point involves the purpose\\n\\nfor which the right is being asserted; the third data point\\n\\ninvolves the place where the right is being asserted; and the\\n\\nfourth data point involves the type of weapon. Heller's most\\n\\nmeaningful message touches all four data points. Refined to bare\\n\\nessence, its message is that the Second Amendment \\\"elevates above\\n\\nall other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens\\n\\nto use arms in defense of hearth and home.\\\" Id. at 635.\\n\\n As applied here, this message checks off the first three\\n\\ndata points. It is undisputed that the individual plaintiffs are\\n\\nnot prohibited persons but, rather, law-abiding, responsible\\n\\ncitizens. Similarly, it is undisputed that they seek to use the\\n\\nproscribed assault weapons and LCMs for self-defense. And,\\n\\nfinally, it is undisputed that they seek to effectuate this usage\\n\\nin their homes. We are, therefore, left to focus on the fourth\\n\\ndata point: the arms proscribed and the extent (if at all) that\\n\\nthose arms are protected by the Second Amendment.\\n\\n In conducting this inquiry, we do not write on an\\n\\nentirely pristine page. Our recent decision in Gould v. Morgan\\n\\nmapped out a two-step approach for analyzing Second Amendment\\n\\nchallenges. See 907 F.3d 659, 668-69 (1st Cir. 2018), petition\\n\\nfor cert. filed, ___ U.S.L.W. ___ (U.S. April 1, 2019) (No. 18-\\n\\n1272). Under this approach, we first ask whether the challenged\\n\\n\\n - 10 -\\n\\flaw burdens conduct that is protected by the Second Amendment.\\n\\nSee id. This inquiry is \\\"backward-looking\\\" and \\\"seeks to determine\\n\\nwhether the regulated conduct 'was understood to be within the\\n\\nscope of the right at the time of ratification.'\\\" Id. at 669\\n\\n(quoting United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2010)). If that step is successfully negotiated so we can say\\n\\nthat the challenged law \\\"burdens conduct falling within the scope\\n\\nof the Second Amendment, [we] then must determine what level of\\n\\nscrutiny is appropriate and must proceed to decide whether the\\n\\nchallenged law survives that level of scrutiny.\\\" Id. We follow\\n\\nthis approach in determining whether the Act withstands the\\n\\nplaintiffs' Second Amendment onslaught.\\n\\n B. The Scope of the Second Amendment Right.\\n\\n This brings us to the question of whether the conduct\\n\\nrestricted by the Act falls under the protective carapace of the\\n\\nSecond Amendment. To answer this question, we must determine\\n\\nwhether possession of the proscribed assault weapons and LCMs in\\n\\nthe home for self-defense is safeguarded by the Second Amendment.3\\n\\n\\n 3\\n One of the amici advances the clever argument that LCMs,\\nlike other magazines, are not \\\"arms\\\" at all because they are not\\nthemselves \\\"[w]eapons of offense, or armour of defence.\\\" Heller,\\n554 U.S. at 581 (alteration in original) (quoting 1 Dictionary of\\nthe English Language 106 (4th ed.) (reprinted 1978)). The\\ndefendants, though, have not proffered such an argument. We\\nordinarily refuse to entertain arguments advanced by amici but not\\nby the parties, see, e.g., In re Sony BMG Music Entm't, 564 F.3d\\n1, 3 (1st Cir. 2009); Lane v. First Nat'l Bank of Bos., 871 F.2d\\n166, 175 (1st Cir. 1989), and we see no reason to depart from that\\n\\n\\n - 11 -\\n\\f Our first task is to consider whether the proscribed\\n\\nweapons are the type of arms \\\"understood to be within the scope of\\n\\nthe [Second Amendment] right at the time of ratification.\\\" Id.\\n\\n(quoting Chester, 628 F.3d at 680). Heller is the beacon by which\\n\\nwe must steer. There, the Court explained that \\\"[t]he traditional\\n\\nmilitia was formed from a pool of men bringing arms 'in common use\\n\\nat the time' for lawful purposes like self-defense.\\\" 554 U.S. at\\n\\n624 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).4\\n\\nThe Court's earlier decision in Miller (which held that a short-\\n\\nbarreled shotgun was not protected by the Second Amendment)\\n\\nfurnishes further context. See 307 U.S. at 175-83. There, the\\n\\nCourt surveyed state laws regulating militias at the time of the\\n\\nfounding and explained that many states, including Massachusetts,\\n\\nhad specified the types of weapons that citizens were required to\\n\\nbring to militia service. See id. at 180-82. The Court concluded\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nprudential principle here. We note, moreover, that the parties do\\nnot argue that the Second Amendment analysis differs with respect\\nto LCMs as opposed to semiautomatic assault weapons, and so we\\nconsider both objects of the Act together.\\n 4 Here, however, there is a wrinkle. Because the plaintiffs'\\nchallenge is directed at a state statute, Gould points to 1868\\n(when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified) as the date for any\\nnecessary historical inquiry. See 907 F.3d at 669. Heller, in\\ncontrast, does not deal with a state law and thus locates the\\nbenchmark at 1791 (the date of ratification of the Constitution\\nitself). Since no party here has argued that this distinction is\\neither material or sufficient to render Heller's analysis\\ninoperative, we need not parse this distinction as \\\"our conclusion\\nwith respect to the historical record would be the same regardless\\nof which ratification date was used.\\\" Id. at 669 n.3.\\n\\n\\n - 12 -\\n\\fthat although \\\"[m]ost if not all of the States have adopted\\n\\nprovisions touching the right to keep and bear arms,\\\" id. at 182,\\n\\nnone has suggested that a short-barreled shotgun was the type of\\n\\nweapon that \\\"could contribute to the common defense,\\\" id. at 178.\\n\\nWith this historical background in place, the Heller Court\\n\\ndetermined that the Second Amendment \\\"extends only to certain types\\n\\nof weapons.\\\" 554 U.S. at 623. One corollary of this determination\\n\\nis that an \\\"important limitation on the right to keep and carry\\n\\narms\\\" is that \\\"the sorts of weapons protected were those 'in common\\n\\nuse at the time.'\\\" Id. at 627 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 179).\\n\\nThe Court added that such a \\\"limitation is fairly supported by the\\n\\nhistorical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of 'dangerous and\\n\\nunusual weapons.'\\\" Id. (citing 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries\\n\\non the Laws of England 148-49 (1769)); see id. at 623 (referencing\\n\\n\\\"the prohibition on terrorizing people with dangerous or unusual\\n\\nweapons\\\").\\n\\n That the proscribed weapons were not in existence, let\\n\\nalone in common use, at the time of ratification, does not end the\\n\\nmatter. Heller left no doubt that \\\"the Second Amendment extends,\\n\\nprima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms,\\n\\neven those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.\\\"\\n\\nId. at 582. The Court reaffirmed this principle some eight years\\n\\nlater, when it reversed a decision of the Massachusetts Supreme\\n\\nJudicial Court (SJC), which had held that stun guns were not\\n\\n\\n - 13 -\\n\\fprotected by the Second Amendment. See Caetano v. Massachusetts,\\n\\n136 S. Ct. 1027, 1027-28 (2016) (per curiam). Pertinently, the\\n\\nCaetano Court debunked the notion that stun guns were unprotected\\n\\nbecause they \\\"were not in common use at the time of the Second\\n\\nAmendment's enactment,\\\" id. at 1027 (quoting Commonwealth v.\\n\\nCaetano, 26 N.E.3d 688, 693 (Mass. 2015)), finding that notion\\n\\n\\\"inconsistent with Heller's clear statement that the Second\\n\\nAmendment 'extends . . . to . . . arms that were not in existence\\n\\nat the time of the founding,'\\\" id. at 1028 (alteration in original)\\n\\n(quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 582); see id. (rejecting conclusion\\n\\n\\\"that stun guns are 'unusual' because they are 'a thoroughly modern\\n\\ninvention'\\\" (quoting Caetano, 26 N.E.3d at 693-94)).\\n\\n Relatedly, the Heller Court acknowledged that \\\"if\\n\\nweapons that are most useful in military service — M-16 rifles and\\n\\nthe like — may be banned,\\\" it might be argued that \\\"the Second\\n\\nAmendment right is completely detached from the prefatory clause.\\\"\\n\\n554 U.S. at 627. After all, militias today \\\"require sophisticated\\n\\narms that are highly unusual in society at large.\\\" Id. But the\\n\\nCourt pointed out that \\\"the conception of the militia at the time\\n\\nof the Second Amendment's ratification was the body of all citizens\\n\\ncapable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful\\n\\nweapons that they possessed at home to militia duty.\\\" Id. Thus,\\n\\n\\\"the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 14 -\\n\\fbetween the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change\\n\\n[judicial] interpretation of the right.\\\" Id. at 627-28.\\n\\n Viewed against this backdrop, the relevant question is\\n\\nneither whether the proscribed weapons were commonly used at the\\n\\ntime of ratification nor whether they are among the types of\\n\\nweapons used by today's militias. Instead, the question is whether\\n\\nthe proscribed weapons are in common use for lawful purposes like\\n\\nself-defense.\\n\\n As to this question, Heller provides only meager\\n\\nguidance. Heller made plain that handguns, which the Court\\n\\ndescribed as \\\"the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-\\n\\ndefense in the home,\\\" are protected. Id. at 629. Conversely,\\n\\n\\\"the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically\\n\\npossessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as\\n\\nshort-barreled shotguns.\\\" Id. at 625. But as to the middle ground\\n\\n— and particularly, as to how to plot the dividing line between\\n\\ncommon and uncommon use — the Court was silent.5\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 We agree with the Seventh Circuit that measuring \\\"common\\nuse\\\" by the sheer number of weapons lawfully owned is somewhat\\nillogical. See Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406,\\n409 (7th Cir. 2015) (\\\"Machine guns aren't commonly owned for lawful\\npurposes today because they are illegal; semi-automatic weapons\\nwith large-capacity magazines are owned more commonly because,\\nuntil recently (in some jurisdictions), they have been legal. Yet\\nit would be absurd to say that the reason why a particular weapon\\ncan be banned is that there is a statute banning it, so that it\\nisn't commonly owned.\\\").\\n\\n\\n - 15 -\\n\\f The parties strive mightily to fill this void. On the\\n\\none hand, the plaintiffs have shown that, as of 2013, nearly\\n\\n5,000,000 people owned at least one semiautomatic assault weapon.\\n\\nThey also have shown that between 1990 and 2015, Americans owned\\n\\napproximately 115,000,000 LCMs. On the other hand, the defendants\\n\\nhave shown that only three percent of guns in the United States\\n\\nare assault weapons and only one percent of Americans own such a\\n\\nweapon. In all events, the record evidence is sparse as to actual\\n\\nuse of any of the proscribed weapons or LCMs for self-defense in\\n\\nthe home.\\n\\n The district court avoided this question entirely. It\\n\\nabjured the \\\"in common use\\\" test, concluding that \\\"Heller . . .\\n\\npresents us with a dispositive and relatively easy inquiry: Are\\n\\nthe banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines 'like' 'M-\\n\\n16 rifles,' i.e., 'weapons that are most useful in military\\n\\nservice,' and thus outside the ambit of the Second Amendment?\\\"\\n\\nWorman, 293 F. Supp. 3d at 264 (quoting Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d\\n\\n114, 136 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 469\\n\\n(2017)). The court went on to find that the proscribed weapons\\n\\nfit within this taxonomy, noting by way of example that one of the\\n\\nproscribed weapons (the Colt AR-15) is virtually identical to the\\n\\nM-16 (save for the fact that the AR-15 does not allow for fully\\n\\nautomatic fire). See id. at 264-66. The plaintiffs argue that\\n\\nthis approach is doubly flawed: they calumnize both the district\\n\\n\\n - 16 -\\n\\fcourt's conclusion that \\\"weapons that are most useful in military\\n\\nservice\\\" are excepted from Second Amendment coverage and its\\n\\ndetermination that the proscribed weapons are \\\"like\\\" \\\"M-16\\n\\nrifles.\\\"\\n\\n Mindful that \\\"[d]iscretion is often the better part of\\n\\nvalor,\\\" United States v. Gonzalez, 736 F.3d 40, 40 (1st Cir. 2013),\\n\\nwe are reluctant to plunge into this factbound morass. In the\\n\\nend, \\\"courts should not rush to decide unsettled issues when the\\n\\nexigencies of a particular case do not require such definitive\\n\\nmeasures.\\\" Privitera v. Curran (In re Curran), 855 F.3d 19, 22\\n\\n(1st Cir. 2017). For present purposes, we simply assume, albeit\\n\\nwithout deciding, that the Act burdens conduct that falls somewhere\\n\\nwithin the compass of the Second Amendment.\\n\\n C. The Level of Scrutiny.\\n\\n The next phase of our inquiry \\\"requires us to evaluate\\n\\nthe [Act] under an appropriate level of scrutiny.\\\" Gould, 907\\n\\nF.3d at 670. The appropriate level of scrutiny \\\"turn[s] on how\\n\\nclosely a particular law or policy approaches the core of the\\n\\nSecond Amendment right and how heavily it burdens that right.\\\"\\n\\nId. at 670-71. We previously established \\\"that the core Second\\n\\nAmendment right is limited to self-defense in the home\\\" on the\\n\\npart of \\\"responsible, law-abiding individuals.\\\" Id. at 671. Given\\n\\nthis understanding, we concluded that the law challenged in Gould\\n\\n(which concerned public carriage of firearms) fell outside the\\n\\n\\n - 17 -\\n\\fcore of the Second Amendment right. See id. at 672. In contrast\\n\\nto the plaintiffs in Gould, the present plaintiffs contend that\\n\\nthe Act affects their ability to defend themselves in their homes.\\n\\nAssuming (favorably to the plaintiffs) that the Act implicates the\\n\\ncore of the Second Amendment right, we must train the lens of our\\n\\ninquiry on \\\"how heavily it burdens that right.\\\" Id. at 671.\\n\\n As is true in many Second Amendment inquiries, our\\n\\nstarting point is Heller. There, the Court unequivocally rebuffed\\n\\nthe argument \\\"that it is permissible to ban the possession of\\n\\nhandguns so long as the possession of other firearms (i.e., long\\n\\nguns) is allowed.\\\" 544 U.S. at 629. The Court's rationale was\\n\\nbased on the premise that \\\"the American people have considered the\\n\\nhandgun to be the quintessential self-defense weapon.\\\" Id. In\\n\\nfashioning this rationale, the Court repeatedly emphasized the\\n\\nunique popularity of the handgun as a means of self-defense. See\\n\\nid. at 628 (calling handguns a \\\"class of 'arms' . . .\\n\\noverwhelmingly chosen by American society for [self-defense]\\\");\\n\\nid. at 628-29 (identifying the handgun as \\\"the most preferred\\n\\nfirearm in the nation to 'keep' and use for protection of one's\\n\\nhome and family\\\"); id. at 629 (declaring that \\\"handguns are the\\n\\nmost popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the\\n\\nhome\\\"). Building on this foundation, the Court made clear that\\n\\nbanning this quintessential self-defense weapon would heavily\\n\\nburden the core right of self-defense in the home. See id. at\\n\\n\\n - 18 -\\n\\f629; see also id. at 632 (describing eighteenth-century gunpowder\\n\\nstorage laws and noting that such laws did \\\"not remotely burden\\n\\nthe right of self-defense as much as an absolute ban on handguns\\\").\\n\\n This same logic leads us to conclude that the Act's\\n\\nrestriction on semiautomatic assault weapons and LCMs does not\\n\\nheavily burden the core right of self-defense in the home. As an\\n\\ninitial matter, the Act does not ban all semiautomatic weapons and\\n\\nmagazines. Instead, it proscribes only a set of specifically\\n\\nenumerated semiautomatic assault weapons, magazines of a\\n\\nparticular capacity, and semiautomatic assault weapons that have\\n\\ncertain combat-style features. Furthermore, the record shows that\\n\\nsemiautomatic assault weapons do not share the features that make\\n\\nhandguns well-suited to self-defense in the home. Cf. id. at 629\\n\\n(explaining that \\\"a citizen may prefer a handgun for home defense\\\"\\n\\nbecause, inter alia, \\\"[i]t is easier to store in a location that\\n\\nis readily accessible in an emergency; it cannot easily be\\n\\nredirected or wrestled away by an attacker; it is easier to use\\n\\nfor those without the upper-body strength to lift and aim a long\\n\\ngun; it can be pointed at a burglar with one hand while the other\\n\\nhand dials the police\\\"). Equally as important is what the record\\n\\ndoes not show: it offers no indication that the proscribed weapons\\n\\nhave commonly been used for home self-defense purposes. In fact,\\n\\nwhen asked directly, not one of the plaintiffs or their six experts\\n\\ncould identify even a single example of the use of an assault\\n\\n\\n - 19 -\\n\\fweapon for home self-defense, nor could they identify even a single\\n\\nexample of a self-defense episode in which ten or more shots were\\n\\nfired. Viewed as a whole, the record suggests that wielding the\\n\\nproscribed weapons for self-defense within the home is tantamount\\n\\nto using a sledgehammer to crack open the shell of a peanut. Thus,\\n\\nwe conclude that the Act does not heavily burden the core Second\\n\\nAmendment right of self-defense within the home.\\n\\n This conclusion fits seamlessly with our decision in\\n\\nHightower. Although that opinion did not directly address what\\n\\nrestrictions may be deemed to heavily burden the core Second\\n\\nAmendment right, we stated that the fact that the plaintiff sought\\n\\na license that \\\"allowed carrying of large capacity weapons\\n\\nweaken[ed] the Second Amendment claim, as [Heller] was concerned\\n\\nwith weapons of the type characteristically used to protect the\\n\\nhome.\\\" Hightower, 693 F.3d at 71 (holding that revocation of\\n\\nlicense to carry concealed, large-capacity firearm based on false\\n\\nstatements in renewal application did not violate Second\\n\\nAmendment). So, too, our conclusion is reinforced by the fact\\n\\nthat — unlike the use of handguns — the use of semiautomatic\\n\\nassault weapons, even in the home, does not \\\"implicate[] the safety\\n\\nonly of those who live or visit there.\\\" Gould, 907 F.3d at 672.\\n\\nRather, the use of semiautomatic assault weapons implicates the\\n\\nsafety of the public at large. After all, such weapons can fire\\n\\nthrough walls, risking the lives of those in nearby apartments or\\n\\n\\n - 20 -\\n\\fon the street. Cf. Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 127 (observing that \\\"rounds\\n\\nfrom assault weapons have the ability to easily penetrate most\\n\\nmaterials used in standard home construction, car doors, and\\n\\nsimilar materials\\\").\\n\\n We have yet to consider what level of scrutiny applies\\n\\nto a law that implicates the core of the Second Amendment right,\\n\\nbut does not \\\"heavily . . . burden[] that right.\\\" Gould, 907 F.3d\\n\\nat 671. Heller does state that a handgun ban would \\\"fail\\n\\nconstitutional muster\\\" under \\\"any of the standards of scrutiny\\n\\nthat [the Court has] applied to enumerated constitutional rights.\\\"\\n\\n554 U.S. at 628-29. But we do not read Heller to suggest that a\\n\\nregulation of arms that only modestly burdens the core Second\\n\\nAmendment right must be subject to the strictest form of\\n\\nconstitutional review. See Gould, 900 F.3d at 673 (\\\"The Heller\\n\\nCourt . . . implie[d] that there is a role for some level of\\n\\nscrutiny less rigorous than strict scrutiny.\\\"); see also Ezell v.\\n\\nCity of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011) (\\\"[A] severe\\n\\nburden on the core Second Amendment right of armed self-defense\\n\\nwill require an extremely strong public-interest justification and\\n\\na close fit between the government's means and its end. . . .\\n\\n[L]aws that merely regulate rather than restrict, and modest\\n\\nburdens on the right may be more easily justified.\\\").\\n\\n In our view, intermediate scrutiny is appropriate as\\n\\nlong as a challenged regulation either fails to implicate the core\\n\\n\\n - 21 -\\n\\fSecond Amendment right or fails to impose a substantial burden on\\n\\nthat right. See Fyock v. Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991, 998-99 (9th\\n\\nCir. 2015). It follows that intermediate scrutiny is the\\n\\nappropriate level of scrutiny for evaluating a law — like the Act\\n\\n— that arguably implicates the core Second Amendment right to self-\\n\\ndefense in the home but places only a modest burden on that right.\\n\\nThis holding aligns us with a number of our sister circuits, which\\n\\nhave applied intermediate scrutiny to laws restricting\\n\\nsemiautomatic assault weapons and LCMs. See, e.g., Ass'n of N.J.\\n\\nRifle & Pistol Clubs v. Att'y Gen. N.J., 910 F.3d 106, 117 (3d\\n\\nCir. 2018) (applying intermediate scrutiny because \\\"[t]he Act here\\n\\ndoes not severely burden the core Second Amendment right to self-\\n\\ndefense in the home\\\"); Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 134 (applying\\n\\nintermediate scrutiny because challenged law did \\\"not seriously\\n\\nimpact a person's ability to defend himself in the home\\\" (internal\\n\\nquotation marks omitted)); N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v.\\n\\nCuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 260 (2d Cir. 2015) (applying intermediate\\n\\nscrutiny because \\\"[t]he burden imposed by the challenged\\n\\nlegislation is real, but . . . not 'severe'\\\"); Heller v. District\\n\\nof Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2011)\\n\\n(applying intermediate scrutiny because challenged prohibition did\\n\\nnot \\\"substantially affect\\\" individuals' right of self-defense).6\\n\\n\\n 6\\n After we heard oral argument in this case, the Illinois\\nSupreme Court held that a law prohibiting the carrying of tasers\\n\\n\\n - 22 -\\n\\fConsequently, we proceed to apply intermediate scrutiny to\\n\\ndetermine whether the Act passes constitutional muster.\\n\\n D. Applying Intermediate Scrutiny.\\n\\n To survive intermediate scrutiny, a statute \\\"must be\\n\\nsubstantially related to an important governmental objective.\\\"\\n\\nGould, 907 F.3d at 672 (quoting Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461\\n\\n(1988)). To achieve this substantial relationship, there must be\\n\\na \\\"reasonable fit\\\" between the restrictions imposed by the law and\\n\\nthe government's valid objectives, \\\"such that the law does not\\n\\nburden more conduct than is reasonably necessary.\\\" Id. at 674\\n\\n(quoting Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2013)).\\n\\n The law that the plaintiffs challenge here — the Act —\\n\\nrestricts the sale, transfer, and possession of certain\\n\\nsemiautomatic assault weapons and LCMs. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch.\\n\\n140, §§ 121, 131M. It does not ban the sale, transfer, or\\n\\npossession of all semiautomatic weapons, nor does it impose any\\n\\nrestrictions on magazines that are designed to hold ten rounds or\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nand stun guns was a \\\"categorical ban\\\" and, thus, was \\\"facially\\nunconstitutional under the [S]econd [A]mendment.\\\" Illinois v.\\nWebb, ___ N.E. 3d ___, ___ (Ill. 2019) [2019 WL 1291586 at *5].\\nThe plaintiffs notified us of this decision pursuant to Federal\\nRule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), asserting that it \\\"provides\\nfurther support for [their] argument that a categorical ban on\\nbearable arms that are commonly kept for lawful purposes is per se\\nunconstitutional.\\\" We reject the plaintiffs' premise that the Act\\nis a categorical ban, see supra note 2, and disagree with the\\nIllinois Supreme Court's conclusion that any law that restricts a\\ncertain type of arms is per se unconstitutional.\\n\\n\\n - 23 -\\n\\ffewer. The Act's manifest purpose is to \\\"help keep the streets\\n\\nand neighborhoods of Massachusetts safe\\\" by \\\"mak[ing] it harder\\n\\nfor criminals to get their hands on these dangerous guns.\\\"\\n\\n We have said before, and today reaffirm, that \\\"few\\n\\ninterests are more central to a state government than protecting\\n\\nthe safety and well-being of its citizens.\\\" Gould, 907 F.3d at\\n\\n673. Since Massachusetts indubitably \\\"has compelling governmental\\n\\ninterests in both public safety and crime prevention,\\\" id., the\\n\\nonly question that remains is whether the Act is substantially\\n\\nrelated to those interests. The answer to this question depends\\n\\non whether the fit between those interests and the Act is\\n\\nreasonable. See id. at 674.\\n\\n In our view, the Act survives under intermediate\\n\\nscrutiny. This view comports with the unanimous weight of circuit-\\n\\ncourt authority analyzing Second Amendment challenges to similar\\n\\nlaws. See, e.g., Ass'n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, 910 F.3d at\\n\\n122; Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 139; N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, 804\\n\\nF.3d at 261; Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1262.\\n\\n The record contains ample evidence of the unique dangers\\n\\nposed by the proscribed weapons. Semiautomatic assault weapons\\n\\npermit a shooter to fire multiple rounds very quickly, allowing\\n\\nhim to hit more victims in a shorter period of time. LCMs\\n\\nexacerbate this danger, allowing the shooter to fire more bullets\\n\\nwithout stopping to reload. Cf. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1264\\n\\n\\n - 24 -\\n\\f(noting that \\\"the 2 or 3 second pause during which a criminal\\n\\nreloads his firearm can be of critical benefit to law enforcement\\\"\\n\\n(internal quotation marks omitted)). It is, therefore, not\\n\\nsurprising that AR-15s equipped with LCMs have been the weapons of\\n\\nchoice in many of the deadliest mass shootings in recent history,\\n\\nincluding horrific events in Pittsburgh (2018), Parkland (2018),\\n\\nLas Vegas (2017), Sutherland Springs (2017), Orlando (2016),\\n\\nNewtown (2012), and Aurora (2012).\\n\\n The record also contains the affidavit of a seasoned\\n\\ntrauma surgeon, who has treated victims of several mass shootings.\\n\\nThis affidavit confirms what common sense suggests: semiautomatic\\n\\nassault weapons cause wounds that \\\"tend to be higher in complexity\\n\\nwith higher complication rates than those injuries from non-\\n\\nassault weapons. They tend to cause far greater damage to the\\n\\nmuscles, bones, soft tissue, and vital organs.\\\" Cf. Panagiotis K.\\n\\nStefanopoulos, et al., Gunshot Wounds: A Review of Ballistics\\n\\nRelated to Penetrating Trauma, 3 J. Acute Disease 178, 181-82\\n\\n(2014). A number of articles, written by physicians who have cared\\n\\nfor assault-weapon victims, substantiate the extreme damage that\\n\\nsuch weapons are prone to cause. See, e.g., Gina Kolata & C.J.\\n\\nChivers, Wounds from Military-Style Rifles? 'A Ghastly Thing to\\n\\nSee', N.Y. Times (Mar. 4, 2018),\\n\\nhttps://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/04/health/parkland-shooting-\\n\\nvictims-ar15.html (\\\"The tissue destruction is almost unimaginable.\\n\\n\\n - 25 -\\n\\fBones are exploded, soft tissue is absolutely destroyed. The\\n\\ninjuries to the chest or abdomen — it's like a bomb went off.\\\");\\n\\nTim Craig et al., As the Wounded Kept Coming, Hospitals Dealt with\\n\\nInjuries Rarely Seen in U.S., Wash. Post (Oct. 3, 2017),\\n\\nhttps://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/as-the-\\n\\nwounded-kept-coming-hospitals-dealt-with-injuries-rarely-seen-\\n\\nin-the-us/2017/10/03/06210b86-a883-11e7-b3aa-\\n\\nc0e2e1d41e38_story.html?utm_term=.5a659eec267b (\\\"If a 9mm bullet\\n\\nstrikes someone in the liver . . . that person might suffer a wound\\n\\nperhaps an inch wide, . . . [b]ut if you're struck in the liver\\n\\nwith an AR-15, it would be like dropping a watermelon onto the\\n\\ncement. It just is disintegrated.\\\" (internal quotation marks\\n\\nomitted)).\\n\\n The defendants proffered evidence that the majority of\\n\\nindividuals who have perpetrated mass shootings obtain their semi-\\n\\nautomatic assault weapons legally. See, e.g., Larry Buchanan et\\n\\nal., How They Got Their Guns, N.Y. Times (updated Feb. 16, 2018),\\n\\nhttps://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/03/us/how-mass-\\n\\nshooters-got-their-guns.html; Mayors Against Illegal Guns,\\n\\nAnalysis of Recent Mass Shootings (2013). This evidence lends\\n\\nsupport to the legislature's conclusion that a law proscribing\\n\\nsemiautomatic assault weapons and LCMs — like the Act — will help\\n\\ncurtail outbreaks of mass violence.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 26 -\\n\\f The plaintiffs do not dispute the extensive evidence\\n\\nregarding the lethality of the proscribed weapons and the frequency\\n\\nof their use in mass shootings. Instead, they argue that \\\"[e]ven\\n\\nassuming the [Act] may curb criminal misuse of the Banned Firearms\\n\\nand Magazines,\\\" the Act fails intermediate scrutiny because it\\n\\n\\\"make[s] no exception for law-abiding, responsible citizens to\\n\\nkeep these arms for lawful purposes like self-defense in the home.\\\"\\n\\nAccording to the plaintiffs, the forbidden assault weapons and\\n\\nLCMs are \\\"ideal\\\" for domestic self-defense for many of the same\\n\\nreasons that such weapons are ideal for mass shootings — they are\\n\\neasier to hold and shoot, require less user accuracy, and allow a\\n\\nshooter to fire many times without reloading. Thus, the plaintiffs\\n\\nassert, any regulation prohibiting law-abiding, responsible\\n\\ncitizens from possessing such weapons sweeps too broadly.\\n\\n This assertion is too facile by half, and we reject it.\\n\\nAlthough we acknowledge that \\\"[i]n dealing with a complex societal\\n\\nproblem like gun violence, there will almost always be room for\\n\\nreasonable minds to differ about the optimal solution,\\\" Gould, 907\\n\\nF.3d at 676, the plaintiffs give unduly short shrift to \\\"the\\n\\nlegislature's prerogative . . . to weigh the evidence, choose among\\n\\nconflicting inferences, and make the necessary policy judgments,\\\"\\n\\nid. The role of a reviewing court is limited to ensuring \\\"that,\\n\\nin formulating its judgments, [the legislature] has drawn\\n\\nreasonable inferences based on substantial evidence,\\\" id.\\n\\n\\n - 27 -\\n\\f(alteration in original) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC,\\n\\n512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994) (opinion of Kennedy, J.)), and that \\\"the\\n\\nfit between the asserted governmental interests and the means\\n\\nchosen to advance them is close enough to pass intermediate\\n\\nscrutiny,\\\" id. at 674.\\n\\n Here, the Massachusetts legislature's conclusion that\\n\\nthe Commonwealth's legitimate interests are best served by\\n\\nproscribing semiautomatic assault weapons and LCMs rests on\\n\\nsubstantial (although not incontrovertible) evidence regarding the\\n\\ninordinate dangers associated with the proscribed weapons. What\\n\\nis more, it strains credulity to argue that the fit between the\\n\\nAct and the asserted governmental interest is unreasonable. As we\\n\\nhave said, the Act does not outlaw all semiautomatic firearms and\\n\\nmagazines. Nor does it circumscribe in any way the fundamental\\n\\nright of law-abiding, responsible citizens to possess handguns in\\n\\ntheir homes for self-defense. Accordingly, we hold that although\\n\\nthe Act may well \\\"touch[] the right to keep and bear arms,\\\" Miller,\\n\\n307 U.S. at 182, it does not impermissibly intrude upon that right\\n\\nbecause it withstands intermediate scrutiny.\\n\\nIII. CONCLUSION\\n\\n This case concerns an issue of paramount importance. In\\n\\nthe wake of increasingly frequent acts of mass violence committed\\n\\nwith semiautomatic assault weapons and LCMs, the interests of state\\n\\nand local governments in regulating the possession and use of such\\n\\n\\n - 28 -\\n\\fweapons are entitled to great weight. Even so, we recognize that\\n\\nsuch interests must be balanced against the time-honored right of\\n\\nindividuals to bear arms in self-defense — a right that is\\n\\nprotected in varying degrees by the Second Amendment.\\n\\n Holding this delicate balance steady and true is\\n\\ndifficult but necessary work. Here, we find that even if the Act\\n\\nimplicates the core of the Second Amendment right, it (at most)\\n\\nminimally burdens that right. Consequently, we are obliged to\\n\\ncede some degree of deference to the decision of the Massachusetts\\n\\nlegislature about how best to regulate the possession and use of\\n\\nthe proscribed weapons.\\n\\n In this instance, that decision rests on a web of\\n\\ncompelling governmental interests, and the fit between those\\n\\ninterests and the restrictions imposed by the Act is both close\\n\\nand reasonable. It follows that the Act withstands intermediate\\n\\nscrutiny — and no more is exigible to blunt the plaintiffs' Second\\n\\nAmendment challenge.\\n\\n We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,\\n\\nthe judgment of the district court is\\n\\n\\n\\nAffirmed.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 29 -\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4391470/\", \"author_raw\": \"SELYA, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SOUTER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SELYA"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614217/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: David Seth WORMAN; Anthony Linden; Jason William Sawyer; Paul Nelson Chamberlain; Gun Owners' Action League, Inc. ; On Target Training, Inc.; Overwatch Outpost, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Maura T. HEALEY, in Her Official Capacity as Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; Daniel Bennett, in His Official Capacity as the Secretary of the Executive Office of Public Safety and Security ; Kerry Gilpin, in Her Official Capacity as Superintendent of the Massachusetts State Police, Defendants, Appellees.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\n\n\nNo. 18-1545\n\n DAVID SETH WORMAN; ANTHONY LINDEN; JASON WILLIAM SAWYER; PAUL\n NELSON CHAMBERLAIN; GUN OWNERS' ACTION LEAGUE, INC.; ON TARGET\n TRAINING, INC.; OVERWATCH OUTPOST,\n\n Plaintiffs, Appellants,\n\n v.\n\nMAURA T. HEALEY, in her official capacity as Attorney General of\n the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; DANIEL BENNETT, in his\n official capacity as the Secretary of the Executive Office of\n Public Safety and Security; KERRY GILPIN, in her official\n capacity as Superintendent of the Massachusetts State Police,\n\n Defendants, Appellees.\n\n\n APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS\n\n [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]\n\n\n Before\n\n Barron, Circuit Judge,\n Souter, Associate Justice,\n and Selya, Circuit Judge.\n\n\n\n John Parker Sweeney, with whom James Michael Campbell,\nRichard Paul Campbell, Campbell Campbell Edwards & Conroy PC, T.\nSky Woodward, James W. Porter, III, Marc A. Nardone, and Bradley\nArant Boult Cummings LLP, were on brief, for appellants.\n\n\n \n Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the Supreme\nCourt of the United States, sitting by designation.\n\f Ilya Shapiro, Trevor Burrus, Matthew Larosiere, Joseph G.S.\nGreenlee, and David B. Kopel on brief for Professors of Second\nAmendment Law, Cato Institute, Second Amendment Foundation,\nCitizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, Jews for\nthe Preservation of Firearms Ownership, Millennial Policy Center,\nand Independence Institute, amici curiae.\n Dan M. Peterson, Dan M. Peterson PLLC, C. D. Michel, Sean A.\nBrady, Anna M. Barvir, and Michel & Associates, P.C., on brief for\nWestern States Sheriffs' Association, Law Enforcement Legal\nDefense Fund, Law Enforcement Action Network, International\nAssociation of Law Enforcement Firearms Instructors, CRPA\nFoundation, International Law Enforcement Educators and Trainers\nAssociation, and Law Enforcement Alliance of America, amici\ncuriae.\n David H. Thompson, Peter A. Patterson, John D. Ohlendorf, and\nCooper & Kirk, PLLC, on brief for National Rifle Association of\nAmerica, Inc., amicus curiae.\n Julia E. Kobick, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Maura\nHealey, Attorney General, William W. Porter and Elizabeth Kaplan,\nAssistant Attorneys General, and Gary Klein, Special Assistant\nAttorney General, were on brief, for appellees.\n Jonathan K. Baum, Mark T. Ciani, Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP,\nJ. Adams Skaggs, and Hannah Shearer on brief for Giffords Law\nCenter to Prevent Gun Violence, amicus curiae.\n Mariel Goetz, Kimberly A. Mottley, Laura Stafford, and\nProskauer Rose LLP, on brief for Brady Center to Prevent Gun\nViolence, amicus curiae.\n Edward Notis-McConarty, M. Patrick Moore, Jr., Vanessa A.\nArslanian, and Hemenway & Barnes LLP on brief for Massachusetts\nChiefs of Police Association and Massachusetts Major City Chiefs\nof Police Association, amici curiae.\n Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General of New Jersey, Andrew J.\nBruck, Executive Assistant Attorney General, Jeremy M. Feigenbaum\nand Glenn Moramarco, Assistant Attorneys General, Melissa Medoway,\nDeputy Attorney General, Xavier Becerra, Attorney General of\nCalifornia, George Jepsen, Attorney General of Connecticut,\nMatthew P. Denn, Attorney General of Delaware, Russell A. Suzuki,\nAttorney General of Hawai'i, Tom Miller, Attorney General of Iowa,\nBrian E. Frosh, Attorney General of Maryland, Ellen F. Rosenblum,\nAttorney General of Oregon, Josh Shapiro, Attorney General of\nPennsylvania, Peter F. Kilmartin, Attorney General of Rhode\nIsland, Mark R. Herring, Attorney General of Virginia, Thomas J.\nDonovan, Jr., Attorney General of Vermont, Robert W. Ferguson,\nAttorney General of Washington, Karl A. Racine, Attorney General\nfor the District of Columbia, on brief for states of New Jersey,\nCalifornia, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawai'i, Iowa, Maryland,\nOregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington,\n\fand the District of Columbia, amici curiae.\n Eric Tirschwell, William J. Taylor, Jr., Mark Anthony\nFrassetto, Deepak Gupta, Jonathan E. Taylor, and Gupta Wessler\nPLLC, on brief for Everytown for Gun Safety, amicus curiae.\n Albert W. Wallis, Elizabeth A. Ritvo, Tristan G. Axelrod,\nBrown Rudnick LLP, Kenneth A. Sweder, and Sweder & Ross LLP, on\nbrief for Jewish Alliance for Law and Social Action, Greater Boston\nInterfaith Organization, Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts,\nEpiscopal Diocese of Western Massachusetts, Islamic Society of\nBoston, Massachusetts Council of Churches, Union for Reform\nJudaism, Central Conference of American Rabbis, Women of Reform\nJudaism, and Men of Reform Judaism, amici curiae.\n Ben T. Clements and Clements & Pineault, LLP, on brief for\nStop Handgun Violence, MA Coalition to Prevent Gun Violence, and\nMassachusetts General Hospital Gun Violence Prevention Coalition,\namici curiae.\n James Murray, pro se, on brief for James Murray, amicus\ncuriae.\n\n\n\n April 26, 2019\n\f SELYA, Circuit Judge. This high-profile case involves\n\na constitutional challenge to a Massachusetts law proscribing the\n\nsale, transfer, and possession of certain semiautomatic assault\n\nweapons and large-capacity magazines (LCMs). See Mass. Gen. Laws\n\nch. 140, §§ 121, 131M (the Act). The plaintiffs assert that they\n\nhave an unfettered Second Amendment right to possess the proscribed\n\nassault weapons and LCMs in their homes for self-defense.1 The\n\ndistrict court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants\n\n(a phalanx of state officials). See Worman v. Healey, 293 F. Supp.\n\n3d 251, 271 (D. Mass. 2018). Although our reasoning differs in\n\ncertain respects from that of the court below, we affirm.\n\n We assume, without deciding, that the proscribed weapons\n\nhave some degree of protection under the Second Amendment. We\n\nfurther assume, again without deciding, that the Act implicates\n\nthe core Second Amendment right of self-defense in the home by\n\nlaw-abiding, responsible individuals. We hold, however, that the\n\nAct's burden on that core right is minimal and, thus, the Act need\n\nonly withstand intermediate scrutiny — which it does.\n\nI. BACKGROUND\n\n We start by rehearsing the background and travel of the\n\ncase. The Massachusetts legislature modeled the Act on the 1994\n\n\n 1\n Throughout this opinion, we use the terms \"proscribed\nassault weapons and LCMs\" and \"proscribed weapons\" interchangeably\nto describe the semiautomatic assault weapons and LCMs targeted by\nthe Act.\n\n\n - 4 -\n\ffederal Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act\n\n(the federal regulation), Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 110101-06, 108\n\nStat. 1796, 1996-2010 (1994), which is no longer in effect. The\n\nfederal regulation prohibited the manufacture, transfer, and\n\npossession of \"semiautomatic assault weapons\" and the transfer and\n\npossession of \"large capacity ammunition feeding devices.\" Id.\n\n§§ 110102-03, 108 Stat. at 1996-2000. For purposes of the federal\n\nregulation, the term \"semiautomatic assault weapon\" was defined to\n\ninclude nineteen specific models, as well as any semiautomatic\n\nrifle, pistol, or shotgun with two or more combat-style features\n\nor the ability to accept a detachable magazine. Id. § 110102(b),\n\n108 Stat. at 1997-98. The term \"large capacity ammunition feeding\n\ndevice\" encompassed any magazine or other feeding device that could\n\naccept more than ten rounds of ammunition. Id. § 110103(b), 108\n\nStat. at 1999. The federal regulation specifically exempted, inter\n\nalia, assault weapons that were lawfully possessed on the date of\n\nits enactment (September 13, 1994), semiautomatic rifles that\n\ncould not hold more than five rounds of ammunition or accept a\n\ndetachable magazine holding more than five rounds of ammunition,\n\nand a specific list of \"long guns most commonly used in hunting\n\nand recreational sports.\" H.R. Rep. No. 103-489, at 20 (1994);\n\nsee Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110102(a), 108 Stat. at 1996-97. In\n\nexplicating the purpose of the federal regulation, Congress stated\n\nthat semiautomatic assault weapons have \"a capability for\n\n\n - 5 -\n\flethality — more wounds, more serious, in more victims — far beyond\n\nthat of other firearms in general, including other semiautomatic\n\nguns.\" H.R. Rep. No. 103-489, at 19-20.\n\n Four years after Congress enacted the federal\n\nregulation, the Massachusetts legislature passed a counterpart\n\nstatute, which made it a crime to sell, transfer, or possess\n\nsemiautomatic assault weapons as defined by the federal\n\nregulation, copies or duplicates of those weapons, and LCMs capable\n\nof holding more than ten rounds of ammunition. See Mass. Gen.\n\nLaws ch. 140, §§ 121, 131M. The Act contained the same exceptions\n\nas the federal regulation, including free passes for weapons\n\nlawfully owned on September 13, 1994, and for sundry automatic\n\nrifles commonly used for hunting and sport. See id.\n\n Congress allowed the federal regulation to expire in\n\n2004, but the Massachusetts legislature struck out in a different\n\ndirection and made the Massachusetts assault weapons regulation\n\npermanent that year. In signing the bill into law, then-Governor\n\nRomney declared that semiautomatic assault weapons and LCMs \"are\n\nnot made for recreation or self-defense. They are instruments of\n\ndestruction with the sole purpose of hunting down and killing\n\npeople.\"\n\n We fast-forward to 2016 when the Massachusetts Attorney\n\nGeneral, Maura Healey, issued a public enforcement notice designed\n\nto \"provide[] guidance on the identification of weapons that are\n\n\n - 6 -\n\f'copies' or 'duplicates' of the enumerated Assault weapons that\n\nare banned under Massachusetts law.\" Approximately six months\n\nlater, the plaintiffs — a diverse group consisting of Massachusetts\n\nfirearm owners, prospective firearm owners, firearm dealers, and\n\na firearm advocacy association — brought suit in the federal\n\ndistrict court, alleging constitutional violations and seeking\n\ndeclaratory and injunctive relief. They named an array of\n\ndefendants including (as relevant here) various state officials in\n\ntheir representative capacities; claimed that the Act, as\n\ninterpreted and enforced by those officials, abridged both the\n\nSecond Amendment and the Due Process Clause; and prayed for\n\ndeclaratory and injunctive relief.\n\n After some procedural skirmishing, not relevant here,\n\nthe parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court\n\nheard arguments of counsel and reserved decision. The court\n\nsubsequently handed down a rescript in which it rejected the\n\nplaintiffs' challenges and explained why it was granting the\n\ndefendants' summary judgment motion. See Worman, 293 F. Supp. 3d\n\nat 258-71. This timely appeal ensued. In it, the plaintiffs\n\nchallenge only the district court's rejection of their Second\n\nAmendment claims.\n\nII. ANALYSIS\n\n We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de\n\nnovo, taking the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom to\n\n\n - 7 -\n\fthe behoof of the non-moving parties (here, the plaintiffs). See\n\nHightower v. City of Boston, 693 F.3d 61, 70 (1st Cir. 2012);\n\nHoulton Citizens' Coal. v. Town of Houlton, 175 F.3d 178, 184 (1st\n\nCir. 1999). \"We will affirm only if the record reveals 'that there\n\nis no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is\n\nentitled to judgment as a matter of law.'\" Avery v. Hughes, 661\n\nF.3d 690, 693 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).\n\nThis standard applies unabated to appeals — like this one — arising\n\nout of a district court's disposition of cross-motions for summary\n\njudgment. See Blackie v. Maine, 75 F.3d 716, 720-21 (1st Cir.\n\n1996). In applying the standard here, we have the benefit not\n\nonly of able briefing by the parties but also of a myriad of\n\nthoughtful amicus briefs (for which we are grateful).\n\n A. The Legal Framework.\n\n The Second Amendment states that \"[a] well regulated\n\nMilitia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right\n\nof the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.\" U.S.\n\nConst. amend. II. In a seminal decision, the Supreme Court held\n\nthat the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to keep\n\nand bear arms (unconnected to service in the militia). See\n\nDistrict of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008). Two\n\nyears later, the Court made pellucid that the Second Amendment\n\napplies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See\n\nMcDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010).\n\n\n - 8 -\n\f The law challenged in Heller constituted an \"absolute\n\nprohibition of handguns held and used for self-defense in the\n\nhome,\" which (the Court ruled) transgressed the Second Amendment.2\n\n554 U.S. at 635-36. Although the Court did not have occasion to\n\nexamine \"the full scope of the Second Amendment\" right, it\n\ncautioned that the right \"is not unlimited.\" Id. at 626. In\n\nfurtherance of this cautionary language, the Court admonished that\n\n\"nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on\n\nlongstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons\n\nand the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms\n\nin sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or\n\nlaws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale\n\nof arms.\" Id. at 626-27. The Court added that the Second Amendment\n\ndoes not confer \"a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever\n\nin any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.\" Id. at 626.\n\n We glean from the teachings of Heller that four data\n\npoints determine the level of protection, if any, that the Second\n\n\n\n\n 2 Although the present plaintiffs attempt to characterize the\nAct as an \"absolute prohibition\" on an entire class of firearms,\nthat characterization is inapt. The Act applies only to a set of\nenumerated semiautomatic assault weapons, to semiautomatic assault\nweapons with particular features, and to magazines of a specific\ncapacity. Seen in this light, the plaintiffs' \"absolute\nprohibition\" argument is circular: essentially, it amounts to a\nsuggestion that whatever group of weapons a regulation prohibits\nmay be deemed a \"class.\" By this logic — which we squarely reject\n— virtually any regulation could be considered an \"absolute\nprohibition\" of a class of weapons.\n\n\n - 9 -\n\fAmendment provides. The first data point involves the person who\n\nis asserting the right; the second data point involves the purpose\n\nfor which the right is being asserted; the third data point\n\ninvolves the place where the right is being asserted; and the\n\nfourth data point involves the type of weapon. Heller's most\n\nmeaningful message touches all four data points. Refined to bare\n\nessence, its message is that the Second Amendment \"elevates above\n\nall other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens\n\nto use arms in defense of hearth and home.\" Id. at 635.\n\n As applied here, this message checks off the first three\n\ndata points. It is undisputed that the individual plaintiffs are\n\nnot prohibited persons but, rather, law-abiding, responsible\n\ncitizens. Similarly, it is undisputed that they seek to use the\n\nproscribed assault weapons and LCMs for self-defense. And,\n\nfinally, it is undisputed that they seek to effectuate this usage\n\nin their homes. We are, therefore, left to focus on the fourth\n\ndata point: the arms proscribed and the extent (if at all) that\n\nthose arms are protected by the Second Amendment.\n\n In conducting this inquiry, we do not write on an\n\nentirely pristine page. Our recent decision in Gould v. Morgan\n\nmapped out a two-step approach for analyzing Second Amendment\n\nchallenges. See 907 F.3d 659, 668-69 (1st Cir. 2018), petition\n\nfor cert. filed, ___ U.S.L.W. ___ (U.S. April 1, 2019) (No. 18-\n\n1272). Under this approach, we first ask whether the challenged\n\n\n - 10 -\n\flaw burdens conduct that is protected by the Second Amendment.\n\nSee id. This inquiry is \"backward-looking\" and \"seeks to determine\n\nwhether the regulated conduct 'was understood to be within the\n\nscope of the right at the time of ratification.'\" Id. at 669\n\n(quoting United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir.\n\n2010)). If that step is successfully negotiated so we can say\n\nthat the challenged law \"burdens conduct falling within the scope\n\nof the Second Amendment, [we] then must determine what level of\n\nscrutiny is appropriate and must proceed to decide whether the\n\nchallenged law survives that level of scrutiny.\" Id. We follow\n\nthis approach in determining whether the Act withstands the\n\nplaintiffs' Second Amendment onslaught.\n\n B. The Scope of the Second Amendment Right.\n\n This brings us to the question of whether the conduct\n\nrestricted by the Act falls under the protective carapace of the\n\nSecond Amendment. To answer this question, we must determine\n\nwhether possession of the proscribed assault weapons and LCMs in\n\nthe home for self-defense is safeguarded by the Second Amendment.3\n\n\n 3\n One of the amici advances the clever argument that LCMs,\nlike other magazines, are not \"arms\" at all because they are not\nthemselves \"[w]eapons of offense, or armour of defence.\" Heller,\n554 U.S. at 581 (alteration in original) (quoting 1 Dictionary of\nthe English Language 106 (4th ed.) (reprinted 1978)). The\ndefendants, though, have not proffered such an argument. We\nordinarily refuse to entertain arguments advanced by amici but not\nby the parties, see, e.g., In re Sony BMG Music Entm't, 564 F.3d\n1, 3 (1st Cir. 2009); Lane v. First Nat'l Bank of Bos., 871 F.2d\n166, 175 (1st Cir. 1989), and we see no reason to depart from that\n\n\n - 11 -\n\f Our first task is to consider whether the proscribed\n\nweapons are the type of arms \"understood to be within the scope of\n\nthe [Second Amendment] right at the time of ratification.\" Id.\n\n(quoting Chester, 628 F.3d at 680). Heller is the beacon by which\n\nwe must steer. There, the Court explained that \"[t]he traditional\n\nmilitia was formed from a pool of men bringing arms 'in common use\n\nat the time' for lawful purposes like self-defense.\" 554 U.S. at\n\n624 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).4\n\nThe Court's earlier decision in Miller (which held that a short-\n\nbarreled shotgun was not protected by the Second Amendment)\n\nfurnishes further context. See 307 U.S. at 175-83. There, the\n\nCourt surveyed state laws regulating militias at the time of the\n\nfounding and explained that many states, including Massachusetts,\n\nhad specified the types of weapons that citizens were required to\n\nbring to militia service. See id. at 180-82. The Court concluded\n\n\n\n\nprudential principle here. We note, moreover, that the parties do\nnot argue that the Second Amendment analysis differs with respect\nto LCMs as opposed to semiautomatic assault weapons, and so we\nconsider both objects of the Act together.\n 4 Here, however, there is a wrinkle. Because the plaintiffs'\nchallenge is directed at a state statute, Gould points to 1868\n(when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified) as the date for any\nnecessary historical inquiry. See 907 F.3d at 669. Heller, in\ncontrast, does not deal with a state law and thus locates the\nbenchmark at 1791 (the date of ratification of the Constitution\nitself). Since no party here has argued that this distinction is\neither material or sufficient to render Heller's analysis\ninoperative, we need not parse this distinction as \"our conclusion\nwith respect to the historical record would be the same regardless\nof which ratification date was used.\" Id. at 669 n.3.\n\n\n - 12 -\n\fthat although \"[m]ost if not all of the States have adopted\n\nprovisions touching the right to keep and bear arms,\" id. at 182,\n\nnone has suggested that a short-barreled shotgun was the type of\n\nweapon that \"could contribute to the common defense,\" id. at 178.\n\nWith this historical background in place, the Heller Court\n\ndetermined that the Second Amendment \"extends only to certain types\n\nof weapons.\" 554 U.S. at 623. One corollary of this determination\n\nis that an \"important limitation on the right to keep and carry\n\narms\" is that \"the sorts of weapons protected were those 'in common\n\nuse at the time.'\" Id. at 627 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 179).\n\nThe Court added that such a \"limitation is fairly supported by the\n\nhistorical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of 'dangerous and\n\nunusual weapons.'\" Id. (citing 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries\n\non the Laws of England 148-49 (1769)); see id. at 623 (referencing\n\n\"the prohibition on terrorizing people with dangerous or unusual\n\nweapons\").\n\n That the proscribed weapons were not in existence, let\n\nalone in common use, at the time of ratification, does not end the\n\nmatter. Heller left no doubt that \"the Second Amendment extends,\n\nprima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms,\n\neven those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.\"\n\nId. at 582. The Court reaffirmed this principle some eight years\n\nlater, when it reversed a decision of the Massachusetts Supreme\n\nJudicial Court (SJC), which had held that stun guns were not\n\n\n - 13 -\n\fprotected by the Second Amendment. See Caetano v. Massachusetts,\n\n136 S. Ct. 1027, 1027-28 (2016) (per curiam). Pertinently, the\n\nCaetano Court debunked the notion that stun guns were unprotected\n\nbecause they \"were not in common use at the time of the Second\n\nAmendment's enactment,\" id. at 1027 (quoting Commonwealth v.\n\nCaetano, 26 N.E.3d 688, 693 (Mass. 2015)), finding that notion\n\n\"inconsistent with Heller's clear statement that the Second\n\nAmendment 'extends . . . to . . . arms that were not in existence\n\nat the time of the founding,'\" id. at 1028 (alteration in original)\n\n(quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 582); see id. (rejecting conclusion\n\n\"that stun guns are 'unusual' because they are 'a thoroughly modern\n\ninvention'\" (quoting Caetano, 26 N.E.3d at 693-94)).\n\n Relatedly, the Heller Court acknowledged that \"if\n\nweapons that are most useful in military service — M-16 rifles and\n\nthe like — may be banned,\" it might be argued that \"the Second\n\nAmendment right is completely detached from the prefatory clause.\"\n\n554 U.S. at 627. After all, militias today \"require sophisticated\n\narms that are highly unusual in society at large.\" Id. But the\n\nCourt pointed out that \"the conception of the militia at the time\n\nof the Second Amendment's ratification was the body of all citizens\n\ncapable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful\n\nweapons that they possessed at home to militia duty.\" Id. Thus,\n\n\"the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit\n\n\n\n\n - 14 -\n\fbetween the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change\n\n[judicial] interpretation of the right.\" Id. at 627-28.\n\n Viewed against this backdrop, the relevant question is\n\nneither whether the proscribed weapons were commonly used at the\n\ntime of ratification nor whether they are among the types of\n\nweapons used by today's militias. Instead, the question is whether\n\nthe proscribed weapons are in common use for lawful purposes like\n\nself-defense.\n\n As to this question, Heller provides only meager\n\nguidance. Heller made plain that handguns, which the Court\n\ndescribed as \"the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-\n\ndefense in the home,\" are protected. Id. at 629. Conversely,\n\n\"the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically\n\npossessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as\n\nshort-barreled shotguns.\" Id. at 625. But as to the middle ground\n\n— and particularly, as to how to plot the dividing line between\n\ncommon and uncommon use — the Court was silent.5\n\n\n\n\n 5 We agree with the Seventh Circuit that measuring \"common\nuse\" by the sheer number of weapons lawfully owned is somewhat\nillogical. See Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406,\n409 (7th Cir. 2015) (\"Machine guns aren't commonly owned for lawful\npurposes today because they are illegal; semi-automatic weapons\nwith large-capacity magazines are owned more commonly because,\nuntil recently (in some jurisdictions), they have been legal. Yet\nit would be absurd to say that the reason why a particular weapon\ncan be banned is that there is a statute banning it, so that it\nisn't commonly owned.\").\n\n\n - 15 -\n\f The parties strive mightily to fill this void. On the\n\none hand, the plaintiffs have shown that, as of 2013, nearly\n\n5,000,000 people owned at least one semiautomatic assault weapon.\n\nThey also have shown that between 1990 and 2015, Americans owned\n\napproximately 115,000,000 LCMs. On the other hand, the defendants\n\nhave shown that only three percent of guns in the United States\n\nare assault weapons and only one percent of Americans own such a\n\nweapon. In all events, the record evidence is sparse as to actual\n\nuse of any of the proscribed weapons or LCMs for self-defense in\n\nthe home.\n\n The district court avoided this question entirely. It\n\nabjured the \"in common use\" test, concluding that \"Heller . . .\n\npresents us with a dispositive and relatively easy inquiry: Are\n\nthe banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines 'like' 'M-\n\n16 rifles,' i.e., 'weapons that are most useful in military\n\nservice,' and thus outside the ambit of the Second Amendment?\"\n\nWorman, 293 F. Supp. 3d at 264 (quoting Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d\n\n114, 136 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 469\n\n(2017)). The court went on to find that the proscribed weapons\n\nfit within this taxonomy, noting by way of example that one of the\n\nproscribed weapons (the Colt AR-15) is virtually identical to the\n\nM-16 (save for the fact that the AR-15 does not allow for fully\n\nautomatic fire). See id. at 264-66. The plaintiffs argue that\n\nthis approach is doubly flawed: they calumnize both the district\n\n\n - 16 -\n\fcourt's conclusion that \"weapons that are most useful in military\n\nservice\" are excepted from Second Amendment coverage and its\n\ndetermination that the proscribed weapons are \"like\" \"M-16\n\nrifles.\"\n\n Mindful that \"[d]iscretion is often the better part of\n\nvalor,\" United States v. Gonzalez, 736 F.3d 40, 40 (1st Cir. 2013),\n\nwe are reluctant to plunge into this factbound morass. In the\n\nend, \"courts should not rush to decide unsettled issues when the\n\nexigencies of a particular case do not require such definitive\n\nmeasures.\" Privitera v. Curran (In re Curran), 855 F.3d 19, 22\n\n(1st Cir. 2017). For present purposes, we simply assume, albeit\n\nwithout deciding, that the Act burdens conduct that falls somewhere\n\nwithin the compass of the Second Amendment.\n\n C. The Level of Scrutiny.\n\n The next phase of our inquiry \"requires us to evaluate\n\nthe [Act] under an appropriate level of scrutiny.\" Gould, 907\n\nF.3d at 670. The appropriate level of scrutiny \"turn[s] on how\n\nclosely a particular law or policy approaches the core of the\n\nSecond Amendment right and how heavily it burdens that right.\"\n\nId. at 670-71. We previously established \"that the core Second\n\nAmendment right is limited to self-defense in the home\" on the\n\npart of \"responsible, law-abiding individuals.\" Id. at 671. Given\n\nthis understanding, we concluded that the law challenged in Gould\n\n(which concerned public carriage of firearms) fell outside the\n\n\n - 17 -\n\fcore of the Second Amendment right. See id. at 672. In contrast\n\nto the plaintiffs in Gould, the present plaintiffs contend that\n\nthe Act affects their ability to defend themselves in their homes.\n\nAssuming (favorably to the plaintiffs) that the Act implicates the\n\ncore of the Second Amendment right, we must train the lens of our\n\ninquiry on \"how heavily it burdens that right.\" Id. at 671.\n\n As is true in many Second Amendment inquiries, our\n\nstarting point is Heller. There, the Court unequivocally rebuffed\n\nthe argument \"that it is permissible to ban the possession of\n\nhandguns so long as the possession of other firearms (i.e., long\n\nguns) is allowed.\" 544 U.S. at 629. The Court's rationale was\n\nbased on the premise that \"the American people have considered the\n\nhandgun to be the quintessential self-defense weapon.\" Id. In\n\nfashioning this rationale, the Court repeatedly emphasized the\n\nunique popularity of the handgun as a means of self-defense. See\n\nid. at 628 (calling handguns a \"class of 'arms' . . .\n\noverwhelmingly chosen by American society for [self-defense]\");\n\nid. at 628-29 (identifying the handgun as \"the most preferred\n\nfirearm in the nation to 'keep' and use for protection of one's\n\nhome and family\"); id. at 629 (declaring that \"handguns are the\n\nmost popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the\n\nhome\"). Building on this foundation, the Court made clear that\n\nbanning this quintessential self-defense weapon would heavily\n\nburden the core right of self-defense in the home. See id. at\n\n\n - 18 -\n\f629; see also id. at 632 (describing eighteenth-century gunpowder\n\nstorage laws and noting that such laws did \"not remotely burden\n\nthe right of self-defense as much as an absolute ban on handguns\").\n\n This same logic leads us to conclude that the Act's\n\nrestriction on semiautomatic assault weapons and LCMs does not\n\nheavily burden the core right of self-defense in the home. As an\n\ninitial matter, the Act does not ban all semiautomatic weapons and\n\nmagazines. Instead, it proscribes only a set of specifically\n\nenumerated semiautomatic assault weapons, magazines of a\n\nparticular capacity, and semiautomatic assault weapons that have\n\ncertain combat-style features. Furthermore, the record shows that\n\nsemiautomatic assault weapons do not share the features that make\n\nhandguns well-suited to self-defense in the home. Cf. id. at 629\n\n(explaining that \"a citizen may prefer a handgun for home defense\"\n\nbecause, inter alia, \"[i]t is easier to store in a location that\n\nis readily accessible in an emergency; it cannot easily be\n\nredirected or wrestled away by an attacker; it is easier to use\n\nfor those without the upper-body strength to lift and aim a long\n\ngun; it can be pointed at a burglar with one hand while the other\n\nhand dials the police\"). Equally as important is what the record\n\ndoes not show: it offers no indication that the proscribed weapons\n\nhave commonly been used for home self-defense purposes. In fact,\n\nwhen asked directly, not one of the plaintiffs or their six experts\n\ncould identify even a single example of the use of an assault\n\n\n - 19 -\n\fweapon for home self-defense, nor could they identify even a single\n\nexample of a self-defense episode in which ten or more shots were\n\nfired. Viewed as a whole, the record suggests that wielding the\n\nproscribed weapons for self-defense within the home is tantamount\n\nto using a sledgehammer to crack open the shell of a peanut. Thus,\n\nwe conclude that the Act does not heavily burden the core Second\n\nAmendment right of self-defense within the home.\n\n This conclusion fits seamlessly with our decision in\n\nHightower. Although that opinion did not directly address what\n\nrestrictions may be deemed to heavily burden the core Second\n\nAmendment right, we stated that the fact that the plaintiff sought\n\na license that \"allowed carrying of large capacity weapons\n\nweaken[ed] the Second Amendment claim, as [Heller] was concerned\n\nwith weapons of the type characteristically used to protect the\n\nhome.\" Hightower, 693 F.3d at 71 (holding that revocation of\n\nlicense to carry concealed, large-capacity firearm based on false\n\nstatements in renewal application did not violate Second\n\nAmendment). So, too, our conclusion is reinforced by the fact\n\nthat — unlike the use of handguns — the use of semiautomatic\n\nassault weapons, even in the home, does not \"implicate[] the safety\n\nonly of those who live or visit there.\" Gould, 907 F.3d at 672.\n\nRather, the use of semiautomatic assault weapons implicates the\n\nsafety of the public at large. After all, such weapons can fire\n\nthrough walls, risking the lives of those in nearby apartments or\n\n\n - 20 -\n\fon the street. Cf. Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 127 (observing that \"rounds\n\nfrom assault weapons have the ability to easily penetrate most\n\nmaterials used in standard home construction, car doors, and\n\nsimilar materials\").\n\n We have yet to consider what level of scrutiny applies\n\nto a law that implicates the core of the Second Amendment right,\n\nbut does not \"heavily . . . burden[] that right.\" Gould, 907 F.3d\n\nat 671. Heller does state that a handgun ban would \"fail\n\nconstitutional muster\" under \"any of the standards of scrutiny\n\nthat [the Court has] applied to enumerated constitutional rights.\"\n\n554 U.S. at 628-29. But we do not read Heller to suggest that a\n\nregulation of arms that only modestly burdens the core Second\n\nAmendment right must be subject to the strictest form of\n\nconstitutional review. See Gould, 900 F.3d at 673 (\"The Heller\n\nCourt . . . implie[d] that there is a role for some level of\n\nscrutiny less rigorous than strict scrutiny.\"); see also Ezell v.\n\nCity of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011) (\"[A] severe\n\nburden on the core Second Amendment right of armed self-defense\n\nwill require an extremely strong public-interest justification and\n\na close fit between the government's means and its end. . . .\n\n[L]aws that merely regulate rather than restrict, and modest\n\nburdens on the right may be more easily justified.\").\n\n In our view, intermediate scrutiny is appropriate as\n\nlong as a challenged regulation either fails to implicate the core\n\n\n - 21 -\n\fSecond Amendment right or fails to impose a substantial burden on\n\nthat right. See Fyock v. Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991, 998-99 (9th\n\nCir. 2015). It follows that intermediate scrutiny is the\n\nappropriate level of scrutiny for evaluating a law — like the Act\n\n— that arguably implicates the core Second Amendment right to self-\n\ndefense in the home but places only a modest burden on that right.\n\nThis holding aligns us with a number of our sister circuits, which\n\nhave applied intermediate scrutiny to laws restricting\n\nsemiautomatic assault weapons and LCMs. See, e.g., Ass'n of N.J.\n\nRifle & Pistol Clubs v. Att'y Gen. N.J., 910 F.3d 106, 117 (3d\n\nCir. 2018) (applying intermediate scrutiny because \"[t]he Act here\n\ndoes not severely burden the core Second Amendment right to self-\n\ndefense in the home\"); Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 134 (applying\n\nintermediate scrutiny because challenged law did \"not seriously\n\nimpact a person's ability to defend himself in the home\" (internal\n\nquotation marks omitted)); N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v.\n\nCuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 260 (2d Cir. 2015) (applying intermediate\n\nscrutiny because \"[t]he burden imposed by the challenged\n\nlegislation is real, but . . . not 'severe'\"); Heller v. District\n\nof Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2011)\n\n(applying intermediate scrutiny because challenged prohibition did\n\nnot \"substantially affect\" individuals' right of self-defense).6\n\n\n 6\n After we heard oral argument in this case, the Illinois\nSupreme Court held that a law prohibiting the carrying of tasers\n\n\n - 22 -\n\fConsequently, we proceed to apply intermediate scrutiny to\n\ndetermine whether the Act passes constitutional muster.\n\n D. Applying Intermediate Scrutiny.\n\n To survive intermediate scrutiny, a statute \"must be\n\nsubstantially related to an important governmental objective.\"\n\nGould, 907 F.3d at 672 (quoting Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461\n\n(1988)). To achieve this substantial relationship, there must be\n\na \"reasonable fit\" between the restrictions imposed by the law and\n\nthe government's valid objectives, \"such that the law does not\n\nburden more conduct than is reasonably necessary.\" Id. at 674\n\n(quoting Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2013)).\n\n The law that the plaintiffs challenge here — the Act —\n\nrestricts the sale, transfer, and possession of certain\n\nsemiautomatic assault weapons and LCMs. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch.\n\n140, §§ 121, 131M. It does not ban the sale, transfer, or\n\npossession of all semiautomatic weapons, nor does it impose any\n\nrestrictions on magazines that are designed to hold ten rounds or\n\n\n\n\nand stun guns was a \"categorical ban\" and, thus, was \"facially\nunconstitutional under the [S]econd [A]mendment.\" Illinois v.\nWebb, ___ N.E. 3d ___, ___ (Ill. 2019) [2019 WL 1291586 at *5].\nThe plaintiffs notified us of this decision pursuant to Federal\nRule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), asserting that it \"provides\nfurther support for [their] argument that a categorical ban on\nbearable arms that are commonly kept for lawful purposes is per se\nunconstitutional.\" We reject the plaintiffs' premise that the Act\nis a categorical ban, see supra note 2, and disagree with the\nIllinois Supreme Court's conclusion that any law that restricts a\ncertain type of arms is per se unconstitutional.\n\n\n - 23 -\n\ffewer. The Act's manifest purpose is to \"help keep the streets\n\nand neighborhoods of Massachusetts safe\" by \"mak[ing] it harder\n\nfor criminals to get their hands on these dangerous guns.\"\n\n We have said before, and today reaffirm, that \"few\n\ninterests are more central to a state government than protecting\n\nthe safety and well-being of its citizens.\" Gould, 907 F.3d at\n\n673. Since Massachusetts indubitably \"has compelling governmental\n\ninterests in both public safety and crime prevention,\" id., the\n\nonly question that remains is whether the Act is substantially\n\nrelated to those interests. The answer to this question depends\n\non whether the fit between those interests and the Act is\n\nreasonable. See id. at 674.\n\n In our view, the Act survives under intermediate\n\nscrutiny. This view comports with the unanimous weight of circuit-\n\ncourt authority analyzing Second Amendment challenges to similar\n\nlaws. See, e.g., Ass'n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, 910 F.3d at\n\n122; Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 139; N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, 804\n\nF.3d at 261; Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1262.\n\n The record contains ample evidence of the unique dangers\n\nposed by the proscribed weapons. Semiautomatic assault weapons\n\npermit a shooter to fire multiple rounds very quickly, allowing\n\nhim to hit more victims in a shorter period of time. LCMs\n\nexacerbate this danger, allowing the shooter to fire more bullets\n\nwithout stopping to reload. Cf. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1264\n\n\n - 24 -\n\f(noting that \"the 2 or 3 second pause during which a criminal\n\nreloads his firearm can be of critical benefit to law enforcement\"\n\n(internal quotation marks omitted)). It is, therefore, not\n\nsurprising that AR-15s equipped with LCMs have been the weapons of\n\nchoice in many of the deadliest mass shootings in recent history,\n\nincluding horrific events in Pittsburgh (2018), Parkland (2018),\n\nLas Vegas (2017), Sutherland Springs (2017), Orlando (2016),\n\nNewtown (2012), and Aurora (2012).\n\n The record also contains the affidavit of a seasoned\n\ntrauma surgeon, who has treated victims of several mass shootings.\n\nThis affidavit confirms what common sense suggests: semiautomatic\n\nassault weapons cause wounds that \"tend to be higher in complexity\n\nwith higher complication rates than those injuries from non-\n\nassault weapons. They tend to cause far greater damage to the\n\nmuscles, bones, soft tissue, and vital organs.\" Cf. Panagiotis K.\n\nStefanopoulos, et al., Gunshot Wounds: A Review of Ballistics\n\nRelated to Penetrating Trauma, 3 J. Acute Disease 178, 181-82\n\n(2014). A number of articles, written by physicians who have cared\n\nfor assault-weapon victims, substantiate the extreme damage that\n\nsuch weapons are prone to cause. See, e.g., Gina Kolata & C.J.\n\nChivers, Wounds from Military-Style Rifles? 'A Ghastly Thing to\n\nSee', N.Y. Times (Mar. 4, 2018),\n\nhttps://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/04/health/parkland-shooting-\n\nvictims-ar15.html (\"The tissue destruction is almost unimaginable.\n\n\n - 25 -\n\fBones are exploded, soft tissue is absolutely destroyed. The\n\ninjuries to the chest or abdomen — it's like a bomb went off.\");\n\nTim Craig et al., As the Wounded Kept Coming, Hospitals Dealt with\n\nInjuries Rarely Seen in U.S., Wash. Post (Oct. 3, 2017),\n\nhttps://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/as-the-\n\nwounded-kept-coming-hospitals-dealt-with-injuries-rarely-seen-\n\nin-the-us/2017/10/03/06210b86-a883-11e7-b3aa-\n\nc0e2e1d41e38_story.html?utm_term=.5a659eec267b (\"If a 9mm bullet\n\nstrikes someone in the liver . . . that person might suffer a wound\n\nperhaps an inch wide, . . . [b]ut if you're struck in the liver\n\nwith an AR-15, it would be like dropping a watermelon onto the\n\ncement. It just is disintegrated.\" (internal quotation marks\n\nomitted)).\n\n The defendants proffered evidence that the majority of\n\nindividuals who have perpetrated mass shootings obtain their semi-\n\nautomatic assault weapons legally. See, e.g., Larry Buchanan et\n\nal., How They Got Their Guns, N.Y. Times (updated Feb. 16, 2018),\n\nhttps://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/03/us/how-mass-\n\nshooters-got-their-guns.html; Mayors Against Illegal Guns,\n\nAnalysis of Recent Mass Shootings (2013). This evidence lends\n\nsupport to the legislature's conclusion that a law proscribing\n\nsemiautomatic assault weapons and LCMs — like the Act — will help\n\ncurtail outbreaks of mass violence.\n\n\n\n\n - 26 -\n\f The plaintiffs do not dispute the extensive evidence\n\nregarding the lethality of the proscribed weapons and the frequency\n\nof their use in mass shootings. Instead, they argue that \"[e]ven\n\nassuming the [Act] may curb criminal misuse of the Banned Firearms\n\nand Magazines,\" the Act fails intermediate scrutiny because it\n\n\"make[s] no exception for law-abiding, responsible citizens to\n\nkeep these arms for lawful purposes like self-defense in the home.\"\n\nAccording to the plaintiffs, the forbidden assault weapons and\n\nLCMs are \"ideal\" for domestic self-defense for many of the same\n\nreasons that such weapons are ideal for mass shootings — they are\n\neasier to hold and shoot, require less user accuracy, and allow a\n\nshooter to fire many times without reloading. Thus, the plaintiffs\n\nassert, any regulation prohibiting law-abiding, responsible\n\ncitizens from possessing such weapons sweeps too broadly.\n\n This assertion is too facile by half, and we reject it.\n\nAlthough we acknowledge that \"[i]n dealing with a complex societal\n\nproblem like gun violence, there will almost always be room for\n\nreasonable minds to differ about the optimal solution,\" Gould, 907\n\nF.3d at 676, the plaintiffs give unduly short shrift to \"the\n\nlegislature's prerogative . . . to weigh the evidence, choose among\n\nconflicting inferences, and make the necessary policy judgments,\"\n\nid. The role of a reviewing court is limited to ensuring \"that,\n\nin formulating its judgments, [the legislature] has drawn\n\nreasonable inferences based on substantial evidence,\" id.\n\n\n - 27 -\n\f(alteration in original) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC,\n\n512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994) (opinion of Kennedy, J.)), and that \"the\n\nfit between the asserted governmental interests and the means\n\nchosen to advance them is close enough to pass intermediate\n\nscrutiny,\" id. at 674.\n\n Here, the Massachusetts legislature's conclusion that\n\nthe Commonwealth's legitimate interests are best served by\n\nproscribing semiautomatic assault weapons and LCMs rests on\n\nsubstantial (although not incontrovertible) evidence regarding the\n\ninordinate dangers associated with the proscribed weapons. What\n\nis more, it strains credulity to argue that the fit between the\n\nAct and the asserted governmental interest is unreasonable. As we\n\nhave said, the Act does not outlaw all semiautomatic firearms and\n\nmagazines. Nor does it circumscribe in any way the fundamental\n\nright of law-abiding, responsible citizens to possess handguns in\n\ntheir homes for self-defense. Accordingly, we hold that although\n\nthe Act may well \"touch[] the right to keep and bear arms,\" Miller,\n\n307 U.S. at 182, it does not impermissibly intrude upon that right\n\nbecause it withstands intermediate scrutiny.\n\nIII. CONCLUSION\n\n This case concerns an issue of paramount importance. In\n\nthe wake of increasingly frequent acts of mass violence committed\n\nwith semiautomatic assault weapons and LCMs, the interests of state\n\nand local governments in regulating the possession and use of such\n\n\n - 28 -\n\fweapons are entitled to great weight. Even so, we recognize that\n\nsuch interests must be balanced against the time-honored right of\n\nindividuals to bear arms in self-defense — a right that is\n\nprotected in varying degrees by the Second Amendment.\n\n Holding this delicate balance steady and true is\n\ndifficult but necessary work. Here, we find that even if the Act\n\nimplicates the core of the Second Amendment right, it (at most)\n\nminimally burdens that right. Consequently, we are obliged to\n\ncede some degree of deference to the decision of the Massachusetts\n\nlegislature about how best to regulate the possession and use of\n\nthe proscribed weapons.\n\n In this instance, that decision rests on a web of\n\ncompelling governmental interests, and the fit between those\n\ninterests and the restrictions imposed by the Act is both close\n\nand reasonable. It follows that the Act withstands intermediate\n\nscrutiny — and no more is exigible to blunt the plaintiffs' Second\n\nAmendment challenge.\n\n We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,\n\nthe judgment of the district court is\n\n\n\nAffirmed.\n\n\n\n\n - 29 -\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: David Seth WORMAN; Anthony Linden; Jason William Sawyer; Paul Nelson Chamberlain; Gun Owners' Action League, Inc. ; On Target Training, Inc.; Overwatch Outpost, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Maura T. HEALEY, in Her Official Capacity as Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; Daniel Bennett, in His Official Capacity as the Secretary of the Executive Office of Public Safety and Security ; Kerry Gilpin, in Her Official Capacity as Superintendent of the Massachusetts State Police, Defendants, Appellees.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the First Circuit\\n\\n\\nNo. 18-1545\\n\\n DAVID SETH WORMAN; ANTHONY LINDEN; JASON WILLIAM SAWYER; PAUL\\n NELSON CHAMBERLAIN; GUN OWNERS' ACTION LEAGUE, INC.; ON TARGET\\n TRAINING, INC.; OVERWATCH OUTPOST,\\n\\n Plaintiffs, Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nMAURA T. HEALEY, in her official capacity as Attorney General of\\n the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; DANIEL BENNETT, in his\\n official capacity as the Secretary of the Executive Office of\\n Public Safety and Security; KERRY GILPIN, in her official\\n capacity as Superintendent of the Massachusetts State Police,\\n\\n Defendants, Appellees.\\n\\n\\n APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS\\n\\n [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]\\n\\n\\n Before\\n\\n Barron, Circuit Judge,\\n Souter, Associate Justice,\\n and Selya, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n John Parker Sweeney, with whom James Michael Campbell,\\nRichard Paul Campbell, Campbell Campbell Edwards & Conroy PC, T.\\nSky Woodward, James W. Porter, III, Marc A. Nardone, and Bradley\\nArant Boult Cummings LLP, were on brief, for appellants.\\n\\n\\n \\n Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the Supreme\\nCourt of the United States, sitting by designation.\\n\\f Ilya Shapiro, Trevor Burrus, Matthew Larosiere, Joseph G.S.\\nGreenlee, and David B. Kopel on brief for Professors of Second\\nAmendment Law, Cato Institute, Second Amendment Foundation,\\nCitizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, Jews for\\nthe Preservation of Firearms Ownership, Millennial Policy Center,\\nand Independence Institute, amici curiae.\\n Dan M. Peterson, Dan M. Peterson PLLC, C. D. Michel, Sean A.\\nBrady, Anna M. Barvir, and Michel & Associates, P.C., on brief for\\nWestern States Sheriffs' Association, Law Enforcement Legal\\nDefense Fund, Law Enforcement Action Network, International\\nAssociation of Law Enforcement Firearms Instructors, CRPA\\nFoundation, International Law Enforcement Educators and Trainers\\nAssociation, and Law Enforcement Alliance of America, amici\\ncuriae.\\n David H. Thompson, Peter A. Patterson, John D. Ohlendorf, and\\nCooper & Kirk, PLLC, on brief for National Rifle Association of\\nAmerica, Inc., amicus curiae.\\n Julia E. Kobick, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Maura\\nHealey, Attorney General, William W. Porter and Elizabeth Kaplan,\\nAssistant Attorneys General, and Gary Klein, Special Assistant\\nAttorney General, were on brief, for appellees.\\n Jonathan K. Baum, Mark T. Ciani, Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP,\\nJ. Adams Skaggs, and Hannah Shearer on brief for Giffords Law\\nCenter to Prevent Gun Violence, amicus curiae.\\n Mariel Goetz, Kimberly A. Mottley, Laura Stafford, and\\nProskauer Rose LLP, on brief for Brady Center to Prevent Gun\\nViolence, amicus curiae.\\n Edward Notis-McConarty, M. Patrick Moore, Jr., Vanessa A.\\nArslanian, and Hemenway & Barnes LLP on brief for Massachusetts\\nChiefs of Police Association and Massachusetts Major City Chiefs\\nof Police Association, amici curiae.\\n Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General of New Jersey, Andrew J.\\nBruck, Executive Assistant Attorney General, Jeremy M. Feigenbaum\\nand Glenn Moramarco, Assistant Attorneys General, Melissa Medoway,\\nDeputy Attorney General, Xavier Becerra, Attorney General of\\nCalifornia, George Jepsen, Attorney General of Connecticut,\\nMatthew P. Denn, Attorney General of Delaware, Russell A. Suzuki,\\nAttorney General of Hawai'i, Tom Miller, Attorney General of Iowa,\\nBrian E. Frosh, Attorney General of Maryland, Ellen F. Rosenblum,\\nAttorney General of Oregon, Josh Shapiro, Attorney General of\\nPennsylvania, Peter F. Kilmartin, Attorney General of Rhode\\nIsland, Mark R. Herring, Attorney General of Virginia, Thomas J.\\nDonovan, Jr., Attorney General of Vermont, Robert W. Ferguson,\\nAttorney General of Washington, Karl A. Racine, Attorney General\\nfor the District of Columbia, on brief for states of New Jersey,\\nCalifornia, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawai'i, Iowa, Maryland,\\nOregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington,\\n\\fand the District of Columbia, amici curiae.\\n Eric Tirschwell, William J. Taylor, Jr., Mark Anthony\\nFrassetto, Deepak Gupta, Jonathan E. Taylor, and Gupta Wessler\\nPLLC, on brief for Everytown for Gun Safety, amicus curiae.\\n Albert W. Wallis, Elizabeth A. Ritvo, Tristan G. Axelrod,\\nBrown Rudnick LLP, Kenneth A. Sweder, and Sweder & Ross LLP, on\\nbrief for Jewish Alliance for Law and Social Action, Greater Boston\\nInterfaith Organization, Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts,\\nEpiscopal Diocese of Western Massachusetts, Islamic Society of\\nBoston, Massachusetts Council of Churches, Union for Reform\\nJudaism, Central Conference of American Rabbis, Women of Reform\\nJudaism, and Men of Reform Judaism, amici curiae.\\n Ben T. Clements and Clements & Pineault, LLP, on brief for\\nStop Handgun Violence, MA Coalition to Prevent Gun Violence, and\\nMassachusetts General Hospital Gun Violence Prevention Coalition,\\namici curiae.\\n James Murray, pro se, on brief for James Murray, amicus\\ncuriae.\\n\\n\\n\\n April 26, 2019\\n\\f SELYA, Circuit Judge. This high-profile case involves\\n\\na constitutional challenge to a Massachusetts law proscribing the\\n\\nsale, transfer, and possession of certain semiautomatic assault\\n\\nweapons and large-capacity magazines (LCMs). See Mass. Gen. Laws\\n\\nch. 140, §§ 121, 131M (the Act). The plaintiffs assert that they\\n\\nhave an unfettered Second Amendment right to possess the proscribed\\n\\nassault weapons and LCMs in their homes for self-defense.1 The\\n\\ndistrict court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants\\n\\n(a phalanx of state officials). See Worman v. Healey, 293 F. Supp.\\n\\n3d 251, 271 (D. Mass. 2018). Although our reasoning differs in\\n\\ncertain respects from that of the court below, we affirm.\\n\\n We assume, without deciding, that the proscribed weapons\\n\\nhave some degree of protection under the Second Amendment. We\\n\\nfurther assume, again without deciding, that the Act implicates\\n\\nthe core Second Amendment right of self-defense in the home by\\n\\nlaw-abiding, responsible individuals. We hold, however, that the\\n\\nAct's burden on that core right is minimal and, thus, the Act need\\n\\nonly withstand intermediate scrutiny — which it does.\\n\\nI. BACKGROUND\\n\\n We start by rehearsing the background and travel of the\\n\\ncase. The Massachusetts legislature modeled the Act on the 1994\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Throughout this opinion, we use the terms \\\"proscribed\\nassault weapons and LCMs\\\" and \\\"proscribed weapons\\\" interchangeably\\nto describe the semiautomatic assault weapons and LCMs targeted by\\nthe Act.\\n\\n\\n - 4 -\\n\\ffederal Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act\\n\\n(the federal regulation), Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 110101-06, 108\\n\\nStat. 1796, 1996-2010 (1994), which is no longer in effect. The\\n\\nfederal regulation prohibited the manufacture, transfer, and\\n\\npossession of \\\"semiautomatic assault weapons\\\" and the transfer and\\n\\npossession of \\\"large capacity ammunition feeding devices.\\\" Id.\\n\\n§§ 110102-03, 108 Stat. at 1996-2000. For purposes of the federal\\n\\nregulation, the term \\\"semiautomatic assault weapon\\\" was defined to\\n\\ninclude nineteen specific models, as well as any semiautomatic\\n\\nrifle, pistol, or shotgun with two or more combat-style features\\n\\nor the ability to accept a detachable magazine. Id. § 110102(b),\\n\\n108 Stat. at 1997-98. The term \\\"large capacity ammunition feeding\\n\\ndevice\\\" encompassed any magazine or other feeding device that could\\n\\naccept more than ten rounds of ammunition. Id. § 110103(b), 108\\n\\nStat. at 1999. The federal regulation specifically exempted, inter\\n\\nalia, assault weapons that were lawfully possessed on the date of\\n\\nits enactment (September 13, 1994), semiautomatic rifles that\\n\\ncould not hold more than five rounds of ammunition or accept a\\n\\ndetachable magazine holding more than five rounds of ammunition,\\n\\nand a specific list of \\\"long guns most commonly used in hunting\\n\\nand recreational sports.\\\" H.R. Rep. No. 103-489, at 20 (1994);\\n\\nsee Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110102(a), 108 Stat. at 1996-97. In\\n\\nexplicating the purpose of the federal regulation, Congress stated\\n\\nthat semiautomatic assault weapons have \\\"a capability for\\n\\n\\n - 5 -\\n\\flethality — more wounds, more serious, in more victims — far beyond\\n\\nthat of other firearms in general, including other semiautomatic\\n\\nguns.\\\" H.R. Rep. No. 103-489, at 19-20.\\n\\n Four years after Congress enacted the federal\\n\\nregulation, the Massachusetts legislature passed a counterpart\\n\\nstatute, which made it a crime to sell, transfer, or possess\\n\\nsemiautomatic assault weapons as defined by the federal\\n\\nregulation, copies or duplicates of those weapons, and LCMs capable\\n\\nof holding more than ten rounds of ammunition. See Mass. Gen.\\n\\nLaws ch. 140, §§ 121, 131M. The Act contained the same exceptions\\n\\nas the federal regulation, including free passes for weapons\\n\\nlawfully owned on September 13, 1994, and for sundry automatic\\n\\nrifles commonly used for hunting and sport. See id.\\n\\n Congress allowed the federal regulation to expire in\\n\\n2004, but the Massachusetts legislature struck out in a different\\n\\ndirection and made the Massachusetts assault weapons regulation\\n\\npermanent that year. In signing the bill into law, then-Governor\\n\\nRomney declared that semiautomatic assault weapons and LCMs \\\"are\\n\\nnot made for recreation or self-defense. They are instruments of\\n\\ndestruction with the sole purpose of hunting down and killing\\n\\npeople.\\\"\\n\\n We fast-forward to 2016 when the Massachusetts Attorney\\n\\nGeneral, Maura Healey, issued a public enforcement notice designed\\n\\nto \\\"provide[] guidance on the identification of weapons that are\\n\\n\\n - 6 -\\n\\f'copies' or 'duplicates' of the enumerated Assault weapons that\\n\\nare banned under Massachusetts law.\\\" Approximately six months\\n\\nlater, the plaintiffs — a diverse group consisting of Massachusetts\\n\\nfirearm owners, prospective firearm owners, firearm dealers, and\\n\\na firearm advocacy association — brought suit in the federal\\n\\ndistrict court, alleging constitutional violations and seeking\\n\\ndeclaratory and injunctive relief. They named an array of\\n\\ndefendants including (as relevant here) various state officials in\\n\\ntheir representative capacities; claimed that the Act, as\\n\\ninterpreted and enforced by those officials, abridged both the\\n\\nSecond Amendment and the Due Process Clause; and prayed for\\n\\ndeclaratory and injunctive relief.\\n\\n After some procedural skirmishing, not relevant here,\\n\\nthe parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court\\n\\nheard arguments of counsel and reserved decision. The court\\n\\nsubsequently handed down a rescript in which it rejected the\\n\\nplaintiffs' challenges and explained why it was granting the\\n\\ndefendants' summary judgment motion. See Worman, 293 F. Supp. 3d\\n\\nat 258-71. This timely appeal ensued. In it, the plaintiffs\\n\\nchallenge only the district court's rejection of their Second\\n\\nAmendment claims.\\n\\nII. ANALYSIS\\n\\n We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de\\n\\nnovo, taking the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom to\\n\\n\\n - 7 -\\n\\fthe behoof of the non-moving parties (here, the plaintiffs). See\\n\\nHightower v. City of Boston, 693 F.3d 61, 70 (1st Cir. 2012);\\n\\nHoulton Citizens' Coal. v. Town of Houlton, 175 F.3d 178, 184 (1st\\n\\nCir. 1999). \\\"We will affirm only if the record reveals 'that there\\n\\nis no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is\\n\\nentitled to judgment as a matter of law.'\\\" Avery v. Hughes, 661\\n\\nF.3d 690, 693 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).\\n\\nThis standard applies unabated to appeals — like this one — arising\\n\\nout of a district court's disposition of cross-motions for summary\\n\\njudgment. See Blackie v. Maine, 75 F.3d 716, 720-21 (1st Cir.\\n\\n1996). In applying the standard here, we have the benefit not\\n\\nonly of able briefing by the parties but also of a myriad of\\n\\nthoughtful amicus briefs (for which we are grateful).\\n\\n A. The Legal Framework.\\n\\n The Second Amendment states that \\\"[a] well regulated\\n\\nMilitia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right\\n\\nof the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.\\\" U.S.\\n\\nConst. amend. II. In a seminal decision, the Supreme Court held\\n\\nthat the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to keep\\n\\nand bear arms (unconnected to service in the militia). See\\n\\nDistrict of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008). Two\\n\\nyears later, the Court made pellucid that the Second Amendment\\n\\napplies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See\\n\\nMcDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010).\\n\\n\\n - 8 -\\n\\f The law challenged in Heller constituted an \\\"absolute\\n\\nprohibition of handguns held and used for self-defense in the\\n\\nhome,\\\" which (the Court ruled) transgressed the Second Amendment.2\\n\\n554 U.S. at 635-36. Although the Court did not have occasion to\\n\\nexamine \\\"the full scope of the Second Amendment\\\" right, it\\n\\ncautioned that the right \\\"is not unlimited.\\\" Id. at 626. In\\n\\nfurtherance of this cautionary language, the Court admonished that\\n\\n\\\"nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on\\n\\nlongstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons\\n\\nand the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms\\n\\nin sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or\\n\\nlaws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale\\n\\nof arms.\\\" Id. at 626-27. The Court added that the Second Amendment\\n\\ndoes not confer \\\"a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever\\n\\nin any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.\\\" Id. at 626.\\n\\n We glean from the teachings of Heller that four data\\n\\npoints determine the level of protection, if any, that the Second\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Although the present plaintiffs attempt to characterize the\\nAct as an \\\"absolute prohibition\\\" on an entire class of firearms,\\nthat characterization is inapt. The Act applies only to a set of\\nenumerated semiautomatic assault weapons, to semiautomatic assault\\nweapons with particular features, and to magazines of a specific\\ncapacity. Seen in this light, the plaintiffs' \\\"absolute\\nprohibition\\\" argument is circular: essentially, it amounts to a\\nsuggestion that whatever group of weapons a regulation prohibits\\nmay be deemed a \\\"class.\\\" By this logic — which we squarely reject\\n— virtually any regulation could be considered an \\\"absolute\\nprohibition\\\" of a class of weapons.\\n\\n\\n - 9 -\\n\\fAmendment provides. The first data point involves the person who\\n\\nis asserting the right; the second data point involves the purpose\\n\\nfor which the right is being asserted; the third data point\\n\\ninvolves the place where the right is being asserted; and the\\n\\nfourth data point involves the type of weapon. Heller's most\\n\\nmeaningful message touches all four data points. Refined to bare\\n\\nessence, its message is that the Second Amendment \\\"elevates above\\n\\nall other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens\\n\\nto use arms in defense of hearth and home.\\\" Id. at 635.\\n\\n As applied here, this message checks off the first three\\n\\ndata points. It is undisputed that the individual plaintiffs are\\n\\nnot prohibited persons but, rather, law-abiding, responsible\\n\\ncitizens. Similarly, it is undisputed that they seek to use the\\n\\nproscribed assault weapons and LCMs for self-defense. And,\\n\\nfinally, it is undisputed that they seek to effectuate this usage\\n\\nin their homes. We are, therefore, left to focus on the fourth\\n\\ndata point: the arms proscribed and the extent (if at all) that\\n\\nthose arms are protected by the Second Amendment.\\n\\n In conducting this inquiry, we do not write on an\\n\\nentirely pristine page. Our recent decision in Gould v. Morgan\\n\\nmapped out a two-step approach for analyzing Second Amendment\\n\\nchallenges. See 907 F.3d 659, 668-69 (1st Cir. 2018), petition\\n\\nfor cert. filed, ___ U.S.L.W. ___ (U.S. April 1, 2019) (No. 18-\\n\\n1272). Under this approach, we first ask whether the challenged\\n\\n\\n - 10 -\\n\\flaw burdens conduct that is protected by the Second Amendment.\\n\\nSee id. This inquiry is \\\"backward-looking\\\" and \\\"seeks to determine\\n\\nwhether the regulated conduct 'was understood to be within the\\n\\nscope of the right at the time of ratification.'\\\" Id. at 669\\n\\n(quoting United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2010)). If that step is successfully negotiated so we can say\\n\\nthat the challenged law \\\"burdens conduct falling within the scope\\n\\nof the Second Amendment, [we] then must determine what level of\\n\\nscrutiny is appropriate and must proceed to decide whether the\\n\\nchallenged law survives that level of scrutiny.\\\" Id. We follow\\n\\nthis approach in determining whether the Act withstands the\\n\\nplaintiffs' Second Amendment onslaught.\\n\\n B. The Scope of the Second Amendment Right.\\n\\n This brings us to the question of whether the conduct\\n\\nrestricted by the Act falls under the protective carapace of the\\n\\nSecond Amendment. To answer this question, we must determine\\n\\nwhether possession of the proscribed assault weapons and LCMs in\\n\\nthe home for self-defense is safeguarded by the Second Amendment.3\\n\\n\\n 3\\n One of the amici advances the clever argument that LCMs,\\nlike other magazines, are not \\\"arms\\\" at all because they are not\\nthemselves \\\"[w]eapons of offense, or armour of defence.\\\" Heller,\\n554 U.S. at 581 (alteration in original) (quoting 1 Dictionary of\\nthe English Language 106 (4th ed.) (reprinted 1978)). The\\ndefendants, though, have not proffered such an argument. We\\nordinarily refuse to entertain arguments advanced by amici but not\\nby the parties, see, e.g., In re Sony BMG Music Entm't, 564 F.3d\\n1, 3 (1st Cir. 2009); Lane v. First Nat'l Bank of Bos., 871 F.2d\\n166, 175 (1st Cir. 1989), and we see no reason to depart from that\\n\\n\\n - 11 -\\n\\f Our first task is to consider whether the proscribed\\n\\nweapons are the type of arms \\\"understood to be within the scope of\\n\\nthe [Second Amendment] right at the time of ratification.\\\" Id.\\n\\n(quoting Chester, 628 F.3d at 680). Heller is the beacon by which\\n\\nwe must steer. There, the Court explained that \\\"[t]he traditional\\n\\nmilitia was formed from a pool of men bringing arms 'in common use\\n\\nat the time' for lawful purposes like self-defense.\\\" 554 U.S. at\\n\\n624 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).4\\n\\nThe Court's earlier decision in Miller (which held that a short-\\n\\nbarreled shotgun was not protected by the Second Amendment)\\n\\nfurnishes further context. See 307 U.S. at 175-83. There, the\\n\\nCourt surveyed state laws regulating militias at the time of the\\n\\nfounding and explained that many states, including Massachusetts,\\n\\nhad specified the types of weapons that citizens were required to\\n\\nbring to militia service. See id. at 180-82. The Court concluded\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nprudential principle here. We note, moreover, that the parties do\\nnot argue that the Second Amendment analysis differs with respect\\nto LCMs as opposed to semiautomatic assault weapons, and so we\\nconsider both objects of the Act together.\\n 4 Here, however, there is a wrinkle. Because the plaintiffs'\\nchallenge is directed at a state statute, Gould points to 1868\\n(when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified) as the date for any\\nnecessary historical inquiry. See 907 F.3d at 669. Heller, in\\ncontrast, does not deal with a state law and thus locates the\\nbenchmark at 1791 (the date of ratification of the Constitution\\nitself). Since no party here has argued that this distinction is\\neither material or sufficient to render Heller's analysis\\ninoperative, we need not parse this distinction as \\\"our conclusion\\nwith respect to the historical record would be the same regardless\\nof which ratification date was used.\\\" Id. at 669 n.3.\\n\\n\\n - 12 -\\n\\fthat although \\\"[m]ost if not all of the States have adopted\\n\\nprovisions touching the right to keep and bear arms,\\\" id. at 182,\\n\\nnone has suggested that a short-barreled shotgun was the type of\\n\\nweapon that \\\"could contribute to the common defense,\\\" id. at 178.\\n\\nWith this historical background in place, the Heller Court\\n\\ndetermined that the Second Amendment \\\"extends only to certain types\\n\\nof weapons.\\\" 554 U.S. at 623. One corollary of this determination\\n\\nis that an \\\"important limitation on the right to keep and carry\\n\\narms\\\" is that \\\"the sorts of weapons protected were those 'in common\\n\\nuse at the time.'\\\" Id. at 627 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 179).\\n\\nThe Court added that such a \\\"limitation is fairly supported by the\\n\\nhistorical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of 'dangerous and\\n\\nunusual weapons.'\\\" Id. (citing 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries\\n\\non the Laws of England 148-49 (1769)); see id. at 623 (referencing\\n\\n\\\"the prohibition on terrorizing people with dangerous or unusual\\n\\nweapons\\\").\\n\\n That the proscribed weapons were not in existence, let\\n\\nalone in common use, at the time of ratification, does not end the\\n\\nmatter. Heller left no doubt that \\\"the Second Amendment extends,\\n\\nprima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms,\\n\\neven those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.\\\"\\n\\nId. at 582. The Court reaffirmed this principle some eight years\\n\\nlater, when it reversed a decision of the Massachusetts Supreme\\n\\nJudicial Court (SJC), which had held that stun guns were not\\n\\n\\n - 13 -\\n\\fprotected by the Second Amendment. See Caetano v. Massachusetts,\\n\\n136 S. Ct. 1027, 1027-28 (2016) (per curiam). Pertinently, the\\n\\nCaetano Court debunked the notion that stun guns were unprotected\\n\\nbecause they \\\"were not in common use at the time of the Second\\n\\nAmendment's enactment,\\\" id. at 1027 (quoting Commonwealth v.\\n\\nCaetano, 26 N.E.3d 688, 693 (Mass. 2015)), finding that notion\\n\\n\\\"inconsistent with Heller's clear statement that the Second\\n\\nAmendment 'extends . . . to . . . arms that were not in existence\\n\\nat the time of the founding,'\\\" id. at 1028 (alteration in original)\\n\\n(quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 582); see id. (rejecting conclusion\\n\\n\\\"that stun guns are 'unusual' because they are 'a thoroughly modern\\n\\ninvention'\\\" (quoting Caetano, 26 N.E.3d at 693-94)).\\n\\n Relatedly, the Heller Court acknowledged that \\\"if\\n\\nweapons that are most useful in military service — M-16 rifles and\\n\\nthe like — may be banned,\\\" it might be argued that \\\"the Second\\n\\nAmendment right is completely detached from the prefatory clause.\\\"\\n\\n554 U.S. at 627. After all, militias today \\\"require sophisticated\\n\\narms that are highly unusual in society at large.\\\" Id. But the\\n\\nCourt pointed out that \\\"the conception of the militia at the time\\n\\nof the Second Amendment's ratification was the body of all citizens\\n\\ncapable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful\\n\\nweapons that they possessed at home to militia duty.\\\" Id. Thus,\\n\\n\\\"the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 14 -\\n\\fbetween the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change\\n\\n[judicial] interpretation of the right.\\\" Id. at 627-28.\\n\\n Viewed against this backdrop, the relevant question is\\n\\nneither whether the proscribed weapons were commonly used at the\\n\\ntime of ratification nor whether they are among the types of\\n\\nweapons used by today's militias. Instead, the question is whether\\n\\nthe proscribed weapons are in common use for lawful purposes like\\n\\nself-defense.\\n\\n As to this question, Heller provides only meager\\n\\nguidance. Heller made plain that handguns, which the Court\\n\\ndescribed as \\\"the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-\\n\\ndefense in the home,\\\" are protected. Id. at 629. Conversely,\\n\\n\\\"the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically\\n\\npossessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as\\n\\nshort-barreled shotguns.\\\" Id. at 625. But as to the middle ground\\n\\n— and particularly, as to how to plot the dividing line between\\n\\ncommon and uncommon use — the Court was silent.5\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 We agree with the Seventh Circuit that measuring \\\"common\\nuse\\\" by the sheer number of weapons lawfully owned is somewhat\\nillogical. See Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406,\\n409 (7th Cir. 2015) (\\\"Machine guns aren't commonly owned for lawful\\npurposes today because they are illegal; semi-automatic weapons\\nwith large-capacity magazines are owned more commonly because,\\nuntil recently (in some jurisdictions), they have been legal. Yet\\nit would be absurd to say that the reason why a particular weapon\\ncan be banned is that there is a statute banning it, so that it\\nisn't commonly owned.\\\").\\n\\n\\n - 15 -\\n\\f The parties strive mightily to fill this void. On the\\n\\none hand, the plaintiffs have shown that, as of 2013, nearly\\n\\n5,000,000 people owned at least one semiautomatic assault weapon.\\n\\nThey also have shown that between 1990 and 2015, Americans owned\\n\\napproximately 115,000,000 LCMs. On the other hand, the defendants\\n\\nhave shown that only three percent of guns in the United States\\n\\nare assault weapons and only one percent of Americans own such a\\n\\nweapon. In all events, the record evidence is sparse as to actual\\n\\nuse of any of the proscribed weapons or LCMs for self-defense in\\n\\nthe home.\\n\\n The district court avoided this question entirely. It\\n\\nabjured the \\\"in common use\\\" test, concluding that \\\"Heller . . .\\n\\npresents us with a dispositive and relatively easy inquiry: Are\\n\\nthe banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines 'like' 'M-\\n\\n16 rifles,' i.e., 'weapons that are most useful in military\\n\\nservice,' and thus outside the ambit of the Second Amendment?\\\"\\n\\nWorman, 293 F. Supp. 3d at 264 (quoting Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d\\n\\n114, 136 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 469\\n\\n(2017)). The court went on to find that the proscribed weapons\\n\\nfit within this taxonomy, noting by way of example that one of the\\n\\nproscribed weapons (the Colt AR-15) is virtually identical to the\\n\\nM-16 (save for the fact that the AR-15 does not allow for fully\\n\\nautomatic fire). See id. at 264-66. The plaintiffs argue that\\n\\nthis approach is doubly flawed: they calumnize both the district\\n\\n\\n - 16 -\\n\\fcourt's conclusion that \\\"weapons that are most useful in military\\n\\nservice\\\" are excepted from Second Amendment coverage and its\\n\\ndetermination that the proscribed weapons are \\\"like\\\" \\\"M-16\\n\\nrifles.\\\"\\n\\n Mindful that \\\"[d]iscretion is often the better part of\\n\\nvalor,\\\" United States v. Gonzalez, 736 F.3d 40, 40 (1st Cir. 2013),\\n\\nwe are reluctant to plunge into this factbound morass. In the\\n\\nend, \\\"courts should not rush to decide unsettled issues when the\\n\\nexigencies of a particular case do not require such definitive\\n\\nmeasures.\\\" Privitera v. Curran (In re Curran), 855 F.3d 19, 22\\n\\n(1st Cir. 2017). For present purposes, we simply assume, albeit\\n\\nwithout deciding, that the Act burdens conduct that falls somewhere\\n\\nwithin the compass of the Second Amendment.\\n\\n C. The Level of Scrutiny.\\n\\n The next phase of our inquiry \\\"requires us to evaluate\\n\\nthe [Act] under an appropriate level of scrutiny.\\\" Gould, 907\\n\\nF.3d at 670. The appropriate level of scrutiny \\\"turn[s] on how\\n\\nclosely a particular law or policy approaches the core of the\\n\\nSecond Amendment right and how heavily it burdens that right.\\\"\\n\\nId. at 670-71. We previously established \\\"that the core Second\\n\\nAmendment right is limited to self-defense in the home\\\" on the\\n\\npart of \\\"responsible, law-abiding individuals.\\\" Id. at 671. Given\\n\\nthis understanding, we concluded that the law challenged in Gould\\n\\n(which concerned public carriage of firearms) fell outside the\\n\\n\\n - 17 -\\n\\fcore of the Second Amendment right. See id. at 672. In contrast\\n\\nto the plaintiffs in Gould, the present plaintiffs contend that\\n\\nthe Act affects their ability to defend themselves in their homes.\\n\\nAssuming (favorably to the plaintiffs) that the Act implicates the\\n\\ncore of the Second Amendment right, we must train the lens of our\\n\\ninquiry on \\\"how heavily it burdens that right.\\\" Id. at 671.\\n\\n As is true in many Second Amendment inquiries, our\\n\\nstarting point is Heller. There, the Court unequivocally rebuffed\\n\\nthe argument \\\"that it is permissible to ban the possession of\\n\\nhandguns so long as the possession of other firearms (i.e., long\\n\\nguns) is allowed.\\\" 544 U.S. at 629. The Court's rationale was\\n\\nbased on the premise that \\\"the American people have considered the\\n\\nhandgun to be the quintessential self-defense weapon.\\\" Id. In\\n\\nfashioning this rationale, the Court repeatedly emphasized the\\n\\nunique popularity of the handgun as a means of self-defense. See\\n\\nid. at 628 (calling handguns a \\\"class of 'arms' . . .\\n\\noverwhelmingly chosen by American society for [self-defense]\\\");\\n\\nid. at 628-29 (identifying the handgun as \\\"the most preferred\\n\\nfirearm in the nation to 'keep' and use for protection of one's\\n\\nhome and family\\\"); id. at 629 (declaring that \\\"handguns are the\\n\\nmost popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the\\n\\nhome\\\"). Building on this foundation, the Court made clear that\\n\\nbanning this quintessential self-defense weapon would heavily\\n\\nburden the core right of self-defense in the home. See id. at\\n\\n\\n - 18 -\\n\\f629; see also id. at 632 (describing eighteenth-century gunpowder\\n\\nstorage laws and noting that such laws did \\\"not remotely burden\\n\\nthe right of self-defense as much as an absolute ban on handguns\\\").\\n\\n This same logic leads us to conclude that the Act's\\n\\nrestriction on semiautomatic assault weapons and LCMs does not\\n\\nheavily burden the core right of self-defense in the home. As an\\n\\ninitial matter, the Act does not ban all semiautomatic weapons and\\n\\nmagazines. Instead, it proscribes only a set of specifically\\n\\nenumerated semiautomatic assault weapons, magazines of a\\n\\nparticular capacity, and semiautomatic assault weapons that have\\n\\ncertain combat-style features. Furthermore, the record shows that\\n\\nsemiautomatic assault weapons do not share the features that make\\n\\nhandguns well-suited to self-defense in the home. Cf. id. at 629\\n\\n(explaining that \\\"a citizen may prefer a handgun for home defense\\\"\\n\\nbecause, inter alia, \\\"[i]t is easier to store in a location that\\n\\nis readily accessible in an emergency; it cannot easily be\\n\\nredirected or wrestled away by an attacker; it is easier to use\\n\\nfor those without the upper-body strength to lift and aim a long\\n\\ngun; it can be pointed at a burglar with one hand while the other\\n\\nhand dials the police\\\"). Equally as important is what the record\\n\\ndoes not show: it offers no indication that the proscribed weapons\\n\\nhave commonly been used for home self-defense purposes. In fact,\\n\\nwhen asked directly, not one of the plaintiffs or their six experts\\n\\ncould identify even a single example of the use of an assault\\n\\n\\n - 19 -\\n\\fweapon for home self-defense, nor could they identify even a single\\n\\nexample of a self-defense episode in which ten or more shots were\\n\\nfired. Viewed as a whole, the record suggests that wielding the\\n\\nproscribed weapons for self-defense within the home is tantamount\\n\\nto using a sledgehammer to crack open the shell of a peanut. Thus,\\n\\nwe conclude that the Act does not heavily burden the core Second\\n\\nAmendment right of self-defense within the home.\\n\\n This conclusion fits seamlessly with our decision in\\n\\nHightower. Although that opinion did not directly address what\\n\\nrestrictions may be deemed to heavily burden the core Second\\n\\nAmendment right, we stated that the fact that the plaintiff sought\\n\\na license that \\\"allowed carrying of large capacity weapons\\n\\nweaken[ed] the Second Amendment claim, as [Heller] was concerned\\n\\nwith weapons of the type characteristically used to protect the\\n\\nhome.\\\" Hightower, 693 F.3d at 71 (holding that revocation of\\n\\nlicense to carry concealed, large-capacity firearm based on false\\n\\nstatements in renewal application did not violate Second\\n\\nAmendment). So, too, our conclusion is reinforced by the fact\\n\\nthat — unlike the use of handguns — the use of semiautomatic\\n\\nassault weapons, even in the home, does not \\\"implicate[] the safety\\n\\nonly of those who live or visit there.\\\" Gould, 907 F.3d at 672.\\n\\nRather, the use of semiautomatic assault weapons implicates the\\n\\nsafety of the public at large. After all, such weapons can fire\\n\\nthrough walls, risking the lives of those in nearby apartments or\\n\\n\\n - 20 -\\n\\fon the street. Cf. Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 127 (observing that \\\"rounds\\n\\nfrom assault weapons have the ability to easily penetrate most\\n\\nmaterials used in standard home construction, car doors, and\\n\\nsimilar materials\\\").\\n\\n We have yet to consider what level of scrutiny applies\\n\\nto a law that implicates the core of the Second Amendment right,\\n\\nbut does not \\\"heavily . . . burden[] that right.\\\" Gould, 907 F.3d\\n\\nat 671. Heller does state that a handgun ban would \\\"fail\\n\\nconstitutional muster\\\" under \\\"any of the standards of scrutiny\\n\\nthat [the Court has] applied to enumerated constitutional rights.\\\"\\n\\n554 U.S. at 628-29. But we do not read Heller to suggest that a\\n\\nregulation of arms that only modestly burdens the core Second\\n\\nAmendment right must be subject to the strictest form of\\n\\nconstitutional review. See Gould, 900 F.3d at 673 (\\\"The Heller\\n\\nCourt . . . implie[d] that there is a role for some level of\\n\\nscrutiny less rigorous than strict scrutiny.\\\"); see also Ezell v.\\n\\nCity of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011) (\\\"[A] severe\\n\\nburden on the core Second Amendment right of armed self-defense\\n\\nwill require an extremely strong public-interest justification and\\n\\na close fit between the government's means and its end. . . .\\n\\n[L]aws that merely regulate rather than restrict, and modest\\n\\nburdens on the right may be more easily justified.\\\").\\n\\n In our view, intermediate scrutiny is appropriate as\\n\\nlong as a challenged regulation either fails to implicate the core\\n\\n\\n - 21 -\\n\\fSecond Amendment right or fails to impose a substantial burden on\\n\\nthat right. See Fyock v. Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991, 998-99 (9th\\n\\nCir. 2015). It follows that intermediate scrutiny is the\\n\\nappropriate level of scrutiny for evaluating a law — like the Act\\n\\n— that arguably implicates the core Second Amendment right to self-\\n\\ndefense in the home but places only a modest burden on that right.\\n\\nThis holding aligns us with a number of our sister circuits, which\\n\\nhave applied intermediate scrutiny to laws restricting\\n\\nsemiautomatic assault weapons and LCMs. See, e.g., Ass'n of N.J.\\n\\nRifle & Pistol Clubs v. Att'y Gen. N.J., 910 F.3d 106, 117 (3d\\n\\nCir. 2018) (applying intermediate scrutiny because \\\"[t]he Act here\\n\\ndoes not severely burden the core Second Amendment right to self-\\n\\ndefense in the home\\\"); Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 134 (applying\\n\\nintermediate scrutiny because challenged law did \\\"not seriously\\n\\nimpact a person's ability to defend himself in the home\\\" (internal\\n\\nquotation marks omitted)); N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v.\\n\\nCuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 260 (2d Cir. 2015) (applying intermediate\\n\\nscrutiny because \\\"[t]he burden imposed by the challenged\\n\\nlegislation is real, but . . . not 'severe'\\\"); Heller v. District\\n\\nof Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2011)\\n\\n(applying intermediate scrutiny because challenged prohibition did\\n\\nnot \\\"substantially affect\\\" individuals' right of self-defense).6\\n\\n\\n 6\\n After we heard oral argument in this case, the Illinois\\nSupreme Court held that a law prohibiting the carrying of tasers\\n\\n\\n - 22 -\\n\\fConsequently, we proceed to apply intermediate scrutiny to\\n\\ndetermine whether the Act passes constitutional muster.\\n\\n D. Applying Intermediate Scrutiny.\\n\\n To survive intermediate scrutiny, a statute \\\"must be\\n\\nsubstantially related to an important governmental objective.\\\"\\n\\nGould, 907 F.3d at 672 (quoting Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461\\n\\n(1988)). To achieve this substantial relationship, there must be\\n\\na \\\"reasonable fit\\\" between the restrictions imposed by the law and\\n\\nthe government's valid objectives, \\\"such that the law does not\\n\\nburden more conduct than is reasonably necessary.\\\" Id. at 674\\n\\n(quoting Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2013)).\\n\\n The law that the plaintiffs challenge here — the Act —\\n\\nrestricts the sale, transfer, and possession of certain\\n\\nsemiautomatic assault weapons and LCMs. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch.\\n\\n140, §§ 121, 131M. It does not ban the sale, transfer, or\\n\\npossession of all semiautomatic weapons, nor does it impose any\\n\\nrestrictions on magazines that are designed to hold ten rounds or\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nand stun guns was a \\\"categorical ban\\\" and, thus, was \\\"facially\\nunconstitutional under the [S]econd [A]mendment.\\\" Illinois v.\\nWebb, ___ N.E. 3d ___, ___ (Ill. 2019) [2019 WL 1291586 at *5].\\nThe plaintiffs notified us of this decision pursuant to Federal\\nRule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), asserting that it \\\"provides\\nfurther support for [their] argument that a categorical ban on\\nbearable arms that are commonly kept for lawful purposes is per se\\nunconstitutional.\\\" We reject the plaintiffs' premise that the Act\\nis a categorical ban, see supra note 2, and disagree with the\\nIllinois Supreme Court's conclusion that any law that restricts a\\ncertain type of arms is per se unconstitutional.\\n\\n\\n - 23 -\\n\\ffewer. The Act's manifest purpose is to \\\"help keep the streets\\n\\nand neighborhoods of Massachusetts safe\\\" by \\\"mak[ing] it harder\\n\\nfor criminals to get their hands on these dangerous guns.\\\"\\n\\n We have said before, and today reaffirm, that \\\"few\\n\\ninterests are more central to a state government than protecting\\n\\nthe safety and well-being of its citizens.\\\" Gould, 907 F.3d at\\n\\n673. Since Massachusetts indubitably \\\"has compelling governmental\\n\\ninterests in both public safety and crime prevention,\\\" id., the\\n\\nonly question that remains is whether the Act is substantially\\n\\nrelated to those interests. The answer to this question depends\\n\\non whether the fit between those interests and the Act is\\n\\nreasonable. See id. at 674.\\n\\n In our view, the Act survives under intermediate\\n\\nscrutiny. This view comports with the unanimous weight of circuit-\\n\\ncourt authority analyzing Second Amendment challenges to similar\\n\\nlaws. See, e.g., Ass'n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, 910 F.3d at\\n\\n122; Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 139; N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, 804\\n\\nF.3d at 261; Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1262.\\n\\n The record contains ample evidence of the unique dangers\\n\\nposed by the proscribed weapons. Semiautomatic assault weapons\\n\\npermit a shooter to fire multiple rounds very quickly, allowing\\n\\nhim to hit more victims in a shorter period of time. LCMs\\n\\nexacerbate this danger, allowing the shooter to fire more bullets\\n\\nwithout stopping to reload. Cf. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1264\\n\\n\\n - 24 -\\n\\f(noting that \\\"the 2 or 3 second pause during which a criminal\\n\\nreloads his firearm can be of critical benefit to law enforcement\\\"\\n\\n(internal quotation marks omitted)). It is, therefore, not\\n\\nsurprising that AR-15s equipped with LCMs have been the weapons of\\n\\nchoice in many of the deadliest mass shootings in recent history,\\n\\nincluding horrific events in Pittsburgh (2018), Parkland (2018),\\n\\nLas Vegas (2017), Sutherland Springs (2017), Orlando (2016),\\n\\nNewtown (2012), and Aurora (2012).\\n\\n The record also contains the affidavit of a seasoned\\n\\ntrauma surgeon, who has treated victims of several mass shootings.\\n\\nThis affidavit confirms what common sense suggests: semiautomatic\\n\\nassault weapons cause wounds that \\\"tend to be higher in complexity\\n\\nwith higher complication rates than those injuries from non-\\n\\nassault weapons. They tend to cause far greater damage to the\\n\\nmuscles, bones, soft tissue, and vital organs.\\\" Cf. Panagiotis K.\\n\\nStefanopoulos, et al., Gunshot Wounds: A Review of Ballistics\\n\\nRelated to Penetrating Trauma, 3 J. Acute Disease 178, 181-82\\n\\n(2014). A number of articles, written by physicians who have cared\\n\\nfor assault-weapon victims, substantiate the extreme damage that\\n\\nsuch weapons are prone to cause. See, e.g., Gina Kolata & C.J.\\n\\nChivers, Wounds from Military-Style Rifles? 'A Ghastly Thing to\\n\\nSee', N.Y. Times (Mar. 4, 2018),\\n\\nhttps://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/04/health/parkland-shooting-\\n\\nvictims-ar15.html (\\\"The tissue destruction is almost unimaginable.\\n\\n\\n - 25 -\\n\\fBones are exploded, soft tissue is absolutely destroyed. The\\n\\ninjuries to the chest or abdomen — it's like a bomb went off.\\\");\\n\\nTim Craig et al., As the Wounded Kept Coming, Hospitals Dealt with\\n\\nInjuries Rarely Seen in U.S., Wash. Post (Oct. 3, 2017),\\n\\nhttps://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/as-the-\\n\\nwounded-kept-coming-hospitals-dealt-with-injuries-rarely-seen-\\n\\nin-the-us/2017/10/03/06210b86-a883-11e7-b3aa-\\n\\nc0e2e1d41e38_story.html?utm_term=.5a659eec267b (\\\"If a 9mm bullet\\n\\nstrikes someone in the liver . . . that person might suffer a wound\\n\\nperhaps an inch wide, . . . [b]ut if you're struck in the liver\\n\\nwith an AR-15, it would be like dropping a watermelon onto the\\n\\ncement. It just is disintegrated.\\\" (internal quotation marks\\n\\nomitted)).\\n\\n The defendants proffered evidence that the majority of\\n\\nindividuals who have perpetrated mass shootings obtain their semi-\\n\\nautomatic assault weapons legally. See, e.g., Larry Buchanan et\\n\\nal., How They Got Their Guns, N.Y. Times (updated Feb. 16, 2018),\\n\\nhttps://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/03/us/how-mass-\\n\\nshooters-got-their-guns.html; Mayors Against Illegal Guns,\\n\\nAnalysis of Recent Mass Shootings (2013). This evidence lends\\n\\nsupport to the legislature's conclusion that a law proscribing\\n\\nsemiautomatic assault weapons and LCMs — like the Act — will help\\n\\ncurtail outbreaks of mass violence.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 26 -\\n\\f The plaintiffs do not dispute the extensive evidence\\n\\nregarding the lethality of the proscribed weapons and the frequency\\n\\nof their use in mass shootings. Instead, they argue that \\\"[e]ven\\n\\nassuming the [Act] may curb criminal misuse of the Banned Firearms\\n\\nand Magazines,\\\" the Act fails intermediate scrutiny because it\\n\\n\\\"make[s] no exception for law-abiding, responsible citizens to\\n\\nkeep these arms for lawful purposes like self-defense in the home.\\\"\\n\\nAccording to the plaintiffs, the forbidden assault weapons and\\n\\nLCMs are \\\"ideal\\\" for domestic self-defense for many of the same\\n\\nreasons that such weapons are ideal for mass shootings — they are\\n\\neasier to hold and shoot, require less user accuracy, and allow a\\n\\nshooter to fire many times without reloading. Thus, the plaintiffs\\n\\nassert, any regulation prohibiting law-abiding, responsible\\n\\ncitizens from possessing such weapons sweeps too broadly.\\n\\n This assertion is too facile by half, and we reject it.\\n\\nAlthough we acknowledge that \\\"[i]n dealing with a complex societal\\n\\nproblem like gun violence, there will almost always be room for\\n\\nreasonable minds to differ about the optimal solution,\\\" Gould, 907\\n\\nF.3d at 676, the plaintiffs give unduly short shrift to \\\"the\\n\\nlegislature's prerogative . . . to weigh the evidence, choose among\\n\\nconflicting inferences, and make the necessary policy judgments,\\\"\\n\\nid. The role of a reviewing court is limited to ensuring \\\"that,\\n\\nin formulating its judgments, [the legislature] has drawn\\n\\nreasonable inferences based on substantial evidence,\\\" id.\\n\\n\\n - 27 -\\n\\f(alteration in original) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC,\\n\\n512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994) (opinion of Kennedy, J.)), and that \\\"the\\n\\nfit between the asserted governmental interests and the means\\n\\nchosen to advance them is close enough to pass intermediate\\n\\nscrutiny,\\\" id. at 674.\\n\\n Here, the Massachusetts legislature's conclusion that\\n\\nthe Commonwealth's legitimate interests are best served by\\n\\nproscribing semiautomatic assault weapons and LCMs rests on\\n\\nsubstantial (although not incontrovertible) evidence regarding the\\n\\ninordinate dangers associated with the proscribed weapons. What\\n\\nis more, it strains credulity to argue that the fit between the\\n\\nAct and the asserted governmental interest is unreasonable. As we\\n\\nhave said, the Act does not outlaw all semiautomatic firearms and\\n\\nmagazines. Nor does it circumscribe in any way the fundamental\\n\\nright of law-abiding, responsible citizens to possess handguns in\\n\\ntheir homes for self-defense. Accordingly, we hold that although\\n\\nthe Act may well \\\"touch[] the right to keep and bear arms,\\\" Miller,\\n\\n307 U.S. at 182, it does not impermissibly intrude upon that right\\n\\nbecause it withstands intermediate scrutiny.\\n\\nIII. CONCLUSION\\n\\n This case concerns an issue of paramount importance. In\\n\\nthe wake of increasingly frequent acts of mass violence committed\\n\\nwith semiautomatic assault weapons and LCMs, the interests of state\\n\\nand local governments in regulating the possession and use of such\\n\\n\\n - 28 -\\n\\fweapons are entitled to great weight. Even so, we recognize that\\n\\nsuch interests must be balanced against the time-honored right of\\n\\nindividuals to bear arms in self-defense — a right that is\\n\\nprotected in varying degrees by the Second Amendment.\\n\\n Holding this delicate balance steady and true is\\n\\ndifficult but necessary work. Here, we find that even if the Act\\n\\nimplicates the core of the Second Amendment right, it (at most)\\n\\nminimally burdens that right. Consequently, we are obliged to\\n\\ncede some degree of deference to the decision of the Massachusetts\\n\\nlegislature about how best to regulate the possession and use of\\n\\nthe proscribed weapons.\\n\\n In this instance, that decision rests on a web of\\n\\ncompelling governmental interests, and the fit between those\\n\\ninterests and the restrictions imposed by the Act is both close\\n\\nand reasonable. It follows that the Act withstands intermediate\\n\\nscrutiny — and no more is exigible to blunt the plaintiffs' Second\\n\\nAmendment challenge.\\n\\n We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,\\n\\nthe judgment of the district court is\\n\\n\\n\\nAffirmed.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 29 -\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1492,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4614218,"string":"4,614,218"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Mayra F. PENA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant, Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Pena v. Honeywell International, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1164P"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Lynch, Stahl, Lipez\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888419/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"035concurrenceinpart\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888420/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"LYNCH, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the First Circuit\\n\\n\\nNo. 18-1164\\n\\n MAYRA F. PENA,\\n\\n Plaintiff, Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.,\\n\\n Defendant, Appellee.\\n\\n\\n APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND\\n\\n [Hon. William E. Smith, U.S. District Judge]\\n\\n\\n Before\\n\\n Lynch, Stahl, and Lipez,\\n Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\n Mark P. Gagliardi for the appellant.\\n Neal J. McNamara, with whom Aaron F. Nadich and Nixon Peabody\\nLLP were on brief, for the appellee.\\n\\n\\n April 26, 2019\\n\\n LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Mayra F. Pena worked as\\n\\na machine operator and associate assembler for defendant Honeywell\\n\\nInternational, Inc. (Honeywell), until Honeywell terminated her\\n\\nemployment on June 17, 2013, on the basis of job abandonment. Pena\\n\\nhad not come to work since March 8, 2013. On September 20, 2013,\\n\\nPena applied for Social Security Disability Income (SSDI)\\n\\nbenefits, asserting that she was totally disabled and had been\\n\\nsince March 8, 2013.\\n\\n On April 16, 2015, Pena filed this suit under the\\n\\nAmericans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.,\\n\\nand under various Rhode Island laws, claiming that Honeywell\\n\\nterminated her employment on the basis of her disabilities, failed\\n\\nto provide her with reasonable accommodations, and retaliated\\n\\nagainst her. After discovery and after she consistently testified\\n\\nat her deposition that she was totally disabled as of March 8,\\n\\n2013, in accord with her SSDI application statements, the district\\n\\ncourt granted Honeywell's motion for summary judgment on all of\\n\\nPena's claims. It noted, among other things, Pena's deposition\\n\\ntestimony and her SSDI application. The court correctly held that\\n\\nPena had not met the requirements of Cleveland v. Policy Management\\n\\nSystems Corporation, 526 U.S. 795 (1999). We affirm the district\\n\\ncourt's grant of summary judgment in favor of Honeywell.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 2 -\\n\\n I.\\n\\nA. Facts\\n\\n We recount the undisputed facts, examining them in the\\n\\nlight most favorable to Pena. See Murray v. Kindred Nursing\\n\\nCenters W. LLC, 789 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2015). In or about 2008,\\n\\nHoneywell hired Pena as a machine operator and associate assembler\\n\\nat its manufacturing facility in Cranston, Rhode Island. Pena\\n\\nworked (except for leave) at the facility until March 8, 2013,\\n\\nafter which she never returned to work. On June 17, 2013,\\n\\nHoneywell terminated Pena's employment for job abandonment.\\n\\n The Cranston facility's various production and assembly\\n\\nareas included the respiratory department,1 the molding department,\\n\\nthe logo department, the quicloc/cedars department, and the SCBA\\n\\narea (SCBA stands for \\\"self-contained breathing apparatus\\\").\\n\\nBefore 2012, Pena usually worked in the respiratory department.\\n\\nIn the molding department, unlike other departments, the machines\\n\\nrun twenty-four hours a day, and emit a new part about every thirty\\n\\nseconds. In other departments, the employees can control the\\n\\ntiming of the machines' operation.2\\n\\n\\n 1 At her deposition, Pena stated that she worked mainly in\\nan area called HEPA, and that the respiratory department and HEPA\\nwere two different areas of the Cranston facility.\\n 2 Some Honeywell employees, not claiming disability,\\nstated that they preferred to work in areas other than the molding\\ndepartment, where they did not have to keep up with the pace of\\nthe machines and could more easily socialize.\\n\\n\\n - 3 -\\n\\n In 2012, Honeywell decided that all employees working in\\n\\nproduction and assembly should be cross-trained so that they could\\n\\nwork as needed in all departments at the Cranston facility,\\n\\nincluding in the molding department. Honeywell believed that it\\n\\nwas important \\\"to move associate assemblers to departments where\\n\\ncustomer demand was greatest and, as a result, an employee['s]\\n\\ninability to work in any particular area would burden the\\n\\nproduction process.\\\" This was particularly true in the molding\\n\\ndepartment due to its continuous operation. Honeywell then trained\\n\\nall of its employees, including Pena, to work in all \\\"assembly\\n\\ndepartments,\\\" including the molding department.\\n\\n In October 2012, Pena was assigned to and worked in the\\n\\nmolding department under this policy. Pena then took a medical\\n\\nleave from November 29, 2012, until January 14, 2013. Pena\\n\\nattributed this request for medical leave to her seasonal\\n\\ndepression. Before this leave, Honeywell had permitted Pena to\\n\\ntake several other medical leaves of absence totaling twenty-three\\n\\nweeks, including from October 14, 2011, to November 21, 2011; from\\n\\nDecember 16, 2011, to February 13, 2012; and from June 22, 2012,\\n\\nto August 6, 2012.\\n\\n When Pena returned to the Cranston facility on January\\n\\n14, 2013, she began working in the molding department four hours\\n\\nper day, two to three times per week. She worked there without\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 4 -\\n\\ncomplaint or incident for about one month. She otherwise typically\\n\\nworked in the respiratory department.\\n\\n In late February 2013, Pena complained to the Senior\\n\\nHuman Resources Generalist, Jose Gouveia, that one of the\\n\\nproduction leaders had told her to go to the molding department.\\n\\nPena says she told Gouveia during that conversation that she did\\n\\nnot want to work in the molding department because \\\"it was harmful\\n\\nto [her] emotionally.\\\"3\\n\\n Pena met with Gouveia, as well as her supervisor, Kevin\\n\\nDyer, and the Health Safety and Environmental Site Leader, Conor\\n\\nRyan, on both March 7 and 8, 2013, about her request not to work\\n\\nin the molding department. At the March 7 meeting, Honeywell\\n\\npersonnel requested that Pena provide a letter from her doctor.\\n\\nThe next day, Pena provided a letter from her physician, Dr. James\\n\\nGreer. Dr. Greer's letter, dated March 4, 2013, stated:\\n\\n Currently, [Pena] is reporting exacerbation of\\n her anxiety symptoms which are interfering\\n with her ability to function. She reports\\n that these specifically occur when she is\\n being sent to the moulding [sic] room as\\n\\n\\n 3 In the same conversation, Pena also told Gouveia that\\n\\\"she was diabetic and the breaks were 15 and 30 minutes apart from\\nher lunch and she could not be 15 minutes late for her coffee nor\\n30 minutes late for her lunch break.\\\" Gouveia told Pena that such\\ndelays were not significant, but if they created a problem he\\n\\\"could revisit the breaks issue.\\\" Pena responded, \\\"I don't like\\nto change my break time, if you want I can get a doctor's note\\nstating that I cannot change my breaks.\\\" The doctor's notes that\\nPena provided to Honeywell do not address this issue, and Pena\\ndoes not say she ever raised the issue again.\\n\\n\\n - 5 -\\n\\n opposed to the more typical duties to which\\n she is accustomed.\\n\\nDr. Greer \\\"request[ed] that [Honeywell] assist her in other\\n\\nplacements than in this setting,\\\" and stated that Pena \\\"is\\n\\ncompletely capable of working in other settings.\\\" Dr. Greer's\\n\\nletter relied almost entirely on Pena's self-reported symptoms and\\n\\ndid not contain a specific medical diagnosis. The letter also did\\n\\nnot explain why the molding department, but not any other\\n\\ndepartment or area, exacerbated Pena's symptoms.\\n\\n Honeywell concluded that Dr. Greer's letter was\\n\\ninadequate to determine what accommodations Pena was requesting\\n\\nand whether Honeywell could meet those requests. On March 8, 2013,\\n\\nRyan and Gouveia told Pena that the only work available to her was\\n\\nin the molding department, so if she refused to do that work, she\\n\\nwould have to go home. Pena decided to go home, and never returned\\n\\nto work after that day.\\n\\n Within a week, Pena had retained an attorney, Veronika\\n\\nKot. Kot told Pena not to communicate with any Honeywell\\n\\npersonnel, as Kot would handle all such communications.\\n\\n Honeywell did not know that Pena had retained counsel,\\n\\nand repeatedly attempted to contact Pena to better understand her\\n\\ncondition and determine what accommodations, if any, would be\\n\\nappropriate. In late March 2013, Gouveia sent Pena a Reasonable\\n\\nAccommodations Request Form.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 6 -\\n\\n On April 2, 2013, Honeywell's Associate Director of\\n\\nHealth Services, Dr. Elizabeth Jennison, wrote to Dr. Greer, asking\\n\\nfor \\\"additional documentation to understand the medical necessity\\n\\nfor [Pena's] request.\\\" Dr. Jennison's letter also asked Dr. Greer\\n\\nto \\\"clarify how [Pena's] anxiety symptoms could allow her to work\\n\\nin many areas of the plant, while interfering with her ability to\\n\\nfunction in one area of the plant, the molding department, for\\n\\nwhich she is equally qualified and trained,\\\" and requested\\n\\nsupporting medical documentation.4\\n\\n In early April 2013, Pena submitted the Reasonable\\n\\nAccommodations Request Form to Honeywell, which was dated April 2,\\n\\n2013. On the form, Pena stated that she was \\\"unable to work in\\n\\nmolding\\\" because \\\"the noise, speed and overall environment gives\\n\\n[her] anxiety, palpitations.\\\" On the form, Pena also stated, \\\"I\\n\\nhad been offered many permanent positions in molding while still\\n\\nworking through an agency and refused because I knew 11 years ago\\n\\nthat I could not perform this job.\\\"\\n\\n The physician's portion of the Reasonable Accommodations\\n\\nRequest Form was left blank, but Pena attached a second letter\\n\\nfrom Dr. Greer dated April 2, 2013. This letter stated that Dr.\\n\\nGreer diagnosed Pena as having \\\"Major Depressive Disorder,\\n\\n\\n 4 At some point, Honeywell set up an appointment for Dr.\\nGreer to come to the Cranston facility in person to discuss Pena's\\ncondition, but Dr. Greer did not attend because he \\\"didn't have\\ntime in [his] busy practice\\\" to visit patients' places of work.\\n\\n\\n - 7 -\\n\\nRecurrent, Severe.\\\" The letter stated that Pena \\\"is eager to\\n\\nreturn to work in her previous capacity,\\\" and that Dr. Greer could\\n\\n\\\"state with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that continued\\n\\nassignment to the more recent work setting will result in worsening\\n\\nstress and further exacerbation of her condition.\\\" Dr. Greer's\\n\\nletter did not attempt to explain why his diagnosis of Pena would\\n\\nallow her to work everywhere except in the molding department.\\n\\n On April 8, 2013, Gouveia sent a letter to Pena stating,\\n\\n\\\"[y]ou have informed us you signed a release to give your physician\\n\\npermission to send your medical records to our medical department;\\n\\nhowever, no[] medical records have been received. As a result,\\n\\nand at the moment, we have insufficient information to assess your\\n\\nrequest.\\\" The letter also stated that while Honeywell \\\"await[ed]\\n\\nthe medical information required to assess [her] request,\\\" Pena\\n\\nhad the following options in the meantime: returning to work and\\n\\nperforming her regular duties, including in the molding\\n\\ndepartment, which was \\\"required of all employees in [Pena's]\\n\\nposition\\\"; remaining on unpaid medical leave; or using any paid\\n\\ntime off she might have available.\\n\\n Gouveia sent a follow-up letter to Pena on April 22,\\n\\n2013, stating that Honeywell had not yet received any information\\n\\nfrom Pena's physician. That same day, Attorney Kot telephoned\\n\\nGouveia. This was the point at which Honeywell became aware that\\n\\nPena had retained counsel. Honeywell's in-house employment\\n\\n\\n - 8 -\\n\\ncounsel, Jacqueline Rolfs, wrote to Kot later that same day, asking\\n\\nher to review Honeywell's correspondence with Pena to understand\\n\\nHoneywell's requests for additional medical records.\\n\\n On April 23, 2013, Kot responded to Rolfs's letter in\\n\\nwriting, stating that Pena had already provided two doctor's notes,\\n\\nand that Honeywell's request for a \\\"release of all her sensitive\\n\\nmedical records, including mental health records,\\\" was an\\n\\n\\\"unnecessary and prohibited intrusion upon her privacy.\\\"\\n\\n On April 25, 2013, Rolfs sent a letter to Kot, attaching\\n\\nthe prior correspondence between Honeywell, Pena, and Dr. Greer.\\n\\nThis letter detailed Honeywell's attempts to communicate with\\n\\nPena, and stated that Honeywell had not asked for all of Pena's\\n\\nrecords, but rather, only those records that would explain how her\\n\\nsymptoms prevented her from working in the molding department.\\n\\nRolfs's letter also stated that \\\"Honeywell remains willing to work\\n\\nwith your client to assess her reasonable accommodation request.\\n\\nHowever, without the cooperation of your client and her physician\\n\\nin providing responses to Honeywell's reasonable questions about\\n\\nthis request, we cannot proceed further in that process.\\\"\\n\\n Kot responded to Rolfs in a letter dated April 30, 2013,\\n\\naccusing Honeywell of violating the ADA and of threatening to\\n\\nterminate Pena's employment if she did not return to work without\\n\\naccommodations. Kot's letter also stated that she would provide\\n\\nanother letter from Pena's doctor shortly.\\n\\n\\n - 9 -\\n\\n On May 6, 2013, Kot wrote to Rolfs again, expressing\\n\\nconcern that Honeywell management had not provided Pena with \\\"the\\n\\nappropriate support\\\" and instead had \\\"apparently . . . urged [Pena]\\n\\nto quit and apply for SSI [Supplemental Security Income]\\\"\\n\\n(Honeywell disputes this). Kot's letter enclosed a memorandum\\n\\nfrom Dr. Greer, stating that Pena \\\"has reported repeatedly and\\n\\nconsistently\\\" that the molding room was stressful because of \\\"a\\n\\nvariety of factors which included increased noise levels, chemical\\n\\nodors, and the presence of robotics.\\\" Dr. Greer's memorandum also\\n\\nstated, \\\"I cannot specifically identify particular issues there\\n\\nwhich might exacerbate her stress, but can state with a reasonable\\n\\ndegree of medical certainty that there is a direct causal\\n\\nrelationship between her working in that setting and the\\n\\nexacerbation of her symptoms.\\\" The memorandum attached four\\n\\nprogress notes from Pena's visits with Dr. Greer that had taken\\n\\nplace between March 4 and April 22, 2013.\\n\\n Rolfs sent a letter to Kot on May 22, 2013, stating that\\n\\nDr. Greer's most recent memorandum still did not explain the\\n\\nconnection between Pena's diagnosis and her ability to work in the\\n\\nmolding department, because all of the items mentioned were also\\n\\ntrue of work conditions in other departments. The letter explained\\n\\nthat:\\n\\n The noise level in molding is not appreciably\\n different than that in respiratory. Indeed,\\n employees in both areas are required to wear\\n\\n\\n - 10 -\\n\\n ear plugs. Nor is there any difference in the\\n chemical odors between respiratory and\\n molding. In addition, there are robotics in\\n both molding and respiratory, and all are\\n enclosed.\\n\\nThe letter stated that \\\"all employees who work on the floor at\\n\\nthis Honeywell facility will be required to rotate into molding as\\n\\nthey complete the necessary training. The rotations are as brief\\n\\nas 15 minutes, or as long as one week.\\\" The letter also stated\\n\\nthat \\\"[r]espiratory will remain Ms. Pena's primary assignment,\\\"\\n\\nbut that \\\"Ms. Pena and the other employees will rotate among all\\n\\nthe areas in the facility, not just molding.\\\" Rolfs's letter also\\n\\nrepeated that Honeywell only sought medical records relevant to\\n\\nPena's request for reasonable accommodation. It stated that \\\"no\\n\\none at Honeywell has suggested that Ms. Pena quit and apply for\\n\\nSSI.\\\" The letter further stated that Dr. Greer had not called\\n\\nHoneywell's Associate Director of Health Services, Dr. Jennison,\\n\\nas Honeywell had requested, and asked that Dr. Greer call Dr.\\n\\nJennison as soon as possible.\\n\\n Honeywell personnel did not hear from Kot after May 6,\\n\\n2013. But the record shows, and her counsel at oral argument\\n\\naffirmed, that Pena had counsel at the time of each of the\\n\\nfollowing crucial events.\\n\\n On June 17, 2013, after Pena had been absent for over\\n\\nthree months and had used all of her medical leave, Honeywell\\n\\nterminated Pena's employment on the basis of job abandonment.\\n\\n\\n - 11 -\\n\\n On September 20, 2013, Pena applied for SSDI benefits.\\n\\nPena was represented by different counsel, Amanda DelFarno, for\\n\\nher SSDI application. Pena's SSDI application included the\\n\\nstatements \\\"I became unable to work because of my disabling\\n\\ncondition on March 8, 2013,\\\" and \\\"I am still disabled.\\\" The\\n\\napplication also stated:\\n\\n I know that anyone who makes or causes to be\\n made a false statement or representation of\\n material fact in an application or for use in\\n determining a right to payment under the\\n Social Security Act commits a crime punishable\\n under federal law by fine, imprisonment, or\\n both. I affirm that all information I have\\n given in connection with this claim is true.\\n\\n That same day, Pena was given an electronic receipt for\\n\\nher SSDI application, which stated, \\\"[y]ou declared under penalty\\n\\nof perjury that you examined all the information on this form and\\n\\nit is true and correct to the best of your knowledge. You were\\n\\ntold that you could be liable under law for providing false\\n\\ninformation.\\\" The receipt stated that Pena should review her SSDI\\n\\napplication and call the telephone number provided within ten days\\n\\nif Pena disagreed with any of the statements in her application.\\n\\nPena does not say that she ever contacted the Social Security\\n\\nAdministration to change any statements in her SSDI application.\\n\\n On September 29, 2015, Pena testified at a hearing before\\n\\nan administrative law judge (ALJ). At the hearing, an impartial\\n\\nmedical expert testified that \\\"the medical evidence of record shows\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 12 -\\n\\nthat the claimant has a 'core problem' of a somatoform disorder\\n\\nwhile translating everything to physical symptoms.\\\"5 On October\\n\\n16, 2015, the ALJ granted Pena's SSDI application in a five-page\\n\\ndecision, finding that Pena had been suffering from somatoform\\n\\ndisorder and was totally disabled as of March 8, 2013.\\n\\nB. Procedural History\\n\\n On April 16, 2015, Pena, represented by new counsel,\\n\\nMark Gagliardi, filed a complaint in Rhode Island Superior Court,\\n\\nwhich Honeywell removed to federal court on the basis of diversity\\n\\njurisdiction. Pena's twelve-count complaint asserted claims under\\n\\nthe federal ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.; the Rhode Island Civil\\n\\nRights Act of 1990, R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 42-112-1 et seq.; the Rhode\\n\\nIsland Fair Employment Practices Act, R.I. Gen Laws §§ 28-5-1 et\\n\\nseq.; the Civil Rights of People With Disabilities Act, R.I. Gen.\\n\\nLaws. §§ 42-87-1 et seq.; and the Rhode Island Whistleblower's\\n\\nProtection Act, R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-50-1 et seq. The Complaint\\n\\nalleges that Honeywell failed to provide Pena with reasonable\\n\\naccommodations (Counts I through IV), terminated her employment on\\n\\nthe basis of her disabilities (Counts V through VIII), and\\n\\nterminated her employment in retaliation for reporting\\n\\ndiscriminatory conduct (Counts IX through XII).\\n\\n\\n 5 Pena states that somatoform disorder is \\\"a form of mental\\nillness that can affect different organs and body systems and cause\\nbodily symptoms, including pain, neurologic[al] problems,\\ngastrointestinal complaints, and sexual symptoms.\\\"\\n\\n\\n - 13 -\\n\\n During discovery, Pena's deposition was taken on\\n\\nNovember 3, 2016. She does not say that she filed any corrections\\n\\nto her deposition transcript. After the completion of discovery,\\n\\nin February 2017, Honeywell moved for summary judgment on all of\\n\\nPena's claims. Pena's counsel filed an opposition to Honeywell's\\n\\nmotion for summary judgment on March 28, 2017, the day it was due.\\n\\nThe opposition attached documents and letters as evidence, but did\\n\\nnot attach any deposition transcripts. The next day, Pena's\\n\\ncounsel filed an \\\"addendum\\\" to the opposition, which included six\\n\\ndeposition transcripts and an affidavit executed by Pena on March\\n\\n29, 2017, the day after the opposition had been due. That same\\n\\nday, Pena's counsel also filed a statement of undisputed facts and\\n\\na statement of disputed facts. On April 11, 2017, Honeywell filed\\n\\na reply brief, which included objections to Pena's late filings,\\n\\nincluding the affidavit. That same day, Pena filed a motion for\\n\\na retroactive extension to file the \\\"addendum,\\\" statement of\\n\\ndisputed facts, and statement of undisputed facts. Later that\\n\\nsame day, Honeywell objected to this motion. On April 26, 2017,\\n\\nthe district court granted Pena's motion for an extension.\\n\\n The magistrate judge held a hearing on Honeywell's\\n\\nmotion for summary judgment on June 19, 2017. On September 22,\\n\\n2017, the magistrate judge entered a report and recommendation\\n\\nthat Honeywell's motion be granted. Pena v. Honeywell Int'l Inc.,\\n\\nNo. CV 15-179 WES, 2018 WL 582579, at *3-*12 (D.R.I. Jan. 29,\\n\\n\\n - 14 -\\n\\n2018). On January 29, 2018, the district court accepted the report\\n\\nand recommendation and granted summary judgment in Honeywell's\\n\\nfavor on all counts. Id. at *3. Pena timely appealed.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n A movant is entitled to summary judgment if \\\"there is no\\n\\ngenuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled\\n\\nto judgment as a matter of law.\\\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). \\\"We\\n\\nreview the district court's disposition of a summary judgment\\n\\nmotion de novo, 'scrutiniz[ing] the evidence in the light most\\n\\nagreeable to the nonmoving party, giving that party the benefit of\\n\\nany and all reasonable inferences.'\\\" Murray, 789 F.3d at 25\\n\\n(quoting Noviello v. City of Bos., 398 F.3d 76, 84 (1st Cir.\\n\\n2005)). If the record is \\\"deficient in vital evidentiary support,\\n\\nthis may suffice to show that the movant has met its initial\\n\\nburden\\\" of \\\"demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of\\n\\nmaterial fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of\\n\\nlaw.\\\" Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 132-33 (1st Cir. 2000).\\n\\nA. Allegation Termination Was Based on Pena's Disabilities\\n\\n The ADA forbids employers from terminating the\\n\\nemployment of a \\\"qualified individual on the basis of disability.\\\"6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 \\\"Rhode Island courts look to federal case law construing\\nthe [ADA] in evaluating analogous state law discrimination\\nclaims.\\\" Pena, 2018 WL 582579 at *3 n.1 (citing Hodgens v. Gen.\\nDynamics, 144 F.3d 151, 158 n.1 (1st Cir. 1998); Barber v. Verizon\\nNew England, No. 05-390-ML, 2006 WL 3524465 at *3 n.1 (D.R.I. Dec.\\n\\n\\n - 15 -\\n\\n42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A prima facie case of disability\\n\\ndiscrimination requires the plaintiff to show that (1) she was\\n\\ndisabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) she was a \\\"qualified\\n\\nindividual,\\\" and (3) the defendant took an adverse employment\\n\\naction against her on the basis of her disability. Tobin v.\\n\\nLiberty Mut. Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 2005); 42 U.S.C.\\n\\n§ 12111(8).\\n\\n Under the ADA, a \\\"qualified individual\\\" is \\\"an\\n\\nindividual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can\\n\\nperform the essential functions of the employment position that\\n\\nsuch individual holds or desires.\\\" 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). By\\n\\ncontrast, a successful SSDI applicant must be physically and\\n\\nmentally impaired such that she cannot do her previous work, or\\n\\n\\\"any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the\\n\\nnational economy.\\\" Id. § 423(d)(2)(A). This difference creates\\n\\nan obvious tension.\\n\\n In Cleveland, the Supreme Court reversed a Fifth Circuit\\n\\ndecision that had created a rebuttable presumption that a\\n\\nplaintiff's filing of an SSDI application precluded her from being\\n\\na \\\"qualified individual\\\" under the ADA. 526 U.S. at 799-800, 807.\\n\\nThe Court remanded to the lower court for the purpose we quote\\n\\nlater. Id. at 807.\\n\\n\\n6, 2006); Kriegel v. State of Rhode Island, 266 F. Supp. 2d 288,\\n296 (D.R.I. 2003)). We will do the same.\\n\\n\\n - 16 -\\n\\n The Court held that an ADA plaintiff in an employment\\n\\ndiscrimination action is not judicially estopped from establishing\\n\\nthat she can perform the essential functions of her job with\\n\\nreasonable accommodations solely because she has previously\\n\\napplied for and received SSDI benefits. Id. at 802. It went on\\n\\nfrom there to establish what a plaintiff must show. Id. at 801-\\n\\n07.\\n\\n The Court stated that the first question was whether\\n\\nthere was an inconsistency between a plaintiff's prior SSDI\\n\\nstatements and her position in the ADA litigation. Id. at 802.\\n\\nThe Court stated that there are \\\"many situations in which an SSDI\\n\\nclaim and an ADA claim can comfortably exist side by side.\\\" Id.\\n\\nat 803. The Court noted that while \\\"the ADA defines a 'qualified\\n\\nindividual' to include a disabled person 'who . . . can perform\\n\\nthe essential functions' of her job 'with reasonable\\n\\naccommodation,'\\\" SSDI \\\"does not take the possibility of\\n\\n'reasonable accommodation' into account.\\\" Id. (alteration in\\n\\noriginal) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B)).\\n\\nInstead, SSDI adjudications involve a \\\"five-step procedure that\\n\\nembodies a set of presumptions about disabilities, job\\n\\navailability, and their interrelation.\\\"7 Id. at 804 (citing 20\\n\\n\\n 7 Under this scheme, some conditions are presumed to be\\ndisabling. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513,\\n517 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d)), vacated on\\nother grounds, 526 U.S. 795, 804 (1999). Pena does not argue that\\n\\n\\n - 17 -\\n\\nC.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1525, 404.1526, 404.1560). These\\n\\npresumptions \\\"eliminat[e] consideration of many differences\\n\\npotentially relevant to an individual's ability to perform a\\n\\nparticular job\\\" under the ADA. Id. Cleveland also noted that\\n\\nSSDI benefits are sometimes awarded \\\"to individuals who not only\\n\\ncan work, but are working,\\\" such as those on a statutory nine month\\n\\ntrial-work period to test their ability to return to work. Id. at\\n\\n805 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 422(c), 423(e)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1592\\n\\n(1998)).\\n\\n Cleveland then stated that \\\"[w]hen faced with a\\n\\nplaintiff's previous sworn statement asserting 'total disability'\\n\\nor the like, the court should require an explanation of any\\n\\napparent inconsistency with the necessary elements of an ADA\\n\\nclaim.\\\" Id. at 807. To defeat summary judgment, the plaintiff's\\n\\n\\\"explanation must be sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror's\\n\\nconcluding that, assuming the truth of, or the plaintiff's good-\\n\\nfaith belief in, the earlier statement, the plaintiff could\\n\\nnonetheless 'perform the essential functions' of her job, with or\\n\\nwithout 'reasonable accommodation.'\\\" Id.\\n\\n Significantly, the plaintiff in Cleveland had argued in\\n\\nher brief that her SSDI statements \\\"were made in a forum which\\n\\ndoes not consider the effect that reasonable workplace\\n\\n\\nher SSDI application relied on a presumption that her condition\\nwas disabling or that she was on a trial-work period.\\n\\n\\n - 18 -\\n\\naccommodations would have on the ability to work,\\\" and that her\\n\\nSSDI statements were \\\"'accurate statements' if examined 'in the\\n\\ntime period in which they were made.'\\\" Id. The Court rejected\\n\\nthe plaintiff's argument that this was all that was needed. The\\n\\ncourt remanded the case so that the parties could \\\"have the\\n\\nopportunity in the trial court to present, or to contest, [the\\n\\nplaintiff's] explanations, in sworn form where appropriate.\\\" Id.\\n\\n Pena argues that she has given an adequate explanation\\n\\nfor the apparent inconsistency between her SSDI statements and her\\n\\nposition in this litigation. She first argues that it is enough\\n\\nfor her to say in her brief that being disabled under the ADA is\\n\\ndifferent from being disabled for SSDI benefits, because the ADA\\n\\ntakes into account an employer's duty to make reasonable\\n\\naccommodations, while SSDI does not. Pena argues that if her SSDI\\n\\napplication or the ALJ had asked if she needed disability\\n\\naccommodations to work, she would have responded \\\"yes.\\\" She states\\n\\nthat this is sufficient to meet her burden under Cleveland. This\\n\\nmisreads (and would read out of the law) Cleveland's reasoned\\n\\nexplanation requirement. When the plaintiff in Cleveland made\\n\\nthese same general arguments, the Court did not accept them;\\n\\nrather, it remanded for factual findings. Id.\\n\\n This court has interpreted Cleveland before, and\\n\\nrejected the argument Pena makes. In DeCaro v. Hasbro, Inc., 580\\n\\nF.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2009), we upheld a jury instruction that the\\n\\n\\n - 19 -\\n\\nstandard for receipt of SSDI benefits is different from the\\n\\nstandard for whether the plaintiff was able, with or without\\n\\nreasonable accommodations, to perform the essential functions of\\n\\nhis job. Id. at 62. We affirmed that the mere fact that the\\n\\nemployee \\\"received [SSDI] benefits is not in itself necessarily\\n\\nfatal to his claim,\\\" but that the receipt of SSDI benefits could\\n\\nbe an admission by the employee of his inability to perform the\\n\\nessential functions of his job, and that the question turned on\\n\\n\\\"all the facts and circumstances.\\\" Id. DeCaro rejected the\\n\\nargument that the mere differences in standards was all that a\\n\\nplaintiff had to show; the burden was on the plaintiff to offer a\\n\\nsufficient explanation. Id.\\n\\n In Sullivan v. Raytheon Co., 262 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2001),\\n\\nwe upheld a grant of summary judgment to the employer where the\\n\\nplaintiff offered \\\"no evidence to explain\\\" why his prior SSDI\\n\\nstatements were consistent with his claim that he could perform\\n\\nthe essential functions of his job with reasonable accommodations.\\n\\nId. at 47. Like here, the plaintiff, in his deposition testimony,\\n\\nhad \\\"continually and consistently claimed that he was totally\\n\\ndisabled\\\" from the date the defendant terminated his employment,\\n\\nand that his condition had \\\"stayed the same or worsened\\\" after\\n\\nthat. Id. We stated that to defeat summary judgment, the\\n\\nplaintiff needed to produce \\\"evidence to explain this\\n\\ndiscrepancy.\\\" Id.\\n\\n\\n - 20 -\\n\\n Nor has Pena's argument been accepted by any circuit.\\n\\nThe Third Circuit has held that \\\"simply averring that the [ADA and\\n\\nSSDI] statutory schemes differ is not enough to survive summary\\n\\njudgment in light of Cleveland. An ADA plaintiff must offer a\\n\\nmore substantial explanation to explain the divergent positions\\n\\ntaken, or else summary judgment could never be granted.\\\" Motley\\n\\nv. N.J. State Police, 196 F.3d 160, 166 (3d Cir. 1999). Under\\n\\nCleveland, \\\"each case should be decided on its unique facts.\\\" Id.\\n\\nat 164. The Fourth Circuit has held that a plaintiff does not\\n\\n\\\"automatically avoid[] summary judgment when the defendant asserts\\n\\nthat the plaintiff's sworn statement of total disability in her\\n\\nSSDI application has negated the 'qualified individual' element of\\n\\nher ADA case.\\\" E.E.O.C. v. Stowe-Pharr Mills, Inc., 216 F.3d 373,\\n\\n378 (4th Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original). The Seventh Circuit\\n\\nhas similarly concluded that \\\"[e]xplanations of the sort Cleveland\\n\\nrequires are, in short, contextual.\\\" Lee v. City of Salem, Ind.,\\n\\n259 F.3d 667, 675 (7th Cir. 2001). The Fifth Circuit has also\\n\\nheld that a plaintiff's explanation that her SSDI statements \\\"did\\n\\nnot take into account the prospect of accommodation as contemplated\\n\\nunder the ADA\\\" is insufficient under Cleveland, at least when the\\n\\nplaintiff has also made \\\"specific factual statements which are\\n\\ninconsistent with her claim\\\" that she could perform the essential\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 21 -\\n\\nfunctions of her job. Reed v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 218\\n\\nF.3d 477, 479-80 (5th Cir. 2000).\\n\\n Pena's second argument is that she has produced evidence\\n\\nof a reasoned explanation sufficient to allow a jury to find she\\n\\nwas a \\\"qualified individual.\\\" We agree with the district court\\n\\nthat she has not met her burden under Cleveland. In her SSDI\\n\\napplication, Pena offered no qualification of any sort to her\\n\\nstatement that she was totally disabled as of March 8, 2013. She\\n\\nsubmitted this application under penalty of perjury, and was\\n\\nrepresented by counsel at the time. From the ALJ's decision that\\n\\nPena was totally disabled due to somatoform disorder as of March\\n\\n8, 2013, it is evident that cause and that date are what Pena had\\n\\nargued to get SSDI benefits. Somatoform disorder is not the\\n\\ndisability for which Pena had claimed to Honeywell she needed\\n\\nreasonable accommodations. This SSDI evidence cuts against her\\n\\nand against the argument that she has provided a reasonable\\n\\nexplanation.\\n\\n As the district court noted, Pena's deposition testimony\\n\\ndoes not explain, but rather reinforces, the inconsistency between\\n\\nher SSDI application and her claims in this case. Pena was\\n\\nrepresented by counsel at her deposition. During Pena's\\n\\ndeposition, Honeywell asked Pena several times to explain the\\n\\nstatements in her SSDI application, and Pena repeatedly stated\\n\\nthat she was totally disabled as of March 8, 2013. She did not\\n\\n\\n - 22 -\\n\\nstate that she could have performed the essential functions of her\\n\\nprior job with reasonable accommodations as of March 8, 2013.\\n\\nHoneywell also asked Pena to explain why her SSDI application\\n\\nstated that she was unable to work as of March 8, 2013, when her\\n\\nADA claim \\\"assert[s] that if [she] had been given an accommodation,\\n\\n[she] could have done [her] job.\\\" Pena responded, \\\"[Honeywell]\\n\\nasked me, [d]o you want to go back to work, and I said, I don't\\n\\nwant to see these people ever anymore.\\\" Honeywell again asked\\n\\nPena to explain why she stated in her SSDI application that she\\n\\nwas unable to work as of March 8, 2013. Pena responded, \\\"[w]hen\\n\\nyou fill out the application, they ask you when was your last day\\n\\nof work,\\\" but as Honeywell pointed out at the deposition, \\\"[t]hat's\\n\\nnot what the application says. The application says, 'I became\\n\\nunable to work because'\\\" of \\\"my disabling condition on March 8,\\n\\n2013.\\\" Not only did Pena not explain the discrepancy, but she\\n\\nalso reaffirmed at her deposition that she was entitled to SSDI\\n\\nbenefits retroactive as of March 8, 2013.\\n\\n Pena attempts to avoid her admissions at deposition\\n\\nthrough several arguments. First, Pena relies on the late\\n\\naffidavit she submitted, attempting to explain away her deposition\\n\\nadmissions with statements not made at deposition and\\n\\ncontradicting the statements she did make.8 Cleveland itself held\\n\\n\\n 8 The affidavit states that (1) Pena's SSDI attorney\\nadvised her to use March 8, 2013, as the onset date of her\\n\\n\\n - 23 -\\n\\nthat \\\"a party cannot create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to\\n\\nsurvive summary judgment simply by contradicting his or her own\\n\\nprevious sworn statement (by, say, filing a later affidavit that\\n\\nflatly contradicts the party's earlier sworn deposition) without\\n\\nexplaining the contradiction or attempting to resolve the\\n\\ndisparity.\\\" Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 806. This court also\\n\\n\\\"refuse[s] to allow issues of fact to be created simply by\\n\\nsubmitting a subsequent contradictory affidavit.\\\" Morales v. A.C.\\n\\nOrssleff's EFTF, 246 F.3d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 2001). \\\"When an\\n\\ninterested witness has given clear answers to unambiguous\\n\\nquestions [at deposition], he cannot create a conflict and resist\\n\\nsummary judgment with an affidavit that is clearly contradictory,\\n\\nbut does not give a satisfactory explanation of why the testimony\\n\\nis changed.\\\" Colantuoni v. Alfred Calcagni & Sons, 44 F.3d 1, 4-\\n\\n5 (1st Cir. 1994). Pena's affidavit is in obvious conflict with\\n\\nher deposition testimony, and Pena has not sufficiently explained\\n\\nor resolved this disparity. Nothing in Cleveland or in First\\n\\nCircuit law permits a plaintiff to do a volte-face from her\\n\\ndeposition admissions.\\n\\n\\n\\ndisability, (2) if the SSDI application or the ALJ had asked if\\nPena needed reasonable accommodations to work, she would have\\nresponded \\\"yes,\\\" (3) if Honeywell had granted Pena's\\naccommodations request, she would have returned to work and would\\nnot have applied for SSDI benefits, and (4) Pena filed for SSDI\\nbenefits because she could no longer work due to her worsened\\ndepression caused by Honeywell terminating her employment.\\n\\n\\n - 24 -\\n\\n Second, Pena disclaims responsibility and blames her\\n\\nSSDI attorney for choosing March 8, 2013, as the onset date of her\\n\\ndisabilities. When Honeywell asked her, \\\"[d]id someone advise you\\n\\nto use the date March 8, 2013 on your application?\\\", Pena did not\\n\\nsay she did so on advice of counsel.9\\n\\n Third, Pena attempts to excuse her admissions in her\\n\\ndeposition testimony by saying in her brief that she did not\\n\\nunderstand the relevant questioning at her deposition. Pena claims\\n\\nthat Honeywell's questions were \\\"confusing\\\" and constituted a\\n\\n\\\"blatant attempt to trip up Pena into admitting that she is lying\\n\\nand trying to manipulate the system.\\\" Pena had counsel with her\\n\\nat the time, who made no such objections. Pena was also provided\\n\\nwith an interpreter at the deposition. In any event, the record\\n\\nshows that Honeywell asked straightforward questions, was upfront\\n\\nabout the Cleveland issue, and gave Pena many opportunities to\\n\\nexplain the discrepancy.\\n\\n Pena's brief attempts a variant argument that she was\\n\\ndisabled when she applied for SSDI benefits, that she was not\\n\\ndisabled on March 8, 2013, and that she became disabled in between.\\n\\nShe argues that her condition worsened after March 8, 2013, and\\n\\nthat that worsening was because Honeywell \\\"denied her request for\\n\\n\\n\\n 9 Instead, in response to this question, Pena stated that\\nfrom March 8, 2013, she was prescribed heavier dosages of her\\nmedications.\\n\\n\\n - 25 -\\n\\na reasonable accommodation when it sent her home\\\" that day. This\\n\\nis a newfound argument and is not supported by the record. That\\n\\nPena's condition worsened later does not mean she was well enough\\n\\nto perform the essential functions of her job on March 8, 2013.\\n\\nAn individual who is totally disabled may still suffer from\\n\\nworsened symptoms later. In Pena's sworn SSDI application and at\\n\\nher sworn deposition, she gave March 8, 2013, her last day at work,\\n\\nas the date on which she became totally disabled.\\n\\n Under Cleveland, Pena has \\\"fail[ed] to make a showing\\n\\nsufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to\\n\\n[her] case, and on which [she] will bear the burden of proof at\\n\\ntrial,\\\" namely, that she is a \\\"qualified individual.\\\" See\\n\\nCleveland, 526 U.S. at 806 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477\\n\\nU.S. 317, 322 (1986)). The district court properly granted\\n\\nHoneywell summary judgment as to Pena's claim that her employment\\n\\nwas terminated because of her disabilities.\\n\\nB. Alleged Failure to Accommodate\\n\\n The ADA's prohibition of employment discrimination\\n\\nincludes an employer's failure to make \\\"reasonable accommodations\\n\\nto the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise\\n\\nqualified individual with a disability.\\\" 42 U.S.C.\\n\\n§ 12112(b)(5)(A). To establish a claim for failure to accommodate,\\n\\na plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury\\n\\nto find that (1) she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA,\\n\\n\\n - 26 -\\n\\n(2) she was a \\\"qualified individual,\\\" and (3) the defendant,\\n\\ndespite knowing of her disability, \\\"did not reasonably accommodate\\n\\nit.\\\" See Tobin, 433 F.3d at 107; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).\\n\\n Pena's failure to accommodate claim requires sufficient\\n\\nevidence that she was a \\\"qualified individual.\\\" See Tobin, 433\\n\\nF.3d at 107; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). She has not presented such\\n\\nevidence. Rather, the undisputed evidence, as discussed earlier,\\n\\nincludes admissions at her deposition and in her briefing that she\\n\\nwas not a \\\"qualified individual,\\\" totally apart from the statements\\n\\nin her SSDI application. The district court properly granted\\n\\nHoneywell's motion for summary judgment as to Pena's failure to\\n\\naccommodate claims.\\n\\nC. Alleged Retaliation\\n\\n Pena's appellate brief argues that Honeywell retaliated\\n\\nagainst her for reporting what she calls \\\"discriminatory\\\" conduct\\n\\nto Honeywell's human resources department. But part of her claim\\n\\nwas not made in the trial court.\\n\\n The disposition of Pena's earlier claims does not\\n\\ndispose of her retaliation claims. See Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't\\n\\nof Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 25 (1st Cir. 2004). \\\"To prove a claim of\\n\\nretaliation, a plaintiff must establish that (1) she engaged in\\n\\nprotected conduct; (2) she experienced an adverse employment\\n\\naction; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected\\n\\nconduct and the adverse employment action.\\\" Id. at 25. \\\"Once a\\n\\n\\n - 27 -\\n\\nplaintiff makes [a prima facie] showing, the burden shifts to the\\n\\ndefendant to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation\\n\\nfor the adverse action.\\\" D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito,\\n\\n675 F.3d 26, 41 (1st Cir. 2012). \\\"If the defendant does so, the\\n\\nburden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered\\n\\nlegitimate explanation is pretextual, meaning that the defendant\\n\\nwas motivated by a retaliatory animus.\\\" Id.\\n\\n Pena argues on appeal that there are disputed issues of\\n\\nmaterial fact as to whether Honeywell retaliated against her by\\n\\nterminating her employment because (1) Pena had requested to remain\\n\\nin the respiratory department on March 8, 2013, due to her anxiety\\n\\nand depression, and (2) Pena had complained to Gouveia in February\\n\\n2013 that her supervisor did not honor her request for meal breaks\\n\\nat very specific times, when she needed to eat because of her\\n\\ndiabetes.\\n\\n We do not engage the first argument. Pena did not make\\n\\nthe argument about her request to remain in the respiratory\\n\\ndepartment in her opposition to Honeywell's motion for summary\\n\\njudgment (or, even belatedly, in her objections to the report and\\n\\nrecommendation). Pena has also failed to develop this argument on\\n\\nappeal, devoting a single sentence to the issue in her brief. For\\n\\nboth reasons, the argument about retaliation due to her request to\\n\\nremain in the respiratory department is waived. See Kozikowski v.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 28 -\\n\\nToll Bros., Inc., 354 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2003); United States\\n\\nv. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).\\n\\n Pena's argument that she was retaliated against for\\n\\nmaking requests as to break times, described in footnote 3, relies\\n\\nsolely on temporal proximity in an effort to establish causality.\\n\\nPena points to the fact that her employment was terminated four\\n\\nmonths after she made the complaint about break times. As the\\n\\ndistrict court found, this four-month period \\\"cannot carry the\\n\\nday.\\\" Pena, 2018 WL 582579, at *2. \\\"The cases that accept mere\\n\\ntemporal proximity between an employer's knowledge of protected\\n\\nactivity and an adverse employment action as sufficient evidence\\n\\nof causality to establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that\\n\\nthe temporal proximity must be very close.\\\" Cherkaoui v. City of\\n\\nQuincy, 877 F.3d 14, 28–29 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Clark Cty.\\n\\nSch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)). \\\"Without some\\n\\ncorroborating evidence suggestive of causation . . . a gap of\\n\\nseveral months cannot alone ground an inference of a causal\\n\\nconnection between a complaint and an allegedly retaliatory\\n\\naction.\\\" Ahern v. Shinseki, 629 F.3d 49, 58 (1st Cir. 2010). The\\n\\ngap of four months, on its own, is not \\\"very close\\\" for\\n\\nestablishing causality.10 See Cherkaoui, 877 F.3d at 29.\\n\\n\\n 10We have previously explained that \\\"[t]hree and four\\nmonth periods have been held insufficient to establish a causal\\nconnection based on temporal proximity.\\\" Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d\\nat 25. But see Sanchez-Rodriguez v. AT&T Mobility Puerto Rico,\\n\\n\\n - 29 -\\n\\n Independently, \\\"[t]he larger picture undercuts any claim\\n\\nof causation.\\\" Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12,\\n\\n16 (1st Cir. 1997). Here, the district court correctly observed\\n\\nthat after Pena's single comment to Gouveia about break times,\\n\\n\\\"the dialogue between [Pena] and Honeywell was singularly focused\\n\\non the issue of her assignment to the Molding Department.\\\" Pena,\\n\\n2018 WL 582579, at *12. The evidence overwhelmingly shows that\\n\\nHoneywell terminated Pena's employment on the basis of job\\n\\nabandonment, and there is insufficient evidence from which Pena\\n\\ncould establish that this reason was pretextual.\\n\\n Pena now claims that Honeywell's adverse employment\\n\\nactions against her actually began the month after she made the\\n\\ncomplaint about break times, when she went home after refusing to\\n\\nwork in the molding department on March 8, 2013. But again, this\\n\\nis belied by the record, because the conversations immediately\\n\\npreceding Pena's decision to go home on March 8, 2013, explicitly\\n\\nreference her refusal to work in the molding department, and the\\n\\nsubsequent communications between Honeywell and Pena were\\n\\nexclusively focused on her desire to be exempt from working in the\\n\\nmolding department. The district court properly granted\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nInc., 673 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2012) (temporal proximity sufficient\\nto establish a prima facie case of causality when plaintiff filed\\nan EEOC complaint about religious discrimination and was placed on\\nactive disciplinary status three months later).\\n\\n\\n - 30 -\\n\\nHoneywell's motion for summary judgment as to Pena's retaliation\\n\\nclaims.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n The district court's grant of summary judgment is\\n\\naffirmed.\\n\\n — Separate Opinion Follows —\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 31 -\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4391471/\", \"author_raw\": \"LYNCH, Circuit Judge\"}, {\"author\": \"LIPEZ, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"LIPEZ, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting\\n\\nin part. Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine designed to\\n\\nsafeguard courts from misuse by litigants who attempt to change\\n\\npositions in the expediency of the moment. Relying on that\\n\\ndoctrine to deny plaintiff Pena an opportunity to seek a remedy\\n\\nbefore a jury for disability discrimination, my colleagues\\n\\nmisapply the Supreme Court's decision in Cleveland v. Policy\\n\\nManagement Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999). Indeed, at the\\n\\nheart of Cleveland is a recognition that courts have been too quick\\n\\nto find a conflict between claims for Social Security Disability\\n\\nInsurance (\\\"SSDI\\\") benefits and claims alleging discrimination\\n\\nunder the Americans with Disabilities Act (\\\"ADA\\\"). The Court held\\n\\nthat a plaintiff could pursue a reasonable accommodation claim\\n\\ndespite an earlier SSDI application asserting total disability if\\n\\nshe provides an \\\"explanation . . . sufficient to warrant a\\n\\nreasonable juror's concluding that, assuming the truth of, or the\\n\\nplaintiff's good-faith belief in, the earlier statement, the\\n\\nplaintiff could nonetheless 'perform the essential functions' of\\n\\nher job, with or without 'reasonable accommodation.'\\\" Id. at 807.\\n\\nIn this case, the explanation offered by Pena could warrant that\\n\\nconclusion by a reasonable jury. Therefore, I respectfully\\n\\ndissent.11\\n\\n\\n 11\\n I join only the portion of the majority opinion affirming\\nsummary judgment for Honeywell on Pena's retaliation claims.\\n\\n\\n - 32 -\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Pena worked at a Honeywell manufacturing facility for\\n\\napproximately five years, from 2008 to 2013, primarily in the\\n\\nrespiratory department. Suffering from anxiety and depression,\\n\\nPena experienced several medical issues throughout that period,\\n\\nand the company routinely accommodated her needs by, for example,\\n\\nallowing her extended time away from the job.\\n\\n In October 2012, after Honeywell decided to cross-train\\n\\nemployees, Pena trained in the molding room. She took a medical\\n\\nleave from November 2012 to January 2013, attributed in part to\\n\\nher depression. Upon her return, Pena started working in the\\n\\nmolding room for eight to twelve hours per week, where she found\\n\\nthat the pace, noise, smell, and enclosure significantly\\n\\nexacerbated her symptoms. Following her complaint about the\\n\\nconditions in late February 2013, she was granted a temporary\\n\\nreprieve from working in the molding room pending further review.\\n\\nOn March 8, 2013, she left work after her supervisor refused her\\n\\nrequest not to work there.\\n\\n Then followed three months of back and forth between\\n\\nHoneywell, Pena's attorney, and her doctor about Pena's desire to\\n\\ncontinue working outside the molding room. She experienced\\n\\nworsening anxiety and stress associated with her employment\\n\\nuncertainty. Honeywell terminated Pena's employment on June 17,\\n\\n2013 for \\\"job abandonment.\\\"\\n\\n\\n - 33 -\\n\\n On September 20, 2013, Pena submitted an application for\\n\\nSSDI benefits in which she stated, \\\"I BECAME UNABLE TO WORK BECAUSE\\n\\nOF MY DISABLING CONDITION ON March 8, 2013. I AM STILL DISABLED.\\\"\\n\\nOn April 16, 2015, Pena filed this action against Honeywell\\n\\nalleging disability discrimination, effectively claiming that she\\n\\ncould work, albeit with an accommodation. Six months later, on\\n\\nOctober 16, 2015, her SSDI application was approved. Her seemingly\\n\\ninconsistent disability and discrimination claims generate the\\n\\njudicial estoppel issue before us.\\n\\n II.\\n\\nA. Judicial Estoppel Principles\\n\\n The Supreme Court said virtually nothing in Cleveland\\n\\nabout the substance of the doctrine of judicial estoppel, but the\\n\\nprinciples governing that doctrine are well-established. The\\n\\npurpose of judicial estoppel is to \\\"safeguard the integrity of the\\n\\ncourts by preventing parties from improperly manipulating the\\n\\nmachinery of the judicial system.\\\" Alt. Sys. Concepts, Inc. v.\\n\\nSynopsys, Inc., 374 F.3d 23, 33 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing New\\n\\nHampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001)). Although\\n\\napplication of judicial estoppel is \\\"not reducible to any general\\n\\nformula[],\\\" several conditions typically drive a court's decision\\n\\nto apply the doctrine. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750. First,\\n\\nthe litigant's earlier and later positions \\\"must be clearly\\n\\ninconsistent.\\\" Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Second,\\n\\n\\n - 34 -\\n\\nthe estopped party must have persuaded a court to accept its prior\\n\\nposition. Alt. Sys. Concepts, Inc., 374 F.3d at 33.12\\n\\n In addition, the Court cautioned that judicial estoppel\\n\\nis an equitable doctrine, applied as an act of discretion. New\\n\\nHampshire, 532 U.S. at 750. Concerns about fairness inform the\\n\\nanalysis. Id. at 751; see also James Wm. Moore, 18 Moore's Federal\\n\\nPractice § 134.31 (3d ed. 2012) (\\\"Application of the doctrine of\\n\\njudicial estoppel should be guided by a sense of fairness, with\\n\\nthe facts of the particular dispute in mind.\\\"). An advantage\\n\\nunfairly gained by the litigant -- or a detriment unfairly imposed\\n\\non the other party -- weighs in favor of estoppel. New Hampshire,\\n\\n532 U.S. at 751. Judicial estoppel thus disfavors intentional\\n\\ninconsistencies and provides leniency for a plaintiff who operated\\n\\nin good faith in presenting conflicting positions. See id. at\\n\\n753.\\n\\nB. The Cleveland Analysis\\n\\n In Cleveland, the Court held that there is no presumption\\n\\nof judicial estoppel against a claim for failure to accommodate an\\n\\nemployee's disability when the employee has already received SSDI\\n\\nbenefits premised on the inability to work. Cleveland, 526 U.S.\\n\\nat 805. The Court reasoned that \\\"there are . . . many situations\\n\\n\\n\\n 12\\n Presumably, the ALJ's award of benefits in SSDI cases\\nconstitutes an acceptance of the prior statement by a court. We\\nhave that circumstance here.\\n\\n\\n - 35 -\\n\\nin which an SSDI claim and an ADA claim can comfortably exist side\\n\\nby side.\\\" Id. at 802-03. Accordingly, a plaintiff may \\\"defeat\\n\\nsummary judgment\\\" if she can provide \\\"a sufficient explanation\\\"\\n\\nfor her \\\"two seemingly divergent\\\" claims. Id. at 797, 806-07.\\n\\n Cleveland tells us that we must conduct the\\n\\ninconsistency analysis \\\"assuming the truth of, or the plaintiff's\\n\\ngood-faith belief in, the earlier statement.\\\" Id. at 807. This\\n\\nassumption binds the plaintiff to her prior assertion,\\n\\nestablishing the contours of the conflict that the plaintiff must\\n\\nexplain. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Salem, 259 F.3d 667, 674 (7th\\n\\nCir. 2001). Although the Court in Cleveland did not prescribe the\\n\\ndetails of the inconsistency inquiry, the Court indicated that an\\n\\nADA claim could not survive if there were \\\"directly conflicting\\n\\nstatements about purely factual matters, such as 'The light was\\n\\nred/green,' or 'I can/cannot raise my arm above my head.'\\\"\\n\\nCleveland, 526 U.S. at 802. Such irreconcilable assertions of\\n\\nfact \\\"present precisely the sort of threat to judicial integrity\\n\\nthat the doctrine of judicial estoppel was designed to prevent.\\\"\\n\\nBos. Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 708 F.3d 254, 264 (1st Cir.\\n\\n2013).\\n\\n By contrast, an SSDI \\\"representation of total disability\\n\\ndiffers from a purely factual statement in that it often implies\\n\\na context-related legal conclusion, namely, 'I am disabled for the\\n\\npurposes of the Social Security Act.'\\\" Cleveland, 526 U.S. at\\n\\n\\n - 36 -\\n\\n802. \\\"So understood, a quasi-legal assertion of this kind does\\n\\nnot foreclose the possibility that the individual is nonetheless\\n\\n'qualified' to work for purposes of the ADA.\\\" Lee, 259 F.3d at\\n\\n673. The Court's reasoning acknowledged that the two statutes\\n\\nreflected contrasting conceptions of disability. Enacted in 1956,\\n\\nthe SSDI program reflects a view of disability as a certifiable\\n\\nmedical excuse from work. For some people, disabilities impose\\n\\nmedical obstacles to employment. Matthew Diller, Dissonant\\n\\nDisability Policies: The Tensions Between the Americans with\\n\\nDisabilities Act and Federal Disability Benefit Programs, 76 Tex.\\n\\nL. Rev. 1003, 1005-06 (1998). Adopted nearly forty years later,\\n\\nthe ADA reflects the different view that a disability will not\\n\\nnecessarily foreclose participation in the workforce. Id. The\\n\\nADA thus requires employers to remove barriers, where feasible,\\n\\nthat impede persons with disabilities from performing the\\n\\nessential functions of their jobs. Id.\\n\\n The Cleveland Court recognized that, \\\"in context, these\\n\\ntwo seemingly divergent statutory contentions are often\\n\\nconsistent,\\\" such that individuals may qualify for SSDI and also\\n\\nremain capable of continuing in their jobs. Cleveland, 526 U.S.\\n\\nat 797. In so concluding, the Court rejected the notion that an\\n\\nSSDI recipient who seeks ADA protection is necessarily gaining an\\n\\nunfair advantage by \\\"double dipping\\\" into two forms of financial\\n\\nsupport for disability. See Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies\\n\\n\\n - 37 -\\n\\nat 1035 (listing cases in which courts were sidetracked by double\\n\\ndipping before Cleveland); Lauren Lowe, Note, What Employees Say,\\n\\nor What Employers Do: How Post-Cleveland Decisions Continue to\\n\\nObscure Discrimination, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1245, 1272 (2009) (listing\\n\\ncases after Cleveland). While a plaintiff must do more than merely\\n\\npoint to the difference in statutory standards for \\\"disability,\\\"\\n\\nthe legal context of the two claims is essential to understanding\\n\\nthe Cleveland inquiry. See DeCaro v. Hasbro, Inc., 580 F.3d 55,\\n\\n62 (1st Cir. 2009).\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Applying the inconsistency analysis required by\\n\\nCleveland, and guided by the principles of judicial estoppel, I\\n\\ndisagree with the majority's conclusion that Pena's SSDI\\n\\napplication statements \\\"I BECAME UNABLE TO WORK BECAUSE OF MY\\n\\nDISABLING CONDITION ON March 8, 2013\\\" and \\\"I AM STILL DISABLED\\\"\\n\\ncontradict irreconcilably her reasonable accommodation claim, such\\n\\nthat judicial estoppel is warranted.\\n\\nA. The Prior Statement\\n\\n The \\\"previous sworn statement\\\" at issue here actually\\n\\nconsists of the two statements in Pena's SSDI application that she\\n\\n\\\"became unable to work\\\" on March 8, 2013 and \\\"[is] still disabled.\\\"\\n\\nCleveland instructs us to assume Pena's good-faith belief in these\\n\\ntwo prior assertions. Hence, to assess the ostensible conflict\\n\\nbetween those SSDI assertions and the particulars of her ADA\\n\\n\\n - 38 -\\n\\nreasonable accommodation claim, we have to understand how Pena\\n\\nexplains her good-faith belief in these assertions.\\n\\n Pena argues that she understood herself to have become\\n\\ndisabled on March 8 \\\"only after her employer denied her request\\n\\nfor a reasonable accommodation.\\\" Her brief points to her\\n\\ndeposition, in which she was asked for the date from which she was\\n\\n\\\"no longer able to work at all.\\\" She responded, \\\"[w]hen I was\\n\\nkicked out of that place.\\\" When asked if she \\\"agree[d] that since\\n\\nMarch 8, 2013 you have been unable to perform any sort of work,\\\"\\n\\nshe responded, \\\"[y]es.\\\" Asked to identify the point when she\\n\\n\\\"bec[a]me unable to work at all,\\\" she responded, \\\"[t]he same moment\\n\\nthat they denied me my job without accommodating me.\\\" Pena argues\\n\\nthat it is essential context that this denial preceded her\\n\\nrepresentation of disability because this denial framed her\\n\\nunderstanding of her situation when she sought SSDI benefits.\\n\\n Her affidavit, filed as part of her opposition to\\n\\nHoneywell's motion for summary judgment, makes this exact point:\\n\\n\\\"I did not apply for SSDI benefits until September 20, 2013, only\\n\\nafter I had exhausted every possible effort of getting the needed\\n\\naccommodation.\\\" Although this affidavit is in the record, the\\n\\ndistrict court dismissed its relevance, quoting Cleveland for the\\n\\npremise that \\\"a party cannot create a genuine issue of fact\\n\\nsufficient to survive summary judgment simply by contradicting his\\n\\nor her own previous sworn statement (by, say, filing a later\\n\\n\\n - 39 -\\n\\naffidavit that flatly contradicts that party's earlier sworn\\n\\ndeposition) without explaining the contradiction or attempting to\\n\\nresolve the disparity.\\\" Pena v. Honeywell Int'l Inc., No. CV 15-\\n\\n179 WES, 2018 WL 582579, at *2 (D.R.I. Jan. 29, 2018) (quoting\\n\\nCleveland, 526 U.S. at 806-07). The district court misses the\\n\\npoint of this affidavit. Its very purpose is to explain, as\\n\\nCleveland says she must do, how she could have a good-faith belief\\n\\nin the truth of her SSDI assertions, while still being able to\\n\\nperform the essential functions of her job with a reasonable\\n\\naccommodation.\\n\\n When Pena filed her SSDI application in September, she\\n\\nknew that the accommodation that she had demanded for more than\\n\\nthree months had been repeatedly and decisively denied to her.\\n\\nGiven this circumstance, a jury could reasonably find that Pena\\n\\nplausibly believed on September 20, 2013 that she became \\\"unable\\n\\nto work\\\" as of March 8, 2013. See Lowe, How Post-Cleveland\\n\\nDecisions Continue to Obscure Discrimination at 1278 (observing\\n\\nthat denial of an accommodation may explain the claimant's good-\\n\\nfaith belief in the assertion to the Social Security Administration\\n\\nthat she was unable to work); see also Diller, Dissonant Disability\\n\\nPolicies at 1042 (noting that statements of \\\"total disability\\\" on\\n\\na disability benefit application may be based on the individual's\\n\\nexperience that no employer will employ her because of her\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 40 -\\n\\ndisability, even if she could perform the essential elements of\\n\\nthe job with accommodation).\\n\\n The majority wrongly chides Pena because she \\\"offered no\\n\\nqualification\\\" for her assertion of disability on her SSDI\\n\\napplication. Cleveland expressly stated that such qualification\\n\\nis not required. Since the SSDI definition of disability does not\\n\\ntake accommodation into account, an applicant need not \\\"refer to\\n\\nthe possibility of reasonable accommodation when she applies for\\n\\nSSDI.\\\" Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 803. The particulars of this case\\n\\nreflect the wisdom of that legal proposition. In her affidavit,\\n\\nPena averred:\\n\\n When I stated on my SSDI application that I\\n was unable to work as of March 8, 2013, I meant\\n that I was totally disabled only for the\\n purposes of receiving SSDI benefits. The SSDI\\n application did not ask if I needed any\\n accommodations of a disability in order to\\n work and no one at any of the hearings asked.\\n Had I been asked, I would have responded,\\n \\\"Yes.\\\"\\n\\nWithout question, Pena could supportably argue to a jury that she\\n\\nheld a good-faith belief in the accuracy of her SSDI application,\\n\\ngiven her understanding of the process, while still being in a\\n\\nposition to perform the essential functions of her job with a\\n\\nreasonable accommodation.\\n\\nB. Ability to Perform Essential Functions\\n\\n We must now evaluate, pursuant to Cleveland, Pena's\\n\\ninsistence that, despite her good-faith belief in her SSDI\\n\\n\\n - 41 -\\n\\nassertions of total disability, she could perform the essential\\n\\nfunctions of the job, as required for her ADA claim.\\n\\n The record plainly permits a jury to find that Pena could\\n\\nhave continued to perform the job she had held before Honeywell\\n\\ninsisted that she work in the molding room. As Pena describes,\\n\\nher years of work at the facility before the rotation requirement\\n\\nwas imposed reflect her ability to fulfill the requirements of the\\n\\njob beyond the molding room. In addition, her efforts to be\\n\\nreinstated at Honeywell, including the submission of three\\n\\ndoctor's notes, constitute further evidence that she could have\\n\\nworked with her requested accommodation. In particular, Dr.\\n\\nGreer's March 4 letter (delivered to Honeywell on March 8), stated\\n\\nthat Pena was \\\"completely capable of working in other settings,\\\"\\n\\nbut that she experienced \\\"exacerbation of her anxiety symptoms\\n\\n. . . . when she is being sent to the moulding [sic] room as\\n\\nopposed to the more typical duties to which she is accustomed.\\\"13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 13 Whether the request not to work in the molding room is a\\nreasonable accommodation is a separate question the jury would\\nneed to answer in evaluating Pena's ADA claim. The district court,\\nadopting the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge,\\nconcluded that if estoppel did not apply, a genuine dispute of\\nmaterial facts about \\\"whether rotation to the Molding Department\\nwas an essential function of Plaintiff's job and whether Plaintiff\\nparticipated in good faith in the interactive process\\\" foreclosed\\nsummary judgment on the reasonable accommodation claim. Pena,\\n2018 WL 582579, at *10.\\n\\n\\n\\n - 42 -\\n\\n The majority compares Pena's case to Sullivan v.\\n\\nRaytheon Co., 262 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2001), in which we affirmed\\n\\nsummary judgment for the employer because the plaintiff made\\n\\nrepeated claims that he was totally disabled and provided \\\"no\\n\\nevidence\\\" that he could work with an accommodation. Id. at 48.\\n\\nThe facts here are strikingly different. Pena has developed a\\n\\nrecord that would support a jury finding that she could have\\n\\ncontinued to work at Honeywell with her requested accommodation.\\n\\nAt summary judgment, courts are obliged to draw record inferences\\n\\non behalf of the nonmovant. Yet the majority draws every inference\\n\\nagainst Pena.\\n\\n Honeywell also attempts to undercut Pena's ADA claim by\\n\\npointing out that she sought an accommodation for anxiety and\\n\\ndepression until June 2013, but she was deemed \\\"totally disabled\\\"\\n\\nby somatoform disorder as of March 2013. The company argues that,\\n\\ngiven her total disability, she would not have been able to work\\n\\neven if her anxiety and depression had been accommodated.\\n\\nHoneywell's argument, however, ignores Cleveland's admonition that\\n\\nostensibly conflicting legal conclusions derived from different\\n\\ndisability processes must be evaluated in their legal context.\\n\\n As Cleveland noted, the SSDI program provides for\\n\\ncategorical determinations of eligibility for benefits to\\n\\nfacilitate the processing of the large number of cases handled by\\n\\nthe Social Security Administration. See 526 U.S. at 804. Pursuant\\n\\n\\n - 43 -\\n\\nto the five-step eligibility procedure, an individual may be deemed\\n\\ntotally disabled without regard to her actual ability to work if\\n\\nher condition \\\"meet[s] or equal[s]\\\" an impairment in the enumerated\\n\\nlist of impairments. Id. at 804. The eligibility finding in such\\n\\na case stems from the \\\"regulatory determination that most\\n\\nindividuals with certain disabilities cannot work.\\\" Anne E.\\n\\nBeaumont, Note, This Estoppel Has Got to Stop: Judicial Estoppel\\n\\nand the Americans with Disabilities Act, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1529,\\n\\n1567 (1996).\\n\\n The ALJ determined that Pena has \\\"somatoform disorder,\\\"\\n\\none of the listed impairments under SSDI regulations, based on the\\n\\ntestimony of an impartial medical expert at the SSDI hearing.\\n\\nBecause Pena met the severity criteria for a finding of categorical\\n\\ndisability, the ALJ bypassed individual review of her capacity for\\n\\nwork. This procedural history undermines Honeywell's argument\\n\\nthat the ALJ determined that Pena is incapable of working even\\n\\nwith an accommodation. It also exposes the baselessness of the\\n\\nmajority's assumption that Pena argued somatoform disorder to the\\n\\nALJ. As noted, the only statements in the record that Pena made\\n\\nin the course of her SSDI application are that she \\\"became unable\\n\\nto work\\\" on March 8, 2013 and \\\"[is] still disabled.\\\"\\n\\n The majority nonetheless erroneously compares Pena's\\n\\ncircumstances to cases in which the plaintiff made specific,\\n\\n\\\"purely factual\\\" statements about disability that were\\n\\n\\n - 44 -\\n\\nincompatible with the undisputed job requirements. Unlike those\\n\\ncases in which the plaintiffs' descriptions of their injuries\\n\\nconflicted with their asserted ability to work with an\\n\\naccommodation, Pena's blanket statement of disability in her SSDI\\n\\napplication does not belie her ADA claim. For example, in Reed v.\\n\\nPetroleum Helicopters, Inc., 218 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2000), cited\\n\\nby the majority, the plaintiff made \\\"specific factual statements\\\"\\n\\nabout her inability to sit for an extended period, which the court\\n\\nfound incompatible with her claimed ability to fly a helicopter.\\n\\nId. at 480.\\n\\n Likewise, in Motley v. New Jersey State Police, 196 F.3d\\n\\n160 (3d Cir. 1999), also cited by the majority, the plaintiff\\n\\nclaimed headaches, backpain, and knee aches when standing and\\n\\nrunning, and he had been found \\\"totally and permanently\\n\\nincapacitated for state police officer duties\\\" by the state police\\n\\nmedical board. Id. at 166. On that record, the plaintiff's\\n\\n\\\"sole[]\\\" reliance on the difference between the statutory schemes\\n\\nwas \\\"fatal.\\\" Id. at 167; see also Feldman v. Am. Mem'l Life Ins.\\n\\nCo., 196 F.3d 783, 791-92 (7th Cir. 1999) (concluding that\\n\\nplaintiff's SSDI benefits application assertions that she could\\n\\nnot drive long distances, work a six- to eight-hour day, or carry\\n\\na briefcase were incompatible with her ADA claim that she could\\n\\nwork as a traveling salesperson); Parker v. Columbia Pictures\\n\\nIndus., 204 F.3d 326, 333 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that \\\"summary\\n\\n\\n - 45 -\\n\\njudgment may be appropriate under Cleveland where the SSDI and ADA\\n\\nclaims 'involve directly conflicting statements about purely\\n\\nfactual matters'\\\") (quoting Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 802); cf. Felix\\n\\nv. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 640, 651 (S.D.N.Y.\\n\\n2001), aff'd, 324 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding judicial\\n\\nestoppel unwarranted where, inter alia, the plaintiff \\\"stated in\\n\\ngeneral terms that she could not work as a result of her disabling\\n\\ncondition without offering particular facts as to that\\n\\ncondition\\\"). Pena's SSDI application did not include specific\\n\\nfactual assertions. Rather, the conflict here between Pena's\\n\\nasserted inability to work and her asserted ability to work with\\n\\naccommodation is exactly the nuanced contradiction that Cleveland\\n\\nrecognized as \\\"often\\\" permissible. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 797.\\n\\n Indeed, in a similar case, the Third Circuit concluded\\n\\nthat limited prior factual assertions did not foreclose a finding\\n\\nthat the plaintiff could perform the essential functions of her\\n\\njob. In Turner v. Hershey Chocolate U.S., 440 F.3d 604 (3d Cir.\\n\\n2006), the employer Hershey decided to require rotation of\\n\\nemployees among three different assembly stations in July 2001.\\n\\nId. at 607. Turner objected that she could not do one of the\\n\\nrotations, which required standing, bending, and twisting, was\\n\\nconsidered more difficult, and was not part of her job requirements\\n\\nup to that point. Id. Hershey determined that Turner could not\\n\\ncontinue to work in her position without this rotation, and \\\"she\\n\\n\\n - 46 -\\n\\nwas deemed a disabled employee.\\\" Id. On a subsequent SSDI\\n\\nbenefits application, Turner stated that she had been unable to\\n\\nwork since July 2001, and she was awarded total disability benefits\\n\\nfrom that time. Id. The Third Circuit determined that Turner was\\n\\nnot judicially estopped from pursuing an ADA claim:\\n\\n As discussed in Cleveland, this statement of\\n inability to work must be read as lacking the\\n qualifier of reasonable accommodation, which did\\n not apply for purposes of her SSDI application, but\\n does apply for purposes of her ADA claim. Thus, in\\n her SSDI application, Turner was saying, in effect,\\n \\\"I am unable to work without reasonable\\n accommodation.\\\" This statement is not inconsistent\\n with her ADA claim, in which she is saying, in\\n effect, \\\"I am able to work with reasonable\\n accommodation.\\\"\\n\\nId. at 610. To the extent that Turner made a factual assertion\\n\\nabout pain that limited her ability to work, the court found it\\n\\ndid not \\\"foreclose the possibility that she could perform [her\\n\\njob] with reasonable accommodation.\\\" Id. at 609. It therefore\\n\\nremanded the case to allow a jury to decide her ADA claim. Id. at\\n\\n610, 613.\\n\\n The parallels to this case are evident: the asserted\\n\\ndate on which the plaintiff was \\\"unable to work\\\" for purposes of\\n\\nSSDI benefits does not \\\"foreclose the possibility\\\" that, at the\\n\\nsame time, she could have continued working with a reasonable\\n\\naccommodation. In the absence of an irreconcilable factual\\n\\nconflict, her prior disability claim and her ADA claim could be\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 47 -\\n\\nreconciled. Hence, judicial estoppel was not required under\\n\\nCleveland.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n Pena's case does not implicate any of the considerations\\n\\nwarranting the application of judicial estoppel. The district\\n\\ncourt found her case \\\"sympathetic,\\\" without any \\\"indication that\\n\\nshe ha[d] taken any positions in bad faith.\\\" See Pena, 2018 WL\\n\\n582579, at *9. There is also no indication of her gaming the\\n\\nsystem or of causing an unfair detriment to Honeywell. Rather, a\\n\\nreasonable jury could conclude from this record that Pena believed\\n\\nherself unable to work because of Honeywell's emphatic rejection\\n\\nof her request for an accommodation and that she could have\\n\\ncontinued to work if provided that accommodation. Pena's\\n\\nexplanation is thus sufficient to show that her two claims are\\n\\nreconcilable and that judicial estoppel should not be applied to\\n\\nforeclose her pursuit of ADA relief. Cleveland requires nothing\\n\\nmore. Pena was entitled to bring her ADA claim to a jury. I\\n\\ntherefore dissent from the majority's decision denying her that\\n\\nopportunity.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 48 -\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4391471/\", \"author_raw\": \"LIPEZ, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"LYNCH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"STAHL"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"LIPEZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614218/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Mayra F. PENA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant, Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\n\n\nNo. 18-1164\n\n MAYRA F. PENA,\n\n Plaintiff, Appellant,\n\n v.\n\n HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.,\n\n Defendant, Appellee.\n\n\n APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND\n\n [Hon. William E. Smith, U.S. District Judge]\n\n\n Before\n\n Lynch, Stahl, and Lipez,\n Circuit Judges.\n\n\n Mark P. Gagliardi for the appellant.\n Neal J. McNamara, with whom Aaron F. Nadich and Nixon Peabody\nLLP were on brief, for the appellee.\n\n\n April 26, 2019\n\n LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Mayra F. Pena worked as\n\na machine operator and associate assembler for defendant Honeywell\n\nInternational, Inc. (Honeywell), until Honeywell terminated her\n\nemployment on June 17, 2013, on the basis of job abandonment. Pena\n\nhad not come to work since March 8, 2013. On September 20, 2013,\n\nPena applied for Social Security Disability Income (SSDI)\n\nbenefits, asserting that she was totally disabled and had been\n\nsince March 8, 2013.\n\n On April 16, 2015, Pena filed this suit under the\n\nAmericans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.,\n\nand under various Rhode Island laws, claiming that Honeywell\n\nterminated her employment on the basis of her disabilities, failed\n\nto provide her with reasonable accommodations, and retaliated\n\nagainst her. After discovery and after she consistently testified\n\nat her deposition that she was totally disabled as of March 8,\n\n2013, in accord with her SSDI application statements, the district\n\ncourt granted Honeywell's motion for summary judgment on all of\n\nPena's claims. It noted, among other things, Pena's deposition\n\ntestimony and her SSDI application. The court correctly held that\n\nPena had not met the requirements of Cleveland v. Policy Management\n\nSystems Corporation, 526 U.S. 795 (1999). We affirm the district\n\ncourt's grant of summary judgment in favor of Honeywell.\n\n\n\n\n - 2 -\n\n I.\n\nA. Facts\n\n We recount the undisputed facts, examining them in the\n\nlight most favorable to Pena. See Murray v. Kindred Nursing\n\nCenters W. LLC, 789 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2015). In or about 2008,\n\nHoneywell hired Pena as a machine operator and associate assembler\n\nat its manufacturing facility in Cranston, Rhode Island. Pena\n\nworked (except for leave) at the facility until March 8, 2013,\n\nafter which she never returned to work. On June 17, 2013,\n\nHoneywell terminated Pena's employment for job abandonment.\n\n The Cranston facility's various production and assembly\n\nareas included the respiratory department,1 the molding department,\n\nthe logo department, the quicloc/cedars department, and the SCBA\n\narea (SCBA stands for \"self-contained breathing apparatus\").\n\nBefore 2012, Pena usually worked in the respiratory department.\n\nIn the molding department, unlike other departments, the machines\n\nrun twenty-four hours a day, and emit a new part about every thirty\n\nseconds. In other departments, the employees can control the\n\ntiming of the machines' operation.2\n\n\n 1 At her deposition, Pena stated that she worked mainly in\nan area called HEPA, and that the respiratory department and HEPA\nwere two different areas of the Cranston facility.\n 2 Some Honeywell employees, not claiming disability,\nstated that they preferred to work in areas other than the molding\ndepartment, where they did not have to keep up with the pace of\nthe machines and could more easily socialize.\n\n\n - 3 -\n\n In 2012, Honeywell decided that all employees working in\n\nproduction and assembly should be cross-trained so that they could\n\nwork as needed in all departments at the Cranston facility,\n\nincluding in the molding department. Honeywell believed that it\n\nwas important \"to move associate assemblers to departments where\n\ncustomer demand was greatest and, as a result, an employee['s]\n\ninability to work in any particular area would burden the\n\nproduction process.\" This was particularly true in the molding\n\ndepartment due to its continuous operation. Honeywell then trained\n\nall of its employees, including Pena, to work in all \"assembly\n\ndepartments,\" including the molding department.\n\n In October 2012, Pena was assigned to and worked in the\n\nmolding department under this policy. Pena then took a medical\n\nleave from November 29, 2012, until January 14, 2013. Pena\n\nattributed this request for medical leave to her seasonal\n\ndepression. Before this leave, Honeywell had permitted Pena to\n\ntake several other medical leaves of absence totaling twenty-three\n\nweeks, including from October 14, 2011, to November 21, 2011; from\n\nDecember 16, 2011, to February 13, 2012; and from June 22, 2012,\n\nto August 6, 2012.\n\n When Pena returned to the Cranston facility on January\n\n14, 2013, she began working in the molding department four hours\n\nper day, two to three times per week. She worked there without\n\n\n\n\n - 4 -\n\ncomplaint or incident for about one month. She otherwise typically\n\nworked in the respiratory department.\n\n In late February 2013, Pena complained to the Senior\n\nHuman Resources Generalist, Jose Gouveia, that one of the\n\nproduction leaders had told her to go to the molding department.\n\nPena says she told Gouveia during that conversation that she did\n\nnot want to work in the molding department because \"it was harmful\n\nto [her] emotionally.\"3\n\n Pena met with Gouveia, as well as her supervisor, Kevin\n\nDyer, and the Health Safety and Environmental Site Leader, Conor\n\nRyan, on both March 7 and 8, 2013, about her request not to work\n\nin the molding department. At the March 7 meeting, Honeywell\n\npersonnel requested that Pena provide a letter from her doctor.\n\nThe next day, Pena provided a letter from her physician, Dr. James\n\nGreer. Dr. Greer's letter, dated March 4, 2013, stated:\n\n Currently, [Pena] is reporting exacerbation of\n her anxiety symptoms which are interfering\n with her ability to function. She reports\n that these specifically occur when she is\n being sent to the moulding [sic] room as\n\n\n 3 In the same conversation, Pena also told Gouveia that\n\"she was diabetic and the breaks were 15 and 30 minutes apart from\nher lunch and she could not be 15 minutes late for her coffee nor\n30 minutes late for her lunch break.\" Gouveia told Pena that such\ndelays were not significant, but if they created a problem he\n\"could revisit the breaks issue.\" Pena responded, \"I don't like\nto change my break time, if you want I can get a doctor's note\nstating that I cannot change my breaks.\" The doctor's notes that\nPena provided to Honeywell do not address this issue, and Pena\ndoes not say she ever raised the issue again.\n\n\n - 5 -\n\n opposed to the more typical duties to which\n she is accustomed.\n\nDr. Greer \"request[ed] that [Honeywell] assist her in other\n\nplacements than in this setting,\" and stated that Pena \"is\n\ncompletely capable of working in other settings.\" Dr. Greer's\n\nletter relied almost entirely on Pena's self-reported symptoms and\n\ndid not contain a specific medical diagnosis. The letter also did\n\nnot explain why the molding department, but not any other\n\ndepartment or area, exacerbated Pena's symptoms.\n\n Honeywell concluded that Dr. Greer's letter was\n\ninadequate to determine what accommodations Pena was requesting\n\nand whether Honeywell could meet those requests. On March 8, 2013,\n\nRyan and Gouveia told Pena that the only work available to her was\n\nin the molding department, so if she refused to do that work, she\n\nwould have to go home. Pena decided to go home, and never returned\n\nto work after that day.\n\n Within a week, Pena had retained an attorney, Veronika\n\nKot. Kot told Pena not to communicate with any Honeywell\n\npersonnel, as Kot would handle all such communications.\n\n Honeywell did not know that Pena had retained counsel,\n\nand repeatedly attempted to contact Pena to better understand her\n\ncondition and determine what accommodations, if any, would be\n\nappropriate. In late March 2013, Gouveia sent Pena a Reasonable\n\nAccommodations Request Form.\n\n\n\n\n - 6 -\n\n On April 2, 2013, Honeywell's Associate Director of\n\nHealth Services, Dr. Elizabeth Jennison, wrote to Dr. Greer, asking\n\nfor \"additional documentation to understand the medical necessity\n\nfor [Pena's] request.\" Dr. Jennison's letter also asked Dr. Greer\n\nto \"clarify how [Pena's] anxiety symptoms could allow her to work\n\nin many areas of the plant, while interfering with her ability to\n\nfunction in one area of the plant, the molding department, for\n\nwhich she is equally qualified and trained,\" and requested\n\nsupporting medical documentation.4\n\n In early April 2013, Pena submitted the Reasonable\n\nAccommodations Request Form to Honeywell, which was dated April 2,\n\n2013. On the form, Pena stated that she was \"unable to work in\n\nmolding\" because \"the noise, speed and overall environment gives\n\n[her] anxiety, palpitations.\" On the form, Pena also stated, \"I\n\nhad been offered many permanent positions in molding while still\n\nworking through an agency and refused because I knew 11 years ago\n\nthat I could not perform this job.\"\n\n The physician's portion of the Reasonable Accommodations\n\nRequest Form was left blank, but Pena attached a second letter\n\nfrom Dr. Greer dated April 2, 2013. This letter stated that Dr.\n\nGreer diagnosed Pena as having \"Major Depressive Disorder,\n\n\n 4 At some point, Honeywell set up an appointment for Dr.\nGreer to come to the Cranston facility in person to discuss Pena's\ncondition, but Dr. Greer did not attend because he \"didn't have\ntime in [his] busy practice\" to visit patients' places of work.\n\n\n - 7 -\n\nRecurrent, Severe.\" The letter stated that Pena \"is eager to\n\nreturn to work in her previous capacity,\" and that Dr. Greer could\n\n\"state with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that continued\n\nassignment to the more recent work setting will result in worsening\n\nstress and further exacerbation of her condition.\" Dr. Greer's\n\nletter did not attempt to explain why his diagnosis of Pena would\n\nallow her to work everywhere except in the molding department.\n\n On April 8, 2013, Gouveia sent a letter to Pena stating,\n\n\"[y]ou have informed us you signed a release to give your physician\n\npermission to send your medical records to our medical department;\n\nhowever, no[] medical records have been received. As a result,\n\nand at the moment, we have insufficient information to assess your\n\nrequest.\" The letter also stated that while Honeywell \"await[ed]\n\nthe medical information required to assess [her] request,\" Pena\n\nhad the following options in the meantime: returning to work and\n\nperforming her regular duties, including in the molding\n\ndepartment, which was \"required of all employees in [Pena's]\n\nposition\"; remaining on unpaid medical leave; or using any paid\n\ntime off she might have available.\n\n Gouveia sent a follow-up letter to Pena on April 22,\n\n2013, stating that Honeywell had not yet received any information\n\nfrom Pena's physician. That same day, Attorney Kot telephoned\n\nGouveia. This was the point at which Honeywell became aware that\n\nPena had retained counsel. Honeywell's in-house employment\n\n\n - 8 -\n\ncounsel, Jacqueline Rolfs, wrote to Kot later that same day, asking\n\nher to review Honeywell's correspondence with Pena to understand\n\nHoneywell's requests for additional medical records.\n\n On April 23, 2013, Kot responded to Rolfs's letter in\n\nwriting, stating that Pena had already provided two doctor's notes,\n\nand that Honeywell's request for a \"release of all her sensitive\n\nmedical records, including mental health records,\" was an\n\n\"unnecessary and prohibited intrusion upon her privacy.\"\n\n On April 25, 2013, Rolfs sent a letter to Kot, attaching\n\nthe prior correspondence between Honeywell, Pena, and Dr. Greer.\n\nThis letter detailed Honeywell's attempts to communicate with\n\nPena, and stated that Honeywell had not asked for all of Pena's\n\nrecords, but rather, only those records that would explain how her\n\nsymptoms prevented her from working in the molding department.\n\nRolfs's letter also stated that \"Honeywell remains willing to work\n\nwith your client to assess her reasonable accommodation request.\n\nHowever, without the cooperation of your client and her physician\n\nin providing responses to Honeywell's reasonable questions about\n\nthis request, we cannot proceed further in that process.\"\n\n Kot responded to Rolfs in a letter dated April 30, 2013,\n\naccusing Honeywell of violating the ADA and of threatening to\n\nterminate Pena's employment if she did not return to work without\n\naccommodations. Kot's letter also stated that she would provide\n\nanother letter from Pena's doctor shortly.\n\n\n - 9 -\n\n On May 6, 2013, Kot wrote to Rolfs again, expressing\n\nconcern that Honeywell management had not provided Pena with \"the\n\nappropriate support\" and instead had \"apparently . . . urged [Pena]\n\nto quit and apply for SSI [Supplemental Security Income]\"\n\n(Honeywell disputes this). Kot's letter enclosed a memorandum\n\nfrom Dr. Greer, stating that Pena \"has reported repeatedly and\n\nconsistently\" that the molding room was stressful because of \"a\n\nvariety of factors which included increased noise levels, chemical\n\nodors, and the presence of robotics.\" Dr. Greer's memorandum also\n\nstated, \"I cannot specifically identify particular issues there\n\nwhich might exacerbate her stress, but can state with a reasonable\n\ndegree of medical certainty that there is a direct causal\n\nrelationship between her working in that setting and the\n\nexacerbation of her symptoms.\" The memorandum attached four\n\nprogress notes from Pena's visits with Dr. Greer that had taken\n\nplace between March 4 and April 22, 2013.\n\n Rolfs sent a letter to Kot on May 22, 2013, stating that\n\nDr. Greer's most recent memorandum still did not explain the\n\nconnection between Pena's diagnosis and her ability to work in the\n\nmolding department, because all of the items mentioned were also\n\ntrue of work conditions in other departments. The letter explained\n\nthat:\n\n The noise level in molding is not appreciably\n different than that in respiratory. Indeed,\n employees in both areas are required to wear\n\n\n - 10 -\n\n ear plugs. Nor is there any difference in the\n chemical odors between respiratory and\n molding. In addition, there are robotics in\n both molding and respiratory, and all are\n enclosed.\n\nThe letter stated that \"all employees who work on the floor at\n\nthis Honeywell facility will be required to rotate into molding as\n\nthey complete the necessary training. The rotations are as brief\n\nas 15 minutes, or as long as one week.\" The letter also stated\n\nthat \"[r]espiratory will remain Ms. Pena's primary assignment,\"\n\nbut that \"Ms. Pena and the other employees will rotate among all\n\nthe areas in the facility, not just molding.\" Rolfs's letter also\n\nrepeated that Honeywell only sought medical records relevant to\n\nPena's request for reasonable accommodation. It stated that \"no\n\none at Honeywell has suggested that Ms. Pena quit and apply for\n\nSSI.\" The letter further stated that Dr. Greer had not called\n\nHoneywell's Associate Director of Health Services, Dr. Jennison,\n\nas Honeywell had requested, and asked that Dr. Greer call Dr.\n\nJennison as soon as possible.\n\n Honeywell personnel did not hear from Kot after May 6,\n\n2013. But the record shows, and her counsel at oral argument\n\naffirmed, that Pena had counsel at the time of each of the\n\nfollowing crucial events.\n\n On June 17, 2013, after Pena had been absent for over\n\nthree months and had used all of her medical leave, Honeywell\n\nterminated Pena's employment on the basis of job abandonment.\n\n\n - 11 -\n\n On September 20, 2013, Pena applied for SSDI benefits.\n\nPena was represented by different counsel, Amanda DelFarno, for\n\nher SSDI application. Pena's SSDI application included the\n\nstatements \"I became unable to work because of my disabling\n\ncondition on March 8, 2013,\" and \"I am still disabled.\" The\n\napplication also stated:\n\n I know that anyone who makes or causes to be\n made a false statement or representation of\n material fact in an application or for use in\n determining a right to payment under the\n Social Security Act commits a crime punishable\n under federal law by fine, imprisonment, or\n both. I affirm that all information I have\n given in connection with this claim is true.\n\n That same day, Pena was given an electronic receipt for\n\nher SSDI application, which stated, \"[y]ou declared under penalty\n\nof perjury that you examined all the information on this form and\n\nit is true and correct to the best of your knowledge. You were\n\ntold that you could be liable under law for providing false\n\ninformation.\" The receipt stated that Pena should review her SSDI\n\napplication and call the telephone number provided within ten days\n\nif Pena disagreed with any of the statements in her application.\n\nPena does not say that she ever contacted the Social Security\n\nAdministration to change any statements in her SSDI application.\n\n On September 29, 2015, Pena testified at a hearing before\n\nan administrative law judge (ALJ). At the hearing, an impartial\n\nmedical expert testified that \"the medical evidence of record shows\n\n\n\n\n - 12 -\n\nthat the claimant has a 'core problem' of a somatoform disorder\n\nwhile translating everything to physical symptoms.\"5 On October\n\n16, 2015, the ALJ granted Pena's SSDI application in a five-page\n\ndecision, finding that Pena had been suffering from somatoform\n\ndisorder and was totally disabled as of March 8, 2013.\n\nB. Procedural History\n\n On April 16, 2015, Pena, represented by new counsel,\n\nMark Gagliardi, filed a complaint in Rhode Island Superior Court,\n\nwhich Honeywell removed to federal court on the basis of diversity\n\njurisdiction. Pena's twelve-count complaint asserted claims under\n\nthe federal ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.; the Rhode Island Civil\n\nRights Act of 1990, R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 42-112-1 et seq.; the Rhode\n\nIsland Fair Employment Practices Act, R.I. Gen Laws §§ 28-5-1 et\n\nseq.; the Civil Rights of People With Disabilities Act, R.I. Gen.\n\nLaws. §§ 42-87-1 et seq.; and the Rhode Island Whistleblower's\n\nProtection Act, R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-50-1 et seq. The Complaint\n\nalleges that Honeywell failed to provide Pena with reasonable\n\naccommodations (Counts I through IV), terminated her employment on\n\nthe basis of her disabilities (Counts V through VIII), and\n\nterminated her employment in retaliation for reporting\n\ndiscriminatory conduct (Counts IX through XII).\n\n\n 5 Pena states that somatoform disorder is \"a form of mental\nillness that can affect different organs and body systems and cause\nbodily symptoms, including pain, neurologic[al] problems,\ngastrointestinal complaints, and sexual symptoms.\"\n\n\n - 13 -\n\n During discovery, Pena's deposition was taken on\n\nNovember 3, 2016. She does not say that she filed any corrections\n\nto her deposition transcript. After the completion of discovery,\n\nin February 2017, Honeywell moved for summary judgment on all of\n\nPena's claims. Pena's counsel filed an opposition to Honeywell's\n\nmotion for summary judgment on March 28, 2017, the day it was due.\n\nThe opposition attached documents and letters as evidence, but did\n\nnot attach any deposition transcripts. The next day, Pena's\n\ncounsel filed an \"addendum\" to the opposition, which included six\n\ndeposition transcripts and an affidavit executed by Pena on March\n\n29, 2017, the day after the opposition had been due. That same\n\nday, Pena's counsel also filed a statement of undisputed facts and\n\na statement of disputed facts. On April 11, 2017, Honeywell filed\n\na reply brief, which included objections to Pena's late filings,\n\nincluding the affidavit. That same day, Pena filed a motion for\n\na retroactive extension to file the \"addendum,\" statement of\n\ndisputed facts, and statement of undisputed facts. Later that\n\nsame day, Honeywell objected to this motion. On April 26, 2017,\n\nthe district court granted Pena's motion for an extension.\n\n The magistrate judge held a hearing on Honeywell's\n\nmotion for summary judgment on June 19, 2017. On September 22,\n\n2017, the magistrate judge entered a report and recommendation\n\nthat Honeywell's motion be granted. Pena v. Honeywell Int'l Inc.,\n\nNo. CV 15-179 WES, 2018 WL 582579, at *3-*12 (D.R.I. Jan. 29,\n\n\n - 14 -\n\n2018). On January 29, 2018, the district court accepted the report\n\nand recommendation and granted summary judgment in Honeywell's\n\nfavor on all counts. Id. at *3. Pena timely appealed.\n\n II.\n\n A movant is entitled to summary judgment if \"there is no\n\ngenuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled\n\nto judgment as a matter of law.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). \"We\n\nreview the district court's disposition of a summary judgment\n\nmotion de novo, 'scrutiniz[ing] the evidence in the light most\n\nagreeable to the nonmoving party, giving that party the benefit of\n\nany and all reasonable inferences.'\" Murray, 789 F.3d at 25\n\n(quoting Noviello v. City of Bos., 398 F.3d 76, 84 (1st Cir.\n\n2005)). If the record is \"deficient in vital evidentiary support,\n\nthis may suffice to show that the movant has met its initial\n\nburden\" of \"demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of\n\nmaterial fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of\n\nlaw.\" Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 132-33 (1st Cir. 2000).\n\nA. Allegation Termination Was Based on Pena's Disabilities\n\n The ADA forbids employers from terminating the\n\nemployment of a \"qualified individual on the basis of disability.\"6\n\n\n\n\n 6 \"Rhode Island courts look to federal case law construing\nthe [ADA] in evaluating analogous state law discrimination\nclaims.\" Pena, 2018 WL 582579 at *3 n.1 (citing Hodgens v. Gen.\nDynamics, 144 F.3d 151, 158 n.1 (1st Cir. 1998); Barber v. Verizon\nNew England, No. 05-390-ML, 2006 WL 3524465 at *3 n.1 (D.R.I. Dec.\n\n\n - 15 -\n\n42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A prima facie case of disability\n\ndiscrimination requires the plaintiff to show that (1) she was\n\ndisabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) she was a \"qualified\n\nindividual,\" and (3) the defendant took an adverse employment\n\naction against her on the basis of her disability. Tobin v.\n\nLiberty Mut. Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 2005); 42 U.S.C.\n\n§ 12111(8).\n\n Under the ADA, a \"qualified individual\" is \"an\n\nindividual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can\n\nperform the essential functions of the employment position that\n\nsuch individual holds or desires.\" 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). By\n\ncontrast, a successful SSDI applicant must be physically and\n\nmentally impaired such that she cannot do her previous work, or\n\n\"any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the\n\nnational economy.\" Id. § 423(d)(2)(A). This difference creates\n\nan obvious tension.\n\n In Cleveland, the Supreme Court reversed a Fifth Circuit\n\ndecision that had created a rebuttable presumption that a\n\nplaintiff's filing of an SSDI application precluded her from being\n\na \"qualified individual\" under the ADA. 526 U.S. at 799-800, 807.\n\nThe Court remanded to the lower court for the purpose we quote\n\nlater. Id. at 807.\n\n\n6, 2006); Kriegel v. State of Rhode Island, 266 F. Supp. 2d 288,\n296 (D.R.I. 2003)). We will do the same.\n\n\n - 16 -\n\n The Court held that an ADA plaintiff in an employment\n\ndiscrimination action is not judicially estopped from establishing\n\nthat she can perform the essential functions of her job with\n\nreasonable accommodations solely because she has previously\n\napplied for and received SSDI benefits. Id. at 802. It went on\n\nfrom there to establish what a plaintiff must show. Id. at 801-\n\n07.\n\n The Court stated that the first question was whether\n\nthere was an inconsistency between a plaintiff's prior SSDI\n\nstatements and her position in the ADA litigation. Id. at 802.\n\nThe Court stated that there are \"many situations in which an SSDI\n\nclaim and an ADA claim can comfortably exist side by side.\" Id.\n\nat 803. The Court noted that while \"the ADA defines a 'qualified\n\nindividual' to include a disabled person 'who . . . can perform\n\nthe essential functions' of her job 'with reasonable\n\naccommodation,'\" SSDI \"does not take the possibility of\n\n'reasonable accommodation' into account.\" Id. (alteration in\n\noriginal) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B)).\n\nInstead, SSDI adjudications involve a \"five-step procedure that\n\nembodies a set of presumptions about disabilities, job\n\navailability, and their interrelation.\"7 Id. at 804 (citing 20\n\n\n 7 Under this scheme, some conditions are presumed to be\ndisabling. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513,\n517 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d)), vacated on\nother grounds, 526 U.S. 795, 804 (1999). Pena does not argue that\n\n\n - 17 -\n\nC.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1525, 404.1526, 404.1560). These\n\npresumptions \"eliminat[e] consideration of many differences\n\npotentially relevant to an individual's ability to perform a\n\nparticular job\" under the ADA. Id. Cleveland also noted that\n\nSSDI benefits are sometimes awarded \"to individuals who not only\n\ncan work, but are working,\" such as those on a statutory nine month\n\ntrial-work period to test their ability to return to work. Id. at\n\n805 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 422(c), 423(e)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1592\n\n(1998)).\n\n Cleveland then stated that \"[w]hen faced with a\n\nplaintiff's previous sworn statement asserting 'total disability'\n\nor the like, the court should require an explanation of any\n\napparent inconsistency with the necessary elements of an ADA\n\nclaim.\" Id. at 807. To defeat summary judgment, the plaintiff's\n\n\"explanation must be sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror's\n\nconcluding that, assuming the truth of, or the plaintiff's good-\n\nfaith belief in, the earlier statement, the plaintiff could\n\nnonetheless 'perform the essential functions' of her job, with or\n\nwithout 'reasonable accommodation.'\" Id.\n\n Significantly, the plaintiff in Cleveland had argued in\n\nher brief that her SSDI statements \"were made in a forum which\n\ndoes not consider the effect that reasonable workplace\n\n\nher SSDI application relied on a presumption that her condition\nwas disabling or that she was on a trial-work period.\n\n\n - 18 -\n\naccommodations would have on the ability to work,\" and that her\n\nSSDI statements were \"'accurate statements' if examined 'in the\n\ntime period in which they were made.'\" Id. The Court rejected\n\nthe plaintiff's argument that this was all that was needed. The\n\ncourt remanded the case so that the parties could \"have the\n\nopportunity in the trial court to present, or to contest, [the\n\nplaintiff's] explanations, in sworn form where appropriate.\" Id.\n\n Pena argues that she has given an adequate explanation\n\nfor the apparent inconsistency between her SSDI statements and her\n\nposition in this litigation. She first argues that it is enough\n\nfor her to say in her brief that being disabled under the ADA is\n\ndifferent from being disabled for SSDI benefits, because the ADA\n\ntakes into account an employer's duty to make reasonable\n\naccommodations, while SSDI does not. Pena argues that if her SSDI\n\napplication or the ALJ had asked if she needed disability\n\naccommodations to work, she would have responded \"yes.\" She states\n\nthat this is sufficient to meet her burden under Cleveland. This\n\nmisreads (and would read out of the law) Cleveland's reasoned\n\nexplanation requirement. When the plaintiff in Cleveland made\n\nthese same general arguments, the Court did not accept them;\n\nrather, it remanded for factual findings. Id.\n\n This court has interpreted Cleveland before, and\n\nrejected the argument Pena makes. In DeCaro v. Hasbro, Inc., 580\n\nF.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2009), we upheld a jury instruction that the\n\n\n - 19 -\n\nstandard for receipt of SSDI benefits is different from the\n\nstandard for whether the plaintiff was able, with or without\n\nreasonable accommodations, to perform the essential functions of\n\nhis job. Id. at 62. We affirmed that the mere fact that the\n\nemployee \"received [SSDI] benefits is not in itself necessarily\n\nfatal to his claim,\" but that the receipt of SSDI benefits could\n\nbe an admission by the employee of his inability to perform the\n\nessential functions of his job, and that the question turned on\n\n\"all the facts and circumstances.\" Id. DeCaro rejected the\n\nargument that the mere differences in standards was all that a\n\nplaintiff had to show; the burden was on the plaintiff to offer a\n\nsufficient explanation. Id.\n\n In Sullivan v. Raytheon Co., 262 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2001),\n\nwe upheld a grant of summary judgment to the employer where the\n\nplaintiff offered \"no evidence to explain\" why his prior SSDI\n\nstatements were consistent with his claim that he could perform\n\nthe essential functions of his job with reasonable accommodations.\n\nId. at 47. Like here, the plaintiff, in his deposition testimony,\n\nhad \"continually and consistently claimed that he was totally\n\ndisabled\" from the date the defendant terminated his employment,\n\nand that his condition had \"stayed the same or worsened\" after\n\nthat. Id. We stated that to defeat summary judgment, the\n\nplaintiff needed to produce \"evidence to explain this\n\ndiscrepancy.\" Id.\n\n\n - 20 -\n\n Nor has Pena's argument been accepted by any circuit.\n\nThe Third Circuit has held that \"simply averring that the [ADA and\n\nSSDI] statutory schemes differ is not enough to survive summary\n\njudgment in light of Cleveland. An ADA plaintiff must offer a\n\nmore substantial explanation to explain the divergent positions\n\ntaken, or else summary judgment could never be granted.\" Motley\n\nv. N.J. State Police, 196 F.3d 160, 166 (3d Cir. 1999). Under\n\nCleveland, \"each case should be decided on its unique facts.\" Id.\n\nat 164. The Fourth Circuit has held that a plaintiff does not\n\n\"automatically avoid[] summary judgment when the defendant asserts\n\nthat the plaintiff's sworn statement of total disability in her\n\nSSDI application has negated the 'qualified individual' element of\n\nher ADA case.\" E.E.O.C. v. Stowe-Pharr Mills, Inc., 216 F.3d 373,\n\n378 (4th Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original). The Seventh Circuit\n\nhas similarly concluded that \"[e]xplanations of the sort Cleveland\n\nrequires are, in short, contextual.\" Lee v. City of Salem, Ind.,\n\n259 F.3d 667, 675 (7th Cir. 2001). The Fifth Circuit has also\n\nheld that a plaintiff's explanation that her SSDI statements \"did\n\nnot take into account the prospect of accommodation as contemplated\n\nunder the ADA\" is insufficient under Cleveland, at least when the\n\nplaintiff has also made \"specific factual statements which are\n\ninconsistent with her claim\" that she could perform the essential\n\n\n\n\n - 21 -\n\nfunctions of her job. Reed v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 218\n\nF.3d 477, 479-80 (5th Cir. 2000).\n\n Pena's second argument is that she has produced evidence\n\nof a reasoned explanation sufficient to allow a jury to find she\n\nwas a \"qualified individual.\" We agree with the district court\n\nthat she has not met her burden under Cleveland. In her SSDI\n\napplication, Pena offered no qualification of any sort to her\n\nstatement that she was totally disabled as of March 8, 2013. She\n\nsubmitted this application under penalty of perjury, and was\n\nrepresented by counsel at the time. From the ALJ's decision that\n\nPena was totally disabled due to somatoform disorder as of March\n\n8, 2013, it is evident that cause and that date are what Pena had\n\nargued to get SSDI benefits. Somatoform disorder is not the\n\ndisability for which Pena had claimed to Honeywell she needed\n\nreasonable accommodations. This SSDI evidence cuts against her\n\nand against the argument that she has provided a reasonable\n\nexplanation.\n\n As the district court noted, Pena's deposition testimony\n\ndoes not explain, but rather reinforces, the inconsistency between\n\nher SSDI application and her claims in this case. Pena was\n\nrepresented by counsel at her deposition. During Pena's\n\ndeposition, Honeywell asked Pena several times to explain the\n\nstatements in her SSDI application, and Pena repeatedly stated\n\nthat she was totally disabled as of March 8, 2013. She did not\n\n\n - 22 -\n\nstate that she could have performed the essential functions of her\n\nprior job with reasonable accommodations as of March 8, 2013.\n\nHoneywell also asked Pena to explain why her SSDI application\n\nstated that she was unable to work as of March 8, 2013, when her\n\nADA claim \"assert[s] that if [she] had been given an accommodation,\n\n[she] could have done [her] job.\" Pena responded, \"[Honeywell]\n\nasked me, [d]o you want to go back to work, and I said, I don't\n\nwant to see these people ever anymore.\" Honeywell again asked\n\nPena to explain why she stated in her SSDI application that she\n\nwas unable to work as of March 8, 2013. Pena responded, \"[w]hen\n\nyou fill out the application, they ask you when was your last day\n\nof work,\" but as Honeywell pointed out at the deposition, \"[t]hat's\n\nnot what the application says. The application says, 'I became\n\nunable to work because'\" of \"my disabling condition on March 8,\n\n2013.\" Not only did Pena not explain the discrepancy, but she\n\nalso reaffirmed at her deposition that she was entitled to SSDI\n\nbenefits retroactive as of March 8, 2013.\n\n Pena attempts to avoid her admissions at deposition\n\nthrough several arguments. First, Pena relies on the late\n\naffidavit she submitted, attempting to explain away her deposition\n\nadmissions with statements not made at deposition and\n\ncontradicting the statements she did make.8 Cleveland itself held\n\n\n 8 The affidavit states that (1) Pena's SSDI attorney\nadvised her to use March 8, 2013, as the onset date of her\n\n\n - 23 -\n\nthat \"a party cannot create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to\n\nsurvive summary judgment simply by contradicting his or her own\n\nprevious sworn statement (by, say, filing a later affidavit that\n\nflatly contradicts the party's earlier sworn deposition) without\n\nexplaining the contradiction or attempting to resolve the\n\ndisparity.\" Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 806. This court also\n\n\"refuse[s] to allow issues of fact to be created simply by\n\nsubmitting a subsequent contradictory affidavit.\" Morales v. A.C.\n\nOrssleff's EFTF, 246 F.3d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 2001). \"When an\n\ninterested witness has given clear answers to unambiguous\n\nquestions [at deposition], he cannot create a conflict and resist\n\nsummary judgment with an affidavit that is clearly contradictory,\n\nbut does not give a satisfactory explanation of why the testimony\n\nis changed.\" Colantuoni v. Alfred Calcagni & Sons, 44 F.3d 1, 4-\n\n5 (1st Cir. 1994). Pena's affidavit is in obvious conflict with\n\nher deposition testimony, and Pena has not sufficiently explained\n\nor resolved this disparity. Nothing in Cleveland or in First\n\nCircuit law permits a plaintiff to do a volte-face from her\n\ndeposition admissions.\n\n\n\ndisability, (2) if the SSDI application or the ALJ had asked if\nPena needed reasonable accommodations to work, she would have\nresponded \"yes,\" (3) if Honeywell had granted Pena's\naccommodations request, she would have returned to work and would\nnot have applied for SSDI benefits, and (4) Pena filed for SSDI\nbenefits because she could no longer work due to her worsened\ndepression caused by Honeywell terminating her employment.\n\n\n - 24 -\n\n Second, Pena disclaims responsibility and blames her\n\nSSDI attorney for choosing March 8, 2013, as the onset date of her\n\ndisabilities. When Honeywell asked her, \"[d]id someone advise you\n\nto use the date March 8, 2013 on your application?\", Pena did not\n\nsay she did so on advice of counsel.9\n\n Third, Pena attempts to excuse her admissions in her\n\ndeposition testimony by saying in her brief that she did not\n\nunderstand the relevant questioning at her deposition. Pena claims\n\nthat Honeywell's questions were \"confusing\" and constituted a\n\n\"blatant attempt to trip up Pena into admitting that she is lying\n\nand trying to manipulate the system.\" Pena had counsel with her\n\nat the time, who made no such objections. Pena was also provided\n\nwith an interpreter at the deposition. In any event, the record\n\nshows that Honeywell asked straightforward questions, was upfront\n\nabout the Cleveland issue, and gave Pena many opportunities to\n\nexplain the discrepancy.\n\n Pena's brief attempts a variant argument that she was\n\ndisabled when she applied for SSDI benefits, that she was not\n\ndisabled on March 8, 2013, and that she became disabled in between.\n\nShe argues that her condition worsened after March 8, 2013, and\n\nthat that worsening was because Honeywell \"denied her request for\n\n\n\n 9 Instead, in response to this question, Pena stated that\nfrom March 8, 2013, she was prescribed heavier dosages of her\nmedications.\n\n\n - 25 -\n\na reasonable accommodation when it sent her home\" that day. This\n\nis a newfound argument and is not supported by the record. That\n\nPena's condition worsened later does not mean she was well enough\n\nto perform the essential functions of her job on March 8, 2013.\n\nAn individual who is totally disabled may still suffer from\n\nworsened symptoms later. In Pena's sworn SSDI application and at\n\nher sworn deposition, she gave March 8, 2013, her last day at work,\n\nas the date on which she became totally disabled.\n\n Under Cleveland, Pena has \"fail[ed] to make a showing\n\nsufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to\n\n[her] case, and on which [she] will bear the burden of proof at\n\ntrial,\" namely, that she is a \"qualified individual.\" See\n\nCleveland, 526 U.S. at 806 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477\n\nU.S. 317, 322 (1986)). The district court properly granted\n\nHoneywell summary judgment as to Pena's claim that her employment\n\nwas terminated because of her disabilities.\n\nB. Alleged Failure to Accommodate\n\n The ADA's prohibition of employment discrimination\n\nincludes an employer's failure to make \"reasonable accommodations\n\nto the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise\n\nqualified individual with a disability.\" 42 U.S.C.\n\n§ 12112(b)(5)(A). To establish a claim for failure to accommodate,\n\na plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury\n\nto find that (1) she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA,\n\n\n - 26 -\n\n(2) she was a \"qualified individual,\" and (3) the defendant,\n\ndespite knowing of her disability, \"did not reasonably accommodate\n\nit.\" See Tobin, 433 F.3d at 107; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).\n\n Pena's failure to accommodate claim requires sufficient\n\nevidence that she was a \"qualified individual.\" See Tobin, 433\n\nF.3d at 107; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). She has not presented such\n\nevidence. Rather, the undisputed evidence, as discussed earlier,\n\nincludes admissions at her deposition and in her briefing that she\n\nwas not a \"qualified individual,\" totally apart from the statements\n\nin her SSDI application. The district court properly granted\n\nHoneywell's motion for summary judgment as to Pena's failure to\n\naccommodate claims.\n\nC. Alleged Retaliation\n\n Pena's appellate brief argues that Honeywell retaliated\n\nagainst her for reporting what she calls \"discriminatory\" conduct\n\nto Honeywell's human resources department. But part of her claim\n\nwas not made in the trial court.\n\n The disposition of Pena's earlier claims does not\n\ndispose of her retaliation claims. See Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't\n\nof Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 25 (1st Cir. 2004). \"To prove a claim of\n\nretaliation, a plaintiff must establish that (1) she engaged in\n\nprotected conduct; (2) she experienced an adverse employment\n\naction; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected\n\nconduct and the adverse employment action.\" Id. at 25. \"Once a\n\n\n - 27 -\n\nplaintiff makes [a prima facie] showing, the burden shifts to the\n\ndefendant to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation\n\nfor the adverse action.\" D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito,\n\n675 F.3d 26, 41 (1st Cir. 2012). \"If the defendant does so, the\n\nburden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered\n\nlegitimate explanation is pretextual, meaning that the defendant\n\nwas motivated by a retaliatory animus.\" Id.\n\n Pena argues on appeal that there are disputed issues of\n\nmaterial fact as to whether Honeywell retaliated against her by\n\nterminating her employment because (1) Pena had requested to remain\n\nin the respiratory department on March 8, 2013, due to her anxiety\n\nand depression, and (2) Pena had complained to Gouveia in February\n\n2013 that her supervisor did not honor her request for meal breaks\n\nat very specific times, when she needed to eat because of her\n\ndiabetes.\n\n We do not engage the first argument. Pena did not make\n\nthe argument about her request to remain in the respiratory\n\ndepartment in her opposition to Honeywell's motion for summary\n\njudgment (or, even belatedly, in her objections to the report and\n\nrecommendation). Pena has also failed to develop this argument on\n\nappeal, devoting a single sentence to the issue in her brief. For\n\nboth reasons, the argument about retaliation due to her request to\n\nremain in the respiratory department is waived. See Kozikowski v.\n\n\n\n\n - 28 -\n\nToll Bros., Inc., 354 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2003); United States\n\nv. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).\n\n Pena's argument that she was retaliated against for\n\nmaking requests as to break times, described in footnote 3, relies\n\nsolely on temporal proximity in an effort to establish causality.\n\nPena points to the fact that her employment was terminated four\n\nmonths after she made the complaint about break times. As the\n\ndistrict court found, this four-month period \"cannot carry the\n\nday.\" Pena, 2018 WL 582579, at *2. \"The cases that accept mere\n\ntemporal proximity between an employer's knowledge of protected\n\nactivity and an adverse employment action as sufficient evidence\n\nof causality to establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that\n\nthe temporal proximity must be very close.\" Cherkaoui v. City of\n\nQuincy, 877 F.3d 14, 28–29 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Clark Cty.\n\nSch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)). \"Without some\n\ncorroborating evidence suggestive of causation . . . a gap of\n\nseveral months cannot alone ground an inference of a causal\n\nconnection between a complaint and an allegedly retaliatory\n\naction.\" Ahern v. Shinseki, 629 F.3d 49, 58 (1st Cir. 2010). The\n\ngap of four months, on its own, is not \"very close\" for\n\nestablishing causality.10 See Cherkaoui, 877 F.3d at 29.\n\n\n 10We have previously explained that \"[t]hree and four\nmonth periods have been held insufficient to establish a causal\nconnection based on temporal proximity.\" Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d\nat 25. But see Sanchez-Rodriguez v. AT&T Mobility Puerto Rico,\n\n\n - 29 -\n\n Independently, \"[t]he larger picture undercuts any claim\n\nof causation.\" Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12,\n\n16 (1st Cir. 1997). Here, the district court correctly observed\n\nthat after Pena's single comment to Gouveia about break times,\n\n\"the dialogue between [Pena] and Honeywell was singularly focused\n\non the issue of her assignment to the Molding Department.\" Pena,\n\n2018 WL 582579, at *12. The evidence overwhelmingly shows that\n\nHoneywell terminated Pena's employment on the basis of job\n\nabandonment, and there is insufficient evidence from which Pena\n\ncould establish that this reason was pretextual.\n\n Pena now claims that Honeywell's adverse employment\n\nactions against her actually began the month after she made the\n\ncomplaint about break times, when she went home after refusing to\n\nwork in the molding department on March 8, 2013. But again, this\n\nis belied by the record, because the conversations immediately\n\npreceding Pena's decision to go home on March 8, 2013, explicitly\n\nreference her refusal to work in the molding department, and the\n\nsubsequent communications between Honeywell and Pena were\n\nexclusively focused on her desire to be exempt from working in the\n\nmolding department. The district court properly granted\n\n\n\n\nInc., 673 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2012) (temporal proximity sufficient\nto establish a prima facie case of causality when plaintiff filed\nan EEOC complaint about religious discrimination and was placed on\nactive disciplinary status three months later).\n\n\n - 30 -\n\nHoneywell's motion for summary judgment as to Pena's retaliation\n\nclaims.\n\n III.\n\n The district court's grant of summary judgment is\n\naffirmed.\n\n — Separate Opinion Follows —\n\n\n\n\n - 31 -\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Mayra F. PENA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant, Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the First Circuit\\n\\n\\nNo. 18-1164\\n\\n MAYRA F. PENA,\\n\\n Plaintiff, Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.,\\n\\n Defendant, Appellee.\\n\\n\\n APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND\\n\\n [Hon. William E. Smith, U.S. District Judge]\\n\\n\\n Before\\n\\n Lynch, Stahl, and Lipez,\\n Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\n Mark P. Gagliardi for the appellant.\\n Neal J. McNamara, with whom Aaron F. Nadich and Nixon Peabody\\nLLP were on brief, for the appellee.\\n\\n\\n April 26, 2019\\n\\n LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Mayra F. Pena worked as\\n\\na machine operator and associate assembler for defendant Honeywell\\n\\nInternational, Inc. (Honeywell), until Honeywell terminated her\\n\\nemployment on June 17, 2013, on the basis of job abandonment. Pena\\n\\nhad not come to work since March 8, 2013. On September 20, 2013,\\n\\nPena applied for Social Security Disability Income (SSDI)\\n\\nbenefits, asserting that she was totally disabled and had been\\n\\nsince March 8, 2013.\\n\\n On April 16, 2015, Pena filed this suit under the\\n\\nAmericans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.,\\n\\nand under various Rhode Island laws, claiming that Honeywell\\n\\nterminated her employment on the basis of her disabilities, failed\\n\\nto provide her with reasonable accommodations, and retaliated\\n\\nagainst her. After discovery and after she consistently testified\\n\\nat her deposition that she was totally disabled as of March 8,\\n\\n2013, in accord with her SSDI application statements, the district\\n\\ncourt granted Honeywell's motion for summary judgment on all of\\n\\nPena's claims. It noted, among other things, Pena's deposition\\n\\ntestimony and her SSDI application. The court correctly held that\\n\\nPena had not met the requirements of Cleveland v. Policy Management\\n\\nSystems Corporation, 526 U.S. 795 (1999). We affirm the district\\n\\ncourt's grant of summary judgment in favor of Honeywell.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 2 -\\n\\n I.\\n\\nA. Facts\\n\\n We recount the undisputed facts, examining them in the\\n\\nlight most favorable to Pena. See Murray v. Kindred Nursing\\n\\nCenters W. LLC, 789 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2015). In or about 2008,\\n\\nHoneywell hired Pena as a machine operator and associate assembler\\n\\nat its manufacturing facility in Cranston, Rhode Island. Pena\\n\\nworked (except for leave) at the facility until March 8, 2013,\\n\\nafter which she never returned to work. On June 17, 2013,\\n\\nHoneywell terminated Pena's employment for job abandonment.\\n\\n The Cranston facility's various production and assembly\\n\\nareas included the respiratory department,1 the molding department,\\n\\nthe logo department, the quicloc/cedars department, and the SCBA\\n\\narea (SCBA stands for \\\"self-contained breathing apparatus\\\").\\n\\nBefore 2012, Pena usually worked in the respiratory department.\\n\\nIn the molding department, unlike other departments, the machines\\n\\nrun twenty-four hours a day, and emit a new part about every thirty\\n\\nseconds. In other departments, the employees can control the\\n\\ntiming of the machines' operation.2\\n\\n\\n 1 At her deposition, Pena stated that she worked mainly in\\nan area called HEPA, and that the respiratory department and HEPA\\nwere two different areas of the Cranston facility.\\n 2 Some Honeywell employees, not claiming disability,\\nstated that they preferred to work in areas other than the molding\\ndepartment, where they did not have to keep up with the pace of\\nthe machines and could more easily socialize.\\n\\n\\n - 3 -\\n\\n In 2012, Honeywell decided that all employees working in\\n\\nproduction and assembly should be cross-trained so that they could\\n\\nwork as needed in all departments at the Cranston facility,\\n\\nincluding in the molding department. Honeywell believed that it\\n\\nwas important \\\"to move associate assemblers to departments where\\n\\ncustomer demand was greatest and, as a result, an employee['s]\\n\\ninability to work in any particular area would burden the\\n\\nproduction process.\\\" This was particularly true in the molding\\n\\ndepartment due to its continuous operation. Honeywell then trained\\n\\nall of its employees, including Pena, to work in all \\\"assembly\\n\\ndepartments,\\\" including the molding department.\\n\\n In October 2012, Pena was assigned to and worked in the\\n\\nmolding department under this policy. Pena then took a medical\\n\\nleave from November 29, 2012, until January 14, 2013. Pena\\n\\nattributed this request for medical leave to her seasonal\\n\\ndepression. Before this leave, Honeywell had permitted Pena to\\n\\ntake several other medical leaves of absence totaling twenty-three\\n\\nweeks, including from October 14, 2011, to November 21, 2011; from\\n\\nDecember 16, 2011, to February 13, 2012; and from June 22, 2012,\\n\\nto August 6, 2012.\\n\\n When Pena returned to the Cranston facility on January\\n\\n14, 2013, she began working in the molding department four hours\\n\\nper day, two to three times per week. She worked there without\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 4 -\\n\\ncomplaint or incident for about one month. She otherwise typically\\n\\nworked in the respiratory department.\\n\\n In late February 2013, Pena complained to the Senior\\n\\nHuman Resources Generalist, Jose Gouveia, that one of the\\n\\nproduction leaders had told her to go to the molding department.\\n\\nPena says she told Gouveia during that conversation that she did\\n\\nnot want to work in the molding department because \\\"it was harmful\\n\\nto [her] emotionally.\\\"3\\n\\n Pena met with Gouveia, as well as her supervisor, Kevin\\n\\nDyer, and the Health Safety and Environmental Site Leader, Conor\\n\\nRyan, on both March 7 and 8, 2013, about her request not to work\\n\\nin the molding department. At the March 7 meeting, Honeywell\\n\\npersonnel requested that Pena provide a letter from her doctor.\\n\\nThe next day, Pena provided a letter from her physician, Dr. James\\n\\nGreer. Dr. Greer's letter, dated March 4, 2013, stated:\\n\\n Currently, [Pena] is reporting exacerbation of\\n her anxiety symptoms which are interfering\\n with her ability to function. She reports\\n that these specifically occur when she is\\n being sent to the moulding [sic] room as\\n\\n\\n 3 In the same conversation, Pena also told Gouveia that\\n\\\"she was diabetic and the breaks were 15 and 30 minutes apart from\\nher lunch and she could not be 15 minutes late for her coffee nor\\n30 minutes late for her lunch break.\\\" Gouveia told Pena that such\\ndelays were not significant, but if they created a problem he\\n\\\"could revisit the breaks issue.\\\" Pena responded, \\\"I don't like\\nto change my break time, if you want I can get a doctor's note\\nstating that I cannot change my breaks.\\\" The doctor's notes that\\nPena provided to Honeywell do not address this issue, and Pena\\ndoes not say she ever raised the issue again.\\n\\n\\n - 5 -\\n\\n opposed to the more typical duties to which\\n she is accustomed.\\n\\nDr. Greer \\\"request[ed] that [Honeywell] assist her in other\\n\\nplacements than in this setting,\\\" and stated that Pena \\\"is\\n\\ncompletely capable of working in other settings.\\\" Dr. Greer's\\n\\nletter relied almost entirely on Pena's self-reported symptoms and\\n\\ndid not contain a specific medical diagnosis. The letter also did\\n\\nnot explain why the molding department, but not any other\\n\\ndepartment or area, exacerbated Pena's symptoms.\\n\\n Honeywell concluded that Dr. Greer's letter was\\n\\ninadequate to determine what accommodations Pena was requesting\\n\\nand whether Honeywell could meet those requests. On March 8, 2013,\\n\\nRyan and Gouveia told Pena that the only work available to her was\\n\\nin the molding department, so if she refused to do that work, she\\n\\nwould have to go home. Pena decided to go home, and never returned\\n\\nto work after that day.\\n\\n Within a week, Pena had retained an attorney, Veronika\\n\\nKot. Kot told Pena not to communicate with any Honeywell\\n\\npersonnel, as Kot would handle all such communications.\\n\\n Honeywell did not know that Pena had retained counsel,\\n\\nand repeatedly attempted to contact Pena to better understand her\\n\\ncondition and determine what accommodations, if any, would be\\n\\nappropriate. In late March 2013, Gouveia sent Pena a Reasonable\\n\\nAccommodations Request Form.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 6 -\\n\\n On April 2, 2013, Honeywell's Associate Director of\\n\\nHealth Services, Dr. Elizabeth Jennison, wrote to Dr. Greer, asking\\n\\nfor \\\"additional documentation to understand the medical necessity\\n\\nfor [Pena's] request.\\\" Dr. Jennison's letter also asked Dr. Greer\\n\\nto \\\"clarify how [Pena's] anxiety symptoms could allow her to work\\n\\nin many areas of the plant, while interfering with her ability to\\n\\nfunction in one area of the plant, the molding department, for\\n\\nwhich she is equally qualified and trained,\\\" and requested\\n\\nsupporting medical documentation.4\\n\\n In early April 2013, Pena submitted the Reasonable\\n\\nAccommodations Request Form to Honeywell, which was dated April 2,\\n\\n2013. On the form, Pena stated that she was \\\"unable to work in\\n\\nmolding\\\" because \\\"the noise, speed and overall environment gives\\n\\n[her] anxiety, palpitations.\\\" On the form, Pena also stated, \\\"I\\n\\nhad been offered many permanent positions in molding while still\\n\\nworking through an agency and refused because I knew 11 years ago\\n\\nthat I could not perform this job.\\\"\\n\\n The physician's portion of the Reasonable Accommodations\\n\\nRequest Form was left blank, but Pena attached a second letter\\n\\nfrom Dr. Greer dated April 2, 2013. This letter stated that Dr.\\n\\nGreer diagnosed Pena as having \\\"Major Depressive Disorder,\\n\\n\\n 4 At some point, Honeywell set up an appointment for Dr.\\nGreer to come to the Cranston facility in person to discuss Pena's\\ncondition, but Dr. Greer did not attend because he \\\"didn't have\\ntime in [his] busy practice\\\" to visit patients' places of work.\\n\\n\\n - 7 -\\n\\nRecurrent, Severe.\\\" The letter stated that Pena \\\"is eager to\\n\\nreturn to work in her previous capacity,\\\" and that Dr. Greer could\\n\\n\\\"state with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that continued\\n\\nassignment to the more recent work setting will result in worsening\\n\\nstress and further exacerbation of her condition.\\\" Dr. Greer's\\n\\nletter did not attempt to explain why his diagnosis of Pena would\\n\\nallow her to work everywhere except in the molding department.\\n\\n On April 8, 2013, Gouveia sent a letter to Pena stating,\\n\\n\\\"[y]ou have informed us you signed a release to give your physician\\n\\npermission to send your medical records to our medical department;\\n\\nhowever, no[] medical records have been received. As a result,\\n\\nand at the moment, we have insufficient information to assess your\\n\\nrequest.\\\" The letter also stated that while Honeywell \\\"await[ed]\\n\\nthe medical information required to assess [her] request,\\\" Pena\\n\\nhad the following options in the meantime: returning to work and\\n\\nperforming her regular duties, including in the molding\\n\\ndepartment, which was \\\"required of all employees in [Pena's]\\n\\nposition\\\"; remaining on unpaid medical leave; or using any paid\\n\\ntime off she might have available.\\n\\n Gouveia sent a follow-up letter to Pena on April 22,\\n\\n2013, stating that Honeywell had not yet received any information\\n\\nfrom Pena's physician. That same day, Attorney Kot telephoned\\n\\nGouveia. This was the point at which Honeywell became aware that\\n\\nPena had retained counsel. Honeywell's in-house employment\\n\\n\\n - 8 -\\n\\ncounsel, Jacqueline Rolfs, wrote to Kot later that same day, asking\\n\\nher to review Honeywell's correspondence with Pena to understand\\n\\nHoneywell's requests for additional medical records.\\n\\n On April 23, 2013, Kot responded to Rolfs's letter in\\n\\nwriting, stating that Pena had already provided two doctor's notes,\\n\\nand that Honeywell's request for a \\\"release of all her sensitive\\n\\nmedical records, including mental health records,\\\" was an\\n\\n\\\"unnecessary and prohibited intrusion upon her privacy.\\\"\\n\\n On April 25, 2013, Rolfs sent a letter to Kot, attaching\\n\\nthe prior correspondence between Honeywell, Pena, and Dr. Greer.\\n\\nThis letter detailed Honeywell's attempts to communicate with\\n\\nPena, and stated that Honeywell had not asked for all of Pena's\\n\\nrecords, but rather, only those records that would explain how her\\n\\nsymptoms prevented her from working in the molding department.\\n\\nRolfs's letter also stated that \\\"Honeywell remains willing to work\\n\\nwith your client to assess her reasonable accommodation request.\\n\\nHowever, without the cooperation of your client and her physician\\n\\nin providing responses to Honeywell's reasonable questions about\\n\\nthis request, we cannot proceed further in that process.\\\"\\n\\n Kot responded to Rolfs in a letter dated April 30, 2013,\\n\\naccusing Honeywell of violating the ADA and of threatening to\\n\\nterminate Pena's employment if she did not return to work without\\n\\naccommodations. Kot's letter also stated that she would provide\\n\\nanother letter from Pena's doctor shortly.\\n\\n\\n - 9 -\\n\\n On May 6, 2013, Kot wrote to Rolfs again, expressing\\n\\nconcern that Honeywell management had not provided Pena with \\\"the\\n\\nappropriate support\\\" and instead had \\\"apparently . . . urged [Pena]\\n\\nto quit and apply for SSI [Supplemental Security Income]\\\"\\n\\n(Honeywell disputes this). Kot's letter enclosed a memorandum\\n\\nfrom Dr. Greer, stating that Pena \\\"has reported repeatedly and\\n\\nconsistently\\\" that the molding room was stressful because of \\\"a\\n\\nvariety of factors which included increased noise levels, chemical\\n\\nodors, and the presence of robotics.\\\" Dr. Greer's memorandum also\\n\\nstated, \\\"I cannot specifically identify particular issues there\\n\\nwhich might exacerbate her stress, but can state with a reasonable\\n\\ndegree of medical certainty that there is a direct causal\\n\\nrelationship between her working in that setting and the\\n\\nexacerbation of her symptoms.\\\" The memorandum attached four\\n\\nprogress notes from Pena's visits with Dr. Greer that had taken\\n\\nplace between March 4 and April 22, 2013.\\n\\n Rolfs sent a letter to Kot on May 22, 2013, stating that\\n\\nDr. Greer's most recent memorandum still did not explain the\\n\\nconnection between Pena's diagnosis and her ability to work in the\\n\\nmolding department, because all of the items mentioned were also\\n\\ntrue of work conditions in other departments. The letter explained\\n\\nthat:\\n\\n The noise level in molding is not appreciably\\n different than that in respiratory. Indeed,\\n employees in both areas are required to wear\\n\\n\\n - 10 -\\n\\n ear plugs. Nor is there any difference in the\\n chemical odors between respiratory and\\n molding. In addition, there are robotics in\\n both molding and respiratory, and all are\\n enclosed.\\n\\nThe letter stated that \\\"all employees who work on the floor at\\n\\nthis Honeywell facility will be required to rotate into molding as\\n\\nthey complete the necessary training. The rotations are as brief\\n\\nas 15 minutes, or as long as one week.\\\" The letter also stated\\n\\nthat \\\"[r]espiratory will remain Ms. Pena's primary assignment,\\\"\\n\\nbut that \\\"Ms. Pena and the other employees will rotate among all\\n\\nthe areas in the facility, not just molding.\\\" Rolfs's letter also\\n\\nrepeated that Honeywell only sought medical records relevant to\\n\\nPena's request for reasonable accommodation. It stated that \\\"no\\n\\none at Honeywell has suggested that Ms. Pena quit and apply for\\n\\nSSI.\\\" The letter further stated that Dr. Greer had not called\\n\\nHoneywell's Associate Director of Health Services, Dr. Jennison,\\n\\nas Honeywell had requested, and asked that Dr. Greer call Dr.\\n\\nJennison as soon as possible.\\n\\n Honeywell personnel did not hear from Kot after May 6,\\n\\n2013. But the record shows, and her counsel at oral argument\\n\\naffirmed, that Pena had counsel at the time of each of the\\n\\nfollowing crucial events.\\n\\n On June 17, 2013, after Pena had been absent for over\\n\\nthree months and had used all of her medical leave, Honeywell\\n\\nterminated Pena's employment on the basis of job abandonment.\\n\\n\\n - 11 -\\n\\n On September 20, 2013, Pena applied for SSDI benefits.\\n\\nPena was represented by different counsel, Amanda DelFarno, for\\n\\nher SSDI application. Pena's SSDI application included the\\n\\nstatements \\\"I became unable to work because of my disabling\\n\\ncondition on March 8, 2013,\\\" and \\\"I am still disabled.\\\" The\\n\\napplication also stated:\\n\\n I know that anyone who makes or causes to be\\n made a false statement or representation of\\n material fact in an application or for use in\\n determining a right to payment under the\\n Social Security Act commits a crime punishable\\n under federal law by fine, imprisonment, or\\n both. I affirm that all information I have\\n given in connection with this claim is true.\\n\\n That same day, Pena was given an electronic receipt for\\n\\nher SSDI application, which stated, \\\"[y]ou declared under penalty\\n\\nof perjury that you examined all the information on this form and\\n\\nit is true and correct to the best of your knowledge. You were\\n\\ntold that you could be liable under law for providing false\\n\\ninformation.\\\" The receipt stated that Pena should review her SSDI\\n\\napplication and call the telephone number provided within ten days\\n\\nif Pena disagreed with any of the statements in her application.\\n\\nPena does not say that she ever contacted the Social Security\\n\\nAdministration to change any statements in her SSDI application.\\n\\n On September 29, 2015, Pena testified at a hearing before\\n\\nan administrative law judge (ALJ). At the hearing, an impartial\\n\\nmedical expert testified that \\\"the medical evidence of record shows\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 12 -\\n\\nthat the claimant has a 'core problem' of a somatoform disorder\\n\\nwhile translating everything to physical symptoms.\\\"5 On October\\n\\n16, 2015, the ALJ granted Pena's SSDI application in a five-page\\n\\ndecision, finding that Pena had been suffering from somatoform\\n\\ndisorder and was totally disabled as of March 8, 2013.\\n\\nB. Procedural History\\n\\n On April 16, 2015, Pena, represented by new counsel,\\n\\nMark Gagliardi, filed a complaint in Rhode Island Superior Court,\\n\\nwhich Honeywell removed to federal court on the basis of diversity\\n\\njurisdiction. Pena's twelve-count complaint asserted claims under\\n\\nthe federal ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.; the Rhode Island Civil\\n\\nRights Act of 1990, R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 42-112-1 et seq.; the Rhode\\n\\nIsland Fair Employment Practices Act, R.I. Gen Laws §§ 28-5-1 et\\n\\nseq.; the Civil Rights of People With Disabilities Act, R.I. Gen.\\n\\nLaws. §§ 42-87-1 et seq.; and the Rhode Island Whistleblower's\\n\\nProtection Act, R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-50-1 et seq. The Complaint\\n\\nalleges that Honeywell failed to provide Pena with reasonable\\n\\naccommodations (Counts I through IV), terminated her employment on\\n\\nthe basis of her disabilities (Counts V through VIII), and\\n\\nterminated her employment in retaliation for reporting\\n\\ndiscriminatory conduct (Counts IX through XII).\\n\\n\\n 5 Pena states that somatoform disorder is \\\"a form of mental\\nillness that can affect different organs and body systems and cause\\nbodily symptoms, including pain, neurologic[al] problems,\\ngastrointestinal complaints, and sexual symptoms.\\\"\\n\\n\\n - 13 -\\n\\n During discovery, Pena's deposition was taken on\\n\\nNovember 3, 2016. She does not say that she filed any corrections\\n\\nto her deposition transcript. After the completion of discovery,\\n\\nin February 2017, Honeywell moved for summary judgment on all of\\n\\nPena's claims. Pena's counsel filed an opposition to Honeywell's\\n\\nmotion for summary judgment on March 28, 2017, the day it was due.\\n\\nThe opposition attached documents and letters as evidence, but did\\n\\nnot attach any deposition transcripts. The next day, Pena's\\n\\ncounsel filed an \\\"addendum\\\" to the opposition, which included six\\n\\ndeposition transcripts and an affidavit executed by Pena on March\\n\\n29, 2017, the day after the opposition had been due. That same\\n\\nday, Pena's counsel also filed a statement of undisputed facts and\\n\\na statement of disputed facts. On April 11, 2017, Honeywell filed\\n\\na reply brief, which included objections to Pena's late filings,\\n\\nincluding the affidavit. That same day, Pena filed a motion for\\n\\na retroactive extension to file the \\\"addendum,\\\" statement of\\n\\ndisputed facts, and statement of undisputed facts. Later that\\n\\nsame day, Honeywell objected to this motion. On April 26, 2017,\\n\\nthe district court granted Pena's motion for an extension.\\n\\n The magistrate judge held a hearing on Honeywell's\\n\\nmotion for summary judgment on June 19, 2017. On September 22,\\n\\n2017, the magistrate judge entered a report and recommendation\\n\\nthat Honeywell's motion be granted. Pena v. Honeywell Int'l Inc.,\\n\\nNo. CV 15-179 WES, 2018 WL 582579, at *3-*12 (D.R.I. Jan. 29,\\n\\n\\n - 14 -\\n\\n2018). On January 29, 2018, the district court accepted the report\\n\\nand recommendation and granted summary judgment in Honeywell's\\n\\nfavor on all counts. Id. at *3. Pena timely appealed.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n A movant is entitled to summary judgment if \\\"there is no\\n\\ngenuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled\\n\\nto judgment as a matter of law.\\\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). \\\"We\\n\\nreview the district court's disposition of a summary judgment\\n\\nmotion de novo, 'scrutiniz[ing] the evidence in the light most\\n\\nagreeable to the nonmoving party, giving that party the benefit of\\n\\nany and all reasonable inferences.'\\\" Murray, 789 F.3d at 25\\n\\n(quoting Noviello v. City of Bos., 398 F.3d 76, 84 (1st Cir.\\n\\n2005)). If the record is \\\"deficient in vital evidentiary support,\\n\\nthis may suffice to show that the movant has met its initial\\n\\nburden\\\" of \\\"demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of\\n\\nmaterial fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of\\n\\nlaw.\\\" Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 132-33 (1st Cir. 2000).\\n\\nA. Allegation Termination Was Based on Pena's Disabilities\\n\\n The ADA forbids employers from terminating the\\n\\nemployment of a \\\"qualified individual on the basis of disability.\\\"6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 \\\"Rhode Island courts look to federal case law construing\\nthe [ADA] in evaluating analogous state law discrimination\\nclaims.\\\" Pena, 2018 WL 582579 at *3 n.1 (citing Hodgens v. Gen.\\nDynamics, 144 F.3d 151, 158 n.1 (1st Cir. 1998); Barber v. Verizon\\nNew England, No. 05-390-ML, 2006 WL 3524465 at *3 n.1 (D.R.I. Dec.\\n\\n\\n - 15 -\\n\\n42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A prima facie case of disability\\n\\ndiscrimination requires the plaintiff to show that (1) she was\\n\\ndisabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) she was a \\\"qualified\\n\\nindividual,\\\" and (3) the defendant took an adverse employment\\n\\naction against her on the basis of her disability. Tobin v.\\n\\nLiberty Mut. Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 2005); 42 U.S.C.\\n\\n§ 12111(8).\\n\\n Under the ADA, a \\\"qualified individual\\\" is \\\"an\\n\\nindividual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can\\n\\nperform the essential functions of the employment position that\\n\\nsuch individual holds or desires.\\\" 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). By\\n\\ncontrast, a successful SSDI applicant must be physically and\\n\\nmentally impaired such that she cannot do her previous work, or\\n\\n\\\"any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the\\n\\nnational economy.\\\" Id. § 423(d)(2)(A). This difference creates\\n\\nan obvious tension.\\n\\n In Cleveland, the Supreme Court reversed a Fifth Circuit\\n\\ndecision that had created a rebuttable presumption that a\\n\\nplaintiff's filing of an SSDI application precluded her from being\\n\\na \\\"qualified individual\\\" under the ADA. 526 U.S. at 799-800, 807.\\n\\nThe Court remanded to the lower court for the purpose we quote\\n\\nlater. Id. at 807.\\n\\n\\n6, 2006); Kriegel v. State of Rhode Island, 266 F. Supp. 2d 288,\\n296 (D.R.I. 2003)). We will do the same.\\n\\n\\n - 16 -\\n\\n The Court held that an ADA plaintiff in an employment\\n\\ndiscrimination action is not judicially estopped from establishing\\n\\nthat she can perform the essential functions of her job with\\n\\nreasonable accommodations solely because she has previously\\n\\napplied for and received SSDI benefits. Id. at 802. It went on\\n\\nfrom there to establish what a plaintiff must show. Id. at 801-\\n\\n07.\\n\\n The Court stated that the first question was whether\\n\\nthere was an inconsistency between a plaintiff's prior SSDI\\n\\nstatements and her position in the ADA litigation. Id. at 802.\\n\\nThe Court stated that there are \\\"many situations in which an SSDI\\n\\nclaim and an ADA claim can comfortably exist side by side.\\\" Id.\\n\\nat 803. The Court noted that while \\\"the ADA defines a 'qualified\\n\\nindividual' to include a disabled person 'who . . . can perform\\n\\nthe essential functions' of her job 'with reasonable\\n\\naccommodation,'\\\" SSDI \\\"does not take the possibility of\\n\\n'reasonable accommodation' into account.\\\" Id. (alteration in\\n\\noriginal) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B)).\\n\\nInstead, SSDI adjudications involve a \\\"five-step procedure that\\n\\nembodies a set of presumptions about disabilities, job\\n\\navailability, and their interrelation.\\\"7 Id. at 804 (citing 20\\n\\n\\n 7 Under this scheme, some conditions are presumed to be\\ndisabling. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513,\\n517 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d)), vacated on\\nother grounds, 526 U.S. 795, 804 (1999). Pena does not argue that\\n\\n\\n - 17 -\\n\\nC.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1525, 404.1526, 404.1560). These\\n\\npresumptions \\\"eliminat[e] consideration of many differences\\n\\npotentially relevant to an individual's ability to perform a\\n\\nparticular job\\\" under the ADA. Id. Cleveland also noted that\\n\\nSSDI benefits are sometimes awarded \\\"to individuals who not only\\n\\ncan work, but are working,\\\" such as those on a statutory nine month\\n\\ntrial-work period to test their ability to return to work. Id. at\\n\\n805 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 422(c), 423(e)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1592\\n\\n(1998)).\\n\\n Cleveland then stated that \\\"[w]hen faced with a\\n\\nplaintiff's previous sworn statement asserting 'total disability'\\n\\nor the like, the court should require an explanation of any\\n\\napparent inconsistency with the necessary elements of an ADA\\n\\nclaim.\\\" Id. at 807. To defeat summary judgment, the plaintiff's\\n\\n\\\"explanation must be sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror's\\n\\nconcluding that, assuming the truth of, or the plaintiff's good-\\n\\nfaith belief in, the earlier statement, the plaintiff could\\n\\nnonetheless 'perform the essential functions' of her job, with or\\n\\nwithout 'reasonable accommodation.'\\\" Id.\\n\\n Significantly, the plaintiff in Cleveland had argued in\\n\\nher brief that her SSDI statements \\\"were made in a forum which\\n\\ndoes not consider the effect that reasonable workplace\\n\\n\\nher SSDI application relied on a presumption that her condition\\nwas disabling or that she was on a trial-work period.\\n\\n\\n - 18 -\\n\\naccommodations would have on the ability to work,\\\" and that her\\n\\nSSDI statements were \\\"'accurate statements' if examined 'in the\\n\\ntime period in which they were made.'\\\" Id. The Court rejected\\n\\nthe plaintiff's argument that this was all that was needed. The\\n\\ncourt remanded the case so that the parties could \\\"have the\\n\\nopportunity in the trial court to present, or to contest, [the\\n\\nplaintiff's] explanations, in sworn form where appropriate.\\\" Id.\\n\\n Pena argues that she has given an adequate explanation\\n\\nfor the apparent inconsistency between her SSDI statements and her\\n\\nposition in this litigation. She first argues that it is enough\\n\\nfor her to say in her brief that being disabled under the ADA is\\n\\ndifferent from being disabled for SSDI benefits, because the ADA\\n\\ntakes into account an employer's duty to make reasonable\\n\\naccommodations, while SSDI does not. Pena argues that if her SSDI\\n\\napplication or the ALJ had asked if she needed disability\\n\\naccommodations to work, she would have responded \\\"yes.\\\" She states\\n\\nthat this is sufficient to meet her burden under Cleveland. This\\n\\nmisreads (and would read out of the law) Cleveland's reasoned\\n\\nexplanation requirement. When the plaintiff in Cleveland made\\n\\nthese same general arguments, the Court did not accept them;\\n\\nrather, it remanded for factual findings. Id.\\n\\n This court has interpreted Cleveland before, and\\n\\nrejected the argument Pena makes. In DeCaro v. Hasbro, Inc., 580\\n\\nF.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2009), we upheld a jury instruction that the\\n\\n\\n - 19 -\\n\\nstandard for receipt of SSDI benefits is different from the\\n\\nstandard for whether the plaintiff was able, with or without\\n\\nreasonable accommodations, to perform the essential functions of\\n\\nhis job. Id. at 62. We affirmed that the mere fact that the\\n\\nemployee \\\"received [SSDI] benefits is not in itself necessarily\\n\\nfatal to his claim,\\\" but that the receipt of SSDI benefits could\\n\\nbe an admission by the employee of his inability to perform the\\n\\nessential functions of his job, and that the question turned on\\n\\n\\\"all the facts and circumstances.\\\" Id. DeCaro rejected the\\n\\nargument that the mere differences in standards was all that a\\n\\nplaintiff had to show; the burden was on the plaintiff to offer a\\n\\nsufficient explanation. Id.\\n\\n In Sullivan v. Raytheon Co., 262 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2001),\\n\\nwe upheld a grant of summary judgment to the employer where the\\n\\nplaintiff offered \\\"no evidence to explain\\\" why his prior SSDI\\n\\nstatements were consistent with his claim that he could perform\\n\\nthe essential functions of his job with reasonable accommodations.\\n\\nId. at 47. Like here, the plaintiff, in his deposition testimony,\\n\\nhad \\\"continually and consistently claimed that he was totally\\n\\ndisabled\\\" from the date the defendant terminated his employment,\\n\\nand that his condition had \\\"stayed the same or worsened\\\" after\\n\\nthat. Id. We stated that to defeat summary judgment, the\\n\\nplaintiff needed to produce \\\"evidence to explain this\\n\\ndiscrepancy.\\\" Id.\\n\\n\\n - 20 -\\n\\n Nor has Pena's argument been accepted by any circuit.\\n\\nThe Third Circuit has held that \\\"simply averring that the [ADA and\\n\\nSSDI] statutory schemes differ is not enough to survive summary\\n\\njudgment in light of Cleveland. An ADA plaintiff must offer a\\n\\nmore substantial explanation to explain the divergent positions\\n\\ntaken, or else summary judgment could never be granted.\\\" Motley\\n\\nv. N.J. State Police, 196 F.3d 160, 166 (3d Cir. 1999). Under\\n\\nCleveland, \\\"each case should be decided on its unique facts.\\\" Id.\\n\\nat 164. The Fourth Circuit has held that a plaintiff does not\\n\\n\\\"automatically avoid[] summary judgment when the defendant asserts\\n\\nthat the plaintiff's sworn statement of total disability in her\\n\\nSSDI application has negated the 'qualified individual' element of\\n\\nher ADA case.\\\" E.E.O.C. v. Stowe-Pharr Mills, Inc., 216 F.3d 373,\\n\\n378 (4th Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original). The Seventh Circuit\\n\\nhas similarly concluded that \\\"[e]xplanations of the sort Cleveland\\n\\nrequires are, in short, contextual.\\\" Lee v. City of Salem, Ind.,\\n\\n259 F.3d 667, 675 (7th Cir. 2001). The Fifth Circuit has also\\n\\nheld that a plaintiff's explanation that her SSDI statements \\\"did\\n\\nnot take into account the prospect of accommodation as contemplated\\n\\nunder the ADA\\\" is insufficient under Cleveland, at least when the\\n\\nplaintiff has also made \\\"specific factual statements which are\\n\\ninconsistent with her claim\\\" that she could perform the essential\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 21 -\\n\\nfunctions of her job. Reed v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 218\\n\\nF.3d 477, 479-80 (5th Cir. 2000).\\n\\n Pena's second argument is that she has produced evidence\\n\\nof a reasoned explanation sufficient to allow a jury to find she\\n\\nwas a \\\"qualified individual.\\\" We agree with the district court\\n\\nthat she has not met her burden under Cleveland. In her SSDI\\n\\napplication, Pena offered no qualification of any sort to her\\n\\nstatement that she was totally disabled as of March 8, 2013. She\\n\\nsubmitted this application under penalty of perjury, and was\\n\\nrepresented by counsel at the time. From the ALJ's decision that\\n\\nPena was totally disabled due to somatoform disorder as of March\\n\\n8, 2013, it is evident that cause and that date are what Pena had\\n\\nargued to get SSDI benefits. Somatoform disorder is not the\\n\\ndisability for which Pena had claimed to Honeywell she needed\\n\\nreasonable accommodations. This SSDI evidence cuts against her\\n\\nand against the argument that she has provided a reasonable\\n\\nexplanation.\\n\\n As the district court noted, Pena's deposition testimony\\n\\ndoes not explain, but rather reinforces, the inconsistency between\\n\\nher SSDI application and her claims in this case. Pena was\\n\\nrepresented by counsel at her deposition. During Pena's\\n\\ndeposition, Honeywell asked Pena several times to explain the\\n\\nstatements in her SSDI application, and Pena repeatedly stated\\n\\nthat she was totally disabled as of March 8, 2013. She did not\\n\\n\\n - 22 -\\n\\nstate that she could have performed the essential functions of her\\n\\nprior job with reasonable accommodations as of March 8, 2013.\\n\\nHoneywell also asked Pena to explain why her SSDI application\\n\\nstated that she was unable to work as of March 8, 2013, when her\\n\\nADA claim \\\"assert[s] that if [she] had been given an accommodation,\\n\\n[she] could have done [her] job.\\\" Pena responded, \\\"[Honeywell]\\n\\nasked me, [d]o you want to go back to work, and I said, I don't\\n\\nwant to see these people ever anymore.\\\" Honeywell again asked\\n\\nPena to explain why she stated in her SSDI application that she\\n\\nwas unable to work as of March 8, 2013. Pena responded, \\\"[w]hen\\n\\nyou fill out the application, they ask you when was your last day\\n\\nof work,\\\" but as Honeywell pointed out at the deposition, \\\"[t]hat's\\n\\nnot what the application says. The application says, 'I became\\n\\nunable to work because'\\\" of \\\"my disabling condition on March 8,\\n\\n2013.\\\" Not only did Pena not explain the discrepancy, but she\\n\\nalso reaffirmed at her deposition that she was entitled to SSDI\\n\\nbenefits retroactive as of March 8, 2013.\\n\\n Pena attempts to avoid her admissions at deposition\\n\\nthrough several arguments. First, Pena relies on the late\\n\\naffidavit she submitted, attempting to explain away her deposition\\n\\nadmissions with statements not made at deposition and\\n\\ncontradicting the statements she did make.8 Cleveland itself held\\n\\n\\n 8 The affidavit states that (1) Pena's SSDI attorney\\nadvised her to use March 8, 2013, as the onset date of her\\n\\n\\n - 23 -\\n\\nthat \\\"a party cannot create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to\\n\\nsurvive summary judgment simply by contradicting his or her own\\n\\nprevious sworn statement (by, say, filing a later affidavit that\\n\\nflatly contradicts the party's earlier sworn deposition) without\\n\\nexplaining the contradiction or attempting to resolve the\\n\\ndisparity.\\\" Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 806. This court also\\n\\n\\\"refuse[s] to allow issues of fact to be created simply by\\n\\nsubmitting a subsequent contradictory affidavit.\\\" Morales v. A.C.\\n\\nOrssleff's EFTF, 246 F.3d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 2001). \\\"When an\\n\\ninterested witness has given clear answers to unambiguous\\n\\nquestions [at deposition], he cannot create a conflict and resist\\n\\nsummary judgment with an affidavit that is clearly contradictory,\\n\\nbut does not give a satisfactory explanation of why the testimony\\n\\nis changed.\\\" Colantuoni v. Alfred Calcagni & Sons, 44 F.3d 1, 4-\\n\\n5 (1st Cir. 1994). Pena's affidavit is in obvious conflict with\\n\\nher deposition testimony, and Pena has not sufficiently explained\\n\\nor resolved this disparity. Nothing in Cleveland or in First\\n\\nCircuit law permits a plaintiff to do a volte-face from her\\n\\ndeposition admissions.\\n\\n\\n\\ndisability, (2) if the SSDI application or the ALJ had asked if\\nPena needed reasonable accommodations to work, she would have\\nresponded \\\"yes,\\\" (3) if Honeywell had granted Pena's\\naccommodations request, she would have returned to work and would\\nnot have applied for SSDI benefits, and (4) Pena filed for SSDI\\nbenefits because she could no longer work due to her worsened\\ndepression caused by Honeywell terminating her employment.\\n\\n\\n - 24 -\\n\\n Second, Pena disclaims responsibility and blames her\\n\\nSSDI attorney for choosing March 8, 2013, as the onset date of her\\n\\ndisabilities. When Honeywell asked her, \\\"[d]id someone advise you\\n\\nto use the date March 8, 2013 on your application?\\\", Pena did not\\n\\nsay she did so on advice of counsel.9\\n\\n Third, Pena attempts to excuse her admissions in her\\n\\ndeposition testimony by saying in her brief that she did not\\n\\nunderstand the relevant questioning at her deposition. Pena claims\\n\\nthat Honeywell's questions were \\\"confusing\\\" and constituted a\\n\\n\\\"blatant attempt to trip up Pena into admitting that she is lying\\n\\nand trying to manipulate the system.\\\" Pena had counsel with her\\n\\nat the time, who made no such objections. Pena was also provided\\n\\nwith an interpreter at the deposition. In any event, the record\\n\\nshows that Honeywell asked straightforward questions, was upfront\\n\\nabout the Cleveland issue, and gave Pena many opportunities to\\n\\nexplain the discrepancy.\\n\\n Pena's brief attempts a variant argument that she was\\n\\ndisabled when she applied for SSDI benefits, that she was not\\n\\ndisabled on March 8, 2013, and that she became disabled in between.\\n\\nShe argues that her condition worsened after March 8, 2013, and\\n\\nthat that worsening was because Honeywell \\\"denied her request for\\n\\n\\n\\n 9 Instead, in response to this question, Pena stated that\\nfrom March 8, 2013, she was prescribed heavier dosages of her\\nmedications.\\n\\n\\n - 25 -\\n\\na reasonable accommodation when it sent her home\\\" that day. This\\n\\nis a newfound argument and is not supported by the record. That\\n\\nPena's condition worsened later does not mean she was well enough\\n\\nto perform the essential functions of her job on March 8, 2013.\\n\\nAn individual who is totally disabled may still suffer from\\n\\nworsened symptoms later. In Pena's sworn SSDI application and at\\n\\nher sworn deposition, she gave March 8, 2013, her last day at work,\\n\\nas the date on which she became totally disabled.\\n\\n Under Cleveland, Pena has \\\"fail[ed] to make a showing\\n\\nsufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to\\n\\n[her] case, and on which [she] will bear the burden of proof at\\n\\ntrial,\\\" namely, that she is a \\\"qualified individual.\\\" See\\n\\nCleveland, 526 U.S. at 806 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477\\n\\nU.S. 317, 322 (1986)). The district court properly granted\\n\\nHoneywell summary judgment as to Pena's claim that her employment\\n\\nwas terminated because of her disabilities.\\n\\nB. Alleged Failure to Accommodate\\n\\n The ADA's prohibition of employment discrimination\\n\\nincludes an employer's failure to make \\\"reasonable accommodations\\n\\nto the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise\\n\\nqualified individual with a disability.\\\" 42 U.S.C.\\n\\n§ 12112(b)(5)(A). To establish a claim for failure to accommodate,\\n\\na plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury\\n\\nto find that (1) she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA,\\n\\n\\n - 26 -\\n\\n(2) she was a \\\"qualified individual,\\\" and (3) the defendant,\\n\\ndespite knowing of her disability, \\\"did not reasonably accommodate\\n\\nit.\\\" See Tobin, 433 F.3d at 107; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).\\n\\n Pena's failure to accommodate claim requires sufficient\\n\\nevidence that she was a \\\"qualified individual.\\\" See Tobin, 433\\n\\nF.3d at 107; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). She has not presented such\\n\\nevidence. Rather, the undisputed evidence, as discussed earlier,\\n\\nincludes admissions at her deposition and in her briefing that she\\n\\nwas not a \\\"qualified individual,\\\" totally apart from the statements\\n\\nin her SSDI application. The district court properly granted\\n\\nHoneywell's motion for summary judgment as to Pena's failure to\\n\\naccommodate claims.\\n\\nC. Alleged Retaliation\\n\\n Pena's appellate brief argues that Honeywell retaliated\\n\\nagainst her for reporting what she calls \\\"discriminatory\\\" conduct\\n\\nto Honeywell's human resources department. But part of her claim\\n\\nwas not made in the trial court.\\n\\n The disposition of Pena's earlier claims does not\\n\\ndispose of her retaliation claims. See Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't\\n\\nof Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 25 (1st Cir. 2004). \\\"To prove a claim of\\n\\nretaliation, a plaintiff must establish that (1) she engaged in\\n\\nprotected conduct; (2) she experienced an adverse employment\\n\\naction; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected\\n\\nconduct and the adverse employment action.\\\" Id. at 25. \\\"Once a\\n\\n\\n - 27 -\\n\\nplaintiff makes [a prima facie] showing, the burden shifts to the\\n\\ndefendant to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation\\n\\nfor the adverse action.\\\" D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito,\\n\\n675 F.3d 26, 41 (1st Cir. 2012). \\\"If the defendant does so, the\\n\\nburden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered\\n\\nlegitimate explanation is pretextual, meaning that the defendant\\n\\nwas motivated by a retaliatory animus.\\\" Id.\\n\\n Pena argues on appeal that there are disputed issues of\\n\\nmaterial fact as to whether Honeywell retaliated against her by\\n\\nterminating her employment because (1) Pena had requested to remain\\n\\nin the respiratory department on March 8, 2013, due to her anxiety\\n\\nand depression, and (2) Pena had complained to Gouveia in February\\n\\n2013 that her supervisor did not honor her request for meal breaks\\n\\nat very specific times, when she needed to eat because of her\\n\\ndiabetes.\\n\\n We do not engage the first argument. Pena did not make\\n\\nthe argument about her request to remain in the respiratory\\n\\ndepartment in her opposition to Honeywell's motion for summary\\n\\njudgment (or, even belatedly, in her objections to the report and\\n\\nrecommendation). Pena has also failed to develop this argument on\\n\\nappeal, devoting a single sentence to the issue in her brief. For\\n\\nboth reasons, the argument about retaliation due to her request to\\n\\nremain in the respiratory department is waived. See Kozikowski v.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 28 -\\n\\nToll Bros., Inc., 354 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2003); United States\\n\\nv. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).\\n\\n Pena's argument that she was retaliated against for\\n\\nmaking requests as to break times, described in footnote 3, relies\\n\\nsolely on temporal proximity in an effort to establish causality.\\n\\nPena points to the fact that her employment was terminated four\\n\\nmonths after she made the complaint about break times. As the\\n\\ndistrict court found, this four-month period \\\"cannot carry the\\n\\nday.\\\" Pena, 2018 WL 582579, at *2. \\\"The cases that accept mere\\n\\ntemporal proximity between an employer's knowledge of protected\\n\\nactivity and an adverse employment action as sufficient evidence\\n\\nof causality to establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that\\n\\nthe temporal proximity must be very close.\\\" Cherkaoui v. City of\\n\\nQuincy, 877 F.3d 14, 28–29 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Clark Cty.\\n\\nSch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)). \\\"Without some\\n\\ncorroborating evidence suggestive of causation . . . a gap of\\n\\nseveral months cannot alone ground an inference of a causal\\n\\nconnection between a complaint and an allegedly retaliatory\\n\\naction.\\\" Ahern v. Shinseki, 629 F.3d 49, 58 (1st Cir. 2010). The\\n\\ngap of four months, on its own, is not \\\"very close\\\" for\\n\\nestablishing causality.10 See Cherkaoui, 877 F.3d at 29.\\n\\n\\n 10We have previously explained that \\\"[t]hree and four\\nmonth periods have been held insufficient to establish a causal\\nconnection based on temporal proximity.\\\" Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d\\nat 25. But see Sanchez-Rodriguez v. AT&T Mobility Puerto Rico,\\n\\n\\n - 29 -\\n\\n Independently, \\\"[t]he larger picture undercuts any claim\\n\\nof causation.\\\" Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12,\\n\\n16 (1st Cir. 1997). Here, the district court correctly observed\\n\\nthat after Pena's single comment to Gouveia about break times,\\n\\n\\\"the dialogue between [Pena] and Honeywell was singularly focused\\n\\non the issue of her assignment to the Molding Department.\\\" Pena,\\n\\n2018 WL 582579, at *12. The evidence overwhelmingly shows that\\n\\nHoneywell terminated Pena's employment on the basis of job\\n\\nabandonment, and there is insufficient evidence from which Pena\\n\\ncould establish that this reason was pretextual.\\n\\n Pena now claims that Honeywell's adverse employment\\n\\nactions against her actually began the month after she made the\\n\\ncomplaint about break times, when she went home after refusing to\\n\\nwork in the molding department on March 8, 2013. But again, this\\n\\nis belied by the record, because the conversations immediately\\n\\npreceding Pena's decision to go home on March 8, 2013, explicitly\\n\\nreference her refusal to work in the molding department, and the\\n\\nsubsequent communications between Honeywell and Pena were\\n\\nexclusively focused on her desire to be exempt from working in the\\n\\nmolding department. The district court properly granted\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nInc., 673 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2012) (temporal proximity sufficient\\nto establish a prima facie case of causality when plaintiff filed\\nan EEOC complaint about religious discrimination and was placed on\\nactive disciplinary status three months later).\\n\\n\\n - 30 -\\n\\nHoneywell's motion for summary judgment as to Pena's retaliation\\n\\nclaims.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n The district court's grant of summary judgment is\\n\\naffirmed.\\n\\n — Separate Opinion Follows —\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 31 -\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1493,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4614219,"string":"4,614,219"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Adolfo FRANCO-ARDON, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Franco-Ardon v. Barr"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1522P"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Lynch, Thompson, Barron\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BARRON, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the First Circuit\\n\\nNo. 18-1522\\n\\n ADOLFO FRANCO-ARDON,\\n\\n Petitioner,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n WILLIAM P. BARR,\\n ATTORNEY GENERAL,\\n\\n Respondent.\\n\\n\\n PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE\\n BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS\\n\\n\\n Before\\n Lynch, Thompson, and Barron,\\n Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\n Randy Olen on brief for petitioner.\\n Laura Halliday Hickein, Trial Attorney, Joseph H. Hunt,\\nAssistant Attorney General, Shelley R. Goad, Assistant Director,\\nOffice of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, on\\nbrief for respondent.\\n\\n\\n\\n April 26, 2019\\n\\n\\n\\t\\n\\n\\n\\n \\n Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Attorney General\\nWilliam P. Barr has been substituted for former Acting Attorney\\nGeneral Matthew G. Whitaker as the respondent.\\n\\f BARRON, Circuit Judge. Adolfo Franco-Ardon (\\\"Franco-\\n\\nArdon\\\"), a Guatemalan citizen, petitions for review of the Board\\n\\nof Immigration Appeals' (\\\"BIA\\\") denial of his motion to reopen his\\n\\n2012 order of removal. Franco-Ardon based that motion on his prior\\n\\ncounsel's alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to\\n\\nfile a brief with this Court in his petition for review of the\\n\\nBIA's denial of his earlier challenge to that removal order. We\\n\\ndeny the petition.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Franco-Ardon's petition arises from the following set of\\n\\ncircumstances. On January 18, 2012, the BIA affirmed the\\n\\nImmigration Judge's (IJ) decision ordering his removal and denying\\n\\nhis request for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection\\n\\nunder the Convention Against Torture. Franco-Ardon then\\n\\npetitioned for review of the BIA's ruling to our Court in Franco-\\n\\nArdon v. Holder, C.A. No. 12-1214. We dismissed the petition on\\n\\nOctober 23, 2012. We did so on the ground that Franco-Ardon had\\n\\nfailed to file a brief pursuant to Local Rules 45.0(a) and 3.0(b).\\n\\n Franco-Ardon thereafter made a number of applications\\n\\nfor a stay of removal to this Court, the last of which we denied\\n\\nin August of 2017 and thus many years after he had filed his\\n\\npetition for review of the BIA's ruling affirming his order of\\n\\nremoval. Franco-Ardon then retained new counsel, who investigated\\n\\nthe reasons for our dismissal of Franco-Ardon's 2012 petition for\\n\\n - 2 -\\n\\freview. That counsel informed Franco-Ardon that his petition for\\n\\nreview had been dismissed due to his former counsel's failure to\\n\\nfile a brief to our Court.\\n\\n In the wake of having been so informed, on January 10,\\n\\n2018, Franco-Ardon filed a motion to reopen with the BIA. He did\\n\\nso on the ground that his prior counsel had provided him with\\n\\nineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file the opening\\n\\nbrief before this Court in his petition for review. The BIA denied\\n\\nthe motion to reopen on May 18, 2018. The BIA concluded that\\n\\nFranco-Ardon had failed to establish either the requisite due\\n\\ndiligence to excuse his failure to comply with the 90-day filing\\n\\ndeadline for motions to reopen, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i),\\n\\nor a \\\"likelihood of success\\\" regarding his ineffective assistance\\n\\nof counsel claim \\\"based on prevailing First Circuit precedent\\\"\\n\\nwhich the BIA did not specify. Franco-Ardon now petitions from\\n\\nthe BIA's denial of his motion to reopen.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n The government contends that we lack jurisdiction over\\n\\nFranco-Ardon's petition for review because it challenges the BIA's\\n\\ndecision to reject a motion to reopen that is based on ineffective\\n\\nassistance of counsel that was allegedly rendered only after the\\n\\nBIA's earlier proceedings had come to an end. The government goes\\n\\non to contend that, even if we do have jurisdiction to review the\\n\\nBIA's ruling rejecting that ground for granting the motion to\\n\\n - 3 -\\n\\freopen, Franco-Ardon's petition for review must be denied for\\n\\neither of the two reasons that the BIA gave for denying the motion.\\n\\n We proceed on the assumption that we may review the BIA's\\n\\ndecision to deny Franco-Ardon's motion to reopen on the merits as,\\n\\neven on that assumption, the petition for review still must be\\n\\ndenied. See Morris v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2018).\\n\\nWe come to that conclusion even if we look past Franco-Ardon's\\n\\nyears-long delay in seeking the motion to reopen and focus,\\n\\ninstead, only on his challenge to the BIA's ruling concerning his\\n\\nfailure to show the \\\"likelihood of success\\\" that the BIA required\\n\\nhim to demonstrate with respect to his ineffective assistance of\\n\\ncounsel claim.\\n\\n Although the BIA was not entirely clear as to the basis\\n\\nfor its \\\"likelihood of success\\\" requirement, the parties appear to\\n\\nagree that the BIA was imposing, in effect, a prejudice\\n\\nrequirement, with respect to Franco-Ardon's ineffective assistance\\n\\nof counsel claim, such that in the absence of him demonstrating\\n\\nsufficient prejudice, his motion to reopen could be properly\\n\\ndenied. Franco-Ardon contends that the BIA erred in concluding\\n\\nthat his ineffective assistance of counsel claim could not support\\n\\nhis motion to reopen due to his failure to show prejudice on the\\n\\nbasis of two out-of-circuit precedents -- Dearinger v. Reno, 232\\n\\nF.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2000) and Gjondrekaj v. Mukasey, 269 Fed.\\n\\nApp'x. 106 (2nd Cir. 2008). But neither precedent supports his\\n\\n - 4 -\\n\\fcontention.\\n\\n Gjonderkaj holds that the BIA has the authority to grant\\n\\na motion to reopen based on an alien's allegation that he received\\n\\nineffective assistance of counsel that resulted in the waiver of\\n\\nthe alien's right to petition for review of the BIA's ruling\\n\\naffirming an order of removal to the Court of Appeals. 269 Fed.\\n\\nApp'x. at 108. But, Gjonderkaj did not address -- as it had no\\n\\noccasion to do so -- whether the BIA may require the alien who\\n\\nmakes such a motion to show that, absent the waiver, the petition\\n\\nfor review was likely to succeed. Thus, Gjondrekaj, which is not\\n\\ncontrolling in any event, provides no support for Franco-Ardon's\\n\\ncontention that the BIA erred in denying his motion to reopen\\n\\ninsofar as it did so because he failed to make that showing of\\n\\nprejudice here.\\n\\n Nor does Dearinger help Franco-Ardon establish that the\\n\\nBIA erred in that regard. In Dearinger, the Ninth Circuit drew an\\n\\nanalogy to Sixth Amendment precedents that govern ineffective\\n\\nassistance of counsel claims in criminal proceedings and held that\\n\\n\\\"prejudice is presumed\\\" when an alien receives ineffective\\n\\nassistance of counsel that results in the alien's waiver of the\\n\\nright to seek a timely federal court challenge to a BIA ruling\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 5 -\\n\\faffirming an order of deportation.1 Dearinger, 232 F.3d at 1045.\\n\\nBut, after Dearinger, we rejected a petition for review of the\\n\\nBIA's affirmance of the denial of a motion to reopen, in which the\\n\\nmotion had been based on the alleged ineffective assistance of the\\n\\nalien's counsel in waiving an appeal to the BIA. See Hernandez v.\\n\\nReno, 238 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2001). And, in doing so, we\\n\\ndeclined \\\"to extend[] the prejudice per se notion from criminal\\n\\nconvictions to review of waiver denials in deportations,\\\" while\\n\\nexpressly noting our disagreement on that score with the result in\\n\\nDearinger. Id. Thus, we cannot accept Franco-Ardon's request\\n\\nthat we now adopt Dearinger's holding that prejudice must be\\n\\npresumed and find that the BIA erred insofar as it ruled otherwise.\\n\\nAccord Bin Wang v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 363 Fed. App'x 888, 890-91\\n\\n(3d Cir. 2010) (rejecting a petitioner's argument that he received\\n\\nineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to\\n\\npetition for appellate review because the petitioner failed to\\n\\nshow a \\\"reasonable likelihood that the result would have been\\n\\ndifferent\\\" but for counsel's errors); Wen Fang Shi v. Holder, 349\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 Although the Court in Dearinger presumed prejudice from the\\nwaiver caused by the ineffective assistance of counsel, it went on\\nto note that the petitioner also needed to establish \\\"plausible\\ngrounds for relief,\\\" 232 F.3d at 1046, which it found to have been\\nsatisfied there without specifying the showing that an alien must\\nmake to satisfy that standard. The Ninth Circuit has since\\nexplained that Dearinger \\\"implicitly\\\" established a\\n\\\"rebuttable . . . presumption of prejudice.\\\" Rojas-Garcia v.\\nAshcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 826 (9th Cir. 2003).\\n\\n - 6 -\\n\\fFed. App'x 569, 570 (2d Cir. 2009) (same).\\n\\n Finally, Franco-Ardon fails to identify anything in the\\n\\nrecord that could suffice to compel the conclusion that he has\\n\\nshown the requisite prejudice from the alleged ineffective\\n\\nassistance of counsel on which he bases his motion to reopen, such\\n\\nas by demonstrating a likelihood of success with respect to his\\n\\noriginal petition for review had it not been waived. Instead,\\n\\nFranco-Ardon simply asserts -- in a conclusory manner -- that he\\n\\nhad meritorious issues to raise in that earlier petition. See\\n\\nUnited States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (treating\\n\\narguments not developed on appeal as waived).\\n\\n III.\\n\\n The petition for review is denied.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 7 -\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4391472/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARRON, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"LYNCH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"THOMPSON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614219/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Adolfo FRANCO-ARDON, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\n\nNo. 18-1522\n\n ADOLFO FRANCO-ARDON,\n\n Petitioner,\n\n v.\n\n WILLIAM P. BARR,\n ATTORNEY GENERAL,\n\n Respondent.\n\n\n PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE\n BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS\n\n\n Before\n Lynch, Thompson, and Barron,\n Circuit Judges.\n\n\n Randy Olen on brief for petitioner.\n Laura Halliday Hickein, Trial Attorney, Joseph H. Hunt,\nAssistant Attorney General, Shelley R. Goad, Assistant Director,\nOffice of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, on\nbrief for respondent.\n\n\n\n April 26, 2019\n\n\n\t\n\n\n\n \n Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Attorney General\nWilliam P. Barr has been substituted for former Acting Attorney\nGeneral Matthew G. Whitaker as the respondent.\n\f BARRON, Circuit Judge. Adolfo Franco-Ardon (\"Franco-\n\nArdon\"), a Guatemalan citizen, petitions for review of the Board\n\nof Immigration Appeals' (\"BIA\") denial of his motion to reopen his\n\n2012 order of removal. Franco-Ardon based that motion on his prior\n\ncounsel's alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to\n\nfile a brief with this Court in his petition for review of the\n\nBIA's denial of his earlier challenge to that removal order. We\n\ndeny the petition.\n\n I.\n\n Franco-Ardon's petition arises from the following set of\n\ncircumstances. On January 18, 2012, the BIA affirmed the\n\nImmigration Judge's (IJ) decision ordering his removal and denying\n\nhis request for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection\n\nunder the Convention Against Torture. Franco-Ardon then\n\npetitioned for review of the BIA's ruling to our Court in Franco-\n\nArdon v. Holder, C.A. No. 12-1214. We dismissed the petition on\n\nOctober 23, 2012. We did so on the ground that Franco-Ardon had\n\nfailed to file a brief pursuant to Local Rules 45.0(a) and 3.0(b).\n\n Franco-Ardon thereafter made a number of applications\n\nfor a stay of removal to this Court, the last of which we denied\n\nin August of 2017 and thus many years after he had filed his\n\npetition for review of the BIA's ruling affirming his order of\n\nremoval. Franco-Ardon then retained new counsel, who investigated\n\nthe reasons for our dismissal of Franco-Ardon's 2012 petition for\n\n - 2 -\n\freview. That counsel informed Franco-Ardon that his petition for\n\nreview had been dismissed due to his former counsel's failure to\n\nfile a brief to our Court.\n\n In the wake of having been so informed, on January 10,\n\n2018, Franco-Ardon filed a motion to reopen with the BIA. He did\n\nso on the ground that his prior counsel had provided him with\n\nineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file the opening\n\nbrief before this Court in his petition for review. The BIA denied\n\nthe motion to reopen on May 18, 2018. The BIA concluded that\n\nFranco-Ardon had failed to establish either the requisite due\n\ndiligence to excuse his failure to comply with the 90-day filing\n\ndeadline for motions to reopen, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i),\n\nor a \"likelihood of success\" regarding his ineffective assistance\n\nof counsel claim \"based on prevailing First Circuit precedent\"\n\nwhich the BIA did not specify. Franco-Ardon now petitions from\n\nthe BIA's denial of his motion to reopen.\n\n II.\n\n The government contends that we lack jurisdiction over\n\nFranco-Ardon's petition for review because it challenges the BIA's\n\ndecision to reject a motion to reopen that is based on ineffective\n\nassistance of counsel that was allegedly rendered only after the\n\nBIA's earlier proceedings had come to an end. The government goes\n\non to contend that, even if we do have jurisdiction to review the\n\nBIA's ruling rejecting that ground for granting the motion to\n\n - 3 -\n\freopen, Franco-Ardon's petition for review must be denied for\n\neither of the two reasons that the BIA gave for denying the motion.\n\n We proceed on the assumption that we may review the BIA's\n\ndecision to deny Franco-Ardon's motion to reopen on the merits as,\n\neven on that assumption, the petition for review still must be\n\ndenied. See Morris v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2018).\n\nWe come to that conclusion even if we look past Franco-Ardon's\n\nyears-long delay in seeking the motion to reopen and focus,\n\ninstead, only on his challenge to the BIA's ruling concerning his\n\nfailure to show the \"likelihood of success\" that the BIA required\n\nhim to demonstrate with respect to his ineffective assistance of\n\ncounsel claim.\n\n Although the BIA was not entirely clear as to the basis\n\nfor its \"likelihood of success\" requirement, the parties appear to\n\nagree that the BIA was imposing, in effect, a prejudice\n\nrequirement, with respect to Franco-Ardon's ineffective assistance\n\nof counsel claim, such that in the absence of him demonstrating\n\nsufficient prejudice, his motion to reopen could be properly\n\ndenied. Franco-Ardon contends that the BIA erred in concluding\n\nthat his ineffective assistance of counsel claim could not support\n\nhis motion to reopen due to his failure to show prejudice on the\n\nbasis of two out-of-circuit precedents -- Dearinger v. Reno, 232\n\nF.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2000) and Gjondrekaj v. Mukasey, 269 Fed.\n\nApp'x. 106 (2nd Cir. 2008). But neither precedent supports his\n\n - 4 -\n\fcontention.\n\n Gjonderkaj holds that the BIA has the authority to grant\n\na motion to reopen based on an alien's allegation that he received\n\nineffective assistance of counsel that resulted in the waiver of\n\nthe alien's right to petition for review of the BIA's ruling\n\naffirming an order of removal to the Court of Appeals. 269 Fed.\n\nApp'x. at 108. But, Gjonderkaj did not address -- as it had no\n\noccasion to do so -- whether the BIA may require the alien who\n\nmakes such a motion to show that, absent the waiver, the petition\n\nfor review was likely to succeed. Thus, Gjondrekaj, which is not\n\ncontrolling in any event, provides no support for Franco-Ardon's\n\ncontention that the BIA erred in denying his motion to reopen\n\ninsofar as it did so because he failed to make that showing of\n\nprejudice here.\n\n Nor does Dearinger help Franco-Ardon establish that the\n\nBIA erred in that regard. In Dearinger, the Ninth Circuit drew an\n\nanalogy to Sixth Amendment precedents that govern ineffective\n\nassistance of counsel claims in criminal proceedings and held that\n\n\"prejudice is presumed\" when an alien receives ineffective\n\nassistance of counsel that results in the alien's waiver of the\n\nright to seek a timely federal court challenge to a BIA ruling\n\n\n\n\n - 5 -\n\faffirming an order of deportation.1 Dearinger, 232 F.3d at 1045.\n\nBut, after Dearinger, we rejected a petition for review of the\n\nBIA's affirmance of the denial of a motion to reopen, in which the\n\nmotion had been based on the alleged ineffective assistance of the\n\nalien's counsel in waiving an appeal to the BIA. See Hernandez v.\n\nReno, 238 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2001). And, in doing so, we\n\ndeclined \"to extend[] the prejudice per se notion from criminal\n\nconvictions to review of waiver denials in deportations,\" while\n\nexpressly noting our disagreement on that score with the result in\n\nDearinger. Id. Thus, we cannot accept Franco-Ardon's request\n\nthat we now adopt Dearinger's holding that prejudice must be\n\npresumed and find that the BIA erred insofar as it ruled otherwise.\n\nAccord Bin Wang v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 363 Fed. App'x 888, 890-91\n\n(3d Cir. 2010) (rejecting a petitioner's argument that he received\n\nineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to\n\npetition for appellate review because the petitioner failed to\n\nshow a \"reasonable likelihood that the result would have been\n\ndifferent\" but for counsel's errors); Wen Fang Shi v. Holder, 349\n\n\n\n 1 Although the Court in Dearinger presumed prejudice from the\nwaiver caused by the ineffective assistance of counsel, it went on\nto note that the petitioner also needed to establish \"plausible\ngrounds for relief,\" 232 F.3d at 1046, which it found to have been\nsatisfied there without specifying the showing that an alien must\nmake to satisfy that standard. The Ninth Circuit has since\nexplained that Dearinger \"implicitly\" established a\n\"rebuttable . . . presumption of prejudice.\" Rojas-Garcia v.\nAshcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 826 (9th Cir. 2003).\n\n - 6 -\n\fFed. App'x 569, 570 (2d Cir. 2009) (same).\n\n Finally, Franco-Ardon fails to identify anything in the\n\nrecord that could suffice to compel the conclusion that he has\n\nshown the requisite prejudice from the alleged ineffective\n\nassistance of counsel on which he bases his motion to reopen, such\n\nas by demonstrating a likelihood of success with respect to his\n\noriginal petition for review had it not been waived. Instead,\n\nFranco-Ardon simply asserts -- in a conclusory manner -- that he\n\nhad meritorious issues to raise in that earlier petition. See\n\nUnited States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (treating\n\narguments not developed on appeal as waived).\n\n III.\n\n The petition for review is denied.\n\n\n\n\n - 7 -\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Adolfo FRANCO-ARDON, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the First Circuit\\n\\nNo. 18-1522\\n\\n ADOLFO FRANCO-ARDON,\\n\\n Petitioner,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n WILLIAM P. BARR,\\n ATTORNEY GENERAL,\\n\\n Respondent.\\n\\n\\n PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE\\n BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS\\n\\n\\n Before\\n Lynch, Thompson, and Barron,\\n Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\n Randy Olen on brief for petitioner.\\n Laura Halliday Hickein, Trial Attorney, Joseph H. Hunt,\\nAssistant Attorney General, Shelley R. Goad, Assistant Director,\\nOffice of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, on\\nbrief for respondent.\\n\\n\\n\\n April 26, 2019\\n\\n\\n\\t\\n\\n\\n\\n \\n Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Attorney General\\nWilliam P. Barr has been substituted for former Acting Attorney\\nGeneral Matthew G. Whitaker as the respondent.\\n\\f BARRON, Circuit Judge. Adolfo Franco-Ardon (\\\"Franco-\\n\\nArdon\\\"), a Guatemalan citizen, petitions for review of the Board\\n\\nof Immigration Appeals' (\\\"BIA\\\") denial of his motion to reopen his\\n\\n2012 order of removal. Franco-Ardon based that motion on his prior\\n\\ncounsel's alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to\\n\\nfile a brief with this Court in his petition for review of the\\n\\nBIA's denial of his earlier challenge to that removal order. We\\n\\ndeny the petition.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Franco-Ardon's petition arises from the following set of\\n\\ncircumstances. On January 18, 2012, the BIA affirmed the\\n\\nImmigration Judge's (IJ) decision ordering his removal and denying\\n\\nhis request for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection\\n\\nunder the Convention Against Torture. Franco-Ardon then\\n\\npetitioned for review of the BIA's ruling to our Court in Franco-\\n\\nArdon v. Holder, C.A. No. 12-1214. We dismissed the petition on\\n\\nOctober 23, 2012. We did so on the ground that Franco-Ardon had\\n\\nfailed to file a brief pursuant to Local Rules 45.0(a) and 3.0(b).\\n\\n Franco-Ardon thereafter made a number of applications\\n\\nfor a stay of removal to this Court, the last of which we denied\\n\\nin August of 2017 and thus many years after he had filed his\\n\\npetition for review of the BIA's ruling affirming his order of\\n\\nremoval. Franco-Ardon then retained new counsel, who investigated\\n\\nthe reasons for our dismissal of Franco-Ardon's 2012 petition for\\n\\n - 2 -\\n\\freview. That counsel informed Franco-Ardon that his petition for\\n\\nreview had been dismissed due to his former counsel's failure to\\n\\nfile a brief to our Court.\\n\\n In the wake of having been so informed, on January 10,\\n\\n2018, Franco-Ardon filed a motion to reopen with the BIA. He did\\n\\nso on the ground that his prior counsel had provided him with\\n\\nineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file the opening\\n\\nbrief before this Court in his petition for review. The BIA denied\\n\\nthe motion to reopen on May 18, 2018. The BIA concluded that\\n\\nFranco-Ardon had failed to establish either the requisite due\\n\\ndiligence to excuse his failure to comply with the 90-day filing\\n\\ndeadline for motions to reopen, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i),\\n\\nor a \\\"likelihood of success\\\" regarding his ineffective assistance\\n\\nof counsel claim \\\"based on prevailing First Circuit precedent\\\"\\n\\nwhich the BIA did not specify. Franco-Ardon now petitions from\\n\\nthe BIA's denial of his motion to reopen.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n The government contends that we lack jurisdiction over\\n\\nFranco-Ardon's petition for review because it challenges the BIA's\\n\\ndecision to reject a motion to reopen that is based on ineffective\\n\\nassistance of counsel that was allegedly rendered only after the\\n\\nBIA's earlier proceedings had come to an end. The government goes\\n\\non to contend that, even if we do have jurisdiction to review the\\n\\nBIA's ruling rejecting that ground for granting the motion to\\n\\n - 3 -\\n\\freopen, Franco-Ardon's petition for review must be denied for\\n\\neither of the two reasons that the BIA gave for denying the motion.\\n\\n We proceed on the assumption that we may review the BIA's\\n\\ndecision to deny Franco-Ardon's motion to reopen on the merits as,\\n\\neven on that assumption, the petition for review still must be\\n\\ndenied. See Morris v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2018).\\n\\nWe come to that conclusion even if we look past Franco-Ardon's\\n\\nyears-long delay in seeking the motion to reopen and focus,\\n\\ninstead, only on his challenge to the BIA's ruling concerning his\\n\\nfailure to show the \\\"likelihood of success\\\" that the BIA required\\n\\nhim to demonstrate with respect to his ineffective assistance of\\n\\ncounsel claim.\\n\\n Although the BIA was not entirely clear as to the basis\\n\\nfor its \\\"likelihood of success\\\" requirement, the parties appear to\\n\\nagree that the BIA was imposing, in effect, a prejudice\\n\\nrequirement, with respect to Franco-Ardon's ineffective assistance\\n\\nof counsel claim, such that in the absence of him demonstrating\\n\\nsufficient prejudice, his motion to reopen could be properly\\n\\ndenied. Franco-Ardon contends that the BIA erred in concluding\\n\\nthat his ineffective assistance of counsel claim could not support\\n\\nhis motion to reopen due to his failure to show prejudice on the\\n\\nbasis of two out-of-circuit precedents -- Dearinger v. Reno, 232\\n\\nF.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2000) and Gjondrekaj v. Mukasey, 269 Fed.\\n\\nApp'x. 106 (2nd Cir. 2008). But neither precedent supports his\\n\\n - 4 -\\n\\fcontention.\\n\\n Gjonderkaj holds that the BIA has the authority to grant\\n\\na motion to reopen based on an alien's allegation that he received\\n\\nineffective assistance of counsel that resulted in the waiver of\\n\\nthe alien's right to petition for review of the BIA's ruling\\n\\naffirming an order of removal to the Court of Appeals. 269 Fed.\\n\\nApp'x. at 108. But, Gjonderkaj did not address -- as it had no\\n\\noccasion to do so -- whether the BIA may require the alien who\\n\\nmakes such a motion to show that, absent the waiver, the petition\\n\\nfor review was likely to succeed. Thus, Gjondrekaj, which is not\\n\\ncontrolling in any event, provides no support for Franco-Ardon's\\n\\ncontention that the BIA erred in denying his motion to reopen\\n\\ninsofar as it did so because he failed to make that showing of\\n\\nprejudice here.\\n\\n Nor does Dearinger help Franco-Ardon establish that the\\n\\nBIA erred in that regard. In Dearinger, the Ninth Circuit drew an\\n\\nanalogy to Sixth Amendment precedents that govern ineffective\\n\\nassistance of counsel claims in criminal proceedings and held that\\n\\n\\\"prejudice is presumed\\\" when an alien receives ineffective\\n\\nassistance of counsel that results in the alien's waiver of the\\n\\nright to seek a timely federal court challenge to a BIA ruling\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 5 -\\n\\faffirming an order of deportation.1 Dearinger, 232 F.3d at 1045.\\n\\nBut, after Dearinger, we rejected a petition for review of the\\n\\nBIA's affirmance of the denial of a motion to reopen, in which the\\n\\nmotion had been based on the alleged ineffective assistance of the\\n\\nalien's counsel in waiving an appeal to the BIA. See Hernandez v.\\n\\nReno, 238 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2001). And, in doing so, we\\n\\ndeclined \\\"to extend[] the prejudice per se notion from criminal\\n\\nconvictions to review of waiver denials in deportations,\\\" while\\n\\nexpressly noting our disagreement on that score with the result in\\n\\nDearinger. Id. Thus, we cannot accept Franco-Ardon's request\\n\\nthat we now adopt Dearinger's holding that prejudice must be\\n\\npresumed and find that the BIA erred insofar as it ruled otherwise.\\n\\nAccord Bin Wang v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 363 Fed. App'x 888, 890-91\\n\\n(3d Cir. 2010) (rejecting a petitioner's argument that he received\\n\\nineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to\\n\\npetition for appellate review because the petitioner failed to\\n\\nshow a \\\"reasonable likelihood that the result would have been\\n\\ndifferent\\\" but for counsel's errors); Wen Fang Shi v. Holder, 349\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 Although the Court in Dearinger presumed prejudice from the\\nwaiver caused by the ineffective assistance of counsel, it went on\\nto note that the petitioner also needed to establish \\\"plausible\\ngrounds for relief,\\\" 232 F.3d at 1046, which it found to have been\\nsatisfied there without specifying the showing that an alien must\\nmake to satisfy that standard. The Ninth Circuit has since\\nexplained that Dearinger \\\"implicitly\\\" established a\\n\\\"rebuttable . . . presumption of prejudice.\\\" Rojas-Garcia v.\\nAshcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 826 (9th Cir. 2003).\\n\\n - 6 -\\n\\fFed. App'x 569, 570 (2d Cir. 2009) (same).\\n\\n Finally, Franco-Ardon fails to identify anything in the\\n\\nrecord that could suffice to compel the conclusion that he has\\n\\nshown the requisite prejudice from the alleged ineffective\\n\\nassistance of counsel on which he bases his motion to reopen, such\\n\\nas by demonstrating a likelihood of success with respect to his\\n\\noriginal petition for review had it not been waived. Instead,\\n\\nFranco-Ardon simply asserts -- in a conclusory manner -- that he\\n\\nhad meritorious issues to raise in that earlier petition. See\\n\\nUnited States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (treating\\n\\narguments not developed on appeal as waived).\\n\\n III.\\n\\n The petition for review is denied.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 7 -\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1494,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4614579,"string":"4,614,579"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Daniel GRAJALES; Wanda I. González; Conjugal Partnership Grajales-González, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. PUERTO RICO PORTS AUTHORITY, Defendant, Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Grajales v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-29"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1424P"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Howard, Thompson, Barron\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BARRON, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the First Circuit\\n\\n\\nNo. 18-1424\\n\\n DANIEL GRAJALES; WANDA I. GONZÁLEZ;\\n CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP GRAJALES-GONZÁLEZ,\\n\\n Plaintiffs, Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n PUERTO RICO PORTS AUTHORITY,\\n\\n Defendant, Appellee.\\n\\n\\n APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO\\n\\n [Hon. Pedro A. Delgado-Hernández, U.S. District Judge]\\n\\n\\n Before\\n\\n Howard, Chief Judge,\\n Thompson and Barron, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\n Eugenio W.A. Géigel-Simounet, with whom Géigel-Simounet Law\\nOffices C.S.P. was on brief for appellants.\\n Luis E. Palou Balsa, with whom Jennifer Lopez-Negrón and\\nNolla, Palou & Casellas LLC were on brief for appellee.\\n\\n\\n April 29, 2019\\n\\f BARRON, Circuit Judge. This appeal is the latest to\\n\\nhave reached us concerning a suit that Daniel Grajales, his wife,\\n\\nand their children bring under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Puerto Rico\\n\\nlaw against the Puerto Rico Ports Authority (the \\\"PRPA\\\") and\\n\\nseveral of its employees after the PRPA transferred him from one\\n\\nposting at the PRPA to another and then eventually terminated his\\n\\nemployment. In this appeal, Grajales asks us to overturn the\\n\\nDistrict Court's grant of summary judgment to the PRPA on res\\n\\njudicata grounds. We affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n This appeal represents Grajales's third in this case.\\n\\nSee Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2012)\\n\\n(\\\"Grajales I\\\"); Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 831 F.3d 11 (1st\\n\\nCir. 2016) (\\\"Grajales II\\\"). In brief, Grajales alleges that he\\n\\nwas transferred to a new job location and subsequently terminated\\n\\nfrom his employment with the PRPA because of both his political\\n\\naffiliation and his reporting of alleged safety violations by PRPA\\n\\nemployees to the Puerto Rico Occupational Safety and Health\\n\\nAdministration. See Grajales II, 831 F.3d at 14.\\n\\n Grajales filed the operative complaint in the District\\n\\nof Puerto Rico on August 31, 2012. He alleged that the PRPA, by\\n\\ntaking such actions against him, violated the First Amendment of\\n\\nthe Federal Constitution and various provisions of Puerto Rico\\n\\nlaw. His wife and their minor children also brought claims against\\n\\n\\n - 2 -\\n\\fthe PRPA, in which they sought damages under a Puerto Rico tort\\n\\nstatute that permits relatives of those unlawfully terminated from\\n\\nemployment to bring derivative claims.\\n\\n On May 18, 2012, just before Grajales filed his complaint\\n\\nin federal court, the Secretary of Labor and Human Resources of\\n\\nPuerto Rico (the \\\"Secretary of Labor\\\"), \\\"representing and for the\\n\\nbenefit of\\\" Grajales, filed a civil complaint against the PRPA in\\n\\nthe Puerto Rico Court of First Instance. See Complaint, Sec'y of\\n\\nLabor & Human Res. v. P.R. Ports Auth., No. AC2012-0079 (P.R. Ct.\\n\\nof First Instance May 18, 2012). The Secretary of Labor alleged\\n\\nin that complaint that Grajales had observed and reported an\\n\\nincident that involved the safety of another employee, that the\\n\\nPRPA had terminated Grajales in retaliation for his reporting of\\n\\nthe incident, and that an investigation by the Puerto Rico\\n\\nDepartment of Labor had found that the PRPA engaged in practices\\n\\nthat endangered the authority's employees. The Secretary of Labor\\n\\nsought Grajales's reinstatement and back pay for him on the basis\\n\\nof Puerto Rico's Occupational Safety and Health Act, P.R. Laws\\n\\nAnn. tit. 29, § 361aa, and Puerto Rico's Retaliation in the Work\\n\\nPlace Law, id. § 194a.\\n\\n On May 17, 2017, while Grajales's federal suit against\\n\\nthe PRPA was still pending, the Court of First Instance entered\\n\\njudgment in favor of the PRPA. The Court of First Instance ruled\\n\\nthat Grajales's termination was justified for a number of non-\\n\\n\\n - 3 -\\n\\fretaliatory reasons, including acts of insubordination, violation\\n\\nof various PRPA policies, and disrespectful behavior that created\\n\\na hostile work environment for others. The Court of First Instance\\n\\nalso rejected Grajales's contention that he was terminated in\\n\\nretaliation for his reporting activity.\\n\\n The PRPA then moved for summary judgment in the District\\n\\nof Puerto Rico case on res judicata grounds in light of the ruling\\n\\nby the Court of First Instance, and the District Court granted\\n\\nthat motion. Grajales now appeals from that judgment.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n We are dealing here with the claimed res judicata effect\\n\\nof a judgment of a Commonwealth court and thus with a judgment\\n\\nthat, under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, must be given \\\"full faith and\\n\\ncredit.\\\" Id.; see also R.G. Fin. Corp. v. Vergara-Nuñez, 446 F.3d\\n\\n178, 182-83 (1st Cir. 2006). In keeping with this statute, we\\n\\nmust give the same res judicata effect to that judgment as the\\n\\njurisdiction that issued it would give it in its own courts. 28\\n\\nU.S.C. § 1738; see also R.G. Fin. Corp., 446 F.3d at 182-83. Thus,\\n\\nwe apply Puerto Rico law to determine the preclusive effect of the\\n\\njudgment of the Court of First Instance. R.G. Fin. Corp., 446\\n\\nF.3d at 182-83. Our review of the District Court's res judicata\\n\\ndetermination is de novo. Id. at 182.\\n\\n Puerto Rico's Civil Code provides, in relevant part:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 4 -\\n\\f In order that the presumption of the res\\n adjudicata may be valid in another suit, it is\\n necessary that, between the case decided by\\n the sentence and that in which the same is\\n invoked, there be the most perfect identity\\n between the things, causes, and persons of the\\n litigants, and their capacity as such.\\n\\nP.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 3343. Thus, to demonstrate that the\\n\\njudgment of the Court of First Instance has res judicata effect\\n\\nhere, the PRPA \\\"must establish three elements: (i) the existence\\n\\nof a prior judgment on the merits that is 'final and unappealable';\\n\\n(ii) a perfect identity of thing or cause between both actions;\\n\\nand (iii) a perfect identity of the parties and the capacities in\\n\\nwhich they acted.\\\" R.G. Fin. Corp., 446 F.3d at 183 (quoting\\n\\nBoateng v. InterAm Univ., Inc., 210 F.3d 56, 61-62 (1st Cir. 2000))\\n\\n(applying Puerto Rico law). Even if the PRPA makes that showing,\\n\\nhowever, res judicata effect may not be given under Puerto Rico\\n\\nlaw to the judgment of the Court of First Instance if \\\"doing so\\n\\nwould defeat the 'ends of justice, especially if reasons of public\\n\\npolicy are involved.'\\\" Núñez-Colón v. Toledo-Dávila, 648 F.3d 15,\\n\\n19 (quoting Bonafont Solís v. Am. Eagle, Exec. Airline, Inc., 1997\\n\\nP.R. Eng. 423416, 1997 WL 423416 (P.R. 1997)).\\n\\n We start with the claims that Grajales brings in his own\\n\\nright, before then turning to the derivative claims of his wife\\n\\nand children. With respect to the claim that he brings on his\\n\\nown, Grajales first contends that the PRPA failed to establish\\n\\nthat the \\\"perfect identity of thing or cause\\\" element had been\\n\\n\\n - 5 -\\n\\fsatisfied. Specifically, he contends that the claims that the\\n\\nSecretary of Labor brought on his behalf in the Court of First\\n\\nInstance \\\"could not include a claim for damages or for [a] First\\n\\nAmendment violation\\\" and was only for the \\\"purpose of reinstating\\n\\n[him] to his previous position\\\" and to recover lost wages.\\n\\n But, the \\\"identity of thing or cause,\\\" we have explained,\\n\\n\\\"refers to factual cause\\\" and is satisfied where two actions \\\"flow\\n\\nfrom the same principal ground or origin.\\\" R.G. Fin. Corp., 446\\n\\nF.3d at 183 (citing Lausell Marxuach v. Diaz de Yanez, 3 P.R.\\n\\nOffic. Trans. 742, 746 (1975)). Thus, \\\"a mere difference in the\\n\\nlegal theories on which two causes of action are grounded does not\\n\\ndestroy the identity of thing or cause that otherwise exists\\n\\nbetween two suits arising out of a common nucleus of operative\\n\\nfact.\\\" Id. at 184 (citing Boateng, 210 F.3d at 62). Instead,\\n\\nthere may still be an \\\"identity of thing or cause\\\" between\\n\\nCommonwealth and federal actions -- notwithstanding the different\\n\\nlegal theories and remedies sought in each -- if they share \\\"a\\n\\ncommon nucleus of operative fact.\\\" See id.\\n\\n We conclude that the District Court correctly determined\\n\\nthat the two actions at issue here do share \\\"a common nucleus of\\n\\noperative fact.\\\" Id. As the PRPA explains, in both actions\\n\\nGrajales \\\"claims he was dismissed from his employment in\\n\\nretaliation for complaining about safety issues in the workplace\\n\\nand/or participating in an investigation performed by [Puerto Rico\\n\\n\\n - 6 -\\n\\fsafety agencies].\\\" Accordingly, we reject Grajales's challenge on\\n\\nthis score.\\n\\n Grajales also relies on Puerto Rico's \\\"public policy\\n\\nexception,\\\" which prevents the application of res judicata in\\n\\n\\\"special circumstances.\\\" García-Monagas v. De Arellano, 674 F.3d\\n\\n45, 56 (1st Cir. 2012). Specifically, Grajales contends that his\\n\\ncase presents such \\\"special circumstances\\\" because the Secretary\\n\\nbrought the prior suit in the Court of First Instance to remedy a\\n\\n\\\"violation of . . . Puerto Rico Public Policy\\\" and that the Puerto\\n\\nRico court \\\"frustrated the ends of justice\\\" by deciding the matter\\n\\n\\\"on documents only,\\\" i.e., at summary judgment.\\n\\n But, the first case that Grajales relies on to support\\n\\nthis argument, Pagán-Hernández v. University of Puerto Rico, 7\\n\\nP.R. Offic. Trans. 795 (P.R. 1978), makes clear that even the\\n\\n\\\"invocation of a constitutional right\\\" is not sufficient, in and\\n\\nof itself, to warrant application of the public policy exception.\\n\\nId. at 808. We thus fail to see how the nature of the claims that\\n\\nGrajales brings suffices to show that the public policy exception\\n\\nto res judicata applies in this case. Nor does Grajales identify\\n\\nany authority that requires the conclusion that res judicata effect\\n\\nmay not be given to a judgment of a Commonwealth court just because\\n\\nthat court dismissed claims of the sort that Grajales brings here\\n\\nvia summary judgment rather than after a trial.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 7 -\\n\\f In his reply brief, Grajales cites Ramos-González v.\\n\\nFélix-Medina, 21 P.R. Offic. Trans. 304 (P.R. 1988), to support\\n\\nhis argument that his circumstances should fall into the public\\n\\npolicy exception. In that case, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court\\n\\napplied the exception to allow to go forward claims alleging\\n\\nserious misconduct by three marshals of the Puerto Rico General\\n\\nCourt of Justice that had been dismissed based on the plaintiff's\\n\\nfailure to prosecute the action in the Commonwealth court. Id. at\\n\\n309-11.\\n\\n The Ramos-González court identified \\\"exceptional\\n\\nreasons\\\" compelling it \\\"to set aside the finality of a judgment.\\\"\\n\\nId. at 333. The court explained that it would set a \\\"bad precedent\\\"\\n\\nto permit a \\\"procedural technicality\\\" -- namely, the dismissal of\\n\\nthe claims based on the plaintiff's failure to prosecute -- \\\"to\\n\\ndefeat the claim of some citizens against three officers of this\\n\\nbranch of government who allegedly tried to take advantage of their\\n\\nposition as such.\\\" Id. at 334. The court concluded in that\\n\\nconnection that \\\"[t]here is a public interest at stake in the\\n\\ninstant case: the purity of the judicial process and the trust in\\n\\nits institutions.\\\" Id. at 334.\\n\\n Here, we see no similarly \\\"exceptional reasons\\\" to\\n\\ncompel us \\\"to set aside the finality of a judgment,\\\" id. at 333,\\n\\ngiven both the differing nature of the claims that are at issue\\n\\nhere and the fact that they were dismissed based on a grant of\\n\\n\\n - 8 -\\n\\fsummary judgment and not by reason of what Ramos-Gonzalez\\n\\ncharacterized as a \\\"procedural technicality.\\\" Id. at 334. We\\n\\nthus reject this ground for not giving res judicata effect to the\\n\\njudgment of the Court of First instance.\\n\\n We turn, then, to the claims that are brought by\\n\\nGrajales' wife and children. The contention is that res judicata\\n\\ndoes not bar these claims because the PRPA has failed to show that\\n\\nthere is a \\\"perfect identity . . . of parties\\\" between the two\\n\\nactions that are at issue, given that the Secretary of Labor\\n\\nbrought the suit in the Court of First Instance only on Grajales's\\n\\nbehalf. But, the District Court concluded that the claims of\\n\\nGrajales's wife and children are brought only \\\"under Article 1802\\n\\nof the Puerto Rico Civil Code,\\\" and no contrary argument has been\\n\\nmade on appeal. That feature of the case matters because, as the\\n\\nDistrict Court explained, Article 1802 claims are \\\"derivative of\\n\\nthe principal plaintiff's claim in that [they are] premised on\\n\\nsome harm to the principal plaintiff, and 'if the principal\\n\\nplaintiff's claim fails, so too does the relative's derivative\\n\\nclaim.'\\\" Pagán-Colón v. Walgreens of San Patricio, Inc., 697 F.3d\\n\\n1, 16 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting González-Figueroa v. J.C. Penney\\n\\nP.R., Inc., 568 F.3d 313, 320 (1st Cir. 2009)). Thus, because\\n\\nGrajales's own claims are barred by res judicata, the derivative\\n\\nclaims of his wife and children necessarily fail.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 9 -\\n\\f III.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the\\n\\nDistrict Court.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 10 -\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4391832/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARRON, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"HOWARD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"THOMPSON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614579/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Daniel GRAJALES; Wanda I. González; Conjugal Partnership Grajales-González, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. PUERTO RICO PORTS AUTHORITY, Defendant, Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-29\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\n\n\nNo. 18-1424\n\n DANIEL GRAJALES; WANDA I. GONZÁLEZ;\n CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP GRAJALES-GONZÁLEZ,\n\n Plaintiffs, Appellants,\n\n v.\n\n PUERTO RICO PORTS AUTHORITY,\n\n Defendant, Appellee.\n\n\n APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO\n\n [Hon. Pedro A. Delgado-Hernández, U.S. District Judge]\n\n\n Before\n\n Howard, Chief Judge,\n Thompson and Barron, Circuit Judges.\n\n\n Eugenio W.A. Géigel-Simounet, with whom Géigel-Simounet Law\nOffices C.S.P. was on brief for appellants.\n Luis E. Palou Balsa, with whom Jennifer Lopez-Negrón and\nNolla, Palou & Casellas LLC were on brief for appellee.\n\n\n April 29, 2019\n\f BARRON, Circuit Judge. This appeal is the latest to\n\nhave reached us concerning a suit that Daniel Grajales, his wife,\n\nand their children bring under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Puerto Rico\n\nlaw against the Puerto Rico Ports Authority (the \"PRPA\") and\n\nseveral of its employees after the PRPA transferred him from one\n\nposting at the PRPA to another and then eventually terminated his\n\nemployment. In this appeal, Grajales asks us to overturn the\n\nDistrict Court's grant of summary judgment to the PRPA on res\n\njudicata grounds. We affirm.\n\n I.\n\n This appeal represents Grajales's third in this case.\n\nSee Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2012)\n\n(\"Grajales I\"); Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 831 F.3d 11 (1st\n\nCir. 2016) (\"Grajales II\"). In brief, Grajales alleges that he\n\nwas transferred to a new job location and subsequently terminated\n\nfrom his employment with the PRPA because of both his political\n\naffiliation and his reporting of alleged safety violations by PRPA\n\nemployees to the Puerto Rico Occupational Safety and Health\n\nAdministration. See Grajales II, 831 F.3d at 14.\n\n Grajales filed the operative complaint in the District\n\nof Puerto Rico on August 31, 2012. He alleged that the PRPA, by\n\ntaking such actions against him, violated the First Amendment of\n\nthe Federal Constitution and various provisions of Puerto Rico\n\nlaw. His wife and their minor children also brought claims against\n\n\n - 2 -\n\fthe PRPA, in which they sought damages under a Puerto Rico tort\n\nstatute that permits relatives of those unlawfully terminated from\n\nemployment to bring derivative claims.\n\n On May 18, 2012, just before Grajales filed his complaint\n\nin federal court, the Secretary of Labor and Human Resources of\n\nPuerto Rico (the \"Secretary of Labor\"), \"representing and for the\n\nbenefit of\" Grajales, filed a civil complaint against the PRPA in\n\nthe Puerto Rico Court of First Instance. See Complaint, Sec'y of\n\nLabor & Human Res. v. P.R. Ports Auth., No. AC2012-0079 (P.R. Ct.\n\nof First Instance May 18, 2012). The Secretary of Labor alleged\n\nin that complaint that Grajales had observed and reported an\n\nincident that involved the safety of another employee, that the\n\nPRPA had terminated Grajales in retaliation for his reporting of\n\nthe incident, and that an investigation by the Puerto Rico\n\nDepartment of Labor had found that the PRPA engaged in practices\n\nthat endangered the authority's employees. The Secretary of Labor\n\nsought Grajales's reinstatement and back pay for him on the basis\n\nof Puerto Rico's Occupational Safety and Health Act, P.R. Laws\n\nAnn. tit. 29, § 361aa, and Puerto Rico's Retaliation in the Work\n\nPlace Law, id. § 194a.\n\n On May 17, 2017, while Grajales's federal suit against\n\nthe PRPA was still pending, the Court of First Instance entered\n\njudgment in favor of the PRPA. The Court of First Instance ruled\n\nthat Grajales's termination was justified for a number of non-\n\n\n - 3 -\n\fretaliatory reasons, including acts of insubordination, violation\n\nof various PRPA policies, and disrespectful behavior that created\n\na hostile work environment for others. The Court of First Instance\n\nalso rejected Grajales's contention that he was terminated in\n\nretaliation for his reporting activity.\n\n The PRPA then moved for summary judgment in the District\n\nof Puerto Rico case on res judicata grounds in light of the ruling\n\nby the Court of First Instance, and the District Court granted\n\nthat motion. Grajales now appeals from that judgment.\n\n II.\n\n We are dealing here with the claimed res judicata effect\n\nof a judgment of a Commonwealth court and thus with a judgment\n\nthat, under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, must be given \"full faith and\n\ncredit.\" Id.; see also R.G. Fin. Corp. v. Vergara-Nuñez, 446 F.3d\n\n178, 182-83 (1st Cir. 2006). In keeping with this statute, we\n\nmust give the same res judicata effect to that judgment as the\n\njurisdiction that issued it would give it in its own courts. 28\n\nU.S.C. § 1738; see also R.G. Fin. Corp., 446 F.3d at 182-83. Thus,\n\nwe apply Puerto Rico law to determine the preclusive effect of the\n\njudgment of the Court of First Instance. R.G. Fin. Corp., 446\n\nF.3d at 182-83. Our review of the District Court's res judicata\n\ndetermination is de novo. Id. at 182.\n\n Puerto Rico's Civil Code provides, in relevant part:\n\n\n\n\n - 4 -\n\f In order that the presumption of the res\n adjudicata may be valid in another suit, it is\n necessary that, between the case decided by\n the sentence and that in which the same is\n invoked, there be the most perfect identity\n between the things, causes, and persons of the\n litigants, and their capacity as such.\n\nP.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 3343. Thus, to demonstrate that the\n\njudgment of the Court of First Instance has res judicata effect\n\nhere, the PRPA \"must establish three elements: (i) the existence\n\nof a prior judgment on the merits that is 'final and unappealable';\n\n(ii) a perfect identity of thing or cause between both actions;\n\nand (iii) a perfect identity of the parties and the capacities in\n\nwhich they acted.\" R.G. Fin. Corp., 446 F.3d at 183 (quoting\n\nBoateng v. InterAm Univ., Inc., 210 F.3d 56, 61-62 (1st Cir. 2000))\n\n(applying Puerto Rico law). Even if the PRPA makes that showing,\n\nhowever, res judicata effect may not be given under Puerto Rico\n\nlaw to the judgment of the Court of First Instance if \"doing so\n\nwould defeat the 'ends of justice, especially if reasons of public\n\npolicy are involved.'\" Núñez-Colón v. Toledo-Dávila, 648 F.3d 15,\n\n19 (quoting Bonafont Solís v. Am. Eagle, Exec. Airline, Inc., 1997\n\nP.R. Eng. 423416, 1997 WL 423416 (P.R. 1997)).\n\n We start with the claims that Grajales brings in his own\n\nright, before then turning to the derivative claims of his wife\n\nand children. With respect to the claim that he brings on his\n\nown, Grajales first contends that the PRPA failed to establish\n\nthat the \"perfect identity of thing or cause\" element had been\n\n\n - 5 -\n\fsatisfied. Specifically, he contends that the claims that the\n\nSecretary of Labor brought on his behalf in the Court of First\n\nInstance \"could not include a claim for damages or for [a] First\n\nAmendment violation\" and was only for the \"purpose of reinstating\n\n[him] to his previous position\" and to recover lost wages.\n\n But, the \"identity of thing or cause,\" we have explained,\n\n\"refers to factual cause\" and is satisfied where two actions \"flow\n\nfrom the same principal ground or origin.\" R.G. Fin. Corp., 446\n\nF.3d at 183 (citing Lausell Marxuach v. Diaz de Yanez, 3 P.R.\n\nOffic. Trans. 742, 746 (1975)). Thus, \"a mere difference in the\n\nlegal theories on which two causes of action are grounded does not\n\ndestroy the identity of thing or cause that otherwise exists\n\nbetween two suits arising out of a common nucleus of operative\n\nfact.\" Id. at 184 (citing Boateng, 210 F.3d at 62). Instead,\n\nthere may still be an \"identity of thing or cause\" between\n\nCommonwealth and federal actions -- notwithstanding the different\n\nlegal theories and remedies sought in each -- if they share \"a\n\ncommon nucleus of operative fact.\" See id.\n\n We conclude that the District Court correctly determined\n\nthat the two actions at issue here do share \"a common nucleus of\n\noperative fact.\" Id. As the PRPA explains, in both actions\n\nGrajales \"claims he was dismissed from his employment in\n\nretaliation for complaining about safety issues in the workplace\n\nand/or participating in an investigation performed by [Puerto Rico\n\n\n - 6 -\n\fsafety agencies].\" Accordingly, we reject Grajales's challenge on\n\nthis score.\n\n Grajales also relies on Puerto Rico's \"public policy\n\nexception,\" which prevents the application of res judicata in\n\n\"special circumstances.\" García-Monagas v. De Arellano, 674 F.3d\n\n45, 56 (1st Cir. 2012). Specifically, Grajales contends that his\n\ncase presents such \"special circumstances\" because the Secretary\n\nbrought the prior suit in the Court of First Instance to remedy a\n\n\"violation of . . . Puerto Rico Public Policy\" and that the Puerto\n\nRico court \"frustrated the ends of justice\" by deciding the matter\n\n\"on documents only,\" i.e., at summary judgment.\n\n But, the first case that Grajales relies on to support\n\nthis argument, Pagán-Hernández v. University of Puerto Rico, 7\n\nP.R. Offic. Trans. 795 (P.R. 1978), makes clear that even the\n\n\"invocation of a constitutional right\" is not sufficient, in and\n\nof itself, to warrant application of the public policy exception.\n\nId. at 808. We thus fail to see how the nature of the claims that\n\nGrajales brings suffices to show that the public policy exception\n\nto res judicata applies in this case. Nor does Grajales identify\n\nany authority that requires the conclusion that res judicata effect\n\nmay not be given to a judgment of a Commonwealth court just because\n\nthat court dismissed claims of the sort that Grajales brings here\n\nvia summary judgment rather than after a trial.\n\n\n\n\n - 7 -\n\f In his reply brief, Grajales cites Ramos-González v.\n\nFélix-Medina, 21 P.R. Offic. Trans. 304 (P.R. 1988), to support\n\nhis argument that his circumstances should fall into the public\n\npolicy exception. In that case, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court\n\napplied the exception to allow to go forward claims alleging\n\nserious misconduct by three marshals of the Puerto Rico General\n\nCourt of Justice that had been dismissed based on the plaintiff's\n\nfailure to prosecute the action in the Commonwealth court. Id. at\n\n309-11.\n\n The Ramos-González court identified \"exceptional\n\nreasons\" compelling it \"to set aside the finality of a judgment.\"\n\nId. at 333. The court explained that it would set a \"bad precedent\"\n\nto permit a \"procedural technicality\" -- namely, the dismissal of\n\nthe claims based on the plaintiff's failure to prosecute -- \"to\n\ndefeat the claim of some citizens against three officers of this\n\nbranch of government who allegedly tried to take advantage of their\n\nposition as such.\" Id. at 334. The court concluded in that\n\nconnection that \"[t]here is a public interest at stake in the\n\ninstant case: the purity of the judicial process and the trust in\n\nits institutions.\" Id. at 334.\n\n Here, we see no similarly \"exceptional reasons\" to\n\ncompel us \"to set aside the finality of a judgment,\" id. at 333,\n\ngiven both the differing nature of the claims that are at issue\n\nhere and the fact that they were dismissed based on a grant of\n\n\n - 8 -\n\fsummary judgment and not by reason of what Ramos-Gonzalez\n\ncharacterized as a \"procedural technicality.\" Id. at 334. We\n\nthus reject this ground for not giving res judicata effect to the\n\njudgment of the Court of First instance.\n\n We turn, then, to the claims that are brought by\n\nGrajales' wife and children. The contention is that res judicata\n\ndoes not bar these claims because the PRPA has failed to show that\n\nthere is a \"perfect identity . . . of parties\" between the two\n\nactions that are at issue, given that the Secretary of Labor\n\nbrought the suit in the Court of First Instance only on Grajales's\n\nbehalf. But, the District Court concluded that the claims of\n\nGrajales's wife and children are brought only \"under Article 1802\n\nof the Puerto Rico Civil Code,\" and no contrary argument has been\n\nmade on appeal. That feature of the case matters because, as the\n\nDistrict Court explained, Article 1802 claims are \"derivative of\n\nthe principal plaintiff's claim in that [they are] premised on\n\nsome harm to the principal plaintiff, and 'if the principal\n\nplaintiff's claim fails, so too does the relative's derivative\n\nclaim.'\" Pagán-Colón v. Walgreens of San Patricio, Inc., 697 F.3d\n\n1, 16 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting González-Figueroa v. J.C. Penney\n\nP.R., Inc., 568 F.3d 313, 320 (1st Cir. 2009)). Thus, because\n\nGrajales's own claims are barred by res judicata, the derivative\n\nclaims of his wife and children necessarily fail.\n\n\n\n\n - 9 -\n\f III.\n\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the\n\nDistrict Court.\n\n\n\n\n - 10 -\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Daniel GRAJALES; Wanda I. González; Conjugal Partnership Grajales-González, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. PUERTO RICO PORTS AUTHORITY, Defendant, Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-29\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the First Circuit\\n\\n\\nNo. 18-1424\\n\\n DANIEL GRAJALES; WANDA I. GONZÁLEZ;\\n CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP GRAJALES-GONZÁLEZ,\\n\\n Plaintiffs, Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n PUERTO RICO PORTS AUTHORITY,\\n\\n Defendant, Appellee.\\n\\n\\n APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO\\n\\n [Hon. Pedro A. Delgado-Hernández, U.S. District Judge]\\n\\n\\n Before\\n\\n Howard, Chief Judge,\\n Thompson and Barron, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\n Eugenio W.A. Géigel-Simounet, with whom Géigel-Simounet Law\\nOffices C.S.P. was on brief for appellants.\\n Luis E. Palou Balsa, with whom Jennifer Lopez-Negrón and\\nNolla, Palou & Casellas LLC were on brief for appellee.\\n\\n\\n April 29, 2019\\n\\f BARRON, Circuit Judge. This appeal is the latest to\\n\\nhave reached us concerning a suit that Daniel Grajales, his wife,\\n\\nand their children bring under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Puerto Rico\\n\\nlaw against the Puerto Rico Ports Authority (the \\\"PRPA\\\") and\\n\\nseveral of its employees after the PRPA transferred him from one\\n\\nposting at the PRPA to another and then eventually terminated his\\n\\nemployment. In this appeal, Grajales asks us to overturn the\\n\\nDistrict Court's grant of summary judgment to the PRPA on res\\n\\njudicata grounds. We affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n This appeal represents Grajales's third in this case.\\n\\nSee Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2012)\\n\\n(\\\"Grajales I\\\"); Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 831 F.3d 11 (1st\\n\\nCir. 2016) (\\\"Grajales II\\\"). In brief, Grajales alleges that he\\n\\nwas transferred to a new job location and subsequently terminated\\n\\nfrom his employment with the PRPA because of both his political\\n\\naffiliation and his reporting of alleged safety violations by PRPA\\n\\nemployees to the Puerto Rico Occupational Safety and Health\\n\\nAdministration. See Grajales II, 831 F.3d at 14.\\n\\n Grajales filed the operative complaint in the District\\n\\nof Puerto Rico on August 31, 2012. He alleged that the PRPA, by\\n\\ntaking such actions against him, violated the First Amendment of\\n\\nthe Federal Constitution and various provisions of Puerto Rico\\n\\nlaw. His wife and their minor children also brought claims against\\n\\n\\n - 2 -\\n\\fthe PRPA, in which they sought damages under a Puerto Rico tort\\n\\nstatute that permits relatives of those unlawfully terminated from\\n\\nemployment to bring derivative claims.\\n\\n On May 18, 2012, just before Grajales filed his complaint\\n\\nin federal court, the Secretary of Labor and Human Resources of\\n\\nPuerto Rico (the \\\"Secretary of Labor\\\"), \\\"representing and for the\\n\\nbenefit of\\\" Grajales, filed a civil complaint against the PRPA in\\n\\nthe Puerto Rico Court of First Instance. See Complaint, Sec'y of\\n\\nLabor & Human Res. v. P.R. Ports Auth., No. AC2012-0079 (P.R. Ct.\\n\\nof First Instance May 18, 2012). The Secretary of Labor alleged\\n\\nin that complaint that Grajales had observed and reported an\\n\\nincident that involved the safety of another employee, that the\\n\\nPRPA had terminated Grajales in retaliation for his reporting of\\n\\nthe incident, and that an investigation by the Puerto Rico\\n\\nDepartment of Labor had found that the PRPA engaged in practices\\n\\nthat endangered the authority's employees. The Secretary of Labor\\n\\nsought Grajales's reinstatement and back pay for him on the basis\\n\\nof Puerto Rico's Occupational Safety and Health Act, P.R. Laws\\n\\nAnn. tit. 29, § 361aa, and Puerto Rico's Retaliation in the Work\\n\\nPlace Law, id. § 194a.\\n\\n On May 17, 2017, while Grajales's federal suit against\\n\\nthe PRPA was still pending, the Court of First Instance entered\\n\\njudgment in favor of the PRPA. The Court of First Instance ruled\\n\\nthat Grajales's termination was justified for a number of non-\\n\\n\\n - 3 -\\n\\fretaliatory reasons, including acts of insubordination, violation\\n\\nof various PRPA policies, and disrespectful behavior that created\\n\\na hostile work environment for others. The Court of First Instance\\n\\nalso rejected Grajales's contention that he was terminated in\\n\\nretaliation for his reporting activity.\\n\\n The PRPA then moved for summary judgment in the District\\n\\nof Puerto Rico case on res judicata grounds in light of the ruling\\n\\nby the Court of First Instance, and the District Court granted\\n\\nthat motion. Grajales now appeals from that judgment.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n We are dealing here with the claimed res judicata effect\\n\\nof a judgment of a Commonwealth court and thus with a judgment\\n\\nthat, under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, must be given \\\"full faith and\\n\\ncredit.\\\" Id.; see also R.G. Fin. Corp. v. Vergara-Nuñez, 446 F.3d\\n\\n178, 182-83 (1st Cir. 2006). In keeping with this statute, we\\n\\nmust give the same res judicata effect to that judgment as the\\n\\njurisdiction that issued it would give it in its own courts. 28\\n\\nU.S.C. § 1738; see also R.G. Fin. Corp., 446 F.3d at 182-83. Thus,\\n\\nwe apply Puerto Rico law to determine the preclusive effect of the\\n\\njudgment of the Court of First Instance. R.G. Fin. Corp., 446\\n\\nF.3d at 182-83. Our review of the District Court's res judicata\\n\\ndetermination is de novo. Id. at 182.\\n\\n Puerto Rico's Civil Code provides, in relevant part:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 4 -\\n\\f In order that the presumption of the res\\n adjudicata may be valid in another suit, it is\\n necessary that, between the case decided by\\n the sentence and that in which the same is\\n invoked, there be the most perfect identity\\n between the things, causes, and persons of the\\n litigants, and their capacity as such.\\n\\nP.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 3343. Thus, to demonstrate that the\\n\\njudgment of the Court of First Instance has res judicata effect\\n\\nhere, the PRPA \\\"must establish three elements: (i) the existence\\n\\nof a prior judgment on the merits that is 'final and unappealable';\\n\\n(ii) a perfect identity of thing or cause between both actions;\\n\\nand (iii) a perfect identity of the parties and the capacities in\\n\\nwhich they acted.\\\" R.G. Fin. Corp., 446 F.3d at 183 (quoting\\n\\nBoateng v. InterAm Univ., Inc., 210 F.3d 56, 61-62 (1st Cir. 2000))\\n\\n(applying Puerto Rico law). Even if the PRPA makes that showing,\\n\\nhowever, res judicata effect may not be given under Puerto Rico\\n\\nlaw to the judgment of the Court of First Instance if \\\"doing so\\n\\nwould defeat the 'ends of justice, especially if reasons of public\\n\\npolicy are involved.'\\\" Núñez-Colón v. Toledo-Dávila, 648 F.3d 15,\\n\\n19 (quoting Bonafont Solís v. Am. Eagle, Exec. Airline, Inc., 1997\\n\\nP.R. Eng. 423416, 1997 WL 423416 (P.R. 1997)).\\n\\n We start with the claims that Grajales brings in his own\\n\\nright, before then turning to the derivative claims of his wife\\n\\nand children. With respect to the claim that he brings on his\\n\\nown, Grajales first contends that the PRPA failed to establish\\n\\nthat the \\\"perfect identity of thing or cause\\\" element had been\\n\\n\\n - 5 -\\n\\fsatisfied. Specifically, he contends that the claims that the\\n\\nSecretary of Labor brought on his behalf in the Court of First\\n\\nInstance \\\"could not include a claim for damages or for [a] First\\n\\nAmendment violation\\\" and was only for the \\\"purpose of reinstating\\n\\n[him] to his previous position\\\" and to recover lost wages.\\n\\n But, the \\\"identity of thing or cause,\\\" we have explained,\\n\\n\\\"refers to factual cause\\\" and is satisfied where two actions \\\"flow\\n\\nfrom the same principal ground or origin.\\\" R.G. Fin. Corp., 446\\n\\nF.3d at 183 (citing Lausell Marxuach v. Diaz de Yanez, 3 P.R.\\n\\nOffic. Trans. 742, 746 (1975)). Thus, \\\"a mere difference in the\\n\\nlegal theories on which two causes of action are grounded does not\\n\\ndestroy the identity of thing or cause that otherwise exists\\n\\nbetween two suits arising out of a common nucleus of operative\\n\\nfact.\\\" Id. at 184 (citing Boateng, 210 F.3d at 62). Instead,\\n\\nthere may still be an \\\"identity of thing or cause\\\" between\\n\\nCommonwealth and federal actions -- notwithstanding the different\\n\\nlegal theories and remedies sought in each -- if they share \\\"a\\n\\ncommon nucleus of operative fact.\\\" See id.\\n\\n We conclude that the District Court correctly determined\\n\\nthat the two actions at issue here do share \\\"a common nucleus of\\n\\noperative fact.\\\" Id. As the PRPA explains, in both actions\\n\\nGrajales \\\"claims he was dismissed from his employment in\\n\\nretaliation for complaining about safety issues in the workplace\\n\\nand/or participating in an investigation performed by [Puerto Rico\\n\\n\\n - 6 -\\n\\fsafety agencies].\\\" Accordingly, we reject Grajales's challenge on\\n\\nthis score.\\n\\n Grajales also relies on Puerto Rico's \\\"public policy\\n\\nexception,\\\" which prevents the application of res judicata in\\n\\n\\\"special circumstances.\\\" García-Monagas v. De Arellano, 674 F.3d\\n\\n45, 56 (1st Cir. 2012). Specifically, Grajales contends that his\\n\\ncase presents such \\\"special circumstances\\\" because the Secretary\\n\\nbrought the prior suit in the Court of First Instance to remedy a\\n\\n\\\"violation of . . . Puerto Rico Public Policy\\\" and that the Puerto\\n\\nRico court \\\"frustrated the ends of justice\\\" by deciding the matter\\n\\n\\\"on documents only,\\\" i.e., at summary judgment.\\n\\n But, the first case that Grajales relies on to support\\n\\nthis argument, Pagán-Hernández v. University of Puerto Rico, 7\\n\\nP.R. Offic. Trans. 795 (P.R. 1978), makes clear that even the\\n\\n\\\"invocation of a constitutional right\\\" is not sufficient, in and\\n\\nof itself, to warrant application of the public policy exception.\\n\\nId. at 808. We thus fail to see how the nature of the claims that\\n\\nGrajales brings suffices to show that the public policy exception\\n\\nto res judicata applies in this case. Nor does Grajales identify\\n\\nany authority that requires the conclusion that res judicata effect\\n\\nmay not be given to a judgment of a Commonwealth court just because\\n\\nthat court dismissed claims of the sort that Grajales brings here\\n\\nvia summary judgment rather than after a trial.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 7 -\\n\\f In his reply brief, Grajales cites Ramos-González v.\\n\\nFélix-Medina, 21 P.R. Offic. Trans. 304 (P.R. 1988), to support\\n\\nhis argument that his circumstances should fall into the public\\n\\npolicy exception. In that case, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court\\n\\napplied the exception to allow to go forward claims alleging\\n\\nserious misconduct by three marshals of the Puerto Rico General\\n\\nCourt of Justice that had been dismissed based on the plaintiff's\\n\\nfailure to prosecute the action in the Commonwealth court. Id. at\\n\\n309-11.\\n\\n The Ramos-González court identified \\\"exceptional\\n\\nreasons\\\" compelling it \\\"to set aside the finality of a judgment.\\\"\\n\\nId. at 333. The court explained that it would set a \\\"bad precedent\\\"\\n\\nto permit a \\\"procedural technicality\\\" -- namely, the dismissal of\\n\\nthe claims based on the plaintiff's failure to prosecute -- \\\"to\\n\\ndefeat the claim of some citizens against three officers of this\\n\\nbranch of government who allegedly tried to take advantage of their\\n\\nposition as such.\\\" Id. at 334. The court concluded in that\\n\\nconnection that \\\"[t]here is a public interest at stake in the\\n\\ninstant case: the purity of the judicial process and the trust in\\n\\nits institutions.\\\" Id. at 334.\\n\\n Here, we see no similarly \\\"exceptional reasons\\\" to\\n\\ncompel us \\\"to set aside the finality of a judgment,\\\" id. at 333,\\n\\ngiven both the differing nature of the claims that are at issue\\n\\nhere and the fact that they were dismissed based on a grant of\\n\\n\\n - 8 -\\n\\fsummary judgment and not by reason of what Ramos-Gonzalez\\n\\ncharacterized as a \\\"procedural technicality.\\\" Id. at 334. We\\n\\nthus reject this ground for not giving res judicata effect to the\\n\\njudgment of the Court of First instance.\\n\\n We turn, then, to the claims that are brought by\\n\\nGrajales' wife and children. The contention is that res judicata\\n\\ndoes not bar these claims because the PRPA has failed to show that\\n\\nthere is a \\\"perfect identity . . . of parties\\\" between the two\\n\\nactions that are at issue, given that the Secretary of Labor\\n\\nbrought the suit in the Court of First Instance only on Grajales's\\n\\nbehalf. But, the District Court concluded that the claims of\\n\\nGrajales's wife and children are brought only \\\"under Article 1802\\n\\nof the Puerto Rico Civil Code,\\\" and no contrary argument has been\\n\\nmade on appeal. That feature of the case matters because, as the\\n\\nDistrict Court explained, Article 1802 claims are \\\"derivative of\\n\\nthe principal plaintiff's claim in that [they are] premised on\\n\\nsome harm to the principal plaintiff, and 'if the principal\\n\\nplaintiff's claim fails, so too does the relative's derivative\\n\\nclaim.'\\\" Pagán-Colón v. Walgreens of San Patricio, Inc., 697 F.3d\\n\\n1, 16 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting González-Figueroa v. J.C. Penney\\n\\nP.R., Inc., 568 F.3d 313, 320 (1st Cir. 2009)). Thus, because\\n\\nGrajales's own claims are barred by res judicata, the derivative\\n\\nclaims of his wife and children necessarily fail.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 9 -\\n\\f III.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the\\n\\nDistrict Court.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 10 -\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1495,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4615151,"string":"4,615,151"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Brenda SMITH Plaintiff, Appellee, v. AROOSTOOK COUNTY; Shawn D. Gillen, in His Official Capacity as Sheriff of Aroostook County Defendants, Appellants."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Smith v. Aroostook County"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-30"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"19-1340P"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Howard, Lynch, Kayatta\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the First Circuit\\n\\nNo. 19-1340\\n\\n BRENDA SMITH\\n\\n Plaintiff, Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n AROOSTOOK COUNTY; SHAWN D. GILLEN, in his official\\n capacity as Sheriff of Aroostook County\\n\\n Defendants, Appellants.\\n \\n\\n APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE\\n\\n [Hon. Nancy Torresen, Chief U.S. District Judge]\\n\\n\\n Before\\n\\n Howard, Chief Judge,\\n Lynch and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\n Peter T. Marchesi, Cassandra S. Shaffer, and Wheeler & Arey,\\nP.A., on brief for appellants.\\n Zachary L. Heiden, Emma E. Bond, ACLU of Maine Foundation,\\nPeter Mancuso, Andrew Schmidt Law PLLC, David A. Soley, James G.\\nMonteleone, and Bernstein Shur, on brief for appellees.\\n\\n\\n April 30, 2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n \\n \\n\\f Per curiam. In considering the defendants' appeal of\\n\\na preliminary injunction entered by the district court, we will\\n\\nset aside the ruling only if the court clearly erred in assessing\\n\\nthe facts, misapprehended the applicable legal principles, or\\n\\notherwise is shown to have abused its discretion. See Wine and\\n\\nSpirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 418 F.3d 36, 46 (1st Cir.\\n\\n2005).\\n Brenda Smith receives a twice daily dose of buprenorphine\\n\\nprescribed by her doctor as treatment for what her doctor\\n\\nclassifies as an opioid use disorder. Smith is due to be\\n\\nincarcerated for forty days at the Aroostook County Jail. Jail\\n\\nofficials informed her counsel that she would not receive her\\n\\nmedication while incarcerated. Her physician opines without serious\\n\\ncontradiction that prior efforts to take Smith off her medication\\n\\nhave not been successful and that her medication is necessary\\n\\nto her continued health; he and other witnesses opine that, given\\n\\nher medical history, forced and immediate withdrawal from\\n\\nbuprenorphine will cause her painful symptoms and increase her\\n\\nrisk of relapse, overdose, and death. She therefore brought this\\n\\nsuit seeking, among other things, injunctive relief compelling the\\n\\ndefendants to provide her medication while she is incarcerated.\\n\\nDefendants replied, in part, that whether she receives the medication\\n\\nwill depend on a case-by-case medical assessment. Defendants,\\n\\nthough, do not actually plan to obtain such an assessment from a\\n\\n\\n - 2 -\\n\\fqualified doctor prior to incarcerating Smith.\\n\\n On this preliminary record, the district court considered\\n\\nthe likelihood of Smith prevailing on a claim for discrimination\\n\\nunder Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act,\\n\\n42 U.S.C. § 12132; the potential for irreparable harm; the\\n\\nbalance of harms; and the public interest. Noting that\\n\\ndefendants' own submissions tout the variety of reasonable\\n\\nalternatives at their disposal for providing Smith with her\\n\\nmedication in a manner that alleviates any security concerns, the\\n\\ndistrict court found a sufficient likelihood of success combined\\n\\nwith both a strong balance of harms and a public interest in favor\\n\\nof Smith so as to warrant a preliminary injunction ordering the\\n\\njail to provide Smith with her medication as prescribed while she\\n\\nis incarcerated.\\n\\n We previously denied the defendants' request for a stay\\n\\nof the district court's order. Now we address the merits of the\\n\\ndefendants' appeal of that order.\\n\\n Having carefully considered the record and the parties'\\n\\nbriefs, we find no abuse of discretion by the district court in\\n\\nits preliminary assessment of the issues that must be balanced in\\n\\ndeciding a request for preliminary injunctive relief.\\n\\n The preliminary injunction is affirmed. The motions of\\n\\nthe American Medical Association, American Society for Addiction\\n\\n\\n\\n - 3 -\\n\\fMedicine, Maine Medical Association, Connecticut Society for\\n\\nAddiction Medicine, Connecticut State Medical Society, Maine\\n\\nAssociation of Psychiatric Physicians, Massachusetts Medical\\n\\nSociety, Massachusetts Society of Addiction Medicine, New Hampshire\\n\\nMedical Society, Northern New England Society for Addiction\\n\\nMedicine, Rhode Island Medical Society, Rhode Island Society for\\n\\nAddiction Medicine, Vermont Medical Society, Joshua M. Sharfstein,\\n\\nBrendan Saloner, Colleen Barry, Noa Krawczyk, Jenny Wen, and Jia\\n\\nAhmad for leave to file amicus briefs on behalf of Smith are denied\\n\\nas moot.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 4 -\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4392404/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"HOWARD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"LYNCH"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KAYATTA"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4615151/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Brenda SMITH Plaintiff, Appellee, v. AROOSTOOK COUNTY; Shawn D. Gillen, in His Official Capacity as Sheriff of Aroostook County Defendants, Appellants.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-30\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\n\nNo. 19-1340\n\n BRENDA SMITH\n\n Plaintiff, Appellee,\n\n v.\n\n AROOSTOOK COUNTY; SHAWN D. GILLEN, in his official\n capacity as Sheriff of Aroostook County\n\n Defendants, Appellants.\n \n\n APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE\n\n [Hon. Nancy Torresen, Chief U.S. District Judge]\n\n\n Before\n\n Howard, Chief Judge,\n Lynch and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.\n\n\n Peter T. Marchesi, Cassandra S. Shaffer, and Wheeler & Arey,\nP.A., on brief for appellants.\n Zachary L. Heiden, Emma E. Bond, ACLU of Maine Foundation,\nPeter Mancuso, Andrew Schmidt Law PLLC, David A. Soley, James G.\nMonteleone, and Bernstein Shur, on brief for appellees.\n\n\n April 30, 2019\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n \n \n\f Per curiam. In considering the defendants' appeal of\n\na preliminary injunction entered by the district court, we will\n\nset aside the ruling only if the court clearly erred in assessing\n\nthe facts, misapprehended the applicable legal principles, or\n\notherwise is shown to have abused its discretion. See Wine and\n\nSpirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 418 F.3d 36, 46 (1st Cir.\n\n2005).\n Brenda Smith receives a twice daily dose of buprenorphine\n\nprescribed by her doctor as treatment for what her doctor\n\nclassifies as an opioid use disorder. Smith is due to be\n\nincarcerated for forty days at the Aroostook County Jail. Jail\n\nofficials informed her counsel that she would not receive her\n\nmedication while incarcerated. Her physician opines without serious\n\ncontradiction that prior efforts to take Smith off her medication\n\nhave not been successful and that her medication is necessary\n\nto her continued health; he and other witnesses opine that, given\n\nher medical history, forced and immediate withdrawal from\n\nbuprenorphine will cause her painful symptoms and increase her\n\nrisk of relapse, overdose, and death. She therefore brought this\n\nsuit seeking, among other things, injunctive relief compelling the\n\ndefendants to provide her medication while she is incarcerated.\n\nDefendants replied, in part, that whether she receives the medication\n\nwill depend on a case-by-case medical assessment. Defendants,\n\nthough, do not actually plan to obtain such an assessment from a\n\n\n - 2 -\n\fqualified doctor prior to incarcerating Smith.\n\n On this preliminary record, the district court considered\n\nthe likelihood of Smith prevailing on a claim for discrimination\n\nunder Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act,\n\n42 U.S.C. § 12132; the potential for irreparable harm; the\n\nbalance of harms; and the public interest. Noting that\n\ndefendants' own submissions tout the variety of reasonable\n\nalternatives at their disposal for providing Smith with her\n\nmedication in a manner that alleviates any security concerns, the\n\ndistrict court found a sufficient likelihood of success combined\n\nwith both a strong balance of harms and a public interest in favor\n\nof Smith so as to warrant a preliminary injunction ordering the\n\njail to provide Smith with her medication as prescribed while she\n\nis incarcerated.\n\n We previously denied the defendants' request for a stay\n\nof the district court's order. Now we address the merits of the\n\ndefendants' appeal of that order.\n\n Having carefully considered the record and the parties'\n\nbriefs, we find no abuse of discretion by the district court in\n\nits preliminary assessment of the issues that must be balanced in\n\ndeciding a request for preliminary injunctive relief.\n\n The preliminary injunction is affirmed. The motions of\n\nthe American Medical Association, American Society for Addiction\n\n\n\n - 3 -\n\fMedicine, Maine Medical Association, Connecticut Society for\n\nAddiction Medicine, Connecticut State Medical Society, Maine\n\nAssociation of Psychiatric Physicians, Massachusetts Medical\n\nSociety, Massachusetts Society of Addiction Medicine, New Hampshire\n\nMedical Society, Northern New England Society for Addiction\n\nMedicine, Rhode Island Medical Society, Rhode Island Society for\n\nAddiction Medicine, Vermont Medical Society, Joshua M. Sharfstein,\n\nBrendan Saloner, Colleen Barry, Noa Krawczyk, Jenny Wen, and Jia\n\nAhmad for leave to file amicus briefs on behalf of Smith are denied\n\nas moot.\n\n\n\n\n - 4 -\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Brenda SMITH Plaintiff, Appellee, v. AROOSTOOK COUNTY; Shawn D. Gillen, in His Official Capacity as Sheriff of Aroostook County Defendants, Appellants.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-30\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the First Circuit\\n\\nNo. 19-1340\\n\\n BRENDA SMITH\\n\\n Plaintiff, Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n AROOSTOOK COUNTY; SHAWN D. GILLEN, in his official\\n capacity as Sheriff of Aroostook County\\n\\n Defendants, Appellants.\\n \\n\\n APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE\\n\\n [Hon. Nancy Torresen, Chief U.S. District Judge]\\n\\n\\n Before\\n\\n Howard, Chief Judge,\\n Lynch and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\n Peter T. Marchesi, Cassandra S. Shaffer, and Wheeler & Arey,\\nP.A., on brief for appellants.\\n Zachary L. Heiden, Emma E. Bond, ACLU of Maine Foundation,\\nPeter Mancuso, Andrew Schmidt Law PLLC, David A. Soley, James G.\\nMonteleone, and Bernstein Shur, on brief for appellees.\\n\\n\\n April 30, 2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n \\n \\n\\f Per curiam. In considering the defendants' appeal of\\n\\na preliminary injunction entered by the district court, we will\\n\\nset aside the ruling only if the court clearly erred in assessing\\n\\nthe facts, misapprehended the applicable legal principles, or\\n\\notherwise is shown to have abused its discretion. See Wine and\\n\\nSpirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 418 F.3d 36, 46 (1st Cir.\\n\\n2005).\\n Brenda Smith receives a twice daily dose of buprenorphine\\n\\nprescribed by her doctor as treatment for what her doctor\\n\\nclassifies as an opioid use disorder. Smith is due to be\\n\\nincarcerated for forty days at the Aroostook County Jail. Jail\\n\\nofficials informed her counsel that she would not receive her\\n\\nmedication while incarcerated. Her physician opines without serious\\n\\ncontradiction that prior efforts to take Smith off her medication\\n\\nhave not been successful and that her medication is necessary\\n\\nto her continued health; he and other witnesses opine that, given\\n\\nher medical history, forced and immediate withdrawal from\\n\\nbuprenorphine will cause her painful symptoms and increase her\\n\\nrisk of relapse, overdose, and death. She therefore brought this\\n\\nsuit seeking, among other things, injunctive relief compelling the\\n\\ndefendants to provide her medication while she is incarcerated.\\n\\nDefendants replied, in part, that whether she receives the medication\\n\\nwill depend on a case-by-case medical assessment. Defendants,\\n\\nthough, do not actually plan to obtain such an assessment from a\\n\\n\\n - 2 -\\n\\fqualified doctor prior to incarcerating Smith.\\n\\n On this preliminary record, the district court considered\\n\\nthe likelihood of Smith prevailing on a claim for discrimination\\n\\nunder Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act,\\n\\n42 U.S.C. § 12132; the potential for irreparable harm; the\\n\\nbalance of harms; and the public interest. Noting that\\n\\ndefendants' own submissions tout the variety of reasonable\\n\\nalternatives at their disposal for providing Smith with her\\n\\nmedication in a manner that alleviates any security concerns, the\\n\\ndistrict court found a sufficient likelihood of success combined\\n\\nwith both a strong balance of harms and a public interest in favor\\n\\nof Smith so as to warrant a preliminary injunction ordering the\\n\\njail to provide Smith with her medication as prescribed while she\\n\\nis incarcerated.\\n\\n We previously denied the defendants' request for a stay\\n\\nof the district court's order. Now we address the merits of the\\n\\ndefendants' appeal of that order.\\n\\n Having carefully considered the record and the parties'\\n\\nbriefs, we find no abuse of discretion by the district court in\\n\\nits preliminary assessment of the issues that must be balanced in\\n\\ndeciding a request for preliminary injunctive relief.\\n\\n The preliminary injunction is affirmed. The motions of\\n\\nthe American Medical Association, American Society for Addiction\\n\\n\\n\\n - 3 -\\n\\fMedicine, Maine Medical Association, Connecticut Society for\\n\\nAddiction Medicine, Connecticut State Medical Society, Maine\\n\\nAssociation of Psychiatric Physicians, Massachusetts Medical\\n\\nSociety, Massachusetts Society of Addiction Medicine, New Hampshire\\n\\nMedical Society, Northern New England Society for Addiction\\n\\nMedicine, Rhode Island Medical Society, Rhode Island Society for\\n\\nAddiction Medicine, Vermont Medical Society, Joshua M. Sharfstein,\\n\\nBrendan Saloner, Colleen Barry, Noa Krawczyk, Jenny Wen, and Jia\\n\\nAhmad for leave to file amicus briefs on behalf of Smith are denied\\n\\nas moot.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n - 4 -\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1496,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4605630,"string":"4,605,630"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Lyle & Van Praagh"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-01"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"15-958-cr(L)"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before: RAGGI, CHIN, AND LOHIER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"CHIN, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"15‐958‐cr(L) \\nUnited States v. Lyle & Van Praagh \\n \\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS \\n FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT \\n\\n \\n\\n August Term 2016 \\n\\n Argued: January 12, 2017 \\n Final Submission: July 6, 2018 \\n Decided: April 1, 2019 \\n\\n Docket Nos. 15‐958‐cr(L), 15‐1175‐cr(CON) \\n \\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \\n \\n Appellee, \\n \\n v. \\n\\n JAMES LYLE, AKA SEALED DEFENDANT 3, MICHAEL VAN PRAAGH, AKA SEALED \\n DEFENDANT 1, \\n \\n Defendants‐Appellants, \\n \\n ANTHONY TARANTINO, AKA SEALED DEFENDANT 2, \\n \\n Defendant. \\n \\n \\n ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \\n FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \\n\\n \\n\\nBefore: \\n RAGGI, CHIN, AND LOHIER, Circuit Judges. \\n\\f \\n\\n \\n \\n Consolidated appeals from judgments of the United States District \\n\\nCourt for the Southern District of New York (Crotty, J.) entered after defendants‐\\n\\nappellants James Lyle and Michael Van Praagh were convicted at trial of charges \\n\\nrelating to drug trafficking. Lyle challenges the admission of (1) physical \\n\\nevidence obtained pursuant to warrantless searches and (2) his post‐arrest and \\n\\nproffer statements. Van Praagh challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence of \\n\\nconspiracy, (2) the admission of Lyleʹs post‐arrest and proffer statements in their \\n\\njoint trial, and (3) the reasonableness of his sentence. \\n\\n AFFIRMED. \\n \\n \\n \\n \\n MICHAEL FERRARA, Assistant United States \\n Attorney (Brendan F. Quigley, Assistant \\n United States Attorney, on the brief), for \\n Geoffrey S. Berman, United States Attorney \\n for the Southern District of New York, New \\n York, New York, for Appellee. \\n \\n DANIEL S. NOOTER (Thomas H. Nooter, on the \\n brief), Freeman Nooter & Ginsberg, New \\n York, New York, for Defendant‐Appellant \\n James Lyle. \\n \\n\\n\\n 2 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\n MARSHA R. TAUBENHAUS, Law Offices of \\n Marsha R. Taubenhaus, New York, New \\n York, for Defendant‐Appellant Michael Van \\n Praagh. \\n \\n \\nCHIN, Circuit Judge: \\n\\n Defendants‐appellants James Lyle and Michael Van Praagh appeal \\n\\nfrom judgments of the United States District Court for the Southern District of \\n\\nNew York (Crotty, J.) convicting them on charges relating to the distribution of \\n\\nmethamphetamine. Lyle challenges the admission at trial of evidence seized \\n\\nduring a December 11, 2013 inventory search of a rental car and a January 9, 2014 \\n\\nsearch of his hotel room. He also challenges the admission at trial of certain post‐\\n\\narrest and proffer statements. Van Praagh challenges the sufficiency of the \\n\\nevidence of his participation in a methamphetamine distribution conspiracy, the \\n\\nadmission of Lyleʹs post‐arrest and proffer statements in their joint trial, and the \\n\\nreasonableness of his sentence. Because we conclude that the evidence at trial \\n\\nwas sufficient to support all convictions, the challenged searches and seizures \\n\\ndid not violate the Fourth Amendment, the admission of Lyleʹs statements did \\n\\nnot violate the Fifth Amendment, and Van Praaghʹs sentence was reasonable, we \\n\\naffirm the judgments of the district court. \\n\\n\\n 3 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\n BACKGROUND \\n\\nI. The Facts \\n\\n Because Van Praagh and Lyle appeal convictions following a jury \\n\\ntrial, we view the evidence in ʺthe light most favorable to the government, \\n\\ncrediting any inferences that the jury might have drawn in its favor.ʺ United \\n\\nStates v. Rosemond, 841 F.3d 95, 99‐100 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. \\n\\nDhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 643 (2d Cir. 2001)). \\n\\n A. Overview \\n\\n Throughout 2013, Van Praagh regularly sold pound quantities of \\n\\nmethamphetamine. These deals generally occurred once a week and often took \\n\\nplace in Manhattan hotels. Van Praagh also sold smaller quantities of \\n\\nmethamphetamine out of his apartment in Queens and through in‐person \\n\\ndeliveries to his customers. Brandon Hodges, an Arizona‐based \\n\\nmethamphetamine supplier, sent Van Praagh methamphetamine on three or four \\n\\noccasions during this time, with the largest shipment containing four ounces of \\n\\nmethamphetamine. Van Praagh regularly sold methamphetamine to Lyle, who \\n\\nwas also a methamphetamine dealer in the New York area. Lyle regularly sold \\n\\nmethamphetamine to Anthony Tarantino. Tarantino initially purchased \\n\\n\\n\\n 4 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nmethamphetamine for personal use, but eventually started selling small \\n\\nquantities of methamphetamine to his own clients. Both Hodges and Tarantino \\n\\ncooperated with the government and testified at trial. \\n\\n In January 2013, Lyle introduced Tarantino to Van Praagh. \\n\\nTarantino accompanied Lyle to Van Praaghʹs apartment so that Lyle could \\n\\nrestock his methamphetamine supply. While at Van Praaghʹs apartment, \\n\\nTarantino saw Lyle purchase methamphetamine from Van Praagh, which Lyle \\n\\nlater sold to Tarantino. In April 2013, Lyle took Tarantino to Van Praaghʹs \\n\\napartment a second time, where Tarantino again observed Lyle ʺre‐up,ʺ i.e., \\n\\npurchase methamphetamine, from Van Praagh. After this second visit, \\n\\nTarantino and Van Praagh became romantically involved, and eventually \\n\\nTarantino moved in with Van Praagh and began helping him sell \\n\\nmethamphetamine. \\n\\n B. The Seizure of Methamphetamine from Van Praaghʹs Hotel Room \\n\\n On May 29, 2013, Van Praagh and Tarantino checked into the Out \\n\\nHotel in midtown Manhattan. That night, they sold pound quantities of \\n\\nmethamphetamine to several customers, including Lyle. The next day, they \\n\\nchecked out of the hotel but accidentally left approximately a pound of \\n\\n\\n\\n 5 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nmethamphetamine and $20,000 cash in the hotel room safe. Hotel staff found the \\n\\ndrugs and money and called the New York City Police Department (ʺNYPDʺ), \\n\\nand officers arrived to seize the drugs and cash. After Van Praagh realized his \\n\\nmistake later that day, he returned to the hotel, where he was arrested by the \\n\\nNYPD. During the arrest, the officers seized a cellular phone and over $1,000 \\n\\ncash from Van Praaghʹs pocket. The officers also searched Van Praaghʹs Vespa \\n\\nscooter parked outside the hotel, where they found part of and packaging for a \\n\\ndigital scale. \\n\\n Soon thereafter, Tarantino brought Lyle money to give to Van \\n\\nPraaghʹs father to bail Van Praagh out of jail. The day after Van Praagh got out \\n\\nof jail, he and Tarantino flew to Arizona to ensure that Van Praaghʹs \\n\\nmethamphetamine suppliers would continue to sell to him. Van Praagh and \\n\\nTarantino returned to New York and continued their sale of methamphetamine. \\n\\n C. Lyleʹs Arrests \\n\\n On December 11, 2013, NYPD officers observed Lyle park and exit a \\n\\ncar in midtown Manhattan. The officers noticed a knife clipped to Lyleʹs pants, \\n\\nwhich they later determined to be an illegal gravity knife. The officers \\n\\napproached Lyle as he was closing the trunk of the car. Lyle told the officers that \\n\\n\\n\\n 6 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nhe was legally permitted to carry a gravity knife because he was a member of the \\n\\nstagehands union and used the knife to perform his job. Lyle initially said he \\n\\nhad not driven the car but when the officers informed him that they had seen \\n\\nhim driving it, Lyle admitted as much. When asked for identification, Lyle \\n\\nproduced a New York State ID with the expiration date scratched off. The \\n\\nofficers confirmed that Lyleʹs driverʹs license was suspended. The officers also \\n\\ndetermined that the vehicle Lyle was driving was a rental car and that Lyle was \\n\\nnot an authorized driver under the rental agreement. Lyle claimed that his \\n\\ngirlfriend had rented the car and had given him permission to drive it. The \\n\\nofficers arrested Lyle for driving with a suspended license and for possessing an \\n\\nillegal knife. \\n\\n Before heading to the station for processing, Lyle asked if the car \\n\\ncould be left at the location and stated that his girlfriend would pick it up. The \\n\\nofficers denied the request and impounded the vehicle. At the police precinct, an \\n\\ninventory search was conducted. Over one pound of methamphetamine and \\n\\napproximately $39,000 cash were found in the trunk of the car. \\n\\n The following day ‐‐ December 12, 2013 ‐‐ Lyle was brought to the \\n\\nDistrict Attorneyʹs Office where he made certain statements in custody after \\n\\n\\n\\n 7 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nbeing read his Miranda rights. When asked about the methamphetamine that \\n\\nwas in the trunk of the rental car, Lyle stated that ʺan individual . . . had \\n\\ncontacted him and asked him to hold something for him.ʺ Tr. 435.1 He stated \\n\\nthat upon meeting with that individual and another individual, he stayed in the \\n\\ncar and did not see what was placed in the trunk but presumed it to be drugs \\n\\nbecause the individual that he was meeting with was known to distribute large \\n\\nquantities of methamphetamine in the New York area. When asked about his \\n\\nrelationship with these two individuals, Lyle stated that he was friends with \\n\\nthem, and had eventually begun working with one of them in delivering \\n\\nmethamphetamine to the individualʹs customers. \\n\\n Lyle stated that the person in charge had a source of supply in \\n\\nArizona named either Brendan or Brandon. Lyle also ʺprovided a few namesʺ of \\n\\nother people in the New York area who distributed large quantities of \\n\\nmethamphetamine. Tr. 436. \\n\\n On January 9, 2014, police in East Windsor, New Jersey responded \\n\\nto an anonymous call that people were using methamphetamine in a hotel room. \\n\\n\\n\\n \\n 1 Lyle identified this individual as Van Praagh, but at trial, ʺindividualʺ \\nwas substituted for Van Praaghʹs name pursuant to Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 \\n(1968). \\n 8 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nWhen they got to the hotel room, Lyle opened the door and invited the officers \\n\\ninside. The officers heard the toilet flush and saw Lyleʹs girlfriend come out of \\n\\nthe bathroom. The officers observed a torch lighter on the bathroom shelf, a \\n\\nsmall clear bag next to the trash can, and a partial clear straw wrapper containing \\n\\nwhite residue on the bathroom floor. Additionally, they observed a towel under \\n\\nthe bathroom doorway. In the bedroom, the officers noticed that a clear bag had \\n\\nbeen affixed to the smoke detector with rubber bands. \\n\\n Officers then performed a consent search of the room, and found \\n\\napproximately fourteen grams of methamphetamine, $3,270 cash, a digital scale, \\n\\nand numerous plastic baggies. Lyle and his girlfriend were both arrested. \\n\\nII. The Proceedings Below \\n\\n A. The Indictment and Van Praaghʹs Arrest \\n\\n Van Praagh, Lyle, and Tarantino were indicted on March 20, 2014. \\n\\nOn March 31, 2014, Drug Enforcement Administration (ʺDEAʺ) agents arrested \\n\\nVan Praagh at his apartment. After receiving consent to search the apartment, \\n\\nagents found tools used to sell drugs, including a heat‐sealer, packaging \\n\\nmaterials, and multiple scales, and a note from Hodges asking Van Praagh to \\n\\nhave Lyle call him. \\n\\n\\n\\n 9 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\n On April 6, 2013, Van Praagh called his father from jail and told him, \\n\\nin a recorded call, ʺthey got nothing . . . . I sterilized the house like I told you.ʺ \\n\\nSupp. App. 104. He also told him, ʺ[t]hey got Anthony [Tarantino], but Iʹm \\n\\nexpecting that heʹll be disappearing any day now . . . . I believe that he had been \\n\\ntalking.ʺ Supp. App. 105. \\n\\n B. Lyleʹs Proffer Session \\n\\n On April 7, 2014, Lyle participated in a proffer session with the \\n\\ngovernment in hope of reaching a cooperation agreement. A proffer agreement \\n\\nwas executed, stipulating that the government would not use any of Lyleʹs \\n\\nstatements made during the proffer sessions against him, except ʺto rebut any \\n\\nevidence or arguments offered by or on behalf of [Lyle].ʺ Lyle App. 36. \\n\\n During the proffer session, Lyle admitted that (1) around 2011 or \\n\\n2012, he sometimes stayed with Van Praagh while working on projects in New \\n\\nYork City; (2) he observed Van Praagh smoking and using methamphetamine; \\n\\n(3) he occasionally delivered packages to Van Praaghʹs clients; (4) he \\n\\naccompanied Van Praagh to deliver methamphetamine thirty to fifty times; \\n\\n(5) Van Praagh told Lyle his supplier was in Arizona; and (6) on one occasion, \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nLyle accompanied Van Praagh to pick up methamphetamine from a library in \\n\\nNew York City. \\n\\n C. The Superseding Indictment and Pretrial Motions \\n\\n A superseding indictment was filed September 30, 2014, charging \\n\\n(1) Van Praagh and Lyle with conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more of \\n\\nmethamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A), from \\n\\nDecember 2012 to January 2014; (2) Van Praagh with distributing and possessing \\n\\nwith intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of \\n\\n21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B), on or about May 30, 2013; and (3) Lyle \\n\\nwith distributing and possessing with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of \\n\\nmethamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B), on or \\n\\nabout December 11, 2013. \\n\\n Before trial, Lyle moved to suppress the physical evidence recovered \\n\\nfrom the search of the automobile, as well as his subsequent post‐arrest \\n\\nstatements. In an affidavit filed in support of the motion, Lyle admitted that \\n\\n(1) just prior to his arrest, he had been driving the car that had been rented by his \\n\\ngirlfriend with her permission; (2) he possessed a gravity knife that day; (3) he \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 11 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\ninitially told the police officers he had not been driving the car but later admitted \\n\\nto driving the car; and (4) his license was suspended at the time. \\n\\n On September 11, 2014, the district court held an evidentiary hearing \\n\\non the voluntariness of Lyleʹs post‐arrest statements and, on October 1, 2014, the \\n\\ncourt denied Lyleʹs motion to suppress. The court found there was probable \\n\\ncause for Lyleʹs arrest, based on his possession of a gravity knife. The court then \\n\\nconcluded that the search of the rental car was justified on two independent \\n\\nbases. First, Lyle had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car \\n\\nbecause he was not an authorized driver under the rental agreement. Second, \\n\\nthe search of the rental car was a valid inventory search. The court also found \\n\\nthat Lyleʹs post‐arrest statements were made voluntarily and pursuant to a valid \\n\\nMiranda waiver. \\n\\n D. The Trial \\n\\n Lyle and Van Praaghʹs trial began on October 14, 2014, and ended on \\n\\nOctober 20, 2014. The government called nineteen witnesses, and introduced \\n\\nphysical evidence consisting of drugs and drug processing materials, text \\n\\nmessages between the defendants, testimony regarding Lyleʹs post‐arrest and \\n\\nproffer statements, and the recorded call Van Praagh made to his father while \\n\\n\\n\\n 12 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nincarcerated. Van Praagh called one witness who testified about the \\n\\ncircumstances of Van Praaghʹs March 31, 2014 arrest. Lyle did not put on a case. \\n\\n During his opening statement, Lyleʹs counsel stated that ʺ[Lyle] \\n\\nobtained, bought, borrowed, was given methamphetamine for his own use. \\n\\nWhere we dispute is the idea that he was a dealer.ʺ Tr. 28. Later that day, the \\n\\ngovernment submitted a letter brief, asserting that Lyleʹs counselʹs argument that \\n\\nLyle was not a dealer opened the door to Lyleʹs proffer statements about \\n\\ndistributing drugs with Van Praagh. \\n\\n Lyleʹs statements to law enforcement were admitted in two contexts. \\n\\nFirst, the district court allowed testimony regarding Lyleʹs December 12, 2013 \\n\\npost‐arrest statements to law enforcement to be admitted only as against him, \\n\\nprohibiting mention of Van Praagh. Van Praagh did not object to the redacted \\n\\ntestimony. Government witnesses testified that Lyle admitted that an \\n\\nʺindividualʺ for whom he worked as a ʺrunnerʺ ʺasked him to hold something for \\n\\nhimʺ in the trunk of the rental car, which Lyle ʺpresumed . . . to be drugsʺ \\n\\nbecause Lyle knew ʺ[t]hat individual along with another individualʺ distributed \\n\\nʺlarge quantities of crystal meth in the New York area.ʺ Tr. 435, 534. Lyle was \\n\\nfriends ʺ[m]ore so with the individual that had not placed the drugs in the \\n\\n\\n\\n 13 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\ntrunk. . . . He said that he began as friends, and eventually he began working \\n\\nwith that individualʺ ‐‐ the ʺindividual who was in chargeʺ‐‐ ʺassisting him in \\n\\ndelivering . . . methamphetamine to that individualʹs customers.ʺ Tr. 435‐36. \\n\\nLyle told law enforcement that the individuals for whom he was working as a \\n\\nrunner had a source of supply in Arizona named either Brendan or Brandon. \\n\\nLyle also gave law enforcement ʺa few namesʺ of other people in the New York \\n\\narea who distributed methamphetamine, including the names of three \\n\\ncompetitor drug dealers. Tr. 436. On cross‐examination, Lyleʹs attorney elicited \\n\\ntestimony that, during the post‐arrest interview, Lyle ʺgave names of people \\n\\nduring the conversation,ʺ one of which was Brandon or Brendan. Tr. 448. \\n\\n Second, toward the close of the governmentʹs case, the district court \\n\\nruled ‐‐ over Lyleʹs objection ‐‐ that Lyleʹs proffer statements were admissible, \\n\\nbut again prohibited mention of Van Praagh. Van Praagh did not object. The \\n\\ngovernment witness then testified that Lyle admitted he had ʺfirst become \\n\\ninvolved in methamphetamineʺ in 2012 through ʺsomeoneʺ he ʺknew . . . from \\n\\nwork.ʺ Tr. 517‐18. Lyle observed ʺthat person . . . using and distributing crystal \\n\\nmethamphetamine.ʺ Tr. 518. Lyle ʺbegan distributing small packagesʺ for that \\n\\nperson and ʺaccompanying that person on deals as well as picking up crystal \\n\\n\\n\\n 14 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nmethamphetamine.ʺ Id. Lyle admitted that ʺhe accompanied this person . . . [on] \\n\\nbetween 30 to 50 occasions. And that at one point they had gone to a library in \\n\\nthe New York City area . . . to pick up crystal methamphetamine.ʺ Id. Lyle said \\n\\nthe methamphetamine supplier was in Arizona. \\n\\n On cross‐examination, Lyleʹs attorney elicited from the witness that \\n\\nʺ[Lyle] actually g[a]ve real names of peopleʺ during his proffer session, and \\n\\nprovided ʺsome names of people whose last names he didnʹt know.ʺ Tr. 524. \\n\\nThese names included ʺZaron,ʺ ʺTed,ʺ ʺBob,ʺ and ʺJoe.ʺ Tr. at 525. \\n\\n At the close of trial, the district court instructed the jury, in pertinent \\n\\npart: ʺThere has been evidence that Mr. Lyle made statements to law \\n\\nenforcement authorities . . . . I want to let you know that . . . Mr. Lyleʹs statement \\n\\nabout his own conduct may not be considered or discussed by you with regard \\n\\nto Mr. Van Praagh.ʺ Tr. 713. \\n\\n On October 20, 2014, the jury found the defendants guilty on all \\n\\ncounts. On March 25, 2015, the district court sentenced Lyle principally to the \\n\\nstatutory mandatory minimum of 120 monthsʹ imprisonment and, on April 2, \\n\\n2015, the district court sentenced Van Praagh principally to 144 monthsʹ \\n\\nimprisonment. In imposing a higher sentence on Van Praagh, the district court \\n\\n\\n\\n 15 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nconcluded that ʺVan Praagh had a higher role, more important role. He dealt in \\n\\nmore drugs than did Mr. Lyle.ʺ Van Praagh App. 62. \\n\\n These appeals followed. On May 9, 2017, we issued an opinion \\n\\naffirming the district courtʹs judgments. United States v. Lyle, 856 F.3d 191 (2d \\n\\nCir. 2017). Lyle petitioned for and was granted certiorari by the Supreme Court. \\n\\nOn May 21, 2018, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the \\n\\ncase for further consideration in light of its intervening decision in Byrd v. United \\n\\nStates, ‐‐‐ U.S. ‐‐‐, 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2018), which addressed the issue of the \\n\\nreasonable expectation of privacy of an unauthorized driver of a rental car. On \\n\\nJuly 6, 2018, the parties submitted letter briefs addressing Byrdʹs impact upon this \\n\\ncase. For the reasons set forth below, we adhere to our original decision. \\n\\n DISCUSSION \\n\\n Six issues are presented: (1) the validity of the warrantless search \\n\\nand seizure of the rental car; (2) the interpretation of Lyleʹs proffer agreement; (3) \\n\\nthe sufficiency of the redactions to Lyleʹs proffer statements; (4) the admissibility \\n\\nof Lyleʹs New Jersey arrest; (5) the sufficiency of the conspiracy evidence against \\n\\nVan Praagh; and (6) the reasonableness of Van Praaghʹs sentence. We address \\n\\neach issue in turn. \\n\\n\\n\\n 16 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nI. Warrantless Search of Rental Car \\n\\n We review a district courtʹs ruling on a suppression motion for clear \\n\\nerror as to factual findings, ʺgiving special deference to findings that are based \\n\\non determinations of witness credibility,ʺ and de novo as to questions of law. \\n\\nUnited States v. Hussain, 835 F.3d 307, 312‐13 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting United States \\n\\nv. Lucky, 569 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir. 2009)). We conclude that Lyleʹs motion was \\n\\nproperly denied for two independent reasons: first, Lyle had no reasonable \\n\\nexpectation of privacy in the rental car, and, second, the inventory search of the \\n\\nrental car was reasonable. \\n\\n A. Applicable Law \\n\\n i. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Rental Car \\n\\n The Fourth Amendment guarantees citizens the ʺright . . . to be \\n\\nsecure in their . . . effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.ʺ U.S. \\n\\nConst. amend. IV. To prove that a search violated the Fourth Amendment, ʺan \\n\\naccused must show that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in a searched \\n\\nplace or item.ʺ United States v. Rahme, 813 F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing \\n\\nRawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980)). The person challenging the search \\n\\nmust demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy in the place searched, and \\n\\n\\n\\n 17 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nthat expectation must be objectively reasonable. United States v. Paulino, 850 F.2d \\n\\n93, 97 (2d Cir. 1988). \\n\\n When we previously ruled in this case, the question of whether an \\n\\nunauthorized driver has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a rental car \\n\\ndivided the various circuit courts, resulting in at least three approaches. See Lyle, \\n\\n856 F.3d at 200‐01 (reviewing circuit split). We did not rule on the question, as \\n\\nwe decided the appeal on other grounds, as discussed below. \\n\\n The Supreme Courtʹs recent decision in Byrd v. United States resolved \\n\\nthe circuit split, holding that the ʺmere fact that a driver in lawful possession or \\n\\ncontrol of a rental car is not listed on the rental agreement will not defeat his or \\n\\nher otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy.ʺ 138 S. Ct. at 1531. The Court \\n\\nrejected the governmentʹs suggestion of a per se rule that unauthorized drivers \\n\\nʺalways lack an expectation of privacy in the automobile based on the rental \\n\\ncompanyʹs lack of authorization alone.ʺ Id. at 1527. Drawing from property \\n\\nprinciples, the Supreme Court reasoned that ʺ[o]ne of the main rights attaching \\n\\nto property is the right to exclude others, and, in the main, one who owns or \\n\\nlawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate \\n\\nexpectation of privacy by virtue of the right to exclude.ʺ Id. at 1527 (quoting \\n\\n\\n\\n 18 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nRakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n. 12 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted)). \\n\\nIt further noted, however, that the concept of lawful possession is central to the \\n\\nexpectation of privacy inquiry, for a ʺʹwrongfulʹ presence at the scene of a search \\n\\nwould not enable a defendant to object to the legality of the search.ʺ Id. at 1529 \\n\\n(quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 141 n. 9). Thus, ʺa person present in a stolen \\n\\nautomobile at the time of the search may [not] object to the lawfulness of the \\n\\nsearch of the automobileʺ regardless of his level of possession and control over \\n\\nthe automobile. See id. \\n\\n ii. Community Caretaking Function \\n\\n It is well established that police have the authority, despite the \\n\\nabsence of a warrant, to seize and remove from the streets automobiles in the \\n\\ninterests of public safety and as part of their community caretaking functions ‐‐ \\n\\nan authority that is beyond reasonable challenge. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 \\n\\nU.S. 364, 368‐69 (1976). In Colorado v. Bertine, the Supreme Court explained that, \\n\\nunder this community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement, police \\n\\nofficers may exercise their discretion in deciding whether to impound a vehicle, \\n\\nʺso long as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and on the \\n\\nbasis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.ʺ 479 \\n\\n\\n\\n 19 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nU.S. 367, 375 (1987). The question of whether Bertine and similar Supreme Court \\n\\nprecedent require an officerʹs decision to impound a car to be made pursuant to \\n\\nstandardized criteria, a question we have not addressed, has created a split \\n\\namong the circuits. \\n\\n Relying on a stricter interpretation of Bertine, two circuits have \\n\\nconcluded that an officerʹs decision to impound a vehicle as part of its role as a \\n\\ncommunity caretaker must be guided by a standardized procedure. See United \\n\\nStates v. Petty, 367 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that ʺ[s]ome degree of \\n\\nstandardized criteria or established routine must regulate these police actions . . . \\n\\nto ensure that impoundments and inventory searches are not merely a ruse for \\n\\ngeneral rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidenceʺ (internal \\n\\nquotation marks omitted)); United States v. Duguay, 93 F.3d 346, 351 (7th Cir. \\n\\n1996) (ʺAmong those criteria which must be standardized are the circumstances \\n\\nin which a car may be impounded.ʺ). Taking a slightly different approach, the \\n\\nD.C. Circuit has held that ʺif a standard impoundment procedure exists, a police \\n\\nofficerʹs failure to adhere thereto is unreasonable and violates the Fourth \\n\\nAmendment.ʺ United States v. Proctor, 489 F.3d 1348, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The \\n\\nTenth Circuit has held that standardized procedures are not required where an \\n\\n\\n\\n 20 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nofficer exercises ʺthe community‐caretaking functions of protecting public safety \\n\\nand promoting the efficient movement of traffic,ʺ but are required in other cases. \\n\\nUnited States v. Sanders, 796 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 2015). \\n\\n The First, Third, and Fifth Circuits, however, have rejected the \\n\\nstandardized criteria requirement, and instead focus their inquiry on the \\n\\nreasonableness of the impoundment under the circumstances. See United States v. \\n\\nMcKinnon, 681 F.3d 203, 208 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (hinging analysis upon \\n\\nʺthe reasonableness of the ʹcommunity caretakerʹ impound viewed in the context \\n\\nof the facts and circumstances encountered by the officerʺ (citation omitted)); \\n\\nUnited States v. Smith, 522 F.3d 305, 314 (3d Cir. 2008) (declining to adopt ʺthe \\n\\nmore structured approach . . . requiring that there be standardized police \\n\\nprocedures governing impoundmentsʺ); United States v. Coccia, 446 F.3d 233, 239 \\n\\n(1st Cir. 2006) (ʺ[I]mpoundments of vehicles for community caretaking purposes \\n\\nare consonant with the Fourth Amendment so long as the impoundment decision \\n\\nwas reasonable under the circumstances.ʺ). These circuits read Bertine ʺto \\n\\nindicate that an impoundment decision made pursuant to standardized \\n\\nprocedures will most likely, although not necessarily always, satisfy the Fourth \\n\\nAmendment.ʺ Coccia, 446 F.3d at 238. \\n\\n\\n\\n 21 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\n B. Application \\n\\n i. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Rental Car \\n\\n In our prior decision, we specifically declined to decide whether an \\n\\nunauthorized driver ever has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a rental car. \\n\\nInstead, we concluded, and now reaffirm, that Lyle lacked standing not just \\n\\nbecause he was an unauthorized driver, but because he was an unlicensed one. \\n\\nAccordingly, Lyleʹs use of the rental car was both unauthorized and unlawful. \\n\\nSee N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law § 511 (prohibiting operating a car without a valid \\n\\nlicense). Lyle should not have been driving any car because his license was \\n\\nsuspended, and a rental company with knowledge of the relevant facts certainly \\n\\nwould not have given him permission to drive its car nor allowed a renter to let \\n\\nhim do so. Under these circumstances, Lyle did not have a reasonable \\n\\nexpectation of privacy in the rental car. See United States v. Haywood, 324 F.3d \\n\\n514, 516 (7th Cir. 2003) (declining to resolve circuit split over whether \\n\\nunauthorized driver had reasonable expectation of privacy in rental car, because \\n\\nunauthorized driver also had suspended license and the combination resulted in \\n\\nno reasonable expectation of privacy); cf. United States v. Tropiano, 50 F.3d 157, \\n\\n161 (2d Cir. 1995) (ʺ[W]e think it obvious that a defendant who knowingly \\n\\n\\n\\n 22 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\npossesses a stolen car has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the car.ʺ); United \\n\\nStates v. Ponce, 947 F.2d 646, 649 (2d Cir. 1991) (ʺTo mount a challenge to a search \\n\\nof a vehicle, defendants must show, among other things, a legitimate basis for \\n\\nbeing in it, such as permission from the owner.ʺ). \\n\\n Byrd does not require a different result. The Court there held that an \\n\\nunauthorized driver in sole possession of a rental car could have a legitimate \\n\\nexpectation of privacy in the vehicle because even an unauthorized driver, in the \\n\\nright circumstances, could have ʺlawful possession and control and the attendant \\n\\nright to exclude.ʺ 138 S. Ct. at 1528. The Court noted that ʺthere may be \\n\\ncountless innocuous reasons why an unauthorized driver might get behind the \\n\\nwheel of a rental car and drive it ‐‐ perhaps the renter is drowsy or inebriated.ʺ \\n\\nId. at 1529. \\n\\n This reasoning does not apply to the circumstances here, where Lyle \\n\\nwas not only the driver of the vehicle but the sole occupant. Because Lyle did \\n\\nnot have a valid driverʹs license, it was unlawful for him to be operating the \\n\\nvehicle. He did not have lawful possession and control of the vehicle in the sense \\n\\nthat he unlawfully drove the vehicle onto the scene and could not lawfully drive \\n\\nit away. See id. (reaffirming conclusion in Rakas v. Illinois that ʺʹwrongfulʹ \\n\\n\\n\\n 23 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\npresence at the scene of a search would not enable a defendant to object to the \\n\\nlegality of the search,ʺ ʺ[n]o matter the degree of [a defendantʹs] possession and \\n\\ncontrol.ʺ). While the absence of a valid license alone may not destroy an \\n\\nunauthorized driverʹs expectation of privacy, Lyleʹs possession and control of the \\n\\ncar was unlawful the moment he started driving it. Just as a car thief would not \\n\\nhave a reasonable expectation of privacy in a stolen car, id., an unauthorized, \\n\\nunlicensed driver in sole possession of a rental car does not have a reasonable \\n\\nexpectation of privacy in the vehicle. Therefore, because Lyleʹs operation of the \\n\\ncar rendered his possession and control unlawful, Byrd is distinguishable. \\n\\n Further, unlike the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which have held that \\n\\na defendant may have standing to challenge a search of a rental car despite \\n\\nlacking a valid license and authorization under the rental agreement if he \\n\\nreceived an authorized driverʹs permission, United States v. Best, 135 F.3d 1223 \\n\\n(8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2006), we conclude \\n\\nthat an authorized renterʹs permission is not determinative of whether a \\n\\ndefendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Indeed, Byrd explicitly \\n\\nrejected the notion that legitimate presence alone affords a defendant with a \\n\\nreasonable expectation of privacy. 138 S. Ct. at 1527 (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at \\n\\n\\n\\n 24 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\n148 (noting that legitimate presence is relevant, but not controlling)). While a \\n\\ndefendant does not lose all his Fourth Amendment rights simply by engaging in \\n\\nillegal acts, he may still lack standing to challenge a search when the law \\n\\nprevents him from being there in the first place, even with the ownerʹs \\n\\npermission. See United States v. Schram, 901 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2018) \\n\\n(rejecting argument that defendant had standing to object to the search of his \\n\\ngirlfriendʹs house because the no‐contact order prohibiting him from contacting \\n\\nhis girlfriend was vitiated by her consent to enter the property). Here, even \\n\\nassuming that, under different circumstances, an unlicensed driver may have an \\n\\nexpectation of privacy in a rental car, Lyleʹs possession and control was unlawful \\n\\nwhile driving the rental car both without a license and without authorization. Cf. \\n\\nUnited States v. Walton, 763 F.3d 655, 663 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that defendant, \\n\\nwho was passenger at time of search and sole authorized driver listed on rental \\n\\nagreement, had reasonable expectation of privacy in rental car despite lacking \\n\\ndriverʹs license because ʺ[a] driver of a car does not lose all Fourth Amendment \\n\\nprotections simply because his license is invalid,ʺ but observing that conclusion \\n\\nwould not obtain if person were both unlicensed and unauthorized). \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\n Lyle argues that he was not operating the vehicle when he was \\n\\narrested and that he lawfully possessed the vehicle. These arguments ignore the \\n\\nfact that Lyle was seen by the agents driving the vehicle, and, indeed, he \\n\\neventually admitted as much. Because he was driving the vehicle illegally, Lyle \\n\\ndid not have lawful possession or control of the vehicle and he does not have \\n\\nstanding to challenge the search. \\n\\n Lyleʹs reliance on the Sixth Circuitʹs decision in United States v. \\n\\nSmith, 263 F.3d 571, 586 (6th Cir. 2001), is misplaced. Smith presented unique \\n\\nfacts. Specifically, Smith was not only the husband of the renter, but he also ʺhad \\n\\na business relationship with the rental companyʺ because he had ʺcalled the \\n\\nrental company to reserve the rental vehicle,ʺ ʺwas given a reservation number,ʺ \\n\\nand ʺprovided the company with his credit card number, and that credit card \\n\\nwas subsequently billed for the rental of the vehicle.ʺ Id. In light of these facts, \\n\\nthe Sixth Circuit determined that ʺSmith was the de facto renter of the vehicleʺ \\n\\nand that, therefore, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the rental car. \\n\\nId. at 586‐87. Lyle was not the de facto renter of the car at issue here. Moreover, \\n\\nthe Sixth Circuit also noted that Smith was a licensed driver. Id. at 586 (ʺSmith \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 26 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nwas a licensed driver . . . . Therefore, it was not illegal for Smith [to] drive the \\n\\nvehicle.ʺ). For these reasons, Smith is distinguishable. \\n\\n Accordingly, we adhere to our original conclusion that Lyle lacked a \\n\\nreasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car, and the district court did not \\n\\nerr in denying his motion to suppress. \\n\\n ii. Impoundment of Rental Car \\n\\n Even assuming Lyle had a legitimate privacy interest in the rental \\n\\ncar, his challenge to the inventory search fails on the merits as the impoundment \\n\\nof the rental car did not violate the Fourth Amendment.2 The Supreme Court has \\n\\nrepeatedly held that the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, \\n\\nsee United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998), which ʺin turn, is measured in \\n\\nobjective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances,ʺ Ohio v. Robinette, \\n\\n519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996). Thus, in line with the First, Third, and Fifth Circuits, we \\n\\nconclude that ʺwhether a decision to impound is reasonable under the Fourth \\n\\n\\n\\n \\n 2 Some courts have concluded that there are two inquiries: first, whether \\nthe impoundment of a car is reasonable; and second, if so, whether the subsequent \\nsearch of the car after the impoundment is reasonable. See, e.g., Duguay, 93 F.3d at 351 \\n(ʺ[T]he decision to impound (the ʹseizureʹ) is properly analyzed as distinct from the \\ndecision to inventory (the ʹsearchʹ).ʺ); Coccia, 446 F.3d at 237 n. 5 (same). Here, Lyle has \\nchallenged only the impoundment and not the subsequent search of the rental vehicle. \\nHence, we need not reach the second inquiry. \\n 27 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nAmendment is based on all the facts and circumstances of a given case.ʺ Coccia, \\n\\n446 F.3d at 239. While the existence of and an officerʹs adherence to a \\n\\nstandardized criteria may be helpful in evaluating the reasonableness of an \\n\\nimpoundment, we decline to adopt a standardized impoundment procedure \\n\\nrequirement. \\n\\n Using a totality of the circumstances analysis, we conclude that the \\n\\nimpoundment here was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment even absent \\n\\nstandardized procedures. Here, at the time of his arrest for driving with a \\n\\nsuspended license and for possessing an illegal knife, Lyle was the rental carʹs \\n\\ndriver and sole occupant. As there was no third party immediately available to \\n\\nentrust with the vehicleʹs safekeeping, the officers could not be certain how long \\n\\nthe rental car would be unattended in Lyleʹs absence. Even if Lyle did not expect \\n\\nto be in custody long, Lyle would not have been able to operate the car himself \\n\\nupon release due to his suspended license. Although Lyle asked for the \\n\\nopportunity to arrange for his girlfriend, the authorized driver under the rental \\n\\nagreement, to remove the rental car, the police were not required to grant the \\n\\nrequest. See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374‐75; see also Duguay, 93 F.3d at 353 & n. 2 \\n\\n(holding impoundment of car unconstitutional when the vehicleʹs other occupant \\n\\n\\n\\n 28 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nwas present at the arrest and could ʺprovide for the speedy and efficient removal \\n\\nof the car from public thoroughfares,ʺ but noting that the Seventh Circuit has \\n\\naffirmed impoundments where the arrestee is the vehicleʹs sole occupant and is \\n\\nlegitimately arrested). Instead, by impounding the vehicle, the officer ensured \\n\\nthat the rental vehicle was not left on a public street in a busy midtown \\n\\nManhattan location where it could have become a nuisance or been stolen or \\n\\ndamaged and could have become illegally parked the next day. See Opperman, \\n\\n428 U.S. at 368‐69 (describing as ʺbeyond challengeʺ the authority of police ʺto \\n\\nseize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public \\n\\nsafety and convenience,ʺ such as vehicles that ʺviolate parking ordinancesʺ); \\n\\nSanders, 796 F.3d at 1249 (ʺOpperman establishes that if a vehicle is obstructing or \\n\\nimpeding traffic on public property, it can be impounded regardless of whether \\n\\nthe impoundment is guided by standardized procedures.ʺ). Moreover, there is \\n\\nno indication that the officers did not act in good faith or solely for the purpose \\n\\nof investigation in exercising their discretion to impound the rental car. \\n\\n Our decision in United States v. Lopez, 547 F.3d 364 (2d Cir. 2008), is \\n\\ninstructive. There, although our discussion primarily concerned the \\n\\nconstitutionality of the inventory search itself, we concluded that the \\n\\n\\n\\n 29 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\ncircumstances called for the impoundment of Lopezʹs car despite any showing of \\n\\na standardized impoundment policy. Id. at 372. Similar to Lyle, Lopez was \\n\\narrested and there was no one immediately available to move his car for \\n\\nsafekeeping in Lopezʹs case because the only other passenger was also arrested. \\n\\nSee id. at 366‐67. Moreover, like Lyleʹs car, Lopezʹs car was parked on a city \\n\\nstreet. Id. at 366. \\n\\n Thus, even if Lyle had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the \\n\\nrental car, the district court did not err in denying his motion to suppress. \\n\\nII. The Proffer Agreement Waiver \\n\\n We review the district courtʹs interpretation of the scope of a proffer \\n\\nagreement waiver de novo and its evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. \\n\\nRosemond, 841 F.3d at 107. \\n\\n A. Applicable Law \\n\\n Ordinarily, a ʺstatement made during plea discussions with an \\n\\nattorney for the prosecuting authorityʺ that does not result in a guilty plea is not \\n\\nadmissible against the defendant who made the statement. Fed. R. Evid. \\n\\n410(a)(4). The protections provided by Rule 410, however, can be waived, \\n\\nincluding in a proffer agreement with the government, provided that such \\n\\n\\n\\n 30 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nwaiver is knowing and voluntary. Rosemond, 841 F.3d at 107; United States v. \\n\\nVelez, 354 F.3d 190, 194‐95 (2d Cir. 2004). \\n\\n To determine whether a proffer agreementʹs waiver provision \\n\\napplies, we ask first whether the defendant has offered any evidence or made a \\n\\nfactual assertion that would trigger the Rule 410 waiver, and, ʺif so, whether the \\n\\nproffer statement ʹfairly rebut[s]ʹ the fact asserted or evidence offered or elicited.ʺ \\n\\nRosemond, 841 F.3d at 107. If the waiver has been triggered and the proffer \\n\\nstatement properly rebuts the assertion triggering the waiver, the government \\n\\nmay offer the proffer statement. Id. \\n\\n In Rosemond, we gave examples of factual assertions that will trigger \\n\\nthe proffer waiver, including ʺasserting, in an opening statement, that someone \\n\\nother than the defendant was the real perpetrator of the crime,ʺ id. at 109 (citing \\n\\nUnited States v. Barrow, 400 F.3d 109, 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2005)), and ʺarguing that a \\n\\nshooting was ʹan intended kidnapping gone wrong,ʹ when the defendant \\n\\nadmitted in a proffer session that the shooting was ʹan intentional murder,ʹʺ id. at \\n\\n110 (quoting United States v. Gomez, 210 F. Supp. 2d 465, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)). \\n\\n B. Application \\n\\n The district court properly held that the waiver was triggered by \\n\\nLyleʹs counselʹs statement during opening argument that ʺwe dispute [] the idea \\n 31 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nthat [Lyle] was a dealer.ʺ Tr. 28. Lyleʹs proffer agreement contained a waiver \\n\\nthat allowed his statements to come in ʺto rebut any evidence or arguments \\n\\noffered by or on behalf of [Lyle].ʺ Lyle App. 36. \\n\\n As this Court has recognized, a defense argument does not trigger a \\n\\nwaiver if it ʺsimply challenge[s] the sufficiency of government proof on [the] \\n\\nelements.ʺ Barrow, 400 F.3d at 119. But ʺa statement of fact in a defense opening, \\n\\nsuch as [a] statement . . . unequivocally identifying [someone other than \\n\\ndefendant] as the real perpetrator of the charged crimes,ʺ is a factual assertion \\n\\nthat would trigger a waiver provision. Id. Here, defense counsel did not ascribe \\n\\nthe charged crime to someone else, but he did more than challenge the \\n\\nsufficiency of the governmentʹs proof. Rather than argue that the government \\n\\nwould not adduce credible evidence that Lyle was a drug dealer, counsel \\n\\ndisputed the very idea that Lyle was a dealer. This is the functional equivalent of \\n\\nan affirmative statement that Lyle, in fact, did not deal methamphetamine. This \\n\\nassertion was belied by Lyleʹs proffer admissions and, thus, triggered the waiver \\n\\nprovision in the proffer agreement. \\n\\n Lyleʹs proffer statements fairly rebut his counselʹs opening argument \\n\\nthat Lyle was not a dealer. The proffer statements at issue included that (1) Lyle \\n\\n\\n\\n 32 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nrepeatedly distributed ʺsmall packagesʺ of methamphetamine; (2) Lyle \\n\\naccompanied another person to obtain and deliver methamphetamine; and \\n\\n(3) Lyle knew the location of the methamphetamine supplier. Taken together, \\n\\nthese statements imply participation in a drug distribution operation and thus \\n\\nfairly rebut Lyleʹs counselʹs argument in his opening statement that Lyle was a \\n\\nmere user of methamphetamine and not a dealer. See Barrow, 400 F.3d at 120‐21 \\n\\n(emphasizing that ʺproper rebuttal is not limited to direct contradictionʺ but \\n\\nʺencompasses any evidence that the trial judge concludes fairly counters and \\n\\ncasts doubt on the truthfulness of factual assertions advanced, whether directly \\n\\nor implicitly, by an adversaryʺ). \\n\\n Hence, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its \\n\\ndiscretion in admitting Lyleʹs proffer statements. \\n\\nIII. The Admission of Lyleʹs Redacted Statements \\n\\n A. Applicable Law \\n\\n In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135‐36 (1968), the Supreme \\n\\nCourt held that admission of a non‐testifying co‐defendantʹs confession naming \\n\\nthe defendant as a perpetrator at their joint trial violates the latterʹs Sixth \\n\\nAmendment right to cross‐examination. The Court later made clear that a non‐\\n\\n\\n\\n 33 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nobvious redaction of a co‐defendantʹs confession to eliminate any references to \\n\\nthe defendant will eliminate any Bruton problem. See Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. \\n\\n185, 195‐97 (1998); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208‐09 (1987). \\n\\n We have consistently held that the introduction of a co‐defendantʹs \\n\\nconfession with the defendantʹs name replaced by a neutral noun or pronoun \\n\\ndoes not violate Bruton. See, e.g., United States v. Jass, 569 F.3d 47, 58 (2d Cir. \\n\\n2009) (noting that operative questions when evaluating Bruton claim are ʺ(1) did \\n\\nthe redacted statement give any indication to the jury that the original statement \\n\\ncontained actual names, and (2) did the statement standing alone otherwise \\n\\nconnect co‐defendants to the crimesʺ (internal quotation marks and ellipsis \\n\\nomitted)). In United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125 (2d Cir. 1989), for example, we \\n\\naffirmed a conviction based in part on a co‐defendantʹs statement that was \\n\\nredacted to reference ʺothers,ʺ ʺother people,ʺ and ʺanother person.ʺ Id. at 1135. \\n\\n To determine whether a redaction is sufficient under Bruton, we \\n\\nview the redacted statement separate and apart from any other evidence \\n\\nadmitted at trial. Id. (citing United States v. Wilkinson, 754 F.2d 1427, 1435 (2d Cir. \\n\\n1985)); see also United States v. Williams, 936 F.2d 698, 700‐01 (2d Cir. 1991) (ʺ[T]he \\n\\nappropriate analysis to be used when applying the Bruton rule requires that we \\n\\n\\n\\n 34 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nview the redacted confession in isolation from the other evidence introduced at \\n\\ntrial. If the confession, when so viewed, does not incriminate the defendant, then \\n\\nit may be admitted with a proper limiting instruction even though other \\n\\nevidence in the case indicates that the neutral pronoun is in fact a reference to the \\n\\ndefendant.ʺ). \\n\\n B. Application \\n\\n Van Praagh contends that his constitutional rights were violated by \\n\\nthe admission of Lyleʹs redacted proffer and post‐arrest statements. We \\n\\nordinarily review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion; however, Van \\n\\nPraagh did not object to the introduction of the redacted statements at trial, and \\n\\nso we review the admission of this evidence for plain error. See United States v. \\n\\nPierce, 785 F.3d 832, 840 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 172 (2015).3 \\n\\n The redacted statements did not violate Bruton. The neutral terms \\n\\nʺindividualʺ and ʺperson,ʺ which were substituted for proper names with the \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n \\n 3 Van Praagh contends that his Bruton argument was preserved by his \\ncounselʹs objection to the admission of Lyleʹs unredacted statements and by Lyleʹs \\ncounselʹs objection to the redacted statements. Admission of unredacted statements, \\nhowever, is a different and independent issue, and Van Praagh cites no authority \\nsuggesting that one partyʹs counsel may preserve another partyʹs claim of error when \\nthe other partyʹs counsel fails timely to join in the objection. Accordingly, plain error \\nreview applies. \\n 35 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nexception of that of a supplier ‐‐ ʺBrendan or Brandon,ʺ Tr. 436, 534 ‐‐ were not so \\n\\nobvious as to indicate to the jury that the original statements contained actual \\n\\nnames. This was an ongoing criminal enterprise where many people were \\n\\ninvolved and the government introduced evidence of methamphetamine dealing \\n\\nby several people. Thus, the substitutions alone did not necessarily identify Van \\n\\nPraagh. Further, Lyleʹs redacted statements sounded sufficiently natural. For \\n\\ninstance, he admitted that he had ʺfirst become involved in methamphetamineʺ \\n\\nthrough ʺsomeoneʺ he ʺknew . . . from work,ʺ Tr. 517‐18, and that the individual \\n\\nfor whom he worked as a ʺrunnerʺ ʺasked him to hold something for himʺ in the \\n\\ntrunk of the rental car. Tr. 435, 534. Because such statements ʺmight actually \\n\\nhave been said by a person admitting his own culpability in the charged \\n\\nconspiracy while shielding the specific identity of his confederate,ʺ they do not \\n\\nviolate Bruton. Jass, 569 F.3d at 62. Nor did the redacted statements, viewed in \\n\\nisolation, contain any information indicating that Van Praagh was the \\n\\nʺindividualʺ in question, let alone information that would ʺimmediately \\n\\ninculpateʺ him. Id. at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted). \\n\\n Van Praagh relies on United States v. Taylor, 745 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. \\n\\n2014), to support his contention that the redactions violated Bruton, but Taylor is \\n\\n\\n\\n 36 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\ndistinguishable. Taylor involved a single robbery of a drug store by four people. \\n\\nId. at 20‐21. One of the four, Luana Miller, became a cooperating witness, and \\n\\nanother, Curtis Taylor, gave post‐arrest confessions. Id. At the trial of Taylor \\n\\nand the two other co‐defendants, the trial court admitted Taylorʹs post‐arrest \\n\\nconfessions but required their redaction to omit identifications of his two co‐\\n\\ndefendants. In the portions of the confessions that were admitted, Millerʹs name \\n\\nwas mentioned but the names of the two co‐defendants were replaced with ʺtwo \\n\\nother individuals,ʺ ʺthe person,ʺ and ʺthe driver.ʺ Id. at 29. We determined that \\n\\nin this circumstance the redactions were so obvious as to violate Bruton. Our \\n\\nreasoning was as follows. First, Millerʹs name was used throughout and, ʺ[i]f \\n\\nTaylor had been trying to avoid naming his confederates, he would not have \\n\\nidentified one of them ‐‐ Miller ‐‐ in the very phrase in which the names of the \\n\\nother confederates are omitted.ʺ Id. Second, the wording of the redacted \\n\\nstatements, i.e., ʺ[t]he robbery was the idea of the person who waited with Luana \\n\\nMiller and Taylor at the gas station,ʺ was stilted and unnatural. Id. Third, in this \\n\\ncontext, the ʺreference to ʹtwo other individualsʹ [was] suspiciously closer to the \\n\\nspeech of a prosecutor than that of a perpetrator.ʺ Id. On the basis of these \\n\\nfactors, we determined that it was obvious that names had been omitted from the \\n\\n\\n\\n 37 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nstatements and, therefore, ʺthe choice of implied identity [was] narrow. The \\n\\nunnamed persons correspond[ed] by number (two) and by role to the pair of co‐\\n\\ndefendants . . . [and] [t]he jury could immediately infer, on the evidence of the \\n\\nredacted confession alone, that Taylor had likely named the co‐defendants.ʺ Id. \\n\\n This case is unlike Taylor. First, Lyleʹs statements referred to multiple \\n\\npeople ‐‐ not only one unnamed person to correspond to the one co‐defendant, \\n\\nVan Praagh. This did not present the necessary process‐of‐elimination problem \\n\\nthat left the juryʹs ʺchoice of implied identity narrowʺ as in Taylor. Id. Second, in \\n\\naddition to Van Praaghʹs methamphetamine dealing, the government introduced \\n\\nevidence of methamphetamine dealing by its two cooperating witnesses ‐‐ \\n\\nTarantino and Hodges ‐‐ as well as several others. Because Lyleʹs statements did \\n\\nnot reference by name those cooperating witnesses, the jury could reasonably \\n\\nhave inferred that they were the ʺother personsʺ Lyle was referring to in his \\n\\nredacted statements. Third, Lyleʹs statements referred to people involved in a \\n\\nconspiracy to engage in ongoing criminal conduct, not a single criminal act like in \\n\\nTaylor. For all of these reasons, Taylor is inapposite. \\n\\n We also note that the district court here gave a limiting instruction. \\n\\nSee Taylor, 745 F.3d at 28 (ʺIt matters that the district court gave limiting \\n\\n\\n\\n 38 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\ninstructionsʺ because ʺ[w]e normally assume that jurors follow limiting \\n\\ninstructionsʺ). The district court specifically instructed the jury that ʺLyleʹs \\n\\nstatement about his own conduct may not be considered or discussed by you \\n\\nwith regard to Mr. Van Praagh.ʺ Tr. 713. \\n\\n Finally, Van Praaghʹs constitutional rights were not violated by \\n\\nLyleʹs counsel eliciting testimony on cross‐examination that his clientʹs \\n\\nstatements had been redacted for presentation at trial and that his client had \\n\\nindeed provided actual names in his proffer and post‐arrest statements. Again, \\n\\nbecause Van Praagh did not object during Lyleʹs attorneyʹs cross‐examination, \\n\\nwe review for plain error. In urging error, Van Praagh relies on Gray v. \\n\\nMaryland, 523 U.S. 185 (holding that ʺconsidered as a class, redactions that . . . \\n\\nnotify the jury that a name has been deletedʺ violated the Confrontation Clause). \\n\\nBut Grayʹs focus was on the inadequacy of the governmentʹs redaction. Van \\n\\nPraagh can point to no case plainly identifying Bruton error when a defendant, \\n\\nwhose post‐arrest statements are being offered against him, elicits the fact of \\n\\nredaction, or elicits parts of the redacted statement. \\n\\n Van Praagh fails to show plain error here. First, his case is \\n\\ndistinguishable from Gray in that there the redaction inadequacy was attributable \\n\\n\\n\\n 39 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nto the prosecution. In any event, Van Praagh cannot satisfy the prejudice prong \\n\\nof plain error because in his case the redacted statements referred to multiple \\n\\nʺindividuals,ʺ which means the revelation could not have been immediately \\n\\ninculpatory. See Jass, 569 F.3d at 61. \\n\\n Further, during cross‐examination, Lyleʹs attorney elicited from the \\n\\nsame witness several of the names that Lyle mentioned during his post‐arrest \\n\\nand proffer statements, including ʺZaron,ʺ ʺTed,ʺ ʺBob,ʺ and ʺJoe.ʺ Tr. 525. In \\n\\nour view, that testimony made it less, not more, obvious to the jury that Lyle had \\n\\nalso mentioned Van Praagh. Van Praaghʹs name was not mentioned at all, and \\n\\nLyleʹs counselʹs elicitation of other names suggested that the ʺother personsʺ \\n\\nmentioned were the individuals whose names Lyleʹs counsel elicited, not Van \\n\\nPraagh. For all of these reasons, the admission of Lyleʹs redacted statements was \\n\\nnot plainly erroneous. \\n\\nIV. Admissibility of Lyleʹs New Jersey Arrest \\n\\n We review a district courtʹs evidentiary rulings for abuse of \\n\\ndiscretion, which we will find only if the district court ʺacted arbitrarily and \\n\\nirrationally.ʺ United States v. Greer, 631 F.3d 608, 614 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting \\n\\nUnited States v. Garcia, 291 F.3d 127, 136 (2d Cir. 2002)). \\n\\n\\n\\n 40 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\n A. Applicable Law \\n\\n Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides: \\n\\n Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a \\n personʹs character in order to show that on a particular occasion the \\n person acted in accordance with the character. \\n \\nFed. R. Evid. 404(b). ʺThe Second Circuitʹs ʹinclusionary ruleʹ allows the \\n\\nadmission of such evidence ʹfor any purpose other than to show a defendantʹs \\n\\ncriminal propensity, as long as the evidence is relevant and satisfies the \\n\\nprobative‐prejudice balancing test of Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.ʹʺ \\n\\nGreer, 631 F.3d at 614 (quoting United States v. Inserra, 34 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. \\n\\n1994)). \\n\\n Not all evidence of uncharged misconduct, however, is prohibited \\n\\nby Rule 404(b). Rather, \\n\\n [E]vidence of uncharged criminal activity is not considered other \\n crimes evidence . . . if it arose out of the same transaction or series of \\n transactions as the charged offense, if it is inextricably intertwined \\n with the evidence regarding the charged offense, or if it is necessary \\n to complete the story of the crime on trial. \\n \\nUnited States v. Carboni, 204 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks \\n\\nomitted); see also Inserra, 34 F.3d at 89 (ʺ[E]vidence of other bad acts may be \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 41 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nadmitted to provide the jury with the complete story of the crimes charged by \\n\\ndemonstrating the context of certain events relevant to the charged offense.ʺ). \\n\\n B. Application \\n\\n The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the \\n\\nevidence seized during the New Jersey arrest in January 2014. First, that \\n\\nevidence was not barred by Rule 404(b) because the arrest ʺarose out of the same \\n\\ntransaction or series of transactions as the charged offense.ʺ Carboni, 204 F.3d at \\n\\n44. Specifically, as discussed above, Lyle argued at trial that he was only a \\n\\nmethamphetamine user ‐‐ not a dealer. The government rebutted that argument \\n\\nwith evidence of Lyleʹs New Jersey arrest. In summation, the government \\n\\nargued: \\n\\n 14 or 15 grams [of methamphetamine] is still many hundreds, if not \\n thousands, of dollars of meth. . . . Also, you know what else was in \\n that room? A dozen baggies, a scale, $3,000 in cash. He was not \\n weighing out meth for his own personal use. That was meth he was \\n going to sell. \\n \\nTr. 629. In other words, the evidence seized pursuant to the New Jersey arrest \\n\\nwas not evidence of other crimes; it was evidence of the very crime charged in \\n\\ncount one of the indictment, a conspiracy involving Lyle, Van Praagh, and others \\n\\nto distribute methamphetamine from in or about December 2012 through in or \\n\\n\\n\\n 42 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nabout January 2014. Accordingly, evidence of the New Jersey arrest was \\n\\nadmissible as direct proof of the methamphetamine distribution conspiracy. \\n\\n Second, and in any event, the evidence of the New Jersey arrest fits \\n\\nwithin the Rule 404(b) inclusionary rule because it shows Lyleʹs knowledge and \\n\\nintent regarding the contents of the rental car. Because Lyle argued throughout \\n\\ntrial that he did not know what was in the trunk of the rental car, his knowledge \\n\\nand intent were at issue. United States v. Ramirez, 894 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1990) \\n\\n(ʺWhen the defendant disavows awareness that a crime was being perpetrated, \\n\\nand the government bears the burden of proving the defendantʹs knowing \\n\\npossession as an element of the crime, knowledge is properly put in issue.ʺ). The \\n\\nfact that Lyle was in possession of 14‐15 grams of methamphetamine and tools of \\n\\nthe drug trade less than a month after he was arrested with the rental car is \\n\\nprobative of his knowledge and intent regarding the contents of the rental car. In \\n\\naddition, the probative value of this evidence was not ʺsubstantially outweighedʺ \\n\\nby the risk of unfair prejudice as it ʺdid not involve conduct any more \\n\\nsensational or disturbing than the crimes with which [Lyle was] charged.ʺ United \\n\\nStates v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112, 1120 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Roldan‐\\n\\nZapata, 916 F.2d 795, 804 (2d Cir. 1990)). Accordingly, the district court acted \\n\\n\\n\\n 43 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nwell within its discretion in finding that the probative value of the evidence \\n\\noutweighed the threat of unfair prejudice. \\n\\nV. Sufficiency of the Conspiracy Evidence \\n\\n We review Van Praaghʹs challenge to whether the evidence was \\n\\nsufficient to support his conspiracy conviction de novo, ʺview[ing] the evidence in \\n\\nthe light most favorable to the government, crediting every inference that could \\n\\nhave been drawn in the governmentʹs favor, and deferring to the juryʹs \\n\\nassessment of witness credibility and its assessment of the weight of the \\n\\nevidence.ʺ Rosemond, 841 F.3d at 113 (quoting United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, \\n\\n62 (2d Cir. 2012)). We must affirm if ʺany rational trier of fact could have found \\n\\nthe essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.ʺ Id. (quoting \\n\\nUnited States v. Vernace, 811 F.3d 609, 615 (2d Cir. 2016)). \\n\\n The crux of a conspiracy is an agreement between two or more \\n\\npersons to join together to accomplish something illegal. United States v. Parker, \\n\\n554 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 2009) (ʺTo prove a conspiracy, the evidence must show \\n\\nthat ʹtwo or more persons agreed to participate in a joint venture intended to \\n\\ncommit an unlawful act.ʹʺ (quoting United States v. Desimone, 119 F.3d 217, 223 \\n\\n(2d Cir. 1997))). We have recognized a ʺnarrow exceptionʺ to the conspiracy rule \\n\\n\\n\\n 44 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nfor a transaction between a buyer and seller of drugs. Id. Under this exception, \\n\\nʺthe existence of a buyer‐seller relationship does not itself establish a conspiracy; \\n\\nhowever, where there is additional evidence showing an agreement to join \\n\\ntogether to accomplish an objective beyond the sale transaction, the evidence \\n\\nmay support a finding that the parties intentionally participated in a conspiracy.ʺ \\n\\nUnited States v. Hawkins, 547 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2008); see also United States v. \\n\\nRojas, 617 F.3d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 2010) (ʺ[T]he exception does not protect either the \\n\\nseller or buyer from a charge that they conspired together to transfer drugs if the \\n\\nevidence supports a finding that they shared a conspiratorial purpose to advance \\n\\nother transfers, whether by the seller or by the buyer.ʺ (alteration and internal \\n\\nquotation marks omitted)). The question thus becomes ʺwhether the evidence in \\n\\nits totality suffices to permit a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the \\n\\ndefendant was not merely a buyer or seller of narcotics, but rather that the \\n\\ndefendant knowingly and intentionally participated in the narcotics‐distribution \\n\\nconspiracy by agreeing to accomplish its illegal objective beyond the mere \\n\\npurchase or sale.ʺ Hawkins, 547 F.3d at 73‐74. \\n\\n Van Praagh did not request a buyer‐seller instruction at trial and so \\n\\nwe review for plain error. Pierce, 785 F.3d at 840. The district court did not \\n\\n\\n\\n 45 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nplainly err in failing to give a buyer‐seller instruction because the government \\n\\npresented ample evidence of a narcotics conspiracy beyond a buyer‐seller \\n\\nrelationship between Van Praagh and Lyle. \\n\\n First, Van Praagh sold methamphetamine not just to Lyle, but to \\n\\nothers. Indeed, he received weekly shipments of methamphetamine, which he \\n\\nthen sold to others. With assistance from Tarantino, he regularly sold \\n\\nmethamphetamine out of his apartment in Queens as well as out of hotels, and \\n\\nhe made deliveries to ʺ[p]robably 50ʺ customers. Tr. 124. \\n\\n Second, the quantity of drugs was consistent with a drug trafficking \\n\\noperation. Tarantino testified that Lyle repeatedly purchased pound‐level \\n\\nquantities of methamphetamine at $19,000 to $25,000 per pound. See United \\n\\nStates v. Contreras, 249 F.3d 595, 600 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that repeat sales \\n\\nsuggest ʺmore than a transient relationship,ʺ but are ʺby themselvesʺ insufficient \\n\\nto support an inference of a conspiracy between the supplier and purchaser); see \\n\\nalso United States v. Murray, 618 F.2d 892, 902 (2d Cir. 1980) (ʺ[O]ne who deals in \\n\\nlarge quantities of narcotics may be presumed to know that he is a part of a \\n\\nventure which extends beyond his individual participation.ʺ (quoting United \\n\\nStates v. Magnano, 543 F.2d 431, 433‐34 (2d Cir. 1976)). \\n\\n\\n\\n 46 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\n Accordingly, the district court did not plainly err in failing to sua \\n\\nsponte give a buyer‐seller instruction. See United States v. Medina, 944 F.2d 60, 65‐\\n\\n66 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that the district court was not required to give a buyer‐\\n\\nseller instruction ʺwhere . . . there is advanced planning among the alleged co‐\\n\\nconspirators to deal in wholesale quantities of drugs obviously not intended for \\n\\npersonal useʺ because ʺ[u]nder such circumstances, the participants in the \\n\\ntransaction may be presumed to know that they are part of a broader \\n\\nconspiracyʺ). \\n\\nVI. Reasonableness of Van Praaghʹs Sentence \\n\\n We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under a \\n\\nʺdeferential abuse‐of‐discretion standard.ʺ United States v. Aldeen, 792 F.3d 247, \\n\\n251 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). The \\n\\nquestion is whether Van Praaghʹs below‐Guidelines sentence of 144 monthsʹ \\n\\nimprisonment ʺshock[s] the conscience,ʺ constitutes a ʺmanifest injustice,ʺ or is \\n\\notherwise substantively unreasonable. Id. at 255 (quoting United States v. Rigas, \\n\\n583 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2009)); see also United States v. Perez‐Frias, 636 F.3d 39, 43 \\n\\n(2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (ʺ[I]n the overwhelming majority of cases, a \\n\\nGuidelines sentence will fall comfortably within the broad range of sentences \\n\\nthat would be reasonable in the particular circumstances. It is therefore difficult \\n 47 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nto find that a below‐Guidelines sentence is unreasonable.ʺ (internal quotation \\n\\nmarks and citation omitted)). \\n\\n Van Praaghʹs below‐Guidelines sentence of 144 months was \\n\\nsubstantively reasonable. The district court fully explained its reasoning. It \\n\\nconsidered Van Praaghʹs ʺvery unhappy upbringing,ʺ and the ʺvery positive \\n\\nchangeʺ that Van Praagh ʺseem[ed] to be undergoing.ʺ Van Praagh App. 58‐59. \\n\\nThe district court determined, however, that a 144‐month sentence was sufficient \\n\\nbut not greater than necessary because Van Praagh (1) had committed a ʺvery \\n\\nseriousʺ crime; (2) had a ʺlong history of drug dealingʺ and ʺplenty of \\n\\nopportunities to changeʺ; (3) clearly had been ʺin charge of dealing more drugs at \\n\\na higher level than [Lyle]ʺ; and (4) had a ʺprior record suggest[ing] that he still \\n\\ncontinues to be a danger to the community.ʺ Id. \\n\\n Van Praaghʹs argument that, like Lyle, he should have been \\n\\nsentenced to the statutory mandatory minimum of 120 monthsʹ imprisonment is \\n\\nunavailing. As the district court noted, Van Praagh had a ʺmore important roleʺ \\n\\nthan Lyle. See Van Praagh App. 62. Van Praagh supplied Lyle with pound \\n\\nquantities of methamphetamine on multiple occasions. Van Praagh had people \\n\\nworking for him to make drug deliveries. Moreover, Van Praaghʹs criminal \\n\\n\\n\\n 48 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nhistory was clearly more serious than Lyleʹs. Although neither man had \\n\\npreviously served any jail time for his crimes, Van Praaghʹs previous convictions \\n\\nincluded crimes relating to methamphetamine, while Lyle had only a violation \\n\\nfor marijuana possession twenty years prior to the instant offense conduct. In \\n\\nthese circumstances, we identify no abuse of the district courtʹs sentencing \\n\\ndiscretion and no merit in Van Praaghʹs claim that his sentence is substantively \\n\\nunreasonable. \\n\\n CONCLUSION \\n\\n To summarize, we conclude as follows: \\n\\n 1. Because Lyle was an unlicensed, as well as unauthorized, \\n\\ndriver of the rental car, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in that car, \\n\\nand the district court did not err in denying his motion to suppress. Even \\n\\nassuming Lyle had a legitimate privacy interest, the search and seizure of the \\n\\nrental car did not violate the Fourth Amendment. \\n\\n 2. Lyleʹs counselʹs statement in his opening argument that ʺwe \\n\\ndispute [] the idea that [Lyle] was a dealer,ʺ Tr. 28, triggered the waiver in Lyleʹs \\n\\nproffer agreement, and the proffer statements, taken together, fairly rebutted his \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 49 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\ncounselʹs argument that Lyle was a mere user of methamphetamine and not a \\n\\ndealer. \\n\\n 3. The admission of Lyleʹs redacted proffer and post‐arrest \\n\\nstatements in the defendantsʹ joint trial was not plainly erroneous because the \\n\\nstatements substituted neutral terms for actual names and had no otherwise \\n\\nidentifying information. Further, the district court did not plainly err in allowing \\n\\nLyleʹs counsel, without Van Praaghʹs objection, to elicit testimony that Lyleʹs \\n\\nstatements had been redacted, that Lyle had provided actual names in his proffer \\n\\nand post‐arrest statements, and what several of those names were because those \\n\\ndisclosures did not prejudice Van Praagh and, indeed, made it less obvious to the \\n\\njury that Lyle was referring to Van Praagh in his statements. \\n\\n 4. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the \\n\\nevidence seized during Lyleʹs New Jersey arrest because (a) it was direct \\n\\nevidence of the conspiracy charged in count one of the superseding indictment, \\n\\nand (b) even if it was not direct evidence, it was not ʺother crimes evidenceʺ \\n\\nprohibited by Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) because it showed Lyleʹs \\n\\nknowledge and intent regarding the contents of the rental car on December 11, \\n\\n2013. \\n\\n\\n\\n 50 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\n 5. The district court did not plainly err in failing to sua sponte \\n\\ngive a buyer‐seller instruction to the jury because the government presented \\n\\nample evidence of a narcotics conspiracy. \\n\\n 6. Van Praaghʹs below‐Guidelines sentence of 144 monthsʹ \\n\\nimprisonment was substantively reasonable. \\n\\n Accordingly, the judgments of the district court are AFFIRMED. \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 51\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4382883/\", \"author_raw\": \"CHIN, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"RAGGI"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"CHIN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"LOHIER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"RAGGI\": \", Circuit\", \"CHIN\": \", Circuit\", \"LOHIER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605630/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Lyle & Van Praagh\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-01\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n15‐958‐cr(L) \nUnited States v. Lyle & Van Praagh \n \n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS \n FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT \n\n \n\n August Term 2016 \n\n Argued: January 12, 2017 \n Final Submission: July 6, 2018 \n Decided: April 1, 2019 \n\n Docket Nos. 15‐958‐cr(L), 15‐1175‐cr(CON) \n \n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \n \n Appellee, \n \n v. \n\n JAMES LYLE, AKA SEALED DEFENDANT 3, MICHAEL VAN PRAAGH, AKA SEALED \n DEFENDANT 1, \n \n Defendants‐Appellants, \n \n ANTHONY TARANTINO, AKA SEALED DEFENDANT 2, \n \n Defendant. \n \n \n ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \n FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \n\n \n\nBefore: \n RAGGI, CHIN, AND LOHIER, Circuit Judges. \n\f \n\n \n \n Consolidated appeals from judgments of the United States District \n\nCourt for the Southern District of New York (Crotty, J.) entered after defendants‐\n\nappellants James Lyle and Michael Van Praagh were convicted at trial of charges \n\nrelating to drug trafficking. Lyle challenges the admission of (1) physical \n\nevidence obtained pursuant to warrantless searches and (2) his post‐arrest and \n\nproffer statements. Van Praagh challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence of \n\nconspiracy, (2) the admission of Lyleʹs post‐arrest and proffer statements in their \n\njoint trial, and (3) the reasonableness of his sentence. \n\n AFFIRMED. \n \n \n \n \n MICHAEL FERRARA, Assistant United States \n Attorney (Brendan F. Quigley, Assistant \n United States Attorney, on the brief), for \n Geoffrey S. Berman, United States Attorney \n for the Southern District of New York, New \n York, New York, for Appellee. \n \n DANIEL S. NOOTER (Thomas H. Nooter, on the \n brief), Freeman Nooter & Ginsberg, New \n York, New York, for Defendant‐Appellant \n James Lyle. \n \n\n\n 2 \n \n\f \n\n MARSHA R. TAUBENHAUS, Law Offices of \n Marsha R. Taubenhaus, New York, New \n York, for Defendant‐Appellant Michael Van \n Praagh. \n \n \nCHIN, Circuit Judge: \n\n Defendants‐appellants James Lyle and Michael Van Praagh appeal \n\nfrom judgments of the United States District Court for the Southern District of \n\nNew York (Crotty, J.) convicting them on charges relating to the distribution of \n\nmethamphetamine. Lyle challenges the admission at trial of evidence seized \n\nduring a December 11, 2013 inventory search of a rental car and a January 9, 2014 \n\nsearch of his hotel room. He also challenges the admission at trial of certain post‐\n\narrest and proffer statements. Van Praagh challenges the sufficiency of the \n\nevidence of his participation in a methamphetamine distribution conspiracy, the \n\nadmission of Lyleʹs post‐arrest and proffer statements in their joint trial, and the \n\nreasonableness of his sentence. Because we conclude that the evidence at trial \n\nwas sufficient to support all convictions, the challenged searches and seizures \n\ndid not violate the Fourth Amendment, the admission of Lyleʹs statements did \n\nnot violate the Fifth Amendment, and Van Praaghʹs sentence was reasonable, we \n\naffirm the judgments of the district court. \n\n\n 3 \n \n\f \n\n BACKGROUND \n\nI. The Facts \n\n Because Van Praagh and Lyle appeal convictions following a jury \n\ntrial, we view the evidence in ʺthe light most favorable to the government, \n\ncrediting any inferences that the jury might have drawn in its favor.ʺ United \n\nStates v. Rosemond, 841 F.3d 95, 99‐100 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. \n\nDhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 643 (2d Cir. 2001)). \n\n A. Overview \n\n Throughout 2013, Van Praagh regularly sold pound quantities of \n\nmethamphetamine. These deals generally occurred once a week and often took \n\nplace in Manhattan hotels. Van Praagh also sold smaller quantities of \n\nmethamphetamine out of his apartment in Queens and through in‐person \n\ndeliveries to his customers. Brandon Hodges, an Arizona‐based \n\nmethamphetamine supplier, sent Van Praagh methamphetamine on three or four \n\noccasions during this time, with the largest shipment containing four ounces of \n\nmethamphetamine. Van Praagh regularly sold methamphetamine to Lyle, who \n\nwas also a methamphetamine dealer in the New York area. Lyle regularly sold \n\nmethamphetamine to Anthony Tarantino. Tarantino initially purchased \n\n\n\n 4 \n \n\f \n\nmethamphetamine for personal use, but eventually started selling small \n\nquantities of methamphetamine to his own clients. Both Hodges and Tarantino \n\ncooperated with the government and testified at trial. \n\n In January 2013, Lyle introduced Tarantino to Van Praagh. \n\nTarantino accompanied Lyle to Van Praaghʹs apartment so that Lyle could \n\nrestock his methamphetamine supply. While at Van Praaghʹs apartment, \n\nTarantino saw Lyle purchase methamphetamine from Van Praagh, which Lyle \n\nlater sold to Tarantino. In April 2013, Lyle took Tarantino to Van Praaghʹs \n\napartment a second time, where Tarantino again observed Lyle ʺre‐up,ʺ i.e., \n\npurchase methamphetamine, from Van Praagh. After this second visit, \n\nTarantino and Van Praagh became romantically involved, and eventually \n\nTarantino moved in with Van Praagh and began helping him sell \n\nmethamphetamine. \n\n B. The Seizure of Methamphetamine from Van Praaghʹs Hotel Room \n\n On May 29, 2013, Van Praagh and Tarantino checked into the Out \n\nHotel in midtown Manhattan. That night, they sold pound quantities of \n\nmethamphetamine to several customers, including Lyle. The next day, they \n\nchecked out of the hotel but accidentally left approximately a pound of \n\n\n\n 5 \n \n\f \n\nmethamphetamine and $20,000 cash in the hotel room safe. Hotel staff found the \n\ndrugs and money and called the New York City Police Department (ʺNYPDʺ), \n\nand officers arrived to seize the drugs and cash. After Van Praagh realized his \n\nmistake later that day, he returned to the hotel, where he was arrested by the \n\nNYPD. During the arrest, the officers seized a cellular phone and over $1,000 \n\ncash from Van Praaghʹs pocket. The officers also searched Van Praaghʹs Vespa \n\nscooter parked outside the hotel, where they found part of and packaging for a \n\ndigital scale. \n\n Soon thereafter, Tarantino brought Lyle money to give to Van \n\nPraaghʹs father to bail Van Praagh out of jail. The day after Van Praagh got out \n\nof jail, he and Tarantino flew to Arizona to ensure that Van Praaghʹs \n\nmethamphetamine suppliers would continue to sell to him. Van Praagh and \n\nTarantino returned to New York and continued their sale of methamphetamine. \n\n C. Lyleʹs Arrests \n\n On December 11, 2013, NYPD officers observed Lyle park and exit a \n\ncar in midtown Manhattan. The officers noticed a knife clipped to Lyleʹs pants, \n\nwhich they later determined to be an illegal gravity knife. The officers \n\napproached Lyle as he was closing the trunk of the car. Lyle told the officers that \n\n\n\n 6 \n \n\f \n\nhe was legally permitted to carry a gravity knife because he was a member of the \n\nstagehands union and used the knife to perform his job. Lyle initially said he \n\nhad not driven the car but when the officers informed him that they had seen \n\nhim driving it, Lyle admitted as much. When asked for identification, Lyle \n\nproduced a New York State ID with the expiration date scratched off. The \n\nofficers confirmed that Lyleʹs driverʹs license was suspended. The officers also \n\ndetermined that the vehicle Lyle was driving was a rental car and that Lyle was \n\nnot an authorized driver under the rental agreement. Lyle claimed that his \n\ngirlfriend had rented the car and had given him permission to drive it. The \n\nofficers arrested Lyle for driving with a suspended license and for possessing an \n\nillegal knife. \n\n Before heading to the station for processing, Lyle asked if the car \n\ncould be left at the location and stated that his girlfriend would pick it up. The \n\nofficers denied the request and impounded the vehicle. At the police precinct, an \n\ninventory search was conducted. Over one pound of methamphetamine and \n\napproximately $39,000 cash were found in the trunk of the car. \n\n The following day ‐‐ December 12, 2013 ‐‐ Lyle was brought to the \n\nDistrict Attorneyʹs Office where he made certain statements in custody after \n\n\n\n 7 \n \n\f \n\nbeing read his Miranda rights. When asked about the methamphetamine that \n\nwas in the trunk of the rental car, Lyle stated that ʺan individual . . . had \n\ncontacted him and asked him to hold something for him.ʺ Tr. 435.1 He stated \n\nthat upon meeting with that individual and another individual, he stayed in the \n\ncar and did not see what was placed in the trunk but presumed it to be drugs \n\nbecause the individual that he was meeting with was known to distribute large \n\nquantities of methamphetamine in the New York area. When asked about his \n\nrelationship with these two individuals, Lyle stated that he was friends with \n\nthem, and had eventually begun working with one of them in delivering \n\nmethamphetamine to the individualʹs customers. \n\n Lyle stated that the person in charge had a source of supply in \n\nArizona named either Brendan or Brandon. Lyle also ʺprovided a few namesʺ of \n\nother people in the New York area who distributed large quantities of \n\nmethamphetamine. Tr. 436. \n\n On January 9, 2014, police in East Windsor, New Jersey responded \n\nto an anonymous call that people were using methamphetamine in a hotel room. \n\n\n\n \n 1 Lyle identified this individual as Van Praagh, but at trial, ʺindividualʺ \nwas substituted for Van Praaghʹs name pursuant to Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 \n(1968). \n 8 \n \n\f \n\nWhen they got to the hotel room, Lyle opened the door and invited the officers \n\ninside. The officers heard the toilet flush and saw Lyleʹs girlfriend come out of \n\nthe bathroom. The officers observed a torch lighter on the bathroom shelf, a \n\nsmall clear bag next to the trash can, and a partial clear straw wrapper containing \n\nwhite residue on the bathroom floor. Additionally, they observed a towel under \n\nthe bathroom doorway. In the bedroom, the officers noticed that a clear bag had \n\nbeen affixed to the smoke detector with rubber bands. \n\n Officers then performed a consent search of the room, and found \n\napproximately fourteen grams of methamphetamine, $3,270 cash, a digital scale, \n\nand numerous plastic baggies. Lyle and his girlfriend were both arrested. \n\nII. The Proceedings Below \n\n A. The Indictment and Van Praaghʹs Arrest \n\n Van Praagh, Lyle, and Tarantino were indicted on March 20, 2014. \n\nOn March 31, 2014, Drug Enforcement Administration (ʺDEAʺ) agents arrested \n\nVan Praagh at his apartment. After receiving consent to search the apartment, \n\nagents found tools used to sell drugs, including a heat‐sealer, packaging \n\nmaterials, and multiple scales, and a note from Hodges asking Van Praagh to \n\nhave Lyle call him. \n\n\n\n 9 \n \n\f \n\n On April 6, 2013, Van Praagh called his father from jail and told him, \n\nin a recorded call, ʺthey got nothing . . . . I sterilized the house like I told you.ʺ \n\nSupp. App. 104. He also told him, ʺ[t]hey got Anthony [Tarantino], but Iʹm \n\nexpecting that heʹll be disappearing any day now . . . . I believe that he had been \n\ntalking.ʺ Supp. App. 105. \n\n B. Lyleʹs Proffer Session \n\n On April 7, 2014, Lyle participated in a proffer session with the \n\ngovernment in hope of reaching a cooperation agreement. A proffer agreement \n\nwas executed, stipulating that the government would not use any of Lyleʹs \n\nstatements made during the proffer sessions against him, except ʺto rebut any \n\nevidence or arguments offered by or on behalf of [Lyle].ʺ Lyle App. 36. \n\n During the proffer session, Lyle admitted that (1) around 2011 or \n\n2012, he sometimes stayed with Van Praagh while working on projects in New \n\nYork City; (2) he observed Van Praagh smoking and using methamphetamine; \n\n(3) he occasionally delivered packages to Van Praaghʹs clients; (4) he \n\naccompanied Van Praagh to deliver methamphetamine thirty to fifty times; \n\n(5) Van Praagh told Lyle his supplier was in Arizona; and (6) on one occasion, \n\n\n\n\n 10 \n \n\f \n\nLyle accompanied Van Praagh to pick up methamphetamine from a library in \n\nNew York City. \n\n C. The Superseding Indictment and Pretrial Motions \n\n A superseding indictment was filed September 30, 2014, charging \n\n(1) Van Praagh and Lyle with conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more of \n\nmethamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A), from \n\nDecember 2012 to January 2014; (2) Van Praagh with distributing and possessing \n\nwith intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of \n\n21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B), on or about May 30, 2013; and (3) Lyle \n\nwith distributing and possessing with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of \n\nmethamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B), on or \n\nabout December 11, 2013. \n\n Before trial, Lyle moved to suppress the physical evidence recovered \n\nfrom the search of the automobile, as well as his subsequent post‐arrest \n\nstatements. In an affidavit filed in support of the motion, Lyle admitted that \n\n(1) just prior to his arrest, he had been driving the car that had been rented by his \n\ngirlfriend with her permission; (2) he possessed a gravity knife that day; (3) he \n\n\n\n\n 11 \n \n\f \n\ninitially told the police officers he had not been driving the car but later admitted \n\nto driving the car; and (4) his license was suspended at the time. \n\n On September 11, 2014, the district court held an evidentiary hearing \n\non the voluntariness of Lyleʹs post‐arrest statements and, on October 1, 2014, the \n\ncourt denied Lyleʹs motion to suppress. The court found there was probable \n\ncause for Lyleʹs arrest, based on his possession of a gravity knife. The court then \n\nconcluded that the search of the rental car was justified on two independent \n\nbases. First, Lyle had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car \n\nbecause he was not an authorized driver under the rental agreement. Second, \n\nthe search of the rental car was a valid inventory search. The court also found \n\nthat Lyleʹs post‐arrest statements were made voluntarily and pursuant to a valid \n\nMiranda waiver. \n\n D. The Trial \n\n Lyle and Van Praaghʹs trial began on October 14, 2014, and ended on \n\nOctober 20, 2014. The government called nineteen witnesses, and introduced \n\nphysical evidence consisting of drugs and drug processing materials, text \n\nmessages between the defendants, testimony regarding Lyleʹs post‐arrest and \n\nproffer statements, and the recorded call Van Praagh made to his father while \n\n\n\n 12 \n \n\f \n\nincarcerated. Van Praagh called one witness who testified about the \n\ncircumstances of Van Praaghʹs March 31, 2014 arrest. Lyle did not put on a case. \n\n During his opening statement, Lyleʹs counsel stated that ʺ[Lyle] \n\nobtained, bought, borrowed, was given methamphetamine for his own use. \n\nWhere we dispute is the idea that he was a dealer.ʺ Tr. 28. Later that day, the \n\ngovernment submitted a letter brief, asserting that Lyleʹs counselʹs argument that \n\nLyle was not a dealer opened the door to Lyleʹs proffer statements about \n\ndistributing drugs with Van Praagh. \n\n Lyleʹs statements to law enforcement were admitted in two contexts. \n\nFirst, the district court allowed testimony regarding Lyleʹs December 12, 2013 \n\npost‐arrest statements to law enforcement to be admitted only as against him, \n\nprohibiting mention of Van Praagh. Van Praagh did not object to the redacted \n\ntestimony. Government witnesses testified that Lyle admitted that an \n\nʺindividualʺ for whom he worked as a ʺrunnerʺ ʺasked him to hold something for \n\nhimʺ in the trunk of the rental car, which Lyle ʺpresumed . . . to be drugsʺ \n\nbecause Lyle knew ʺ[t]hat individual along with another individualʺ distributed \n\nʺlarge quantities of crystal meth in the New York area.ʺ Tr. 435, 534. Lyle was \n\nfriends ʺ[m]ore so with the individual that had not placed the drugs in the \n\n\n\n 13 \n \n\f \n\ntrunk. . . . He said that he began as friends, and eventually he began working \n\nwith that individualʺ ‐‐ the ʺindividual who was in chargeʺ‐‐ ʺassisting him in \n\ndelivering . . . methamphetamine to that individualʹs customers.ʺ Tr. 435‐36. \n\nLyle told law enforcement that the individuals for whom he was working as a \n\nrunner had a source of supply in Arizona named either Brendan or Brandon. \n\nLyle also gave law enforcement ʺa few namesʺ of other people in the New York \n\narea who distributed methamphetamine, including the names of three \n\ncompetitor drug dealers. Tr. 436. On cross‐examination, Lyleʹs attorney elicited \n\ntestimony that, during the post‐arrest interview, Lyle ʺgave names of people \n\nduring the conversation,ʺ one of which was Brandon or Brendan. Tr. 448. \n\n Second, toward the close of the governmentʹs case, the district court \n\nruled ‐‐ over Lyleʹs objection ‐‐ that Lyleʹs proffer statements were admissible, \n\nbut again prohibited mention of Van Praagh. Van Praagh did not object. The \n\ngovernment witness then testified that Lyle admitted he had ʺfirst become \n\ninvolved in methamphetamineʺ in 2012 through ʺsomeoneʺ he ʺknew . . . from \n\nwork.ʺ Tr. 517‐18. Lyle observed ʺthat person . . . using and distributing crystal \n\nmethamphetamine.ʺ Tr. 518. Lyle ʺbegan distributing small packagesʺ for that \n\nperson and ʺaccompanying that person on deals as well as picking up crystal \n\n\n\n 14 \n \n\f \n\nmethamphetamine.ʺ Id. Lyle admitted that ʺhe accompanied this person . . . [on] \n\nbetween 30 to 50 occasions. And that at one point they had gone to a library in \n\nthe New York City area . . . to pick up crystal methamphetamine.ʺ Id. Lyle said \n\nthe methamphetamine supplier was in Arizona. \n\n On cross‐examination, Lyleʹs attorney elicited from the witness that \n\nʺ[Lyle] actually g[a]ve real names of peopleʺ during his proffer session, and \n\nprovided ʺsome names of people whose last names he didnʹt know.ʺ Tr. 524. \n\nThese names included ʺZaron,ʺ ʺTed,ʺ ʺBob,ʺ and ʺJoe.ʺ Tr. at 525. \n\n At the close of trial, the district court instructed the jury, in pertinent \n\npart: ʺThere has been evidence that Mr. Lyle made statements to law \n\nenforcement authorities . . . . I want to let you know that . . . Mr. Lyleʹs statement \n\nabout his own conduct may not be considered or discussed by you with regard \n\nto Mr. Van Praagh.ʺ Tr. 713. \n\n On October 20, 2014, the jury found the defendants guilty on all \n\ncounts. On March 25, 2015, the district court sentenced Lyle principally to the \n\nstatutory mandatory minimum of 120 monthsʹ imprisonment and, on April 2, \n\n2015, the district court sentenced Van Praagh principally to 144 monthsʹ \n\nimprisonment. In imposing a higher sentence on Van Praagh, the district court \n\n\n\n 15 \n \n\f \n\nconcluded that ʺVan Praagh had a higher role, more important role. He dealt in \n\nmore drugs than did Mr. Lyle.ʺ Van Praagh App. 62. \n\n These appeals followed. On May 9, 2017, we issued an opinion \n\naffirming the district courtʹs judgments. United States v. Lyle, 856 F.3d 191 (2d \n\nCir. 2017). Lyle petitioned for and was granted certiorari by the Supreme Court. \n\nOn May 21, 2018, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the \n\ncase for further consideration in light of its intervening decision in Byrd v. United \n\nStates, ‐‐‐ U.S. ‐‐‐, 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2018), which addressed the issue of the \n\nreasonable expectation of privacy of an unauthorized driver of a rental car. On \n\nJuly 6, 2018, the parties submitted letter briefs addressing Byrdʹs impact upon this \n\ncase. For the reasons set forth below, we adhere to our original decision. \n\n DISCUSSION \n\n Six issues are presented: (1) the validity of the warrantless search \n\nand seizure of the rental car; (2) the interpretation of Lyleʹs proffer agreement; (3) \n\nthe sufficiency of the redactions to Lyleʹs proffer statements; (4) the admissibility \n\nof Lyleʹs New Jersey arrest; (5) the sufficiency of the conspiracy evidence against \n\nVan Praagh; and (6) the reasonableness of Van Praaghʹs sentence. We address \n\neach issue in turn. \n\n\n\n 16 \n \n\f \n\nI. Warrantless Search of Rental Car \n\n We review a district courtʹs ruling on a suppression motion for clear \n\nerror as to factual findings, ʺgiving special deference to findings that are based \n\non determinations of witness credibility,ʺ and de novo as to questions of law. \n\nUnited States v. Hussain, 835 F.3d 307, 312‐13 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting United States \n\nv. Lucky, 569 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir. 2009)). We conclude that Lyleʹs motion was \n\nproperly denied for two independent reasons: first, Lyle had no reasonable \n\nexpectation of privacy in the rental car, and, second, the inventory search of the \n\nrental car was reasonable. \n\n A. Applicable Law \n\n i. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Rental Car \n\n The Fourth Amendment guarantees citizens the ʺright . . . to be \n\nsecure in their . . . effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.ʺ U.S. \n\nConst. amend. IV. To prove that a search violated the Fourth Amendment, ʺan \n\naccused must show that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in a searched \n\nplace or item.ʺ United States v. Rahme, 813 F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing \n\nRawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980)). The person challenging the search \n\nmust demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy in the place searched, and \n\n\n\n 17 \n \n\f \n\nthat expectation must be objectively reasonable. United States v. Paulino, 850 F.2d \n\n93, 97 (2d Cir. 1988). \n\n When we previously ruled in this case, the question of whether an \n\nunauthorized driver has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a rental car \n\ndivided the various circuit courts, resulting in at least three approaches. See Lyle, \n\n856 F.3d at 200‐01 (reviewing circuit split). We did not rule on the question, as \n\nwe decided the appeal on other grounds, as discussed below. \n\n The Supreme Courtʹs recent decision in Byrd v. United States resolved \n\nthe circuit split, holding that the ʺmere fact that a driver in lawful possession or \n\ncontrol of a rental car is not listed on the rental agreement will not defeat his or \n\nher otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy.ʺ 138 S. Ct. at 1531. The Court \n\nrejected the governmentʹs suggestion of a per se rule that unauthorized drivers \n\nʺalways lack an expectation of privacy in the automobile based on the rental \n\ncompanyʹs lack of authorization alone.ʺ Id. at 1527. Drawing from property \n\nprinciples, the Supreme Court reasoned that ʺ[o]ne of the main rights attaching \n\nto property is the right to exclude others, and, in the main, one who owns or \n\nlawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate \n\nexpectation of privacy by virtue of the right to exclude.ʺ Id. at 1527 (quoting \n\n\n\n 18 \n \n\f \n\nRakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n. 12 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted)). \n\nIt further noted, however, that the concept of lawful possession is central to the \n\nexpectation of privacy inquiry, for a ʺʹwrongfulʹ presence at the scene of a search \n\nwould not enable a defendant to object to the legality of the search.ʺ Id. at 1529 \n\n(quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 141 n. 9). Thus, ʺa person present in a stolen \n\nautomobile at the time of the search may [not] object to the lawfulness of the \n\nsearch of the automobileʺ regardless of his level of possession and control over \n\nthe automobile. See id. \n\n ii. Community Caretaking Function \n\n It is well established that police have the authority, despite the \n\nabsence of a warrant, to seize and remove from the streets automobiles in the \n\ninterests of public safety and as part of their community caretaking functions ‐‐ \n\nan authority that is beyond reasonable challenge. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 \n\nU.S. 364, 368‐69 (1976). In Colorado v. Bertine, the Supreme Court explained that, \n\nunder this community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement, police \n\nofficers may exercise their discretion in deciding whether to impound a vehicle, \n\nʺso long as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and on the \n\nbasis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.ʺ 479 \n\n\n\n 19 \n \n\f \n\nU.S. 367, 375 (1987). The question of whether Bertine and similar Supreme Court \n\nprecedent require an officerʹs decision to impound a car to be made pursuant to \n\nstandardized criteria, a question we have not addressed, has created a split \n\namong the circuits. \n\n Relying on a stricter interpretation of Bertine, two circuits have \n\nconcluded that an officerʹs decision to impound a vehicle as part of its role as a \n\ncommunity caretaker must be guided by a standardized procedure. See United \n\nStates v. Petty, 367 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that ʺ[s]ome degree of \n\nstandardized criteria or established routine must regulate these police actions . . . \n\nto ensure that impoundments and inventory searches are not merely a ruse for \n\ngeneral rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidenceʺ (internal \n\nquotation marks omitted)); United States v. Duguay, 93 F.3d 346, 351 (7th Cir. \n\n1996) (ʺAmong those criteria which must be standardized are the circumstances \n\nin which a car may be impounded.ʺ). Taking a slightly different approach, the \n\nD.C. Circuit has held that ʺif a standard impoundment procedure exists, a police \n\nofficerʹs failure to adhere thereto is unreasonable and violates the Fourth \n\nAmendment.ʺ United States v. Proctor, 489 F.3d 1348, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The \n\nTenth Circuit has held that standardized procedures are not required where an \n\n\n\n 20 \n \n\f \n\nofficer exercises ʺthe community‐caretaking functions of protecting public safety \n\nand promoting the efficient movement of traffic,ʺ but are required in other cases. \n\nUnited States v. Sanders, 796 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 2015). \n\n The First, Third, and Fifth Circuits, however, have rejected the \n\nstandardized criteria requirement, and instead focus their inquiry on the \n\nreasonableness of the impoundment under the circumstances. See United States v. \n\nMcKinnon, 681 F.3d 203, 208 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (hinging analysis upon \n\nʺthe reasonableness of the ʹcommunity caretakerʹ impound viewed in the context \n\nof the facts and circumstances encountered by the officerʺ (citation omitted)); \n\nUnited States v. Smith, 522 F.3d 305, 314 (3d Cir. 2008) (declining to adopt ʺthe \n\nmore structured approach . . . requiring that there be standardized police \n\nprocedures governing impoundmentsʺ); United States v. Coccia, 446 F.3d 233, 239 \n\n(1st Cir. 2006) (ʺ[I]mpoundments of vehicles for community caretaking purposes \n\nare consonant with the Fourth Amendment so long as the impoundment decision \n\nwas reasonable under the circumstances.ʺ). These circuits read Bertine ʺto \n\nindicate that an impoundment decision made pursuant to standardized \n\nprocedures will most likely, although not necessarily always, satisfy the Fourth \n\nAmendment.ʺ Coccia, 446 F.3d at 238. \n\n\n\n 21 \n \n\f \n\n B. Application \n\n i. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Rental Car \n\n In our prior decision, we specifically declined to decide whether an \n\nunauthorized driver ever has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a rental car. \n\nInstead, we concluded, and now reaffirm, that Lyle lacked standing not just \n\nbecause he was an unauthorized driver, but because he was an unlicensed one. \n\nAccordingly, Lyleʹs use of the rental car was both unauthorized and unlawful. \n\nSee N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law § 511 (prohibiting operating a car without a valid \n\nlicense). Lyle should not have been driving any car because his license was \n\nsuspended, and a rental company with knowledge of the relevant facts certainly \n\nwould not have given him permission to drive its car nor allowed a renter to let \n\nhim do so. Under these circumstances, Lyle did not have a reasonable \n\nexpectation of privacy in the rental car. See United States v. Haywood, 324 F.3d \n\n514, 516 (7th Cir. 2003) (declining to resolve circuit split over whether \n\nunauthorized driver had reasonable expectation of privacy in rental car, because \n\nunauthorized driver also had suspended license and the combination resulted in \n\nno reasonable expectation of privacy); cf. United States v. Tropiano, 50 F.3d 157, \n\n161 (2d Cir. 1995) (ʺ[W]e think it obvious that a defendant who knowingly \n\n\n\n 22 \n \n\f \n\npossesses a stolen car has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the car.ʺ); United \n\nStates v. Ponce, 947 F.2d 646, 649 (2d Cir. 1991) (ʺTo mount a challenge to a search \n\nof a vehicle, defendants must show, among other things, a legitimate basis for \n\nbeing in it, such as permission from the owner.ʺ). \n\n Byrd does not require a different result. The Court there held that an \n\nunauthorized driver in sole possession of a rental car could have a legitimate \n\nexpectation of privacy in the vehicle because even an unauthorized driver, in the \n\nright circumstances, could have ʺlawful possession and control and the attendant \n\nright to exclude.ʺ 138 S. Ct. at 1528. The Court noted that ʺthere may be \n\ncountless innocuous reasons why an unauthorized driver might get behind the \n\nwheel of a rental car and drive it ‐‐ perhaps the renter is drowsy or inebriated.ʺ \n\nId. at 1529. \n\n This reasoning does not apply to the circumstances here, where Lyle \n\nwas not only the driver of the vehicle but the sole occupant. Because Lyle did \n\nnot have a valid driverʹs license, it was unlawful for him to be operating the \n\nvehicle. He did not have lawful possession and control of the vehicle in the sense \n\nthat he unlawfully drove the vehicle onto the scene and could not lawfully drive \n\nit away. See id. (reaffirming conclusion in Rakas v. Illinois that ʺʹwrongfulʹ \n\n\n\n 23 \n \n\f \n\npresence at the scene of a search would not enable a defendant to object to the \n\nlegality of the search,ʺ ʺ[n]o matter the degree of [a defendantʹs] possession and \n\ncontrol.ʺ). While the absence of a valid license alone may not destroy an \n\nunauthorized driverʹs expectation of privacy, Lyleʹs possession and control of the \n\ncar was unlawful the moment he started driving it. Just as a car thief would not \n\nhave a reasonable expectation of privacy in a stolen car, id., an unauthorized, \n\nunlicensed driver in sole possession of a rental car does not have a reasonable \n\nexpectation of privacy in the vehicle. Therefore, because Lyleʹs operation of the \n\ncar rendered his possession and control unlawful, Byrd is distinguishable. \n\n Further, unlike the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which have held that \n\na defendant may have standing to challenge a search of a rental car despite \n\nlacking a valid license and authorization under the rental agreement if he \n\nreceived an authorized driverʹs permission, United States v. Best, 135 F.3d 1223 \n\n(8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2006), we conclude \n\nthat an authorized renterʹs permission is not determinative of whether a \n\ndefendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Indeed, Byrd explicitly \n\nrejected the notion that legitimate presence alone affords a defendant with a \n\nreasonable expectation of privacy. 138 S. Ct. at 1527 (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at \n\n\n\n 24 \n \n\f \n\n148 (noting that legitimate presence is relevant, but not controlling)). While a \n\ndefendant does not lose all his Fourth Amendment rights simply by engaging in \n\nillegal acts, he may still lack standing to challenge a search when the law \n\nprevents him from being there in the first place, even with the ownerʹs \n\npermission. See United States v. Schram, 901 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2018) \n\n(rejecting argument that defendant had standing to object to the search of his \n\ngirlfriendʹs house because the no‐contact order prohibiting him from contacting \n\nhis girlfriend was vitiated by her consent to enter the property). Here, even \n\nassuming that, under different circumstances, an unlicensed driver may have an \n\nexpectation of privacy in a rental car, Lyleʹs possession and control was unlawful \n\nwhile driving the rental car both without a license and without authorization. Cf. \n\nUnited States v. Walton, 763 F.3d 655, 663 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that defendant, \n\nwho was passenger at time of search and sole authorized driver listed on rental \n\nagreement, had reasonable expectation of privacy in rental car despite lacking \n\ndriverʹs license because ʺ[a] driver of a car does not lose all Fourth Amendment \n\nprotections simply because his license is invalid,ʺ but observing that conclusion \n\nwould not obtain if person were both unlicensed and unauthorized). \n\n\n\n\n 25 \n \n\f \n\n Lyle argues that he was not operating the vehicle when he was \n\narrested and that he lawfully possessed the vehicle. These arguments ignore the \n\nfact that Lyle was seen by the agents driving the vehicle, and, indeed, he \n\neventually admitted as much. Because he was driving the vehicle illegally, Lyle \n\ndid not have lawful possession or control of the vehicle and he does not have \n\nstanding to challenge the search. \n\n Lyleʹs reliance on the Sixth Circuitʹs decision in United States v. \n\nSmith, 263 F.3d 571, 586 (6th Cir. 2001), is misplaced. Smith presented unique \n\nfacts. Specifically, Smith was not only the husband of the renter, but he also ʺhad \n\na business relationship with the rental companyʺ because he had ʺcalled the \n\nrental company to reserve the rental vehicle,ʺ ʺwas given a reservation number,ʺ \n\nand ʺprovided the company with his credit card number, and that credit card \n\nwas subsequently billed for the rental of the vehicle.ʺ Id. In light of these facts, \n\nthe Sixth Circuit determined that ʺSmith was the de facto renter of the vehicleʺ \n\nand that, therefore, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the rental car. \n\nId. at 586‐87. Lyle was not the de facto renter of the car at issue here. Moreover, \n\nthe Sixth Circuit also noted that Smith was a licensed driver. Id. at 586 (ʺSmith \n\n\n\n\n 26 \n \n\f \n\nwas a licensed driver . . . . Therefore, it was not illegal for Smith [to] drive the \n\nvehicle.ʺ). For these reasons, Smith is distinguishable. \n\n Accordingly, we adhere to our original conclusion that Lyle lacked a \n\nreasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car, and the district court did not \n\nerr in denying his motion to suppress. \n\n ii. Impoundment of Rental Car \n\n Even assuming Lyle had a legitimate privacy interest in the rental \n\ncar, his challenge to the inventory search fails on the merits as the impoundment \n\nof the rental car did not violate the Fourth Amendment.2 The Supreme Court has \n\nrepeatedly held that the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, \n\nsee United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998), which ʺin turn, is measured in \n\nobjective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances,ʺ Ohio v. Robinette, \n\n519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996). Thus, in line with the First, Third, and Fifth Circuits, we \n\nconclude that ʺwhether a decision to impound is reasonable under the Fourth \n\n\n\n \n 2 Some courts have concluded that there are two inquiries: first, whether \nthe impoundment of a car is reasonable; and second, if so, whether the subsequent \nsearch of the car after the impoundment is reasonable. See, e.g., Duguay, 93 F.3d at 351 \n(ʺ[T]he decision to impound (the ʹseizureʹ) is properly analyzed as distinct from the \ndecision to inventory (the ʹsearchʹ).ʺ); Coccia, 446 F.3d at 237 n. 5 (same). Here, Lyle has \nchallenged only the impoundment and not the subsequent search of the rental vehicle. \nHence, we need not reach the second inquiry. \n 27 \n \n\f \n\nAmendment is based on all the facts and circumstances of a given case.ʺ Coccia, \n\n446 F.3d at 239. While the existence of and an officerʹs adherence to a \n\nstandardized criteria may be helpful in evaluating the reasonableness of an \n\nimpoundment, we decline to adopt a standardized impoundment procedure \n\nrequirement. \n\n Using a totality of the circumstances analysis, we conclude that the \n\nimpoundment here was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment even absent \n\nstandardized procedures. Here, at the time of his arrest for driving with a \n\nsuspended license and for possessing an illegal knife, Lyle was the rental carʹs \n\ndriver and sole occupant. As there was no third party immediately available to \n\nentrust with the vehicleʹs safekeeping, the officers could not be certain how long \n\nthe rental car would be unattended in Lyleʹs absence. Even if Lyle did not expect \n\nto be in custody long, Lyle would not have been able to operate the car himself \n\nupon release due to his suspended license. Although Lyle asked for the \n\nopportunity to arrange for his girlfriend, the authorized driver under the rental \n\nagreement, to remove the rental car, the police were not required to grant the \n\nrequest. See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374‐75; see also Duguay, 93 F.3d at 353 & n. 2 \n\n(holding impoundment of car unconstitutional when the vehicleʹs other occupant \n\n\n\n 28 \n \n\f \n\nwas present at the arrest and could ʺprovide for the speedy and efficient removal \n\nof the car from public thoroughfares,ʺ but noting that the Seventh Circuit has \n\naffirmed impoundments where the arrestee is the vehicleʹs sole occupant and is \n\nlegitimately arrested). Instead, by impounding the vehicle, the officer ensured \n\nthat the rental vehicle was not left on a public street in a busy midtown \n\nManhattan location where it could have become a nuisance or been stolen or \n\ndamaged and could have become illegally parked the next day. See Opperman, \n\n428 U.S. at 368‐69 (describing as ʺbeyond challengeʺ the authority of police ʺto \n\nseize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public \n\nsafety and convenience,ʺ such as vehicles that ʺviolate parking ordinancesʺ); \n\nSanders, 796 F.3d at 1249 (ʺOpperman establishes that if a vehicle is obstructing or \n\nimpeding traffic on public property, it can be impounded regardless of whether \n\nthe impoundment is guided by standardized procedures.ʺ). Moreover, there is \n\nno indication that the officers did not act in good faith or solely for the purpose \n\nof investigation in exercising their discretion to impound the rental car. \n\n Our decision in United States v. Lopez, 547 F.3d 364 (2d Cir. 2008), is \n\ninstructive. There, although our discussion primarily concerned the \n\nconstitutionality of the inventory search itself, we concluded that the \n\n\n\n 29 \n \n\f \n\ncircumstances called for the impoundment of Lopezʹs car despite any showing of \n\na standardized impoundment policy. Id. at 372. Similar to Lyle, Lopez was \n\narrested and there was no one immediately available to move his car for \n\nsafekeeping in Lopezʹs case because the only other passenger was also arrested. \n\nSee id. at 366‐67. Moreover, like Lyleʹs car, Lopezʹs car was parked on a city \n\nstreet. Id. at 366. \n\n Thus, even if Lyle had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the \n\nrental car, the district court did not err in denying his motion to suppress. \n\nII. The Proffer Agreement Waiver \n\n We review the district courtʹs interpretation of the scope of a proffer \n\nagreement waiver de novo and its evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. \n\nRosemond, 841 F.3d at 107. \n\n A. Applicable Law \n\n Ordinarily, a ʺstatement made during plea discussions with an \n\nattorney for the prosecuting authorityʺ that does not result in a guilty plea is not \n\nadmissible against the defendant who made the statement. Fed. R. Evid. \n\n410(a)(4). The protections provided by Rule 410, however, can be waived, \n\nincluding in a proffer agreement with the government, provided that such \n\n\n\n 30 \n \n\f \n\nwaiver is knowing and voluntary. Rosemond, 841 F.3d at 107; United States v. \n\nVelez, 354 F.3d 190, 194‐95 (2d Cir. 2004). \n\n To determine whether a proffer agreementʹs waiver provision \n\napplies, we ask first whether the defendant has offered any evidence or made a \n\nfactual assertion that would trigger the Rule 410 waiver, and, ʺif so, whether the \n\nproffer statement ʹfairly rebut[s]ʹ the fact asserted or evidence offered or elicited.ʺ \n\nRosemond, 841 F.3d at 107. If the waiver has been triggered and the proffer \n\nstatement properly rebuts the assertion triggering the waiver, the government \n\nmay offer the proffer statement. Id. \n\n In Rosemond, we gave examples of factual assertions that will trigger \n\nthe proffer waiver, including ʺasserting, in an opening statement, that someone \n\nother than the defendant was the real perpetrator of the crime,ʺ id. at 109 (citing \n\nUnited States v. Barrow, 400 F.3d 109, 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2005)), and ʺarguing that a \n\nshooting was ʹan intended kidnapping gone wrong,ʹ when the defendant \n\nadmitted in a proffer session that the shooting was ʹan intentional murder,ʹʺ id. at \n\n110 (quoting United States v. Gomez, 210 F. Supp. 2d 465, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)). \n\n B. Application \n\n The district court properly held that the waiver was triggered by \n\nLyleʹs counselʹs statement during opening argument that ʺwe dispute [] the idea \n 31 \n \n\f \n\nthat [Lyle] was a dealer.ʺ Tr. 28. Lyleʹs proffer agreement contained a waiver \n\nthat allowed his statements to come in ʺto rebut any evidence or arguments \n\noffered by or on behalf of [Lyle].ʺ Lyle App. 36. \n\n As this Court has recognized, a defense argument does not trigger a \n\nwaiver if it ʺsimply challenge[s] the sufficiency of government proof on [the] \n\nelements.ʺ Barrow, 400 F.3d at 119. But ʺa statement of fact in a defense opening, \n\nsuch as [a] statement . . . unequivocally identifying [someone other than \n\ndefendant] as the real perpetrator of the charged crimes,ʺ is a factual assertion \n\nthat would trigger a waiver provision. Id. Here, defense counsel did not ascribe \n\nthe charged crime to someone else, but he did more than challenge the \n\nsufficiency of the governmentʹs proof. Rather than argue that the government \n\nwould not adduce credible evidence that Lyle was a drug dealer, counsel \n\ndisputed the very idea that Lyle was a dealer. This is the functional equivalent of \n\nan affirmative statement that Lyle, in fact, did not deal methamphetamine. This \n\nassertion was belied by Lyleʹs proffer admissions and, thus, triggered the waiver \n\nprovision in the proffer agreement. \n\n Lyleʹs proffer statements fairly rebut his counselʹs opening argument \n\nthat Lyle was not a dealer. The proffer statements at issue included that (1) Lyle \n\n\n\n 32 \n \n\f \n\nrepeatedly distributed ʺsmall packagesʺ of methamphetamine; (2) Lyle \n\naccompanied another person to obtain and deliver methamphetamine; and \n\n(3) Lyle knew the location of the methamphetamine supplier. Taken together, \n\nthese statements imply participation in a drug distribution operation and thus \n\nfairly rebut Lyleʹs counselʹs argument in his opening statement that Lyle was a \n\nmere user of methamphetamine and not a dealer. See Barrow, 400 F.3d at 120‐21 \n\n(emphasizing that ʺproper rebuttal is not limited to direct contradictionʺ but \n\nʺencompasses any evidence that the trial judge concludes fairly counters and \n\ncasts doubt on the truthfulness of factual assertions advanced, whether directly \n\nor implicitly, by an adversaryʺ). \n\n Hence, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its \n\ndiscretion in admitting Lyleʹs proffer statements. \n\nIII. The Admission of Lyleʹs Redacted Statements \n\n A. Applicable Law \n\n In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135‐36 (1968), the Supreme \n\nCourt held that admission of a non‐testifying co‐defendantʹs confession naming \n\nthe defendant as a perpetrator at their joint trial violates the latterʹs Sixth \n\nAmendment right to cross‐examination. The Court later made clear that a non‐\n\n\n\n 33 \n \n\f \n\nobvious redaction of a co‐defendantʹs confession to eliminate any references to \n\nthe defendant will eliminate any Bruton problem. See Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. \n\n185, 195‐97 (1998); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208‐09 (1987). \n\n We have consistently held that the introduction of a co‐defendantʹs \n\nconfession with the defendantʹs name replaced by a neutral noun or pronoun \n\ndoes not violate Bruton. See, e.g., United States v. Jass, 569 F.3d 47, 58 (2d Cir. \n\n2009) (noting that operative questions when evaluating Bruton claim are ʺ(1) did \n\nthe redacted statement give any indication to the jury that the original statement \n\ncontained actual names, and (2) did the statement standing alone otherwise \n\nconnect co‐defendants to the crimesʺ (internal quotation marks and ellipsis \n\nomitted)). In United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125 (2d Cir. 1989), for example, we \n\naffirmed a conviction based in part on a co‐defendantʹs statement that was \n\nredacted to reference ʺothers,ʺ ʺother people,ʺ and ʺanother person.ʺ Id. at 1135. \n\n To determine whether a redaction is sufficient under Bruton, we \n\nview the redacted statement separate and apart from any other evidence \n\nadmitted at trial. Id. (citing United States v. Wilkinson, 754 F.2d 1427, 1435 (2d Cir. \n\n1985)); see also United States v. Williams, 936 F.2d 698, 700‐01 (2d Cir. 1991) (ʺ[T]he \n\nappropriate analysis to be used when applying the Bruton rule requires that we \n\n\n\n 34 \n \n\f \n\nview the redacted confession in isolation from the other evidence introduced at \n\ntrial. If the confession, when so viewed, does not incriminate the defendant, then \n\nit may be admitted with a proper limiting instruction even though other \n\nevidence in the case indicates that the neutral pronoun is in fact a reference to the \n\ndefendant.ʺ). \n\n B. Application \n\n Van Praagh contends that his constitutional rights were violated by \n\nthe admission of Lyleʹs redacted proffer and post‐arrest statements. We \n\nordinarily review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion; however, Van \n\nPraagh did not object to the introduction of the redacted statements at trial, and \n\nso we review the admission of this evidence for plain error. See United States v. \n\nPierce, 785 F.3d 832, 840 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 172 (2015).3 \n\n The redacted statements did not violate Bruton. The neutral terms \n\nʺindividualʺ and ʺperson,ʺ which were substituted for proper names with the \n\n\n\n\n \n 3 Van Praagh contends that his Bruton argument was preserved by his \ncounselʹs objection to the admission of Lyleʹs unredacted statements and by Lyleʹs \ncounselʹs objection to the redacted statements. Admission of unredacted statements, \nhowever, is a different and independent issue, and Van Praagh cites no authority \nsuggesting that one partyʹs counsel may preserve another partyʹs claim of error when \nthe other partyʹs counsel fails timely to join in the objection. Accordingly, plain error \nreview applies. \n 35 \n \n\f \n\nexception of that of a supplier ‐‐ ʺBrendan or Brandon,ʺ Tr. 436, 534 ‐‐ were not so \n\nobvious as to indicate to the jury that the original statements contained actual \n\nnames. This was an ongoing criminal enterprise where many people were \n\ninvolved and the government introduced evidence of methamphetamine dealing \n\nby several people. Thus, the substitutions alone did not necessarily identify Van \n\nPraagh. Further, Lyleʹs redacted statements sounded sufficiently natural. For \n\ninstance, he admitted that he had ʺfirst become involved in methamphetamineʺ \n\nthrough ʺsomeoneʺ he ʺknew . . . from work,ʺ Tr. 517‐18, and that the individual \n\nfor whom he worked as a ʺrunnerʺ ʺasked him to hold something for himʺ in the \n\ntrunk of the rental car. Tr. 435, 534. Because such statements ʺmight actually \n\nhave been said by a person admitting his own culpability in the charged \n\nconspiracy while shielding the specific identity of his confederate,ʺ they do not \n\nviolate Bruton. Jass, 569 F.3d at 62. Nor did the redacted statements, viewed in \n\nisolation, contain any information indicating that Van Praagh was the \n\nʺindividualʺ in question, let alone information that would ʺimmediately \n\ninculpateʺ him. Id. at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted). \n\n Van Praagh relies on United States v. Taylor, 745 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. \n\n2014), to support his contention that the redactions violated Bruton, but Taylor is \n\n\n\n 36 \n \n\f \n\ndistinguishable. Taylor involved a single robbery of a drug store by four people. \n\nId. at 20‐21. One of the four, Luana Miller, became a cooperating witness, and \n\nanother, Curtis Taylor, gave post‐arrest confessions. Id. At the trial of Taylor \n\nand the two other co‐defendants, the trial court admitted Taylorʹs post‐arrest \n\nconfessions but required their redaction to omit identifications of his two co‐\n\ndefendants. In the portions of the confessions that were admitted, Millerʹs name \n\nwas mentioned but the names of the two co‐defendants were replaced with ʺtwo \n\nother individuals,ʺ ʺthe person,ʺ and ʺthe driver.ʺ Id. at 29. We determined that \n\nin this circumstance the redactions were so obvious as to violate Bruton. Our \n\nreasoning was as follows. First, Millerʹs name was used throughout and, ʺ[i]f \n\nTaylor had been trying to avoid naming his confederates, he would not have \n\nidentified one of them ‐‐ Miller ‐‐ in the very phrase in which the names of the \n\nother confederates are omitted.ʺ Id. Second, the wording of the redacted \n\nstatements, i.e., ʺ[t]he robbery was the idea of the person who waited with Luana \n\nMiller and Taylor at the gas station,ʺ was stilted and unnatural. Id. Third, in this \n\ncontext, the ʺreference to ʹtwo other individualsʹ [was] suspiciously closer to the \n\nspeech of a prosecutor than that of a perpetrator.ʺ Id. On the basis of these \n\nfactors, we determined that it was obvious that names had been omitted from the \n\n\n\n 37 \n \n\f \n\nstatements and, therefore, ʺthe choice of implied identity [was] narrow. The \n\nunnamed persons correspond[ed] by number (two) and by role to the pair of co‐\n\ndefendants . . . [and] [t]he jury could immediately infer, on the evidence of the \n\nredacted confession alone, that Taylor had likely named the co‐defendants.ʺ Id. \n\n This case is unlike Taylor. First, Lyleʹs statements referred to multiple \n\npeople ‐‐ not only one unnamed person to correspond to the one co‐defendant, \n\nVan Praagh. This did not present the necessary process‐of‐elimination problem \n\nthat left the juryʹs ʺchoice of implied identity narrowʺ as in Taylor. Id. Second, in \n\naddition to Van Praaghʹs methamphetamine dealing, the government introduced \n\nevidence of methamphetamine dealing by its two cooperating witnesses ‐‐ \n\nTarantino and Hodges ‐‐ as well as several others. Because Lyleʹs statements did \n\nnot reference by name those cooperating witnesses, the jury could reasonably \n\nhave inferred that they were the ʺother personsʺ Lyle was referring to in his \n\nredacted statements. Third, Lyleʹs statements referred to people involved in a \n\nconspiracy to engage in ongoing criminal conduct, not a single criminal act like in \n\nTaylor. For all of these reasons, Taylor is inapposite. \n\n We also note that the district court here gave a limiting instruction. \n\nSee Taylor, 745 F.3d at 28 (ʺIt matters that the district court gave limiting \n\n\n\n 38 \n \n\f \n\ninstructionsʺ because ʺ[w]e normally assume that jurors follow limiting \n\ninstructionsʺ). The district court specifically instructed the jury that ʺLyleʹs \n\nstatement about his own conduct may not be considered or discussed by you \n\nwith regard to Mr. Van Praagh.ʺ Tr. 713. \n\n Finally, Van Praaghʹs constitutional rights were not violated by \n\nLyleʹs counsel eliciting testimony on cross‐examination that his clientʹs \n\nstatements had been redacted for presentation at trial and that his client had \n\nindeed provided actual names in his proffer and post‐arrest statements. Again, \n\nbecause Van Praagh did not object during Lyleʹs attorneyʹs cross‐examination, \n\nwe review for plain error. In urging error, Van Praagh relies on Gray v. \n\nMaryland, 523 U.S. 185 (holding that ʺconsidered as a class, redactions that . . . \n\nnotify the jury that a name has been deletedʺ violated the Confrontation Clause). \n\nBut Grayʹs focus was on the inadequacy of the governmentʹs redaction. Van \n\nPraagh can point to no case plainly identifying Bruton error when a defendant, \n\nwhose post‐arrest statements are being offered against him, elicits the fact of \n\nredaction, or elicits parts of the redacted statement. \n\n Van Praagh fails to show plain error here. First, his case is \n\ndistinguishable from Gray in that there the redaction inadequacy was attributable \n\n\n\n 39 \n \n\f \n\nto the prosecution. In any event, Van Praagh cannot satisfy the prejudice prong \n\nof plain error because in his case the redacted statements referred to multiple \n\nʺindividuals,ʺ which means the revelation could not have been immediately \n\ninculpatory. See Jass, 569 F.3d at 61. \n\n Further, during cross‐examination, Lyleʹs attorney elicited from the \n\nsame witness several of the names that Lyle mentioned during his post‐arrest \n\nand proffer statements, including ʺZaron,ʺ ʺTed,ʺ ʺBob,ʺ and ʺJoe.ʺ Tr. 525. In \n\nour view, that testimony made it less, not more, obvious to the jury that Lyle had \n\nalso mentioned Van Praagh. Van Praaghʹs name was not mentioned at all, and \n\nLyleʹs counselʹs elicitation of other names suggested that the ʺother personsʺ \n\nmentioned were the individuals whose names Lyleʹs counsel elicited, not Van \n\nPraagh. For all of these reasons, the admission of Lyleʹs redacted statements was \n\nnot plainly erroneous. \n\nIV. Admissibility of Lyleʹs New Jersey Arrest \n\n We review a district courtʹs evidentiary rulings for abuse of \n\ndiscretion, which we will find only if the district court ʺacted arbitrarily and \n\nirrationally.ʺ United States v. Greer, 631 F.3d 608, 614 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting \n\nUnited States v. Garcia, 291 F.3d 127, 136 (2d Cir. 2002)). \n\n\n\n 40 \n \n\f \n\n A. Applicable Law \n\n Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides: \n\n Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a \n personʹs character in order to show that on a particular occasion the \n person acted in accordance with the character. \n \nFed. R. Evid. 404(b). ʺThe Second Circuitʹs ʹinclusionary ruleʹ allows the \n\nadmission of such evidence ʹfor any purpose other than to show a defendantʹs \n\ncriminal propensity, as long as the evidence is relevant and satisfies the \n\nprobative‐prejudice balancing test of Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.ʹʺ \n\nGreer, 631 F.3d at 614 (quoting United States v. Inserra, 34 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. \n\n1994)). \n\n Not all evidence of uncharged misconduct, however, is prohibited \n\nby Rule 404(b). Rather, \n\n [E]vidence of uncharged criminal activity is not considered other \n crimes evidence . . . if it arose out of the same transaction or series of \n transactions as the charged offense, if it is inextricably intertwined \n with the evidence regarding the charged offense, or if it is necessary \n to complete the story of the crime on trial. \n \nUnited States v. Carboni, 204 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks \n\nomitted); see also Inserra, 34 F.3d at 89 (ʺ[E]vidence of other bad acts may be \n\n\n\n\n 41 \n \n\f \n\nadmitted to provide the jury with the complete story of the crimes charged by \n\ndemonstrating the context of certain events relevant to the charged offense.ʺ). \n\n B. Application \n\n The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the \n\nevidence seized during the New Jersey arrest in January 2014. First, that \n\nevidence was not barred by Rule 404(b) because the arrest ʺarose out of the same \n\ntransaction or series of transactions as the charged offense.ʺ Carboni, 204 F.3d at \n\n44. Specifically, as discussed above, Lyle argued at trial that he was only a \n\nmethamphetamine user ‐‐ not a dealer. The government rebutted that argument \n\nwith evidence of Lyleʹs New Jersey arrest. In summation, the government \n\nargued: \n\n 14 or 15 grams [of methamphetamine] is still many hundreds, if not \n thousands, of dollars of meth. . . . Also, you know what else was in \n that room? A dozen baggies, a scale, $3,000 in cash. He was not \n weighing out meth for his own personal use. That was meth he was \n going to sell. \n \nTr. 629. In other words, the evidence seized pursuant to the New Jersey arrest \n\nwas not evidence of other crimes; it was evidence of the very crime charged in \n\ncount one of the indictment, a conspiracy involving Lyle, Van Praagh, and others \n\nto distribute methamphetamine from in or about December 2012 through in or \n\n\n\n 42 \n \n\f \n\nabout January 2014. Accordingly, evidence of the New Jersey arrest was \n\nadmissible as direct proof of the methamphetamine distribution conspiracy. \n\n Second, and in any event, the evidence of the New Jersey arrest fits \n\nwithin the Rule 404(b) inclusionary rule because it shows Lyleʹs knowledge and \n\nintent regarding the contents of the rental car. Because Lyle argued throughout \n\ntrial that he did not know what was in the trunk of the rental car, his knowledge \n\nand intent were at issue. United States v. Ramirez, 894 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1990) \n\n(ʺWhen the defendant disavows awareness that a crime was being perpetrated, \n\nand the government bears the burden of proving the defendantʹs knowing \n\npossession as an element of the crime, knowledge is properly put in issue.ʺ). The \n\nfact that Lyle was in possession of 14‐15 grams of methamphetamine and tools of \n\nthe drug trade less than a month after he was arrested with the rental car is \n\nprobative of his knowledge and intent regarding the contents of the rental car. In \n\naddition, the probative value of this evidence was not ʺsubstantially outweighedʺ \n\nby the risk of unfair prejudice as it ʺdid not involve conduct any more \n\nsensational or disturbing than the crimes with which [Lyle was] charged.ʺ United \n\nStates v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112, 1120 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Roldan‐\n\nZapata, 916 F.2d 795, 804 (2d Cir. 1990)). Accordingly, the district court acted \n\n\n\n 43 \n \n\f \n\nwell within its discretion in finding that the probative value of the evidence \n\noutweighed the threat of unfair prejudice. \n\nV. Sufficiency of the Conspiracy Evidence \n\n We review Van Praaghʹs challenge to whether the evidence was \n\nsufficient to support his conspiracy conviction de novo, ʺview[ing] the evidence in \n\nthe light most favorable to the government, crediting every inference that could \n\nhave been drawn in the governmentʹs favor, and deferring to the juryʹs \n\nassessment of witness credibility and its assessment of the weight of the \n\nevidence.ʺ Rosemond, 841 F.3d at 113 (quoting United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, \n\n62 (2d Cir. 2012)). We must affirm if ʺany rational trier of fact could have found \n\nthe essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.ʺ Id. (quoting \n\nUnited States v. Vernace, 811 F.3d 609, 615 (2d Cir. 2016)). \n\n The crux of a conspiracy is an agreement between two or more \n\npersons to join together to accomplish something illegal. United States v. Parker, \n\n554 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 2009) (ʺTo prove a conspiracy, the evidence must show \n\nthat ʹtwo or more persons agreed to participate in a joint venture intended to \n\ncommit an unlawful act.ʹʺ (quoting United States v. Desimone, 119 F.3d 217, 223 \n\n(2d Cir. 1997))). We have recognized a ʺnarrow exceptionʺ to the conspiracy rule \n\n\n\n 44 \n \n\f \n\nfor a transaction between a buyer and seller of drugs. Id. Under this exception, \n\nʺthe existence of a buyer‐seller relationship does not itself establish a conspiracy; \n\nhowever, where there is additional evidence showing an agreement to join \n\ntogether to accomplish an objective beyond the sale transaction, the evidence \n\nmay support a finding that the parties intentionally participated in a conspiracy.ʺ \n\nUnited States v. Hawkins, 547 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2008); see also United States v. \n\nRojas, 617 F.3d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 2010) (ʺ[T]he exception does not protect either the \n\nseller or buyer from a charge that they conspired together to transfer drugs if the \n\nevidence supports a finding that they shared a conspiratorial purpose to advance \n\nother transfers, whether by the seller or by the buyer.ʺ (alteration and internal \n\nquotation marks omitted)). The question thus becomes ʺwhether the evidence in \n\nits totality suffices to permit a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the \n\ndefendant was not merely a buyer or seller of narcotics, but rather that the \n\ndefendant knowingly and intentionally participated in the narcotics‐distribution \n\nconspiracy by agreeing to accomplish its illegal objective beyond the mere \n\npurchase or sale.ʺ Hawkins, 547 F.3d at 73‐74. \n\n Van Praagh did not request a buyer‐seller instruction at trial and so \n\nwe review for plain error. Pierce, 785 F.3d at 840. The district court did not \n\n\n\n 45 \n \n\f \n\nplainly err in failing to give a buyer‐seller instruction because the government \n\npresented ample evidence of a narcotics conspiracy beyond a buyer‐seller \n\nrelationship between Van Praagh and Lyle. \n\n First, Van Praagh sold methamphetamine not just to Lyle, but to \n\nothers. Indeed, he received weekly shipments of methamphetamine, which he \n\nthen sold to others. With assistance from Tarantino, he regularly sold \n\nmethamphetamine out of his apartment in Queens as well as out of hotels, and \n\nhe made deliveries to ʺ[p]robably 50ʺ customers. Tr. 124. \n\n Second, the quantity of drugs was consistent with a drug trafficking \n\noperation. Tarantino testified that Lyle repeatedly purchased pound‐level \n\nquantities of methamphetamine at $19,000 to $25,000 per pound. See United \n\nStates v. Contreras, 249 F.3d 595, 600 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that repeat sales \n\nsuggest ʺmore than a transient relationship,ʺ but are ʺby themselvesʺ insufficient \n\nto support an inference of a conspiracy between the supplier and purchaser); see \n\nalso United States v. Murray, 618 F.2d 892, 902 (2d Cir. 1980) (ʺ[O]ne who deals in \n\nlarge quantities of narcotics may be presumed to know that he is a part of a \n\nventure which extends beyond his individual participation.ʺ (quoting United \n\nStates v. Magnano, 543 F.2d 431, 433‐34 (2d Cir. 1976)). \n\n\n\n 46 \n \n\f \n\n Accordingly, the district court did not plainly err in failing to sua \n\nsponte give a buyer‐seller instruction. See United States v. Medina, 944 F.2d 60, 65‐\n\n66 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that the district court was not required to give a buyer‐\n\nseller instruction ʺwhere . . . there is advanced planning among the alleged co‐\n\nconspirators to deal in wholesale quantities of drugs obviously not intended for \n\npersonal useʺ because ʺ[u]nder such circumstances, the participants in the \n\ntransaction may be presumed to know that they are part of a broader \n\nconspiracyʺ). \n\nVI. Reasonableness of Van Praaghʹs Sentence \n\n We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under a \n\nʺdeferential abuse‐of‐discretion standard.ʺ United States v. Aldeen, 792 F.3d 247, \n\n251 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). The \n\nquestion is whether Van Praaghʹs below‐Guidelines sentence of 144 monthsʹ \n\nimprisonment ʺshock[s] the conscience,ʺ constitutes a ʺmanifest injustice,ʺ or is \n\notherwise substantively unreasonable. Id. at 255 (quoting United States v. Rigas, \n\n583 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2009)); see also United States v. Perez‐Frias, 636 F.3d 39, 43 \n\n(2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (ʺ[I]n the overwhelming majority of cases, a \n\nGuidelines sentence will fall comfortably within the broad range of sentences \n\nthat would be reasonable in the particular circumstances. It is therefore difficult \n 47 \n \n\f \n\nto find that a below‐Guidelines sentence is unreasonable.ʺ (internal quotation \n\nmarks and citation omitted)). \n\n Van Praaghʹs below‐Guidelines sentence of 144 months was \n\nsubstantively reasonable. The district court fully explained its reasoning. It \n\nconsidered Van Praaghʹs ʺvery unhappy upbringing,ʺ and the ʺvery positive \n\nchangeʺ that Van Praagh ʺseem[ed] to be undergoing.ʺ Van Praagh App. 58‐59. \n\nThe district court determined, however, that a 144‐month sentence was sufficient \n\nbut not greater than necessary because Van Praagh (1) had committed a ʺvery \n\nseriousʺ crime; (2) had a ʺlong history of drug dealingʺ and ʺplenty of \n\nopportunities to changeʺ; (3) clearly had been ʺin charge of dealing more drugs at \n\na higher level than [Lyle]ʺ; and (4) had a ʺprior record suggest[ing] that he still \n\ncontinues to be a danger to the community.ʺ Id. \n\n Van Praaghʹs argument that, like Lyle, he should have been \n\nsentenced to the statutory mandatory minimum of 120 monthsʹ imprisonment is \n\nunavailing. As the district court noted, Van Praagh had a ʺmore important roleʺ \n\nthan Lyle. See Van Praagh App. 62. Van Praagh supplied Lyle with pound \n\nquantities of methamphetamine on multiple occasions. Van Praagh had people \n\nworking for him to make drug deliveries. Moreover, Van Praaghʹs criminal \n\n\n\n 48 \n \n\f \n\nhistory was clearly more serious than Lyleʹs. Although neither man had \n\npreviously served any jail time for his crimes, Van Praaghʹs previous convictions \n\nincluded crimes relating to methamphetamine, while Lyle had only a violation \n\nfor marijuana possession twenty years prior to the instant offense conduct. In \n\nthese circumstances, we identify no abuse of the district courtʹs sentencing \n\ndiscretion and no merit in Van Praaghʹs claim that his sentence is substantively \n\nunreasonable. \n\n CONCLUSION \n\n To summarize, we conclude as follows: \n\n 1. Because Lyle was an unlicensed, as well as unauthorized, \n\ndriver of the rental car, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in that car, \n\nand the district court did not err in denying his motion to suppress. Even \n\nassuming Lyle had a legitimate privacy interest, the search and seizure of the \n\nrental car did not violate the Fourth Amendment. \n\n 2. Lyleʹs counselʹs statement in his opening argument that ʺwe \n\ndispute [] the idea that [Lyle] was a dealer,ʺ Tr. 28, triggered the waiver in Lyleʹs \n\nproffer agreement, and the proffer statements, taken together, fairly rebutted his \n\n\n\n\n 49 \n \n\f \n\ncounselʹs argument that Lyle was a mere user of methamphetamine and not a \n\ndealer. \n\n 3. The admission of Lyleʹs redacted proffer and post‐arrest \n\nstatements in the defendantsʹ joint trial was not plainly erroneous because the \n\nstatements substituted neutral terms for actual names and had no otherwise \n\nidentifying information. Further, the district court did not plainly err in allowing \n\nLyleʹs counsel, without Van Praaghʹs objection, to elicit testimony that Lyleʹs \n\nstatements had been redacted, that Lyle had provided actual names in his proffer \n\nand post‐arrest statements, and what several of those names were because those \n\ndisclosures did not prejudice Van Praagh and, indeed, made it less obvious to the \n\njury that Lyle was referring to Van Praagh in his statements. \n\n 4. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the \n\nevidence seized during Lyleʹs New Jersey arrest because (a) it was direct \n\nevidence of the conspiracy charged in count one of the superseding indictment, \n\nand (b) even if it was not direct evidence, it was not ʺother crimes evidenceʺ \n\nprohibited by Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) because it showed Lyleʹs \n\nknowledge and intent regarding the contents of the rental car on December 11, \n\n2013. \n\n\n\n 50 \n \n\f \n\n 5. The district court did not plainly err in failing to sua sponte \n\ngive a buyer‐seller instruction to the jury because the government presented \n\nample evidence of a narcotics conspiracy. \n\n 6. Van Praaghʹs below‐Guidelines sentence of 144 monthsʹ \n\nimprisonment was substantively reasonable. \n\n Accordingly, the judgments of the district court are AFFIRMED. \n\n\n\n\n 51\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Lyle & Van Praagh\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-01\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n15‐958‐cr(L) \\nUnited States v. Lyle & Van Praagh \\n \\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS \\n FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT \\n\\n \\n\\n August Term 2016 \\n\\n Argued: January 12, 2017 \\n Final Submission: July 6, 2018 \\n Decided: April 1, 2019 \\n\\n Docket Nos. 15‐958‐cr(L), 15‐1175‐cr(CON) \\n \\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \\n \\n Appellee, \\n \\n v. \\n\\n JAMES LYLE, AKA SEALED DEFENDANT 3, MICHAEL VAN PRAAGH, AKA SEALED \\n DEFENDANT 1, \\n \\n Defendants‐Appellants, \\n \\n ANTHONY TARANTINO, AKA SEALED DEFENDANT 2, \\n \\n Defendant. \\n \\n \\n ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \\n FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \\n\\n \\n\\nBefore: \\n RAGGI, CHIN, AND LOHIER, Circuit Judges. \\n\\f \\n\\n \\n \\n Consolidated appeals from judgments of the United States District \\n\\nCourt for the Southern District of New York (Crotty, J.) entered after defendants‐\\n\\nappellants James Lyle and Michael Van Praagh were convicted at trial of charges \\n\\nrelating to drug trafficking. Lyle challenges the admission of (1) physical \\n\\nevidence obtained pursuant to warrantless searches and (2) his post‐arrest and \\n\\nproffer statements. Van Praagh challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence of \\n\\nconspiracy, (2) the admission of Lyleʹs post‐arrest and proffer statements in their \\n\\njoint trial, and (3) the reasonableness of his sentence. \\n\\n AFFIRMED. \\n \\n \\n \\n \\n MICHAEL FERRARA, Assistant United States \\n Attorney (Brendan F. Quigley, Assistant \\n United States Attorney, on the brief), for \\n Geoffrey S. Berman, United States Attorney \\n for the Southern District of New York, New \\n York, New York, for Appellee. \\n \\n DANIEL S. NOOTER (Thomas H. Nooter, on the \\n brief), Freeman Nooter & Ginsberg, New \\n York, New York, for Defendant‐Appellant \\n James Lyle. \\n \\n\\n\\n 2 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\n MARSHA R. TAUBENHAUS, Law Offices of \\n Marsha R. Taubenhaus, New York, New \\n York, for Defendant‐Appellant Michael Van \\n Praagh. \\n \\n \\nCHIN, Circuit Judge: \\n\\n Defendants‐appellants James Lyle and Michael Van Praagh appeal \\n\\nfrom judgments of the United States District Court for the Southern District of \\n\\nNew York (Crotty, J.) convicting them on charges relating to the distribution of \\n\\nmethamphetamine. Lyle challenges the admission at trial of evidence seized \\n\\nduring a December 11, 2013 inventory search of a rental car and a January 9, 2014 \\n\\nsearch of his hotel room. He also challenges the admission at trial of certain post‐\\n\\narrest and proffer statements. Van Praagh challenges the sufficiency of the \\n\\nevidence of his participation in a methamphetamine distribution conspiracy, the \\n\\nadmission of Lyleʹs post‐arrest and proffer statements in their joint trial, and the \\n\\nreasonableness of his sentence. Because we conclude that the evidence at trial \\n\\nwas sufficient to support all convictions, the challenged searches and seizures \\n\\ndid not violate the Fourth Amendment, the admission of Lyleʹs statements did \\n\\nnot violate the Fifth Amendment, and Van Praaghʹs sentence was reasonable, we \\n\\naffirm the judgments of the district court. \\n\\n\\n 3 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\n BACKGROUND \\n\\nI. The Facts \\n\\n Because Van Praagh and Lyle appeal convictions following a jury \\n\\ntrial, we view the evidence in ʺthe light most favorable to the government, \\n\\ncrediting any inferences that the jury might have drawn in its favor.ʺ United \\n\\nStates v. Rosemond, 841 F.3d 95, 99‐100 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. \\n\\nDhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 643 (2d Cir. 2001)). \\n\\n A. Overview \\n\\n Throughout 2013, Van Praagh regularly sold pound quantities of \\n\\nmethamphetamine. These deals generally occurred once a week and often took \\n\\nplace in Manhattan hotels. Van Praagh also sold smaller quantities of \\n\\nmethamphetamine out of his apartment in Queens and through in‐person \\n\\ndeliveries to his customers. Brandon Hodges, an Arizona‐based \\n\\nmethamphetamine supplier, sent Van Praagh methamphetamine on three or four \\n\\noccasions during this time, with the largest shipment containing four ounces of \\n\\nmethamphetamine. Van Praagh regularly sold methamphetamine to Lyle, who \\n\\nwas also a methamphetamine dealer in the New York area. Lyle regularly sold \\n\\nmethamphetamine to Anthony Tarantino. Tarantino initially purchased \\n\\n\\n\\n 4 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nmethamphetamine for personal use, but eventually started selling small \\n\\nquantities of methamphetamine to his own clients. Both Hodges and Tarantino \\n\\ncooperated with the government and testified at trial. \\n\\n In January 2013, Lyle introduced Tarantino to Van Praagh. \\n\\nTarantino accompanied Lyle to Van Praaghʹs apartment so that Lyle could \\n\\nrestock his methamphetamine supply. While at Van Praaghʹs apartment, \\n\\nTarantino saw Lyle purchase methamphetamine from Van Praagh, which Lyle \\n\\nlater sold to Tarantino. In April 2013, Lyle took Tarantino to Van Praaghʹs \\n\\napartment a second time, where Tarantino again observed Lyle ʺre‐up,ʺ i.e., \\n\\npurchase methamphetamine, from Van Praagh. After this second visit, \\n\\nTarantino and Van Praagh became romantically involved, and eventually \\n\\nTarantino moved in with Van Praagh and began helping him sell \\n\\nmethamphetamine. \\n\\n B. The Seizure of Methamphetamine from Van Praaghʹs Hotel Room \\n\\n On May 29, 2013, Van Praagh and Tarantino checked into the Out \\n\\nHotel in midtown Manhattan. That night, they sold pound quantities of \\n\\nmethamphetamine to several customers, including Lyle. The next day, they \\n\\nchecked out of the hotel but accidentally left approximately a pound of \\n\\n\\n\\n 5 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nmethamphetamine and $20,000 cash in the hotel room safe. Hotel staff found the \\n\\ndrugs and money and called the New York City Police Department (ʺNYPDʺ), \\n\\nand officers arrived to seize the drugs and cash. After Van Praagh realized his \\n\\nmistake later that day, he returned to the hotel, where he was arrested by the \\n\\nNYPD. During the arrest, the officers seized a cellular phone and over $1,000 \\n\\ncash from Van Praaghʹs pocket. The officers also searched Van Praaghʹs Vespa \\n\\nscooter parked outside the hotel, where they found part of and packaging for a \\n\\ndigital scale. \\n\\n Soon thereafter, Tarantino brought Lyle money to give to Van \\n\\nPraaghʹs father to bail Van Praagh out of jail. The day after Van Praagh got out \\n\\nof jail, he and Tarantino flew to Arizona to ensure that Van Praaghʹs \\n\\nmethamphetamine suppliers would continue to sell to him. Van Praagh and \\n\\nTarantino returned to New York and continued their sale of methamphetamine. \\n\\n C. Lyleʹs Arrests \\n\\n On December 11, 2013, NYPD officers observed Lyle park and exit a \\n\\ncar in midtown Manhattan. The officers noticed a knife clipped to Lyleʹs pants, \\n\\nwhich they later determined to be an illegal gravity knife. The officers \\n\\napproached Lyle as he was closing the trunk of the car. Lyle told the officers that \\n\\n\\n\\n 6 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nhe was legally permitted to carry a gravity knife because he was a member of the \\n\\nstagehands union and used the knife to perform his job. Lyle initially said he \\n\\nhad not driven the car but when the officers informed him that they had seen \\n\\nhim driving it, Lyle admitted as much. When asked for identification, Lyle \\n\\nproduced a New York State ID with the expiration date scratched off. The \\n\\nofficers confirmed that Lyleʹs driverʹs license was suspended. The officers also \\n\\ndetermined that the vehicle Lyle was driving was a rental car and that Lyle was \\n\\nnot an authorized driver under the rental agreement. Lyle claimed that his \\n\\ngirlfriend had rented the car and had given him permission to drive it. The \\n\\nofficers arrested Lyle for driving with a suspended license and for possessing an \\n\\nillegal knife. \\n\\n Before heading to the station for processing, Lyle asked if the car \\n\\ncould be left at the location and stated that his girlfriend would pick it up. The \\n\\nofficers denied the request and impounded the vehicle. At the police precinct, an \\n\\ninventory search was conducted. Over one pound of methamphetamine and \\n\\napproximately $39,000 cash were found in the trunk of the car. \\n\\n The following day ‐‐ December 12, 2013 ‐‐ Lyle was brought to the \\n\\nDistrict Attorneyʹs Office where he made certain statements in custody after \\n\\n\\n\\n 7 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nbeing read his Miranda rights. When asked about the methamphetamine that \\n\\nwas in the trunk of the rental car, Lyle stated that ʺan individual . . . had \\n\\ncontacted him and asked him to hold something for him.ʺ Tr. 435.1 He stated \\n\\nthat upon meeting with that individual and another individual, he stayed in the \\n\\ncar and did not see what was placed in the trunk but presumed it to be drugs \\n\\nbecause the individual that he was meeting with was known to distribute large \\n\\nquantities of methamphetamine in the New York area. When asked about his \\n\\nrelationship with these two individuals, Lyle stated that he was friends with \\n\\nthem, and had eventually begun working with one of them in delivering \\n\\nmethamphetamine to the individualʹs customers. \\n\\n Lyle stated that the person in charge had a source of supply in \\n\\nArizona named either Brendan or Brandon. Lyle also ʺprovided a few namesʺ of \\n\\nother people in the New York area who distributed large quantities of \\n\\nmethamphetamine. Tr. 436. \\n\\n On January 9, 2014, police in East Windsor, New Jersey responded \\n\\nto an anonymous call that people were using methamphetamine in a hotel room. \\n\\n\\n\\n \\n 1 Lyle identified this individual as Van Praagh, but at trial, ʺindividualʺ \\nwas substituted for Van Praaghʹs name pursuant to Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 \\n(1968). \\n 8 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nWhen they got to the hotel room, Lyle opened the door and invited the officers \\n\\ninside. The officers heard the toilet flush and saw Lyleʹs girlfriend come out of \\n\\nthe bathroom. The officers observed a torch lighter on the bathroom shelf, a \\n\\nsmall clear bag next to the trash can, and a partial clear straw wrapper containing \\n\\nwhite residue on the bathroom floor. Additionally, they observed a towel under \\n\\nthe bathroom doorway. In the bedroom, the officers noticed that a clear bag had \\n\\nbeen affixed to the smoke detector with rubber bands. \\n\\n Officers then performed a consent search of the room, and found \\n\\napproximately fourteen grams of methamphetamine, $3,270 cash, a digital scale, \\n\\nand numerous plastic baggies. Lyle and his girlfriend were both arrested. \\n\\nII. The Proceedings Below \\n\\n A. The Indictment and Van Praaghʹs Arrest \\n\\n Van Praagh, Lyle, and Tarantino were indicted on March 20, 2014. \\n\\nOn March 31, 2014, Drug Enforcement Administration (ʺDEAʺ) agents arrested \\n\\nVan Praagh at his apartment. After receiving consent to search the apartment, \\n\\nagents found tools used to sell drugs, including a heat‐sealer, packaging \\n\\nmaterials, and multiple scales, and a note from Hodges asking Van Praagh to \\n\\nhave Lyle call him. \\n\\n\\n\\n 9 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\n On April 6, 2013, Van Praagh called his father from jail and told him, \\n\\nin a recorded call, ʺthey got nothing . . . . I sterilized the house like I told you.ʺ \\n\\nSupp. App. 104. He also told him, ʺ[t]hey got Anthony [Tarantino], but Iʹm \\n\\nexpecting that heʹll be disappearing any day now . . . . I believe that he had been \\n\\ntalking.ʺ Supp. App. 105. \\n\\n B. Lyleʹs Proffer Session \\n\\n On April 7, 2014, Lyle participated in a proffer session with the \\n\\ngovernment in hope of reaching a cooperation agreement. A proffer agreement \\n\\nwas executed, stipulating that the government would not use any of Lyleʹs \\n\\nstatements made during the proffer sessions against him, except ʺto rebut any \\n\\nevidence or arguments offered by or on behalf of [Lyle].ʺ Lyle App. 36. \\n\\n During the proffer session, Lyle admitted that (1) around 2011 or \\n\\n2012, he sometimes stayed with Van Praagh while working on projects in New \\n\\nYork City; (2) he observed Van Praagh smoking and using methamphetamine; \\n\\n(3) he occasionally delivered packages to Van Praaghʹs clients; (4) he \\n\\naccompanied Van Praagh to deliver methamphetamine thirty to fifty times; \\n\\n(5) Van Praagh told Lyle his supplier was in Arizona; and (6) on one occasion, \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nLyle accompanied Van Praagh to pick up methamphetamine from a library in \\n\\nNew York City. \\n\\n C. The Superseding Indictment and Pretrial Motions \\n\\n A superseding indictment was filed September 30, 2014, charging \\n\\n(1) Van Praagh and Lyle with conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more of \\n\\nmethamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A), from \\n\\nDecember 2012 to January 2014; (2) Van Praagh with distributing and possessing \\n\\nwith intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of \\n\\n21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B), on or about May 30, 2013; and (3) Lyle \\n\\nwith distributing and possessing with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of \\n\\nmethamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B), on or \\n\\nabout December 11, 2013. \\n\\n Before trial, Lyle moved to suppress the physical evidence recovered \\n\\nfrom the search of the automobile, as well as his subsequent post‐arrest \\n\\nstatements. In an affidavit filed in support of the motion, Lyle admitted that \\n\\n(1) just prior to his arrest, he had been driving the car that had been rented by his \\n\\ngirlfriend with her permission; (2) he possessed a gravity knife that day; (3) he \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 11 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\ninitially told the police officers he had not been driving the car but later admitted \\n\\nto driving the car; and (4) his license was suspended at the time. \\n\\n On September 11, 2014, the district court held an evidentiary hearing \\n\\non the voluntariness of Lyleʹs post‐arrest statements and, on October 1, 2014, the \\n\\ncourt denied Lyleʹs motion to suppress. The court found there was probable \\n\\ncause for Lyleʹs arrest, based on his possession of a gravity knife. The court then \\n\\nconcluded that the search of the rental car was justified on two independent \\n\\nbases. First, Lyle had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car \\n\\nbecause he was not an authorized driver under the rental agreement. Second, \\n\\nthe search of the rental car was a valid inventory search. The court also found \\n\\nthat Lyleʹs post‐arrest statements were made voluntarily and pursuant to a valid \\n\\nMiranda waiver. \\n\\n D. The Trial \\n\\n Lyle and Van Praaghʹs trial began on October 14, 2014, and ended on \\n\\nOctober 20, 2014. The government called nineteen witnesses, and introduced \\n\\nphysical evidence consisting of drugs and drug processing materials, text \\n\\nmessages between the defendants, testimony regarding Lyleʹs post‐arrest and \\n\\nproffer statements, and the recorded call Van Praagh made to his father while \\n\\n\\n\\n 12 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nincarcerated. Van Praagh called one witness who testified about the \\n\\ncircumstances of Van Praaghʹs March 31, 2014 arrest. Lyle did not put on a case. \\n\\n During his opening statement, Lyleʹs counsel stated that ʺ[Lyle] \\n\\nobtained, bought, borrowed, was given methamphetamine for his own use. \\n\\nWhere we dispute is the idea that he was a dealer.ʺ Tr. 28. Later that day, the \\n\\ngovernment submitted a letter brief, asserting that Lyleʹs counselʹs argument that \\n\\nLyle was not a dealer opened the door to Lyleʹs proffer statements about \\n\\ndistributing drugs with Van Praagh. \\n\\n Lyleʹs statements to law enforcement were admitted in two contexts. \\n\\nFirst, the district court allowed testimony regarding Lyleʹs December 12, 2013 \\n\\npost‐arrest statements to law enforcement to be admitted only as against him, \\n\\nprohibiting mention of Van Praagh. Van Praagh did not object to the redacted \\n\\ntestimony. Government witnesses testified that Lyle admitted that an \\n\\nʺindividualʺ for whom he worked as a ʺrunnerʺ ʺasked him to hold something for \\n\\nhimʺ in the trunk of the rental car, which Lyle ʺpresumed . . . to be drugsʺ \\n\\nbecause Lyle knew ʺ[t]hat individual along with another individualʺ distributed \\n\\nʺlarge quantities of crystal meth in the New York area.ʺ Tr. 435, 534. Lyle was \\n\\nfriends ʺ[m]ore so with the individual that had not placed the drugs in the \\n\\n\\n\\n 13 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\ntrunk. . . . He said that he began as friends, and eventually he began working \\n\\nwith that individualʺ ‐‐ the ʺindividual who was in chargeʺ‐‐ ʺassisting him in \\n\\ndelivering . . . methamphetamine to that individualʹs customers.ʺ Tr. 435‐36. \\n\\nLyle told law enforcement that the individuals for whom he was working as a \\n\\nrunner had a source of supply in Arizona named either Brendan or Brandon. \\n\\nLyle also gave law enforcement ʺa few namesʺ of other people in the New York \\n\\narea who distributed methamphetamine, including the names of three \\n\\ncompetitor drug dealers. Tr. 436. On cross‐examination, Lyleʹs attorney elicited \\n\\ntestimony that, during the post‐arrest interview, Lyle ʺgave names of people \\n\\nduring the conversation,ʺ one of which was Brandon or Brendan. Tr. 448. \\n\\n Second, toward the close of the governmentʹs case, the district court \\n\\nruled ‐‐ over Lyleʹs objection ‐‐ that Lyleʹs proffer statements were admissible, \\n\\nbut again prohibited mention of Van Praagh. Van Praagh did not object. The \\n\\ngovernment witness then testified that Lyle admitted he had ʺfirst become \\n\\ninvolved in methamphetamineʺ in 2012 through ʺsomeoneʺ he ʺknew . . . from \\n\\nwork.ʺ Tr. 517‐18. Lyle observed ʺthat person . . . using and distributing crystal \\n\\nmethamphetamine.ʺ Tr. 518. Lyle ʺbegan distributing small packagesʺ for that \\n\\nperson and ʺaccompanying that person on deals as well as picking up crystal \\n\\n\\n\\n 14 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nmethamphetamine.ʺ Id. Lyle admitted that ʺhe accompanied this person . . . [on] \\n\\nbetween 30 to 50 occasions. And that at one point they had gone to a library in \\n\\nthe New York City area . . . to pick up crystal methamphetamine.ʺ Id. Lyle said \\n\\nthe methamphetamine supplier was in Arizona. \\n\\n On cross‐examination, Lyleʹs attorney elicited from the witness that \\n\\nʺ[Lyle] actually g[a]ve real names of peopleʺ during his proffer session, and \\n\\nprovided ʺsome names of people whose last names he didnʹt know.ʺ Tr. 524. \\n\\nThese names included ʺZaron,ʺ ʺTed,ʺ ʺBob,ʺ and ʺJoe.ʺ Tr. at 525. \\n\\n At the close of trial, the district court instructed the jury, in pertinent \\n\\npart: ʺThere has been evidence that Mr. Lyle made statements to law \\n\\nenforcement authorities . . . . I want to let you know that . . . Mr. Lyleʹs statement \\n\\nabout his own conduct may not be considered or discussed by you with regard \\n\\nto Mr. Van Praagh.ʺ Tr. 713. \\n\\n On October 20, 2014, the jury found the defendants guilty on all \\n\\ncounts. On March 25, 2015, the district court sentenced Lyle principally to the \\n\\nstatutory mandatory minimum of 120 monthsʹ imprisonment and, on April 2, \\n\\n2015, the district court sentenced Van Praagh principally to 144 monthsʹ \\n\\nimprisonment. In imposing a higher sentence on Van Praagh, the district court \\n\\n\\n\\n 15 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nconcluded that ʺVan Praagh had a higher role, more important role. He dealt in \\n\\nmore drugs than did Mr. Lyle.ʺ Van Praagh App. 62. \\n\\n These appeals followed. On May 9, 2017, we issued an opinion \\n\\naffirming the district courtʹs judgments. United States v. Lyle, 856 F.3d 191 (2d \\n\\nCir. 2017). Lyle petitioned for and was granted certiorari by the Supreme Court. \\n\\nOn May 21, 2018, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the \\n\\ncase for further consideration in light of its intervening decision in Byrd v. United \\n\\nStates, ‐‐‐ U.S. ‐‐‐, 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2018), which addressed the issue of the \\n\\nreasonable expectation of privacy of an unauthorized driver of a rental car. On \\n\\nJuly 6, 2018, the parties submitted letter briefs addressing Byrdʹs impact upon this \\n\\ncase. For the reasons set forth below, we adhere to our original decision. \\n\\n DISCUSSION \\n\\n Six issues are presented: (1) the validity of the warrantless search \\n\\nand seizure of the rental car; (2) the interpretation of Lyleʹs proffer agreement; (3) \\n\\nthe sufficiency of the redactions to Lyleʹs proffer statements; (4) the admissibility \\n\\nof Lyleʹs New Jersey arrest; (5) the sufficiency of the conspiracy evidence against \\n\\nVan Praagh; and (6) the reasonableness of Van Praaghʹs sentence. We address \\n\\neach issue in turn. \\n\\n\\n\\n 16 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nI. Warrantless Search of Rental Car \\n\\n We review a district courtʹs ruling on a suppression motion for clear \\n\\nerror as to factual findings, ʺgiving special deference to findings that are based \\n\\non determinations of witness credibility,ʺ and de novo as to questions of law. \\n\\nUnited States v. Hussain, 835 F.3d 307, 312‐13 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting United States \\n\\nv. Lucky, 569 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir. 2009)). We conclude that Lyleʹs motion was \\n\\nproperly denied for two independent reasons: first, Lyle had no reasonable \\n\\nexpectation of privacy in the rental car, and, second, the inventory search of the \\n\\nrental car was reasonable. \\n\\n A. Applicable Law \\n\\n i. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Rental Car \\n\\n The Fourth Amendment guarantees citizens the ʺright . . . to be \\n\\nsecure in their . . . effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.ʺ U.S. \\n\\nConst. amend. IV. To prove that a search violated the Fourth Amendment, ʺan \\n\\naccused must show that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in a searched \\n\\nplace or item.ʺ United States v. Rahme, 813 F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing \\n\\nRawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980)). The person challenging the search \\n\\nmust demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy in the place searched, and \\n\\n\\n\\n 17 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nthat expectation must be objectively reasonable. United States v. Paulino, 850 F.2d \\n\\n93, 97 (2d Cir. 1988). \\n\\n When we previously ruled in this case, the question of whether an \\n\\nunauthorized driver has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a rental car \\n\\ndivided the various circuit courts, resulting in at least three approaches. See Lyle, \\n\\n856 F.3d at 200‐01 (reviewing circuit split). We did not rule on the question, as \\n\\nwe decided the appeal on other grounds, as discussed below. \\n\\n The Supreme Courtʹs recent decision in Byrd v. United States resolved \\n\\nthe circuit split, holding that the ʺmere fact that a driver in lawful possession or \\n\\ncontrol of a rental car is not listed on the rental agreement will not defeat his or \\n\\nher otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy.ʺ 138 S. Ct. at 1531. The Court \\n\\nrejected the governmentʹs suggestion of a per se rule that unauthorized drivers \\n\\nʺalways lack an expectation of privacy in the automobile based on the rental \\n\\ncompanyʹs lack of authorization alone.ʺ Id. at 1527. Drawing from property \\n\\nprinciples, the Supreme Court reasoned that ʺ[o]ne of the main rights attaching \\n\\nto property is the right to exclude others, and, in the main, one who owns or \\n\\nlawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate \\n\\nexpectation of privacy by virtue of the right to exclude.ʺ Id. at 1527 (quoting \\n\\n\\n\\n 18 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nRakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n. 12 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted)). \\n\\nIt further noted, however, that the concept of lawful possession is central to the \\n\\nexpectation of privacy inquiry, for a ʺʹwrongfulʹ presence at the scene of a search \\n\\nwould not enable a defendant to object to the legality of the search.ʺ Id. at 1529 \\n\\n(quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 141 n. 9). Thus, ʺa person present in a stolen \\n\\nautomobile at the time of the search may [not] object to the lawfulness of the \\n\\nsearch of the automobileʺ regardless of his level of possession and control over \\n\\nthe automobile. See id. \\n\\n ii. Community Caretaking Function \\n\\n It is well established that police have the authority, despite the \\n\\nabsence of a warrant, to seize and remove from the streets automobiles in the \\n\\ninterests of public safety and as part of their community caretaking functions ‐‐ \\n\\nan authority that is beyond reasonable challenge. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 \\n\\nU.S. 364, 368‐69 (1976). In Colorado v. Bertine, the Supreme Court explained that, \\n\\nunder this community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement, police \\n\\nofficers may exercise their discretion in deciding whether to impound a vehicle, \\n\\nʺso long as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and on the \\n\\nbasis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.ʺ 479 \\n\\n\\n\\n 19 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nU.S. 367, 375 (1987). The question of whether Bertine and similar Supreme Court \\n\\nprecedent require an officerʹs decision to impound a car to be made pursuant to \\n\\nstandardized criteria, a question we have not addressed, has created a split \\n\\namong the circuits. \\n\\n Relying on a stricter interpretation of Bertine, two circuits have \\n\\nconcluded that an officerʹs decision to impound a vehicle as part of its role as a \\n\\ncommunity caretaker must be guided by a standardized procedure. See United \\n\\nStates v. Petty, 367 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that ʺ[s]ome degree of \\n\\nstandardized criteria or established routine must regulate these police actions . . . \\n\\nto ensure that impoundments and inventory searches are not merely a ruse for \\n\\ngeneral rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidenceʺ (internal \\n\\nquotation marks omitted)); United States v. Duguay, 93 F.3d 346, 351 (7th Cir. \\n\\n1996) (ʺAmong those criteria which must be standardized are the circumstances \\n\\nin which a car may be impounded.ʺ). Taking a slightly different approach, the \\n\\nD.C. Circuit has held that ʺif a standard impoundment procedure exists, a police \\n\\nofficerʹs failure to adhere thereto is unreasonable and violates the Fourth \\n\\nAmendment.ʺ United States v. Proctor, 489 F.3d 1348, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The \\n\\nTenth Circuit has held that standardized procedures are not required where an \\n\\n\\n\\n 20 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nofficer exercises ʺthe community‐caretaking functions of protecting public safety \\n\\nand promoting the efficient movement of traffic,ʺ but are required in other cases. \\n\\nUnited States v. Sanders, 796 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 2015). \\n\\n The First, Third, and Fifth Circuits, however, have rejected the \\n\\nstandardized criteria requirement, and instead focus their inquiry on the \\n\\nreasonableness of the impoundment under the circumstances. See United States v. \\n\\nMcKinnon, 681 F.3d 203, 208 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (hinging analysis upon \\n\\nʺthe reasonableness of the ʹcommunity caretakerʹ impound viewed in the context \\n\\nof the facts and circumstances encountered by the officerʺ (citation omitted)); \\n\\nUnited States v. Smith, 522 F.3d 305, 314 (3d Cir. 2008) (declining to adopt ʺthe \\n\\nmore structured approach . . . requiring that there be standardized police \\n\\nprocedures governing impoundmentsʺ); United States v. Coccia, 446 F.3d 233, 239 \\n\\n(1st Cir. 2006) (ʺ[I]mpoundments of vehicles for community caretaking purposes \\n\\nare consonant with the Fourth Amendment so long as the impoundment decision \\n\\nwas reasonable under the circumstances.ʺ). These circuits read Bertine ʺto \\n\\nindicate that an impoundment decision made pursuant to standardized \\n\\nprocedures will most likely, although not necessarily always, satisfy the Fourth \\n\\nAmendment.ʺ Coccia, 446 F.3d at 238. \\n\\n\\n\\n 21 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\n B. Application \\n\\n i. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Rental Car \\n\\n In our prior decision, we specifically declined to decide whether an \\n\\nunauthorized driver ever has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a rental car. \\n\\nInstead, we concluded, and now reaffirm, that Lyle lacked standing not just \\n\\nbecause he was an unauthorized driver, but because he was an unlicensed one. \\n\\nAccordingly, Lyleʹs use of the rental car was both unauthorized and unlawful. \\n\\nSee N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law § 511 (prohibiting operating a car without a valid \\n\\nlicense). Lyle should not have been driving any car because his license was \\n\\nsuspended, and a rental company with knowledge of the relevant facts certainly \\n\\nwould not have given him permission to drive its car nor allowed a renter to let \\n\\nhim do so. Under these circumstances, Lyle did not have a reasonable \\n\\nexpectation of privacy in the rental car. See United States v. Haywood, 324 F.3d \\n\\n514, 516 (7th Cir. 2003) (declining to resolve circuit split over whether \\n\\nunauthorized driver had reasonable expectation of privacy in rental car, because \\n\\nunauthorized driver also had suspended license and the combination resulted in \\n\\nno reasonable expectation of privacy); cf. United States v. Tropiano, 50 F.3d 157, \\n\\n161 (2d Cir. 1995) (ʺ[W]e think it obvious that a defendant who knowingly \\n\\n\\n\\n 22 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\npossesses a stolen car has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the car.ʺ); United \\n\\nStates v. Ponce, 947 F.2d 646, 649 (2d Cir. 1991) (ʺTo mount a challenge to a search \\n\\nof a vehicle, defendants must show, among other things, a legitimate basis for \\n\\nbeing in it, such as permission from the owner.ʺ). \\n\\n Byrd does not require a different result. The Court there held that an \\n\\nunauthorized driver in sole possession of a rental car could have a legitimate \\n\\nexpectation of privacy in the vehicle because even an unauthorized driver, in the \\n\\nright circumstances, could have ʺlawful possession and control and the attendant \\n\\nright to exclude.ʺ 138 S. Ct. at 1528. The Court noted that ʺthere may be \\n\\ncountless innocuous reasons why an unauthorized driver might get behind the \\n\\nwheel of a rental car and drive it ‐‐ perhaps the renter is drowsy or inebriated.ʺ \\n\\nId. at 1529. \\n\\n This reasoning does not apply to the circumstances here, where Lyle \\n\\nwas not only the driver of the vehicle but the sole occupant. Because Lyle did \\n\\nnot have a valid driverʹs license, it was unlawful for him to be operating the \\n\\nvehicle. He did not have lawful possession and control of the vehicle in the sense \\n\\nthat he unlawfully drove the vehicle onto the scene and could not lawfully drive \\n\\nit away. See id. (reaffirming conclusion in Rakas v. Illinois that ʺʹwrongfulʹ \\n\\n\\n\\n 23 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\npresence at the scene of a search would not enable a defendant to object to the \\n\\nlegality of the search,ʺ ʺ[n]o matter the degree of [a defendantʹs] possession and \\n\\ncontrol.ʺ). While the absence of a valid license alone may not destroy an \\n\\nunauthorized driverʹs expectation of privacy, Lyleʹs possession and control of the \\n\\ncar was unlawful the moment he started driving it. Just as a car thief would not \\n\\nhave a reasonable expectation of privacy in a stolen car, id., an unauthorized, \\n\\nunlicensed driver in sole possession of a rental car does not have a reasonable \\n\\nexpectation of privacy in the vehicle. Therefore, because Lyleʹs operation of the \\n\\ncar rendered his possession and control unlawful, Byrd is distinguishable. \\n\\n Further, unlike the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which have held that \\n\\na defendant may have standing to challenge a search of a rental car despite \\n\\nlacking a valid license and authorization under the rental agreement if he \\n\\nreceived an authorized driverʹs permission, United States v. Best, 135 F.3d 1223 \\n\\n(8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2006), we conclude \\n\\nthat an authorized renterʹs permission is not determinative of whether a \\n\\ndefendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Indeed, Byrd explicitly \\n\\nrejected the notion that legitimate presence alone affords a defendant with a \\n\\nreasonable expectation of privacy. 138 S. Ct. at 1527 (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at \\n\\n\\n\\n 24 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\n148 (noting that legitimate presence is relevant, but not controlling)). While a \\n\\ndefendant does not lose all his Fourth Amendment rights simply by engaging in \\n\\nillegal acts, he may still lack standing to challenge a search when the law \\n\\nprevents him from being there in the first place, even with the ownerʹs \\n\\npermission. See United States v. Schram, 901 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2018) \\n\\n(rejecting argument that defendant had standing to object to the search of his \\n\\ngirlfriendʹs house because the no‐contact order prohibiting him from contacting \\n\\nhis girlfriend was vitiated by her consent to enter the property). Here, even \\n\\nassuming that, under different circumstances, an unlicensed driver may have an \\n\\nexpectation of privacy in a rental car, Lyleʹs possession and control was unlawful \\n\\nwhile driving the rental car both without a license and without authorization. Cf. \\n\\nUnited States v. Walton, 763 F.3d 655, 663 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that defendant, \\n\\nwho was passenger at time of search and sole authorized driver listed on rental \\n\\nagreement, had reasonable expectation of privacy in rental car despite lacking \\n\\ndriverʹs license because ʺ[a] driver of a car does not lose all Fourth Amendment \\n\\nprotections simply because his license is invalid,ʺ but observing that conclusion \\n\\nwould not obtain if person were both unlicensed and unauthorized). \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\n Lyle argues that he was not operating the vehicle when he was \\n\\narrested and that he lawfully possessed the vehicle. These arguments ignore the \\n\\nfact that Lyle was seen by the agents driving the vehicle, and, indeed, he \\n\\neventually admitted as much. Because he was driving the vehicle illegally, Lyle \\n\\ndid not have lawful possession or control of the vehicle and he does not have \\n\\nstanding to challenge the search. \\n\\n Lyleʹs reliance on the Sixth Circuitʹs decision in United States v. \\n\\nSmith, 263 F.3d 571, 586 (6th Cir. 2001), is misplaced. Smith presented unique \\n\\nfacts. Specifically, Smith was not only the husband of the renter, but he also ʺhad \\n\\na business relationship with the rental companyʺ because he had ʺcalled the \\n\\nrental company to reserve the rental vehicle,ʺ ʺwas given a reservation number,ʺ \\n\\nand ʺprovided the company with his credit card number, and that credit card \\n\\nwas subsequently billed for the rental of the vehicle.ʺ Id. In light of these facts, \\n\\nthe Sixth Circuit determined that ʺSmith was the de facto renter of the vehicleʺ \\n\\nand that, therefore, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the rental car. \\n\\nId. at 586‐87. Lyle was not the de facto renter of the car at issue here. Moreover, \\n\\nthe Sixth Circuit also noted that Smith was a licensed driver. Id. at 586 (ʺSmith \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 26 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nwas a licensed driver . . . . Therefore, it was not illegal for Smith [to] drive the \\n\\nvehicle.ʺ). For these reasons, Smith is distinguishable. \\n\\n Accordingly, we adhere to our original conclusion that Lyle lacked a \\n\\nreasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car, and the district court did not \\n\\nerr in denying his motion to suppress. \\n\\n ii. Impoundment of Rental Car \\n\\n Even assuming Lyle had a legitimate privacy interest in the rental \\n\\ncar, his challenge to the inventory search fails on the merits as the impoundment \\n\\nof the rental car did not violate the Fourth Amendment.2 The Supreme Court has \\n\\nrepeatedly held that the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, \\n\\nsee United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998), which ʺin turn, is measured in \\n\\nobjective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances,ʺ Ohio v. Robinette, \\n\\n519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996). Thus, in line with the First, Third, and Fifth Circuits, we \\n\\nconclude that ʺwhether a decision to impound is reasonable under the Fourth \\n\\n\\n\\n \\n 2 Some courts have concluded that there are two inquiries: first, whether \\nthe impoundment of a car is reasonable; and second, if so, whether the subsequent \\nsearch of the car after the impoundment is reasonable. See, e.g., Duguay, 93 F.3d at 351 \\n(ʺ[T]he decision to impound (the ʹseizureʹ) is properly analyzed as distinct from the \\ndecision to inventory (the ʹsearchʹ).ʺ); Coccia, 446 F.3d at 237 n. 5 (same). Here, Lyle has \\nchallenged only the impoundment and not the subsequent search of the rental vehicle. \\nHence, we need not reach the second inquiry. \\n 27 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nAmendment is based on all the facts and circumstances of a given case.ʺ Coccia, \\n\\n446 F.3d at 239. While the existence of and an officerʹs adherence to a \\n\\nstandardized criteria may be helpful in evaluating the reasonableness of an \\n\\nimpoundment, we decline to adopt a standardized impoundment procedure \\n\\nrequirement. \\n\\n Using a totality of the circumstances analysis, we conclude that the \\n\\nimpoundment here was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment even absent \\n\\nstandardized procedures. Here, at the time of his arrest for driving with a \\n\\nsuspended license and for possessing an illegal knife, Lyle was the rental carʹs \\n\\ndriver and sole occupant. As there was no third party immediately available to \\n\\nentrust with the vehicleʹs safekeeping, the officers could not be certain how long \\n\\nthe rental car would be unattended in Lyleʹs absence. Even if Lyle did not expect \\n\\nto be in custody long, Lyle would not have been able to operate the car himself \\n\\nupon release due to his suspended license. Although Lyle asked for the \\n\\nopportunity to arrange for his girlfriend, the authorized driver under the rental \\n\\nagreement, to remove the rental car, the police were not required to grant the \\n\\nrequest. See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374‐75; see also Duguay, 93 F.3d at 353 & n. 2 \\n\\n(holding impoundment of car unconstitutional when the vehicleʹs other occupant \\n\\n\\n\\n 28 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nwas present at the arrest and could ʺprovide for the speedy and efficient removal \\n\\nof the car from public thoroughfares,ʺ but noting that the Seventh Circuit has \\n\\naffirmed impoundments where the arrestee is the vehicleʹs sole occupant and is \\n\\nlegitimately arrested). Instead, by impounding the vehicle, the officer ensured \\n\\nthat the rental vehicle was not left on a public street in a busy midtown \\n\\nManhattan location where it could have become a nuisance or been stolen or \\n\\ndamaged and could have become illegally parked the next day. See Opperman, \\n\\n428 U.S. at 368‐69 (describing as ʺbeyond challengeʺ the authority of police ʺto \\n\\nseize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public \\n\\nsafety and convenience,ʺ such as vehicles that ʺviolate parking ordinancesʺ); \\n\\nSanders, 796 F.3d at 1249 (ʺOpperman establishes that if a vehicle is obstructing or \\n\\nimpeding traffic on public property, it can be impounded regardless of whether \\n\\nthe impoundment is guided by standardized procedures.ʺ). Moreover, there is \\n\\nno indication that the officers did not act in good faith or solely for the purpose \\n\\nof investigation in exercising their discretion to impound the rental car. \\n\\n Our decision in United States v. Lopez, 547 F.3d 364 (2d Cir. 2008), is \\n\\ninstructive. There, although our discussion primarily concerned the \\n\\nconstitutionality of the inventory search itself, we concluded that the \\n\\n\\n\\n 29 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\ncircumstances called for the impoundment of Lopezʹs car despite any showing of \\n\\na standardized impoundment policy. Id. at 372. Similar to Lyle, Lopez was \\n\\narrested and there was no one immediately available to move his car for \\n\\nsafekeeping in Lopezʹs case because the only other passenger was also arrested. \\n\\nSee id. at 366‐67. Moreover, like Lyleʹs car, Lopezʹs car was parked on a city \\n\\nstreet. Id. at 366. \\n\\n Thus, even if Lyle had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the \\n\\nrental car, the district court did not err in denying his motion to suppress. \\n\\nII. The Proffer Agreement Waiver \\n\\n We review the district courtʹs interpretation of the scope of a proffer \\n\\nagreement waiver de novo and its evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. \\n\\nRosemond, 841 F.3d at 107. \\n\\n A. Applicable Law \\n\\n Ordinarily, a ʺstatement made during plea discussions with an \\n\\nattorney for the prosecuting authorityʺ that does not result in a guilty plea is not \\n\\nadmissible against the defendant who made the statement. Fed. R. Evid. \\n\\n410(a)(4). The protections provided by Rule 410, however, can be waived, \\n\\nincluding in a proffer agreement with the government, provided that such \\n\\n\\n\\n 30 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nwaiver is knowing and voluntary. Rosemond, 841 F.3d at 107; United States v. \\n\\nVelez, 354 F.3d 190, 194‐95 (2d Cir. 2004). \\n\\n To determine whether a proffer agreementʹs waiver provision \\n\\napplies, we ask first whether the defendant has offered any evidence or made a \\n\\nfactual assertion that would trigger the Rule 410 waiver, and, ʺif so, whether the \\n\\nproffer statement ʹfairly rebut[s]ʹ the fact asserted or evidence offered or elicited.ʺ \\n\\nRosemond, 841 F.3d at 107. If the waiver has been triggered and the proffer \\n\\nstatement properly rebuts the assertion triggering the waiver, the government \\n\\nmay offer the proffer statement. Id. \\n\\n In Rosemond, we gave examples of factual assertions that will trigger \\n\\nthe proffer waiver, including ʺasserting, in an opening statement, that someone \\n\\nother than the defendant was the real perpetrator of the crime,ʺ id. at 109 (citing \\n\\nUnited States v. Barrow, 400 F.3d 109, 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2005)), and ʺarguing that a \\n\\nshooting was ʹan intended kidnapping gone wrong,ʹ when the defendant \\n\\nadmitted in a proffer session that the shooting was ʹan intentional murder,ʹʺ id. at \\n\\n110 (quoting United States v. Gomez, 210 F. Supp. 2d 465, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)). \\n\\n B. Application \\n\\n The district court properly held that the waiver was triggered by \\n\\nLyleʹs counselʹs statement during opening argument that ʺwe dispute [] the idea \\n 31 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nthat [Lyle] was a dealer.ʺ Tr. 28. Lyleʹs proffer agreement contained a waiver \\n\\nthat allowed his statements to come in ʺto rebut any evidence or arguments \\n\\noffered by or on behalf of [Lyle].ʺ Lyle App. 36. \\n\\n As this Court has recognized, a defense argument does not trigger a \\n\\nwaiver if it ʺsimply challenge[s] the sufficiency of government proof on [the] \\n\\nelements.ʺ Barrow, 400 F.3d at 119. But ʺa statement of fact in a defense opening, \\n\\nsuch as [a] statement . . . unequivocally identifying [someone other than \\n\\ndefendant] as the real perpetrator of the charged crimes,ʺ is a factual assertion \\n\\nthat would trigger a waiver provision. Id. Here, defense counsel did not ascribe \\n\\nthe charged crime to someone else, but he did more than challenge the \\n\\nsufficiency of the governmentʹs proof. Rather than argue that the government \\n\\nwould not adduce credible evidence that Lyle was a drug dealer, counsel \\n\\ndisputed the very idea that Lyle was a dealer. This is the functional equivalent of \\n\\nan affirmative statement that Lyle, in fact, did not deal methamphetamine. This \\n\\nassertion was belied by Lyleʹs proffer admissions and, thus, triggered the waiver \\n\\nprovision in the proffer agreement. \\n\\n Lyleʹs proffer statements fairly rebut his counselʹs opening argument \\n\\nthat Lyle was not a dealer. The proffer statements at issue included that (1) Lyle \\n\\n\\n\\n 32 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nrepeatedly distributed ʺsmall packagesʺ of methamphetamine; (2) Lyle \\n\\naccompanied another person to obtain and deliver methamphetamine; and \\n\\n(3) Lyle knew the location of the methamphetamine supplier. Taken together, \\n\\nthese statements imply participation in a drug distribution operation and thus \\n\\nfairly rebut Lyleʹs counselʹs argument in his opening statement that Lyle was a \\n\\nmere user of methamphetamine and not a dealer. See Barrow, 400 F.3d at 120‐21 \\n\\n(emphasizing that ʺproper rebuttal is not limited to direct contradictionʺ but \\n\\nʺencompasses any evidence that the trial judge concludes fairly counters and \\n\\ncasts doubt on the truthfulness of factual assertions advanced, whether directly \\n\\nor implicitly, by an adversaryʺ). \\n\\n Hence, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its \\n\\ndiscretion in admitting Lyleʹs proffer statements. \\n\\nIII. The Admission of Lyleʹs Redacted Statements \\n\\n A. Applicable Law \\n\\n In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135‐36 (1968), the Supreme \\n\\nCourt held that admission of a non‐testifying co‐defendantʹs confession naming \\n\\nthe defendant as a perpetrator at their joint trial violates the latterʹs Sixth \\n\\nAmendment right to cross‐examination. The Court later made clear that a non‐\\n\\n\\n\\n 33 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nobvious redaction of a co‐defendantʹs confession to eliminate any references to \\n\\nthe defendant will eliminate any Bruton problem. See Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. \\n\\n185, 195‐97 (1998); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208‐09 (1987). \\n\\n We have consistently held that the introduction of a co‐defendantʹs \\n\\nconfession with the defendantʹs name replaced by a neutral noun or pronoun \\n\\ndoes not violate Bruton. See, e.g., United States v. Jass, 569 F.3d 47, 58 (2d Cir. \\n\\n2009) (noting that operative questions when evaluating Bruton claim are ʺ(1) did \\n\\nthe redacted statement give any indication to the jury that the original statement \\n\\ncontained actual names, and (2) did the statement standing alone otherwise \\n\\nconnect co‐defendants to the crimesʺ (internal quotation marks and ellipsis \\n\\nomitted)). In United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125 (2d Cir. 1989), for example, we \\n\\naffirmed a conviction based in part on a co‐defendantʹs statement that was \\n\\nredacted to reference ʺothers,ʺ ʺother people,ʺ and ʺanother person.ʺ Id. at 1135. \\n\\n To determine whether a redaction is sufficient under Bruton, we \\n\\nview the redacted statement separate and apart from any other evidence \\n\\nadmitted at trial. Id. (citing United States v. Wilkinson, 754 F.2d 1427, 1435 (2d Cir. \\n\\n1985)); see also United States v. Williams, 936 F.2d 698, 700‐01 (2d Cir. 1991) (ʺ[T]he \\n\\nappropriate analysis to be used when applying the Bruton rule requires that we \\n\\n\\n\\n 34 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nview the redacted confession in isolation from the other evidence introduced at \\n\\ntrial. If the confession, when so viewed, does not incriminate the defendant, then \\n\\nit may be admitted with a proper limiting instruction even though other \\n\\nevidence in the case indicates that the neutral pronoun is in fact a reference to the \\n\\ndefendant.ʺ). \\n\\n B. Application \\n\\n Van Praagh contends that his constitutional rights were violated by \\n\\nthe admission of Lyleʹs redacted proffer and post‐arrest statements. We \\n\\nordinarily review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion; however, Van \\n\\nPraagh did not object to the introduction of the redacted statements at trial, and \\n\\nso we review the admission of this evidence for plain error. See United States v. \\n\\nPierce, 785 F.3d 832, 840 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 172 (2015).3 \\n\\n The redacted statements did not violate Bruton. The neutral terms \\n\\nʺindividualʺ and ʺperson,ʺ which were substituted for proper names with the \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n \\n 3 Van Praagh contends that his Bruton argument was preserved by his \\ncounselʹs objection to the admission of Lyleʹs unredacted statements and by Lyleʹs \\ncounselʹs objection to the redacted statements. Admission of unredacted statements, \\nhowever, is a different and independent issue, and Van Praagh cites no authority \\nsuggesting that one partyʹs counsel may preserve another partyʹs claim of error when \\nthe other partyʹs counsel fails timely to join in the objection. Accordingly, plain error \\nreview applies. \\n 35 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nexception of that of a supplier ‐‐ ʺBrendan or Brandon,ʺ Tr. 436, 534 ‐‐ were not so \\n\\nobvious as to indicate to the jury that the original statements contained actual \\n\\nnames. This was an ongoing criminal enterprise where many people were \\n\\ninvolved and the government introduced evidence of methamphetamine dealing \\n\\nby several people. Thus, the substitutions alone did not necessarily identify Van \\n\\nPraagh. Further, Lyleʹs redacted statements sounded sufficiently natural. For \\n\\ninstance, he admitted that he had ʺfirst become involved in methamphetamineʺ \\n\\nthrough ʺsomeoneʺ he ʺknew . . . from work,ʺ Tr. 517‐18, and that the individual \\n\\nfor whom he worked as a ʺrunnerʺ ʺasked him to hold something for himʺ in the \\n\\ntrunk of the rental car. Tr. 435, 534. Because such statements ʺmight actually \\n\\nhave been said by a person admitting his own culpability in the charged \\n\\nconspiracy while shielding the specific identity of his confederate,ʺ they do not \\n\\nviolate Bruton. Jass, 569 F.3d at 62. Nor did the redacted statements, viewed in \\n\\nisolation, contain any information indicating that Van Praagh was the \\n\\nʺindividualʺ in question, let alone information that would ʺimmediately \\n\\ninculpateʺ him. Id. at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted). \\n\\n Van Praagh relies on United States v. Taylor, 745 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. \\n\\n2014), to support his contention that the redactions violated Bruton, but Taylor is \\n\\n\\n\\n 36 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\ndistinguishable. Taylor involved a single robbery of a drug store by four people. \\n\\nId. at 20‐21. One of the four, Luana Miller, became a cooperating witness, and \\n\\nanother, Curtis Taylor, gave post‐arrest confessions. Id. At the trial of Taylor \\n\\nand the two other co‐defendants, the trial court admitted Taylorʹs post‐arrest \\n\\nconfessions but required their redaction to omit identifications of his two co‐\\n\\ndefendants. In the portions of the confessions that were admitted, Millerʹs name \\n\\nwas mentioned but the names of the two co‐defendants were replaced with ʺtwo \\n\\nother individuals,ʺ ʺthe person,ʺ and ʺthe driver.ʺ Id. at 29. We determined that \\n\\nin this circumstance the redactions were so obvious as to violate Bruton. Our \\n\\nreasoning was as follows. First, Millerʹs name was used throughout and, ʺ[i]f \\n\\nTaylor had been trying to avoid naming his confederates, he would not have \\n\\nidentified one of them ‐‐ Miller ‐‐ in the very phrase in which the names of the \\n\\nother confederates are omitted.ʺ Id. Second, the wording of the redacted \\n\\nstatements, i.e., ʺ[t]he robbery was the idea of the person who waited with Luana \\n\\nMiller and Taylor at the gas station,ʺ was stilted and unnatural. Id. Third, in this \\n\\ncontext, the ʺreference to ʹtwo other individualsʹ [was] suspiciously closer to the \\n\\nspeech of a prosecutor than that of a perpetrator.ʺ Id. On the basis of these \\n\\nfactors, we determined that it was obvious that names had been omitted from the \\n\\n\\n\\n 37 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nstatements and, therefore, ʺthe choice of implied identity [was] narrow. The \\n\\nunnamed persons correspond[ed] by number (two) and by role to the pair of co‐\\n\\ndefendants . . . [and] [t]he jury could immediately infer, on the evidence of the \\n\\nredacted confession alone, that Taylor had likely named the co‐defendants.ʺ Id. \\n\\n This case is unlike Taylor. First, Lyleʹs statements referred to multiple \\n\\npeople ‐‐ not only one unnamed person to correspond to the one co‐defendant, \\n\\nVan Praagh. This did not present the necessary process‐of‐elimination problem \\n\\nthat left the juryʹs ʺchoice of implied identity narrowʺ as in Taylor. Id. Second, in \\n\\naddition to Van Praaghʹs methamphetamine dealing, the government introduced \\n\\nevidence of methamphetamine dealing by its two cooperating witnesses ‐‐ \\n\\nTarantino and Hodges ‐‐ as well as several others. Because Lyleʹs statements did \\n\\nnot reference by name those cooperating witnesses, the jury could reasonably \\n\\nhave inferred that they were the ʺother personsʺ Lyle was referring to in his \\n\\nredacted statements. Third, Lyleʹs statements referred to people involved in a \\n\\nconspiracy to engage in ongoing criminal conduct, not a single criminal act like in \\n\\nTaylor. For all of these reasons, Taylor is inapposite. \\n\\n We also note that the district court here gave a limiting instruction. \\n\\nSee Taylor, 745 F.3d at 28 (ʺIt matters that the district court gave limiting \\n\\n\\n\\n 38 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\ninstructionsʺ because ʺ[w]e normally assume that jurors follow limiting \\n\\ninstructionsʺ). The district court specifically instructed the jury that ʺLyleʹs \\n\\nstatement about his own conduct may not be considered or discussed by you \\n\\nwith regard to Mr. Van Praagh.ʺ Tr. 713. \\n\\n Finally, Van Praaghʹs constitutional rights were not violated by \\n\\nLyleʹs counsel eliciting testimony on cross‐examination that his clientʹs \\n\\nstatements had been redacted for presentation at trial and that his client had \\n\\nindeed provided actual names in his proffer and post‐arrest statements. Again, \\n\\nbecause Van Praagh did not object during Lyleʹs attorneyʹs cross‐examination, \\n\\nwe review for plain error. In urging error, Van Praagh relies on Gray v. \\n\\nMaryland, 523 U.S. 185 (holding that ʺconsidered as a class, redactions that . . . \\n\\nnotify the jury that a name has been deletedʺ violated the Confrontation Clause). \\n\\nBut Grayʹs focus was on the inadequacy of the governmentʹs redaction. Van \\n\\nPraagh can point to no case plainly identifying Bruton error when a defendant, \\n\\nwhose post‐arrest statements are being offered against him, elicits the fact of \\n\\nredaction, or elicits parts of the redacted statement. \\n\\n Van Praagh fails to show plain error here. First, his case is \\n\\ndistinguishable from Gray in that there the redaction inadequacy was attributable \\n\\n\\n\\n 39 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nto the prosecution. In any event, Van Praagh cannot satisfy the prejudice prong \\n\\nof plain error because in his case the redacted statements referred to multiple \\n\\nʺindividuals,ʺ which means the revelation could not have been immediately \\n\\ninculpatory. See Jass, 569 F.3d at 61. \\n\\n Further, during cross‐examination, Lyleʹs attorney elicited from the \\n\\nsame witness several of the names that Lyle mentioned during his post‐arrest \\n\\nand proffer statements, including ʺZaron,ʺ ʺTed,ʺ ʺBob,ʺ and ʺJoe.ʺ Tr. 525. In \\n\\nour view, that testimony made it less, not more, obvious to the jury that Lyle had \\n\\nalso mentioned Van Praagh. Van Praaghʹs name was not mentioned at all, and \\n\\nLyleʹs counselʹs elicitation of other names suggested that the ʺother personsʺ \\n\\nmentioned were the individuals whose names Lyleʹs counsel elicited, not Van \\n\\nPraagh. For all of these reasons, the admission of Lyleʹs redacted statements was \\n\\nnot plainly erroneous. \\n\\nIV. Admissibility of Lyleʹs New Jersey Arrest \\n\\n We review a district courtʹs evidentiary rulings for abuse of \\n\\ndiscretion, which we will find only if the district court ʺacted arbitrarily and \\n\\nirrationally.ʺ United States v. Greer, 631 F.3d 608, 614 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting \\n\\nUnited States v. Garcia, 291 F.3d 127, 136 (2d Cir. 2002)). \\n\\n\\n\\n 40 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\n A. Applicable Law \\n\\n Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides: \\n\\n Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a \\n personʹs character in order to show that on a particular occasion the \\n person acted in accordance with the character. \\n \\nFed. R. Evid. 404(b). ʺThe Second Circuitʹs ʹinclusionary ruleʹ allows the \\n\\nadmission of such evidence ʹfor any purpose other than to show a defendantʹs \\n\\ncriminal propensity, as long as the evidence is relevant and satisfies the \\n\\nprobative‐prejudice balancing test of Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.ʹʺ \\n\\nGreer, 631 F.3d at 614 (quoting United States v. Inserra, 34 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. \\n\\n1994)). \\n\\n Not all evidence of uncharged misconduct, however, is prohibited \\n\\nby Rule 404(b). Rather, \\n\\n [E]vidence of uncharged criminal activity is not considered other \\n crimes evidence . . . if it arose out of the same transaction or series of \\n transactions as the charged offense, if it is inextricably intertwined \\n with the evidence regarding the charged offense, or if it is necessary \\n to complete the story of the crime on trial. \\n \\nUnited States v. Carboni, 204 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks \\n\\nomitted); see also Inserra, 34 F.3d at 89 (ʺ[E]vidence of other bad acts may be \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 41 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nadmitted to provide the jury with the complete story of the crimes charged by \\n\\ndemonstrating the context of certain events relevant to the charged offense.ʺ). \\n\\n B. Application \\n\\n The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the \\n\\nevidence seized during the New Jersey arrest in January 2014. First, that \\n\\nevidence was not barred by Rule 404(b) because the arrest ʺarose out of the same \\n\\ntransaction or series of transactions as the charged offense.ʺ Carboni, 204 F.3d at \\n\\n44. Specifically, as discussed above, Lyle argued at trial that he was only a \\n\\nmethamphetamine user ‐‐ not a dealer. The government rebutted that argument \\n\\nwith evidence of Lyleʹs New Jersey arrest. In summation, the government \\n\\nargued: \\n\\n 14 or 15 grams [of methamphetamine] is still many hundreds, if not \\n thousands, of dollars of meth. . . . Also, you know what else was in \\n that room? A dozen baggies, a scale, $3,000 in cash. He was not \\n weighing out meth for his own personal use. That was meth he was \\n going to sell. \\n \\nTr. 629. In other words, the evidence seized pursuant to the New Jersey arrest \\n\\nwas not evidence of other crimes; it was evidence of the very crime charged in \\n\\ncount one of the indictment, a conspiracy involving Lyle, Van Praagh, and others \\n\\nto distribute methamphetamine from in or about December 2012 through in or \\n\\n\\n\\n 42 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nabout January 2014. Accordingly, evidence of the New Jersey arrest was \\n\\nadmissible as direct proof of the methamphetamine distribution conspiracy. \\n\\n Second, and in any event, the evidence of the New Jersey arrest fits \\n\\nwithin the Rule 404(b) inclusionary rule because it shows Lyleʹs knowledge and \\n\\nintent regarding the contents of the rental car. Because Lyle argued throughout \\n\\ntrial that he did not know what was in the trunk of the rental car, his knowledge \\n\\nand intent were at issue. United States v. Ramirez, 894 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1990) \\n\\n(ʺWhen the defendant disavows awareness that a crime was being perpetrated, \\n\\nand the government bears the burden of proving the defendantʹs knowing \\n\\npossession as an element of the crime, knowledge is properly put in issue.ʺ). The \\n\\nfact that Lyle was in possession of 14‐15 grams of methamphetamine and tools of \\n\\nthe drug trade less than a month after he was arrested with the rental car is \\n\\nprobative of his knowledge and intent regarding the contents of the rental car. In \\n\\naddition, the probative value of this evidence was not ʺsubstantially outweighedʺ \\n\\nby the risk of unfair prejudice as it ʺdid not involve conduct any more \\n\\nsensational or disturbing than the crimes with which [Lyle was] charged.ʺ United \\n\\nStates v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112, 1120 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Roldan‐\\n\\nZapata, 916 F.2d 795, 804 (2d Cir. 1990)). Accordingly, the district court acted \\n\\n\\n\\n 43 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nwell within its discretion in finding that the probative value of the evidence \\n\\noutweighed the threat of unfair prejudice. \\n\\nV. Sufficiency of the Conspiracy Evidence \\n\\n We review Van Praaghʹs challenge to whether the evidence was \\n\\nsufficient to support his conspiracy conviction de novo, ʺview[ing] the evidence in \\n\\nthe light most favorable to the government, crediting every inference that could \\n\\nhave been drawn in the governmentʹs favor, and deferring to the juryʹs \\n\\nassessment of witness credibility and its assessment of the weight of the \\n\\nevidence.ʺ Rosemond, 841 F.3d at 113 (quoting United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, \\n\\n62 (2d Cir. 2012)). We must affirm if ʺany rational trier of fact could have found \\n\\nthe essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.ʺ Id. (quoting \\n\\nUnited States v. Vernace, 811 F.3d 609, 615 (2d Cir. 2016)). \\n\\n The crux of a conspiracy is an agreement between two or more \\n\\npersons to join together to accomplish something illegal. United States v. Parker, \\n\\n554 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 2009) (ʺTo prove a conspiracy, the evidence must show \\n\\nthat ʹtwo or more persons agreed to participate in a joint venture intended to \\n\\ncommit an unlawful act.ʹʺ (quoting United States v. Desimone, 119 F.3d 217, 223 \\n\\n(2d Cir. 1997))). We have recognized a ʺnarrow exceptionʺ to the conspiracy rule \\n\\n\\n\\n 44 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nfor a transaction between a buyer and seller of drugs. Id. Under this exception, \\n\\nʺthe existence of a buyer‐seller relationship does not itself establish a conspiracy; \\n\\nhowever, where there is additional evidence showing an agreement to join \\n\\ntogether to accomplish an objective beyond the sale transaction, the evidence \\n\\nmay support a finding that the parties intentionally participated in a conspiracy.ʺ \\n\\nUnited States v. Hawkins, 547 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2008); see also United States v. \\n\\nRojas, 617 F.3d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 2010) (ʺ[T]he exception does not protect either the \\n\\nseller or buyer from a charge that they conspired together to transfer drugs if the \\n\\nevidence supports a finding that they shared a conspiratorial purpose to advance \\n\\nother transfers, whether by the seller or by the buyer.ʺ (alteration and internal \\n\\nquotation marks omitted)). The question thus becomes ʺwhether the evidence in \\n\\nits totality suffices to permit a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the \\n\\ndefendant was not merely a buyer or seller of narcotics, but rather that the \\n\\ndefendant knowingly and intentionally participated in the narcotics‐distribution \\n\\nconspiracy by agreeing to accomplish its illegal objective beyond the mere \\n\\npurchase or sale.ʺ Hawkins, 547 F.3d at 73‐74. \\n\\n Van Praagh did not request a buyer‐seller instruction at trial and so \\n\\nwe review for plain error. Pierce, 785 F.3d at 840. The district court did not \\n\\n\\n\\n 45 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nplainly err in failing to give a buyer‐seller instruction because the government \\n\\npresented ample evidence of a narcotics conspiracy beyond a buyer‐seller \\n\\nrelationship between Van Praagh and Lyle. \\n\\n First, Van Praagh sold methamphetamine not just to Lyle, but to \\n\\nothers. Indeed, he received weekly shipments of methamphetamine, which he \\n\\nthen sold to others. With assistance from Tarantino, he regularly sold \\n\\nmethamphetamine out of his apartment in Queens as well as out of hotels, and \\n\\nhe made deliveries to ʺ[p]robably 50ʺ customers. Tr. 124. \\n\\n Second, the quantity of drugs was consistent with a drug trafficking \\n\\noperation. Tarantino testified that Lyle repeatedly purchased pound‐level \\n\\nquantities of methamphetamine at $19,000 to $25,000 per pound. See United \\n\\nStates v. Contreras, 249 F.3d 595, 600 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that repeat sales \\n\\nsuggest ʺmore than a transient relationship,ʺ but are ʺby themselvesʺ insufficient \\n\\nto support an inference of a conspiracy between the supplier and purchaser); see \\n\\nalso United States v. Murray, 618 F.2d 892, 902 (2d Cir. 1980) (ʺ[O]ne who deals in \\n\\nlarge quantities of narcotics may be presumed to know that he is a part of a \\n\\nventure which extends beyond his individual participation.ʺ (quoting United \\n\\nStates v. Magnano, 543 F.2d 431, 433‐34 (2d Cir. 1976)). \\n\\n\\n\\n 46 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\n Accordingly, the district court did not plainly err in failing to sua \\n\\nsponte give a buyer‐seller instruction. See United States v. Medina, 944 F.2d 60, 65‐\\n\\n66 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that the district court was not required to give a buyer‐\\n\\nseller instruction ʺwhere . . . there is advanced planning among the alleged co‐\\n\\nconspirators to deal in wholesale quantities of drugs obviously not intended for \\n\\npersonal useʺ because ʺ[u]nder such circumstances, the participants in the \\n\\ntransaction may be presumed to know that they are part of a broader \\n\\nconspiracyʺ). \\n\\nVI. Reasonableness of Van Praaghʹs Sentence \\n\\n We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under a \\n\\nʺdeferential abuse‐of‐discretion standard.ʺ United States v. Aldeen, 792 F.3d 247, \\n\\n251 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). The \\n\\nquestion is whether Van Praaghʹs below‐Guidelines sentence of 144 monthsʹ \\n\\nimprisonment ʺshock[s] the conscience,ʺ constitutes a ʺmanifest injustice,ʺ or is \\n\\notherwise substantively unreasonable. Id. at 255 (quoting United States v. Rigas, \\n\\n583 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2009)); see also United States v. Perez‐Frias, 636 F.3d 39, 43 \\n\\n(2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (ʺ[I]n the overwhelming majority of cases, a \\n\\nGuidelines sentence will fall comfortably within the broad range of sentences \\n\\nthat would be reasonable in the particular circumstances. It is therefore difficult \\n 47 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nto find that a below‐Guidelines sentence is unreasonable.ʺ (internal quotation \\n\\nmarks and citation omitted)). \\n\\n Van Praaghʹs below‐Guidelines sentence of 144 months was \\n\\nsubstantively reasonable. The district court fully explained its reasoning. It \\n\\nconsidered Van Praaghʹs ʺvery unhappy upbringing,ʺ and the ʺvery positive \\n\\nchangeʺ that Van Praagh ʺseem[ed] to be undergoing.ʺ Van Praagh App. 58‐59. \\n\\nThe district court determined, however, that a 144‐month sentence was sufficient \\n\\nbut not greater than necessary because Van Praagh (1) had committed a ʺvery \\n\\nseriousʺ crime; (2) had a ʺlong history of drug dealingʺ and ʺplenty of \\n\\nopportunities to changeʺ; (3) clearly had been ʺin charge of dealing more drugs at \\n\\na higher level than [Lyle]ʺ; and (4) had a ʺprior record suggest[ing] that he still \\n\\ncontinues to be a danger to the community.ʺ Id. \\n\\n Van Praaghʹs argument that, like Lyle, he should have been \\n\\nsentenced to the statutory mandatory minimum of 120 monthsʹ imprisonment is \\n\\nunavailing. As the district court noted, Van Praagh had a ʺmore important roleʺ \\n\\nthan Lyle. See Van Praagh App. 62. Van Praagh supplied Lyle with pound \\n\\nquantities of methamphetamine on multiple occasions. Van Praagh had people \\n\\nworking for him to make drug deliveries. Moreover, Van Praaghʹs criminal \\n\\n\\n\\n 48 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\nhistory was clearly more serious than Lyleʹs. Although neither man had \\n\\npreviously served any jail time for his crimes, Van Praaghʹs previous convictions \\n\\nincluded crimes relating to methamphetamine, while Lyle had only a violation \\n\\nfor marijuana possession twenty years prior to the instant offense conduct. In \\n\\nthese circumstances, we identify no abuse of the district courtʹs sentencing \\n\\ndiscretion and no merit in Van Praaghʹs claim that his sentence is substantively \\n\\nunreasonable. \\n\\n CONCLUSION \\n\\n To summarize, we conclude as follows: \\n\\n 1. Because Lyle was an unlicensed, as well as unauthorized, \\n\\ndriver of the rental car, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in that car, \\n\\nand the district court did not err in denying his motion to suppress. Even \\n\\nassuming Lyle had a legitimate privacy interest, the search and seizure of the \\n\\nrental car did not violate the Fourth Amendment. \\n\\n 2. Lyleʹs counselʹs statement in his opening argument that ʺwe \\n\\ndispute [] the idea that [Lyle] was a dealer,ʺ Tr. 28, triggered the waiver in Lyleʹs \\n\\nproffer agreement, and the proffer statements, taken together, fairly rebutted his \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 49 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\ncounselʹs argument that Lyle was a mere user of methamphetamine and not a \\n\\ndealer. \\n\\n 3. The admission of Lyleʹs redacted proffer and post‐arrest \\n\\nstatements in the defendantsʹ joint trial was not plainly erroneous because the \\n\\nstatements substituted neutral terms for actual names and had no otherwise \\n\\nidentifying information. Further, the district court did not plainly err in allowing \\n\\nLyleʹs counsel, without Van Praaghʹs objection, to elicit testimony that Lyleʹs \\n\\nstatements had been redacted, that Lyle had provided actual names in his proffer \\n\\nand post‐arrest statements, and what several of those names were because those \\n\\ndisclosures did not prejudice Van Praagh and, indeed, made it less obvious to the \\n\\njury that Lyle was referring to Van Praagh in his statements. \\n\\n 4. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the \\n\\nevidence seized during Lyleʹs New Jersey arrest because (a) it was direct \\n\\nevidence of the conspiracy charged in count one of the superseding indictment, \\n\\nand (b) even if it was not direct evidence, it was not ʺother crimes evidenceʺ \\n\\nprohibited by Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) because it showed Lyleʹs \\n\\nknowledge and intent regarding the contents of the rental car on December 11, \\n\\n2013. \\n\\n\\n\\n 50 \\n \\n\\f \\n\\n 5. The district court did not plainly err in failing to sua sponte \\n\\ngive a buyer‐seller instruction to the jury because the government presented \\n\\nample evidence of a narcotics conspiracy. \\n\\n 6. Van Praaghʹs below‐Guidelines sentence of 144 monthsʹ \\n\\nimprisonment was substantively reasonable. \\n\\n Accordingly, the judgments of the district court are AFFIRMED. \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 51\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1497,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4605631,"string":"4,605,631"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"FIH, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FOUNDATION CAPITAL PARTNERS LLC, Fka Foundation Managing Member LLC, Dean Barr, Joseph Meehan, Thomas Ward, Joseph Elmlinger, Defendants-Appellees"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"FIH, LLC v. Foundation Capital Partners, LLC."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-01"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"Docket 18-357-cv; August Term, 2018"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Jacobs, Lynch, Vilardo\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"18-357-cv\\nFIH, LLC v. Foundation Capital Partners, LLC.\\n\\n\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n August Term, 2018\\n\\n Argued: March 8, 2019 Decided: April 1, 2019\\n\\n Docket No. 18-357-cv\\n\\n\\n\\n FIH, LLC,\\n\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n — v. —\\n\\n FOUNDATION CAPITAL PARTNERS LLC, FKA FOUNDATION\\n MANAGING MEMBER LLC, DEAN BARR, JOSEPH MEEHAN,\\n THOMAS WARD, JOSEPH ELMLINGER,\\n\\n Defendants-Appellees,\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nB e f o r e:\\n\\n JACOBS and LYNCH, Circuit Judges, and VILARDO, District Judge.*\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n*\\n Judge Lawrence J. Vilardo, of the United States District Court for the Western\\nDistrict of New York, sitting by designation.\\n\\f FIH, LLC (“FIH”) appeals from the district court’s grant of summary\\njudgment dismissing its federal securities law claims against Foundation Capital\\nPartners, LLC (“Foundation”), Dean Barr, Joseph Meehan, Thomas Ward, and\\nJoseph Elmlinger (collectively “defendants”). FIH argues that it had reasonably\\nrelied on material misrepresentations by defendants in deciding to invest in\\nFoundation, and that defendants are therefore liable under federal and state law.\\nThe district court concluded as a matter of law that FIH could not have\\nreasonably relied on the alleged misrepresentations, because such reliance was\\nprecluded by a general merger clause in Foundation’s LLC agreement,\\nincorporated by reference into the subscription agreements by which FIH had\\ninvested in Foundation. Concluding that the merger clause did not as a matter of\\nlaw preclude FIH’s reasonable reliance on the alleged misrepresentations, we\\nVACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further\\nproceedings.\\n\\n\\n\\n SAMUEL J. LIEBERMAN (Ben Hutman, on the brief), Sadis &\\n Goldberg LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.\\n\\n DAVID G. TRACHTENBERG (Stephen J. Arena, on the brief),\\n Trachtenberg Rodes & Friedberg LLP, New York, NY,\\n for Defendant-Appellee Joseph Elmlinger.\\n\\n Peter M. Nolin, Carmody Torrance Sandak & Hennessey LLP,\\n Stamford, CT, for Defendant-Appellee Dean Barr.\\n\\n Stephen G. Walko, Andrea C. Sisca, Ivey, Barnum & O’Mara\\n LLC, Greenwich, CT, for Defendant-Appellee Thomas\\n Ward.\\n\\n Jonathan P. Whitcomb, Diserio Martin O’Connor & Castiglioni\\n LLP, Stamford, CT, for Defendant-Appellee Joseph Meehan.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\fGERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n FIH, LLC (“FIH”) appeals from a grant of summary judgment against it,\\n\\nentered by the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut\\n\\n(Arterton, J.), in its action against Foundation Capital Partners, LLC\\n\\n(“Foundation”), the general partner in a private equity fund set up to invest in\\n\\nminority interests in general partnerships of large hedge funds, and its member-\\n\\npartners (collectively, “defendants”). FIH alleged that it had purchased a\\n\\nmembership interest in Foundation on the basis of misrepresentations by\\n\\ndefendants, and asserted claims against them under § 10(b) of the Securities\\n\\nExchange Act of 1934, the Connecticut Securities Act, and Connecticut common\\n\\nlaw. The alleged misrepresentations are that Foundation had an active pipeline of\\n\\ninvestments and that two of Foundation’s key partners were able to work\\n\\ntogether notwithstanding one partner’s embittered divorce of the other’s sister-\\n\\nin-law. The district court held that a merger clause in Foundation’s LLC\\n\\nagreement, incorporated into the subscription agreements by which FIH invested\\n\\nin Foundation, precluded FIH’s reasonable reliance on the alleged\\n\\nmisrepresentations as a matter of law. For the reasons that follow, we VACATE\\n\\nand REMAND.\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\f FACTUAL BACKGROUND1\\n\\n Foundation was formed to act as general partner in Foundation Capital\\n\\nPartners, L.P. (the “Fund”), a private equity fund formed to invest in minority\\n\\ninterests in general partnerships of large hedge funds. Rather than directly invest\\n\\nin assets under management by such hedge funds, the Fund was to receive a\\n\\nportion of the annual management and performance fees taken in by the hedge\\n\\nfund partnerships. Foundation was operated by four partners, Dean Barr, Joseph\\n\\nMeehan, Joseph Elmlinger, and Thomas Ward.\\n\\n In the Fall of 2013, Foundation solicited FIH to invest directly in it—rather\\n\\nthan in the Fund. As part of its solicitation of FIH, Foundation provided FIH with\\n\\nan offering memorandum entitled “Foundation Managing Member LLC\\n\\nDisclosure Statement November 13, 2013“ (the “Offering Memo”). The Offering\\n\\nMemo represented that the Fund was “in active negotiations” with two hedge\\n\\nfunds that it planned to invest in, codenamed “Granite” and “Lake,” and\\n\\nhighlighted the Fund’s “Current Transaction Pipeline” of 23 supposed potential\\n\\ntransactions relating to investment in other hedge funds. FIH alleges that\\n\\n\\n1\\n The facts recited below are based on the evidence in the summary judgment\\nrecord, taken in the light most favorable to FIH and drawing all reasonable\\ninferences in FIH’s favor. See Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 229 (2d Cir.\\n2016).\\n\\n 4\\n\\f“[r]epresentations about active transaction negotiations in the pipeline were key\\n\\nto [its] investment decision, because Foundation needed to close its first\\n\\nacquisition of a hedge fund minority interest to start generating substantial\\n\\nincome.” Appellant’s Br. at 4.\\n\\n In February 2014, Foundation gave FIH access to due diligence materials,\\n\\nwhich identified fourteen specific targets delineated by their code names:\\n\\n“Projects Lake, Apex, Corvette, Granite, Breakout, Pilot, Centaur, Pound, Tensor,\\n\\nMainstay, Yale, Halo, Gun, and Bronco.” App’x at 146. The targets were\\n\\nidentified only by code names, ostensibly to protect the confidentiality of\\n\\nFoundation’s negotiations. Thus, at this stage of Foundation’s solicitation of FIH,\\n\\nFIH had no opportunity to verify Foundation’s claims by contacting the\\n\\npurported target hedge funds. The due diligence materials explained that these\\n\\ntargets were “the current representative [Foundation] Pipeline, including those\\n\\nwith which the firm was in active discussion,” and that “this pipeline has become\\n\\nincreasingly active in recent months as a result of industry recovery, manager\\n\\ninterest, regulatory reform and the presence of relatively few buyers.” Id. These\\n\\nmaterials also “represented that non-disclosure agreements had been signed with\\n\\nthe target hedge funds in Projects Lake and Granite.” Id.\\n\\n\\n 5\\n\\f In addition, in an email to FIH on December 30, 2013, Barr represented that\\n\\nFoundation had four “possible transactions in the works,” referencing Projects\\n\\nBronco, Corvette, Lake, and Centaur. Id. On January 22, 2014, Barr emailed FIH to\\n\\nupdate it on Project Apex, and represented that “I believe we can move\\n\\nexpeditiously on this deal.” Id. And on February 3, 2014, Barr again emailed FIH\\n\\nto give an update on Project Pilot, representing that “[w]e have some reasonably\\n\\ngood intel that suggests that this offer would be given serious consideration.” Id.\\n\\n Through due diligence, FIH also learned that Barr was in the process of\\n\\ndivorcing Meehan’s sister-in-law. At that time, Barr was the managing partner of\\n\\nFoundation and Meehan was the Chief Operating Officer of Foundation. Barr\\n\\nand Meehan were each also managing principals of Foundation, and each held\\n\\nequal 46.175% interests in the company. FIH specifically asked the two men if\\n\\nthey would be able to continue working well together following a potential\\n\\ninvestment by FIH in Foundation. Barr and Meehan each represented that they\\n\\ncould “work together” professionally in spite of the divorce, and that they could\\n\\n“keep their professional and personal lives separate.” Id. at 910. Barr represented\\n\\nto FIH that the divorce was “under control,” “getting better,” and “amicable,”\\n\\nand was thus “not material” to FIH’s decision to invest in Foundation. Id. Barr\\n\\n\\n\\n 6\\n\\falso told FIH that “there was nothing FIH needed to know about [his] personality\\n\\nand there were no other matters FIH should know about [him].” Id. at 913.\\n\\n On February 11, 2014, FIH and Foundation executed a document entitled\\n\\n“Foundation Managing Member LLC Subscription Agreement” (the\\n\\n“Subscription Agreement”),2 concretizing FIH’s investment in Foundation. The\\n\\nSubscription Agreement identifies FIH as the “Subscriber” and Foundation as the\\n\\n“Company,” and provides inter alia that FIH:\\n\\n tenders this subscription for a membership interest in the Company on\\n the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Company\\n Agreement (as defined below) as amended through the Seventh\\n Amendment to the Company Agreement dated as of the date of this\\n Subscription Agreement[.]\\n\\nId. at 586.\\n\\n The Subscription Agreement also contains the following provision within a\\n\\nsection entitled “Representations and Warranties of the Subscriber”:\\n\\n The Subscriber has such knowledge and experience in financial and\\n business matters that the Subscriber is capable of evaluating the merits\\n and risks of an investment in the Interest, and of making an informed\\n investment decision, and the Subscriber has consulted and relied solely\\n upon the advice of its own counsel, accountant and other advisers with\\n regard to such legal, investment, tax and other considerations\\n\\n\\n2\\n On February 28, 2014, the parties executed a second subscription agreement that\\nmade several changes to the original Subscription Agreement, none of them\\nrelevant to this appeal.\\n\\n 7\\n\\f regarding such investment and on that basis believes that an\\n investment in an Interest is suitable and appropriate for such\\n Subscriber. The Subscriber has had, either individually or through its\\n duly authorized officers, employees or agents, an opportunity to (i) ask\\n questions of and receive answers from the Company and its\\n management concerning the terms and conditions of the Interests and\\n the proposed operation of the Company and (ii) obtain information\\n necessary to verify the accuracy of the information provided.\\n\\nId. The Subscription Agreement further provides the following within a section\\n\\nentitled “Representations and Warranties of the Company”:\\n\\n The Company hereby represents and warrants to, and agrees with, the\\n Subscriber that (a) attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct\\n copy of the Company Agreement that has been conformed to reflect all\\n amendments to the Company Agreement through the Seventh\\n Amendment to the Company Agreement dated as of the date of this\\n Subscription Agreement and (b) the salary of each Managing Principal\\n in 2014 will not exceed the amount set forth with respect to that\\n Managing Principal in Exhibit B attached hereto.\\n\\nId. at 588.\\n\\n The “Company Agreement” to which the Subscription Agreement refers is\\n\\na document identified as the Limited Liability Company Agreement. Paragraph\\n\\n11.9 of the Company Agreement, entitled “Entire Agreement” (the “merger\\n\\nclause”), provides that “[t]his Agreement constitutes the entire agreement of the\\n\\nMembers and supersedes all prior agreements among the Members with respect\\n\\nto the subject matter hereof, including the Original Agreement[.]” Id. at 637. The\\n\\n\\n 8\\n\\fSubscription Agreement itself, however, does not contain any merger clause or\\n\\ndisclaimers of reliance on outside representations. Indeed, the Subscription\\n\\nAgreement omits specific anti-reliance disclaimers that Foundation had used in\\n\\nconnection with other investments in the Fund.3\\n\\n Shortly after investing in Foundation, FIH learned that defendants’\\n\\nrepresentations about the active “pipeline” and about Barr and Meehan’s\\n\\nsupposedly workable relationship, which were material to FIH’s investment\\n\\ndecision, were false. On March 4, 2014, Foundation disclosed to FIH the first in a\\n\\nseries of internal documents called “Project Activity Logs.” The Project Activity\\n\\nLogs listed hedge fund targets in Foundation’s pipeline under three categories:\\n\\nLive Deals, Prospects, and Dead Projects. These documents revealed that\\n\\nFoundation had overstated its deal activity in the Offering Memo and due\\n\\ndiligence materials. For example, Projects Granite and Lake, which had been\\n\\n\\n\\n3\\n For example, one such agreement stated that:\\n\\n Other than the Memorandum and the Partnership Agreement, the\\n Subscriber is not relying upon any other information, representation or\\n warranty by the Fund, the General Partner, or the Investment Manager\\n in determining to invest in the Fund.\\n\\nApp’x at 963.\\n\\n\\n 9\\n\\ftouted in the due diligence materials as the most developed of the potential\\n\\ndeals, were both “On Hold” with no ongoing negotiations. And although\\n\\nFoundation had stated in its February 2014 due diligence materials that the\\n\\n“pipeline has become increasingly active in recent months,” in fact, Foundation\\n\\nhad a decreasing number of active deals in February 2014 compared to prior\\n\\nmonths.\\n\\n Similarly, in contrast to the representations about Barr and Meehan’s\\n\\nsupposedly cordial relationship, it became clear to FIH after investing in\\n\\nFoundation that the two were at loggerheads. A series of emails that FIH\\n\\nreceived from Meehan and Elmlinger one month after FIH’s investment revealed\\n\\nthat Barr and Meehan privately admitted that they were unable to work together\\n\\n(see emails in the margin).4 Moreover, Barr, who apparently was on the verge of\\n\\npersonal bankruptcy, had repeatedly threatened to quit working at Foundation\\n\\n\\n\\n4\\n For example: On November 1, 2013, Barr emailed Meehan stating “If you’re\\ngoing to continue to behave like this during the divorce, I really don’t think it’s\\nwise for us to work together going forward.” App’x at 1024. On September 25,\\n2013, Barr emailed Meehan stating “I know you despise me . . . . I’m really\\nthinking of calling it quits . . . . We’re all headed for disaster.” Id. at 1031–32. On\\nFebruary 3, 2014, virtually contemporaneously with Barr’s assurances to FIH that\\nhe could continue to work well with Meehan, Barr emailed Meehan stating “Joe,\\nwe are officially broken from each other.” Id. at 1034.\\n\\n 10\\n\\f(see emails in the margin).5 None of these facts had been disclosed to FIH as a\\n\\nprospective investor.\\n\\n PROCEDURAL HISTORY\\n\\n Based on those misrepresentations, FIH filed this action against defendants\\n\\nin the District of Connecticut, alleging violations of § 10(b) of the Securities\\n\\nExchange Act of 1934 and the Connecticut Securities Act, as well as related state\\n\\ncommon-law claims. After the district court, in a ruling not challenged on appeal\\n\\nby FIH, dismissed some of FIH’s claims and limited the scope of potentially\\n\\nactionable misrepresentations, FIH filed its Second Amended Complaint, the\\n\\noperative complaint on appeal, specifically alleging that it had purchased a $6.75\\n\\nmillion interest in Foundation in reliance on the misrepresentations by\\n\\ndefendants discussed above.\\n\\n In September 2016, Meehan, with the consent of all parties, moved to\\n\\n\\n\\n5\\n For example: On January 16, 2014, Meehan emailed Elmlinger and Ward, stating\\nthat “[Barr] has again posited that he needs” an advance on his partner draw, or\\nhe would face immediate “bankruptcy, etc.” App’x at 1045. On January 30, 2014,\\nBarr emailed Meehan, Ward, and Elmlinger stating that “I probably have a week\\nbefore things implode around me . . . . I’m on the verge of collapse.” Id. at 1042.\\nOn February 4, 2014, Barr emailed Meehan stating that “I can’t make it passed\\n[sic] Friday. My world caves in. I’m not kidding and I don’t know if I can live\\nthrough it. It’s that serious.” Id. at 1038.\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\fextend by 60 days the deadlines for discovery and for filing dispositive motions.\\n\\nOn September 26, 2016, the district court held a telephonic status conference,\\n\\nduring which the parties discussed the reasons necessitating the extension of the\\n\\ndiscovery deadline. During that conference, the court asked whether it was still\\n\\nthe case that neither party anticipated using experts. FIH’s counsel stated, “I\\n\\nbelieve that’s true your Honor, for us, speaking for the plaintiff.” FIH, LLC v.\\n\\nFound. Capital Partners LLC, No. 15 Civ. 785 (JBA), 2018 WL 638997, at *3 (D.\\n\\nConn. Jan. 31, 2018). Nevertheless, at 11:52 pm on the last day before discovery\\n\\nclosed, FIH attempted to serve an expert report, which the district court excluded\\n\\nas untimely. In March 2017, defendants moved for summary judgment on all\\n\\nclaims.6\\n\\n On January 31, 2018, the district court granted defendants’ motions for\\n\\nsummary judgement as to FIH’s federal securities law claims, and declined to\\n\\nexercise supplemental jurisdiction over its state-law claims. Id. The court held\\n\\nthat (1) there was no material dispute between the parties that FIH was a\\n\\nsophisticated investor with respect to its investment in Foundation; (2) the\\n\\n\\n6\\n Concurrently, FIH moved for summary judgment on its claims regarding\\ndefendants’ misrepresentations about the pipeline. FIH does not appeal from the\\ndistrict court’s denial of that motion.\\n\\n 12\\n\\finvestment contract constituted a fully integrated agreement; and (3) the contract\\n\\ndid not include the alleged misrepresentations at issue, and therefore as a matter\\n\\nof law FIH could not reasonably have relied on those misrepresentations. This\\n\\nappeal followed.\\n\\n DISCUSSION\\n\\nI. Standard of Review\\n\\n We review a district court’s decision granting summary judgment de novo,\\n\\nand will affirm only if the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the\\n\\nnon-movant, shows no “genuine dispute of material fact” and demonstrates “the\\n\\nmovant’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.” Ace Partners, LLC v. Town\\n\\nof E. Hartford, 883 F.3d 190, 194–95 (2d Cir. 2018). Issues of contract interpretation\\n\\nare also “subject to de novo review.” In re Delta Air Lines, Inc., 608 F.3d 139, 145 (2d\\n\\nCir. 2010).\\n\\nII. Reasonable Reliance\\n\\n FIH contends that the district court erred in holding that the merger clause\\n\\ncontained in the Company Agreement made FIH’s reliance on defendants’\\n\\nmisrepresentations unreasonable as a matter of law. FIH makes three arguments\\n\\nin support of this position: First, FIH argues that the merger clause in the\\n\\n\\n 13\\n\\fCompany Agreement does not apply to the Subscription Agreement because the\\n\\nSubscription Agreement does not expressly incorporate all relevant provisions of\\n\\nthe Company Agreement. Second, FIH argues that even if the Subscription\\n\\nAgreement had fully incorporated the Company Agreement, the merger clause\\n\\ndoes not make FIH’s reliance on defendants’ misrepresentations unreasonable as\\n\\na matter of law because it is only a “general” merger clause, as opposed to a\\n\\nspecific disclaimer. Third, FIH argues that it reasonably relied on defendants’\\n\\nmisrepresentations because they involved the “deliberate concealment of facts”\\n\\nknown only to the defendants, which thus fell within the purview of the\\n\\n“peculiar knowledge doctrine.”7 Because we conclude that the general merger\\n\\nclause contained in the Company Agreement is not the type of disclaimer that\\n\\ncould prevent FIH’s reasonable reliance on defendants’ alleged\\n\\nmisrepresentations as a matter of law, we need not reach FIH’s other arguments.\\n\\n As we have repeatedly emphasized, the issue of reasonable reliance\\n\\nrequires that we consider “the entire context of the transaction, including . . . its\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n7\\n See Warner Theatre Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 149 F.3d 134, 136 (2d\\nCir. 1998) (A “specific disclaimer will not undermine another party’s allegation of\\nreasonable reliance on the misrepresentations” if “the allegedly misrepresented\\nfacts are peculiarly within the misrepresenting party's knowledge.”)\\n\\n 14\\n\\fcomplexity and magnitude, the sophistication of the parties, and the content of\\n\\nany agreements between them.” Crigger v. Fahnestock & Co., 443 F.3d 230, 235 (2d\\n\\nCir. 2006). The reasonableness of a plaintiff’s reliance is a “nettlesome” and “fact\\n\\nintensive” question, Loreley, 797 F.3d at 186 n.19, quoting Schlaifer Nance & Co. v.\\n\\nEstate of Warhol, 119 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir. 1997) and thus “is often a question of fact\\n\\nfor the jury rather than a question of law for the court.” STMicroelectronics, N.V. v.\\n\\nCredit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 648 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2011). Standing alone,\\n\\ntherefore, a general disclaimer (still less a general merger clause) is not sufficient\\n\\nas a matter of law to preclude reasonable reliance on material factual\\n\\nmisrepresentations, even by a sophisticated investor.\\n\\n In Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., New York, 295 F.3d 312, 330–31 (2d Cir. 2002), we\\n\\nheld that general disclaimers are insufficient to defeat reasonable reliance on\\n\\nmaterial misrepresentations as a matter of law, even by a sophisticated party.\\n\\nAccord, Loreley Fin. (Jersey) No. 3 Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Sec., LLC, 797 F.3d 160, 186\\n\\nn.19 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff in Caiola was “an entrepreneur and sophisticated\\n\\ninvestor,” engaged in complex trading activity with Citibank. Caiola, 295 F.3d at\\n\\n315. Representatives of Citibank orally promised Caiola “that as his\\n\\ncounterparty[, Citibank] would control its own risks through a strategy known as\\n\\n\\n 15\\n\\f‘delta hedging,’”8 id. at 317, and “that [Caiola’s] synthetic trading relationship\\n\\nwith Citibank would remain unaltered” by Citibank’s upcoming merger, id. at\\n\\n318. “However, . . . contrary to its representations and unknown to Caiola,\\n\\nCitibank had secretly stopped delta hedging and transformed Caiola’s synthetic\\n\\nportfolio into a physical one by executing massive trades in the physical markets\\n\\nthat mirrored Caiola’s synthetic transactions.” Id. Consequently, Caiola brought\\n\\nsecurities fraud claims against Citibank based on Citibank’s misrepresentations.\\n\\n The district court dismissed Caiola’s claims, finding inter alia that it was\\n\\nunreasonable as a matter of law for him to have relied on the oral representations\\n\\nfrom Citibank. Id. at 320. “Apparently resting its analysis on parol evidence\\n\\nprinciples,” id., the district court relied on the following provisions in the\\n\\nrelevant agreements between the parties:\\n\\n This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement and understanding of\\n the parties with respect to its subject matter and supersedes all oral\\n communication and prior writings with respect thereto . . .\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n8\\n Delta hedging makes a derivative position, such as an option position, immune\\nto small changes in the price of an underlying asset, such as a stock, over a short\\nperiod of time. See John C. Hull, Options Futures, and Other Derivatives 311–12 (4th\\ned. 2000).\\n\\n 16\\n\\f [Caiola] has such knowledge and experience in financial, business and\\n tax matters that render him capable of evaluating the merits and risks\\n of this Agreement and the Transactions contemplated hereunder; [and]\\n has determined that [] the Transactions contemplated hereunder are\\n suitable for him . . .\\n\\n\\n [Caiola] is not relying on any advice, statements or recommendations\\n (whether written or oral) of the other party, . . . .\\n\\n\\nid. at 317–18.\\n\\n Citibank argued that a “reasonable investor of Caiola’s sophistication\\n\\nwould not have relied upon Citibank’s oral misrepresentations” because of the\\n\\ndisclaimers that “Caiola would not be relying on Citibank’s advice or\\n\\nrecommendations, that he would make his own investment decisions, and that\\n\\nCitibank would not be his fiduciary or advisor.” Id. at 330 On appeal, we\\n\\nreversed: “We are not persuaded that these disclaimers barred Caiola from\\n\\nrelying on Citibank’s oral statements.” Id. We explained instead that “[a]\\n\\ndisclaimer is generally enforceable only if it tracks the substance of the alleged\\n\\nmisrepresentation,” and that “[t]he disclaimer provisions contained in the\\n\\n[agreements] fall well short of tracking the particular misrepresentations alleged\\n\\nby Caiola.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The disclaimers were\\n\\nineffective because, while “Caiola specifically allege[d] that Citibank offered false\\n\\n 17\\n\\fassurances that after the . . . merger [that] the parties’ existing trading\\n\\nrelationship would not change and that Citibank would continue to act as a delta\\n\\nhedging counterparty,” “[t]he disclaimer . . . state[d] only in general terms that\\n\\nneither party relied ‘on any advice, statements or recommendation (whether\\n\\nwritten or oral) of the other party.’” Id.\\n\\n Similarly, in the instant case, there are no disclaimers sufficiently specific\\n\\nto satisfy the standard set forth in Caiola. Nowhere in the Company Agreement\\n\\nor elsewhere is there explicit language disclaiming reliance on external\\n\\nrepresentations of the kind alleged by FIH in this case (i.e. statements about\\n\\nongoing deal activity or about personal relationships between Foundation’s\\n\\ndirectors or officers). Rather, the relevant language in the Subscription\\n\\nAgreement and the Company Agreement on which defendants rely, quoted\\n\\nabove, is strikingly similar to the merger clause and “sophisticated investor”\\n\\nlanguage found insufficient in Caiola. And neither agreement in this case contains\\n\\nany clause as strong as the general disclaimer, found insufficient in Caiola, of\\n\\nreliance on “any advice, statements or recommendations (whether written or\\n\\noral) of the other party.” Id. at 317.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18\\n\\f In its decision granting summary judgment in favor of defendants in this\\n\\ncase, the district court attempted to distinguished Caiola by explaining that it did\\n\\nnot find FIH’s reliance unreasonable on the basis of the “admittedly generalized\\n\\ndisclaimers” in the Subscription Agreement,9 but rather on the basis of the\\n\\nmerger clause in the Company Agreement. FIH, LLC, 2018 WL 638997, at *14 n.5.\\n\\nOn appeal, defendants argue that according to our decisions in Emergent Capital\\n\\nInv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2003) and ATSI\\n\\nCommc’ns., Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2007), even general merger\\n\\nclauses (as opposed to disclaimers, as discussed in Caiola) can defeat reasonable\\n\\nreliance when an investor is sophisticated and the representations at issue are not\\n\\ncontained in the operative agreement. We are not persuaded.\\n\\n A merger clause is a provision of a contract signifying that the contract is a\\n\\ncomplete statement of the parties’ agreement, superseding any prior oral or\\n\\nwritten terms. In other words, a merger clause operates to limit the universe of\\n\\n\\n\\n9\\n The district court was correct not to rely on that disclaimer. The language in the\\nSubscription Agreement stating that “the Subscriber has consulted and relied\\nsolely upon the advice of its own counsel, accountant and other advisers . . . and\\non that basis believes that an investment in an Interest is suitable and appropriate\\nfor such Subscriber” is not specific enough to bar an action by FIH for fraudulent\\nmisrepresentation based on defendants’ alleged misrepresentations.\\n\\n 19\\n\\fthe parties’ contractual obligations to the text of the contract itself. This does not\\n\\nmean, however, that a merger clause serves as a catch-all disclaimer of reliance\\n\\non any conceivable pre-contract misrepresentations about facts pertaining to the\\n\\nsubject matter of the contract that could form the basis of a claim for fraud in the\\n\\ninducement.\\n\\n As we explained in Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir.\\n\\n1997), because the concept of a merger clause “rests on the rationale that a later\\n\\nwritten agreement has supplanted prior negotiations, it follows that [it] does not\\n\\ncome into play until the existence of an enforceable written agreement has been\\n\\nshown,” and thus it cannot be used to “exclude evidence to show that there was\\n\\nno agreement or that the agreement was invalid.” Therefore, we held, a “general\\n\\nmerger clause does not preclude parol testimony where a claim is based on fraud\\n\\nin the inducement.” Id. And it is for that reason that in Caiola we found\\n\\n“questionable” the district court’s “importation of parol evidence principles into\\n\\nthe federal securities laws” when it found that “the oral misrepresentations\\n\\nallegedly made by Citibank . . . can be disregarded” insofar as they contradict\\n\\n“unambiguous language in the [agreements between the parties].” Caiola, 295\\n\\nF.3d at 330, n.9.\\n\\n\\n 20\\n\\f Moreover, contrary to defendants’ characterization of Emergent Capital and\\n\\nATSI, neither of those cases stands for the proposition that merger clauses can\\n\\nserve as all-encompassing disclaimers of pre-contract factual misrepresentations.\\n\\nThe district court in Emergent Capital explicitly held that “a general merger clause\\n\\n‘stating that the signatories acknowledge [that] the written document supersedes\\n\\nall prior agreements and constitutes the sole embodiment of their obligations’\\n\\ndoes not bar an action for fraud.” 195 F. Supp. 2d 551, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). In that\\n\\ncase, the court considered a merger clause, similar to the one in this case, which\\n\\nstated that:\\n\\n This Agreement, together with the exhibits and schedules hereto and\\n ancillary Agreements, contains the entire understanding and\\n agreement between or among any of them, and supersedes all prior\\n understandings or agreements between or among any of them with\\n respect to the subject matter hereof.\\n\\n\\n\\nId. The court explained that “[i]f this merger clause stood alone, there would be\\n\\nno question that it would not by itself preclude reasonable reliance as a matter of\\n\\nlaw.\\\" Id. However, the court found that given the specific facts of that case,\\n\\nEmergent could not claim reasonable reliance, because in addition to the merger\\n\\nclause, the relevant agreements made “29 separate representations and\\n\\n\\n\\n 21\\n\\fwarranties and 16 separate covenants in favor of the . . . purchasers, including\\n\\nEmergent.” Id.\\n\\n On appeal, we affirmed the relevant part of the district court’s decision,\\n\\nholding that “Emergent should have protected itself by insisting that [the alleged\\n\\nmisrepresentations at issue] be included in the stock purchase agreement[,\\n\\nbecause] [g]iven [defendant’s] extensive contractual representations about other\\n\\nmatters, [Emergent’s] sophistication, and the size of the transaction, Emergent’s\\n\\nfailure to do so precludes as a matter of law a finding of reasonable reliance upon\\n\\ndefendants’ misrepresentations.” Emergent Capital, 343 F.3d at 195 (emphasis\\n\\nadded). Here, in contrast, there are no “extensive contractual representations”\\n\\nabout the status of the Fund’s transaction pipeline, the working relationships\\n\\nbetween Foundation’s principals, or any similar subject matter, that might have\\n\\noperated as an implicit disclaimer regarding Foundation’s extra-contractual\\n\\nfactual representations to FIH. Instead, there is only the general merger clause in\\n\\nthe Company Agreement.\\n\\n Defendants argue that, like the plaintiff in Emergent Capital, FIH “did, in\\n\\nfact, actively negotiate and demand certain terms, representations and conditions\\n\\nin connection with its investment,” and thus that Emergent Capital cannot be\\n\\n\\n 22\\n\\fdistinguished on that ground. Appellees’ Br. at 21–22. But each of the negotiated\\n\\nterms that defendants cite—including that “Foundation’s partners [would] defer\\n\\nsome of their compensation until Foundation closed a pipeline hedge fund deal,”\\n\\nid. at 22; that FIH would “share in any management fee earned by Foundation in\\n\\nmanaging the Fund,” id.; “a revised involuntary transfer provision[,] . . . terms\\n\\nconcerning rights of first refusal, most favored nation status, pre-emptive rights,\\n\\nand tag-along rights,” id.—relate to the parties’ obligations, and do not constitute\\n\\naffirmative factual representations of any kind. This is an entirely different\\n\\nsituation from that in Emergent Capital, where the parties actually negotiated\\n\\nfactual representations to be included in the written agreements that suggest a\\n\\nclosed set of such representations upon which the plaintiff’s reliance was\\n\\nacknowledged.\\n\\n The ATSI decision, on which defendants similarly rely for the proposition\\n\\nthat “[w]here the plaintiff is a sophisticated investor and an integrated agreement\\n\\nbetween the parties does not include the misrepresentation at issue, the plaintiff\\n\\ncannot establish reasonable reliance on that misrepresentation,” 493 F.3d at 105\\n\\n(citing Emergent Capital, 343 F.3d at 196), is inapposite for the same reason. For\\n\\none thing, the agreement at issue in that case contained an explicit disclaimer as\\n\\n\\n 23\\n\\fpart of the merger clause, stating that “[t]here are no restrictions, promises,\\n\\nwarranties, or undertakings, other than those set forth or referred to herein.” Id.\\n\\nat 95. We specifically noted that disclaimer in our decision with regard to the\\n\\nplaintiff’s reasonable reliance on the alleged misrepresentations in that case. See\\n\\nid. at 105 (“Of the misrepresentations that ATSI claims, we can quickly dispose of\\n\\nall except the two alleged in the transaction agreements. The . . . agreement\\n\\nbetween [the parties] plainly states that the only promises, restrictions, and\\n\\nwarranties to the transaction were those set forth in the transaction documents.”).\\n\\nMoreover, the subject matter of some of the alleged oral misrepresentations in\\n\\nATSI—that defendants “would not engage in any activity to depress” the price of\\n\\n“stock” by rapidly selling it, id. at 94,—was specifically addressed by written\\n\\nrepresentations in the agreements at issue, providing “that the [defendants]\\n\\nwould soon sell its converted common stock into the public markets” within “90\\n\\ndays of closing” the deal, id. at 95. In this case, by contrast, the merger clause\\n\\ncontains no disclaimer of any kind of representation, and the subject matter of\\n\\ndefendants’ alleged misrepresentations was not addressed by affirmative\\n\\nrepresentations in any agreement between the parties.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24\\n\\f We do not suggest in any way that general disclaimers or merger clauses,\\n\\nthe sophistication of an investor, or the presence of various promises or\\n\\nrepresentations in a written agreement are irrelevant to the reasonableness of a\\n\\nparty’s reliance on pre-contract factual misrepresentations. The defendants here\\n\\nremain free to argue to a jury, based on these or other factors, that FIH did not\\n\\nreasonably rely on any misrepresentations the jury might conclude were made.\\n\\nIndeed, as Emergent Capital demonstrates, there may be circumstances where a\\n\\ngeneral disclaimer or merger clause, together with an extensive roster of\\n\\nspecifically negotiated factual warranties and representations, can lead to a\\n\\nconclusion that, in the particular circumstances of a case, no reasonable jury\\n\\ncould find reasonable reliance on a representation not inserted into the written\\n\\ncontract. And, of course, careful investors negotiating the terms of an\\n\\nindividualized investment can protect themselves by demanding that any\\n\\nrepresentation that is critical to their investment decision be incorporated into the\\n\\nwritten investment agreement.\\n\\nIII. Exclusion of the Expert Report\\n\\n\\n FIH also argues that the district court’s summary judgment decision must\\n\\nbe reversed because the court erred in excluding as untimely an expert report\\n\\n 25\\n\\fopining that in accordance with private equity industry practice, “FIH was\\n\\nreasonable in relying on defendants’ false statements.” Appellant’s Br. at 36. FIH\\n\\nclaims that the district court abused its discretion in excluding this report, which\\n\\nFIH attempted to serve on January 23, 2018 at 11:52pm—eight minutes before the\\n\\nclose of court-ordered discovery. Although we conclude above that the summary\\n\\njudgment decision must be vacated in any event, we address this argument\\n\\nbecause the district court’s ruling on the proposed expert testimony is relevant to\\n\\nthe anticipated trial of this matter.\\n\\n We review a district court’s discovery ruling for “abuse of discretion.”\\n\\nWills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32, 41 (2d Cir. 2004). A district court abuses\\n\\nits discretion “when its decision cannot be located within the range of\\n\\npermissible decisions or is based on a clearly erroneous factual finding or an\\n\\nerror of law.” United States v. Scully, 877 F.3d 464, 474 (2d Cir. 2017). The\\n\\nreasonableness of a decision excluding expert testimony is evaluated according\\n\\nto the following factors: “(1) the party’s explanation for the failure to comply\\n\\nwith the disclosure requirement; (2) the importance of the testimony of the\\n\\nprecluded witnesses; (3) the prejudice suffered by the opposing party as a result\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 26\\n\\fof having to prepare to meet the new testimony; and (4) the possibility of a\\n\\ncontinuance.” Patterson v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104, 117 (2d Cir. 2006).\\n\\n Having considered each of the above factors, we conclude that the district\\n\\ncourt was within its discretion to exclude the expert report. Although the report\\n\\nwas technically served before the close of fact discovery and the court’s\\n\\nscheduling order did not contain an explicit deadline to disclose expert\\n\\nwitnesses, such a deadline had not been set only because FIH had advised the\\n\\ncourt that it did not intend to submit expert testimony, and therefore no party\\n\\nrequested that the court amend the discovery schedule to include one. In any\\n\\nevent, the district court acted well within its discretion in enforcing the discovery\\n\\ndeadline that it did set. Because FIH’s proposed expert would still have needed\\n\\nto be deposed, and defendants would have needed an opportunity to present a\\n\\ncounter-expert, the literally eleventh-hour disclosure of the expert report would\\n\\nhave extended discovery beyond the already-extended, agreed-upon, and court-\\n\\nordered discovery deadline. We therefore identify no error or abuse of discretion\\n\\nin the district court’s exclusion of the expert’s report.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 27\\n\\f CONCLUSION\\n\\n\\n For the reasons stated above, we VACATE the judgment of the district\\n\\ncourt granting summary judgment in favor of appellees, and REMAND for\\n\\nfurther proceedings.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 28\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4382884/\", \"author_raw\": \"GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"JACOBS"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"LYNCH"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"VILARDO"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605631/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: FIH, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FOUNDATION CAPITAL PARTNERS LLC, Fka Foundation Managing Member LLC, Dean Barr, Joseph Meehan, Thomas Ward, Joseph Elmlinger, Defendants-Appellees\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-01\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n18-357-cv\nFIH, LLC v. Foundation Capital Partners, LLC.\n\n\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n August Term, 2018\n\n Argued: March 8, 2019 Decided: April 1, 2019\n\n Docket No. 18-357-cv\n\n\n\n FIH, LLC,\n\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n\n — v. —\n\n FOUNDATION CAPITAL PARTNERS LLC, FKA FOUNDATION\n MANAGING MEMBER LLC, DEAN BARR, JOSEPH MEEHAN,\n THOMAS WARD, JOSEPH ELMLINGER,\n\n Defendants-Appellees,\n\n\n\n\nB e f o r e:\n\n JACOBS and LYNCH, Circuit Judges, and VILARDO, District Judge.*\n\n\n\n\n*\n Judge Lawrence J. Vilardo, of the United States District Court for the Western\nDistrict of New York, sitting by designation.\n\f FIH, LLC (“FIH”) appeals from the district court’s grant of summary\njudgment dismissing its federal securities law claims against Foundation Capital\nPartners, LLC (“Foundation”), Dean Barr, Joseph Meehan, Thomas Ward, and\nJoseph Elmlinger (collectively “defendants”). FIH argues that it had reasonably\nrelied on material misrepresentations by defendants in deciding to invest in\nFoundation, and that defendants are therefore liable under federal and state law.\nThe district court concluded as a matter of law that FIH could not have\nreasonably relied on the alleged misrepresentations, because such reliance was\nprecluded by a general merger clause in Foundation’s LLC agreement,\nincorporated by reference into the subscription agreements by which FIH had\ninvested in Foundation. Concluding that the merger clause did not as a matter of\nlaw preclude FIH’s reasonable reliance on the alleged misrepresentations, we\nVACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further\nproceedings.\n\n\n\n SAMUEL J. LIEBERMAN (Ben Hutman, on the brief), Sadis &\n Goldberg LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.\n\n DAVID G. TRACHTENBERG (Stephen J. Arena, on the brief),\n Trachtenberg Rodes & Friedberg LLP, New York, NY,\n for Defendant-Appellee Joseph Elmlinger.\n\n Peter M. Nolin, Carmody Torrance Sandak & Hennessey LLP,\n Stamford, CT, for Defendant-Appellee Dean Barr.\n\n Stephen G. Walko, Andrea C. Sisca, Ivey, Barnum & O’Mara\n LLC, Greenwich, CT, for Defendant-Appellee Thomas\n Ward.\n\n Jonathan P. Whitcomb, Diserio Martin O’Connor & Castiglioni\n LLP, Stamford, CT, for Defendant-Appellee Joseph Meehan.\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\fGERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judge:\n\n FIH, LLC (“FIH”) appeals from a grant of summary judgment against it,\n\nentered by the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut\n\n(Arterton, J.), in its action against Foundation Capital Partners, LLC\n\n(“Foundation”), the general partner in a private equity fund set up to invest in\n\nminority interests in general partnerships of large hedge funds, and its member-\n\npartners (collectively, “defendants”). FIH alleged that it had purchased a\n\nmembership interest in Foundation on the basis of misrepresentations by\n\ndefendants, and asserted claims against them under § 10(b) of the Securities\n\nExchange Act of 1934, the Connecticut Securities Act, and Connecticut common\n\nlaw. The alleged misrepresentations are that Foundation had an active pipeline of\n\ninvestments and that two of Foundation’s key partners were able to work\n\ntogether notwithstanding one partner’s embittered divorce of the other’s sister-\n\nin-law. The district court held that a merger clause in Foundation’s LLC\n\nagreement, incorporated into the subscription agreements by which FIH invested\n\nin Foundation, precluded FIH’s reasonable reliance on the alleged\n\nmisrepresentations as a matter of law. For the reasons that follow, we VACATE\n\nand REMAND.\n\n\n\n 3\n\f FACTUAL BACKGROUND1\n\n Foundation was formed to act as general partner in Foundation Capital\n\nPartners, L.P. (the “Fund”), a private equity fund formed to invest in minority\n\ninterests in general partnerships of large hedge funds. Rather than directly invest\n\nin assets under management by such hedge funds, the Fund was to receive a\n\nportion of the annual management and performance fees taken in by the hedge\n\nfund partnerships. Foundation was operated by four partners, Dean Barr, Joseph\n\nMeehan, Joseph Elmlinger, and Thomas Ward.\n\n In the Fall of 2013, Foundation solicited FIH to invest directly in it—rather\n\nthan in the Fund. As part of its solicitation of FIH, Foundation provided FIH with\n\nan offering memorandum entitled “Foundation Managing Member LLC\n\nDisclosure Statement November 13, 2013“ (the “Offering Memo”). The Offering\n\nMemo represented that the Fund was “in active negotiations” with two hedge\n\nfunds that it planned to invest in, codenamed “Granite” and “Lake,” and\n\nhighlighted the Fund’s “Current Transaction Pipeline” of 23 supposed potential\n\ntransactions relating to investment in other hedge funds. FIH alleges that\n\n\n1\n The facts recited below are based on the evidence in the summary judgment\nrecord, taken in the light most favorable to FIH and drawing all reasonable\ninferences in FIH’s favor. See Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 229 (2d Cir.\n2016).\n\n 4\n\f“[r]epresentations about active transaction negotiations in the pipeline were key\n\nto [its] investment decision, because Foundation needed to close its first\n\nacquisition of a hedge fund minority interest to start generating substantial\n\nincome.” Appellant’s Br. at 4.\n\n In February 2014, Foundation gave FIH access to due diligence materials,\n\nwhich identified fourteen specific targets delineated by their code names:\n\n“Projects Lake, Apex, Corvette, Granite, Breakout, Pilot, Centaur, Pound, Tensor,\n\nMainstay, Yale, Halo, Gun, and Bronco.” App’x at 146. The targets were\n\nidentified only by code names, ostensibly to protect the confidentiality of\n\nFoundation’s negotiations. Thus, at this stage of Foundation’s solicitation of FIH,\n\nFIH had no opportunity to verify Foundation’s claims by contacting the\n\npurported target hedge funds. The due diligence materials explained that these\n\ntargets were “the current representative [Foundation] Pipeline, including those\n\nwith which the firm was in active discussion,” and that “this pipeline has become\n\nincreasingly active in recent months as a result of industry recovery, manager\n\ninterest, regulatory reform and the presence of relatively few buyers.” Id. These\n\nmaterials also “represented that non-disclosure agreements had been signed with\n\nthe target hedge funds in Projects Lake and Granite.” Id.\n\n\n 5\n\f In addition, in an email to FIH on December 30, 2013, Barr represented that\n\nFoundation had four “possible transactions in the works,” referencing Projects\n\nBronco, Corvette, Lake, and Centaur. Id. On January 22, 2014, Barr emailed FIH to\n\nupdate it on Project Apex, and represented that “I believe we can move\n\nexpeditiously on this deal.” Id. And on February 3, 2014, Barr again emailed FIH\n\nto give an update on Project Pilot, representing that “[w]e have some reasonably\n\ngood intel that suggests that this offer would be given serious consideration.” Id.\n\n Through due diligence, FIH also learned that Barr was in the process of\n\ndivorcing Meehan’s sister-in-law. At that time, Barr was the managing partner of\n\nFoundation and Meehan was the Chief Operating Officer of Foundation. Barr\n\nand Meehan were each also managing principals of Foundation, and each held\n\nequal 46.175% interests in the company. FIH specifically asked the two men if\n\nthey would be able to continue working well together following a potential\n\ninvestment by FIH in Foundation. Barr and Meehan each represented that they\n\ncould “work together” professionally in spite of the divorce, and that they could\n\n“keep their professional and personal lives separate.” Id. at 910. Barr represented\n\nto FIH that the divorce was “under control,” “getting better,” and “amicable,”\n\nand was thus “not material” to FIH’s decision to invest in Foundation. Id. Barr\n\n\n\n 6\n\falso told FIH that “there was nothing FIH needed to know about [his] personality\n\nand there were no other matters FIH should know about [him].” Id. at 913.\n\n On February 11, 2014, FIH and Foundation executed a document entitled\n\n“Foundation Managing Member LLC Subscription Agreement” (the\n\n“Subscription Agreement”),2 concretizing FIH’s investment in Foundation. The\n\nSubscription Agreement identifies FIH as the “Subscriber” and Foundation as the\n\n“Company,” and provides inter alia that FIH:\n\n tenders this subscription for a membership interest in the Company on\n the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Company\n Agreement (as defined below) as amended through the Seventh\n Amendment to the Company Agreement dated as of the date of this\n Subscription Agreement[.]\n\nId. at 586.\n\n The Subscription Agreement also contains the following provision within a\n\nsection entitled “Representations and Warranties of the Subscriber”:\n\n The Subscriber has such knowledge and experience in financial and\n business matters that the Subscriber is capable of evaluating the merits\n and risks of an investment in the Interest, and of making an informed\n investment decision, and the Subscriber has consulted and relied solely\n upon the advice of its own counsel, accountant and other advisers with\n regard to such legal, investment, tax and other considerations\n\n\n2\n On February 28, 2014, the parties executed a second subscription agreement that\nmade several changes to the original Subscription Agreement, none of them\nrelevant to this appeal.\n\n 7\n\f regarding such investment and on that basis believes that an\n investment in an Interest is suitable and appropriate for such\n Subscriber. The Subscriber has had, either individually or through its\n duly authorized officers, employees or agents, an opportunity to (i) ask\n questions of and receive answers from the Company and its\n management concerning the terms and conditions of the Interests and\n the proposed operation of the Company and (ii) obtain information\n necessary to verify the accuracy of the information provided.\n\nId. The Subscription Agreement further provides the following within a section\n\nentitled “Representations and Warranties of the Company”:\n\n The Company hereby represents and warrants to, and agrees with, the\n Subscriber that (a) attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct\n copy of the Company Agreement that has been conformed to reflect all\n amendments to the Company Agreement through the Seventh\n Amendment to the Company Agreement dated as of the date of this\n Subscription Agreement and (b) the salary of each Managing Principal\n in 2014 will not exceed the amount set forth with respect to that\n Managing Principal in Exhibit B attached hereto.\n\nId. at 588.\n\n The “Company Agreement” to which the Subscription Agreement refers is\n\na document identified as the Limited Liability Company Agreement. Paragraph\n\n11.9 of the Company Agreement, entitled “Entire Agreement” (the “merger\n\nclause”), provides that “[t]his Agreement constitutes the entire agreement of the\n\nMembers and supersedes all prior agreements among the Members with respect\n\nto the subject matter hereof, including the Original Agreement[.]” Id. at 637. The\n\n\n 8\n\fSubscription Agreement itself, however, does not contain any merger clause or\n\ndisclaimers of reliance on outside representations. Indeed, the Subscription\n\nAgreement omits specific anti-reliance disclaimers that Foundation had used in\n\nconnection with other investments in the Fund.3\n\n Shortly after investing in Foundation, FIH learned that defendants’\n\nrepresentations about the active “pipeline” and about Barr and Meehan’s\n\nsupposedly workable relationship, which were material to FIH’s investment\n\ndecision, were false. On March 4, 2014, Foundation disclosed to FIH the first in a\n\nseries of internal documents called “Project Activity Logs.” The Project Activity\n\nLogs listed hedge fund targets in Foundation’s pipeline under three categories:\n\nLive Deals, Prospects, and Dead Projects. These documents revealed that\n\nFoundation had overstated its deal activity in the Offering Memo and due\n\ndiligence materials. For example, Projects Granite and Lake, which had been\n\n\n\n3\n For example, one such agreement stated that:\n\n Other than the Memorandum and the Partnership Agreement, the\n Subscriber is not relying upon any other information, representation or\n warranty by the Fund, the General Partner, or the Investment Manager\n in determining to invest in the Fund.\n\nApp’x at 963.\n\n\n 9\n\ftouted in the due diligence materials as the most developed of the potential\n\ndeals, were both “On Hold” with no ongoing negotiations. And although\n\nFoundation had stated in its February 2014 due diligence materials that the\n\n“pipeline has become increasingly active in recent months,” in fact, Foundation\n\nhad a decreasing number of active deals in February 2014 compared to prior\n\nmonths.\n\n Similarly, in contrast to the representations about Barr and Meehan’s\n\nsupposedly cordial relationship, it became clear to FIH after investing in\n\nFoundation that the two were at loggerheads. A series of emails that FIH\n\nreceived from Meehan and Elmlinger one month after FIH’s investment revealed\n\nthat Barr and Meehan privately admitted that they were unable to work together\n\n(see emails in the margin).4 Moreover, Barr, who apparently was on the verge of\n\npersonal bankruptcy, had repeatedly threatened to quit working at Foundation\n\n\n\n4\n For example: On November 1, 2013, Barr emailed Meehan stating “If you’re\ngoing to continue to behave like this during the divorce, I really don’t think it’s\nwise for us to work together going forward.” App’x at 1024. On September 25,\n2013, Barr emailed Meehan stating “I know you despise me . . . . I’m really\nthinking of calling it quits . . . . We’re all headed for disaster.” Id. at 1031–32. On\nFebruary 3, 2014, virtually contemporaneously with Barr’s assurances to FIH that\nhe could continue to work well with Meehan, Barr emailed Meehan stating “Joe,\nwe are officially broken from each other.” Id. at 1034.\n\n 10\n\f(see emails in the margin).5 None of these facts had been disclosed to FIH as a\n\nprospective investor.\n\n PROCEDURAL HISTORY\n\n Based on those misrepresentations, FIH filed this action against defendants\n\nin the District of Connecticut, alleging violations of § 10(b) of the Securities\n\nExchange Act of 1934 and the Connecticut Securities Act, as well as related state\n\ncommon-law claims. After the district court, in a ruling not challenged on appeal\n\nby FIH, dismissed some of FIH’s claims and limited the scope of potentially\n\nactionable misrepresentations, FIH filed its Second Amended Complaint, the\n\noperative complaint on appeal, specifically alleging that it had purchased a $6.75\n\nmillion interest in Foundation in reliance on the misrepresentations by\n\ndefendants discussed above.\n\n In September 2016, Meehan, with the consent of all parties, moved to\n\n\n\n5\n For example: On January 16, 2014, Meehan emailed Elmlinger and Ward, stating\nthat “[Barr] has again posited that he needs” an advance on his partner draw, or\nhe would face immediate “bankruptcy, etc.” App’x at 1045. On January 30, 2014,\nBarr emailed Meehan, Ward, and Elmlinger stating that “I probably have a week\nbefore things implode around me . . . . I’m on the verge of collapse.” Id. at 1042.\nOn February 4, 2014, Barr emailed Meehan stating that “I can’t make it passed\n[sic] Friday. My world caves in. I’m not kidding and I don’t know if I can live\nthrough it. It’s that serious.” Id. at 1038.\n\n\n 11\n\fextend by 60 days the deadlines for discovery and for filing dispositive motions.\n\nOn September 26, 2016, the district court held a telephonic status conference,\n\nduring which the parties discussed the reasons necessitating the extension of the\n\ndiscovery deadline. During that conference, the court asked whether it was still\n\nthe case that neither party anticipated using experts. FIH’s counsel stated, “I\n\nbelieve that’s true your Honor, for us, speaking for the plaintiff.” FIH, LLC v.\n\nFound. Capital Partners LLC, No. 15 Civ. 785 (JBA), 2018 WL 638997, at *3 (D.\n\nConn. Jan. 31, 2018). Nevertheless, at 11:52 pm on the last day before discovery\n\nclosed, FIH attempted to serve an expert report, which the district court excluded\n\nas untimely. In March 2017, defendants moved for summary judgment on all\n\nclaims.6\n\n On January 31, 2018, the district court granted defendants’ motions for\n\nsummary judgement as to FIH’s federal securities law claims, and declined to\n\nexercise supplemental jurisdiction over its state-law claims. Id. The court held\n\nthat (1) there was no material dispute between the parties that FIH was a\n\nsophisticated investor with respect to its investment in Foundation; (2) the\n\n\n6\n Concurrently, FIH moved for summary judgment on its claims regarding\ndefendants’ misrepresentations about the pipeline. FIH does not appeal from the\ndistrict court’s denial of that motion.\n\n 12\n\finvestment contract constituted a fully integrated agreement; and (3) the contract\n\ndid not include the alleged misrepresentations at issue, and therefore as a matter\n\nof law FIH could not reasonably have relied on those misrepresentations. This\n\nappeal followed.\n\n DISCUSSION\n\nI. Standard of Review\n\n We review a district court’s decision granting summary judgment de novo,\n\nand will affirm only if the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the\n\nnon-movant, shows no “genuine dispute of material fact” and demonstrates “the\n\nmovant’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.” Ace Partners, LLC v. Town\n\nof E. Hartford, 883 F.3d 190, 194–95 (2d Cir. 2018). Issues of contract interpretation\n\nare also “subject to de novo review.” In re Delta Air Lines, Inc., 608 F.3d 139, 145 (2d\n\nCir. 2010).\n\nII. Reasonable Reliance\n\n FIH contends that the district court erred in holding that the merger clause\n\ncontained in the Company Agreement made FIH’s reliance on defendants’\n\nmisrepresentations unreasonable as a matter of law. FIH makes three arguments\n\nin support of this position: First, FIH argues that the merger clause in the\n\n\n 13\n\fCompany Agreement does not apply to the Subscription Agreement because the\n\nSubscription Agreement does not expressly incorporate all relevant provisions of\n\nthe Company Agreement. Second, FIH argues that even if the Subscription\n\nAgreement had fully incorporated the Company Agreement, the merger clause\n\ndoes not make FIH’s reliance on defendants’ misrepresentations unreasonable as\n\na matter of law because it is only a “general” merger clause, as opposed to a\n\nspecific disclaimer. Third, FIH argues that it reasonably relied on defendants’\n\nmisrepresentations because they involved the “deliberate concealment of facts”\n\nknown only to the defendants, which thus fell within the purview of the\n\n“peculiar knowledge doctrine.”7 Because we conclude that the general merger\n\nclause contained in the Company Agreement is not the type of disclaimer that\n\ncould prevent FIH’s reasonable reliance on defendants’ alleged\n\nmisrepresentations as a matter of law, we need not reach FIH’s other arguments.\n\n As we have repeatedly emphasized, the issue of reasonable reliance\n\nrequires that we consider “the entire context of the transaction, including . . . its\n\n\n\n\n7\n See Warner Theatre Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 149 F.3d 134, 136 (2d\nCir. 1998) (A “specific disclaimer will not undermine another party’s allegation of\nreasonable reliance on the misrepresentations” if “the allegedly misrepresented\nfacts are peculiarly within the misrepresenting party's knowledge.”)\n\n 14\n\fcomplexity and magnitude, the sophistication of the parties, and the content of\n\nany agreements between them.” Crigger v. Fahnestock & Co., 443 F.3d 230, 235 (2d\n\nCir. 2006). The reasonableness of a plaintiff’s reliance is a “nettlesome” and “fact\n\nintensive” question, Loreley, 797 F.3d at 186 n.19, quoting Schlaifer Nance & Co. v.\n\nEstate of Warhol, 119 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir. 1997) and thus “is often a question of fact\n\nfor the jury rather than a question of law for the court.” STMicroelectronics, N.V. v.\n\nCredit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 648 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2011). Standing alone,\n\ntherefore, a general disclaimer (still less a general merger clause) is not sufficient\n\nas a matter of law to preclude reasonable reliance on material factual\n\nmisrepresentations, even by a sophisticated investor.\n\n In Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., New York, 295 F.3d 312, 330–31 (2d Cir. 2002), we\n\nheld that general disclaimers are insufficient to defeat reasonable reliance on\n\nmaterial misrepresentations as a matter of law, even by a sophisticated party.\n\nAccord, Loreley Fin. (Jersey) No. 3 Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Sec., LLC, 797 F.3d 160, 186\n\nn.19 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff in Caiola was “an entrepreneur and sophisticated\n\ninvestor,” engaged in complex trading activity with Citibank. Caiola, 295 F.3d at\n\n315. Representatives of Citibank orally promised Caiola “that as his\n\ncounterparty[, Citibank] would control its own risks through a strategy known as\n\n\n 15\n\f‘delta hedging,’”8 id. at 317, and “that [Caiola’s] synthetic trading relationship\n\nwith Citibank would remain unaltered” by Citibank’s upcoming merger, id. at\n\n318. “However, . . . contrary to its representations and unknown to Caiola,\n\nCitibank had secretly stopped delta hedging and transformed Caiola’s synthetic\n\nportfolio into a physical one by executing massive trades in the physical markets\n\nthat mirrored Caiola’s synthetic transactions.” Id. Consequently, Caiola brought\n\nsecurities fraud claims against Citibank based on Citibank’s misrepresentations.\n\n The district court dismissed Caiola’s claims, finding inter alia that it was\n\nunreasonable as a matter of law for him to have relied on the oral representations\n\nfrom Citibank. Id. at 320. “Apparently resting its analysis on parol evidence\n\nprinciples,” id., the district court relied on the following provisions in the\n\nrelevant agreements between the parties:\n\n This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement and understanding of\n the parties with respect to its subject matter and supersedes all oral\n communication and prior writings with respect thereto . . .\n\n\n\n\n8\n Delta hedging makes a derivative position, such as an option position, immune\nto small changes in the price of an underlying asset, such as a stock, over a short\nperiod of time. See John C. Hull, Options Futures, and Other Derivatives 311–12 (4th\ned. 2000).\n\n 16\n\f [Caiola] has such knowledge and experience in financial, business and\n tax matters that render him capable of evaluating the merits and risks\n of this Agreement and the Transactions contemplated hereunder; [and]\n has determined that [] the Transactions contemplated hereunder are\n suitable for him . . .\n\n\n [Caiola] is not relying on any advice, statements or recommendations\n (whether written or oral) of the other party, . . . .\n\n\nid. at 317–18.\n\n Citibank argued that a “reasonable investor of Caiola’s sophistication\n\nwould not have relied upon Citibank’s oral misrepresentations” because of the\n\ndisclaimers that “Caiola would not be relying on Citibank’s advice or\n\nrecommendations, that he would make his own investment decisions, and that\n\nCitibank would not be his fiduciary or advisor.” Id. at 330 On appeal, we\n\nreversed: “We are not persuaded that these disclaimers barred Caiola from\n\nrelying on Citibank’s oral statements.” Id. We explained instead that “[a]\n\ndisclaimer is generally enforceable only if it tracks the substance of the alleged\n\nmisrepresentation,” and that “[t]he disclaimer provisions contained in the\n\n[agreements] fall well short of tracking the particular misrepresentations alleged\n\nby Caiola.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The disclaimers were\n\nineffective because, while “Caiola specifically allege[d] that Citibank offered false\n\n 17\n\fassurances that after the . . . merger [that] the parties’ existing trading\n\nrelationship would not change and that Citibank would continue to act as a delta\n\nhedging counterparty,” “[t]he disclaimer . . . state[d] only in general terms that\n\nneither party relied ‘on any advice, statements or recommendation (whether\n\nwritten or oral) of the other party.’” Id.\n\n Similarly, in the instant case, there are no disclaimers sufficiently specific\n\nto satisfy the standard set forth in Caiola. Nowhere in the Company Agreement\n\nor elsewhere is there explicit language disclaiming reliance on external\n\nrepresentations of the kind alleged by FIH in this case (i.e. statements about\n\nongoing deal activity or about personal relationships between Foundation’s\n\ndirectors or officers). Rather, the relevant language in the Subscription\n\nAgreement and the Company Agreement on which defendants rely, quoted\n\nabove, is strikingly similar to the merger clause and “sophisticated investor”\n\nlanguage found insufficient in Caiola. And neither agreement in this case contains\n\nany clause as strong as the general disclaimer, found insufficient in Caiola, of\n\nreliance on “any advice, statements or recommendations (whether written or\n\noral) of the other party.” Id. at 317.\n\n\n\n\n 18\n\f In its decision granting summary judgment in favor of defendants in this\n\ncase, the district court attempted to distinguished Caiola by explaining that it did\n\nnot find FIH’s reliance unreasonable on the basis of the “admittedly generalized\n\ndisclaimers” in the Subscription Agreement,9 but rather on the basis of the\n\nmerger clause in the Company Agreement. FIH, LLC, 2018 WL 638997, at *14 n.5.\n\nOn appeal, defendants argue that according to our decisions in Emergent Capital\n\nInv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2003) and ATSI\n\nCommc’ns., Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2007), even general merger\n\nclauses (as opposed to disclaimers, as discussed in Caiola) can defeat reasonable\n\nreliance when an investor is sophisticated and the representations at issue are not\n\ncontained in the operative agreement. We are not persuaded.\n\n A merger clause is a provision of a contract signifying that the contract is a\n\ncomplete statement of the parties’ agreement, superseding any prior oral or\n\nwritten terms. In other words, a merger clause operates to limit the universe of\n\n\n\n9\n The district court was correct not to rely on that disclaimer. The language in the\nSubscription Agreement stating that “the Subscriber has consulted and relied\nsolely upon the advice of its own counsel, accountant and other advisers . . . and\non that basis believes that an investment in an Interest is suitable and appropriate\nfor such Subscriber” is not specific enough to bar an action by FIH for fraudulent\nmisrepresentation based on defendants’ alleged misrepresentations.\n\n 19\n\fthe parties’ contractual obligations to the text of the contract itself. This does not\n\nmean, however, that a merger clause serves as a catch-all disclaimer of reliance\n\non any conceivable pre-contract misrepresentations about facts pertaining to the\n\nsubject matter of the contract that could form the basis of a claim for fraud in the\n\ninducement.\n\n As we explained in Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir.\n\n1997), because the concept of a merger clause “rests on the rationale that a later\n\nwritten agreement has supplanted prior negotiations, it follows that [it] does not\n\ncome into play until the existence of an enforceable written agreement has been\n\nshown,” and thus it cannot be used to “exclude evidence to show that there was\n\nno agreement or that the agreement was invalid.” Therefore, we held, a “general\n\nmerger clause does not preclude parol testimony where a claim is based on fraud\n\nin the inducement.” Id. And it is for that reason that in Caiola we found\n\n“questionable” the district court’s “importation of parol evidence principles into\n\nthe federal securities laws” when it found that “the oral misrepresentations\n\nallegedly made by Citibank . . . can be disregarded” insofar as they contradict\n\n“unambiguous language in the [agreements between the parties].” Caiola, 295\n\nF.3d at 330, n.9.\n\n\n 20\n\f Moreover, contrary to defendants’ characterization of Emergent Capital and\n\nATSI, neither of those cases stands for the proposition that merger clauses can\n\nserve as all-encompassing disclaimers of pre-contract factual misrepresentations.\n\nThe district court in Emergent Capital explicitly held that “a general merger clause\n\n‘stating that the signatories acknowledge [that] the written document supersedes\n\nall prior agreements and constitutes the sole embodiment of their obligations’\n\ndoes not bar an action for fraud.” 195 F. Supp. 2d 551, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). In that\n\ncase, the court considered a merger clause, similar to the one in this case, which\n\nstated that:\n\n This Agreement, together with the exhibits and schedules hereto and\n ancillary Agreements, contains the entire understanding and\n agreement between or among any of them, and supersedes all prior\n understandings or agreements between or among any of them with\n respect to the subject matter hereof.\n\n\n\nId. The court explained that “[i]f this merger clause stood alone, there would be\n\nno question that it would not by itself preclude reasonable reliance as a matter of\n\nlaw.\" Id. However, the court found that given the specific facts of that case,\n\nEmergent could not claim reasonable reliance, because in addition to the merger\n\nclause, the relevant agreements made “29 separate representations and\n\n\n\n 21\n\fwarranties and 16 separate covenants in favor of the . . . purchasers, including\n\nEmergent.” Id.\n\n On appeal, we affirmed the relevant part of the district court’s decision,\n\nholding that “Emergent should have protected itself by insisting that [the alleged\n\nmisrepresentations at issue] be included in the stock purchase agreement[,\n\nbecause] [g]iven [defendant’s] extensive contractual representations about other\n\nmatters, [Emergent’s] sophistication, and the size of the transaction, Emergent’s\n\nfailure to do so precludes as a matter of law a finding of reasonable reliance upon\n\ndefendants’ misrepresentations.” Emergent Capital, 343 F.3d at 195 (emphasis\n\nadded). Here, in contrast, there are no “extensive contractual representations”\n\nabout the status of the Fund’s transaction pipeline, the working relationships\n\nbetween Foundation’s principals, or any similar subject matter, that might have\n\noperated as an implicit disclaimer regarding Foundation’s extra-contractual\n\nfactual representations to FIH. Instead, there is only the general merger clause in\n\nthe Company Agreement.\n\n Defendants argue that, like the plaintiff in Emergent Capital, FIH “did, in\n\nfact, actively negotiate and demand certain terms, representations and conditions\n\nin connection with its investment,” and thus that Emergent Capital cannot be\n\n\n 22\n\fdistinguished on that ground. Appellees’ Br. at 21–22. But each of the negotiated\n\nterms that defendants cite—including that “Foundation’s partners [would] defer\n\nsome of their compensation until Foundation closed a pipeline hedge fund deal,”\n\nid. at 22; that FIH would “share in any management fee earned by Foundation in\n\nmanaging the Fund,” id.; “a revised involuntary transfer provision[,] . . . terms\n\nconcerning rights of first refusal, most favored nation status, pre-emptive rights,\n\nand tag-along rights,” id.—relate to the parties’ obligations, and do not constitute\n\naffirmative factual representations of any kind. This is an entirely different\n\nsituation from that in Emergent Capital, where the parties actually negotiated\n\nfactual representations to be included in the written agreements that suggest a\n\nclosed set of such representations upon which the plaintiff’s reliance was\n\nacknowledged.\n\n The ATSI decision, on which defendants similarly rely for the proposition\n\nthat “[w]here the plaintiff is a sophisticated investor and an integrated agreement\n\nbetween the parties does not include the misrepresentation at issue, the plaintiff\n\ncannot establish reasonable reliance on that misrepresentation,” 493 F.3d at 105\n\n(citing Emergent Capital, 343 F.3d at 196), is inapposite for the same reason. For\n\none thing, the agreement at issue in that case contained an explicit disclaimer as\n\n\n 23\n\fpart of the merger clause, stating that “[t]here are no restrictions, promises,\n\nwarranties, or undertakings, other than those set forth or referred to herein.” Id.\n\nat 95. We specifically noted that disclaimer in our decision with regard to the\n\nplaintiff’s reasonable reliance on the alleged misrepresentations in that case. See\n\nid. at 105 (“Of the misrepresentations that ATSI claims, we can quickly dispose of\n\nall except the two alleged in the transaction agreements. The . . . agreement\n\nbetween [the parties] plainly states that the only promises, restrictions, and\n\nwarranties to the transaction were those set forth in the transaction documents.”).\n\nMoreover, the subject matter of some of the alleged oral misrepresentations in\n\nATSI—that defendants “would not engage in any activity to depress” the price of\n\n“stock” by rapidly selling it, id. at 94,—was specifically addressed by written\n\nrepresentations in the agreements at issue, providing “that the [defendants]\n\nwould soon sell its converted common stock into the public markets” within “90\n\ndays of closing” the deal, id. at 95. In this case, by contrast, the merger clause\n\ncontains no disclaimer of any kind of representation, and the subject matter of\n\ndefendants’ alleged misrepresentations was not addressed by affirmative\n\nrepresentations in any agreement between the parties.\n\n\n\n\n 24\n\f We do not suggest in any way that general disclaimers or merger clauses,\n\nthe sophistication of an investor, or the presence of various promises or\n\nrepresentations in a written agreement are irrelevant to the reasonableness of a\n\nparty’s reliance on pre-contract factual misrepresentations. The defendants here\n\nremain free to argue to a jury, based on these or other factors, that FIH did not\n\nreasonably rely on any misrepresentations the jury might conclude were made.\n\nIndeed, as Emergent Capital demonstrates, there may be circumstances where a\n\ngeneral disclaimer or merger clause, together with an extensive roster of\n\nspecifically negotiated factual warranties and representations, can lead to a\n\nconclusion that, in the particular circumstances of a case, no reasonable jury\n\ncould find reasonable reliance on a representation not inserted into the written\n\ncontract. And, of course, careful investors negotiating the terms of an\n\nindividualized investment can protect themselves by demanding that any\n\nrepresentation that is critical to their investment decision be incorporated into the\n\nwritten investment agreement.\n\nIII. Exclusion of the Expert Report\n\n\n FIH also argues that the district court’s summary judgment decision must\n\nbe reversed because the court erred in excluding as untimely an expert report\n\n 25\n\fopining that in accordance with private equity industry practice, “FIH was\n\nreasonable in relying on defendants’ false statements.” Appellant’s Br. at 36. FIH\n\nclaims that the district court abused its discretion in excluding this report, which\n\nFIH attempted to serve on January 23, 2018 at 11:52pm—eight minutes before the\n\nclose of court-ordered discovery. Although we conclude above that the summary\n\njudgment decision must be vacated in any event, we address this argument\n\nbecause the district court’s ruling on the proposed expert testimony is relevant to\n\nthe anticipated trial of this matter.\n\n We review a district court’s discovery ruling for “abuse of discretion.”\n\nWills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32, 41 (2d Cir. 2004). A district court abuses\n\nits discretion “when its decision cannot be located within the range of\n\npermissible decisions or is based on a clearly erroneous factual finding or an\n\nerror of law.” United States v. Scully, 877 F.3d 464, 474 (2d Cir. 2017). The\n\nreasonableness of a decision excluding expert testimony is evaluated according\n\nto the following factors: “(1) the party’s explanation for the failure to comply\n\nwith the disclosure requirement; (2) the importance of the testimony of the\n\nprecluded witnesses; (3) the prejudice suffered by the opposing party as a result\n\n\n\n\n 26\n\fof having to prepare to meet the new testimony; and (4) the possibility of a\n\ncontinuance.” Patterson v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104, 117 (2d Cir. 2006).\n\n Having considered each of the above factors, we conclude that the district\n\ncourt was within its discretion to exclude the expert report. Although the report\n\nwas technically served before the close of fact discovery and the court’s\n\nscheduling order did not contain an explicit deadline to disclose expert\n\nwitnesses, such a deadline had not been set only because FIH had advised the\n\ncourt that it did not intend to submit expert testimony, and therefore no party\n\nrequested that the court amend the discovery schedule to include one. In any\n\nevent, the district court acted well within its discretion in enforcing the discovery\n\ndeadline that it did set. Because FIH’s proposed expert would still have needed\n\nto be deposed, and defendants would have needed an opportunity to present a\n\ncounter-expert, the literally eleventh-hour disclosure of the expert report would\n\nhave extended discovery beyond the already-extended, agreed-upon, and court-\n\nordered discovery deadline. We therefore identify no error or abuse of discretion\n\nin the district court’s exclusion of the expert’s report.\n\n\n\n\n 27\n\f CONCLUSION\n\n\n For the reasons stated above, we VACATE the judgment of the district\n\ncourt granting summary judgment in favor of appellees, and REMAND for\n\nfurther proceedings.\n\n\n\n\n 28\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: FIH, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FOUNDATION CAPITAL PARTNERS LLC, Fka Foundation Managing Member LLC, Dean Barr, Joseph Meehan, Thomas Ward, Joseph Elmlinger, Defendants-Appellees\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-01\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n18-357-cv\\nFIH, LLC v. Foundation Capital Partners, LLC.\\n\\n\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n August Term, 2018\\n\\n Argued: March 8, 2019 Decided: April 1, 2019\\n\\n Docket No. 18-357-cv\\n\\n\\n\\n FIH, LLC,\\n\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n — v. —\\n\\n FOUNDATION CAPITAL PARTNERS LLC, FKA FOUNDATION\\n MANAGING MEMBER LLC, DEAN BARR, JOSEPH MEEHAN,\\n THOMAS WARD, JOSEPH ELMLINGER,\\n\\n Defendants-Appellees,\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nB e f o r e:\\n\\n JACOBS and LYNCH, Circuit Judges, and VILARDO, District Judge.*\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n*\\n Judge Lawrence J. Vilardo, of the United States District Court for the Western\\nDistrict of New York, sitting by designation.\\n\\f FIH, LLC (“FIH”) appeals from the district court’s grant of summary\\njudgment dismissing its federal securities law claims against Foundation Capital\\nPartners, LLC (“Foundation”), Dean Barr, Joseph Meehan, Thomas Ward, and\\nJoseph Elmlinger (collectively “defendants”). FIH argues that it had reasonably\\nrelied on material misrepresentations by defendants in deciding to invest in\\nFoundation, and that defendants are therefore liable under federal and state law.\\nThe district court concluded as a matter of law that FIH could not have\\nreasonably relied on the alleged misrepresentations, because such reliance was\\nprecluded by a general merger clause in Foundation’s LLC agreement,\\nincorporated by reference into the subscription agreements by which FIH had\\ninvested in Foundation. Concluding that the merger clause did not as a matter of\\nlaw preclude FIH’s reasonable reliance on the alleged misrepresentations, we\\nVACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further\\nproceedings.\\n\\n\\n\\n SAMUEL J. LIEBERMAN (Ben Hutman, on the brief), Sadis &\\n Goldberg LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.\\n\\n DAVID G. TRACHTENBERG (Stephen J. Arena, on the brief),\\n Trachtenberg Rodes & Friedberg LLP, New York, NY,\\n for Defendant-Appellee Joseph Elmlinger.\\n\\n Peter M. Nolin, Carmody Torrance Sandak & Hennessey LLP,\\n Stamford, CT, for Defendant-Appellee Dean Barr.\\n\\n Stephen G. Walko, Andrea C. Sisca, Ivey, Barnum & O’Mara\\n LLC, Greenwich, CT, for Defendant-Appellee Thomas\\n Ward.\\n\\n Jonathan P. Whitcomb, Diserio Martin O’Connor & Castiglioni\\n LLP, Stamford, CT, for Defendant-Appellee Joseph Meehan.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\fGERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n FIH, LLC (“FIH”) appeals from a grant of summary judgment against it,\\n\\nentered by the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut\\n\\n(Arterton, J.), in its action against Foundation Capital Partners, LLC\\n\\n(“Foundation”), the general partner in a private equity fund set up to invest in\\n\\nminority interests in general partnerships of large hedge funds, and its member-\\n\\npartners (collectively, “defendants”). FIH alleged that it had purchased a\\n\\nmembership interest in Foundation on the basis of misrepresentations by\\n\\ndefendants, and asserted claims against them under § 10(b) of the Securities\\n\\nExchange Act of 1934, the Connecticut Securities Act, and Connecticut common\\n\\nlaw. The alleged misrepresentations are that Foundation had an active pipeline of\\n\\ninvestments and that two of Foundation’s key partners were able to work\\n\\ntogether notwithstanding one partner’s embittered divorce of the other’s sister-\\n\\nin-law. The district court held that a merger clause in Foundation’s LLC\\n\\nagreement, incorporated into the subscription agreements by which FIH invested\\n\\nin Foundation, precluded FIH’s reasonable reliance on the alleged\\n\\nmisrepresentations as a matter of law. For the reasons that follow, we VACATE\\n\\nand REMAND.\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\f FACTUAL BACKGROUND1\\n\\n Foundation was formed to act as general partner in Foundation Capital\\n\\nPartners, L.P. (the “Fund”), a private equity fund formed to invest in minority\\n\\ninterests in general partnerships of large hedge funds. Rather than directly invest\\n\\nin assets under management by such hedge funds, the Fund was to receive a\\n\\nportion of the annual management and performance fees taken in by the hedge\\n\\nfund partnerships. Foundation was operated by four partners, Dean Barr, Joseph\\n\\nMeehan, Joseph Elmlinger, and Thomas Ward.\\n\\n In the Fall of 2013, Foundation solicited FIH to invest directly in it—rather\\n\\nthan in the Fund. As part of its solicitation of FIH, Foundation provided FIH with\\n\\nan offering memorandum entitled “Foundation Managing Member LLC\\n\\nDisclosure Statement November 13, 2013“ (the “Offering Memo”). The Offering\\n\\nMemo represented that the Fund was “in active negotiations” with two hedge\\n\\nfunds that it planned to invest in, codenamed “Granite” and “Lake,” and\\n\\nhighlighted the Fund’s “Current Transaction Pipeline” of 23 supposed potential\\n\\ntransactions relating to investment in other hedge funds. FIH alleges that\\n\\n\\n1\\n The facts recited below are based on the evidence in the summary judgment\\nrecord, taken in the light most favorable to FIH and drawing all reasonable\\ninferences in FIH’s favor. See Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 229 (2d Cir.\\n2016).\\n\\n 4\\n\\f“[r]epresentations about active transaction negotiations in the pipeline were key\\n\\nto [its] investment decision, because Foundation needed to close its first\\n\\nacquisition of a hedge fund minority interest to start generating substantial\\n\\nincome.” Appellant’s Br. at 4.\\n\\n In February 2014, Foundation gave FIH access to due diligence materials,\\n\\nwhich identified fourteen specific targets delineated by their code names:\\n\\n“Projects Lake, Apex, Corvette, Granite, Breakout, Pilot, Centaur, Pound, Tensor,\\n\\nMainstay, Yale, Halo, Gun, and Bronco.” App’x at 146. The targets were\\n\\nidentified only by code names, ostensibly to protect the confidentiality of\\n\\nFoundation’s negotiations. Thus, at this stage of Foundation’s solicitation of FIH,\\n\\nFIH had no opportunity to verify Foundation’s claims by contacting the\\n\\npurported target hedge funds. The due diligence materials explained that these\\n\\ntargets were “the current representative [Foundation] Pipeline, including those\\n\\nwith which the firm was in active discussion,” and that “this pipeline has become\\n\\nincreasingly active in recent months as a result of industry recovery, manager\\n\\ninterest, regulatory reform and the presence of relatively few buyers.” Id. These\\n\\nmaterials also “represented that non-disclosure agreements had been signed with\\n\\nthe target hedge funds in Projects Lake and Granite.” Id.\\n\\n\\n 5\\n\\f In addition, in an email to FIH on December 30, 2013, Barr represented that\\n\\nFoundation had four “possible transactions in the works,” referencing Projects\\n\\nBronco, Corvette, Lake, and Centaur. Id. On January 22, 2014, Barr emailed FIH to\\n\\nupdate it on Project Apex, and represented that “I believe we can move\\n\\nexpeditiously on this deal.” Id. And on February 3, 2014, Barr again emailed FIH\\n\\nto give an update on Project Pilot, representing that “[w]e have some reasonably\\n\\ngood intel that suggests that this offer would be given serious consideration.” Id.\\n\\n Through due diligence, FIH also learned that Barr was in the process of\\n\\ndivorcing Meehan’s sister-in-law. At that time, Barr was the managing partner of\\n\\nFoundation and Meehan was the Chief Operating Officer of Foundation. Barr\\n\\nand Meehan were each also managing principals of Foundation, and each held\\n\\nequal 46.175% interests in the company. FIH specifically asked the two men if\\n\\nthey would be able to continue working well together following a potential\\n\\ninvestment by FIH in Foundation. Barr and Meehan each represented that they\\n\\ncould “work together” professionally in spite of the divorce, and that they could\\n\\n“keep their professional and personal lives separate.” Id. at 910. Barr represented\\n\\nto FIH that the divorce was “under control,” “getting better,” and “amicable,”\\n\\nand was thus “not material” to FIH’s decision to invest in Foundation. Id. Barr\\n\\n\\n\\n 6\\n\\falso told FIH that “there was nothing FIH needed to know about [his] personality\\n\\nand there were no other matters FIH should know about [him].” Id. at 913.\\n\\n On February 11, 2014, FIH and Foundation executed a document entitled\\n\\n“Foundation Managing Member LLC Subscription Agreement” (the\\n\\n“Subscription Agreement”),2 concretizing FIH’s investment in Foundation. The\\n\\nSubscription Agreement identifies FIH as the “Subscriber” and Foundation as the\\n\\n“Company,” and provides inter alia that FIH:\\n\\n tenders this subscription for a membership interest in the Company on\\n the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Company\\n Agreement (as defined below) as amended through the Seventh\\n Amendment to the Company Agreement dated as of the date of this\\n Subscription Agreement[.]\\n\\nId. at 586.\\n\\n The Subscription Agreement also contains the following provision within a\\n\\nsection entitled “Representations and Warranties of the Subscriber”:\\n\\n The Subscriber has such knowledge and experience in financial and\\n business matters that the Subscriber is capable of evaluating the merits\\n and risks of an investment in the Interest, and of making an informed\\n investment decision, and the Subscriber has consulted and relied solely\\n upon the advice of its own counsel, accountant and other advisers with\\n regard to such legal, investment, tax and other considerations\\n\\n\\n2\\n On February 28, 2014, the parties executed a second subscription agreement that\\nmade several changes to the original Subscription Agreement, none of them\\nrelevant to this appeal.\\n\\n 7\\n\\f regarding such investment and on that basis believes that an\\n investment in an Interest is suitable and appropriate for such\\n Subscriber. The Subscriber has had, either individually or through its\\n duly authorized officers, employees or agents, an opportunity to (i) ask\\n questions of and receive answers from the Company and its\\n management concerning the terms and conditions of the Interests and\\n the proposed operation of the Company and (ii) obtain information\\n necessary to verify the accuracy of the information provided.\\n\\nId. The Subscription Agreement further provides the following within a section\\n\\nentitled “Representations and Warranties of the Company”:\\n\\n The Company hereby represents and warrants to, and agrees with, the\\n Subscriber that (a) attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct\\n copy of the Company Agreement that has been conformed to reflect all\\n amendments to the Company Agreement through the Seventh\\n Amendment to the Company Agreement dated as of the date of this\\n Subscription Agreement and (b) the salary of each Managing Principal\\n in 2014 will not exceed the amount set forth with respect to that\\n Managing Principal in Exhibit B attached hereto.\\n\\nId. at 588.\\n\\n The “Company Agreement” to which the Subscription Agreement refers is\\n\\na document identified as the Limited Liability Company Agreement. Paragraph\\n\\n11.9 of the Company Agreement, entitled “Entire Agreement” (the “merger\\n\\nclause”), provides that “[t]his Agreement constitutes the entire agreement of the\\n\\nMembers and supersedes all prior agreements among the Members with respect\\n\\nto the subject matter hereof, including the Original Agreement[.]” Id. at 637. The\\n\\n\\n 8\\n\\fSubscription Agreement itself, however, does not contain any merger clause or\\n\\ndisclaimers of reliance on outside representations. Indeed, the Subscription\\n\\nAgreement omits specific anti-reliance disclaimers that Foundation had used in\\n\\nconnection with other investments in the Fund.3\\n\\n Shortly after investing in Foundation, FIH learned that defendants’\\n\\nrepresentations about the active “pipeline” and about Barr and Meehan’s\\n\\nsupposedly workable relationship, which were material to FIH’s investment\\n\\ndecision, were false. On March 4, 2014, Foundation disclosed to FIH the first in a\\n\\nseries of internal documents called “Project Activity Logs.” The Project Activity\\n\\nLogs listed hedge fund targets in Foundation’s pipeline under three categories:\\n\\nLive Deals, Prospects, and Dead Projects. These documents revealed that\\n\\nFoundation had overstated its deal activity in the Offering Memo and due\\n\\ndiligence materials. For example, Projects Granite and Lake, which had been\\n\\n\\n\\n3\\n For example, one such agreement stated that:\\n\\n Other than the Memorandum and the Partnership Agreement, the\\n Subscriber is not relying upon any other information, representation or\\n warranty by the Fund, the General Partner, or the Investment Manager\\n in determining to invest in the Fund.\\n\\nApp’x at 963.\\n\\n\\n 9\\n\\ftouted in the due diligence materials as the most developed of the potential\\n\\ndeals, were both “On Hold” with no ongoing negotiations. And although\\n\\nFoundation had stated in its February 2014 due diligence materials that the\\n\\n“pipeline has become increasingly active in recent months,” in fact, Foundation\\n\\nhad a decreasing number of active deals in February 2014 compared to prior\\n\\nmonths.\\n\\n Similarly, in contrast to the representations about Barr and Meehan’s\\n\\nsupposedly cordial relationship, it became clear to FIH after investing in\\n\\nFoundation that the two were at loggerheads. A series of emails that FIH\\n\\nreceived from Meehan and Elmlinger one month after FIH’s investment revealed\\n\\nthat Barr and Meehan privately admitted that they were unable to work together\\n\\n(see emails in the margin).4 Moreover, Barr, who apparently was on the verge of\\n\\npersonal bankruptcy, had repeatedly threatened to quit working at Foundation\\n\\n\\n\\n4\\n For example: On November 1, 2013, Barr emailed Meehan stating “If you’re\\ngoing to continue to behave like this during the divorce, I really don’t think it’s\\nwise for us to work together going forward.” App’x at 1024. On September 25,\\n2013, Barr emailed Meehan stating “I know you despise me . . . . I’m really\\nthinking of calling it quits . . . . We’re all headed for disaster.” Id. at 1031–32. On\\nFebruary 3, 2014, virtually contemporaneously with Barr’s assurances to FIH that\\nhe could continue to work well with Meehan, Barr emailed Meehan stating “Joe,\\nwe are officially broken from each other.” Id. at 1034.\\n\\n 10\\n\\f(see emails in the margin).5 None of these facts had been disclosed to FIH as a\\n\\nprospective investor.\\n\\n PROCEDURAL HISTORY\\n\\n Based on those misrepresentations, FIH filed this action against defendants\\n\\nin the District of Connecticut, alleging violations of § 10(b) of the Securities\\n\\nExchange Act of 1934 and the Connecticut Securities Act, as well as related state\\n\\ncommon-law claims. After the district court, in a ruling not challenged on appeal\\n\\nby FIH, dismissed some of FIH’s claims and limited the scope of potentially\\n\\nactionable misrepresentations, FIH filed its Second Amended Complaint, the\\n\\noperative complaint on appeal, specifically alleging that it had purchased a $6.75\\n\\nmillion interest in Foundation in reliance on the misrepresentations by\\n\\ndefendants discussed above.\\n\\n In September 2016, Meehan, with the consent of all parties, moved to\\n\\n\\n\\n5\\n For example: On January 16, 2014, Meehan emailed Elmlinger and Ward, stating\\nthat “[Barr] has again posited that he needs” an advance on his partner draw, or\\nhe would face immediate “bankruptcy, etc.” App’x at 1045. On January 30, 2014,\\nBarr emailed Meehan, Ward, and Elmlinger stating that “I probably have a week\\nbefore things implode around me . . . . I’m on the verge of collapse.” Id. at 1042.\\nOn February 4, 2014, Barr emailed Meehan stating that “I can’t make it passed\\n[sic] Friday. My world caves in. I’m not kidding and I don’t know if I can live\\nthrough it. It’s that serious.” Id. at 1038.\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\fextend by 60 days the deadlines for discovery and for filing dispositive motions.\\n\\nOn September 26, 2016, the district court held a telephonic status conference,\\n\\nduring which the parties discussed the reasons necessitating the extension of the\\n\\ndiscovery deadline. During that conference, the court asked whether it was still\\n\\nthe case that neither party anticipated using experts. FIH’s counsel stated, “I\\n\\nbelieve that’s true your Honor, for us, speaking for the plaintiff.” FIH, LLC v.\\n\\nFound. Capital Partners LLC, No. 15 Civ. 785 (JBA), 2018 WL 638997, at *3 (D.\\n\\nConn. Jan. 31, 2018). Nevertheless, at 11:52 pm on the last day before discovery\\n\\nclosed, FIH attempted to serve an expert report, which the district court excluded\\n\\nas untimely. In March 2017, defendants moved for summary judgment on all\\n\\nclaims.6\\n\\n On January 31, 2018, the district court granted defendants’ motions for\\n\\nsummary judgement as to FIH’s federal securities law claims, and declined to\\n\\nexercise supplemental jurisdiction over its state-law claims. Id. The court held\\n\\nthat (1) there was no material dispute between the parties that FIH was a\\n\\nsophisticated investor with respect to its investment in Foundation; (2) the\\n\\n\\n6\\n Concurrently, FIH moved for summary judgment on its claims regarding\\ndefendants’ misrepresentations about the pipeline. FIH does not appeal from the\\ndistrict court’s denial of that motion.\\n\\n 12\\n\\finvestment contract constituted a fully integrated agreement; and (3) the contract\\n\\ndid not include the alleged misrepresentations at issue, and therefore as a matter\\n\\nof law FIH could not reasonably have relied on those misrepresentations. This\\n\\nappeal followed.\\n\\n DISCUSSION\\n\\nI. Standard of Review\\n\\n We review a district court’s decision granting summary judgment de novo,\\n\\nand will affirm only if the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the\\n\\nnon-movant, shows no “genuine dispute of material fact” and demonstrates “the\\n\\nmovant’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.” Ace Partners, LLC v. Town\\n\\nof E. Hartford, 883 F.3d 190, 194–95 (2d Cir. 2018). Issues of contract interpretation\\n\\nare also “subject to de novo review.” In re Delta Air Lines, Inc., 608 F.3d 139, 145 (2d\\n\\nCir. 2010).\\n\\nII. Reasonable Reliance\\n\\n FIH contends that the district court erred in holding that the merger clause\\n\\ncontained in the Company Agreement made FIH’s reliance on defendants’\\n\\nmisrepresentations unreasonable as a matter of law. FIH makes three arguments\\n\\nin support of this position: First, FIH argues that the merger clause in the\\n\\n\\n 13\\n\\fCompany Agreement does not apply to the Subscription Agreement because the\\n\\nSubscription Agreement does not expressly incorporate all relevant provisions of\\n\\nthe Company Agreement. Second, FIH argues that even if the Subscription\\n\\nAgreement had fully incorporated the Company Agreement, the merger clause\\n\\ndoes not make FIH’s reliance on defendants’ misrepresentations unreasonable as\\n\\na matter of law because it is only a “general” merger clause, as opposed to a\\n\\nspecific disclaimer. Third, FIH argues that it reasonably relied on defendants’\\n\\nmisrepresentations because they involved the “deliberate concealment of facts”\\n\\nknown only to the defendants, which thus fell within the purview of the\\n\\n“peculiar knowledge doctrine.”7 Because we conclude that the general merger\\n\\nclause contained in the Company Agreement is not the type of disclaimer that\\n\\ncould prevent FIH’s reasonable reliance on defendants’ alleged\\n\\nmisrepresentations as a matter of law, we need not reach FIH’s other arguments.\\n\\n As we have repeatedly emphasized, the issue of reasonable reliance\\n\\nrequires that we consider “the entire context of the transaction, including . . . its\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n7\\n See Warner Theatre Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 149 F.3d 134, 136 (2d\\nCir. 1998) (A “specific disclaimer will not undermine another party’s allegation of\\nreasonable reliance on the misrepresentations” if “the allegedly misrepresented\\nfacts are peculiarly within the misrepresenting party's knowledge.”)\\n\\n 14\\n\\fcomplexity and magnitude, the sophistication of the parties, and the content of\\n\\nany agreements between them.” Crigger v. Fahnestock & Co., 443 F.3d 230, 235 (2d\\n\\nCir. 2006). The reasonableness of a plaintiff’s reliance is a “nettlesome” and “fact\\n\\nintensive” question, Loreley, 797 F.3d at 186 n.19, quoting Schlaifer Nance & Co. v.\\n\\nEstate of Warhol, 119 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir. 1997) and thus “is often a question of fact\\n\\nfor the jury rather than a question of law for the court.” STMicroelectronics, N.V. v.\\n\\nCredit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 648 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2011). Standing alone,\\n\\ntherefore, a general disclaimer (still less a general merger clause) is not sufficient\\n\\nas a matter of law to preclude reasonable reliance on material factual\\n\\nmisrepresentations, even by a sophisticated investor.\\n\\n In Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., New York, 295 F.3d 312, 330–31 (2d Cir. 2002), we\\n\\nheld that general disclaimers are insufficient to defeat reasonable reliance on\\n\\nmaterial misrepresentations as a matter of law, even by a sophisticated party.\\n\\nAccord, Loreley Fin. (Jersey) No. 3 Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Sec., LLC, 797 F.3d 160, 186\\n\\nn.19 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff in Caiola was “an entrepreneur and sophisticated\\n\\ninvestor,” engaged in complex trading activity with Citibank. Caiola, 295 F.3d at\\n\\n315. Representatives of Citibank orally promised Caiola “that as his\\n\\ncounterparty[, Citibank] would control its own risks through a strategy known as\\n\\n\\n 15\\n\\f‘delta hedging,’”8 id. at 317, and “that [Caiola’s] synthetic trading relationship\\n\\nwith Citibank would remain unaltered” by Citibank’s upcoming merger, id. at\\n\\n318. “However, . . . contrary to its representations and unknown to Caiola,\\n\\nCitibank had secretly stopped delta hedging and transformed Caiola’s synthetic\\n\\nportfolio into a physical one by executing massive trades in the physical markets\\n\\nthat mirrored Caiola’s synthetic transactions.” Id. Consequently, Caiola brought\\n\\nsecurities fraud claims against Citibank based on Citibank’s misrepresentations.\\n\\n The district court dismissed Caiola’s claims, finding inter alia that it was\\n\\nunreasonable as a matter of law for him to have relied on the oral representations\\n\\nfrom Citibank. Id. at 320. “Apparently resting its analysis on parol evidence\\n\\nprinciples,” id., the district court relied on the following provisions in the\\n\\nrelevant agreements between the parties:\\n\\n This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement and understanding of\\n the parties with respect to its subject matter and supersedes all oral\\n communication and prior writings with respect thereto . . .\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n8\\n Delta hedging makes a derivative position, such as an option position, immune\\nto small changes in the price of an underlying asset, such as a stock, over a short\\nperiod of time. See John C. Hull, Options Futures, and Other Derivatives 311–12 (4th\\ned. 2000).\\n\\n 16\\n\\f [Caiola] has such knowledge and experience in financial, business and\\n tax matters that render him capable of evaluating the merits and risks\\n of this Agreement and the Transactions contemplated hereunder; [and]\\n has determined that [] the Transactions contemplated hereunder are\\n suitable for him . . .\\n\\n\\n [Caiola] is not relying on any advice, statements or recommendations\\n (whether written or oral) of the other party, . . . .\\n\\n\\nid. at 317–18.\\n\\n Citibank argued that a “reasonable investor of Caiola’s sophistication\\n\\nwould not have relied upon Citibank’s oral misrepresentations” because of the\\n\\ndisclaimers that “Caiola would not be relying on Citibank’s advice or\\n\\nrecommendations, that he would make his own investment decisions, and that\\n\\nCitibank would not be his fiduciary or advisor.” Id. at 330 On appeal, we\\n\\nreversed: “We are not persuaded that these disclaimers barred Caiola from\\n\\nrelying on Citibank’s oral statements.” Id. We explained instead that “[a]\\n\\ndisclaimer is generally enforceable only if it tracks the substance of the alleged\\n\\nmisrepresentation,” and that “[t]he disclaimer provisions contained in the\\n\\n[agreements] fall well short of tracking the particular misrepresentations alleged\\n\\nby Caiola.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The disclaimers were\\n\\nineffective because, while “Caiola specifically allege[d] that Citibank offered false\\n\\n 17\\n\\fassurances that after the . . . merger [that] the parties’ existing trading\\n\\nrelationship would not change and that Citibank would continue to act as a delta\\n\\nhedging counterparty,” “[t]he disclaimer . . . state[d] only in general terms that\\n\\nneither party relied ‘on any advice, statements or recommendation (whether\\n\\nwritten or oral) of the other party.’” Id.\\n\\n Similarly, in the instant case, there are no disclaimers sufficiently specific\\n\\nto satisfy the standard set forth in Caiola. Nowhere in the Company Agreement\\n\\nor elsewhere is there explicit language disclaiming reliance on external\\n\\nrepresentations of the kind alleged by FIH in this case (i.e. statements about\\n\\nongoing deal activity or about personal relationships between Foundation’s\\n\\ndirectors or officers). Rather, the relevant language in the Subscription\\n\\nAgreement and the Company Agreement on which defendants rely, quoted\\n\\nabove, is strikingly similar to the merger clause and “sophisticated investor”\\n\\nlanguage found insufficient in Caiola. And neither agreement in this case contains\\n\\nany clause as strong as the general disclaimer, found insufficient in Caiola, of\\n\\nreliance on “any advice, statements or recommendations (whether written or\\n\\noral) of the other party.” Id. at 317.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18\\n\\f In its decision granting summary judgment in favor of defendants in this\\n\\ncase, the district court attempted to distinguished Caiola by explaining that it did\\n\\nnot find FIH’s reliance unreasonable on the basis of the “admittedly generalized\\n\\ndisclaimers” in the Subscription Agreement,9 but rather on the basis of the\\n\\nmerger clause in the Company Agreement. FIH, LLC, 2018 WL 638997, at *14 n.5.\\n\\nOn appeal, defendants argue that according to our decisions in Emergent Capital\\n\\nInv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2003) and ATSI\\n\\nCommc’ns., Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2007), even general merger\\n\\nclauses (as opposed to disclaimers, as discussed in Caiola) can defeat reasonable\\n\\nreliance when an investor is sophisticated and the representations at issue are not\\n\\ncontained in the operative agreement. We are not persuaded.\\n\\n A merger clause is a provision of a contract signifying that the contract is a\\n\\ncomplete statement of the parties’ agreement, superseding any prior oral or\\n\\nwritten terms. In other words, a merger clause operates to limit the universe of\\n\\n\\n\\n9\\n The district court was correct not to rely on that disclaimer. The language in the\\nSubscription Agreement stating that “the Subscriber has consulted and relied\\nsolely upon the advice of its own counsel, accountant and other advisers . . . and\\non that basis believes that an investment in an Interest is suitable and appropriate\\nfor such Subscriber” is not specific enough to bar an action by FIH for fraudulent\\nmisrepresentation based on defendants’ alleged misrepresentations.\\n\\n 19\\n\\fthe parties’ contractual obligations to the text of the contract itself. This does not\\n\\nmean, however, that a merger clause serves as a catch-all disclaimer of reliance\\n\\non any conceivable pre-contract misrepresentations about facts pertaining to the\\n\\nsubject matter of the contract that could form the basis of a claim for fraud in the\\n\\ninducement.\\n\\n As we explained in Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir.\\n\\n1997), because the concept of a merger clause “rests on the rationale that a later\\n\\nwritten agreement has supplanted prior negotiations, it follows that [it] does not\\n\\ncome into play until the existence of an enforceable written agreement has been\\n\\nshown,” and thus it cannot be used to “exclude evidence to show that there was\\n\\nno agreement or that the agreement was invalid.” Therefore, we held, a “general\\n\\nmerger clause does not preclude parol testimony where a claim is based on fraud\\n\\nin the inducement.” Id. And it is for that reason that in Caiola we found\\n\\n“questionable” the district court’s “importation of parol evidence principles into\\n\\nthe federal securities laws” when it found that “the oral misrepresentations\\n\\nallegedly made by Citibank . . . can be disregarded” insofar as they contradict\\n\\n“unambiguous language in the [agreements between the parties].” Caiola, 295\\n\\nF.3d at 330, n.9.\\n\\n\\n 20\\n\\f Moreover, contrary to defendants’ characterization of Emergent Capital and\\n\\nATSI, neither of those cases stands for the proposition that merger clauses can\\n\\nserve as all-encompassing disclaimers of pre-contract factual misrepresentations.\\n\\nThe district court in Emergent Capital explicitly held that “a general merger clause\\n\\n‘stating that the signatories acknowledge [that] the written document supersedes\\n\\nall prior agreements and constitutes the sole embodiment of their obligations’\\n\\ndoes not bar an action for fraud.” 195 F. Supp. 2d 551, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). In that\\n\\ncase, the court considered a merger clause, similar to the one in this case, which\\n\\nstated that:\\n\\n This Agreement, together with the exhibits and schedules hereto and\\n ancillary Agreements, contains the entire understanding and\\n agreement between or among any of them, and supersedes all prior\\n understandings or agreements between or among any of them with\\n respect to the subject matter hereof.\\n\\n\\n\\nId. The court explained that “[i]f this merger clause stood alone, there would be\\n\\nno question that it would not by itself preclude reasonable reliance as a matter of\\n\\nlaw.\\\" Id. However, the court found that given the specific facts of that case,\\n\\nEmergent could not claim reasonable reliance, because in addition to the merger\\n\\nclause, the relevant agreements made “29 separate representations and\\n\\n\\n\\n 21\\n\\fwarranties and 16 separate covenants in favor of the . . . purchasers, including\\n\\nEmergent.” Id.\\n\\n On appeal, we affirmed the relevant part of the district court’s decision,\\n\\nholding that “Emergent should have protected itself by insisting that [the alleged\\n\\nmisrepresentations at issue] be included in the stock purchase agreement[,\\n\\nbecause] [g]iven [defendant’s] extensive contractual representations about other\\n\\nmatters, [Emergent’s] sophistication, and the size of the transaction, Emergent’s\\n\\nfailure to do so precludes as a matter of law a finding of reasonable reliance upon\\n\\ndefendants’ misrepresentations.” Emergent Capital, 343 F.3d at 195 (emphasis\\n\\nadded). Here, in contrast, there are no “extensive contractual representations”\\n\\nabout the status of the Fund’s transaction pipeline, the working relationships\\n\\nbetween Foundation’s principals, or any similar subject matter, that might have\\n\\noperated as an implicit disclaimer regarding Foundation’s extra-contractual\\n\\nfactual representations to FIH. Instead, there is only the general merger clause in\\n\\nthe Company Agreement.\\n\\n Defendants argue that, like the plaintiff in Emergent Capital, FIH “did, in\\n\\nfact, actively negotiate and demand certain terms, representations and conditions\\n\\nin connection with its investment,” and thus that Emergent Capital cannot be\\n\\n\\n 22\\n\\fdistinguished on that ground. Appellees’ Br. at 21–22. But each of the negotiated\\n\\nterms that defendants cite—including that “Foundation’s partners [would] defer\\n\\nsome of their compensation until Foundation closed a pipeline hedge fund deal,”\\n\\nid. at 22; that FIH would “share in any management fee earned by Foundation in\\n\\nmanaging the Fund,” id.; “a revised involuntary transfer provision[,] . . . terms\\n\\nconcerning rights of first refusal, most favored nation status, pre-emptive rights,\\n\\nand tag-along rights,” id.—relate to the parties’ obligations, and do not constitute\\n\\naffirmative factual representations of any kind. This is an entirely different\\n\\nsituation from that in Emergent Capital, where the parties actually negotiated\\n\\nfactual representations to be included in the written agreements that suggest a\\n\\nclosed set of such representations upon which the plaintiff’s reliance was\\n\\nacknowledged.\\n\\n The ATSI decision, on which defendants similarly rely for the proposition\\n\\nthat “[w]here the plaintiff is a sophisticated investor and an integrated agreement\\n\\nbetween the parties does not include the misrepresentation at issue, the plaintiff\\n\\ncannot establish reasonable reliance on that misrepresentation,” 493 F.3d at 105\\n\\n(citing Emergent Capital, 343 F.3d at 196), is inapposite for the same reason. For\\n\\none thing, the agreement at issue in that case contained an explicit disclaimer as\\n\\n\\n 23\\n\\fpart of the merger clause, stating that “[t]here are no restrictions, promises,\\n\\nwarranties, or undertakings, other than those set forth or referred to herein.” Id.\\n\\nat 95. We specifically noted that disclaimer in our decision with regard to the\\n\\nplaintiff’s reasonable reliance on the alleged misrepresentations in that case. See\\n\\nid. at 105 (“Of the misrepresentations that ATSI claims, we can quickly dispose of\\n\\nall except the two alleged in the transaction agreements. The . . . agreement\\n\\nbetween [the parties] plainly states that the only promises, restrictions, and\\n\\nwarranties to the transaction were those set forth in the transaction documents.”).\\n\\nMoreover, the subject matter of some of the alleged oral misrepresentations in\\n\\nATSI—that defendants “would not engage in any activity to depress” the price of\\n\\n“stock” by rapidly selling it, id. at 94,—was specifically addressed by written\\n\\nrepresentations in the agreements at issue, providing “that the [defendants]\\n\\nwould soon sell its converted common stock into the public markets” within “90\\n\\ndays of closing” the deal, id. at 95. In this case, by contrast, the merger clause\\n\\ncontains no disclaimer of any kind of representation, and the subject matter of\\n\\ndefendants’ alleged misrepresentations was not addressed by affirmative\\n\\nrepresentations in any agreement between the parties.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24\\n\\f We do not suggest in any way that general disclaimers or merger clauses,\\n\\nthe sophistication of an investor, or the presence of various promises or\\n\\nrepresentations in a written agreement are irrelevant to the reasonableness of a\\n\\nparty’s reliance on pre-contract factual misrepresentations. The defendants here\\n\\nremain free to argue to a jury, based on these or other factors, that FIH did not\\n\\nreasonably rely on any misrepresentations the jury might conclude were made.\\n\\nIndeed, as Emergent Capital demonstrates, there may be circumstances where a\\n\\ngeneral disclaimer or merger clause, together with an extensive roster of\\n\\nspecifically negotiated factual warranties and representations, can lead to a\\n\\nconclusion that, in the particular circumstances of a case, no reasonable jury\\n\\ncould find reasonable reliance on a representation not inserted into the written\\n\\ncontract. And, of course, careful investors negotiating the terms of an\\n\\nindividualized investment can protect themselves by demanding that any\\n\\nrepresentation that is critical to their investment decision be incorporated into the\\n\\nwritten investment agreement.\\n\\nIII. Exclusion of the Expert Report\\n\\n\\n FIH also argues that the district court’s summary judgment decision must\\n\\nbe reversed because the court erred in excluding as untimely an expert report\\n\\n 25\\n\\fopining that in accordance with private equity industry practice, “FIH was\\n\\nreasonable in relying on defendants’ false statements.” Appellant’s Br. at 36. FIH\\n\\nclaims that the district court abused its discretion in excluding this report, which\\n\\nFIH attempted to serve on January 23, 2018 at 11:52pm—eight minutes before the\\n\\nclose of court-ordered discovery. Although we conclude above that the summary\\n\\njudgment decision must be vacated in any event, we address this argument\\n\\nbecause the district court’s ruling on the proposed expert testimony is relevant to\\n\\nthe anticipated trial of this matter.\\n\\n We review a district court’s discovery ruling for “abuse of discretion.”\\n\\nWills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32, 41 (2d Cir. 2004). A district court abuses\\n\\nits discretion “when its decision cannot be located within the range of\\n\\npermissible decisions or is based on a clearly erroneous factual finding or an\\n\\nerror of law.” United States v. Scully, 877 F.3d 464, 474 (2d Cir. 2017). The\\n\\nreasonableness of a decision excluding expert testimony is evaluated according\\n\\nto the following factors: “(1) the party’s explanation for the failure to comply\\n\\nwith the disclosure requirement; (2) the importance of the testimony of the\\n\\nprecluded witnesses; (3) the prejudice suffered by the opposing party as a result\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 26\\n\\fof having to prepare to meet the new testimony; and (4) the possibility of a\\n\\ncontinuance.” Patterson v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104, 117 (2d Cir. 2006).\\n\\n Having considered each of the above factors, we conclude that the district\\n\\ncourt was within its discretion to exclude the expert report. Although the report\\n\\nwas technically served before the close of fact discovery and the court’s\\n\\nscheduling order did not contain an explicit deadline to disclose expert\\n\\nwitnesses, such a deadline had not been set only because FIH had advised the\\n\\ncourt that it did not intend to submit expert testimony, and therefore no party\\n\\nrequested that the court amend the discovery schedule to include one. In any\\n\\nevent, the district court acted well within its discretion in enforcing the discovery\\n\\ndeadline that it did set. Because FIH’s proposed expert would still have needed\\n\\nto be deposed, and defendants would have needed an opportunity to present a\\n\\ncounter-expert, the literally eleventh-hour disclosure of the expert report would\\n\\nhave extended discovery beyond the already-extended, agreed-upon, and court-\\n\\nordered discovery deadline. We therefore identify no error or abuse of discretion\\n\\nin the district court’s exclusion of the expert’s report.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 27\\n\\f CONCLUSION\\n\\n\\n For the reasons stated above, we VACATE the judgment of the district\\n\\ncourt granting summary judgment in favor of appellees, and REMAND for\\n\\nfurther proceedings.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 28\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1498,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8443943,"string":"8,443,943"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. James LYLE, aka Sealed 3, Michael Van Praagh, aka Sealed 1, Anthony Tarantino, aka Sealed 2"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Lyle"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-01"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"Docket Nos. 15-958-cr(L); 15-1175-cr(CON); August Term 2016"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Chin, Lohier, Raggi\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415374/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"CHIN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"LOHIER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"RAGGI"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443943/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. James LYLE, aka Sealed 3, Michael Van Praagh, aka Sealed 1, Anthony Tarantino, aka Sealed 2\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-01\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. James LYLE, aka Sealed 3, Michael Van Praagh, aka Sealed 1, Anthony Tarantino, aka Sealed 2\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-01\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1499,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4605877,"string":"4,605,877"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Valls v. Allstate Ins. Co."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-02"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3495-cv"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before: LEVAL, CABRANES, PARKER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"17‐3495‐cv \\nValls v. Allstate Ins. Co.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n for the Second Circuit\\n \\n \\n AUGUST TERM 2018 \\n \\n No. 17‐3495‐cv \\n \\n WILLIAM A. VALLS, \\n CHRISTINE C. VALLS, \\n \\n Plaintiffs‐Appellants, \\n \\n v. \\n \\n ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, \\n \\n Defendant‐Appellee. \\n \\n \\n On Appeal from the United States District Court \\n for the District of Connecticut \\n \\n \\n ARGUED: JANUARY 30, 2019 \\n DECIDED: APRIL 2, 2019 \\n \\n \\nBefore: LEVAL, CABRANES, PARKER, Circuit Judges.\\n\\f17‐3495‐cv \\nValls v. Allstate Ins. Co.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n \\n\\n This appeal arises from the multitude of lawsuits filed by \\nConnecticut homeowners whose basement walls were likely \\nconstructed with defective concrete manufactured by the now‐defunct \\nJ.J. Mottes Company—the so‐called “crumbling concrete cases.” \\nPlaintiffs‐Appellants William A. Valls and Christine C. Valls (the \\n“Vallses”) appeal from a September 28, 2017 judgment of the United \\nStates District Court for the District of Connecticut (Victor A. Bolden, \\nJudge) granting the motion of Defendant‐Appellee Allstate Insurance \\nCompany (“Allstate”) to dismiss the Vallses’ amended complaint \\npursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). This case \\npresents a single question: Whether the “collapse” provision in the \\ninstant Allstate homeowner’s insurance policy affords coverage for \\nbasement walls that exhibit significant cracking but remain standing. \\nWe conclude that, unfortunate as the Vallses’ circumstances may be, \\ntheir policy terms do not afford coverage. Accordingly, we AFFIRM \\nthe District Court’s September 28, 2017 judgment. \\n \\n\\n JEFFREY R. LINDEQUIST, Law Office of \\n Michael D. Parker, Springfield, MA, for \\n Plaintiffs‐Appellants. \\n\\n RAYMOND T. DEMEO (Jessica A.R. Hamilton, \\n on the brief), Robinson & Cole LLP, Hartford, \\n CT, for Defendant‐Appellee. \\n\\n \\n\\f \\n\\nPER CURIAM: \\n\\n This appeal arises from the multitude of lawsuits filed by \\nConnecticut homeowners whose basement walls were likely \\nconstructed with defective concrete manufactured by the now‐defunct \\nJ.J. Mottes Company—the so‐called “crumbling concrete cases.” \\nPlaintiffs‐Appellants William A. Valls and Christine C. Valls (the \\n“Vallses”) appeal from a September 28, 2017 judgment of the United \\nStates District Court for the District of Connecticut (Victor A. Bolden, \\nJudge) granting the motion of Defendant‐Appellee Allstate Insurance \\nCompany (“Allstate”) to dismiss the Vallses’ amended complaint \\npursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). This case \\npresents a single question: Whether the “collapse” provision in the \\ninstant Allstate homeowner’s insurance policy affords coverage for \\nbasement walls that exhibit significant cracking but remain standing. \\nWe conclude that, unfortunate as the Vallses’ circumstances may be, \\ntheir policy terms do not afford coverage. Accordingly, we AFFIRM \\nthe District Court’s September 28, 2017 judgment. \\n \\n I. BACKGROUND \\n\\n The Vallses own a home in Coventry, Connecticut that is \\ninsured by Allstate. In October 2015, the Vallses noticed several \\nhorizontal and vertical cracks in their basement walls. While the \\ndegree of damage is disputed, it is not disputed that the basement \\nwalls remain standing. Accepting the facts plausibly alleged in the \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 \\n \\n\\fcomplaint, the dispute is whether Allstate’s homeowner’s insurance \\nPolicy (the “Policy”) covers the damage the Vallses have alleged. \\n \\n The Vallses originally filed this action in state court, and Allstate \\ntimely removed the case to the District Court. The amended complaint \\nprincipally asserts three causes of action against Allstate: (1) breach of \\ncontract based on Allstate’s denial of coverage under the Policy; (2) \\nbreach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (3) \\nunfair and deceptive practices in violation of the Connecticut Unfair \\nInsurance Practices Act (“CUIPA”), as enforced through the \\nConnecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”). \\n \\n The Policy is an “all‐risk” policy that covers “sudden and \\naccidental direct physical loss to property . . . except as limited or \\nexcluded in this policy.”1 The Policy generally excludes “[c]ollapse” \\nfrom its all‐risk coverage.2 In a section entitled “Additional \\nProtection,” however, the Policy reinstates coverage for a limited class \\nof collapses: \\n \\n We will cover: \\n \\n a) the entire collapse of a covered building \\n structure; \\n\\n\\n\\n 1 J.A. 27. \\n 2 Id. at 28. \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 \\n \\n\\f b) the entire collapse of part of a covered \\n building structure; and \\n c) direct physical loss to covered property \\n caused by (a) or (b) above. \\n \\n For coverage to apply, the collapse of a building \\n structure specified in (a) or (b) above must be a \\n sudden and accidental direct physical loss \\n caused by one or more of the following: . . . \\n \\n b) hidden decay of the building structure; . . . \\n \\n f) defective methods or materials used in \\n construction, repair, remodeling or renovation. \\n\\n Collapse does not include settling, cracking, \\n shrinking, bulging or expansion.3 \\n \\nThe sole issue on appeal is whether the gradual deterioration of the \\nVallses’ still‐standing basement walls constitutes a covered “collapse” \\nunder this provision of the Policy. \\n \\n II. CERTIFICATION \\n\\n Because this case depends on Connecticut state law, and a large \\nnumber of Connecticut homes covered by homeowners’ policies \\n\\n 3 Id. at 36 (emphasis omitted). \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 \\n \\n\\fappear to be similarly affected by defective concrete foundations, we \\ncontemplated certifying the question of coverage to the Connecticut \\nSupreme Court. At oral argument, we asked the parties whether they \\nwere amenable to certification. Allstate, the out‐of‐state party in this \\ndiversity case, strenuously objected to certification. For the reasons \\nthat follow, we decline to certify. \\n \\n Under the rules of this Court and Connecticut law, we may \\ncertify a question to the Connecticut Supreme Court “if the answer \\nmay be determinative of an issue” in a pending case before us “and if \\nthere is no controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision or \\nstatute.”4 “Certification is a discretionary device, both for the \\ncertifying court and for the court requested to answer the certified \\nquestion[s].”5 \\n \\n There is much to be said in favor of certification in such a case. \\nThe issue is, of course, one of Connecticut law. Without the guidance \\nof the Connecticut Supreme Court, we can have no assurance that our \\nresolution will correspond to what the Connecticut Supreme Court \\nwould or will eventually decide. In a diversity case, we sit in some \\nsense as an intermediate appellate court of the state, but our rulings on \\nan issue of state law are not reviewable by the highest court of the state. \\nAs a result, we risk that “the party who lost in federal court has been \\nunjustly denied her state‐law rights,” without any “means of effective \\n\\n\\n See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51‐199b(d); 2d Cir. Local R. 27.2. \\n 4\\n\\n\\n\\n Riordan v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1992). \\n 5\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 \\n \\n\\fredress.”6 Our decision, if based on the Connecticut Supreme Court’s \\nanswer to a certified question, might effectively resolve numerous \\npending state court cases, while our decision without guidance from \\nthe Connecticut Supreme Court will give little or no meaningful \\ninstruction to how Connecticut’s Supreme Court will rule on the many \\npending cases. Moreover, certification by federal courts may serve \\nprinciples of comity and federalism by deferring to state courts to \\ndecide on state law issues, especially where policy concerns of \\nparticular importance in the state are at stake. \\n \\n On the other hand, as courts have recognized, certification has \\nsignificant potential detriments for the parties, many of which are \\npresent in this case. It increases, at times enormously, the expenses \\nincurred by the parties, as it requires at least two additional rounds of \\nappellate review.7 Certification also inevitably delays the resolution of \\nthe case, sometimes for well more than a year. In cases involving \\nmodest amounts at stake, the expense added by certification can \\nexceed the amount in contention, and, depending on the \\ncircumstances, the attendant delays may also be unjustifiably \\nburdensome.8 For example, in a case such as this that involves an \\n\\n McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 159 (2d Cir. 1997) (Calabresi, J., \\n 6\\n\\ndissenting). \\n\\n See also Brown v. Argosy Gaming Co., 384 F.3d 413, 417 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting \\n 7\\n\\nthe Seventh Circuit’s “hesitancy to utilize the certification process with its \\nincumbent costs to the litigants and the state court system”). \\n 8 See Tunick v. Safir, 209 F.3d 67, 78‐79 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting the delay and \\nexpense associated with certification); see also id. at 95 (Sack, J., concurring) \\n(objecting to certification because it would postpone the plaintiff’s speech, but \\n\\n\\n\\n 7 \\n \\n\\findividual homeowner’s insurance claim, the added litigation costs of \\ncertification may effectively nullify a significant portion of the \\nplaintiffs’ potential recovery, or even exceed the value of the claim. \\n \\n In addition, while our Court has at times underlined the value \\nof certification to our federal system, in that the device helps to \\nrealize the federalist objective of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. \\n64 (1938), significant federalism interests can also cut against \\ncertification. In diversity cases, certification can effectively defeat a \\nlitigant’s constitutionally endorsed entitlement to have its case \\nadjudicated by a federal court rather than a state court, as \\ncertification will often effectively empower the state court to \\ndetermine the outcome.9 Where the out‐of‐state litigant removes a \\ndispute against an in‐state litigant to federal court (or originates the \\nsuit in federal court), certification nevertheless returns that litigant to \\nstate court, potentially nullifying the right of access to the federal \\ncourt.10 That right of access to federal courts in diversity cases, \\nexpressly authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the \\nJudiciary Act of 1789 enacted by the first Congress (now provided by \\n28 U.S.C. § 1332), is a meaningful part of our federal structure. Here, \\nAllstate, the out‐of‐state litigant, removed to federal court and, upon\", \"author\": \"Judge) granting the motion of Defendant-Appellee Allstate Insurance\"}, {\"type\": \"concurrence\", \"author\": \"reluctantly\", \"text\": \"reluctantly concurring in certification as preferable to a stalemate without a \\nmajority). \\n 9 See Corsair Special Situations Fund, L.P. v. Pesiri, 863 F.3d 176, 184 (2d Cir. \\n2017) (Leval, J., concurring). \\n 10 See id. \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 \\n \\n\\four inquiry whether it consented to certification, objected \\nemphatically. Under these circumstances, Allstate as a foreign party \\nhas a constitutionally‐recognized interest in not being put back in \\nstate court through the process of certification, an interest which is \\nentitled to significant weight in a federal court’s decision whether to \\ncertify.11 \\n \\n We recognize that in certain unusual circumstances, the \\narguments favoring certification may be strong notwithstanding \\nobjection by a party. For example, some “state law questions only \\narise in disputes governed exclusively by federal law, such as \\nbankruptcy or copyright,” such that “unless there is certification, the \\nstate courts [would be] substantially deprived of the opportunity to \\ndefine state law.”12 And some cases involve a question of state \\nstatutory interpretation antecedent to a federal constitutional issue, \\nwhich would raise the possibility of federal court abstention under \\nthe Pullman doctrine.13 The Supreme Court has explained that \\ncertification is particularly appropriate in that context because, \\nabsent certification, (1) a federal court’s application of the canon of \\nconstitutional avoidance to a state statute is especially likely to create \\n“friction‐generating error” between its interpretation and that of state \\n\\n\\n See id. (noting that this concern on behalf of the out‐of‐state litigant was \\n 11\\n\\nnot worrisome in that case “because, when the possibility of certification was \\npresented to the parties, neither side objected”). \\n 12 Gutierrez v. Smith, 702 F.3d 103, 116 (2d Cir. 2012). \\n 13 See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 9 \\n \\n\\fcourts, and (2) federal courts might unnecessarily or prematurely \\ndecide on constitutional issues that might be avoided by a state \\ncourt’s interpretation of the statute.14 Moreover, the Court explained, \\nalthough the certification process may entail added cost and delay, \\nthat cost and delay are typically lower than that associated with the \\nprocess of abstention, rendering certification an appealing \\nalterative.15 \\n \\n These cases, however, raise no such special circumstances. \\nNotwithstanding the potential benefits of certification, its inevitable \\nburdens on the parties relating to cost and delay and its consequence \\nfor a party exercising its right to have a diversity case decided by a \\nfederal court weighs against certification when the parties do not \\nunanimously consent. For these reasons, we have concluded that \\ncertification to the Supreme Court of Connecticut is not appropriate \\nin this case. \\n \\n III. DISCUSSION \\n\\n There is no dispute that Connecticut law governs our \\ninterpretation of the Policy. Connecticut courts interpret an insurance \\npolicy “by the same general rules that govern the construction of any \\nwritten contract”—that is, by “look[ing] at the contract as a whole, \\nconsider[ing] all relevant portions together and, if possible, giv[ing] \\n\\n See Tunick, 209 F.3d at 75‐76 (citing Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, \\n 14\\n\\n520 U.S. 43, 79 (1997)). \\n 15 See Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 79. \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 \\n \\n\\foperative effect to every provision in order to reach a reasonable \\noverall result.”16 If the policy’s terms are “clear and unambiguous,” \\nthen that language “must be accorded its natural and ordinary \\nmeaning.”17 Any ambiguities in the policy are “construed in favor of \\nthe insured because the insurance company drafted the policy.”18 \\n \\n The Vallses contend that our interpretation of the Policy’s \\ncollapse provision should be governed by Beach v. Middlesex Mutual \\nAssurance Co., 205 Conn. 246 (1987). But the insurance policy analyzed \\nin Beach is easily distinguished. Unlike the Allstate Policy, the policy \\nin Beach did not define or otherwise qualify the term “collapse.” \\nIndeed, it was the absence of such clarifying language that rendered \\nthe term “collapse” ambiguous in the Beach policy. Based on this \\nambiguity, the court in Beach concluded that the term “collapse,” left \\nundefined, encompasses “substantial impairment of the structural \\nintegrity of a building.”19 Here, by contrast, Allstate has expressly \\ncircumscribed the definition of “collapse” in its Policy with several \\nqualifying terms. For example, Allstate’s Policy requires that such \\ncollapses be “entire,” “sudden,” and “accidental.” \\n\\n 16 Lexington Ins. Co. v. Lexington Healthcare Grp., Inc., 311 Conn. 29, 37‐38 \\n(2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). \\n 17 Id. at 38 (internal quotation marks omitted). \\n 18 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). \\n 19 Beach, 205 Conn. at 253; see also id. at 251 (“If the defendant wished to rely \\non a single facial meaning of the term ‘collapse’ as used in its policy, it had the \\nopportunity expressly to define the term to provide for the limited usage it now \\nclaims to have intended.”). \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 11 \\n \\n\\f \\n We now turn to the limiting effect of the terms “sudden and \\naccidental” and “entire collapse” within the Policy. The phrase \\n“sudden and accidental” in the Policy20 requires that the collapse in \\nquestion occur both abruptly and unexpectedly. As the Connecticut \\nSupreme Court has observed: \\n \\n Reading “sudden” in its context, i.e. joined \\n by the word “and” to the word “accident,” \\n the inescapable conclusion is that “sudden,” \\n even if including the concept of \\n unexpectedness, also adds an additional \\n element because unexpectedness is already \\n expressed by “accidental.” This additional \\n element is the temporal meaning of \\n “sudden,” i.e. abruptness or brevity.21 \\n \\n Here, the gradual erosion and cracking of the basement walls \\nwas not sudden. Thus, the inclusion of the words “sudden and \\naccidental” in the collapse provision is sufficient to bar coverage under \\nthe Policy for the damage sustained to the Vallses’ basement walls. \\n \\n\\n 20 J.A. 36. \\n 21 Buell Indus., Inc. v. Greater New York Mut. Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527, 540‐41 \\n(2002) (quotation marks added) (internal ellipsis and brackets omitted) (quoting \\nMustang Tractor & Equip. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 76 F.3d 89, 92 (5th Cir. 1996)) \\n(interpreting the terms “sudden and accidental” in a pollution exclusion clause). \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 \\n \\n\\f \\n Because any alleged collapse here was not “sudden,” it follows \\nthat the damage to the Vallses’ walls is not covered by the Policy. But \\neven if such cracking could be said to have occurred suddenly or \\naccidentally, the Vallses’ claim is still barred because the damage \\nsustained to their basement walls cannot be deemed an “entire \\ncollapse.”22 Whatever the term “entire collapse” encompasses, it must \\nentail more than mere “cracking,” since cracking is expressly excluded \\nunder the Policy’s provision that “[c]ollapse does not include settling, \\ncracking, shrinking, bulging or expansion.”23 \\n \\n * * * \\n\\n The Vallses claim that it is inconsistent to interpret the term \\n“sudden” as imposing an abruptness requirement when several of the \\nPolicy’s enumerated causes of collapse—including “hidden decay”—\\noccur gradually. But this argument is unavailing, since physical \\ncollapse can occur abruptly even if the underlying cause proceeds \\nslowly. One district court has helpfully illustrated the distinction as \\nfollows: \\n \\n There’s termites in the house. No collapse. \\n They’re eating away; every day they’re \\n eating away. No collapse. They keep eating \\n\\n\\n 22 J.A. 36 (emphasis added). \\n 23 See id. \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 13 \\n \\n\\f away. Finally, they eat enough that the beam \\n fails. . . . Now there’s coverage. Now you \\n have a collapse or falling in. The fact that it \\n was caused by termites and it was a slow \\n process doesn’t mean you didn’t have an \\n abrupt collapse. You did, when the beam \\n failed and there was literally a falling of the \\n beam, a failure of the beam.24 \\n \\nWhile the concrete in the Vallses’ basement walls may be gradually \\ndeteriorating, there has been no sudden entire collapse, and there is no \\ncoverage for gradual decay unless it has caused such a collapse. \\nAccordingly, the Vallses’ claim was properly excluded under the \\nPolicy. \\n \\n We conclude that the horizontal and vertical cracking in the \\nVallses’ basement walls does not constitute a covered “collapse” under \\nthe Policy. Accordingly, Allstate did not breach its contract by denying \\ncoverage for the Vallses’ claim. And because Allstate did not breach \\nits contract, the Vallses’ bad faith and CUTPA/CUIPA claims \\nnecessarily fail.25 \\n\\n\\n Agosti v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 279 F. Supp. 3d 370, 378 (D. Conn. \\n 24\\n\\n2017) (Underhill, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted). \\n 25 See Capstone Bldg. Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 308 Conn. 760, 798 (2013) \\n(“[B]ad faith is not actionable apart from a wrongful denial of a benefit.”); Zulick v. \\nPatrons Mut. Ins. Co., 287 Conn. 367, 378 (2008) (“Because we have concluded that \\nthe [insurer’s] interpretation of the policy’s coverage limitation was correct, there \\ncan be no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the application of that \\n\\n\\n\\n 14 \\n \\n\\f IV. CONCLUSION \\n\\n To summarize: We hold that the “collapse” provision in the \\nAllstate homeowner’s insurance policy at issue here does not afford \\ncoverage for basement walls that exhibit signs of deterioration but \\nthat have not collapsed suddenly, accidentally, and entirely, as \\nrequired by the Policy. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the \\nDistrict Court’s September 28, 2017 judgment dismissing the Vallses’ \\namended complaint for failure to state a claim. \\n\\n\\n\\n\\ninterpretation as a general business practice constituted oppressive, unethical or \\nunscrupulous conduct in violation of [CUTPA/CUIPA].”). \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 15\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"LEVAL"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"CABRANES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"PARKER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"LEVAL\": \", Circuit\", \"CABRANES\": \", Circuit\", \"PARKER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605877/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Valls v. Allstate Ins. Co.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-02\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n17‐3495‐cv \nValls v. Allstate Ins. Co.\n\n\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n for the Second Circuit\n \n \n AUGUST TERM 2018 \n \n No. 17‐3495‐cv \n \n WILLIAM A. VALLS, \n CHRISTINE C. VALLS, \n \n Plaintiffs‐Appellants, \n \n v. \n \n ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, \n \n Defendant‐Appellee. \n \n \n On Appeal from the United States District Court \n for the District of Connecticut \n \n \n ARGUED: JANUARY 30, 2019 \n DECIDED: APRIL 2, 2019 \n \n \nBefore: LEVAL, CABRANES, PARKER, Circuit Judges.\n\f17‐3495‐cv \nValls v. Allstate Ins. Co.\n\n\n\n\n \n\n This appeal arises from the multitude of lawsuits filed by \nConnecticut homeowners whose basement walls were likely \nconstructed with defective concrete manufactured by the now‐defunct \nJ.J. Mottes Company—the so‐called “crumbling concrete cases.” \nPlaintiffs‐Appellants William A. Valls and Christine C. Valls (the \n“Vallses”) appeal from a September 28, 2017 judgment of the United \nStates District Court for the District of Connecticut (Victor A. Bolden, \nJudge) granting the motion of Defendant‐Appellee Allstate Insurance \nCompany (“Allstate”) to dismiss the Vallses’ amended complaint \npursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). This case \npresents a single question: Whether the “collapse” provision in the \ninstant Allstate homeowner’s insurance policy affords coverage for \nbasement walls that exhibit significant cracking but remain standing. \nWe conclude that, unfortunate as the Vallses’ circumstances may be, \ntheir policy terms do not afford coverage. Accordingly, we AFFIRM \nthe District Court’s September 28, 2017 judgment. \n \n\n JEFFREY R. LINDEQUIST, Law Office of \n Michael D. Parker, Springfield, MA, for \n Plaintiffs‐Appellants. \n\n RAYMOND T. DEMEO (Jessica A.R. Hamilton, \n on the brief), Robinson & Cole LLP, Hartford, \n CT, for Defendant‐Appellee. \n\n \n\f \n\nPER CURIAM: \n\n This appeal arises from the multitude of lawsuits filed by \nConnecticut homeowners whose basement walls were likely \nconstructed with defective concrete manufactured by the now‐defunct \nJ.J. Mottes Company—the so‐called “crumbling concrete cases.” \nPlaintiffs‐Appellants William A. Valls and Christine C. Valls (the \n“Vallses”) appeal from a September 28, 2017 judgment of the United \nStates District Court for the District of Connecticut (Victor A. Bolden, \nJudge) granting the motion of Defendant‐Appellee Allstate Insurance \nCompany (“Allstate”) to dismiss the Vallses’ amended complaint \npursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). This case \npresents a single question: Whether the “collapse” provision in the \ninstant Allstate homeowner’s insurance policy affords coverage for \nbasement walls that exhibit significant cracking but remain standing. \nWe conclude that, unfortunate as the Vallses’ circumstances may be, \ntheir policy terms do not afford coverage. Accordingly, we AFFIRM \nthe District Court’s September 28, 2017 judgment. \n \n I. BACKGROUND \n\n The Vallses own a home in Coventry, Connecticut that is \ninsured by Allstate. In October 2015, the Vallses noticed several \nhorizontal and vertical cracks in their basement walls. While the \ndegree of damage is disputed, it is not disputed that the basement \nwalls remain standing. Accepting the facts plausibly alleged in the \n\n\n\n\n 3 \n \n\fcomplaint, the dispute is whether Allstate’s homeowner’s insurance \nPolicy (the “Policy”) covers the damage the Vallses have alleged. \n \n The Vallses originally filed this action in state court, and Allstate \ntimely removed the case to the District Court. The amended complaint \nprincipally asserts three causes of action against Allstate: (1) breach of \ncontract based on Allstate’s denial of coverage under the Policy; (2) \nbreach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (3) \nunfair and deceptive practices in violation of the Connecticut Unfair \nInsurance Practices Act (“CUIPA”), as enforced through the \nConnecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”). \n \n The Policy is an “all‐risk” policy that covers “sudden and \naccidental direct physical loss to property . . . except as limited or \nexcluded in this policy.”1 The Policy generally excludes “[c]ollapse” \nfrom its all‐risk coverage.2 In a section entitled “Additional \nProtection,” however, the Policy reinstates coverage for a limited class \nof collapses: \n \n We will cover: \n \n a) the entire collapse of a covered building \n structure; \n\n\n\n 1 J.A. 27. \n 2 Id. at 28. \n\n\n\n\n 4 \n \n\f b) the entire collapse of part of a covered \n building structure; and \n c) direct physical loss to covered property \n caused by (a) or (b) above. \n \n For coverage to apply, the collapse of a building \n structure specified in (a) or (b) above must be a \n sudden and accidental direct physical loss \n caused by one or more of the following: . . . \n \n b) hidden decay of the building structure; . . . \n \n f) defective methods or materials used in \n construction, repair, remodeling or renovation. \n\n Collapse does not include settling, cracking, \n shrinking, bulging or expansion.3 \n \nThe sole issue on appeal is whether the gradual deterioration of the \nVallses’ still‐standing basement walls constitutes a covered “collapse” \nunder this provision of the Policy. \n \n II. CERTIFICATION \n\n Because this case depends on Connecticut state law, and a large \nnumber of Connecticut homes covered by homeowners’ policies \n\n 3 Id. at 36 (emphasis omitted). \n\n\n\n\n 5 \n \n\fappear to be similarly affected by defective concrete foundations, we \ncontemplated certifying the question of coverage to the Connecticut \nSupreme Court. At oral argument, we asked the parties whether they \nwere amenable to certification. Allstate, the out‐of‐state party in this \ndiversity case, strenuously objected to certification. For the reasons \nthat follow, we decline to certify. \n \n Under the rules of this Court and Connecticut law, we may \ncertify a question to the Connecticut Supreme Court “if the answer \nmay be determinative of an issue” in a pending case before us “and if \nthere is no controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision or \nstatute.”4 “Certification is a discretionary device, both for the \ncertifying court and for the court requested to answer the certified \nquestion[s].”5 \n \n There is much to be said in favor of certification in such a case. \nThe issue is, of course, one of Connecticut law. Without the guidance \nof the Connecticut Supreme Court, we can have no assurance that our \nresolution will correspond to what the Connecticut Supreme Court \nwould or will eventually decide. In a diversity case, we sit in some \nsense as an intermediate appellate court of the state, but our rulings on \nan issue of state law are not reviewable by the highest court of the state. \nAs a result, we risk that “the party who lost in federal court has been \nunjustly denied her state‐law rights,” without any “means of effective \n\n\n See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51‐199b(d); 2d Cir. Local R. 27.2. \n 4\n\n\n\n Riordan v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1992). \n 5\n\n\n\n\n 6 \n \n\fredress.”6 Our decision, if based on the Connecticut Supreme Court’s \nanswer to a certified question, might effectively resolve numerous \npending state court cases, while our decision without guidance from \nthe Connecticut Supreme Court will give little or no meaningful \ninstruction to how Connecticut’s Supreme Court will rule on the many \npending cases. Moreover, certification by federal courts may serve \nprinciples of comity and federalism by deferring to state courts to \ndecide on state law issues, especially where policy concerns of \nparticular importance in the state are at stake. \n \n On the other hand, as courts have recognized, certification has \nsignificant potential detriments for the parties, many of which are \npresent in this case. It increases, at times enormously, the expenses \nincurred by the parties, as it requires at least two additional rounds of \nappellate review.7 Certification also inevitably delays the resolution of \nthe case, sometimes for well more than a year. In cases involving \nmodest amounts at stake, the expense added by certification can \nexceed the amount in contention, and, depending on the \ncircumstances, the attendant delays may also be unjustifiably \nburdensome.8 For example, in a case such as this that involves an \n\n McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 159 (2d Cir. 1997) (Calabresi, J., \n 6\n\ndissenting). \n\n See also Brown v. Argosy Gaming Co., 384 F.3d 413, 417 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting \n 7\n\nthe Seventh Circuit’s “hesitancy to utilize the certification process with its \nincumbent costs to the litigants and the state court system”). \n 8 See Tunick v. Safir, 209 F.3d 67, 78‐79 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting the delay and \nexpense associated with certification); see also id. at 95 (Sack, J., concurring) \n(objecting to certification because it would postpone the plaintiff’s speech, but \n\n\n\n 7 \n \n\findividual homeowner’s insurance claim, the added litigation costs of \ncertification may effectively nullify a significant portion of the \nplaintiffs’ potential recovery, or even exceed the value of the claim. \n \n In addition, while our Court has at times underlined the value \nof certification to our federal system, in that the device helps to \nrealize the federalist objective of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. \n64 (1938), significant federalism interests can also cut against \ncertification. In diversity cases, certification can effectively defeat a \nlitigant’s constitutionally endorsed entitlement to have its case \nadjudicated by a federal court rather than a state court, as \ncertification will often effectively empower the state court to \ndetermine the outcome.9 Where the out‐of‐state litigant removes a \ndispute against an in‐state litigant to federal court (or originates the \nsuit in federal court), certification nevertheless returns that litigant to \nstate court, potentially nullifying the right of access to the federal \ncourt.10 That right of access to federal courts in diversity cases, \nexpressly authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the \nJudiciary Act of 1789 enacted by the first Congress (now provided by \n28 U.S.C. § 1332), is a meaningful part of our federal structure. Here, \nAllstate, the out‐of‐state litigant, removed to federal court and, upon\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Valls v. Allstate Ins. Co.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-02\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n17‐3495‐cv \\nValls v. Allstate Ins. Co.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n for the Second Circuit\\n \\n \\n AUGUST TERM 2018 \\n \\n No. 17‐3495‐cv \\n \\n WILLIAM A. VALLS, \\n CHRISTINE C. VALLS, \\n \\n Plaintiffs‐Appellants, \\n \\n v. \\n \\n ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, \\n \\n Defendant‐Appellee. \\n \\n \\n On Appeal from the United States District Court \\n for the District of Connecticut \\n \\n \\n ARGUED: JANUARY 30, 2019 \\n DECIDED: APRIL 2, 2019 \\n \\n \\nBefore: LEVAL, CABRANES, PARKER, Circuit Judges.\\n\\f17‐3495‐cv \\nValls v. Allstate Ins. Co.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n \\n\\n This appeal arises from the multitude of lawsuits filed by \\nConnecticut homeowners whose basement walls were likely \\nconstructed with defective concrete manufactured by the now‐defunct \\nJ.J. Mottes Company—the so‐called “crumbling concrete cases.” \\nPlaintiffs‐Appellants William A. Valls and Christine C. Valls (the \\n“Vallses”) appeal from a September 28, 2017 judgment of the United \\nStates District Court for the District of Connecticut (Victor A. Bolden, \\nJudge) granting the motion of Defendant‐Appellee Allstate Insurance \\nCompany (“Allstate”) to dismiss the Vallses’ amended complaint \\npursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). This case \\npresents a single question: Whether the “collapse” provision in the \\ninstant Allstate homeowner’s insurance policy affords coverage for \\nbasement walls that exhibit significant cracking but remain standing. \\nWe conclude that, unfortunate as the Vallses’ circumstances may be, \\ntheir policy terms do not afford coverage. Accordingly, we AFFIRM \\nthe District Court’s September 28, 2017 judgment. \\n \\n\\n JEFFREY R. LINDEQUIST, Law Office of \\n Michael D. Parker, Springfield, MA, for \\n Plaintiffs‐Appellants. \\n\\n RAYMOND T. DEMEO (Jessica A.R. Hamilton, \\n on the brief), Robinson & Cole LLP, Hartford, \\n CT, for Defendant‐Appellee. \\n\\n \\n\\f \\n\\nPER CURIAM: \\n\\n This appeal arises from the multitude of lawsuits filed by \\nConnecticut homeowners whose basement walls were likely \\nconstructed with defective concrete manufactured by the now‐defunct \\nJ.J. Mottes Company—the so‐called “crumbling concrete cases.” \\nPlaintiffs‐Appellants William A. Valls and Christine C. Valls (the \\n“Vallses”) appeal from a September 28, 2017 judgment of the United \\nStates District Court for the District of Connecticut (Victor A. Bolden, \\nJudge) granting the motion of Defendant‐Appellee Allstate Insurance \\nCompany (“Allstate”) to dismiss the Vallses’ amended complaint \\npursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). This case \\npresents a single question: Whether the “collapse” provision in the \\ninstant Allstate homeowner’s insurance policy affords coverage for \\nbasement walls that exhibit significant cracking but remain standing. \\nWe conclude that, unfortunate as the Vallses’ circumstances may be, \\ntheir policy terms do not afford coverage. Accordingly, we AFFIRM \\nthe District Court’s September 28, 2017 judgment. \\n \\n I. BACKGROUND \\n\\n The Vallses own a home in Coventry, Connecticut that is \\ninsured by Allstate. In October 2015, the Vallses noticed several \\nhorizontal and vertical cracks in their basement walls. While the \\ndegree of damage is disputed, it is not disputed that the basement \\nwalls remain standing. Accepting the facts plausibly alleged in the \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 \\n \\n\\fcomplaint, the dispute is whether Allstate’s homeowner’s insurance \\nPolicy (the “Policy”) covers the damage the Vallses have alleged. \\n \\n The Vallses originally filed this action in state court, and Allstate \\ntimely removed the case to the District Court. The amended complaint \\nprincipally asserts three causes of action against Allstate: (1) breach of \\ncontract based on Allstate’s denial of coverage under the Policy; (2) \\nbreach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (3) \\nunfair and deceptive practices in violation of the Connecticut Unfair \\nInsurance Practices Act (“CUIPA”), as enforced through the \\nConnecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”). \\n \\n The Policy is an “all‐risk” policy that covers “sudden and \\naccidental direct physical loss to property . . . except as limited or \\nexcluded in this policy.”1 The Policy generally excludes “[c]ollapse” \\nfrom its all‐risk coverage.2 In a section entitled “Additional \\nProtection,” however, the Policy reinstates coverage for a limited class \\nof collapses: \\n \\n We will cover: \\n \\n a) the entire collapse of a covered building \\n structure; \\n\\n\\n\\n 1 J.A. 27. \\n 2 Id. at 28. \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 \\n \\n\\f b) the entire collapse of part of a covered \\n building structure; and \\n c) direct physical loss to covered property \\n caused by (a) or (b) above. \\n \\n For coverage to apply, the collapse of a building \\n structure specified in (a) or (b) above must be a \\n sudden and accidental direct physical loss \\n caused by one or more of the following: . . . \\n \\n b) hidden decay of the building structure; . . . \\n \\n f) defective methods or materials used in \\n construction, repair, remodeling or renovation. \\n\\n Collapse does not include settling, cracking, \\n shrinking, bulging or expansion.3 \\n \\nThe sole issue on appeal is whether the gradual deterioration of the \\nVallses’ still‐standing basement walls constitutes a covered “collapse” \\nunder this provision of the Policy. \\n \\n II. CERTIFICATION \\n\\n Because this case depends on Connecticut state law, and a large \\nnumber of Connecticut homes covered by homeowners’ policies \\n\\n 3 Id. at 36 (emphasis omitted). \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 \\n \\n\\fappear to be similarly affected by defective concrete foundations, we \\ncontemplated certifying the question of coverage to the Connecticut \\nSupreme Court. At oral argument, we asked the parties whether they \\nwere amenable to certification. Allstate, the out‐of‐state party in this \\ndiversity case, strenuously objected to certification. For the reasons \\nthat follow, we decline to certify. \\n \\n Under the rules of this Court and Connecticut law, we may \\ncertify a question to the Connecticut Supreme Court “if the answer \\nmay be determinative of an issue” in a pending case before us “and if \\nthere is no controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision or \\nstatute.”4 “Certification is a discretionary device, both for the \\ncertifying court and for the court requested to answer the certified \\nquestion[s].”5 \\n \\n There is much to be said in favor of certification in such a case. \\nThe issue is, of course, one of Connecticut law. Without the guidance \\nof the Connecticut Supreme Court, we can have no assurance that our \\nresolution will correspond to what the Connecticut Supreme Court \\nwould or will eventually decide. In a diversity case, we sit in some \\nsense as an intermediate appellate court of the state, but our rulings on \\nan issue of state law are not reviewable by the highest court of the state. \\nAs a result, we risk that “the party who lost in federal court has been \\nunjustly denied her state‐law rights,” without any “means of effective \\n\\n\\n See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51‐199b(d); 2d Cir. Local R. 27.2. \\n 4\\n\\n\\n\\n Riordan v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1992). \\n 5\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 \\n \\n\\fredress.”6 Our decision, if based on the Connecticut Supreme Court’s \\nanswer to a certified question, might effectively resolve numerous \\npending state court cases, while our decision without guidance from \\nthe Connecticut Supreme Court will give little or no meaningful \\ninstruction to how Connecticut’s Supreme Court will rule on the many \\npending cases. Moreover, certification by federal courts may serve \\nprinciples of comity and federalism by deferring to state courts to \\ndecide on state law issues, especially where policy concerns of \\nparticular importance in the state are at stake. \\n \\n On the other hand, as courts have recognized, certification has \\nsignificant potential detriments for the parties, many of which are \\npresent in this case. It increases, at times enormously, the expenses \\nincurred by the parties, as it requires at least two additional rounds of \\nappellate review.7 Certification also inevitably delays the resolution of \\nthe case, sometimes for well more than a year. In cases involving \\nmodest amounts at stake, the expense added by certification can \\nexceed the amount in contention, and, depending on the \\ncircumstances, the attendant delays may also be unjustifiably \\nburdensome.8 For example, in a case such as this that involves an \\n\\n McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 159 (2d Cir. 1997) (Calabresi, J., \\n 6\\n\\ndissenting). \\n\\n See also Brown v. Argosy Gaming Co., 384 F.3d 413, 417 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting \\n 7\\n\\nthe Seventh Circuit’s “hesitancy to utilize the certification process with its \\nincumbent costs to the litigants and the state court system”). \\n 8 See Tunick v. Safir, 209 F.3d 67, 78‐79 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting the delay and \\nexpense associated with certification); see also id. at 95 (Sack, J., concurring) \\n(objecting to certification because it would postpone the plaintiff’s speech, but \\n\\n\\n\\n 7 \\n \\n\\findividual homeowner’s insurance claim, the added litigation costs of \\ncertification may effectively nullify a significant portion of the \\nplaintiffs’ potential recovery, or even exceed the value of the claim. \\n \\n In addition, while our Court has at times underlined the value \\nof certification to our federal system, in that the device helps to \\nrealize the federalist objective of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. \\n64 (1938), significant federalism interests can also cut against \\ncertification. In diversity cases, certification can effectively defeat a \\nlitigant’s constitutionally endorsed entitlement to have its case \\nadjudicated by a federal court rather than a state court, as \\ncertification will often effectively empower the state court to \\ndetermine the outcome.9 Where the out‐of‐state litigant removes a \\ndispute against an in‐state litigant to federal court (or originates the \\nsuit in federal court), certification nevertheless returns that litigant to \\nstate court, potentially nullifying the right of access to the federal \\ncourt.10 That right of access to federal courts in diversity cases, \\nexpressly authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the \\nJudiciary Act of 1789 enacted by the first Congress (now provided by \\n28 U.S.C. § 1332), is a meaningful part of our federal structure. Here, \\nAllstate, the out‐of‐state litigant, removed to federal court and, upon\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}}],"truncated":false,"partial":false},"paginationData":{"pageIndex":14,"numItemsPerPage":100,"numTotalItems":31175,"offset":1400,"length":100}},"jwt":"eyJhbGciOiJFZERTQSJ9.eyJyZWFkIjp0cnVlLCJwZXJtaXNzaW9ucyI6eyJyZXBvLmNvbnRlbnQucmVhZCI6dHJ1ZX0sImlhdCI6MTc3ODc4ODg5Mywic3ViIjoiL2RhdGFzZXRzL2VpdGFucy1wdS9jbC1jb2RpbmctaW5wdXQiLCJleHAiOjE3Nzg3OTI0OTMsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vaHVnZ2luZ2ZhY2UuY28ifQ.Y_qjU29arqSqubQx4Chtv0U817tW3zBnBlCeukc29DQ9M7rdVR-lYC9mEx4gytCdvxp_0Q6H3n74ztaHMUYMCA","displayUrls":true,"splitSizeSummaries":[{"config":"default","split":"train","numRows":31175,"numBytesParquet":1629387251}]},"discussionsStats":{"closed":0,"open":1,"total":1},"fullWidth":true,"hasGatedAccess":true,"hasFullAccess":true,"isEmbedded":false,"savedQueries":{"community":[],"user":[]}}">
id int64 | name string | name_abbreviation string | decision_date string | docket_number string | court string | casebody string | judge1 string | judge2 string | judge3 string | exactly_three_caps int64 | extra_judges string | judge_designations string | opinions_count int64 | majority_count int64 | dissent_count int64 | concurrence_count int64 | other_count int64 | primary_citation string | reporter string | volume null | resource_url string | precedential_status string | 010combined_count int64 | 020lead_count int64 | 030concurrence_count int64 | 035concurrenceinpart_count int64 | 040dissent_count int64 | year int64 | month int64 | messages list |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
7,335,534 | Helen KRUKAS v. AARP, INC. | Krukas v. AARP, Inc. | 2019-03-17 | Civil Action No. 18-1124 (BAH) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7253454/"}]} | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7335534/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||||
7,334,904 | Brian LLOYD v. INGENUITY PREP PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOL | Lloyd v. Ingenuity Prep Pub. Charter Sch. | 2019-03-18 | Case No. 1:18-cv-00801 (TNM-GMH) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "McFadden", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7252824/", "author_raw": ""}]} | MCFADDEN | MCFADDEN | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7334904/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
7,335,386 | Kasim KURD v. REPUBLIC OF TURKEY | Kurd v. Republic of Turk. | 2019-03-18 | Civil Action No. 18-1117 (CKK) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Kollar, Kotelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7253306/", "author_raw": ""}]} | KOLLAR | KOLLAR | KOTELLY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7335386/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
7,335,387 | PERI & SONS FARMS, INC. v. R. Alexander ACOSTA | Peri & Sons Farms, Inc. v. Acosta | 2019-03-18 | Civil Action No. 19-34 (TJK) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Kelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7253307/", "author_raw": ""}]} | KELLY | KELLY | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7335387/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
7,335,964 | IN RE GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION OF POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF 18 U.S.C. § 1956 AND 50 U.S.C. § 1705 | In re Grand Jury Investigation of Possible Violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and 50 U.S.C. § 1705 | 2019-03-18 | Miscellaneous Case Nos. 18-175; 18-176; 18-177 (BAH) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Howell", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7253884/", "author_raw": ""}]} | HOWELL | HOWELL | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7335964/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,601,055 | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee v. Charles Lee SMOOT, Appellant | United States v. Charles Smoot | 2019-03-19 | 18-3007 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Srinivasan, Edwards, Randolph", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge EDWARDS.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\n\n\n\nArgued January 11, 2019 Decided March 19, ... | SRINIVASAN | EDWARDS | RANDOLPH | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4601055/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
7,334,906 | WILDEARTH GUARDIANS v. ZINKE, Western Energy Alliance, Defendant-Intervenors | WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke | 2019-03-19 | Civil Action No.: 16-1724 (RC) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Contreras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7252826/", "author_raw": ""}]} | CONTRERAS | CONTRERAS | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7334906/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
7,334,992 | Abhishek Famanlal RAVAL v. UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES | Raval v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. | 2019-03-20 | Civil Case No. 17-2358 (RJL) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Leon", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7252912/", "author_raw": ""}]} | LEON | LEON | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7334992/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
7,335,389 | Betty CLAYTON v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA | Clayton v. Dist. of Columbia | 2019-03-20 | Civil Action No. 11-1889 (RDM) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Moss", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7253309/", "author_raw": ""}]} | MOSS | MOSS | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7335389/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
7,335,461 | WESTERN SURETY COMPANY v. U.S. ENGINEERING COMPANY | W. Sur. Co. v. U.S. Eng'g Co. | 2019-03-20 | Civil Action No. 15-cv-00327 (TSC) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Chutkan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7253381/", "author_raw": ""}]} | CHUTKAN | CHUTKAN | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7335461/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
7,334,473 | PURSUING AMERICA'S GREATNESS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION | Pursuing America's Greatness v. Fed. Election Comm'n | 2019-03-21 | Civil Action No. 15-cv-1217 (TSC) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Chutkan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7252393/", "author_raw": ""}]} | CHUTKAN | CHUTKAN | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7334473/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
7,335,465 | The GROUNDFISH FORUM v. Wilbur L. ROSS | Groundfish Forum v. Ross | 2019-03-21 | Civil Action No. 16-2495 (TJK) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Kelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7253385/", "author_raw": ""}]} | KELLY | KELLY | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7335465/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,344,434 | JUDGE ROTENBERG EDUCATIONAL CENTER, INC. v. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services | Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin. | 2019-03-21 | Civil Action No. 17-2092 (BAH) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8312871/"}]} | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8344434/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||||
7,334,903 | United States v. $6,999,925.00 OF FUNDS ASSOCIATED WITH VELMUR MANAGEMENT PTE LTD | United States v. $6, 999, 925.00 of Funds Associated With Velmur Mgmt. Pte LTD | 2019-03-22 | Civil Action No.: 17-1705 (RC) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Contreras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7252823/", "author_raw": ""}]} | CONTRERAS | CONTRERAS | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7334903/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
7,335,462 | Mary ERWIN-SIMPSON v. AIRASIA BERHAD | Erwin-Simpson v. AirAsia Berhad | 2019-03-22 | Case No. 18-cv-00083 (CRC) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Cooper", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7253382/", "author_raw": ""}]} | COOPER | COOPER | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7335462/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
7,335,463 | Hazell BROOKS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA | Brooks v. Dist. of Columbia | 2019-03-22 | Case No. 18-cv-0732 (CRC) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Cooper", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7253383/", "author_raw": ""}]} | COOPER | COOPER | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7335463/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
7,335,466 | JUDICIAL WATCH, INC. v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE | Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce | 2019-03-22 | Case No. 17-cv-1283 (EGS) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Sullivan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7253386/", "author_raw": ""}]} | SULLIVAN | SULLIVAN | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7335466/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
7,335,464 | AMERICAN OVERSIGHT v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and Federal Bureau of Investigation | American Oversight v. U.S. Dep't of Justice | 2019-03-25 | Civil Action No. 17-727 (RDM) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7253384/"}]} | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7335464/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||||
7,335,467 | Cai-Yen FIRESTONE v. FEDERAL RETIREMENT THRIFT INVESTMENT BOARD | Firestone v. Fed. Ret. Thrift Inv. Bd. | 2019-03-25 | Civil Action No. 16-1810 (CKK) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Kollar, Kotelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7253387/", "author_raw": ""}]} | KOLLAR | KOLLAR | KOTELLY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7335467/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
7,335,535 | Velma OLU-COLE, Parent and next friend of M.K. v. E.L. HAYNES PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOL | Olu-Cole v. E.L. Haynes Pub. Charter Sch. | 2019-03-25 | Case No. 1:18-cv-00238 (TNM) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "McFadden", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7253455/", "author_raw": ""}]} | MCFADDEN | MCFADDEN | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7335535/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,603,637 | UNITED STATES of America, Appellant v. Jaime Omar VASQUEZ-BENITEZ, Also Known as Guero, Also Known as Alex Antonio Vasquez, Also Known as Jaime Hureo, Also Known as Jerman Vasquez-Mato, Also Known as Julio Israel Vasquez, Also Known as Herman Eduardo Vasquez, Appellee | United States v. Jaime Vasquez-Benitez | 2019-03-26 | 18-3076; C/w 18-3080 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Henderson, Tatel, Ginsburg", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\n\n\n\nArgued February 25, 2019 Decided March 26, 2019\n\n ... | HENDERSON | TATEL | GINSBURG | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4603637/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,603,638 | In RE: Deposition of Matthew A. LEFANDE, Esq., United States, Appellee v. Matthew August LeFande, Appellant | United States v. Lefande (In Re Deposition Lefande) | 2019-03-26 | 18-7031 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Millett, Pillard, Edwards", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge PILLARD", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\n\n\n\nArgued January 15, 2019 Decided March 26, 2019\n\n ... | MILLETT | PILLARD | EDWARDS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4603638/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
7,335,536 | Kimberly SELLERS v. Kirstjen NIELSEN, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security | Sellers v. Nielsen | 2019-03-26 | Civ. Action No: 17-2205 (EGS) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Sullivan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7253456/", "author_raw": ""}]} | SULLIVAN | SULLIVAN | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7335536/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,344,435 | SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA v. Alex M. AZAR, II | Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Azar | 2019-03-26 | Civil Action No.: 18-776 (RC) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8312872/"}]} | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8344435/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||||
7,334,746 | Ronnie Maurice STEWART v. Alex M. AZAR II | Stewart v. Azar | 2019-03-27 | Civil Action No. 18-152 (JEB) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Boasberg", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7252666/", "author_raw": ""}]} | BOASBERG | BOASBERG | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7334746/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
7,334,983 | CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY v. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY | Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency | 2019-03-27 | Civil Action No. 16-175 (BAH) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7252903/"}]} | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7334983/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||||
7,334,985 | Jane DOE 1 v. The GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY | Doe v. George Wash. Univ. | 2019-03-27 | Civil Action No. 18-1391 (RBW) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Walton", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7252905/", "author_raw": ""}]} | WALTON | WALTON | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7334985/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
7,334,986 | Warren HARRIS v. Muriel E. BOWSER | Harris v. Bowser | 2019-03-27 | Civil Action No. 18-cv-768 (CKK) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Kollar, Kotelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7252906/", "author_raw": ""}]} | KOLLAR | KOLLAR | KOTELLY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7334986/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
7,334,987 | Demanne CUTCHIN v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA | Cutchin v. Dist. of Columbia | 2019-03-27 | Civil Action No. 14-0206 (RBW) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Walton", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7252907/", "author_raw": ""}]} | WALTON | WALTON | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7334987/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
7,334,988 | CALIFORNIA CATTLEMEN'S ASSOCIATION v. UNITED STATES FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, and Center for Biological Diversity Defendant-Intervenors. | Cal. Cattlemen's Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. | 2019-03-27 | Case No. 1:17-cv-01536 (TNM) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "McFadden", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7252908/", "author_raw": ""}]} | MCFADDEN | MCFADDEN | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7334988/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
7,334,995 | Lena LASHER v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES | Lasher v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. | 2019-03-27 | Civil Action No. 17-1746 (ABJ) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Jackson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7252915/", "author_raw": ""}]} | NO_JUDGES | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7334995/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||||
8,339,292 | IN RE Sharra Neves CARVALHO, Debtor. Teodora Aureliana Simu v. Sharra Neves Carvalho | Simu v. Carvalho (In re Carvalho) | 2019-03-27 | Bankruptcy Petition No. 15-646; Civil Action No. 18-92 (RBW) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8307623/"}]} | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8339292/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||||
8,344,365 | Charles GRESHAM v. Alex M. AZAR II | Gresham v. Azar | 2019-03-27 | Civil Action No. 18-1900 (JEB) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8312801/"}]} | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8344365/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||||
8,344,389 | CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY v. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY | Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency | 2019-03-27 | Civil Action No. 17-1270 (ABJ) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8312825/"}]} | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8344389/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||||
7,334,475 | State of NEW YORK v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR | New York v. U.S. Dept. Of Labor | 2019-03-28 | Civil Action No. 18-1747 (JDB) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Bates", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7252395/", "author_raw": ""}]} | BATES | BATES | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7334475/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
7,334,989 | MISSOURI COALITION FOR THE ENVIRONMENT v. UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS | Mo. Coal. for the Env't v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs | 2019-03-28 | Civil Action No. 18-663 (TJK) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7252909/"}]} | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7334989/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||||
7,334,996 | Thomas I. GAGE, pro se v. SOMERSET COUNTY | Gage v. Somerset Cnty. | 2019-03-28 | Civil Action No. 18-272 (CKK) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Kollar, Kotelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7252916/", "author_raw": ""}]} | KOLLAR | KOLLAR | KOTELLY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7334996/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
7,334,997 | LaDale RICH v. United States | Rich v. United States | 2019-03-28 | Civil Action No. 17-02328 (TFH) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Hogan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7252917/", "author_raw": ""}]} | HOGAN | HOGAN | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7334997/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,344,442 | Brad BAUMAN v. Edward BUTOWSKY | Bauman v. Butowsky | 2019-03-28 | Civil Case No. 18-01191 (RJL) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8312879/"}]} | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8344442/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||||
7,334,990 | CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY v. Ryan ZINKE, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Interior, and Safari Club International, Defendant-Intervenors | Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke | 2019-03-29 | Case No. 17-cv-2504-RCL | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7252910/"}]} | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7334990/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||||
7,334,998 | Thomas V. SAKIEVICH v. United States | Sakievich v. United States | 2019-03-29 | Civil Action No. 14-1671 (ABJ) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Jackson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7252918/", "author_raw": ""}]} | NO_JUDGES | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7334998/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||||
7,335,074 | M. Gregg BLOCHE and Jonathan H. Marks v. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE | Bloche v. Dep't of Def. | 2019-03-29 | Civil Action No.: 07-2050 (RC) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Contreras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7252994/", "author_raw": ""}]} | CONTRERAS | CONTRERAS | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7335074/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
7,335,075 | PLYMOUTH COUNTY RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION, on Behalf of Itself and All Others Similarly Situated v. ADVISORY BOARD COMPANY | Plymouth Cnty. Ret. Ass'n ex rel. Situated v. Advisory Bd. Co. | 2019-03-29 | Civil Action No.: 17-1940 (RC) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7252995/"}]} | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7335075/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||||
7,335,333 | Aaron Darnell GRANT v. Steven T. MNUCHIN, Secretary, United States Department of Treasury | Grant v. Mnuchin | 2019-03-29 | Civil Action No. 15-1008 (RMC) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Collyer", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7253253/", "author_raw": ""}]} | COLLYER | COLLYER | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7335333/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
7,335,614 | José CONEJO v. AM. FED'N OF GOV'T EMPS., AFL-CIO | Conejo v. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps. | 2019-03-29 | Civil No. 17-CV-1802 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Lamberth", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7253534/", "author_raw": ""}]} | LAMBERTH | LAMBERTH | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7335614/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
7,335,708 | Gary ANTHONY v. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS DISTRICT LODGE 1 | Anthony v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers Dist. Lodge 1 | 2019-03-29 | Civil Action No. 17-1249 (ABJ) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Jackson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7253628/", "author_raw": ""}]} | NO_JUDGES | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7335708/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||||
7,335,883 | EXELON GENERATION CO., LLC v. Benjamin H. GRUMBLES | Exelon Generation Co. v. Grumbles | 2019-03-29 | Civil Action No. 18-1224 (RMC) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Collyer", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7253803/", "author_raw": ""}]} | COLLYER | COLLYER | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7335883/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
7,335,884 | Jason LEOPOLD v. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY | Leopold v. Cent. Intelligence Agency | 2019-03-29 | Civil Action No.: 17-2176 (RC) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Contreras, Introduction", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7253804/", "author_raw": ""}]} | CONTRERAS | CONTRERAS | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7335884/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
7,335,885 | CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHICS IN WASHINGTON and Noah Bookbinder v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION | Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Federal Election Commission | 2019-03-29 | Civil Action No.: 18-76 (RC) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Contreras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7253805/", "author_raw": ""}]} | CONTRERAS | CONTRERAS | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7335885/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
7,335,385 | CONTINENTAL RESOURCES, INC. v. Gregory J. GOULD, Director, Office of Natural Resources Revenue, United States Department of Interior | Cont'l Res., Inc. v. Gould | 2019-03-30 | Civil Action No. 14-65 (RDM) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Moss", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7253305/", "author_raw": ""}]} | MOSS | MOSS | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7335385/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
7,335,886 | AMERICAN OVERSIGHT v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES | American Oversigh v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. | 2019-03-30 | Civil Action No. 17-1448 (ABJ) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Jackson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7253806/", "author_raw": ""}]} | NO_JUDGES | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7335886/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||||
7,335,887 | REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN v. Anatolie STATI | Republic of Kaz. v. Stati | 2019-03-30 | Civil Action No. 17-2067 (ABJ) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Jackson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7253807/", "author_raw": ""}]} | NO_JUDGES | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7335887/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||||
7,335,962 | POTOMAC RIVERKEEPER, INC. v. Andrew WHEELER, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency | Potomac Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Wheeler | 2019-03-31 | No. 17-cv-1023 (DLF) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Friedrich", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7253882/", "author_raw": ""}]} | FRIEDRICH | FRIEDRICH | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7335962/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
7,335,965 | LEVEL THE PLAYING FIELD v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION | Level the Playing Field v. Federal Election Commission | 2019-03-31 | Case No. 15-cv-1397 (TSC) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/7253885/"}]} | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/7335965/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||||
4,595,521 | Kevin SHARPE, Petitioner v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondent | Sharpe v. Dep't of Justice | 2019-03-01 | 2017-2356 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit | {"judges": "Moore, Taranto, Chen", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MOORE, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n for the Federal Circuit\n ______________________\n\n KEVIN SHARPE,\n Petitioner\n\n ... | MOORE | TARANTO | CHEN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4595521/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,596,451 | WEISHAN HONGDA AQUATIC FOOD CO., LTD., Plaintiff China Kingdom (Beijing) Import & Export Co., Ltd., Shanghai Ocean Flavor International Trading Co., Ltd., Deyan Aquatic Products and Food Co., Ltd., Plaintiffs-Appellants v. UNITED STATES, Crawfish Processors Alliance, Defendants-Appellees | Weishan Hongda Aquatic Food Co. v. United States | 2019-03-05 | 2018-1375 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit | {"judges": "Dyk, Wallach, Chen", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "WALLACH, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n for the Federal Circuit\n ______________________\n\n WEISHAN HONGDA AQUATIC FOOD CO., LTD.,\n Plaintiff\n\nCHINA KINGDOM (... | DYK | WALLACH | CHEN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4596451/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,597,631 | Charles H. JAMES, Claimant-Appellant v. Robert WILKIE, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee | James v. Wilkie | 2019-03-07 | 2018-1264 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit | {"judges": "Wallach, Linn, Hughes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "WALLACH, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n for the Federal Circuit\n ______________________\n\n CHARLES H. JAMES,\n Claimant-Appellant\n\n ... | WALLACH | LINN | HUGHES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597631/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,598,028 | PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, Appellant v. APPLE, INC., Appellee | Personal Web Technologies, LLC v. Apple, Inc. | 2019-03-08 | 2018-1599 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit | {"judges": "Moore, Taranto, Chen", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "CHEN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n for the Federal Circuit\n ______________________\n\n PERSONAL WEB TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,\n Appellant\n\n ... | MOORE | TARANTO | CHEN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4598028/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,598,709 | CANADIAN SOLAR, INC., Changzhou Trina Solar Energy Co., Ltd., Hefei JA Solar Technology Co., Ltd., Shanghai JA Solar Technology Co., Ltd., Yingli Green Energy Holding Company Limited, Yingli Green Energy Americas, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants Shanghai BYD Co., Ltd., BYD (Shangluo) Industrial Co., Ltd., China Sunergy (Na... | Canadian Solar, Inc. v. United States | 2019-03-12 | 2017-2577 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit | {"judges": "Newman, O'Malley, Chen", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "O'MALLEY, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n for the Federal Circuit\n ______________________\n\n CANADIAN SOLAR, INC., CHANGZHOU TRINA\n SOLAR ENERGY CO., LTD., HEFEI JA SOLAR\nTECH... | NEWMAN | O'MALLEY | CHEN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4598709/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,599,133 | Jacqueline H. JONES, Claimant-Appellant v. Robert WILKIE, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee | Jones v. Wilkie | 2019-03-13 | 2017-2120 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit | {"judges": "Moore, Reyna, Chen", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "CHEN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n for the Federal Circuit\n ______________________\n\n JACQUELINE H. JONES,\n Claimant-Appellant\n\n ... | MOORE | REYNA | CHEN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4599133/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,599,782 | FOREST LABORATORIES, LLC, Fka Forest Laboratories, Inc., Forest Laboratories Holdings Ltd., Plaintiffs-Cross-Appellants v. SIGMAPHARM LABORATORIES, LLC, Defendant-Appellee Hikma Pharmaceuticals LLC, Hikma Pharmaceuticals PLC, Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., Fka West-Ward Pharmaceuticals Corp., Breckenridge Pharmaceutic... | Forest Laboratories, LLC v. Sigmapharm Laboratories, LLC | 2019-03-14 | 2017-2369; 2017-2370; 2017-2372; 2017-2373; 2017-2374; 2017-2375; 2017-2376; 2017-2389; 2017-2412; 2017-2436; 2017-2438; 2017-2440; 2017-2441 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit | {"judges": "Prost, Dyk, Moore", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MOORE, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n for the Federal Circuit\n ______________________\n\n FOREST LABORATORIES, LLC, FKA FOREST\nLABORATORIES, INC., FOREST LABORATORIES\n ... | PROST | DYK | MOORE | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4599782/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,600,243 | Teresa A. RUEL, Claimant-Appellant v. Robert WILKIE, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee | Ruel v. Wilkie | 2019-03-15 | 2017-2562 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit | {"judges": "Moore, Reyna, Chen", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "CHEN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n for the Federal Circuit\n ______________________\n\n TERESA A. RUEL,\n Claimant-Appellant\n\n ... | MOORE | REYNA | CHEN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4600243/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,600,244 | NATURAL ALTERNATIVES INTERNATIONAL, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant v. CREATIVE COMPOUNDS, LLC, Defendant-Appellee Does 1-100, Core Supplement Technologies, Inc., Honey Badger, LLC, Myopharma, Inc., Defendants | Natural Alternatives Int'l, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC | 2019-03-15 | 2018-1295 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit | {"judges": "Moore, Reyna, Wallach", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MOORE, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n for the Federal Circuit\n ______________________\n\n NATURAL ALTERNATIVES INTERNATIONAL,\n INC.,\n Plai... | MOORE | REYNA | WALLACH | 1 | {} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4600244/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,600,853 | SHENYANG YUANDA ALUMINUM INDUSTRY ENGINEERING CO., LTD., Yuanda USA Corp., Plaintiffs Jangho Curtain Wall Americas Co. Ltd., Permasteelisa North America Corp., Permasteelisa South China Factory, Permasteelisa Hong Kong Limited, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. UNITED STATES, Architectural Glass & Aluminum Company, Walters & Wo... | Shenyang Yuanda Aluminum Indus. Eng'g Co. v. United States | 2019-03-18 | 2018-1553, 2018-1554 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit | {"judges": "Prost, Newman, Taranto", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "TARANTO, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n for the Federal Circuit\n ______________________\n\n SHENYANG YUANDA ALUMINUM INDUSTRY\n ENGINEERING CO., LTD., YUANDA USA CORP.,\n... | PROST | NEWMAN | TARANTO | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4600853/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,601,483 | SRI INTERNATIONAL, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee v. CISCO SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant-Appellant | Sri International, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc. | 2019-03-20 | 2017-2223 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit | {"judges": "Lourie, O'Malley, Stoll", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9824718/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/op... | LOURIE | O'MALLEY | STOLL | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4601483/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,444,040 | SRI INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. | Sri Int'l, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc. | 2019-03-20 | 2017-2223 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit | {"judges": "Lourie, Malley, Stoll", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415477/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opin... | LOURIE | MALLEY | STOLL | 1 | {} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8444040/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,603,640 | ARCTIC CAT INC., Appellant v. GEP POWER PRODUCTS, INC., Appellee | Arctic Cat Inc. v. Gep Power Products, Inc. | 2019-03-26 | 2018-1520; 2018-1521 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit | {"judges": "Prost, Reyna, Taranto", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "TARANTO, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n for the Federal Circuit\n ______________________\n\n ARCTIC CAT INC.,\n Appellant\n\n ... | PROST | REYNA | TARANTO | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4603640/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,604,606 | GRUNENTHAL GMBH, Assertio Therapeutics, Inc., Plaintiffs-Cross-Appellants v. ALKEM LABORATORIES LIMITED, Hikma Pharmaceuticals International Limited, Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., Defendants-Appellants Actavis Elizabeth LLC, Defendant-Appellee Actavis Laboratories UT, Inc., Defendant | Grunenthal Gmbh v. Alkem Laboratories Limited | 2019-03-28 | 2017-1153; 2017-2048; 2017-2049; 2017-2050 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit | {"judges": "Reyna, Taranto, Chen", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "REYNA, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n for the Federal Circuit\n ______________________\n\n GRUNENTHAL GMBH, ASSERTIO\n THERAPEUTICS, INC.,\n Pl... | REYNA | TARANTO | CHEN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4604606/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,604,609 | ENDO PHARMACEUTICALS INC., Plaintiff-Appellant Mallinckrodt LLC, Plaintiff v. TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC., Barr Laboratories, Inc., Actavis LLC, Fka Actavis Inc., Actavis South Atlantic LLC, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Defendants-Appellees Actavis Pharma, Inc., Actavis Elizabeth LLC, Actavis Holdco U.S., Inc., D... | Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. | 2019-03-28 | 2017-1240; 2017-1455; 2017-1887 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit | {"judges": "Wallach, Clevenger, Stoll", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STOLL, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n for the Federal Circuit\n ______________________\n\n ENDO PHARMACEUTICALS INC.,\n Plaintiff-Appellant\n\n ... | WALLACH | CLEVENGER | STOLL | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4604609/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,604,610 | CHARGEPOINT, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant v. SEMACONNECT, INC., Defendant-Appellee | Chargepoint, Inc. v. Semaconnect, Inc. | 2019-03-28 | 2018-1739 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit | {"judges": "Prost, Reyna, Taranto", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PROST, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n for the Federal Circuit\n ______________________\n\n CHARGEPOINT, INC.,\n Plaintiff-Appellant\n\n ... | PROST | REYNA | TARANTO | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4604610/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,605,148 | TEK GLOBAL, S.R.L., TEK Corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. SEALANT SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL, INC., ITW Global Tire Repair, Defendants-Appellants | Tek Global, S.R.L., Tek Corp. v. Sealant Sys. Int'l, Inc. | 2019-03-29 | 2017-2507 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit | {"judges": "Prost, Dyk, Wallach", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PROST, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n for the Federal Circuit\n ______________________\n\n TEK GLOBAL, S.R.L., TEK CORPORATION,\n Plaintiffs-Appellees\n\n ... | PROST | DYK | WALLACH | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605148/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,605,149 | Shenyang Yuanda Aluminum v. United States | 2019-03-29 | 18-1553 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit | {"judges": "", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n for the Federal Circuit\n ______________________\n\n March 29, 2019\n\n ERRATA\n ______________________\n\n ... | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605149/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||||||
4,605,150 | AFGE LOCAL 3599, Petitioner v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Respondent | Afge Local 3599 v. E.E.O.C. | 2019-03-29 | 2018-1888 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit | {"judges": "Taranto, Bryson, Stoll", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRYSON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n for the Federal Circuit\n ______________________\n\n AFGE LOCAL 3599,\n Petitioner\n\n ... | TARANTO | BRYSON | STOLL | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605150/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,606,650 | UNITED STATES, Appellant, v. Noor MOHAMED, Defendant, Appellee. | United States v. Mohamed | 2019-04-03 | 18-1498P | U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": "Lynch, Stahl, Barron", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888308/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opini... | LYNCH | STAHL | BARRON | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606650/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,606,651 | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Rusty HOOD, Defendant, Appellant. | United States v. Hood | 2019-04-03 | 18-1407P | U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": "Barron, Souter, Selya", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRON, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\n\nNo. 18-1407\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n Appellee,\n... | BARRON | SOUTER | SELYA | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606651/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,606,652 | United States v. Gonzalez-Calderon | 2019-04-03 | 17-1519P | U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": "Before Thompson, Circuit Judge, Souter,* Associate Justice, and Lipez, Circuit Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "LIPEZ, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\n\nNo. 17-1519\n\n UNITED STATE... | THOMPSON | SOUTER | LIPEZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606652/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,606,653 | STARR SURPLUS LINES INSURANCE COMPANY, as Subrogee to AdvancePierre Foods, Inc., Plaintiff, Appellant, v. MOUNTAIRE FARMS INC., Defendant, Appellee. | Starr Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Mountaire Farms Inc. | 2019-04-03 | 18-1818P | U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": "Lynch, Stahl, Barron", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRON, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\n\n\nNo. 18-1818\n\n STARR SURPLUS LINES INSURANCE COMPANY, as Subrogee to\n ADVANCEPIERR... | LYNCH | STAHL | BARRON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606653/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,619,567 | United States v. Xavier GONZÁLEZ-CALDERÓN | United States v. GonzáLez-CalderóN | 2019-04-03 | No. 17-1519 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": "Lipez", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8598817/", "author_raw": ""}]} | LIPEZ | LIPEZ | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8619567/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,607,449 | UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Kenny O. PACHECO, Defendant, Appellant. | United States v. Pacheco | 2019-04-05 | 16-1690P | U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": "Kayatta, Souter, Selya", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "the judge detailed the scope of Pacheco's waiver", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\n\nNo. 16-1690\n\n UNITED STATES,\n\n ... | KAYATTA | SOUTER | SELYA | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607449/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,607,450 | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Seth J. BLEWITT, Defendant, Appellant. | United States v. Blewitt | 2019-04-05 | 18-1356P | U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": "Lynch, Selya, Boudin", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SELYA, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\n\n\nNo. 18-1356\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n Appellee,... | LYNCH | SELYA | BOUDIN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607450/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,607,927 | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. José Mercedes LEON, Defendant, Appellant. | United States v. Mercedes Leon | 2019-04-08 | 18-1600P | U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": "Lynch, Selya, Boudin", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BOUDIN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\n\n\nNo. 18-1600\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n Appellee,\n\n ... | LYNCH | SELYA | BOUDIN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607927/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,607,928 | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jonathan GONZÁLEZ-BARBOSA, Defendant, Appellant. | United States v. Gonzalez-Barbosa | 2019-04-08 | 17-1688P | U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": "Howard, Lipez, Barron", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "HOWARD, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\n\n\nNo. 17-1688\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n Appellee,\n\n... | HOWARD | LIPEZ | BARRON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607928/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,610,635 | UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Fabian VILORIA-SEPULVEDA, A/K/A Fabian Vilora-Sepúlveda, Defendant, Appellant. | United States v. Viloria-Sepulveda | 2019-04-16 | 18-1152P | U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": "Howard, Lynch, Lipez", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "LYNCH, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\n\nNo. 18-1152\n\n UNITED STATES,\n\n Appellee,\n\n ... | HOWARD | LYNCH | LIPEZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610635/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,610,945 | AER ADVISORS, INC.; William J. Deutsch ; Peter E. Deutsch, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. FIDELITY BROKERAGE SERVICES, LLC, Defendant, Appellee. | AER Advisors Inc. v. Fidelity Brokerage Svcs., LLC | 2019-04-17 | 18-1884P | U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": "Thompson, Souter, Lipez", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "THOMPSON, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\n\n\nNo. 18-1884\n\n AER ADVISORS, INC.; WILLIAM J. DEUTSCH; PETER E. DEUTSCH,\n\n ... | THOMPSON | SOUTER | LIPEZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610945/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,611,940 | UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Juan Jose TULL-ABREU, Defendant, Appellant. | United States v. Tull-Abreu | 2019-04-19 | 17-1364P | U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": "Lynch, Lipez, Barron", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "LYNCH, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\n\n\nNo. 17-1364\n\n UNITED STATES,\n\n Appellee,\n\n ... | LYNCH | LIPEZ | BARRON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4611940/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,611,941 | UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Ernesto ORTIZ-ÁLVAREZ, Defendant, Appellant. | United States v. Ortiz-Alvarez | 2019-04-19 | 18-1452P | U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": "Torruella, Lynch, Thompson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "LYNCH, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\n\nNo. 18-1452\n\n UNITED STATES,\n\n Appellee,\n\n ... | TORRUELLA | LYNCH | THOMPSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4611941/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,611,942 | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. David MOREL, Jr., Defendant, Appellant. | United States v. Morel | 2019-04-19 | 17-1696P | U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": "Lynch, Lipez, Barron", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "LYNCH, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\n\n\nNo. 17-1696\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n Appellee,... | LYNCH | LIPEZ | BARRON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4611942/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,611,943 | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Alex COLÓN-ROSARIO, Defendant, Appellant. | United States v. Colon-Rosario | 2019-04-19 | 17-2122P | U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": "Kayatta, Souter, Selya", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SELYA, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\nNo. 17-2122\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n Appellee,\n\n ... | KAYATTA | SOUTER | SELYA | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4611943/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,613,231 | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Vincent ANZALONE, Defendant, Appellant. | United States v. Anzalone | 2019-04-24 | 17-1454P | U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": "Torruella, Selya, Barron", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\n\n\nNo. 17-1454\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n App... | TORRUELLA | SELYA | BARRON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613231/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,613,232 | Frank STAPLES, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Richard GERRY, Warden, New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, William Wrenn, Commissioner of the New Hampshire Department of Corrections, Defendant, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Jeffrey Brown, New Hampshire Parole... | Staples v. Gerry | 2019-04-24 | 18-1727P | U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": "Lynch, Thompson, Barron", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRON, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\n\n\nNo. 18-1727\n\n FRANK STAPLES,\n\n Plaintiff, Appellant,\n... | LYNCH | THOMPSON | BARRON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613232/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,613,233 | In RE: Edgar A. REYES-COLON, Involuntary Debtor. Popular Auto, Inc.; Banco Popular De Puerto Rico, Appellees, Cross-Appellants, v. Edgar A. Reyes-Colon, Appellant, Cross-Appellee. | Popular Auto, Inc. v. Reyes-Colon (In Re Reyes-Colon) | 2019-04-24 | 17-1971P | U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": "Howard, Thompson, Kayatta", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "KAYATTA, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\n\n\nNos. 17-1971, 17-1972\n\n IN RE: EDGAR A. REYES-COLON,\n\n ... | HOWARD | THOMPSON | KAYATTA | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613233/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,614,217 | David Seth WORMAN; Anthony Linden; Jason William Sawyer; Paul Nelson Chamberlain; Gun Owners' Action League, Inc. ; On Target Training, Inc.; Overwatch Outpost, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Maura T. HEALEY, in Her Official Capacity as Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; Daniel Bennett, in His Official ... | Worman v. Healey | 2019-04-26 | 18-1545P | U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": "Barron, Souter, Selya", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SELYA, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\n\n\nNo. 18-1545\n\n DAVID SETH WORMAN; ANTHONY LINDEN; JASON WILLIAM SAWYER; PAUL\n NELSON CHAMBERLAIN; GUN OWN... | BARRON | SOUTER | SELYA | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614217/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,614,218 | Mayra F. PENA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant, Appellee. | Pena v. Honeywell International, Inc. | 2019-04-26 | 18-1164P | U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": "Lynch, Stahl, Lipez", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888419/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "035concurrenceinpart", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest... | LYNCH | STAHL | LIPEZ | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614218/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,614,219 | Adolfo FRANCO-ARDON, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. | Franco-Ardon v. Barr | 2019-04-26 | 18-1522P | U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": "Lynch, Thompson, Barron", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRON, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\n\nNo. 18-1522\n\n ADOLFO FRANCO-ARDON,\n\n Petitioner,\n\n... | LYNCH | THOMPSON | BARRON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614219/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,614,579 | Daniel GRAJALES; Wanda I. González; Conjugal Partnership Grajales-González, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. PUERTO RICO PORTS AUTHORITY, Defendant, Appellee. | Grajales v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority | 2019-04-29 | 18-1424P | U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": "Howard, Thompson, Barron", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRON, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\n\n\nNo. 18-1424\n\n DANIEL GRAJALES; WANDA I. GONZÁLEZ;\n CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP G... | HOWARD | THOMPSON | BARRON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614579/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,615,151 | Brenda SMITH Plaintiff, Appellee, v. AROOSTOOK COUNTY; Shawn D. Gillen, in His Official Capacity as Sheriff of Aroostook County Defendants, Appellants. | Smith v. Aroostook County | 2019-04-30 | 19-1340P | U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": "Howard, Lynch, Kayatta", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the First Circuit\n\nNo. 19-1340\n\n BRENDA SMITH\n\n Plaintiff, Appellee,\n\n ... | HOWARD | LYNCH | KAYATTA | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4615151/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,605,630 | United States v. Lyle & Van Praagh | 2019-04-01 | 15-958-cr(L) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": "Before: RAGGI, CHIN, AND LOHIER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "CHIN, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "15‐958‐cr(L) \nUnited States v. Lyle & Van Praagh \n \n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS \n ... | RAGGI | CHIN | LOHIER | 1 | {"RAGGI": ", Circuit", "CHIN": ", Circuit", "LOHIER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605630/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,605,631 | FIH, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FOUNDATION CAPITAL PARTNERS LLC, Fka Foundation Managing Member LLC, Dean Barr, Joseph Meehan, Thomas Ward, Joseph Elmlinger, Defendants-Appellees | FIH, LLC v. Foundation Capital Partners, LLC. | 2019-04-01 | Docket 18-357-cv; August Term, 2018 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": "Jacobs, Lynch, Vilardo", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "18-357-cv\nFIH, LLC v. Foundation Capital Partners, LLC.\n\n\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SECOND ... | JACOBS | LYNCH | VILARDO | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605631/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,443,943 | United States v. James LYLE, aka Sealed 3, Michael Van Praagh, aka Sealed 1, Anthony Tarantino, aka Sealed 2 | United States v. Lyle | 2019-04-01 | Docket Nos. 15-958-cr(L); 15-1175-cr(CON); August Term 2016 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": "Chin, Lohier, Raggi", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415374/", "author_raw": ""}]} | CHIN | LOHIER | RAGGI | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443943/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,605,877 | Valls v. Allstate Ins. Co. | 2019-04-02 | 17-3495-cv | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": "Before: LEVAL, CABRANES, PARKER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"type": "010combined", "text": "17‐3495‐cv \nValls v. Allstate Ins. Co.\n\n\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n for the Second Circuit\n... | LEVAL | CABRANES | PARKER | 1 | {"LEVAL": ", Circuit", "CABRANES": ", Circuit", "PARKER": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605877/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.